The Logic of Transitional Justice and State Repression:
The Effects of Human Rights Prosecutions in Post-Conflict States

Online Appendix

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A. Robustness Tests

I. V-Dem data on physical integrity rights

To validate the main results in the article, Table A1 reports results from an additional analysis for a smaller range of rights abuses using data from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2019b).

We use three measures from V-Dem: Torture (called *v2cltort* in V-Dem), Killings (*v2clkill*), and Arrest (*v2smarrest*). For each, we use V-Dem's ordinal measure of change, ranging from 0 to 3.

Indicators of torture and killings from V-Dem are narrower in their scope than typical standards-based human rights datasets (Clay et al. 2020). The torture variable captures torture specifically intended to "extract information or intimidate victims" (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 161). In addition, the V-Dem measure of political killings focuses on killings "for the purpose of eliminating political opponents" (Coppedge et al. 2019a, 161). Again, this is a much narrower focus than what is found in human rights law and standards-based measures. As an alternative indicator of political imprisonment, we use the closest V-Dem measure, arrests for political content online (*v2smarrest*, labeled "Arrest" in Table A1 below). There is no V-Dem measure for forced disappearances.

The relatively limited temporal coverage of V-Dem data restricts the sample to 1007 observations. Changes in repressive practices are also rarer in the ordinal V-Dem data than in the CIRI data. For example, 14.8% of all cases see improvements in CIRI political imprisonment in our sample, as opposed to 1.1% of cases in V-Dem for arrests for political content online. Similarly, 13% of the cases in our CIRI sample see improvements in torture, versus 3% of the cases in V-Dem for torture. For extrajudicial killings, 16.3% of the cases see improvements in CIRI, while this drops to 4.1% in V-Dem.

Despite these limitations, the patterns track the results reported in the main article. Domestic trials are associated with improvements in the areas of torture and arrests for political content online; the coefficient on the trial variable is also positive in the killings equation, although not statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, the estimate of ρ — the correlation between the imprisonment equation and the trial equation — remains negative and statistically significant. These results are therefore consistent with the visibility and substitution hypotheses.

Ultimately, V-Dem does not measure all the concepts required for fully testing our theory. However, the similar patterns we find for this narrower set of rights abuses lend validity to the findings reported in the main article.

Table A1
Multivariate probit model (V-Dem measures for arrest, torture, and killings)

Variable		Estimate	Std.error
(1) ΔArrest			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	1.243**	(0.601)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	-1.876**	(0.806)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.096***	(0.033)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.027	(0.092)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.001	(0.098)
	Ongoing Conflict	-1.872	(1.200)
	Arrest$_{t-1}$	-0.570***	(0.144)
	Constant	-1.278	(1.618)
(2) ΔTorture			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	2.189***	(0.524)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.519	(0.886)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.074**	(0.032)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.017	(0.101)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.200***	(0.065)
	Ongoing Conflict	0.049	(0.290)
	Torture$_{t-1}$	-0.741***	(0.130)
	Constant	2.397*	(1.308)
(3) ΔKillings			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.618	(0.574)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	-1.114*	(0.612)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.053**	(0.025)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.051	(0.093)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.067	(0.064)
	Ongoing Conflict	-0.091	(0.312)
	Killings$_{t-1}$	-0.429***	(0.103)
	Constant	0.197	(1.152)
(4) Domestic trial			
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	-0.854	(0.766)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.043	(0.028)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.117	(0.089)
	Conflict intensity	0.251	(0.183)
	Constant	-2.695***	(0.534)
$\rho_{2,1}$		0.624***	(0.108)
$\rho_{3,1}$		0.631***	(0.138)
$\rho_{4,1}$		-0.316**	(0.165)
$\rho_{3,2}$		0.718***	(0.078)
$\rho_{4,2}$		-0.566***	(0.153)
$\rho_{4,3}$		-0.144	(0.187)
LR$\sim\chi^2$ $\rho_{2,1}=\rho_{3,1}=\rho_{4,1}=\rho_{5,1}=\rho_{3,2}=\rho_{4,2}=\rho_{5,2}=\rho_{4,3}=\rho_{5,3}=\rho_{5,4}=0$			49.44***
Observations			1007
Log pseudolikelihood			-482.56

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

II. Declines in respect for each physical integrity right

Table A2 reports the results of a set of models in which the dependent variable is a binary indicator of *decline* in the respect for each of the physical integrity rights from time *t-1* to *t* — that is, the increased use of an abuse. In the sample, 13.7% of cases experienced decline in the area of political imprisonment (that is, an increase in the use of political imprisonment); 14.4% for torture; 16.2% for killings; and 12.8% for forced disappearances.

The results provide even stronger support for the visibility hypothesis. Recall that the visibility hypothesis predicts improvements in relatively visible forms of physical integrity rights violations, and a shift in the leader's repression strategy towards less visible tactics. Domestic trials make it significantly less likely that we observe declines in protections against political imprisonment and torture. While not statistically significant at conventional levels, the coefficient on domestic trials is also negative in the killings equation (when trial is lagged by two years the result is both negative and statistically significant).

Notably, the results for the disappearances equation suggest that trials induce the government to engage in *more* disappearances than before (i.e., trials have a positive association with disappearances). Again, this accords with the visibility hypothesis. The use of relatively visible forms of repression — political imprisonment, torture, killings — decreases with the initiation of trials, whereas the use of relatively invisible forms — forced disappearances, which we argued in the main article are distinctively opaque — increases.

Table A2
Multivariate probit model (DV is decline in respect for a given right from *t-1* to *t*)

Variable		Estimate	Std.error
(1) ΔPolitical imprisonment			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	-0.760***	(0.224)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	0.190	(0.152)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	-0.700**	(0.352)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	-0.020	(0.015)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.081	(0.058)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	0.046	(0.037)
	Ongoing conflict	0.358**	(0.143)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	-0.225	(0.302)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.021	(0.171)
	CAT ratification	-0.130	(0.096)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.242*	(0.144)
	Africa	0.557***	(0.179)
	Asia	0.799***	(0.171)
	Europe	0.043	(0.154)
	Imprisonment$_{t-1}$	1.126***	(0.109)
	Constant	-3.299***	(0.716)
(2) ΔTorture			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	-0.975**	(0.438)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	0.175	(0.195)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	-0.839	(0.522)
	Polity2 $_{t-1}$	-0.009	(0.014)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.006	(0.087)
	Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	0.151**	(0.062)
	Ongoing conflict	0.423***	(0.096)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	1.618***	(0.150)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.239	(0.359)
	CAT ratification	0.137	(0.173)
	ICCPR ratification	0.148	(0.127)
	Africa	0.103	(0.174)
	Asia	-0.114	(0.236)
	Europe	-0.152	(0.253)
	Torture$_{t-1}$	-0.232	(0.286)
	Constant	-4.179***	(1.263)
(3) ΔKillings			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	-0.257	(0.437)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.259*	(0.151)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	-0.936**	(0.469)
	Polity2 $_{t-1}$	0.027*	(0.014)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.012	(0.062)
	Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	0.226***	(0.045)
	Ongoing conflict	0.701***	(0.139)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	1.140***	(0.084)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	0.210	(0.285)
	CAT ratification	0.312**	(0.150)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.021	(0.099)

	Africa	0.055	(0.135)
	Asia	0.124	(0.175)
	Europe	0.083	(0.194)
	$Killing_{t-1}$	-0.628***	(0.142)
	Constant	-5.879***	(0.761)
(4) ΔDisappearances			
	$Domestic\ trial_{t-1}$	1.280***	(0.356)
	$Domestic\ trial_{t-2}$	-0.054	(0.229)
	$Judicial\ independence_{t-1}$	-0.447	(0.358)
	$Polity2_{t-1}$	-0.008	(0.013)
	$Ln(GDP\ per\ capita)_{t-1}$	-0.054	(0.050)
	$Ln(population)_{t-1}$	0.136***	(0.034)
	Ongoing conflict	0.762***	(0.131)
	$Truth\ commission_{t-1}$	0.645***	(0.068)
	$Amnesty_{t-1}$	0.015	(0.267)
	CAT ratification	0.327**	(0.129)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.134	(0.107)
	Africa	0.003	(0.140)
	Asia	-0.044	(0.140)
	Europe	0.033	(0.150)
	$Disappearances_{t-1}$	-0.419*	(0.221)
	Constant	-3.713***	(0.619)
(5) Domestic trial			
	$Judicial\ independence_{t-1}$	-0.797**	(0.348)
	$Polity2_{t-1}$	0.032***	(0.012)
	$Ln(GDP\ per\ capita)_{t-1}$	0.081	(0.075)
	$Truth\ Commission_{t-1}$	0.635**	(0.281)
	$Amnesty_{t-1}$	0.236	(0.146)
	CAT ratification	0.062	(0.158)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.025	(0.169)
	Conflict intensity	0.035	(0.131)
	Constant	-1.630***	(0.447)
$\rho_{2,1}$		0.336***	(0.082)
$\rho_{3,1}$		0.312***	(0.075)
$\rho_{4,1}$		0.196***	(0.072)
$\rho_{5,1}$		0.527***	(0.102)
$\rho_{3,2}$		0.476***	(0.062)
$\rho_{4,2}$		0.221***	(0.073)
$\rho_{5,2}$		0.456***	(0.158)
$\rho_{4,3}$		0.353***	(0.074)
$\rho_{5,3}$		0.278	(0.193)
$\rho_{5,4}$		-0.552***	(0.109)
$LR \sim \chi^2\ \rho_{2,1}=\rho_{3,1}=\rho_{4,1}=\rho_{5,1}=\rho_{3,2}=\rho_{4,2}=\rho_{5,2}=\rho_{4,3}=\rho_{5,3}=\rho_{5,4}=0$			138.82
Observations			2041
Log psuedolikelihood			-2819.54

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include a cubic polynomial of time. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

III. Loser targeted trials and substitution

As further evidence that human rights prosecutions are being used selectively against specific challengers, we conduct an additional test that distinguishes between two categories of trial defendants: conflict losers and victors.

We use a dichotomous measure of whether a trial targeted members of the losing party to the conflict, *loser targeted trial,* as a proxy for trial selectivity. To construct this new variable, we draw on conflict outcome data from UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and additional transitional justice data from Kitagawa (2017). UCDP identifies the outcome of each conflict, including whether the government or rebels were victorious. The transitional justice data identifies whether side A (the government), side B (the rebels), or both actors were targeted by a given trial. From this information, we code *loser targeted trial* as 1 if the loser of a conflict was targeted by a given trial, and 0 otherwise.

As the main article notes, trials that target members of a defeated party do not represent the whole universe of prosecutions against political rivals of the state — those in power at the time of the trial are not necessarily the victors of conflict, and challengers to the regime may be either new to the political scene since the end of the conflict or internal to the ruler's close circles. Further, not every conflict is coded as having a clear victor and loser; in these cases, we cannot derive this measure. Nonetheless, *loser targeted trial* as a proxy for a former rival of the state is one indicator for the selectiveness of a human rights trial. It speaks to the political intent underlying a strategy of substitution.

We re-estimate the full multivariate probit model as before to identify the ρ parameters for the correlation between errors in equation 1, where the dependent variable is improvement in *political imprisonment*, and equation 5, where the dependent variable is now the incidence of *a loser targeted trial*. A strong substitution effect remains, at -0.136 (p-value < 0.05). This is consistent with our claim that efforts towards political imprisonment are being diverted to the judicial means of targeting state rivals.

In addition, we estimate the multivariate probit model excluding equation 5 altogether, reported in Table A4. The results on trials and political imprisonment remain unchanged. However, the coefficient on domestic trials in the "killings" equation loses statistical significance. Modeling trials as a substitute therefore changes the substantive interpretation of the relationship between human rights prosecutions and repression.

Table A3
Multivariate probit model (DV in Equation 5 is loser targeted trial)

Variable		Estimate	Std. Error
(1) ΔPolitical imprisonment			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.417***	(0.144)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.148	(0.351)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.060***	(0.013)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.079	(0.063)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.204***	(0.037)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.511***	(0.171)
	Imprisonment$_{t-1}$	-1.053***	(0.082)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.382	(0.272)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	0.060	(0.137)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.260	(0.243)
	CAT ratification	-0.034	(0.110)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.288**	(0.139)
	Africa	-0.115	(0.165)
	Asia	-0.423***	(0.154)
	Europe	0.216	(0.225)
	Constant	3.980***	(0.759)
(2) ΔTorture			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	-0.267	(0.201)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.664*	(0.364)
	Polity2 $_{t-1}$	0.008	(0.014)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.023	(0.058)
	Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	-0.151***	(0.037)
	Ongoing Conflict	-0.388**	(0.173)
	Torture$_{t-1}$	-1.105***	(0.095)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.714***	(0.260)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	0.028	(0.141)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.355**	(0.171)
	CAT ratification	-0.301***	(0.103)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.247**	(0.115)
	Africa	0.109	(0.149)
	Asia	-0.158	(0.164)
	Europe	0.496***	(0.162)
	Constant	1.908***	(0.718)
(3) ΔKillings			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.043	(0.165)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	1.342***	(0.402)
	Polity2 $_{t-1}$	-0.054***	(0.015)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.060	(0.062)
	Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	-0.168***	(0.035)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.798***	(0.138)
	Killing$_{t-1}$	-0.996***	(0.085)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.032	(0.286)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.176	(0.157)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.026	(0.176)
	CAT ratification	0.051	(0.125)

	ICCPR ratification	-0.026	(0.162)
	Africa	-0.137	(0.195)
	Asia	-0.218	(0.200)
	Europe	0.652***	(0.176)
	Constant	2.709***	(0.714)
(4) ΔDisappearances			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.031	(0.155)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.147	(0.453)
	Polity2 $_{t-1}$	-0.008	(0.015)
	Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.024	(0.064)
	Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	-0.136***	(0.044)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.859***	(0.174)
	Disappearances$_{t-1}$	-1.201***	(0.093)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.617***	(0.208)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.014	(0.139)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	0.118	(0.174)
	CAT ratification	0.046	(0.137)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.187	(0.186)
	Africa	0.238	(0.209)
	Asia	0.019	(0.222)
	Europe	-0.392	(0.420)
	Constant	2.498***	(0.868)
(5) Loser targeted trial			
	Judicial independence$_{t-1}$	-1.290**	(0.514)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.020	(0.017)
	Ln(GDP per capita)$_{t-1}$	-0.063	(0.061)
	Conflict intensity	0.143	(0.122)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	-0.250	(0.247)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.058	(0.210)
	CAT ratification	-0.043	(0.191)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.250	(0.247)
	Constant	-0.596	(0.507)
$\rho_{2,1}$		0.255***	(0.054)
$\rho_{3,1}$		0.251***	(0.055)
$\rho_{4,1}$		0.047	(0.064)
$\rho_{5,1}$		-0.136**	(0.078)
$\rho_{3,2}$		0.251***	(0.057)
$\rho_{4,2}$		0.071	(0.072)
$\rho_{5,2}$		-0.025	(0.092)
$\rho_{4,3}$		0.463***	(0.058)
$\rho_{5,3}$		-0.063	(0.092)
$\rho_{5,4}$		-0.012	(0.088)
LR$\sim\chi^2$ $\rho_{2,1}=\rho_{3,1}=\rho_{4,1}=\rho_{5,1}=\rho_{3,2}=\rho_{4,2}=\rho_{5,2}=\rho_{4,3}=\rho_{5,3}=\rho_{5,4}=0$			107.32***
Observations			2041
Log pseudolikelihood			-2926.99

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include a cubic polynomial of time. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

Table A4
Multivariate probit model excluding non-recursive relationship between trials and political imprisonment (Equation 5)

Variable		Estimate	Std.error
(1) Political Imprisonment			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.424***	(0.144)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.147	(0.350)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.060***	(0.013)
	Ln(GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.080	(0.063)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.204***	(0.037)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.516***	(0.170)
	Imprisonment$_{t-1}$	-1.052***	(0.082)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.383	(0.272)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	0.061	(0.136)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.288	(0.241)
	CAT ratification	-0.029	(0.109)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.291**	(0.138)
	Africa	-0.121	(0.165)
	Asia	-0.424***	(0.154)
	Europe	0.211	(0.224)
	Constant	3.983***	(0.759)
(2) ΔTorture			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	-0.267	(0.201)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.662*	(0.362)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.008	(0.014)
	Ln(GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.023	(0.058)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.151***	(0.037)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.388**	(0.173)
	Torture$_{t-1}$	-1.105***	(0.095)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.714***	(0.261)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	0.029	(0.141)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.358**	(0.169)
	CAT ratification	-0.300***	(0.103)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.247**	(0.115)
	Africa	0.108	(0.150)
	Asia	-0.158	(0.164)
	Europe	0.495***	(0.163)
	Constant	1.906***	(0.718)
(3) ΔKillings			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.045	(0.165)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	1.338***	(0.401)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	-0.054***	(0.015)
	Ln(GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	-0.060	(0.062)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.168***	(0.035)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.799***	(0.138)
	Killings$_{t-1}$	-0.993***	(0.085)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.030	(0.286)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.174	(0.157)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.035	(0.176)

	CAT ratification	0.052	(0.124)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.027	(0.162)
	Africa	-0.140	(0.195)
	Asia	-0.217	(0.200)
	Europe	0.647***	(0.177)
	Constant	2.702***	(0.713)
(4) ΔDisappearances			
	Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.030	(0.155)
	Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.144	(0.457)
	Polity2$_{t-1}$	-0.008	(0.015)
	Ln(GDP per capita $_{t-1}$	0.024	(0.064)
	Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.136***	(0.044)
	Ongoing conflict	-0.859***	(0.174)
	Disappearances$_{t-1}$	-1.201***	(0.093)
	Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.618***	(0.209)
	Amnesty $_{t-1}$	-0.016	(0.140)
	Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	0.118	(0.173)
	CAT ratification	0.047	(0.138)
	ICCPR ratification	-0.187	(0.187)
	Africa	0.238	(0.209)
	Asia	0.019	(0.223)
	Europe	-0.388	(0.419)
	Constant	2.501***	(0.867)
$\rho_{2,1}$		0.254***	(0.054)
$\rho_{3,1}$		0.250***	(0.055)
$\rho_{4,1}$		0.048	(0.064)
$\rho_{3,2}$		0.251***	(0.057)
$\rho_{4,2}$		0.073	(0.072)
$\rho_{4,3}$		0.464 ***	(0.058)
LR~χ^2 $\rho_{2,1}=\rho_{3,1}=\rho_{4,1}=\rho_{5,1}=\rho_{3,2}=\rho_{4,2}=\rho_{5,2}=\rho_{4,3}=\rho_{5,3}=\rho_{5,4}=0$			105.011***
Observations			2041
Log pseudolikelihood			-2664.11

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include a cubic polynomial of time. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

IV. Trial counts

Our theory is agnostic as to whether a greater number of trials will lead to larger effects. What is most important is that *any* human rights trial starts within the state. Indeed, there are few states that implement a high volume of trials in the period 1982-2011 covered by our study. The average yearly number of trials among states that held any trials at all was 1.2. The distribution of country-conflict cases in the sample by the number of human rights trials they held is below:

Table A5
Distribution of country-conflict cases that experience domestic trials

Number of trials (if any)	Number of cases
1	86
2	9
3	3
4	0
5	0
6	1

For completeness and transparency, we estimate a set of single equation probit models using a count measure of trials in a given country-year, lagged by one year, to check that the results are consistent with those reported in Table 1 of the main analysis. Table A6 shows these results.

Table A6
Single equation probit models (Main independent variable is *trial count*)

	ΔPhysical Integrity Rights	ΔImprisonment	ΔTorture	ΔKillings	ΔDisappearances
	1	2	3	4	5
Domestic trial count$_{t-1}$	0.085	0.396***	-0.199	-0.015	-0.065
	(0.075)	(0.086)	(0.167)	(0.122)	(0.114)
Judicial independence$_{t-1}$	0.300	0.196	0.702**	1.343***	0.166
	(0.296)	(0.353)	(0.357)	(0.391)	(0.450)
Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.009	0.060***	0.006	-0.053***	-0.009
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ln(GDP per capita)$_{t-1}$	-0.027	-0.085	0.018	-0.073	0.010
	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.064)
Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.165***	-0.207***	-0.152***	-0.162***	-0.130***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.045)
Ongoing conflict	-0.767***	-0.521***	-0.380**	-0.738***	-0.794***
	(0.140)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.137)	(0.169)
De jure amnesty$_{t-1}$	-0.125	0.073	0.042	-0.115	-0.022
	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.149)	(0.143)
Truth commission$_{t-1}$	0.168	0.358	0.669**	0.103	0.682***
	(0.190)	(0.263)	(0.267)	(0.284)	(0.194)
CAT ratification	-0.068	-0.025	-0.280***	0.059	0.053
	(0.085)	(0.110)	(0.101)	(0.122)	(0.136)
ICCPR ratification	-0.238**	-0.290**	-0.221**	-0.023	-0.158
	(0.102)	(0.136)	(0.112)	(0.154)	(0.181)
Africa	-0.079	-0.131	0.118	-0.151	0.225
	(0.121)	(0.166)	(0.148)	(0.193)	(0.215)
Asia	-0.224	-0.429***	-0.143	-0.235	0.009
	(0.137)	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.198)	(0.227)
Europe	0.416***	0.180	0.483***	0.663***	-0.327
	(0.123)	(0.219)	(0.157)	(0.171)	(0.410)
Physical integrity rights$_{t-1}$	-0.240***				
	(0.0240)				
Political imprisonment$_{t-1}$		-1.072***			
		(0.083)			
Torture$_{t-1}$			-1.073***		
			(0.095)		
Killings$_{t-1}$				-0.960***	
				(0.089)	
Disappearances$_{t-1}$					-1.148***
					(0.098)
Constant	3.356***	4.088***	1.878***	2.682***	2.425***
	(0.545)	(0.758)	(0.717)	(0.705)	(0.868)
Log likelihood	-1160.5	-702.5	-678.9	-772.8	-570.3
Observations	2041	2047	2054	2052	2050

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include cubic polynomial of time.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

V. Single equation ordered probit models using absolute levels

Table A7 shows the results from a set of stand-alone single equation ordered probit models. In each model, the dependent variable is the absolute level of the relevant type of physical integrity right. That is, rights outcomes are not jointly modeled as in the multivariate probit. Each ordered probit model therefore controls for the absolute levels of other physical integrity rights abuses than the type used as the dependent variable.

Importantly, the ordered probit models cannot account for substitution between specific abuses and trials. As a result, these alternative models produce patterns similar to the single equation ordered probit models reported as a benchmark in Table 1 of the main article.

Table A7
Single equation ordered probit models (DV is absolute level of each physical integrity right)

	Parsimonious models				*Full models with all covariates*			
	Imprison.	Torture	Killings	Disapp.	Imprison.	Torture	Killings	Disapp.
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.182*	-0.0856	-0.0245	0.098	0.155	-0.087	-0.092	0.132
	(0.122)	(0.170)	(0.150)	(0.119)	(0.132)	(0.169)	(0.155)	(0.123)
Judicial independence$_{t-1}$	-0.286	0.648**	0.702	-0.322	0.086	0.334	0.991**	-0.463
	(0.371)	(0.299)	(0.473)	(0.463)	(0.315)	(0.309)	(0.406)	(0.461)
Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.069***	-0.007	-0.042***	0.017	0.056***	0.014	-0.057***	0.023*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Ln(GDP per capita)$_{t-1}$	0.006	-0.0345	0.0736*	-0.014	-0.070	0.028	-0.036	0.054
	(0.044)	(0.0414)	(0.0407)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.039)
Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.153***	-0.081***	-0.094***	-0.070**	-0.111***	-0.088**	-0.128***	-0.073*
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Ongoing conflict	-0.235	-0.021	-0.375***	-0.468***	-0.283*	-0.040	-0.405***	-0.460***
	(0.159)	(0.169)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.116)	(0.120)
De jure amnesty$_{t-1}$					0.172	0.096	-0.178*	-0.148
					(0.111)	(0.128)	(0.105)	(0.098)
Truth commission$_{t-1}$					0.278	0.460*	-0.132	0.155
					(0.272)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.320)
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$					-0.198	-0.237*	0.146	0.006
					(0.133)	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.140)
CAT ratification					0.076	-0.316***	0.074	0.142
					(0.087)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.091)
ICCPR ratification					-0.147	-0.204*	0.066	-0.076
					(0.127)	(0.107)	(0.122)	(0.116)
Africa					-0.310**	0.184	-0.146	0.220
					(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.149)
Asia					-0.624***	0.101	-0.069	0.150

					(0.136)	(0.167)	(0.143)	(0.138)
Europe					0.025	0.095	0.806***	-0.378
					(0.209)	(0.169)	(0.186)	(0.309)
Political imprisonment		0.225***	0.201***	0.128		0.236***	0.147**	0.164**
		(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.078)		(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Torture	0.228***		0.428***	0.106	0.216***		0.430***	0.128*
	(0.072)		(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.068)		(0.062)	(0.072)
Killing	0.158**	0.426***		0.491***	0.137**	0.438***		0.531***
	(0.067)	(0.056)		(0.101)	(0.061)	(0.058)		(0.078)
Disappearances	0.093	0.072	0.451***		0.117*	0.086	0.498***	
	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.110)		(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.085)	
Political imprisonment$_{t-1}$	1.142***				1.096***			
	(0.055)				(0.054)			
Torture$_{t-1}$		1.036***				0.985***		
		(0.081)				(0.080)		
Killing$_{t-1}$			1.064***				0.996***	
			(0.082)				(0.073)	
Disappearances$_{t-1}$				1.082***				1.053***
				(0.113)				(0.105)
Cut$_1$	-1.585**	0.174	0.346	-0.828	-1.710**	0.175	-0.880	-0.316
	(0.630)	(0.623)	(0.584)	(0.692)	(0.687)	(0.713)	(0.618)	(0.683)
Cut$_2$	0.055	2.170***	2.244***	0.419	-0.031	2.202***	1.064*	0.946
	(0.634)	(0.629)	(0.583)	(0.708)	(0.693)	(0.715)	(0.623)	(0.676)
Log Likelihood	-1333.1	-1192.1	-1404.8	-1214.2	-1308.3	-1171.6	-1375.7	-1204.6
Observations	2045	2049	2047	2047	2045	2049	2047	2047

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

B. Sample Data

Table B1
List of Countries in Sample (1982-2011)

Cuba	Sierra Leone	Nepal
Haiti	Ghana	Thailand
Dominican Republic	Togo	Cambodia
Trinidad and Tobago	Cameroon	Laos
Mexico	Nigeria	Malaysia
Guatemala	Central African Republic	Philippines
El Salvador	Chad	Indonesia
Nicaragua	Congo Brazzaville	Papua New Guinea
Costa Rica	Congo Kinshasa	
Panama	Uganda	
Colombia	Kenya	
Venezuela	Burundi	
Suriname	Rwanda	
Peru	Djibouti	
Bolivia	Ethiopia	
Paraguay	Eritrea	
Chile	Angola	
Argentina	Mozambique	
Uruguay	South Africa	
United Kingdom	Comoros	
France	Morocco	
Spain	Algeria	
Macedonia	Tunisia	
Croatia	Sudan	
Yugoslavia	Iran	
Greece	Turkey	
Moldova	Iraq	
Romania	Egypt	
Russia	Syria	
Georgia	Lebanon	
Azerbaijan	Israel	
Mali	Saudi Arabia	
Senegal	Tajikistan	
Mauritania	Uzbekistan	
Niger	China	
Ivory Coast	India	
Guinea	Pakistan	
Burkina Faso	Bangladesh	
Liberia	Sri Lanka	

Table B2
Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Physical integrity improvement	0.320	0.467	0	1
Physicial integrity$_{t-1}$	3.669	2.125	0	8
Political imprisonment improvement	0.148	0.355	0	1
Political imprisonment $_{t-1}$	0.789	0.801	0	2
Torture improvement	0.130	0.337	0	1
Torture $_{t-1}$	0.461	0.608	0	2
Killing improvement	0.163	0.370	0	1
Killing $_{t-1}$	0.962	0.780	0	2
Disappearance improvement	0.133	0.339	0	1
Disappearance $_{t-1}$	1.457	0.751	0	2
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.049	0.215	0	1
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	0.047	0.212	0	1
Polity2 $_{t-1}$	1.656	6.591	-10	10
Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	7.277	1.334	4.287	10.635
Ln(Population) $_{t-1}$	16.639	1.367	13.097	21.014
Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.399	0.250	0.012	0.975
Ongong conflict	0.077	0.267	0	1
Previous conflict intensity	1.508	0.500	1	2
De jure amnesty $_{t-1}$	0.078	0.268	0	1
Truth commission $_{t-1}$	0.015	0.122	0	1
CAT ratification	0.674	0.469	0	1
ICCPR ratification	0.820	0.384	0	1
Africa	0.353	0.478	0	1
Asia	0.284	0.451	0	1
Europe	0.109	0.311	0	1

C. Full Models from Main Article

The tables below report all coefficients for covariates included in the models appearing in Tables 1 and 2 of the main article.

Table 1: Conventional single equation probit models. DV is *improvement* in each physical integrity right from *t-1* to *t*.

	ΔPhys. Int. Rights	ΔImprisonment	ΔTorture	ΔKillings	ΔDisappearances
	1	2	3	4	5
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.070	0.420***	-0.280	0.025	0.042
	(0.125)	(0.146)	(0.207)	(0.168)	(0.154)
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$	-0.035	-0.295	-0.356**	-0.039	0.157
	(0.134)	(0.238)	(0.165)	(0.185)	(0.177)
Judicial independence$_{t-1}$	0.296	0.154	0.677*	1.345***	0.184
	(0.294)	(0.347)	(0.359)	(0.392)	(0.451)
Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.009	0.060***	0.007	-0.053***	-0.009
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ln(GDP per capita)$_{t-1}$	-0.027	-0.083	0.022	-0.073	0.010
	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.166***	-0.206***	-0.149***	-0.162***	-0.131***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.046)
Ongoing conflict	-0.765***	-0.506***	-0.387**	-0.739***	-0.790***
	(0.141)	(0.168)	(0.175)	(0.136)	(0.168)
De jure amnesty$_{t-1}$	-0.125	0.079	0.064	-0.114	-0.027
	(0.128)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.142)
Truth commission$_{t-1}$	0.174	0.387	0.715***	0.103	0.643***
	(0.192)	(0.273)	(0.264)	(0.282)	(0.202)
CAT ratification	-0.069	-0.029	-0.285***	0.059	0.055
	(0.085)	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.122)	(0.136)
ICCPR ratification	-0.237**	-0.282**	-0.222**	-0.024	-0.158
	(0.102)	(0.135)	(0.112)	(0.155)	(0.183)
Africa	-0.080	-0.137	0.115	-0.150	0.233
	(0.121)	(0.164)	(0.147)	(0.194)	(0.216)
Asia	-0.224	-0.432***	-0.146	-0.235	0.013
	(0.137)	(0.154)	(0.160)	(0.198)	(0.228)
Europe	0.421***	0.208	0.498***	0.664***	-0.352
	(0.125)	(0.224)	(0.163)	(0.170)	(0.411)
Phys. int. rights$_{t-1}$	-0.241***				
	(0.024)				
Pol. imprisonment$_{t-1}$		-1.068***			
		(0.083)			
Torture$_{t-1}$			-1.079***		
			(0.096)		
Killings$_{t-1}$				-0.959***	
				(0.089)	
Disappearances$_{t-1}$					-1.146***
					(0.097)
Constant	3.364***	4.077***	1.838**	2.682***	2.426***
	(0.545)	(0.764)	(0.719)	(0.705)	(0.875)
Log likelihood	-1160.7	-704.5	-676.9	-772.8	-570.0
Observations	2041	2047	2054	2052	2050

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include a cubic polynomial of time.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

Table 2: Multivariate probit models. DV is *improvement* in each physical integrity right

from *t-1* to *t* (Equations 1-4) and *domestic trial* (Equation 5).

	Parsimonious model		*Full model*	
Variable	Estimate	Std. error	Estimate	Std. error
(1) ΔPolitical Imprisonment				
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	1.875***	(0.617)	1.694**	(0.766)
Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.147	(0.380)	0.227	(0.365)
Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.057***	(0.012)	0.056***	(0.013)
Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.064	(0.044)	-0.090	(0.062)
Ln(population)$_{t-1}$	-0.233***	(0.036)	-0.199***	(0.036)
Ongoing conflict	-0.442***	(0.169)	-0.491***	(0.171)
Imprisonment$_{t-1}$	-0.961***	(0.092)	-1.017***	(0.091)
Truth commission $_{t-1}$			0.203	(0.341)
Amnesty $_{t-1}$			0.027	(0.136)
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$			-0.343	(0.215)
CAT ratification			-0.026	(0.109)
ICCPR ratification			-0.271**	(0.133)
Africa			-0.107	(0.161)
Asia			-0.415***	(0.147)
Europe			0.187	(0.218)
Constant	3.851***	(0.714)	3.863***	(0.761)
(2) ΔTorture				
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.498	(0.439)	0.120	(0.436)
Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.811**	(0.374)	0.690*	(0.355)
Polity2 $_{t-1}$	-0.003	(0.012)	0.007	(0.014)
Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.0145	(0.046)	0.019	(0.058)
Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	-0.159***	(0.032)	-0.152***	(0.036)
Ongoing conflict	-0.311*	(0.164)	-0.387**	(0.171)
Torture$_{t-1}$	-0.995***	(0.101)	-1.101***	(0.095)
Truth commission $_{t-1}$			0.661**	(0.279)
Amnesty $_{t-1}$			0.015	(0.143)
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$			-0.376**	(0.168)
CAT ratification			-0.298***	(0.103)
ICCPR ratification			-0.243**	(0.114)
Africa			0.111	(0.149)
Asia			-0.157	(0.162)
Europe			0.489***	(0.163)
Constant	1.690***	(0.616)	1.911***	(0.717)
(3) ΔKillings				
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	1.242**	(0.593)	1.412*	(1.094)
Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	1.024**	(0.462)	1.365***	(0.395)
Polity2 $_{t-1}$	-0.039***	(0.014)	-0.055***	(0.015)
Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	0.014	(0.056)	-0.069	(0.062)
Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	-0.156***	(0.032)	-0.165***	(0.034)
Ongoing conflict	-0.716***	(0.124)	-0.779***	(0.135)
Killing$_{t-1}$	-0.847***	(0.080)	-0.962***	(0.086)
Truth commission $_{t-1}$			-0.111	(0.310)
Amnesty $_{t-1}$			-0.200	(0.157)
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$			-0.099	(0.169)
CAT ratification			0.054	(0.124)

ICCPR ratification			-0.021	(0.162)
Africa			-0.128	(0.191)
Asia			-0.215	(0.194)
Europe			0.618***	(0.181)
Constant	1.848***	(0.631)	2.650***	(0.703)
(4) ΔDisappearances				
Domestic trial$_{t-1}$	0.476	(0.403)	0.454	(0.545)
Judicial independence $_{t-1}$	0.297	(0.520)	0.171	(0.455)
Polity2 $_{t-1}$	-0.016	(0.014)	-0.009	(0.015)
Ln(GDP per capita) $_{t-1}$	-0.065	(0.061)	0.020	(0.063)
Ln(population) $_{t-1}$	-0.139***	(0.036)	-0.136***	(0.044)
Ongoing conflict	-0.805***	(0.179)	-0.859***	(0.177)
Disappearances$_{t-1}$	-1.153***	(0.102)	-1.197***	(0.091)
Truth commission $_{t-1}$			0.562**	(0.235)
Amnesty $_{t-1}$			-0.029	(0.139)
Domestic trial$_{t-2}$			0.099	(0.193)
CAT ratification			0.050	(0.138)
ICCPR ratification			-0.184	(0.187)
Africa			0.238	(0.207)
Asia			0.020	(0.221)
Europe			-0.389	(0.420)
Constant	3.028***	(0.722)	2.500***	(0.865)
(5) Domestic Trial				
Judicial independence$_{t-1}$	-1.084**	(0.473)	-0.964**	(0.479)
Polity2$_{t-1}$	0.044***	(0.0165)	0.038**	(0.018)
Ln(GDP per capita)$_{t-1}$	0.107*	(0.0612)	0.103	(0.065)
Conflict intensity	-0.011	(0.115)	-0.038	(0.119)
Truth commission $_{t-1}$			0.618	(0.379)
Amnesty $_{t-1}$			0.209	(0.173)
CAT ratification			0.069	(0.156)
ICCPR ratification			-0.000	(0.196)
Constant	-1.714***	(0.425)	-1.766***	(0.430)
$\rho_{2,1}$	0.293***	(0.06)	0.263***	(0.059)
$\rho_{3,1}$	0.286***	(0.058)	0.280***	(0.060)
$\rho_{4,1}$	0.081	(0.075)	0.073	(0.066)
$\rho_{5,1}$	-0.646***	(0.244)	-0.577***	(0.300)
$\rho_{3,2}$	0.255***	(0.055)	0.260***	(0.056)
$\rho_{4,2}$	0.067	(0.076)	0.072	(0.075)
$\rho_{5,2}$	-0.317*	(0.174)	-0.177	(0.183)
$\rho_{4,3}$	0.449***	(0.066)	0.475***	(0.058)
$\rho_{5,3}$	-0.528***	(0.231)	-0.609	(0.422)
$\rho_{5,4}$	-0.207	(0.185)	-0.200	(0.247)
LR~χ^2 $\rho_{2,1}=\rho_{3,1}=\rho_{4,1}=\rho_{5,1}=\rho_{3,2}=\rho_{4,2}=\rho_{5,2}=\rho_{4,3}=\rho_{5,3}=\rho_{5,4}=0$		112.19***		107.98***
Observations		2041		2041
Log psuedolikelihood		-3097.8		-3035.26

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. All models include a cubic polynomial of time.
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.

D. Appendix References

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