Supplement C
Implicit Black-White Preference Interacts with Speech's Ideological Content, not Speaker's Apparent Race (Study 1)

The following supplemental analysis describes in more detail how willingness to protect speech acts criticizing Arabs or Americans was related to implicit racial preferences in Study 1, when the speaker was apparently a Black or White American (Study 1).

Introduction: Implicit Predictors of Political Tolerance

One explanation for political intolerance is that malice towards a disliked group overwhelms individuals' abstract principles (Marcus et al., 1995), implying that intergroup bias predicts political intolerance. Indeed, a recent discussion of political tolerance speculated that (explicit, self-reported) group prejudice may be an important predictor of political tolerance, despite the apparent independent of social and political tolerance (Gibson, 2006). Research on discrimination and bias finds that (a) bias can be activated automatically and affect judgment and behavior without conscious awareness, control, or intention (Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989); that individuals are often unable to introspect and accurately report the sources of their behaviors and beliefs (cf. Wilson, 2002) or correct for biasing influences (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Indeed, implicit measures assess constructs without introspection and often reveal evaluations that are distinct from explicitly endorsed beliefs and values (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). In particular, measures of automatic bias better predict biased behavior in socially sensitive domains like race (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, in press). If deviation from principled application of speech rights is unintentionally influenced by qualities of the speaker or contents of the speech act, then implicit measures may be effective in identifying whether negativity toward a group and its members relates to individuals' ability to extend political tolerance consistently.

Study 1: Method, Results, & Discussion

Previous research (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004) had found that the first and last names used in Study 1 effectively connoted White or Black racial identity, but the present data did not directly check the effect of this manipulation. That is, we could not directly evaluate whether the lack of effects of the speaker's apparent race occurred because the speaker's name failed to indicate his apparent racial identity as a Black American (Darnell, Jamal, Kareem, or Leroy Jackson) or a White American (Brad, Todd, Jay, or Brett Sullivan). However, for the sake of future research that investigates how group membership in social outgroups affects political tolerance of the group members, the results are reported here.

In Study 1, we examined whether implicit racial attitudes predicted respondents' considered judgments of their willingness to protect the speech. Overall[1], respondents displayed implicit preference for Whites compared to Blacks ($n = 491$, $M = 0.34$, $SD = 0.39$) and for freedom compared to security ($n = 467$, $M = 0.35$, $SD = 0.36$)[2]. Greater explicit political

[1] Valid freedom or race IAT data were collected from 958 respondents, after dropping IAT results for 34 who went too fast (< 300 ms) in one or more blocks, 26 for excessive error trials in one or more blocks, and 10 for missing data or a 40+% error rate in a critical block (see Nosek, et al., 2007, for more details of the exclusion criteria).

[2] Follow-up hierarchical regression analyses were conducted for the 467 respondents completing the Freedom-Security preference IAT, but implicit pro-freedom preferences were not clearly related to speech protection. That is, compared to the baseline model (manuscript Table I; $R^2 = .297$), no significant two-way interactions existed ($\Delta R^2 = .003$, all Fs < 1) and only the three-way interaction between the speech's ideological content, respondents' politics, and Freedom-Security IAT scores was significant, $F(1,459) = 9.83$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, but $\Delta R^2 = .015$. Because of its correlation with respondents' politics, this interaction could not clearly be decomposed and is not discussed further.

conservatism significantly predicted weaker implicit pro-freedom preference (r = -.17, CI_{95} = -.08 – -.26); did not significantly predict implicit preference for Whites compared to Blacks (r = .04, CI_{95} = .13 − -.05), and predicted stronger implicit preference for conservatives compared to liberals (r = .68, CI_{95} = .63 – .73; as reported in the manuscript).

Implicit Racial Preferences. Although the omnibus test of the effect of the speaker's race (Study 1) suggested that Black and White American speakers were equally protected, it is possible that stronger implicit racial preference would predict *inconsistency* in political tolerance. Hierarchical regression analyses, similar to those reported for Study 2, indicated the following. For respondents who completed the White-Black preference Implicit Association Test (IAT; N = 491), compared to the baseline model that considered the hypothesized effects of speech content and political orientation (R^2 = .264), a model that additionally considered the main effects of the speaker's apparent ethnicity and of respondents' implicit racial preference did not improve prediction of the willingness to protect the speech (both Fs < 1, R^2 = .266). In a subsequent model that considered all additional two-way interactions (R^2 = .296), the interaction between implicit pro-White/anti-Black IAT scores and the speech's *ideological* content, F (1, 480) = 18.59, η_p^2 = .04, was the only additional interaction (all other Fs < 1) that emerged, and no higher-order interactions qualified this relationship. That is, contrary to the original hypothesis, implicit racial preference was not relevant for predicting protection based on speaker's racial identity as a White or Black American. Instead, it predicted protection based on the speech's ideological content.

Follow-up separate slope analysis found when partialing for the effects of respondents' political orientation, stronger implicit preference for Whites compared to Blacks predicted weaker protection of the statement criticizing Americans and stronger protection of the statement criticizing Arabs. For the left-wing statement criticizing Americans, weaker speech protection was predicted (R^2 = .129) by stronger implicit racial preference, β = .21, t(238) = 3.45, and greater political conservatism, β = .27, t(238) = 4.46. For the right-wing statement criticizing Arabs, weaker speech protection was predicted (R^2 = .03) by stronger implicit racial preference, β = .17, t(247) = 2.76, when controlling for political orientation, β = .05, t(247) = 0.80, *ns*. Figure C.1 displays the direct relation between implicit preference for Whites compared to Blacks and willingness to protect the speech as a function of the speech's ideological content.

A potential, and admittedly post-hoc, interpretation is that implicit racial preference served as an indicator of ethnocentrism (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004), such that speech acts that criticize the ingroup (Americans are the problem) are more threatening to people higher in ethnocentrism, regardless of who says them. Whereas, speech acts that criticize outgroups (Arabs are the problem) are less threatening to people higher in ethnocentrism, regardless of who says them.

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
Figure C. 1. Linear regression of the relationship between implicit preference for Whites compared to Blacks and willingness to protect left-wing and right-wing statements (Study 1).