# Brexit domino?
# The political contagion effects of voter-endorsed disintegration withdrawals from international institutions

Stefanie Walter
University of Zurich
walter@ipz.uzh.ch

# Online Appendix

**Abstract**

This article examines the systemic implications of the growing popular backlash against international cooperation and analyzes how voter-endorsed attempts to withdraw from international institutions reverberate abroad. Observing other countries' disintegration experiences allows voters to better assess the feasibility and desirability of such withdrawals. More positive withdrawal experiences encourage exit-support abroad, whereas negative experiences are likely to have a deterring effect. These contagion effects will be conditioned by the availability of information and voters' willingness to learn. The article empirically examines this argument for the case of Brexit. It leverages original survey data 58,959 EU-27 Europeans collected in six survey waves during the Brexit withdrawal negotiations and from a two-wave survey of 2,241 Swiss voters conducted around the first Brexit extension in spring 2019. It finds both encouragement and deterrence effects, which are bigger when respondents pay attention to Brexit and are dampened by motivated reasoning.

**Information about the EU-27 survey**

The analysis of EU-27 public opinion is based on data collected through a cross-sectional tracking survey on respondents across the EU that asked a set of eight identical questions plus two variable questions over the entire project period every six months between July 2018 and December 2020. The questions were placed on Dalia Research's Europulse omnibus survey (https://daliaresearch.com/europulse/). This is a regularly conducted online survey of a census representative sample of approximately 10.000 working-age Europeans from all EU member states. All participants are volunteers for social science research and over the age of 18, i.e. in full capacity to give informed consent. Dalia follows an open recruitment approach that lets respondents opt-in voluntarily and leverages the reach of third-party apps and mobile websites. The surveys do not require respondents to become members of a research panel, thereby allowing both first-time and regular survey-takers to participate. For all recruited participants, participation is strictly voluntary, they can exit the survey at any point and they can refuse to answer questions at any time.

Respondents are drawn across all 28 EU Member States, with sample sizes roughly proportional to their population size (see table A1 below; UK respondents were excluded for the analysis). In order to obtain census representative results, the data are weighted based upon the most recent Eurostat statistics. The target weighting variables are age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED (2011) levels 0-2, 3-4, and 5-8), and degree of urbanization (rural and urban).

This omnibus has been used by other researchers (see e.g., Karstens 2019; De Vries 2017, 2018, 2019). De Vries (2018: 66 (footnote 6)) notes that the demographical background of EuroPulse survey respondents shows very little difference from nationally representative surveys. Additional analysis (see online appendix) show that average country-level EU support in the November 2018 Eurobarometer and the December 2018 EuroPulse survey are correlated, especially for countries with a sample size larger than 300. While the EuroPulse also contains data for the UK, these are omitted in my analyses.

The tracking questions asked respondents about their expectations regarding the effects of Brexit, their preferred EU negotiation strategy, and various questions about their support for the EU, including how they would vote in an EU membership referendum in their own country.

**Table A1: Sample sizes by country**

| country | July 17 | Dec 17 | June 18 | Dec 18 | July 19 | Dec 19 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AT** | 166 | 173 | 182 | 197 | 180 | 197 | 1,095 |
| **BE** | 236 | 226 | 219 | 235 | 231 | 984 | 2,131 |
| **BG** | 154 | 156 | 148 | 149 | 152 | 159 | 918 |
| **CY** | 23 | 17 | 16 | 18 | 21 | 21 | 116 |
| **CZ** | 200 | 204 | 199 | 274 | 224 | 241 | 1,342 |
| **DE** | 1,551 | 1,477 | 1,536 | 1,740 | 1,769 | 1,734 | 9,807 |
| **DK** | 115 | 105 | 136 | 111 | 119 | 124 | 710 |
| **EE** | 24 | 24 | 29 | 26 | 30 | 32 | 165 |
| **ES** | 1,048 | 1,067 | 994 | 1,060 | 1,163 | 1,047 | 6,379 |
| **FI** | 112 | 112 | 107 | 106 | 111 | 116 | 664 |
| **FR** | 1,184 | 1,324 | 1,206 | 1,292 | 1,270 | 1,354 | 7,630 |
| **GR** | 233 | 212 | 218 | 216 | 224 | 228 | 1,331 |
| **HR** | 81 | 79 | 81 | 88 | 89 | 99 | 517 |
| **HU** | 193 | 199 | 200 | 196 | 210 | 224 | 1,222 |
| **IE** | 98 | 82 | 74 | 98 | 99 | 106 | 557 |
| **IT** | 1,203 | 1,246 | 1,184 | 1,231 | 1,309 | 1,277 | 7,450 |
| **LT** | 55 | 62 | 50 | 53 | 58 | 59 | 337 |
| **LU** | 12 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 12 | 16 | 83 |
| **LV** | 36 | 38 | 41 | 39 | 41 | 41 | 236 |
| **MT** | 12 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 13 | 15 | 69 |
| **NL** | 319 | 324 | 317 | 994 | 1,088 | 1,021 | 4,063 |
| **PL** | 980 | 992 | 1,018 | 1,059 | 1,114 | 1,091 | 6,254 |
| **PT** | 215 | 218 | 186 | 235 | 209 | 223 | 1,286 |
| **RO** | 381 | 405 | 385 | 404 | 418 | 438 | 2,431 |
| **SE** | 187 | 191 | 191 | 194 | 197 | 220 | 1,180 |
| **SI** | 47 | 44 | 36 | 47 | 45 | 48 | 267 |
| **SK** | 113 | 121 | 116 | 126 | 118 | 125 | 719 |
| **Total** | 8,978 | 9,119 | 8,895 | 10,213 | 10,514 | 11,240 | 58,959 |

**Table A2: Distribution of key variables**

**Table A2a: Evaluations of Brexit effect on UK**

*Five years from now on, do you think Brexit will make the UK…*

| | All respondents |
|---|---|
| much worse off | 10.5% |
| somewhat worse off | 26.6% |
| neither better nor worse off | 25.6% |
| somewhat better off | 16.1% |
| much better off | 8.7% |
| Don't know/NA | 12.5% |
| N | 58,956 |

Note: Weighted data

**Table A2b: Support for EU-exit in hypothetical EU referendum**

*If [YOUR COUNTRY] were to hold a referendum on leaving the EU today, how would you vote?"*

| | All respondents |
|---|---|
| Definitetely leave | 10.8% |
| Probably leave | 13.4% |
| Probably remain | 25.1% |
| Definitetely remain | 40.2% |
| Don't know/NA | 10.5% |
| N | 58,957 |

Note: Weighted data

**Table A3: Descriptive Statistics**

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brexit effect on UK | 52,169 | 2.807 | 1.158 | 1 | 5 |
| Brexit effect on UK (dummy) | 52,169 | 0.452 | 0.289 | 0 | 1 |
| Support for EU-exit | 58,959 | 0.233 | 0.423 | 0 | 1 |
| Leaver (dummy) | 58,959 | 1.010 | 0.014 | 1 | 1.037 |
| GBP exchange rate relative to July 2017 | 53,125 | 3.088 | 1.030 | 1 | 4 |
| Attention paid to Brexit | 58,959 | 1.812 | 0.853 | 0 | 3 |
| Opinion of EU | 58,957 | 3.343 | 1.123 | 1 | 5 |
| Preferred future path for EU | 58,957 | 1.816 | 1.152 | 0 | 3 |
| Age | 58,959 | 40.420 | 13.229 | 18 | 69 |
| Education | 57,679 | 3.157 | 0.780 | 1 | 5 |
| Female | 58,959 | 0.492 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Rural | 58,959 | 0.271 | 0.445 | 0 | 1 |

**Table A4: Robustness of Figure 1 to controlling for sociodemographics**

| | (1)<br>Brexit evaluation | (2)<br>Leaver |
|---|---|---|
| Dec 17 | -0.003*** | 0.020*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Jun 18 | 0.004*** | 0.013*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Dec 18 | -0.015*** | -0.013*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Jun 19 | -0.044*** | -0.050*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Dec 19 | -0.045*** | -0.036*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Age | -0.001*** | 0.002*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Education | -0.045*** | -0.042*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | 0.008* | -0.026*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Rural | 0.003 | 0.022*** |
| | (0.00) | (0.01) |
| _Constant | 0.674*** | 0.304*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| N | 51225 | 57679 |
| Log likelihood | -7518.4 | -31400.0 |
| AIC | 15048.9 | 62871.6 |

**Table A5: Brexit evaluations and support for EU-exit in the EU-27: Estimating Table 1, model 3 without controlling for euroskepticism**

| Dependent variable: | **EU-exit support** |
|---|---|
| GBP exchange rate | 1.473** |
| | (0.61) |
| Attention paid to Brexit | -0.107*** |
| | (0.01) |
| UK much worse off | -0.529*** |
| | (0.02) |
| UK somewhat worse off | -0.469*** |
| | (0.01) |
| UK somewhat better off | 0.484*** |
| | (0.02) |
| UK much better off | 1.085*** |
| | (0.03) |
| age | 0.006*** |
| | (0.00) |
| education | -0.065*** |
| | (0.00) |
| female | -0.011* |
| | (0.01) |
| rural | 0.053*** |
| | (0.02) |
| Constant | 0.559 |
| | (0.62) |
| N | 48126 |
| Log likelihood | -60200 |
| AIC | 120000 |
| Wave-level variance | 0.000 |
| Country-level variance | 0.037 |
| Individual-level variance | 0.754 |

**Table A6: Motivated reasoning: Results underlying Figure 3**

| Dependent variable: | **Support for EU-exit** |
|---|---|
| GBP exchange rate | 1.724*** |
| | (0.60) |
| UK much worse off | -0.466*** |
| | (0.04) |
| UK somewhat worse off | -0.403*** |
| | (0.04) |
| UK somewhat better off | 0.240*** |
| | (0.03) |
| UK much better off | 0.486*** |
| | (0.06) |
| EU very negative | 1.217*** |
| | (0.04) |
| EU somewhat negative | 0.580*** |
| | (0.03) |
| EU somewhat positive | -0.536*** |
| | (0.03) |
| EU very positive | -0.832*** |
| | (0.04) |
| much worse off * very negative | 0.357*** |
| | (0.09) |
| much worse off * somewhat negative | -0.002 |
| | (0.04) |
| much worse off * somewhat positive | 0.081* |
| | (0.05) |
| much worse off * very positive | 0.292*** |
| | (0.06) |
| somewhat worse off * very negative | 0.321*** |
| | (0.06) |
| somewhat worse off * somewhat negative | 0.014 |
| | (0.05) |
| somewhat worse off * somewhat positive | 0.132** |
| | (0.05) |
| somewhat worse off * very positive | 0.245*** |
| | (0.05) |
| somewhat better off * very negative | -0.004 |
| | (0.04) |
| somewhat better off * somewhat negative | 0.069* |

| | |
|---|---|
| | (0.04) |
| somewhat better off * somewhat positive | -0.067 |
| | (0.05) |
| somewhat better off * very positive | -0.064 |
| | (0.04) |
| much better off * very negative | -0.046 |
| | (0.06) |
| much better off * somewhat negative | 0.141*** |
| | (0.03) |
| much better off * somewhat positive | -0.203*** |
| | (0.06) |
| much better off * very positive | -0.360*** |
| | (0.09) |
| Attention paid to Brexit | -0.037*** |
| | (0.01) |
| EU reform: more powers to EU | -0.082*** |
| | (0.01) |
| EU reform: Maintain status quo | -0.065*** |
| | (0.01) |
| EU reform: return EU powers | 0.059*** |
| | (0.02) |
| Age in years | 0.001*** |
| | (0.00) |
| education | -0.040*** |
| | (0.00) |
| female | -0.004 |
| | (0.01) |
| rural | 0.028*** |
| | (0.01) |
| Constant | 0.552 |
| | (0.60) |
| N | 48124 |
| Log likelihood | -47700 |
| AIC | 95478 |
| Wave-level variance | 0.0002 |
| Country-level variance | 0.0094 |
| Individual-level variance | 0.4446 |

**Information about Swiss survey**

The analysis of Swiss public opinion is based on original data collected in two-wave rolling cross-section survey. The survey was designed to cover the critical phase around the UK's original withdrawal date on March 29, 2019, which proved to be two of the most chaotic weeks of the Brexit negotiations. As the end of British EU membership drew nearer and was increasingly likely to end with a chaotic No-Deal-Brexit on March 29, 2019, Brexit made front-page news across Europe. The "Brexit chaos" that unfolded in the weeks surrounding March 29 put the trade-offs and difficulties associated with leaving the EU into the spotlight.

Data were collected in two cross-sectional survey waves before and after the events surrounding the UK's first and failed attempt to leave the EU on 29 March 2019 and the first Brexit extension in early April 2019. The first wave of 1622 respondents was surveyed between March 13-28 2019.

After a two-week break during which British and UK policymakers struggled to find a viable way out of the Brexit impasse and during which a chaotic "no-deal-Brexit" had become a distinct possibility, the EU extended the Brexit deadline to 31 October 2019. Immediately after this decision, a second wave of 836 respondents was surveyed (fieldwork April 12-18, 2019).

Both samples were built using quota sampling of Swiss citizens. The survey was carried out by Infratest dimap.

**Table 7: Descriptive Statistics Analysis Switzerland**

| Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote intention weapons reform | 2,593 | 2.231 | 1.101 | 1 | 4 |
| Vote intention limitation initiative | 2,556 | 2.495 | 1.051 | 1 | 4 |
| vote intention framework agreement | 2,524 | 2.523 | 0.924 | 1 | 4 |
| vote intention end bilaterals | 2,559 | 2.109 | 0.994 | 1 | 4 |
| April 2019 wave | 3,085 | 0.338 | 0.473 | 0 | 1 |
| Brexit effect on UK | 2,872 | 1.981 | 1.144 | 0 | 4 |
| SVP voter | 3,085 | 0.211 | 0.408 | 0 | 1 |
| Eu opinion | 2,864 | 1.625 | 1.006 | 0 | 4 |
| Risk propensity | 2,466 | 4.087 | 1.250 | 1 | 7 |
| Education | 3,085 | 2.679 | 1.087 | 0 | 4 |
| Age | 2,924 | 49.700 | 15.079 | 18 | 93 |
| Female | 3,085 | 0.531 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Unmployed | 3,085 | 0.035 | 0.185 | 0 | 1 |
| French-speaking | 2,939 | 0.300 | 0.458 | 0 | 1 |
| Italian-speaking | 2,939 | 0.028 | 0.164 | 0 | 1 |

**Table A8: Interaction Aril 19-wave, conditional on attention**

| | Model 1<br>Against weapons reform | Model 2<br>Support for limitation initiative | Model 4<br>Support for terminating bilateral treaties | Model 3<br>Against institutional framework agreement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| April 19-wave | 0.027 | 0.031 | -0.031 | -0.134 |
| (post Brexit chaos) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.11) |
| Medium Brexit attention | -0.036 | 0.041 | -0.023 | -0.222*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) |
| High Brexit attention | -0.034 | -0.005 | -0.003 | -0.319*** |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.09) |
| April 19 * medium Brexit attention | -0.007 | -0.060 | 0.007 | 0.086 |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.13) |
| April 19 * high Brexit attention | -0.115* | -0.040 | -0.062 | -0.026 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.13) |
| SVP voter (dummy) | 0.365*** | 0.420*** | 0.393*** | 1.005*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Risk propensity | 0.020** | -0.001 | 0.012 | 0.040** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Education | -0.045*** | -0.026* | -0.031** | -0.072*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Age in years | -0.001 | 0.002*** | -0.001 | 0.003* |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | -0.122*** | -0.064*** | -0.077*** | -0.057 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) |
| Unemployed | 0.036 | 0.102* | 0.078 | 0.147 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.09) |
| French-speaking | -0.013 | 0.096*** | -0.070*** | 0.063 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Italian-speaking | 0.126** | 0.340*** | 0.190*** | 0.530*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.14) |
| Constant | 0.434*** | 0.325*** | 0.512*** | 1.999*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.14) |
| N | 2458 | 2458 | 2458 | 2251 |
| R2 | 0.151 | 0.16 | 0.151 | 0.233 |
| F | 23.636 | 29.171 | 26.27 | 31.489 |

**Table A9: Interaction Aril 19-wave, conditional on being a SVP-voter**

| | Model 1<br>Against weapons reform | Model 2<br>Support for limitation initiative | Model 4<br>Support for terminating bilateral treaties | Model 3<br>Against institutional framework agreement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| April 19-dummy | -0.036 | -0.026 | -0.070*** | -0.136*** |
| (post Brexit chaos) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) |
| SVP voter (dummy) | 0.346*** | 0.396*** | 0.369*** | 0.971*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) |
| April 19 * SVP voter | 0.064 | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.116 |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.12) |
| Brexit attention | -0.035** | -0.012 | -0.010 | -0.159*** |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) |
| Risk propensity | 0.020** | -0.002 | 0.012 | 0.041** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| Education | -0.046*** | -0.027* | -0.032** | -0.073*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| Age in years | -0.001 | 0.002*** | -0.001 | 0.003* |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Female | -0.120*** | -0.062*** | -0.075*** | -0.054 |
| | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) |
| Unemployed | 0.034 | 0.102* | 0.078 | 0.146 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.10) |
| French-speaking | -0.011 | 0.091*** | -0.068*** | 0.069 |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.05) |
| Italian-speaking | 0.121* | 0.340*** | 0.187*** | 0.525*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.14) |
| Constant | 0.449*** | 0.363*** | 0.517*** | 1.973*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.13) |
| N | 2458 | 2458 | 2458 | 2251 |
| R2 | 0.149 | 0.160 | 0.151 | 0.233 |
| F | 26.286 | 35.287 | 30.222 | 37.595 |

**Figure A1: Brexit attention and opinion of the EU, EU-27 respondents**



**Figure A2: Evaluation of Brexit-effect on UK and opinion of the EU and intention to vote for EU-exit, EU-27 respondents**

**Figure A2a: Opinion of the EU and evaluation of Brexit-effect on UK (EU-27)**




**Figure A2b: Evaluation of Brexit-effect on UK and intention to vote for EU-exit and**



**Figure A1: Brexit attention and opinion of the EU, Swiss respondents**




**Figure A4: Opinion of the EU and evaluation of Brexit-effect on UK (Switzerland**



**Figure A5: Evaluation of Brexit-effect on UK and intention to vote for SVP (Switzerland)**




## Bibliography

de Vries, C. (2019). Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12981

De Vries, C. (2017). Benchmarking Brexit: How the British decision to leave shapes EU public opinion. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *55*, 38–53.

De Vries, C. (2018). *Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karstens, F. (2019). How public discourse affects attitudes towards Freedom of Movement and Schengen. *European Union Politics*, *21*(1), 43–63