Appendix for Effects of Exposure to New Electoral Rules: Field Experimental Evidence from Sierra Leone

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A Ethical Considerations

The study took the following steps to ensure the research adhered to ethical principles. All study participants (in both treatment and control groups and in both the field experiment and the survey experiment) were informed that they were part of a research study. As described in the paper, enumerators in the field experiment followed a random walk procedure to select individuals (alternating on gender) to invite into the study. Study participants were asked for their consent before proceeding with both the baseline and the end-line surveys. Neither the field experiment nor the survey experiment involved any deception. Individuals who completed each survey were provided a modest amount of airtime (mobile/data) credits as compensation, in keeping with local norms about appropriate levels of compensation for surveys. The compensation transfer required collecting mobile phone numbers from respondents, which then enabled enumerators to locate the respondents again for the end-line survey. Respondents were informed that their phone numbers would be used for this purpose. All phone numbers were deleted from all devices and datasets after data collection was complete. We also avoided asking any questions considered possibly sensitive by the Sierra Leone Research Ethics committee – e.g., vote choice intention. The study was designed to introduce no more than minimal risk to participants.

Because the field experiment took place around an election, we also took the following steps to ensure that we met ethical standards for such research: First, the content of the treatment presented facts and was non-partisan. Second, we did not ultimately deprive any respondents of this factual, non-partisan information, because we chose to provide the information to the control group after collecting responses to the endline survey, just before the election. Third, we ensured that the eleven hundred respondents in the field experiment were recruited in a dispersed way across all urban areas of the country, such that no polling station, district, or national vote shares would be substantively affected by any effects of the distribution of this information.

B Additional Details about Sierra Leone Politics and the New Rules

Table B.1: Election turnout in Sierra Leone (2002-2023)

Year	Election Date	System	Registered Voters	Nation-wide turnout (% of Registered Voters)	Parliamentary Seat shares
2002	14 May, 2002	PR	2,342,547	83%	SLPP 83, APC 27, PLP 2
2007	11 August, 2007	FPTP	2,617,554	75.8%	APC 59, SLPP 43, PMDC 10
2012	17 November, 2012	FPTP	2,692,635	87.3%	APC 67, SLPP 42
2018	7 March, 2018	FPTP	3,178,663	84.2%	APC 68, SLPP 49, C4C 8, NGC 4, Independent 3
2023	24 June, 2023	PR	3,374,258	83%	SLPP 81, APC 54

Note: For the 2002 and 2007 elections, data is sourced from the Inter-Parliamentary Union Global Data on National Parliaments: see here and here. For the 2012 elections, data is additionally sourced from the Carter Centre's election observation mission report here. Sources for the 2018 and 2023 election include Wikipedia and the Election Commission of Sierra Leone. PLP stands for the Peace and Liberation Party; PMDC stands for the People's Movement for Democratic Change. Parliamentary seat shares reflects only directly elected seats, and excludes indirectly elected Paramount Chief positions, which the unicameral legislature also includes.

Table B.2: District Magnitudes under the New PR System (2023)

District	Number of Elected Seats
Bo	12
Bombali	8
Bonthe	5
Falaba	4
Kailahun	10
Kambia	6
Karene	5
Kenema	12
Koinadugu	4
Kono	10
Moyamba	6
Port Loko	10
Pujehun	7
Tonkolili	10
Western Rural	10
Western Urban	16

Table B.3: District-Level Largest Party Shares and Margins Before and After PR Reform (2018 vs 2023)

District	Largest Party Share 2018(%)	Largest Party Share 2023(%)	Δ Largest Share	Victory Margin 2018	Victory Margin 2023	Δ Victory Margin
Bo	72.44	87.21	14.77	61.97	77.42	15.45
Bombali	80.55	91.64	11.09	69.99	84.89	14.90
Bonthe	68.66	95.17	26.51	54.95	90.34	35.39
Falaba	40.33	50.75	10.42	10.32	7.85	-2.47
Kailahun	62.12	96.18	34.06	38.23	92.36	54.13
Kambia	42.17	56.36	14.19	2.79	22.17	19.38
Karene	74.82	71.97	-2.85	64.17	45.96	-18.21
Kenema	75.14	94.92	19.78	62.96	90.88	27.92
Koinadugu	50.32	62.53	12.21	29.29	32.26	2.97
Kono	49.22	59.96	10.74	25.82	34.08	8.26
Moyamba	65.17	78.21	13.04	47.43	61.04	13.61
Port Loko	60.83	59.42	-1.41	46.59	23.54	-23.05
Pujehun	54.92	93.43	38.51	30.17	89.03	58.86
Tonkolili	65.56	80.41	14.85	51.79	67.35	15.56
Western Rural	51.06	52.34	1.28	16.60	7.09	-9.51
Western Urban	54.51	55.12	0.61	21.10	12.20	-8.90
Mean	60.49	74.10	13.61	39.63	52.40	12.77

Note: For 2018, vote shares are aggregated up from single-member majoritarian constituencies by summing all votes received by each party across constituencies within each district to produce district-wide vote shares. This does not reflect the actual share of seats/constituencies won by the party as under the old system. The 2023 figures report district-level vote shares under the new multi-member PR contests. Victory margin is the percentage point difference between vote share for the leading party and the second-largest party in the district.

Table B.4: District-Level Distance to One More Seat Before and After PR Reform (2018 vs 2023)

District	Percentage Points Needed for One More Seat in 2018	Percentage Points Needed for One More Seat in 2023	Δ in P.P. Needed for One More Seat (2023-2018)
Bo	1.86	2.11	0.25
Bombali	52.28	4.15	-48.13
Bonthe	38.26	10.35	-27.91
Falaba	1.12	17.90	16.78
Kailahun	0.73	8.08	7.35
Kambia	2.22	9.49	7.27
Karene	3.44	7.87	4.43
Kenema	9.85	7.86	-1.99
Koinadugu	17.61	8.52	-9.09
Kono	5.10	3.90	-1.20
Moyamba	15.71	10.05	-5.66
Port Loko	23.25	10.48	-12.97
Pujehun	3.00	7.41	4.41
Tonkolili	2.77	6.94	4.17
Western Rural	4.37	7.66	3.29
Western Urban	1.51	7.08	5.57
Mean	11.44	8.11	-3.33

Note: For 2018, the additional vote share needed to get one extra seat in the district is the smallest vote margin of victory among the SMD constituencies in that district in the 2018 elections. For instance, among the SMD constituencies in Bo district, Constituency 84 saw the winning MP candidates secure the district by 1.86 percentage points, the smallest margin of victory in the district. For 2023, the additional vote share needed to get one extra seat in a district is one of the following: (1) the distance (in percentage points) to the electoral threshold for the party closest to but below the 11.9% threshold, (2) the distance (in percentage points) to the largest remainder, or (3) the distance (in percentage points) to the Hare quotient, depending on which of 1-3 is the shortest distance in that district to secure one of the parties that appeared on the ballot one more seat.

Figure B.1: Sierra Leone in Global Context, Using Varieties of Democracy Indicators (2023)



Note: The graph plots all countries in the V-Dem 2023 dataset using V-Dem's clientelism index (*v2xnp_client*) and V-Dem's clean elections index (*v2xel_frefair*). Sierra Leone is denoted in red.

C Journalists' Campaign Observations

Together with IGR, we hired local journalists in 6 of the country's 16 districts to keep diaries about campaign strategies and messaging that they observed in the 4 weeks before the election. We selected the six districts to balance partisan-leanings and expected electoral competitiveness. The six districts were Bo, Bombali, Kono, Pujehun, Tonkolili, and Western Area Urban (which includes Freetown). These journalists logged qualitative reports about the campaign activity they witnessed in their district, focusing on posters, fliers, rallies, radio shows, and WhatsApp advertising. Here are representative examples of what they logged: In Tonkolili district, the APC used fliers to promote their presidential candidate but also fliers with an individual MP candidate's face on it, which underscores a candidate-centered messaging strategy typical of plurality voting even in parliamentary contests.[38] The journalists documented several instances of campaign material that emphasized individual candidate qualities for the MP races. An example from the capital Freetown was a campaign poster that read "Best Guy for MP Western Area Abdulai Kamara" with a message inscription "Take Back 2023." The poster contained a picture of the APC Presidential candidate together with a picture of the aforementioned APC parliamentary candidate, Mr. Kamara.[39] Another such parliamentary campaign emphasizing individual candidate quality was observed in Bombali district, where a candidate named Salieu Osman Sesay (commonly called SOS) had a poster with his smiling face alongside the caption "Vote SOS for continuity and better representation in the House of Parliament" with no party affiliation indicated.[40] On other posters by this candidate, he was described as "The most experienced economist in Parliament; SOS is the answer,"[41] despite the fact that he himself would not be on the ballot.

[38] Journalist reports from June 7th and June 12th 2023 in Tonkolili district.
[39] Journalist report, June 7th 2023 in Western Area Urban district.
[40] Journalist report, June 19th 2023 in Bombali district.
[41] Ibid.

Other journalists observed signs of a partial shift in campaign strategies that indicated some attempts at adaptation to the new electoral rules. In Bombali district, the APC was seen taking some steps toward PR-aligned campaigning by organizing joint canvassing efforts where multiple parliamentary and councillor candidates appeared together at campaign events under a unified party banner, promoting collective rather than personal achievements.[42] In Kono, smaller parties like National Unity Reconciliation Party (NURP) and independents conducted voter sensitization door-to-door canvassing while displaying sample ballots[43], and a radio program by the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) party emphasized a "Took it All" message, urging supporters to cast their vote for *all* races on the ballot in their party's favor.[44] In Pujehun district, the local journalist reported several instances where the SLPP and independent candidates both attempted grassroots campaign efforts at educating people about the PR district-block voting system.[45] At the same time, the shift was partial at best even within geographic districts: at one SLPP campaign event in Pujehun, an incumbent SLPP parliamentary candidate started by talking up his many constituency-level development achievements, then attributed those achievements to the party and its leadership, and then switched back to making constituency-specific development promises. The excerpt from the journalist report of this event reads: "The key speaker from the SLPP Party was an MP Candidate, who, during his statement, highlighted his endless community projects ranging from the construction of culverts, rehabilitation of schools, the provision of local machines for agriculture and payment of fees for university students among many others. He said all these projects were achieved because of the SLPP Party President Tok N Do. He went further to promise the community people that if they cast their votes for the SLPP Party come 24 June 2023 electricity to their community health center may be provided, and, in fact, he also promised them a solar light system within 3 days to the community at large."

Across our journalists' diaries, there were occasional mentions of voter education campaigns but these notes were always marginal to the main activities, which focused on primary candidates (often the presidential candidates) and many particularistic appeals. Out of more than one hundred entries between the end of May and election day (June 24, 2023), only a handful mentioned observing party operatives explaining the parliamentary ballot or new rules to voters. One of the longer notes on this subject was about the activities of an alternative party (not the incumbent SLPP or the main opposition APC), the Unity Reconciliation Party(NURP), in Kono district. It read, "The Unity Reconciliation Party(NURP) was engaged on door to door sensitization with sample of Kono District Parliamentary Know Your Candidates. From my observation [the sensitization involved] four parties including seven independent candidates. The party members were moving from one point to the other displaying the sample ballot and educate their supporters, how to vote. The team was also spotted at the Gbense market talking to traders and customers to vote for the party." Even here one can see how voters might not have gotten a full picture of the details of the new rules even when engaged by a voter education campaign. Some political operatives continued to label the education project "Know Your Candidates," while at the same time encouraging party voting. None of this is to say that voter education campaigns did not occur during the lead-up to the elections, or that the two major parties did not mention the new PR rules; rather the consistent theme is that, even during period of vigorous campaigning, the level and clarity of information about the new rules during this period were still relatively low.

[42] Journalist reports from June 2nd and June 11th 2023 in Bombali district.
[43] Journalist report, June 15th 2023 in Kono district.
[44] Journalist report, June 19th, 2023 in Kono district.
[45] Journalist reports from June 2nd, June 3rd, and June 14th in Pujehun district.

D Validating Our Proxy for Partisanship

Because we were not allowed by the Sierra Leone IRB to directly ask respondents about partisanship during a sensitive pre-election period, we proxied for likely partisan attachment based on a combination of respondents' geographical and ethnic markers. Specifically, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) strongholds were identified by stronghold districts in the South and East such as Moyamba, Bonthe, Kenema, Bo, Kailahun, and Pujehun, and among speakers of the Mende language. All People's Congress (APC) strongholds included northern districts that have traditionally aligned with the APC like Port Loko, Tonkolili, Bombali, Falaba, Karene, and Koinadugu, particularly among Temne and Limba speakers. Waterloo in the Western Area was additionally coded as an APC stronghold due to its electoral history. Competitive districts such as Kono, Kambia, Western Urban, and Western Rural were categorized as having swing or mixed political affiliations, if the above stated ethno-linguistic criteria were not met. Our measure thus allows variation in partisanship both across and within districts.

To validate our approach to proxying for partisanship, we analyzed data from the 2023 Afrobarometer survey conducted in Sierra Leone (the same year as our study). The survey asks respondents whether they feel close to any political party (yes/no) and, if so, which political party. The survey also asks for the respondent's ethnic group and notes the respondents' regions. In Table D.1, we confirm that the ethnic groups we used as proxies for SLPP and APC partisanship (Mende for SLPP and Temne and Limba for APC) do in fact correlate strongly with Afrobarometer's measures of feeling close to those specific parties. Likewise, the southern and eastern regions are strongly correlated with feeling close to the SLPP, the northern region most correlated with support for the APC (compared to the eastern and southern regions), and the northwestern district (which holds both Western Urban and Western Rural districts) much more mixed, as we assumed. Membership in the Kono ethnic group is also, as we assumed, strongly correlated with support for parties other than the APC or the SLPP. If we subset the Afrobarometer to urban respondents only, we find the same patterns. The only difference in Table D.1 and our approach is that we have no respondents that we know to be Yalunka, Loko, Koranko or ethnically Krio.[46] We therefore set aside the positive correlations between these ethnic identities and APC support in the Afrobarometer data.

[46]Many of our respondents speak Krio, which is the lingua franca in Sierra Leone, but we do not know them to identify ethnically as Krio. All of these groups are very small in the Afrobarometer sample. Indeed, there are no Yalunka respondents among urban Afrobarometer respondents, only 8 Loko, 14 Koranko, and 19 identifying as ethnically Krio.

Table D.1: Correlations Between Partisanship and Ethnicity/Region in the 2023 Sierra Leone Afrobarometer

	Close to:		
	SLPP	APC	Other Party
Mende	0.310**	0.092	0.023
	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.050)
Themne	-0.124	0.485***	0.009
	(0.145)	(0.140)	(0.050)
Limba	-0.081	0.478***	0.011
	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.052)
Kono	0.027	0.169	0.126**
	(0.155)	(0.149)	(0.053)
Eastern	0.101**	-0.071*	-0.014
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.015)
Southern	0.291***	-0.073*	-0.007
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.015)
Northern	0.065	0.060(*)	-0.014
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.014)
North-West	0.019	-0.052	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.014)
Krio	-0.083	0.436**	-0.005
	(0.172)	(0.165)	(0.060)
Loko	-0.083	0.402**	0.000
	(0.170)	(0.165)	(0.059)
Sherbro	0.080	0.141	0.002
	(0.0163)	(0.157)	0.056
Fullah	-0.020	0.119	0.024
	(0.155)	(0.149)	0.053)
Koranko	0.004	0.269*	0.007
	(0.155)	(0.150)	(0.053)
Yalunka	-0.061	0.389**	0.009
	(0.199)	(0.191)	(0.068)
Madingo	0.048	0.187	0.023
	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.054)
Susu	0.040	0.146	0.019
	(0.161)	(0.155)	(0.055)
Kissi	0.037	0.206	0.046
	(0.166)	(0.160)	(0.057)
Observations	1200	1200	1200
R2	0.28	0.21	0.03

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Reference region is Western region. Reference ethnic group is other.

E Additional Field Experiment Results

E.1 Summary Statistics, Balance, and Attrition

Table E.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Male	737	0.51	0.5	0	0	1	1
Educational Attainment	737	3.6	1.3	1	3	4	7
Age	737	34	13	18	24	39	105
Married	737	0.46	0.5	0	0	1	1
Has Children	737	0.7	0.46	0	0	1	1
Number of Children	735	2.1	2.3	0	0	3	23
Mende Speaker	737	0.26	0.44	0	0	1	1
Krio Speaker	737	0.41	0.49	0	0	1	1
Temne Speaker	737	0.14	0.35	0	0	0	1
Kono Speaker	737	0.026	0.16	0	0	0	1
Fullah Speaker	737	0.042	0.2	0	0	0	1
English Speaker	737	0.016	0.13	0	0	0	1
Discusses Politics	725	2.5	1.2	1	1	3	4
Trust in 2018 Elections	658	3.4	1	1	3	4	4
Registered to Vote	737	0.99	0.12	0	1	1	1
Would vote	737	0.9	0.3	0	1	1	1
Encourage others	737	0.54	0.5	0	0	1	1
Treatment Status	737	0.49	0.5	0	0	1	1

Note: The table displays summary statistics for key demographic, participation and trust variables for the full sample of respondents that we were able to interview during baseline and endline both. "Educational Attainment" is an ordinal variable ranging from 1-7 according to the level of the respondents' highest level of education (1 being no education to 7 being post-graduate degree). "Trust in 2018 Elections" measures the scaled mean response to the question asked during the baseline survey: "How strongly do you agree with the following statement? The 2018 election was free and fair. (1-4 scale)", with values closer to 4 indicating "strong agree" and values closer to 1 indicating "strongly disagree". 'Discuss politics' is an ordinal variable on a scale from 1-4, where 1 corresponds to the respondent answering that they never discuss politics with family and friends, to 4, which corresponds to the respondent answering that they very often discuss politics. The discuss politics question was asked during baseline and endline both, so the one here reflects the baseline response summary which is pertinent when checking for balance on pre-treatment covariates in Table E.2. Tables E.18 and E.23 reflect the endline survey version of the discuss politics variable. 'Encourage others' is a variable measuring whether or not the respondent reported being willing to encourage others to vote. "Treatment Status" equals 1 if the respondent received information about the switch to PR, and 0 if not.

Table E.2: Balance Table

	Difference in Means:	
	Treated with PR Info	
Male	0.014	0.014
	(0.040)	(0.042)
No Education	0.073	0.072
	(0.067)	(0.072)
APC voter	-0.076	-0.064
	(0.057)	(0.062)
SLPP voter	-0.061	-0.071
	(0.062)	(0.065)
Primary Schooling	0.097	0.072
	(0.090)	(0.093)
Junior Secondary schooling	-0.060	-0.056
	(0.064)	(0.067)
High School	0.009	-0.001
	(0.049)	(0.052)
Respondent Age	-0.001	-0.0003
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Married	-0.123***	-0.153***
	(0.044)	(0.046)
Number of Children	0.024**	0.023*
	(0.011)	(0.012)
Mende Speaker	-0.015	-0.014
	(0.065)	(0.068)
Krio Speaker	-0.007	-0.018
	(0.051)	(0.055)
Discusses Politics	0.011	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Trust in 2018 Elections		0.023
		(0.020)
Observations	723	645
F Statistic	1.420 (df = 13; 709)	1.424 (df = 14; 630)

Note: This table presents the results of a balance check assessing whether key demographic and political characteristics are evenly distributed across treatment and control groups in the study. Model (1) excludes while Model (2) includes pre-treatment trust in the electoral process, which drops the sample size slightly due to item non-response. The dependent variable "Treatment" indicator is regressed on a range of variables including gender, education level, political party affiliation, age, marital status, number of children, ethnic group, political discussion frequency, and trust in the electoral process. Coefficients represent the difference in means between the treatment and control groups, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficients indicate imbalance in the corresponding characteristic. An F-test of joint significance of all covariates indicates that baseline covariates do not jointly predict treatment status.

Table E.3: Lack of Differential Attrition

	Dependent variable:
	Attrited
Treated	0.029
	(0.028)
Constant	0.328***
	(0.020)
Observations	1,121
R^2	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.00004
F Statistic	1.050 (df = 1; 1119)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
The dependent variable "Attrited" indicates whether respondents from the baseline survey did not participate in the follow-up survey (1 = attrited, 0 = participated). The model assesses the effect of treatment assignment on the probability of attrition between baseline and endline surveys, using OLS (linear probability model). Coefficients represent the change in the probability of attrition associated with being in the treatment group compared to the control group. Standard errors are in parentheses.

E.2 Knowledge Outcomes

Table E.4: Null Effects on General Political Knowledge

	Dependent variable: Correct knowledge of		
	Candidate list process	Positions on ballot	Women's representation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.022	-0.001	-0.034
	(0.037)	(0.106)	(0.037)
Married	0.004	-0.020	0.038
	(0.043)	(0.123)	(0.043)
No. of Children	-0.011	-0.024	-0.024***
	(0.009)	(0.026)	(0.009)
Constant	0.580***	3.132***	0.593***
	(0.033)	(0.093)	(0.032)
Observations	735	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance.
"Positions on ballot" is a count of correct answers to question about which positions will be voted for on the ballot.

Table E.5: Null Effects on General Knowledge Index

	Dependent variable:
	Knowledge Index
Treated	0.021
	(0.038)
Married	-0.025
	(0.045)
No. of Children	-0.014
	(0.009)
Constant	0.032
	(0.034)
Observations	735
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance. The knowledge index is the average of standardized (z-score) measures of five knowledge variables: (1) that MPs are elected under PR, (2) the president is elected under FPTP, (3) the candidate list process, (4) women's representation provisions, and (5) count of correctly identified positions on the ballot. Each item was first transformed into a z-score, then averaged to form the index.

As we explain in the main text of the paper, evidence suggests that voter education, apart from our intervention, was not widespread even in the weeks right before the election. The IGR-Irish Aid survey we referenced was conducted in April 2023 and estimated that 85% of the voting age population did not know about the new electoral rules. The diaries of the journalists with whom we collaborated in the weeks right before the election noted little in the way of campaigning or voter education around the new rules. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that some efforts at voter education did occur in the period right before the election but were not have been picked up in the six areas covered by the journalists we collaborated; these efforts might have increased knowledge about MMD PR within the control group in some areas we sampled from in the experiment, reducing treatment effects on knowledge about the new ballots. In Table E.6, we examine individual correlates of correct answers to this question. There are some geographic indicators that suggest voter education campaigns in those areas. In particular, being a resident of Western Rural province was strongly associated with answering the PR ballot question correctly within the control group.

Table E.6: Predictors of Knowledge of MP Ballot Rules (Control Group Only)

	Dependent variable:		
	Knows MP ballot elects parties		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Demographics:			
Male	0.005	−0.053	−0.175
	(0.185)	(0.190)	(0.318)
Married	−0.035	0.072	−0.105
	(0.385)	(0.471)	(0.413)
College educated	−0.121	−0.178	−0.197
	(0.265)	(0.329)	(0.365)
Low education	0.454	0.399	0.192
	(0.288)	(0.317)	(0.409)
Age	−0.001	−0.003	−0.009
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.017)
Number of children	0.042	0.065	0.100
	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.136)
Mende	−0.502	−0.036	−0.611
	(0.714)	(1.020)	(0.569)
Krio	0.782***	0.831***	0.484
	(0.259)	(0.264)	(0.702)
Temne	0.335	0.301	0.440
	(0.415)	(0.411)	(0.509)
Kono	−0.993	−1.118	−0.695
	(1.338)	(0.967)	(0.898)
Fullah	−0.135	0.015	−0.028
	(0.588)	(0.509)	(0.937)
Province:			
North-West Province		0.198	
		(0.492)	
Northern Province		0.747*	
		(0.399)	
Southern Province		−0.148	
		(0.244)	
Western Rural		1.543***	
		(0.298)	
Western Urban		0.921	
		(0.588)	
District:			
Bo			1.143***
			(0.145)
Bombali			4.651***
			(0.243)
Bonthe			0.189
			(0.343)
Falaba			2.008***
			(0.521)
Kailahun			20.052***
			(1.153)
Kambia			1.279***
			(0.229)
Karene			1.461***
			(0.453)
Koinadugu			1.095***
			(0.285)
Kono			−0.079
			(0.607)
Moyamba			2.523***
			(0.351)
Port Loko			0.906***
			(0.179)
Pujehun			−15.068***
			(1.142)
Tonkolili			−1.283***
			(0.287)
Western Rural District			2.437***
			(0.124)
Western Urban District			2.020***
			(0.368)
Constant	−0.894***	−1.455***	−1.887***
	(0.268)	(0.431)	(0.728)
Observations	373	373	373
Sample	Control Only	Control Only	Control Only
SE Clustering	Province	Province	District
Reference Geography	NA	Eastern Province	Kenema District
Log Likelihood	−230.698	−223.016	−169.638
Akaike Inf. Crit.	485.396	480.031	393.277

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Linear probability models estimated on control group respondents only. Dependent variable is a binary indicator for correctly knowing that MPs are elected via proportional representation (PR). Model (1) includes language and demographic predictors only, Model (2) adds province fixed effects, with the Eastern district as the reference, Model (3) adds district fixed effects, with Kenema as the reference. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Because the effect of treatment on correct answers to the question about choosing a party or a candidate on the parliamentary ballot was 15% over the baseline in control but not huge, we conducted mediation analyses of the treatment effect on support for particularistic appeals to see if there was a detectable indirect effect through correct answers to the parliamentary ballot question. We conducted these analyses both within the full sample (Table E.7) and within the sample that excludes Western Rural province where more voter education might have taken place even among control respondents (Table E.8. We focus on treatment effects on support for particularistic appeals, because these are the results that are not conditional on anything (e.g., gender, reminders of 2018) and thus we can conduct mediation analyses—albeit with all the caveats about sequential ignorability (Bullock, Green and Ha, 2010)—straightforwardly within the full sample. We find evidence in both Tables E.7 and E.8 of an indirect effect through correct answers to the ballot question, which is significant at the 0.10 level.

Table E.7: Mediation of PR Knowledge on Support for Particularistic Appeals

Effect	Estimate	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p.value
ACME (Indirect Effect)	-0.009*	-0.021	0.001	0.100
ADE (Direct Effect)	-0.068*	-0.140	0.001	0.054
Total Effect	-0.078**	-0.148	-0.008	0.026
Proportion Mediated	0.119	-0.054	0.596	0.118

Quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 simulations. Full sample included.

Table E.8: Mediation of Knowledge on Support for Particularistic Appeals (Excluding Western Rural)

Effect	Estimate	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper	p.value
ACME (Indirect Effect)	-0.011*	-0.024	0.0005	0.058
ADE (Direct Effect)	-0.052	-0.126	0.019	0.146
Total Effect	-0.063*	-0.135	0.008	0.084
Proportion Mediated	0.167	-0.708	1.179	0.130

Quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 simulations. Estimates exclude Western Rural respondents, where knowledge about MP ballots using PR was higher than the rest of the country.

E.3 Main Tables with Coefficients on Covariates Displayed

Table E.9: Treatment Effects on Knowledge of Electoral Systems, Full Results

	Dependent variable:		
	Knows MP Elected Through PR	Knows President Elected Through FPTP	Accurate Answers about Women's Representation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.060*	0.048	-0.034
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Married	-0.056	-0.040	0.038
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Number of Children	-0.006	0.014	-0.024***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.400***	0.404***	0.593***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Observations	733	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls for marital status and number of children of the respondent correct for minor imbalance.

Table E.10: Treatment Effects on Approval of Different Campaign Appeals, Full Results

	Dependent variable: Strong Approval of		
	Universal	Particularistic	Leader Quality
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.002	-0.122**	-0.031
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)
SLPP voter	0.215***	0.261***	0.330***
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Swing voter	0.023	0.071	0.118*
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Treated × SLPP voter	-0.081	0.104	0.021
	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.078)
Treated × Swing voter	-0.141	0.010	-0.136
	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.089)
Married	0.019	-0.018	0.013
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Number of Children	-0.007	0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.642***	0.549***	0.493***
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Observations	735	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls for marital status and number of children of the respondent correct for minor imbalance.

Table E.11: Treatment Effects on Political Participation, Full Results

	Dependent variable:			
	Would vote	Vote Wait Time	Would volunteer	Encourage others
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.020	1.363**	-0.069	-0.056
	(0.031)	(0.665)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Male	-0.012	1.512**	0.023	-0.076
	(0.031)	(0.653)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Treated × Male	0.040	-2.460***	0.058	0.018
	(0.044)	(0.933)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Married	0.015	0.246	-0.043	-0.037
	(0.026)	(0.546)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Number of Children	-0.002	0.013	0.001	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.115)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	0.906***	3.646***	0.731***	0.618***
	(0.025)	(0.533)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Observations	735	724	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls for marital status and number of children of the respondent correct for minor imbalance.

Table E.12: Effects of Treatment on Trust in Elections, Full Results

	Dependent variable: Trust in		
	Free & Fair Election	Counting Process	Peaceful Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
First Reminded of 2018	-0.131**	0.037	0.056
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Treated	-0.112**	-0.007	-0.025
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Treated x	0.245***	0.028	0.044
First 2018	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Married	0.031	0.094**	0.057
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Number of Children	0.0002	-0.002	0.005
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.638***	0.349***	0.354***
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Observations	658	614	633

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls for marital status and number of children of the respondent correct for minor imbalance.

E.4 Main Tables without Covariates

Table E.13: Treatment Effects on Knowledge of Electoral Systems, Without Covariates

	Dependent variable:		
	Knows MP Elected Through PR	Knows President Elected Through FPTP	Accurate Answers about Women's Representation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.063*	0.053	-0.038
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	0.358***	0.411***	0.563***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	735	737	737
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.14: Treatment Effects on Approval of Different Campaign Appeals, Without Covariates

	Dependent variable: Strong Approval of		
	Universal	Particularistic	Leader Quality
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.004	-0.129**	-0.039
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.058)
SLPP voter	0.213***	0.256***	0.327***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Swing voter	0.024	0.068	0.114*
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.064)
Treated × SLPP voter	-0.081	0.114	0.027
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Treated × Swing voter	-0.144	0.019	-0.130
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Constant	0.638***	0.546***	0.500***
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	737	737	737
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.15: Treatment Effects on Participation by Gender, Without Covariates

	Dependent variable:			
	Would vote	Vote Wait Time	Would volunteer	Encourage others
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.021	1.294*	-0.065	-0.059
	(0.031)	(0.661)	(0.048)	(0.052)
Male	-0.013	1.462**	0.025	-0.076
	(0.031)	(0.649)	(0.047)	(0.051)
Treated × Male	0.039	-2.399***	0.056	0.024
	(0.044)	(0.927)	(0.067)	(0.073)
Constant	0.911***	3.831***	0.711***	0.605***
	(0.021)	(0.454)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Observations	737	726	737	737
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table E.16: Effects of Treatment on Trust in Elections, Without Covariates

	Dependent variable: Trust in		
	Free & Fair Election	Counting Process	Peaceful Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
First Reminded of 2018	-0.134**	0.033	0.052
	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Treated	-0.115**	-0.017	-0.027
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Treated× First 2018	0.244***	0.026	0.040
	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.078)
Constant	0.654***	0.393***	0.394***
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Observations	660	616	635
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E.5 Evidence Against Pure Politicization

We checked whether our treatment effects vary across districts that did and did not have smaller parties or independents disadvantaged by the reform, as well as whether our treatment effects vary across incumbent (SLPP), opposition (APC), and swing voters, in order to gauge whether citizens more likely to have been exposed to pushback against the reform exhibited different reactions to the information about the reform. We do find some limited evidence that APC supporters sometimes react negatively to the new rules by, e.g., withdrawing their plans to participate or lowering their trust in the elections (see Appendix Tables

E.17 and E.19), but these results are few. We find that both SLPP *and* swing voters reacted to the new rules in ways consistent with our pre-registered expectations (Appendix Tables E.17-E.19), and that citizens in districts where third parties were disadvantaged by the reform did not react differently to treatment (Appendix Tables E.20-E.22).

Table E.17: Treatment Effects on Participation Outcomes by Partisanship

	Dependent variable:			
	Would vote	Vote Wait Time	Would volunteer	Encourage others
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.017	-0.425	-0.096*	-0.090
	(0.038)	(0.793)	(0.057)	(0.062)
SLPP voter	-0.069**	1.078	0.214***	0.270***
	(0.035)	(0.728)	(0.052)	(0.057)
Swing voter	-0.022	3.738***	0.116*	0.006
	(0.042)	(0.872)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Treated × SLPP voter	0.059	0.771	0.103	0.046
	(0.051)	(1.062)	(0.076)	(0.083)
Treated × Swing voter	-0.026	0.219	0.051	0.103
	(0.058)	(1.215)	(0.087)	(0.095)
Married	0.015	0.460	-0.050	-0.041
	(0.026)	(0.535)	(0.038)	(0.042)
No. of Children	-0.002	0.041	0.003	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.113)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	0.935***	2.937***	0.623***	0.465***
	(0.029)	(0.595)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Observations	735	724	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance.

Table E.18: Treatment Effects on Participation Outcomes by Partisanship

	Dependent variable:		
	Discuss Politics	Attended a rally	Would register others
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.037	-0.144**	-0.104*
	(0.138)	(0.061)	(0.054)
SLPP voter	0.424***	0.022	0.066
	(0.127)	(0.056)	(0.050)
Swing voter	0.507***	0.082	-0.067
	(0.150)	(0.066)	(0.060)
Treated × SLPP voter	0.053	0.123	0.181**
	(0.185)	(0.081)	(0.073)
Treated × Swing voter	-0.007	0.055	0.138*
	(0.210)	(0.092)	(0.083)
No. of Children	-0.003	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Married	0.047	0.053	0.053
	(0.093)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Constant	2.318***	0.320***	0.723***
	(0.103)	(0.046)	(0.041)
Observations	710	720	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include respondent's number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance. 'Discuss politics' is an ordinal variable on a scale from 1-4, where 1 corresponds to the respondent answering that they never discuss politics, to 4, which corresponds to the respondent answering that they very often discuss politics. 'Rally attendance' is variable measuring whether or not the respondent attended an election campaign rally in 2023. 'Would register others' is a variable measuring whether or not the respondent reported being willing to help others to register to vote.

Table E.19: Trust Outcomes by Partisanship and Treatment

	Dependent variable: Trust in		
	Free & Fair Election	Counting process	Peaceful election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.153**	-0.070	-0.031
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.065)
SLPP voter	0.337***	0.469***	0.498***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Swing voter	0.156**	0.029	0.126*
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Treated × SLPP voter	0.248***	0.104	0.049
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.083)
Treated × Swing voter	0.207**	0.130	0.029
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.094)
Married	0.022	0.054	0.023
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
No. of Children	0.004	-0.001	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.378***	0.155***	0.138***
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Observations	658	614	633

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance.

Table E.20: Effects on Participation by Third-Party/Independent Disadvantage Districts under PR and Gender

	Dependent variable:			
	Would vote	Wait Time	Would volunteer	Encourage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.004	-1.084	-0.007	-0.016
	(0.024)	(0.704)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Third party/independent disadvantage	-0.018	-0.223	0.171*	0.222**
	(0.041)	(1.353)	(0.097)	(0.106)
Female		-1.529**	-0.037	0.042
		(0.719)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Treated×Third Party/Independent Disadvantage	0.030	-0.167	-0.003	-0.155
	(0.059)	(1.964)	(0.141)	(0.154)
Treated×Female		2.568**	-0.090	-0.030
		(1.028)	(0.073)	(0.080)
Third Party/Independent Disadvantage×Female		0.143	0.020	0.101
		(1.766)	(0.127)	(0.138)
Treated× Disadvantage×Female		-0.389	0.127	0.089
		(2.559)	(0.183)	(0.200)
No. of Children	-0.002	0.019	-0.002	-0.00001
	(0.005)	(0.117)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Married	0.015	0.250	-0.053	-0.053
	(0.026)	(0.551)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Constant	0.903***	5.176***	0.740***	0.524***
	(0.020)	(0.550)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Observations	735	724	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controls include number of children and marital status.

Third party/independent disadvantage is an indicator for districts where viable third parties or independent candidates in the 2018 constituency-level races were no longer viable under PR rules in 2023.

Table E.21: Effects on Trust Moderated by Third-Party/Independent Disadvantage under PR

	Dependent variable:		
	Free & Fair Election	Counting Process	Peaceful Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.005	-0.016	-0.014
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Third Party/Independent Disadvantage	-0.046	-0.028	0.084
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Treated × Third Party/Independent Disadvantage	0.059	0.121	0.066
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.100)
No. of Children	0.001	-0.003	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Married	0.031	0.094**	0.050
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Constant	0.577***	0.377***	0.375***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Observations	658	614	633

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controls include number of children and marital status.

Third party/independent disadvantage is an indicator for districts where viable third parties or independent candidates in the 2018 constituency-level races were no longer viable under PR rules in 2023.

Table E.22: Effects on Trust Moderated by 2018 Reminders and Third-Party/Independent Disadvantage

	Dependent variable:		
	Free & Fair Election	Counting Process	Peaceful Election
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.112*	-0.036	-0.030
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.062)
First Reminded of 2018	-0.146**	0.022	0.045
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Third Party/Independent Disadvantage	-0.088	-0.070	0.057
	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Treated×2018 Reminder	0.225***	0.038	0.031
	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.087)
Treated×Disadvantage	-0.009	0.150	0.030
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
2018 Reminder×Disadvantage	0.086	0.078	0.048
	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.139)
Treated×2018 Reminder×Disadvantage	0.114	-0.057	0.068
	(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.201)
No. of Children	0.001	-0.003	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Married	0.028	0.093**	0.047
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Constant	0.653***	0.365***	0.351***
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Observations	658	614	633

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controls include number of children and marital status.

Third party/independent disadvantage is an indicator for districts where viable third parties or independent candidates in the 2018 constituency-level races were no longer viable under PR rules in 2023.

E.6 Evidence Against Social Desirability, Sensitivity, and Data Collection Issues

Contrary to what one would expect if question sensitivity were driving results, there was not significantly more attrition or differential attrition from questions about campaign appeals, participation, or trust than from other questions in the survey. Table E.23 shows there is no differential attrition by treatment status on potentially sensitive questions about political participation and trust.

Table E.23: Differential Attrition on Sensitive Questions

	Dependent variable:		
	Free & Fair Elections	Rally attendance	Discuss politics
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.006	-0.013	-0.018
	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Constant	0.101***	0.027***	0.043***
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Observations	737	737	737
R^2	0.0001	0.002	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	0.001	0.001
F Statistic (df = 1; 735)	0.080	1.525	1.781
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
The dependent variables represent whether respondents were attrited on potentially sensitive questions about trust in free and fair elections, rally attendance, and discussing politics. The table displays OLS regression coefficients for the treatment effect on the likelihood of attrition on each question. Standard errors are in parentheses.

First, as previously mentioned, we observe null effects on a range of hypothesized outcomes that the app might have affected if it had been fully implemented. Yet, we did find null results on outcomes that the app should have influenced, as can be seen in Tables E.25-E.27. If enumerators were trying to support our initial hypotheses, we should not have obtained these null results, especially because the enumerators were hired by IGR and, if anything, would have been more motivated to find effects of the app itself (which IGR developed) rather than of the text messages. Second, our enumerator training sessions made no mention of our hypotheses, making it unlikely that data collection would be influenced by any preconceived expectations about the study's intended goals. Our pre-registration of the study's methodology and analyses was filed only as the data collection period was finishing, on June 23rd (before we had access to the data), making it impossible for the enumerators to read the full pre-analysis plan prior to data collection. Last, our quality control protocols included daily monitoring of data quality by IGR and swift address of quality issues (e.g., too short interviews, demographic data that did not match between baseline and endline) with individual enumerators.[47]

[47]IGR staff personally called respondents to verify surveys and demographic data for any problematic surveys.

Table E.24: Identifying SLPP Campaign Issues

	Dependent variable	
	Education	Gender
	(1)	(2)
Treated	-0.016	0.004
	(0.033)	(0.032)
Married	0.031	0.058
	(0.038)	(0.037)
No. of Children	-0.012	-0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.747***	0.764***
	(0.029)	(0.028)
Observations	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance. The outcomes are indicator variables for whether or not the respondents correctly identified education and 'protecting women and girls' as top SLPP campaign issues. The exact wording of the question was: "We are interested in how much voters have heard about the major political parties' manifestos for the upcoming elections in Sierra Leone. We will list a few different issue areas. For each issue, please tell us which political party you most associate with that issue. We are not asking whether you agree or disagree with the party's stance on that issue; we are not asking which party you support. Instead we are asking which party you think about when we mention each of these issues. I will now list policy issues one by one and you will tell me which party you MOST associate this policy with."

Table E.25: Effects on Identifying SLPP Campaign Issues

	Dependent variable:	
	Education	Gender
	(1)	(2)
Treated	-0.025	-0.056
	(0.054)	(0.051)
SLPP voter	0.344***	0.317***
	(0.049)	(0.047)
Swing voter	0.026	0.057
	(0.059)	(0.056)
Treated × SLPP voter	-0.010	0.082
	(0.072)	(0.068)
Treated × Swing voter	0.070	0.114
	(0.082)	(0.078)
Married	0.016	0.049
	(0.036)	(0.034)
No. of Children	-0.012	-0.013*
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Constant	0.600***	0.617***
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Observations	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance. The outcomes are indicator variables for whether or not the respondents correctly identified education and 'protecting women and girls' as top SLPP campaign issues. The exact wording of the question was: "We are interested in how much voters have heard about the major political parties' manifestos for the upcoming elections in Sierra Leone. We will list a few different issue areas. For each issue, please tell us which political party you most associate with that issue. We are not asking whether you agree or disagree with the party's stance on that issue; we are not asking which party you support. Instead we are asking which party you think about when we mention each of these issues. I will now list policy issues one by one and you will tell me which party you MOST associate this policy with.

Table E.26: Effects on Identifying APC Campaign Issues

	Dependent variable:	
	The Economy	Healthcare
	(1)	(2)
Treated	-0.004	-0.056
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Married	-0.070	-0.133***
	(0.043)	(0.043)
No. of Children	-0.001	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	0.596***	0.522***
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Observations	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance. The outcomes are indicator variables for whether or not the respondents correctly identified the economy and 'health and sanitation' as top APC campaign issues. The exact wording of the question was: "We are interested in how much voters have heard about the major political parties' manifestos for the upcoming elections in Sierra Leone. We will list a few different issue areas. For each issue, please tell us which political party you most associate with that issue. We are not asking whether you agree or disagree with the party's stance on that issue; we are not asking which party you support. Instead we are asking which party you think about when we mention each of these issues. I will now list policy issues one by one and you will tell me which party you MOST associate this policy with."

Table E.27: Effects on Identifying APC Campaign Issues

	Dependent variable:	
	The Economy	Healthcare
	(1)	(2)
Treated	0.073	0.012
	(0.057)	(0.062)
SLPP voter	-0.435***	-0.210***
	(0.053)	(0.057)
Swing voter	-0.228***	-0.221***
	(0.063)	(0.068)
Treated × SLPP voter	-0.153**	-0.137*
	(0.077)	(0.083)
Treated × Swing voter	-0.050	-0.021
	(0.088)	(0.094)
Married	-0.063	-0.137***
	(0.039)	(0.042)
No. of Children	-0.003	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	0.836***	0.669***
	(0.043)	(0.047)
Observations	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance. The outcomes are indicator variables for whether or not the respondents correctly identified the economy and 'health and sanitation' as top APC campaign issues. The exact wording of the question was: "We are interested in how much voters have heard about the major political parties' manifestos for the upcoming elections in Sierra Leone. We will list a few different issue areas. For each issue, please tell us which political party you most associate with that issue. We are not asking whether you agree or disagree with the party's stance on that issue; we are not asking which party you support. Instead we are asking which party you think about when we mention each of these issues. I will now list policy issues one by one and you will tell me which party you MOST associate this policy with."

We also find no evidence that the treatment induced socially desirable answers to questions throughout the survey. For instance, ethnic voting is a sensitive topic in Sierra Leone. Many people frown on it, and many people understand that Westerners disapprove of it. If treatment were inducing people to feel more self-conscious about their responses, we would expect treatment also to lower respondents' rate of admitting that they vote on the basis of ethnicity. Instead, as can be seen in Table E.28, columns 1 and 2, treatment has no effect on reported ethnic voting. If respondents had been induced by treatment to feel monitored, we would expect treatment to have induced all kinds of positive responses about the elections—like that they are more satisfied with candidates running in other races (column 3 of Table E.28). We see no evidence of such patterns.

Table E.28: Treatment Effects on Socially Desirable Responses

	Dependent variable:		
	Ethnic vote MP	Ethnic vote President	No good Candidates
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.001	0.003	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Constant	0.046***	0.050***	0.025**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Observations	735	735	735
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance.
Full results in Table E.29. Results without covariates are in Table E.30.

Table E.29: Treatment Effects on Socially Desirable Responses, Full Results

	Dependent variable:		
	Ethnic vote MP	Ethnic vote President	No good Candidates
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	0.001	0.003	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Number of Children	-0.001	-0.001	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Married	0.025	0.016	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.015)
Constant	0.046***	0.050***	0.025**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Observations	735	735	735

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Controls for marital status and number of children of the respondent correct for minor imbalance.

Table E.30: Treatment Effects on Socially Desirable Responses, Without Covariates

	Dependent variable:		
	Ethnic vote MP	Ethnic vote President	No good Candidates
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treated	-0.001	0.002	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Constant	0.056***	0.056***	0.032***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Observations	737	737	737
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table E.31: Treatment Effects on Trust Index

	Dependent variable:
	Trust Index
First Reminded of 2018	-0.002
	(0.047)
Treated	-0.047
	(0.048)
Treated×Reminded 2018	0.093
	(0.067)
No. of Children	0.001
	(0.008)
Married	0.051
	(0.039)
Constant	0.444***
	(0.038)
Observations	685
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The trust index is constructed as the simple average of three binary indicators: trust in the election being free and fair, trust in vote counting, and trust in the election being peaceful. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the proportion of trust dimensions endorsed by the respondent. Controls include number of children and marital status to correct for minor imbalance.

E.7 Lack of Moderation by Ethnic Diversity

We conducted additional analyses, e.g., controlling for the Ethnic Fractionalization Difference Index (EFDI), the difference between a respondents' district-level and chiefdom-level ethnic fractionalization,

and interacting it with treatment in Table E.32. All results should be taken with a grain of salt, given that all respondents are from urban areas, which, on the whole, involve highly diverse chiefdoms and districts. The results indeed suggest that EFDI does not significantly predict support for any type of campaign appeal. It also does not generally moderate the effect of our treatment on approval of different campaign appeals, with a possible exception: support for country-wide universal appeals may be lower among respondents who learn about the new rules and live in places where the ethnic diversity of their chiefdom is quite similar than the ethnic diversity of their district (though the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant). Because our sample is urban respondents who typically already live in highly diverse areas, these are mostly people who live in highly diverse chiefdoms and highly diverse districts. They may perceive universal (country-wide) appeals as pie in the sky.

Table E.32: Treatment Effects on Approval of Appeals Moderated by Ethnic Diversity

	Dependent variable: Strong Approval		
	Universal	Particularistic	Leader Qualities
Treated	-0.078*	-0.073	-0.051
	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.057)
Ethnic Frac. Difference (EFDI)	-0.382	0.137	-0.230
	(0.343)	(0.215)	(0.329)
SLPP Voter	0.124	0.330***	0.299***
	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.088)
Swing Voter	-0.081	0.084	0.020
	(0.100)	(0.077)	(0.118)
No. of Children	-0.007	0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Married	0.018	-0.020	0.011
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Treated × EFDI	0.082	-0.032	-0.063
	(0.150)	(0.288)	(0.181)
Constant	0.736***	0.506***	0.548***
	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.084)
Observations	735	735	735

Note: Controls include number of children and marital status.
EFDI is the difference between a respondents' district-level and chiefdom-level ethnic fractionalization.
Standard errors in all models are clustered at the chiefdom level.

E.8 Multiple Comparison Corrections

The following tables present FDR-adjusted p-values within pre-registered families of outcomes, within which there were multiple measures of the same concept. The pre-registered families were measures of knowledge of the new PR system, intentions to participate, and trust in elections.

Table E.33: False Discovery Rate (Benjamini–Hochberg) within Knowledge Family

Outcome	Estimate	StdError	p	FDR-adjusted p (q)	N
MP elected via PR	0.060	0.036	0.099	0.198	733
Candidate-list process	-0.022	0.037	0.551	0.551	735

Family includes only knowledge outcomes expected to move by treatment: MP elected via PR and candidate-list process.
Entries are ITT effects of treatment; q-values are Benjamini–Hochberg FDR-adjusted within this family.
Covariates include marital status and number of children.

Table E.34: False Discovery Rate Adjustment (BH) within Intent to Participate Family

Outcome	Estimate	StdError	p	FDR-adjusted p (q)	N
Would vote	-0.020	0.031	0.521	0.521	735
Vote wait time	1.363	0.665	0.041	0.102	724
Vote wait time × Male	-2.460	0.933	0.009	0.043	724
Would volunteer	-0.069	0.048	0.151	0.251	735
Encourage others	-0.056	0.053	0.285	0.357	735

Entries include main treatment effects and gender interaction for vote wait time.
q-values are Benjamini–Hochberg FDR-adjusted p-vals within the intent to participate family.
Covariates include marital status and number of children.

Table E.35: False Discovery Rate Adjustment (BH) within Trust Family

Outcome	Estimate	StdError	p	FDR-adjusted p (q)	N
Trust free & fair election	-0.112	0.055	0.043	0.128	658
Trust free & fair election × 2018 reminder	0.245	0.076	0.001	0.008	658
Trust vote counting	-0.007	0.057	0.897	0.897	614
Trust vote counting × 2018 reminder	0.028	0.079	0.724	0.869	614
Trust peaceful election	-0.025	0.056	0.661	0.869	633
Trust peaceful election × 2018 reminder	0.044	0.078	0.579	0.869	633

Entries show ITT effects and interaction terms (Treatment × 2018 election reminder) on the family of trust outcomes.
q-values are Benjamini–Hochberg FDR-adjusted p-vals within the trust family.
Covariates include marital status and number of children.

F Deviations from the Pre-Analysis Plan

Table F.1: Summary of Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)

Item from PAP	**Status**	**Explanation**
Bundled treatment: app + SMS/WhatsApp messages	Partially implemented	All treatment respondents received SMS/WhatsApp messages with electoral rule changes, but app access was unequal (Android-only; Apple store delay; email login barriers). Treatment redefined as exposure to SMS/Whatsapp-based information about electoral rules.
Estimate Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) using IV (assignment → app awareness or download)	Not estimated	Assignment to treatment was a weak instrument for both app awareness and usage due technical access issues (see Section 'Implementation'). ITT estimates are reported instead.
Multiple comparisons: defining the knowledge outcomes family	Modified	We apply FDR corrections (Benjaminin-Hochberg method) within a knowledge family restricted to outcomes that the SMS/Whatsapp message treatments were designed to move (knowledge that MPs are elected via PR and knowledge of the party-controlled candidate list process). We exclude the "matching parties to manifestos" item from this family, as pre-registered in our PAP, due to implementation constraints limiting access to in-app manifesto content (see Implementation section of the paper for details). We also did not pre-register and so exclude from the family questions about knowledge that the president is elected via FPTP or knowledge questions about women's representation; nothing in our treatment specified the women's quota under the new PR system.

G Follow-up Survey Experiment Results

We estimate treatment effects in the survey experiment using ordinary least squares (OLS), with indicators for treatment arm assignment as the main explanatory variables. The estimating equation is:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta_k \cdot \text{TreatmentArm}_{ik} + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where Y_i denotes the outcome of interest for online respondent i, such as trust in elections, expectations of candidate policy priorities, or hours willing to wait to vote. TreatmentArm_{ik} is a set of mutually exclusive indicators corresponding to the survey experimental treatment conditions. k indexes each treatment arm (e.g., PR + 12% Threshold, PR Only, PR + Women, etc.). The reference category in all regressions is *FPTP Only*. Except in Tables G.26-G.33, regressions are unweighted and estimated via OLS (linear probability models for binary outcomes). All results should be treated as exploratory; they were designed as a follow-up to the pre-registered field experiment but were not themselves pre-registered.

Table G.1: Summary Statistics: Pre-treatment Covariates

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Male	1,464	0.80	0.40	0	1
Urban resident	1,452	0.56	0.50	0	1
Peri-urban resident	1,452	0.08	0.28	0	1
Discuss politics often (ordered)	1,391	2.96	0.80	1	4
Smartphone owner	1,464	0.97	0.18	0	1
Registered to vote	1,418	0.96	0.20	0	1
Education (ordered)	1,425	3.64	0.69	0	5
Ever married	1,409	0.34	0.47	0	1
Has children	1,464	0.50	0.50	0	1
Age	1,464	29.75	9.10	18	120
Eastern Province	1,464	0.19	0.40	0	1
North-West Province	1,464	0.06	0.23	0	1
Northern Province	1,464	0.14	0.35	0	1
Southern Province	1,464	0.15	0.36	0	1
Western Province	1,464	0.45	0.50	0	1
Party: SLPP	1,464	0.31	0.46	0	1
Party: APC	1,464	0.19	0.39	0	1
Party: Swing/Mixed	1,464	0.51	0.50	0	1
Speaks Krio	1,464	0.68	0.47	0	1
Speaks English	1,464	0.09	0.29	0	1
Speaks Mende	1,464	0.10	0.30	0	1
Speaks Temne	1,464	0.06	0.23	0	1
Speaks Kono	1,464	0.01	0.11	0	1
Speaks Loko	1,464	0.001	0.04	0	1
Speaks Koranko	1,464	0.01	0.08	0	1
Comprehension	1,288	0.69	0.42	0.00	1.00

Note: Summary statistics for key demographic variables of participants in the follow-up online survey experiment. For binary indicators (e.g., *Male*, *Urban resident*, *Smartphone owner*, *Registered to vote*, *Ever married*, and *Has children*) the mean is the proportion equal to 1. *Discuss politics often* is an ordinal self-report on a 1–4 scale (1 = never, 4 = very often). *Education (ordered)* is an ordinal schooling measure (higher values = higher attainment). *Age* is a numeric integer variable for the respondent's age. Province and party variables are mutually exclusive 0/1 dummies: provinces are Eastern, North-West, Northern, Southern, Western; party proxies are SLPP, APC, and Swing/Mixed. Language variables (e.g., Krio, English, Mende, Temne, Kono, Loko, Koranko) indicate whether the respondent speaks that language at home. *Comprehension* is the share of comprehension or attention items answered correctly (0–1). On average, respondents answered 69% of the items correctly. 60.2% of respondents answered all of the comprehension questions they received correctly (ie., their *'Comprehension'* was the maximum 1). Sample sizes vary across rows due to item non-response.

Table G.2: Treatment Assignment: Counts and Percent

Treatment Arm	*N*	Percent
FPTP + Women	166	11.30
FPTP Only	176	12
PR + 1% Thresh + Women	162	11.10
PR + 12% Thresh + Women	156	10.70
PR + 12% Threshold	176	12
PR + Women	161	11
PR Only	170	11.60
Women Only	157	10.70
Pure Control	140	9.60
Total	1464	100

Note: This table displays balance in treatment assignment to different treatment conditions for online participants in the survey experiment.

Table G.3: Balance of Pre-treatment Covariates Across Treatment Arms

Variable	Overall Mean	FPTP +Women	FPTP Only	PR+1% +Women	PR+12% +Women	PR +12%	PR +Women	PR Only	Pure Control	Women Only	Omnibus *p*-val
Male	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.85	0.80	0.76	0.77	0.79	0.80	0.80	0.73
Urban resident	0.56	0.58	0.56	0.61	0.56	0.54	0.53	0.57	0.53	0.53	0.86
Discuss politics often	2.96	2.92	2.95	2.95	3.05	2.97	2.88	2.94	2.93	3	0.79
Smartphone owner	0.97	0.96	0.98	0.96	0.96	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.97	0.94	0.66
Registered to vote	0.96	0.96	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.62
Education (ordered)	3.63	3.64	3.59	3.63	3.68	3.69	3.67	3.65	3.66	3.51	0.42
Ever married	0.34	0.37	0.36	0.31	0.42	0.30	0.29	0.35	0.37	0.29	0.20
Has children	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.49	0.51	0.49	0.54	0.47	0.88
Age	29.75	30.04	30.20	29.81	30.35	29.27	29.16	29.55	30.44	29.01	0.82
Eastern Province	0.19	0.16	0.21	0.20	0.18	0.21	0.17	0.20	0.12	0.28	0.06
North-West Province	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.39
Northern Province	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.19	0.13	0.78
Southern Province	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.09	0.12	0.21	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.11
Western Province	0.45	0.51	0.43	0.55	0.44	0.40	0.47	0.46	0.45	0.38	0.06
Party: SLPP	0.31	0.29	0.33	0.24	0.25	0.34	0.27	0.35	0.31	0.38	0.11
Party: APC	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.25	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.24	0.16	0.31
Party: Swing/Mixed	0.51	0.55	0.51	0.59	0.50	0.47	0.54	0.48	0.45	0.47	0.20
Speaks Krio	0.68	0.62	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.72	0.72	0.65	0.65	0.69	0.53
Speaks English	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.44
Speaks Mende	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.10	0.08	0.10	0.14	0.12	0.62
Speaks Temne	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.88
Speaks Kono	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.64
Speaks Loko	0.001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.01	0	0.48
Speaks Koranko	0.01	0.01	0	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0	0	0.26

Note: Variables are defined as in Table G.1. The *Overall Mean* column reports the full-sample mean (for binaries, the share equal to 1). Each subsequent column reports the mean within a treatment arm. The *Omnibus p-val* tests equality of arm means for that row using an ANOVA of the covariate on treatment assignment.

Table G.4: Effect of Electoral Rules on Willingness to Wait to Vote (Hours), Moderated by Gender

	Dependent variable:			
	Hours willing to wait to vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350
	(0.683)	(0.752)	(0.733)	(0.717)
Female	−1.360	−1.360	−1.360	−1.360
	(1.094)	(1.205)	(1.174)	(1.148)
(PR + 12% Threshold) × Female	3.222**	3.222**	3.222**	3.222**
	(1.488)	(1.639)	(1.597)	(1.562)
Pure Control		0.321	0.321	0.321
		(0.791)	(0.771)	(0.754)
Pure Control × Female		3.611**	3.611**	3.611**
		(1.799)	(1.753)	(1.714)
FPTP + Women			0.266	0.266
			(0.735)	(0.718)
(FPTP + Women) × Female			1.976	1.976
			(1.665)	(1.628)
Women Only			0.567	0.567
			(0.747)	(0.730)
Women Only × Female			1.392	1.392
			(1.680)	(1.643)
PR Only				−0.520
				(0.716)
PR Only × Female				0.795
				(1.608)
PR + Women			−0.323	−0.323
			(0.748)	(0.732)
(PR + Women) × Female			2.761*	2.761*
			(1.634)	(1.598)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.387	−0.387
			(0.729)	(0.713)
(PR + 1% Thresh + Women) × Female			0.940	0.940
			(1.784)	(1.744)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.797	0.797
			(0.750)	(0.733)
(PR + 12% Thresh + Women) × Female			0.410	0.410
			(1.693)	(1.655)
Constant	4.057***	4.057***	4.057***	4.057***
	(0.478)	(0.526)	(0.513)	(0.501)
Observations	348	486	1,285	1,455
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is self-reported hours willing to wait in line to vote. Regressions are OLS with treatment arm dummies, *Female*, and their interactions; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.5: Effect of Electoral Rules on Trust in Free and Fair Elections

	Dependent variable:			
	Trust election is free fair (1-4)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	-0.285^{***}	-0.285^{**}	-0.285^{**}	-0.285^{**}
	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Pure Control		-0.346^{***}	-0.346^{***}	-0.346^{***}
		(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.119)
FPTP + Women			-0.176	-0.176
			(0.114)	(0.115)
Women Only			-0.090	-0.090
			(0.114)	(0.114)
PR Only				-0.443^{***}
				(0.113)
PR + Women			-0.422^{***}	-0.422^{***}
			(0.115)	(0.115)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			-0.349^{***}	-0.349^{***}
			(0.113)	(0.114)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			-0.353^{***}	-0.353^{***}
			(0.115)	(0.116)
Constant	2.892^{***}	2.892^{***}	2.892^{***}	2.892^{***}
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Observations	317	447	1,189	1,345
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is self-reported trust that the election is free and fair (1–4). Regressions are OLS with treatment arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.6: Effect of Electoral Rules on Trust in Free and Fair Elections, Moderated by Gender

	Dependent variable:			
	Trust election is free fair (1-4)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.304**	−0.304**	−0.304**	−0.304**
	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Female	−0.031	−0.031	−0.031	−0.031
	(0.197)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.203)
(PR + 12% Threshold) × Female	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
	(0.268)	(0.274)	(0.276)	(0.277)
Pure Control		−0.383***	−0.383***	−0.383***
		(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Pure Control × Female		0.197	0.197	0.197
		(0.299)	(0.301)	(0.302)
FPTP + Women			−0.118	−0.118
			(0.128)	(0.128)
(FPTP + Women) × Female			−0.282	−0.282
			(0.287)	(0.289)
Women Only			−0.085	−0.085
			(0.126)	(0.127)
Women Only × Female			−0.032	−0.032
			(0.291)	(0.292)
PR Only				−0.378***
				(0.126)
PR Only × Female				−0.328
				(0.286)
PR + Women			−0.372***	−0.372***
			(0.128)	(0.129)
(PR + Women) × Female			−0.237	−0.237
			(0.286)	(0.287)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.360***	−0.360***
			(0.124)	(0.124)
(PR + 1% Thresh + Women) × Female			0.073	0.073
			(0.318)	(0.319)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.454***	−0.454***
			(0.128)	(0.129)
(PR + 12% Thresh + Women) × Female			0.516*	0.516*
			(0.292)	(0.293)
Constant	2.898***	2.898***	2.898***	2.898***
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Observations	317	447	1,189	1,345
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is self-reported trust that the election is free and fair (1–4). Regressions are OLS with treatment arm dummies, *Female*, and arm×*Female* interactions; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.7: Priority if Elected: Country-wide Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose country-wide development, if elected			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.076	−0.076	−0.076	−0.076
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Pure Control		−0.045	−0.045	−0.045
		(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
FPTP + Women			−0.017	−0.017
			(0.053)	(0.052)
Women Only			−0.025	−0.025
			(0.053)	(0.053)
PR Only				−0.099*
				(0.052)
PR + Women			−0.077	−0.077
			(0.053)	(0.053)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.104**	−0.104**
			(0.053)	(0.053)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.101*	−0.101*
			(0.054)	(0.053)
Constant	0.419***	0.419***	0.419***	0.419***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *development policies that help the whole country* if elected. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.8: Priority while Campaigning: Country-wide Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose country-wide development, while campaigning.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.046	−0.046	−0.046	−0.046
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Pure Control		−0.058	−0.058	−0.058
		(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
FPTP + Women			−0.079	−0.079
			(0.054)	(0.054)
Women Only			−0.064	−0.064
			(0.055)	(0.055)
PR Only				−0.054
				(0.252)
PR + Women			−0.026	−0.026
			(0.054)	(0.054)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.154***	−0.154***
			(0.055)	(0.055)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.141**	−0.141**
			(0.055)	(0.055)
Constant	0.554***	0.554***	0.554***	0.554***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Observations	350	489	1,286	1,290
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent thinks the candidate would campaign on *development policies that help the whole country*. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.9: Priority if Elected: Neighborhood/Chiefdom Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose neighborhood/chiefdom development, if elected.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.054	−0.054	−0.054	−0.054
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Pure Control		−0.043	−0.043	−0.043
		(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)
FPTP + Women			−0.034	−0.034
			(0.034)	(0.034)
Women Only			−0.067**	−0.067*
			(0.034)	(0.034)
PR Only				−0.033
				(0.034)
PR + Women			−0.077**	−0.077**
			(0.034)	(0.034)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.057*	−0.057*
			(0.034)	(0.034)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.032	−0.032
			(0.034)	(0.035)
Constant	0.151***	0.151***	0.151***	0.151***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *development policies that benefit specific neighborhoods or chiefdoms* if elected. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.10: Priority while Campaigning: Neighborhood/Chiefdom Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose neighborhood/chiefdom development, while campaigning.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.080**	−0.080**	−0.080**	−0.080**
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Pure Control		−0.015	−0.015	−0.015
		(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.040)
FPTP + Women			0.036	0.036
			(0.039)	(0.039)
Women Only			−0.032	−0.032
			(0.039)	(0.039)
PR Only				−0.166
				(0.180)
PR + Women			−0.060	−0.060
			(0.039)	(0.039)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.016	0.016
			(0.039)	(0.039)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.015	0.015
			(0.039)	(0.039)
Constant	0.166***	0.166***	0.166***	0.166***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Observations	350	489	1,286	1,290
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent thinks the candidate would campaign on *development policies that benefit specific neighborhoods or chiefdoms*. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.11: Priority if Elected: District-Level Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose district-level development, if elected.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Pure Control		−0.015	−0.015	−0.015
		(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
FPTP + Women			−0.015	−0.015
			(0.027)	(0.028)
Women Only			0.006	0.006
			(0.027)	(0.028)
PR Only				0.031
				(0.027)
PR + Women			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.027)	(0.028)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.005	0.005
			(0.027)	(0.028)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.041	0.041
			(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	0.058***	0.058***	0.058***	0.058***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *development policies that benefit large districts* if elected. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.12: Priority while Campaigning: District-Level Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose district-level development, while campaigning.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Pure Control		0.004	0.004	0.004
		(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
FPTP + Women			0.007	0.007
			(0.035)	(0.035)
Women Only			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.035)	(0.035)
PR Only				−0.097
				(0.163)
PR + Women			0.040	0.040
			(0.035)	(0.035)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.034	0.034
			(0.035)	(0.035)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.038	0.038
			(0.036)	(0.036)
Constant	0.097***	0.097***	0.097***	0.097***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Observations	350	489	1,286	1,290
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent thinks the candidate would campaign on *development policies that benefit large districts*. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.13: Priority if Elected: Party-Leader Relationships

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose party-leader relationships, if elected.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.064	0.064	0.064	0.064
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Pure Control		0.083	0.083	0.083
		(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
FPTP + Women			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.052)	(0.052)
Women Only			−0.026	−0.026
			(0.052)	(0.053)
PR Only				0.064
				(0.051)
PR + Women			0.144***	0.144***
			(0.052)	(0.052)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.106**	0.106**
			(0.052)	(0.052)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.074	0.074
			(0.053)	(0.053)
Constant	0.291***	0.291***	0.291***	0.291***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *their own relationships with party leaders* if elected. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.14: Priority while Campaigning: Party-Leader Relationships

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose party-leader relationships, while campaigning.			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.074*	0.074*	0.074**	0.074*
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Pure Control		0.030	0.030	0.030
		(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
FPTP + Women			−0.011	−0.011
			(0.038)	(0.039)
Women Only			−0.012	−0.012
			(0.039)	(0.039)
PR Only				0.136
				(0.179)
PR + Women			0.047	0.047
			(0.039)	(0.039)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.079**	0.079**
			(0.039)	(0.039)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.060	0.060
			(0.039)	(0.039)
Constant	0.114***	0.114***	0.114***	0.114***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Observations	350	489	1,286	1,290
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would campaign on *their own relationships with party leaders*. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.15: Priority if Elected: Women-focused Development

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose women-focused development (if elected)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.051**	0.051**	0.051*	0.051**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Pure Control		0.032	0.032	0.032
		(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.027)
FPTP + Women			0.069**	0.069***
			(0.027)	(0.026)
Women Only			0.124***	0.124***
			(0.027)	(0.026)
PR Only				0.018
				(0.026)
PR + Women			0.044*	0.044*
			(0.027)	(0.026)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.076***	0.076***
			(0.027)	(0.026)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.028	0.028
			(0.027)	(0.026)
Constant	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *development policies that help women in particular* if elected. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.16: Priority if Elected: Women-Focused Development, Moderated by Gender

	Dependent variable:			
	Candidate will choose women-focused development (if elected)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.038*	0.038	0.038	0.038
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Female	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.045)
(PR + 12% Threshold) × Female	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Pure Control		0.029	0.029	0.029
		(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Pure Control × Female		0.012	0.012	0.012
		(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.067)
FPTP + Women			0.063**	0.063**
			(0.030)	(0.029)
(FPTP + Women) × Female			0.028	0.028
			(0.067)	(0.065)
Women Only			0.107***	0.107***
			(0.030)	(0.029)
Women Only × Female			0.082	0.082
			(0.067)	(0.065)
PR Only				0.015
				(0.028)
PR Only × Female				0.012
				(0.064)
PR + Women			0.041	0.041
			(0.030)	(0.029)
(PR + Women) × Female			0.010	0.010
			(0.065)	(0.063)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.052*	0.052*
			(0.029)	(0.028)
(PR + 1% Thresh + Women) × Female			0.168**	0.168**
			(0.071)	(0.069)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.026	0.026
			(0.030)	(0.029)
(PR + 12% Thresh + Women) × Female			0.008	0.008
			(0.068)	(0.066)
Constant	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *development policies that help women in particular* if elected. Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies interacted with *Female* (gender indicator); reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.17: Agreement: My Vote Would Matter in the Election

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.160	0.160	0.160	0.160
	(0.317)	(0.312)	(0.309)	(0.309)
Pure Control		0.306	0.306	0.306
		(0.333)	(0.330)	(0.330)
FPTP + Women			0.222	0.222
			(0.314)	(0.315)
Women Only			0.166	0.166
			(0.318)	(0.318)
PR Only				−0.026
				(0.313)
PR + Women			−0.174	−0.174
			(0.316)	(0.317)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.264	−0.264
			(0.315)	(0.316)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.237	0.237
			(0.318)	(0.319)
Constant	6.943***	6.943***	6.943***	6.943***
	(0.225)	(0.221)	(0.219)	(0.219)
Observations	349	486	1,285	1,453
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.18: Agreement: My Vote Would Matter in the Election, Moderated by Gender

	Dependent variable:			
	1-10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.235	0.235	0.235	0.235
	(0.358)	(0.353)	(0.349)	(0.349)
Female	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
	(0.574)	(0.565)	(0.559)	(0.559)
PR + 12% Threshold × Female	−0.327	−0.327	−0.327	−0.327
	(0.781)	(0.769)	(0.760)	(0.760)
Pure Control		0.400	0.400	0.400
		(0.372)	(0.368)	(0.368)
Pure Control × Female		−0.481	−0.481	−0.481
		(0.845)	(0.835)	(0.835)
FPTP + Women			0.337	0.337
			(0.350)	(0.350)
FPTP + Women × Female			−0.588	−0.588
			(0.798)	(0.798)
Women Only			0.016	0.016
			(0.355)	(0.355)
Women Only × Female			0.733	0.733
			(0.800)	(0.800)
PR Only				0.242
				(0.348)
PR Only × Female				−1.363*
				(0.792)
PR + Women			−0.261	−0.261
			(0.357)	(0.356)
PR + Women × Female			0.373	0.373
			(0.778)	(0.778)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.313	−0.313
			(0.346)	(0.346)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women × Female			0.343	0.343
			(0.849)	(0.849)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.153	0.153
			(0.356)	(0.356)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women × Female			0.409	0.409
			(0.800)	(0.800)
Constant	6.936***	6.936***	6.936***	6.936***
	(0.250)	(0.246)	(0.243)	(0.243)
Observations	349	486	1,285	1,453

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies interacted with *Female* (gender indicator); reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.19: Agreement: There Will Be Good Options for Parties/Candidates

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.509*	−0.509*	−0.509*	−0.509*
	(0.294)	(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.293)
Pure Control		−0.113	−0.113	−0.113
		(0.311)	(0.310)	(0.311)
FPTP + Women			−0.201	−0.201
			(0.297)	(0.298)
Women Only			−0.342	−0.342
			(0.300)	(0.301)
PR Only				−0.824***
				(0.295)
PR + Women			−0.504*	−0.504*
			(0.298)	(0.300)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.370	−0.370
			(0.297)	(0.298)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.280	−0.280
			(0.300)	(0.302)
Constant	6.931***	6.931***	6.931***	6.931***
	(0.208)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.207)
Observations	348	486	1,281	1,449
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.20: Agreement: Politics Is Too Complicated to Understand

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.298	0.298	0.298	0.298
	(0.313)	(0.320)	(0.317)	(0.317)
Pure Control		0.208	0.208	0.208
		(0.341)	(0.338)	(0.338)
FPTP + Women			0.351	0.351
			(0.321)	(0.321)
Women Only			0.388	0.388
			(0.326)	(0.326)
PR Only				−0.248
				(0.319)
PR + Women			0.255	0.255
			(0.323)	(0.323)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.264	0.264
			(0.322)	(0.322)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.159	0.159
			(0.327)	(0.327)
Constant	5.057***	5.057***	5.057***	5.057***
	(0.221)	(0.225)	(0.223)	(0.223)
Observations	347	483	1,277	1,445
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.21: Agreement: Government Is Interested in What People Like Me Think

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.313)	(0.314)	(0.319)	(0.321)
Pure Control		−0.006	−0.006	−0.006
		(0.333)	(0.338)	(0.340)
FPTP + Women			−0.121	−0.121
			(0.324)	(0.326)
Women Only			0.003	0.003
			(0.327)	(0.329)
PR Only				−0.005
				(0.321)
PR + Women			0.307	0.307
			(0.324)	(0.326)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.004	−0.004
			(0.323)	(0.325)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.011	0.011
			(0.328)	(0.330)
Constant	5.146***	5.146***	5.146***	5.146***
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.225)	(0.226)
Observations	341	477	1,264	1,434
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.22: Agreement: People Like Me Can Make a Difference in Politics

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.087	−0.087	−0.087	−0.087
	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.285)	(0.288)
Pure Control		0.156	0.156	0.156
		(0.299)	(0.303)	(0.306)
FPTP + Women			−0.133	−0.133
			(0.289)	(0.292)
Women Only			−0.179	−0.179
			(0.293)	(0.296)
PR Only				−0.270
				(0.290)
PR + Women			−0.138	−0.138
			(0.291)	(0.294)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.315	−0.315
			(0.290)	(0.293)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.041	−0.041
			(0.293)	(0.296)
Constant	7.538***	7.538***	7.538***	7.538***
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.204)
Observations	346	483	1,279	1,447
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.23: Agreement: Election chooses Political Representatives in a Fair Way

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.542*	−0.542*	−0.542*	−0.542*
	(0.305)	(0.306)	(0.305)	(0.307)
Pure Control		−0.686**	−0.686**	−0.686**
		(0.327)	(0.325)	(0.328)
FPTP + Women			−0.182	−0.182
			(0.310)	(0.312)
Women Only			−0.344	−0.344
			(0.314)	(0.316)
PR Only				−0.498
				(0.310)
PR + Women			−0.644**	−0.644**
			(0.313)	(0.315)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.507	−0.507
			(0.310)	(0.313)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.655**	−0.655**
			(0.314)	(0.317)
Constant	6.421***	6.421***	6.421***	6.421***
	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.218)
Observations	345	481	1,272	1,440
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.24: Agreement: Women Candidates Are Likely to Be Elected

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.088
	(0.310)	(0.317)	(0.303)	(0.307)
Pure Control		−0.216	−0.216	−0.216
		(0.336)	(0.322)	(0.326)
FPTP + Women			0.019	0.019
			(0.307)	(0.310)
Women Only			0.608*	0.608*
			(0.311)	(0.315)
PR Only				−0.124
				(0.308)
PR + Women			0.313	0.313
			(0.309)	(0.312)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.260	0.260
			(0.308)	(0.311)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.229	−0.229
			(0.313)	(0.317)
Constant	6.012***	6.012***	6.012***	6.012***
	(0.220)	(0.225)	(0.215)	(0.218)
Observations	341	478	1,271	1,441
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are OLS with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Weighted Sample Regressions: Follow-up Survey Experiment

Because of the nature of online participant recruitment and Facebook usage in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including Sierra Leone, our follow-up survey experimental sample was more male, better educated, and slightly younger on average than the field experimental sample. Owing to the slightly younger, and gender skewed nature of the online sample, fewer follow-up survey respondents also reported being married, relative to our field experimental sample. It also had more self-reported Krio and English speakers and fewer Temne and Mende speakers relative to the field experiment, likely owing to the overrepresentation of the Western Area (which includes the capital of Freetown) in the online sample. The second and third columns of Table G.25 below show the comparisons between the field experimental sample and the unweighted online sample along these respondent characteristics. To improve comparability between the two samples, we used post-stratification and reweighted the online sample so that its marginal distributions more closely matched the field experiment sample. This procedure reduces the risk that differences in the composition of the samples between the field experiment and the follow-up survey experiment are driving observed differences in estimated treatment effects.

We re-weighted the online survey sample to more closely align with the field experimental sample along five dimensions: gender, educational attainment, primary language spoken at home, age, and marital status. We implemented a two-stage adjustment method. First, we used post-stratification to force the survey sample to match the distribution of respondents across five major language categories (Krio, Mende, Temne, English, and Other) observed in the field experiment. Second, we applied linear calibration to adjust the post-stratified design along additional margins: gender (male vs. female), marital status (married vs. not married), college education (college degree or higher vs. less than college degree), and the mean age of 34 years observed in the field experiment sample. This approach yields observation-level weights such that the weighted survey margins align with the field-based targets. Note that we did not reweight on self-reported residential area type (urban, peri-urban or rural) from the survey experiment, even though the field experiment was conducted entirely in urban and peri-urban areas of the country. Nearly 35% of our online respondents self-identified as living in a rural area, but given near-universal smartphone usage (97%) among the sample and what we know about the concentration of Facebook usage in more urban areas in Sierra Leone, this self-reported measure may be unreliable. Using it for reweighting might only add noise to our analysis.

As is common with such a weighting approach involving multiple variables, some weights became extreme. To limit the influence of high-weight cases, we capped weights at an upper bound of 5. This trimming reduced the variance inflation introduced by calibration (raising the effective sample size ratio from around 0.20 untrimmed to around 0.32 after trimming), while keeping the weighted proportions reasonably close to the field experiment target proportions, as seen in Column 4 and 5 of G.25. It presents a side-by-side comparison of target margins, unweighted survey margins, and weighted survey margins (with trimming). All weighted regressions that follow in this appendix section are estimated using these trimmed weights.

Table G.25: Field Experimental Sample vs. Online Survey Sample (unweighted vs. weighted)

Variable	Field Target Sample	Unweighted Sample	Weighted Sample (trim=5)	Weighted - Target (Abs Diff.)
Male	50.9%	79.7%	56.5%	5.6%
Married	46.3%	28.8%	42.0%	4.2%
College Educated	22.3%	61.3%	27.4%	5.2%
Mean age	34.00	29.75	32.96	1.04
Krio Speaker	42.1%	68.4%	50.9%	8.8%
Mende Speaker	26.2%	9.6%	21.6%	4.6%
Temne Speaker	14.1%	5.5%	10.7%	3.5%
English Speaker	1.5%	9.3%	2.3%	0.8%
Other Language	16.1%	7.2%	14.5%	1.6%

Table G.26: Effect on Willingness to Wait to Vote (Hours), Moderated by Gender — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	Hours willing to wait to vote			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.158	0.158	0.158	0.158
	(0.847)	(0.846)	(0.846)	(0.846)
Female	−1.082	−1.082	−1.082	−1.082
	(1.036)	(1.036)	(1.035)	(1.035)
PR + 12% Threshold × Female	2.286	2.286	2.286	2.286
	(1.500)	(1.499)	(1.498)	(1.498)
Pure Control		−0.826	−0.826	−0.826
		(0.824)	(0.824)	(0.824)
Pure Control × Female		5.991**	5.991**	5.991**
		(2.348)	(2.346)	(2.346)
FPTP + Women			0.174	0.174
			(1.153)	(1.153)
FPTP + Women × Female			1.512	1.512
			(2.069)	(2.069)
Women Only			1.819*	1.819*
			(1.025)	(1.025)
Women Only × Female			0.034	0.034
			(1.740)	(1.740)
PR Only				−0.869
				(0.883)
PR Only × Female				0.614
				(1.252)
PR + Women			0.328	0.328
			(1.082)	(1.082)
PR + Women × Female			2.079	2.079
			(2.034)	(2.033)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.236	0.236
			(1.022)	(1.022)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women × Female			1.282	1.282
			(2.039)	(2.039)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.297	−0.297
			(0.890)	(0.889)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women × Female			1.823	1.823
			(1.503)	(1.503)
Constant	3.949***	3.949***	3.949***	3.949***
	(0.722)	(0.722)	(0.722)	(0.722)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	348	486	1,285	1,455

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is self-reported hours willing to wait in line to vote. Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment arm dummies, *Female*, and their interactions; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.27: Trust Elections Are Free and Fair — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	Trust in free and fair elections (1-4)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.143	−0.143	−0.143	−0.143
	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.220)
Pure Control		−0.226	−0.226	−0.226
		(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)
FPTP + Women			−0.253	−0.253
			(0.198)	(0.198)
Women Only			0.079	0.079
			(0.185)	(0.185)
PR Only				−0.362*
				(0.205)
PR + Women			−0.178	−0.178
			(0.193)	(0.193)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.121	−0.121
			(0.216)	(0.216)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.162	−0.162
			(0.222)	(0.222)
Constant	2.816***	2.816***	2.816***	2.816***
	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	317	447	1,189	1,345

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is self-reported trust that the election is free and fair (1–4). Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.28: Trust Elections Are Free and Fair, Moderated by Gender — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	Trust in free and fair elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033
	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)
Female	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.311)
PR + 12% Threshold × Female	−0.326	−0.326	−0.326	−0.326
	(0.436)	(0.436)	(0.436)	(0.436)
Pure Control		−0.143	−0.143	−0.143
		(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.292)
Pure Control × Female		−0.187	−0.187	−0.187
		(0.476)	(0.476)	(0.476)
FPTP + Women			−0.167	−0.167
			(0.257)	(0.257)
FPTP + Women × Female			−0.223	−0.223
			(0.402)	(0.402)
Women Only			0.199	0.199
			(0.228)	(0.228)
Women Only × Female			−0.281	−0.281
			(0.386)	(0.386)
PR Only				−0.117
				(0.240)
PR Only × Female				−0.549
				(0.420)
PR + Women			0.088	0.088
			(0.247)	(0.247)
PR + Women × Female			−0.547	−0.547
			(0.387)	(0.387)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.062	−0.062
			(0.248)	(0.248)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women × Female			−0.185	−0.185
			(0.488)	(0.488)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.389	−0.389
			(0.268)	(0.268)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women × Female			0.599	0.599
			(0.440)	(0.440)
Constant	2.799***	2.799***	2.799***	2.799***
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	317	447	1,189	1,345

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is self-reported trust that the election is free and fair (1–4). Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment arm dummies, *Female*, and arm×*Female* interactions; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.29: Priority while Campaigning: Neighborhood/Chiefdom Development — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	Pr(Neighborhood/Chiefdom development while campaigning)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.029	−0.029	−0.029	−0.029
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Pure Control		−0.011	−0.011	−0.011
		(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
FPTP + Women			0.116	0.116
			(0.075)	(0.075)
Women Only			−0.020	−0.020
			(0.063)	(0.063)
PR Only				−0.129***
				(0.045)
PR + Women			−0.002	−0.002
			(0.070)	(0.070)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.032	0.032
			(0.071)	(0.071)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.004	−0.004
			(0.058)	(0.058)
Constant	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	350	489	1,286	1,290

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent thinks the candidate would campaign on *development policies that benefit specific neighborhoods or chiefdoms*. Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.30: Priority while Campaigning: Party–Leader Relationships — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	Pr(Party–leader relationships while campaigning)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Pure Control		0.053	0.053	0.053
		(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.067)
FPTP + Women			−0.031	−0.031
			(0.049)	(0.049)
Women Only			−0.021	−0.021
			(0.056)	(0.056)
PR Only				0.569**
				(0.271)
PR + Women			0.022	0.022
			(0.066)	(0.066)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.076	0.076
			(0.069)	(0.069)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.127*	0.127*
			(0.076)	(0.076)
Constant	0.104**	0.104**	0.104**	0.104**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	350	489	1,286	1,290

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent thinks the candidate would campaign on *their own relationships with party leaders*. Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.31: Priority if Elected: Women-Focused Development, Moderated by Gender — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	Pr(Women-focused development if elected)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.081*	0.081*	0.081*	0.081*
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Female	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
PR + 12% Threshold × Female	−0.045	−0.045	−0.045	−0.045
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Pure Control		0.064	0.064	0.064
		(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Pure Control × Female		−0.028	−0.028	−0.028
		(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
FPTP + Women			0.114**	0.114**
			(0.047)	(0.047)
FPTP + Women × Female			−0.121*	−0.121*
			(0.064)	(0.064)
Women Only			0.206**	0.206**
			(0.083)	(0.083)
Women Only × Female			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.132)	(0.132)
PR Only				0.009
				(0.007)
PR Only × Female				0.034
				(0.083)
PR + Women			0.041*	0.041*
			(0.023)	(0.023)
PR + Women × Female			−0.007	−0.007
			(0.065)	(0.065)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			0.128	0.128
			(0.079)	(0.079)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women × Female			0.136	0.136
			(0.144)	(0.144)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.075*	0.075*
			(0.045)	(0.045)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women × Female			−0.021	−0.021
			(0.089)	(0.089)
Constant	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	347	486	1,274	1,443

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent predicts the candidate would prioritize *development policies that help women in particular* if elected. Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment-arm dummies interacted with *Female* (gender indicator); reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.32: Agreement: My Vote Would Matter in the Election — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	0.375	0.375	0.375	0.375
	(0.519)	(0.519)	(0.519)	(0.519)
Pure Control		0.242	0.242	0.242
		(0.541)	(0.540)	(0.540)
FPTP + Women			0.238	0.238
			(0.504)	(0.504)
Women Only			−0.056	−0.056
			(0.555)	(0.555)
PR Only				−0.295
				(0.533)
PR + Women			0.599	0.599
			(0.487)	(0.487)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.107	−0.107
			(0.501)	(0.501)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			0.340	0.340
			(0.522)	(0.522)
Constant	7.032***	7.032***	7.032***	7.032***
	(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.370)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	349	486	1,285	1,453

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

Table G.33: Agreement: Election Chooses Political Representatives in a Fair Way — Weighted

	Dependent variable:			
	1–10 agreement scale			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PR + 12% Threshold	−0.773	−0.773	−0.773	−0.773
	(0.491)	(0.491)	(0.490)	(0.490)
Pure Control		−1.105**	−1.105**	−1.105**
		(0.557)	(0.556)	(0.556)
FPTP + Women			−0.761	−0.761
			(0.516)	(0.516)
Women Only			−0.637	−0.637
			(0.531)	(0.531)
PR Only				−1.020*
				(0.564)
PR + Women			−0.912*	−0.912*
			(0.489)	(0.489)
PR + 1% Thresh + Women			−0.435	−0.435
			(0.491)	(0.491)
PR + 12% Thresh + Women			−0.805	−0.805
			(0.550)	(0.550)
Constant	6.781***	6.781***	6.781***	6.781***
	(0.357)	(0.356)	(0.356)	(0.356)
Reference Group	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only	FPTP Only
Sample (No. of Treatment Arms)	2	3	8	Full
Weighted Sample?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	345	481	1,272	1,440

Note: $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Outcome is a 1–10 agreement slider (higher = stronger agreement with the statement). Regressions are weighted linear models with treatment-arm dummies; reference category is *FPTP Only*. Column (1) compares *PR + 12% Threshold* vs. FPTP Only (2 arms); (2) adds *Pure Control* (3 arms); (3) adds all women-quota info arms (8 arms); (4) includes all treatment arms.

H Field Experiment Survey Instruments

H.1 Baseline survey questions (original `variable names` in parentheses)

- Do you own a smartphone? (`owns_smartphone`) Yes/No
- Can you confirm you are above 18 years old? (`age_confirmation`) Yes/No
- Province (`province`) [enumerator entered: Eastern, Northern, Southern, Western Rural, Western Urban, North-West]
- District (`district`) [enumerator entered: Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Kambia, Karene, Port Loko, Bombali, Falaba, Koinadugu, Tonokolili, Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba, Pujehun, Western Rural, Western Urban]
- City/town (`city_town`) [enumerator entered: Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Koidu, Lunsar, Waterloo, Port Loko, Kabala, Bonthe, Other:specify]
- Chiefdom name (`chiefdom`) [enumerator entered]
- Constituency (`constituency`) [enumerator entered integer]
- Interview Date (`interview_date`)
- Enumerator name [enumerator entered – deidentified]
- GPS coordinates [enumerator entered – deidentified]
- Respondent gender (`respondent_gender`) [enumerator entered: Male/Female]
- How old are you? (`respondent_age`) [years]
- What language do you speak at home? (`language`) [English, Krio, Mende, Temne, Kono, Loko, Sherbro, Limba, Fullah, Koranko, Yalunka, Madingo, Susu, Vai, Kru, Gola, Kissi, Other: Specify, Don't Know]
- What is the highest level of education you have completed? (`respondent_educ`) [No formal education, Primary School, Junior Secondary School, Senior Secondary School or High School, Bachelor's degree, Postgraduate degree, Do not know, Do not wish to say]
- Are you or have you ever been married? (`respondent_marital`) [Single/Never Married, Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Prefer not to say]
- Do you have any children? (`respondent_children`) Yes/No
- How many children do you have (if yes to above)? (`respondent_children_num`) (Integer)
- How often if at all do you discuss politics with friends or family? (`discuss_politics`) [Very often, sometimes, rarely, never, prefer not to say]
- Do you intend to participate in any political campaign events leading up to the elections on June 24? (`campaign_participate`) [Yes/No/Prefer not to say]
- Are you registered to vote? (`vote_register`) [Yes/No/Prefer Not to Say]
- Do you intend to vote in the elections on 24 June? (`vote_intention`) [Yes/No/Prefer Not to Say]
- When voters cost their ballots in the upcoming election, will they mark their preferred candidate or their preferred party on their ballots? (`ballot_knowledge`) [Candidate, Party, Both, Don't know, Prefer not to say]

- In the upcoming June 24 elections for which positions will voters be casting their ballots? (`positions_knowledge`) [President, Vice President, Member of Parliament, Senator, Ward Councilor, District Chairperson, Chief, Don't Know, Prefer not to say]
- How strongly do you agree with the following statement? The 2018 election was free and fair. (`election_trust_2018`) [Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree, Prefer not to say]

H.2 Endline survey questions (original `variable names` appear in parentheses)

- Phone number [enumerator entered – deidentified]
- Can you confirm that you were interviewed a week or two ago by an enumerator from IGR? (`intro_confirmation_previous_interview`) [Yes/No/Do not remember] Both Yes and Do not remember were allowed to continue to verification questions.
- Can you again confirm that you are above 18 years old? (`age_confirmation.x`) [Yes/No]
- Province (`province.y`) [enumerator entered: Eastern, Northern, Southern, Western Rural, Western Urban, North-West]
- District (`district.y`) [enumerator entered: Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Kambia, Karene, Port Loko, Bombali, Falaba, Koinadugu, Tonokolili, Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba, Pujehun, Western Rural, Western Urban]
- City/town (`city_town.y`) [enumerator entered: Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Koidu, Lunsar, Waterloo, Port Loko, Kabala, Bonthe, Other:specify]
- Chiefdom name (`chiefdom`) [enumerator entered]
- Constituency number (`constituency_num.y`) – enumerator entered if available
- Constituency name (`constituency_name.y`) – enumerator entered if available
- Enumerator name [enumerator entered – deidentified]
- GPS location [enumerator entered – deidentified]
- What is your phone number? [for confirmation – deidentified]
- What is the gender of respondent? (`respondent_gender_endline`) [enumerator entered: Male/Female]
- How old are you? (`respondent_age_endline`) (years)
- What language do you speak at home? (`language_endline`) [English, Krio, Mende, Temne, Kono, Loko, Sherbro, Limba, Fullah, Koranko, Yalunka, Madingo, Susu, Vai, Kru, Gola, Kissi, Other: Specify, Don't Know]
- What is the highest level of education you have completed? (`respondent_educ_endline`) [No formal education, Primary School, Junior Secondary School, Senior Secondary School or High School, Bachelor's degree, Postgraduate degree, Do not know, Do not wish to say]
- We are interested in how much voters have heard about the major political parties' manifestos for the upcoming elections in Sierra Leone. We will list a few different issue areas. For each issue, please tell us which political party you most associate with that issue. We are not asking whether you agree or disagree with the party's stance on that issue; we are not asking which party you support. Instead, we are asking which party you think about when we mention each of these issues. I will now list policy issues one by one and you will tell me which party you MOST associate this policy with:

- Education/schools (`party_educ`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- Roads (`party_roads`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- The economy (`party_econ`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- Jobs and unemployment (`party_jobs`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- Health and sanitation (`party_health`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- Electricity (`party_electric`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- Agriculture (`party_agric`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]
- Protecting women and girls (`party_women`) [All People's Congress APC, National Grand Coalition NGC, Sierra Leone People's Party SLPP, National Democratic Alliance NDA, Peoples Movement for Democratic Change PMDC, United National Peoples Party UNPP, Unity Party UP, United Democratic Movement UDM, National Unity Reconciliation Party NURP, Republican National Independence Party ReNIP, Coalition for Change C4C, Other, Independent Candidates, Prefer not to Say, Do Not Know]

- How will you decide which presidential candidate to vote for during the 2023 elections? (`vote_factor_president`) [Candidate's policies, personally know candidate, the candidate is from the political party I support, ethnicity and region of candidate, all candidates are the same, Other: specify, NA (does not plan to vote), Prefer not to say, Don't know]

- How will you decide how to vote in the parliamentary elections? (`vote_factor_mp`) [Candidate's policies, personally know candidate, the candidate is from the political party I support, ethnicity and region of candidate, all candidates are the same, Other: specify, NA (does not plan to vote), Prefer not to say, Don't know]

- Imagine a party representative gave the following message during a campaign rally [order randomized]:

  - (Universal/programmatic appeal) Vote for our party to create a brighter future for Sierra Leone! Our party will tackle youth unemployment by focusing on TVET, National Youth Schemes, Economic Empowerment, Sports, Music, Performing Arts, Public Works, and Agriculture. Our manifesto is committed to providing free quality education for pre-primary, primary, and secondary levels. Our party will also introduce a comprehensive health plan that includes expanding and prioritizing the Free Health Care Initiative, building and strengthening the capacity of regional hospitals, providing free health care to the elderly, physically challenged, Ebola orphans, and other vulnerable groups. Together, we can secure a prosperous future for Sierra Leone in ALL districts and chiefdoms. How much would you approve of this candidate's party? (`appeal_1`, `appeal_5` or `appeal_8` depending on the order in which appeals shown to respondent) [Strongly approve, Somewhat approve, Neither approve nor disapprove, Somewhat disapprove, Strongly disapprove, Prefer not to say]
  - (Particularistic appeal) Vote for our party and create a brighter future for (insert respondent's chiefdom and town)! Our party will invest in setting up training programs in your community. We will build new, well-equipped classrooms in your community. Our party will build a state-of-the-art health care facility within a 3-mile radius of your community, ensuring accessible, affordable, and high quality healthcare services for you and your family. This will directly benefit you and your loved ones, making a real difference in your day-to-day lives in this chiefdom. Together we can secure a prosperous future in this chiefdom. How much would you approve of this candidate's party? (`appeal_2`, `appeal_2_other`, `appeal_4`, `appeal_4_other`, `appeal_9`, or `appeal_9_other`, depending on the order in which appeals shown to respondent) [Strongly approve, Somewhat approve, Neither approve nor disapprove, Somewhat disapprove, Strongly disapprove, Prefer not to say]
  - (Candidate-centered appeal) Vote for our party because we have incredible leaders that will make the future of Sierra Leone and of this community bright! The leaders of this party have a long record of delivering on their promises to voters. They know how to govern and care deeply about the people. And they are good people themselves – with their hearts and minds invested in doing what is right, for you and for all of Sierra Leone. Other parties have scandals, and people in public for the wrong things, and people in public life for the wrong reasons. Our commitment is to good governance. Together, we can secure a prosperous future for Sierra Leone and this community. How much would you approve of this candidate's party? (`appeal_3`, `appeal_6` or `appeal_7` depending on the order in which appeals shown to respondent) [Strongly approve, Somewhat approve, Neither approve nor disapprove, Somewhat disapprove, Strongly disapprove, Prefer not to say]

- When voters cast their ballots in the upcoming presidential election will they mark their preferred candidate or their preferred ballot? (`ballot_knowledge_president`) [Candidate, Party, Both, Don't know, Prefer not to say]

- When voters cast their ballots in the upcoming parliamentary election to elect MPs, will they mark their preferred candidate or their preferred party on their ballot? (`ballot_knowledge_mp`) [Candidate, Party, Both, Don't know, Prefer not to say]

- Which of these statements in your view best reflects how MPs are selected under the PR system? (`mp_selection_knowledge`) [It is the voters who decide who will be the parliamentary candidates; it is the political parties that decide who the MP candidate will be.]

- In the upcoming June 24 elections, for which positions will voters be casting their ballots? (positions_knowledge_endline) [President, Vice President, MP, Senator, Mayor, Ward Councilor, District chairperson, Chief, Don't know, Prefer not to say]
- Which of the following statements is closest to your view? 1. The electoral system we are using now does a better job of getting more women elected to parliament; 2. The electoral system we used before did a better job of getting more women elected to parliament. (knowledge_women_system) [Agree with statement 1, Agree with statement 2, Prefer not to say]
- Did you attend any campaign rallies during the previous election in 2018? Again, we are not asking for which parties, just whether you attended any. (rally_attendance_past or rally_attendance_past_2, depending on the order in which the past election versus present election rally attendance question was asked.) [Yes/No/Prefer Not to Say]
- Did you attend any campaign rallies during this election season? (rally_attendance or rally_attendance_2, depending on the order in which the present election versus past election rally attendance question was asked.) [Yes/No/Prefer Not to Say]
- Besides rallies, were there any other forms of campaigning you witnessed during this election campaign period in your neighborhood? (other_campaign_activity or other_campaign_activity_2, depending on whether past election rally attendance was asked first before the present campaign activity witnessing question or not.) [Yes/No/Prefer not to say]
- What other forms of campaigning did you witness? (other_campaign_types or other_campaign_types_2) [Door-to-door canvassing, posters and billboards, Facebook/Whatsapp/social media, Radio, Small village sermons/roadshows, other (please specify).]
- How often, if at all, do you discuss politics with friends or family? (discuss_politics_endline or discuss_politics_endline_2) [Very often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never, Prefer not to say]
- In your opinion, has anything changed between the election campaigns you attended or witnessed between 2018 and now? (campaign_change or campaign_change_2) [Yes/No/Prefer not to say/Do not remember]
- Are you registered to vote? (vote_register_endline) [Yes/No/Prefer not to say]
- There are various actions that people sometimes take as citizens. We are interested in whether you would do these things if offered the opportunity in the near future. We understand that not everyone can participate in these ways, given scarce time and resources and other obligations, so there is not problem if you say you would not. For instance, if elections were held tomorrow, would you vote? Or if you are not registered but had the opportunity to register tomorrow, would you register? (vote_tomorrow) [Yes I would do this, I might do this, No I would not do this, Prefer not to say]
- Would you help others to vote or help others register to vote? (vote_register_others) [Yes I would do this, I might do this, No I would not do this, Prefer not to say]
- Would you volunteer as an election observer or otherwise to help ensure free and fair elections? (vote_volunteer) [Yes I would do this, I might do this, No I would not do this, Prefer not to say]
- Would you encourage others to attend campaign events such as rallies so they can be informed about what policies parties and candidates are promising? (vote_encourage_others) [Yes I would do this, I might do this, No I would not do this, Prefer not to say]
- How long at most would you be willing to wait in line at your polling station in order to vote? (vote_wait_time) [answer in HOURS - integer]
- How likely do you think it is that the upcoming June 24 elections will be free and fair? (trust_election if asked about 2023 second, trust_election_2 if asked about 2023 election first) [Very likely, Somewhat likely, Not that likely, Not at all likely, Prefer not to say]

- How strongly do you agree with the following statement? The 2018 election was free and fair. (`trust_election_past` if asked about 2018 first, `trust_election_past_2` if asked about 2018 second) [Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Somewhat disagree, Strong disagree, Prefer not to say]
- How much do you trust that election officials will count votes in a transparent and fair way this election? (`trust_vote_counting` or `trust_vote_counting_2`) [Not at all, Trust a little, Trust a lot, Prefer not to Say, Don't know]
- How much do you trust election officials will ensure that voting proceeds in a peaceful manner? (`trust_peaceful_election` or `trust_peaceful_election_2`) [Not at all, Trust a little, Trust a lot, Prefer not to Say, Don't know]
- Political parties have selected the candidates who will be voted in the districts in the upcoming elections. How satisfied are you with the candidates on the list? (`satisfaction_candidates`) [Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, Not at all satisfied, Prefer not to say, Don't know about the list]
- What, if anything, worries you the most about the 2023 elections? (`concerns_elections`) [The elections will not be free and fair, Low voter education, No good candidates, Violence or security incidents, I am not worried, Don't know, Prefer not to say)
- Are you familiar with the Sense Bod mobile app? (`sense_bod_familiar`) [Yes, No, Do Not Remember]
- If yes, have you downloaded it on your phone or used it elsewhere? (`sense_bod_downloa`) [Yes, No, Do Not Remember]
- If yes, how frequently have you used the Sense Bod app during this campaign season? (`sense_bod_frequency`) [Once, A few times, Many times]
- If yes, have you told others about the Sense Bod app? (`sense_bod_others`) [Yes, No, Do Not Remember]

I Survey Experiment Instrument (`variable names` in parentheses)

The survey was offered in both English and Krio. Only the English version is displayed below.

Pre-Treatment Questions

Answer options are shown in square brackets after the question:

1. Do you prefer to take this survey in English or in Krio? (`language`) [English/Krio]
2. Informed Consent Script
3. Do you agree to participate in this study? (`consent_final`) [Yes/No; survey ends if no.]
4. Can you confirm you are above 18 years old? (`above18`) [Yes/No]
5. In which province do you live? (`province_final`) [List of provinces]
6. In which district do you live? (`district_final`) [List of districts]
7. Are you a man or a woman? (`gender_final`) [Man/Woman]
8. What type of area do you live in: urban, rural, peri-urban? (`urbanrural_final`) [Urban/Peri-urban/Rural]
9. How often if at all do you discuss politics with friends or family? (`discusspolitics_final`) [Very often/Sometimes/Rarely/Never/Prefer not to say]
10. Do you own a smartphone? (`smartphone_final`) [Yes/No]
11. Are you registered to vote? (`registered_final`) [Yes/No]
12. What language do you speak at home? (`homelanguage_final`) [List of language options]
13. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (`education_final`) [No formal education/primary school/Junior secondary school/Senior secondary or high school/Bachelor's degree (College, university, technical or vocational school)/Postgraduate degree (Master's, PhD, etc)/Prefer not to say]
14. Are you or have you ever been married? (`married_final`) [No, I'm single and never been married/Yes, I am married/Yes, but I am widowed/Yes, but I am divorced/Yes, but I am separated/Prefer not to say]
15. Do you have any children? (`children_final`) [Yes/No]
16. How old are you (`age_final`) [number]

Treatments (treatment_arm)

Pure control respondents were shown, "Now we would like to ask you some questions about a hypothetical parliamentary election that could take place in your country. Please answer questions to the best of your ability. There are no right or wrong answers here. We are interested in your opinions." These respondents received no additional information about the electoral system.

Every other respondent was shown a similar opening paragraph, "Now we would like to ask you some questions about a hypothetical parliamentary election that might take place in your country. We'd like you to read the description of the electoral rules that might be used and then answer questions to the best of your ability. There are no right or wrong answers here. We are interested in your opinions." Then they were randomly assigned to one of the following pieces of additional information:

FPTP: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses first-past-the-post rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific MP candidate on the ballot and that whichever candidate gets the most votes wins."

MMD PR + 12% Threshold: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses proportional representation rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific party (not candidate) on the ballot, that there are multiple MPs elected per district, and that parties get seats in parliament according to the size of their vote share in the district. Party leaders decide which candidates take those seats. In order to get any seats, a party has to get at least 12% of the vote."

MMD PR: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses proportional representation rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific party (not candidate) on the ballot, that there are multiple MPs elected per district, and that parties get seats in parliament according to the size of their vote share in the district. Party leaders decide which candidates take those seats."

MMD PR + Gender Quotas: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses proportional representation rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific party (not candidate) on the ballot, that there are multiple MPs elected per district, and that parties get seats in parliament according to the size of their vote share in the district. Party leaders decide which candidates take those seats. Parties are also required to have one third of their candidates running in that election be women."

MMD PR + 12% Threshold + Gender Quotas: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses proportional representation rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific party (not candidate) on the ballot, that there are multiple MPs elected per district, and that parties get seats in parliament according to the size of their vote share in the district. Party leaders decide which candidates take those seats. In order to get any seats, a party has to get at least 12% of the vote. Parties are also required to have one third of their candidates running in that election be women."

MMD PR + 1% Threshold + Gender Quotas: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses proportional representation rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific party (not candidate) on the ballot, that there are multiple MPs elected per district, and that parties get seats in parliament according to the size of their vote share in the district. Party leaders decide which candidates take those seats. In order to get any seats, a party has to get at least 1% of the vote. Parties are also required to have one third of their candidates running in that election be women."

FPTP + Gender Quotas: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone that uses first-past-the-post rules. These rules mean that voters choose a specific MP candidate on the ballot and that whichever candidate gets the most votes wins. Parties are also required to have one third of their candidates running in that election be women."

Gender Quotas Alone: "Imagine that an election is taking place in Sierra Leone in which parties are required to have one third of their MP candidates running in the election be women."

In addition to the treatment text, respondents were shown a simple infographic about the electoral rules they were being primed about to help visualize the rules:



(a) FPTP (b) PR (MMD) (c) Gender quota

Figure I.1: **Infographics shown in the survey experiment. Each respondent saw one infographic alongside the treatment text depending on treatment assignment. Infographic (c) was displayed to respondents in the "Gender Quotas Alone" treatment. Pure Control respondents did not receive any infographic.**

Outcome Measures

Depending on the treatment respondents were assigned to, they first received appropriate comprehension check question(s) to reinforce the treatment (between 1-3 comprehension check questions, based on the treatment). Pure control respondents did not receive the comprehension check reinforcement. The treatment text was also displayed at the top of each outcome question page on Qualtrics to continue to reinforce the treatment as respondents went through the outcome module:

- In the election described above, do people select a party or a candidate on the ballot? [A party/A candidate/I don't know] (`comprehension_check_rules`)
- In the election described above, what share of each party's candidates have to be women? [One half/One fourth/One third/All/I don't know] (`comprehension_check_womenrep`)
- In the election described above, what is the minimum share of the total vote a party must get to win any seats? (`comprehension_check_thresh`) [1%/10%/12%/I don't Know]

Then all respondents across treatments were subjected to a standard battery of outcome questions:

1. If you were voting in the election described above, how many hours would you be willing to wait in line to vote? (`hours_wait_vote`) [integer entry for number of hours]
2. Briefly, can you explain why you would wait this amount of time to vote? (`open_wait_text` in SL_followup_qual_dataset.csv)[Open-ended response]
3. How much do you trust that the election described above would be conducted freely and fairly? (`trust_free_fair`) [Trust a lot/Trust some/Trust a little/Trust not at all/Prefer not to say]
4. How likely do you think the election described above would involve electoral violence? (`expect_violence`) [Not at all likely/A little bit likely/Somewhat likely/Very likely/Prefer not to say]
5. How likely do you think the election described above would involve electoral misconduct? (`expect_fraud`) [Not at all likely/A little bit likely/Somewhat likely/Very likely/Prefer not to say]
6. Briefly, can you explain why you believe the election described above would be run in this way? (`open_trust_text` in SL_followup_qual_dataset.csv) [Open-ended response]

7. If a candidate running in the election above promised to deliver a clinic to your neighborhood or chiefdom, how much would you believe that promise? (`believe_clinic`)
    - I would believe strongly in that promise
    - I would believe in that promise somewhat
    - I would believe in that promise a little bit
    - I would not believe at all in that promise
    - Prefer not to say
8. If a candidate running in the election above promised to deliver a school to your neighborhood or chiefdom, how much would you believe that promise? (`believe_school`)
    - I would believe strongly in that promise
    - I would believe in that promise somewhat
    - I would believe in that promise a little bit
    - I would not believe at all in that promise
    - Prefer not to say
9. If a candidate running in the election above promised to deliver money to your neighborhood or chiefdom, how much would you believe that promise? (`believe_money`)
    - I would believe strongly in that promise
    - I would believe in that promise somewhat
    - I would believe in that promise a little bit
    - I would not believe at all in that promise
    - Prefer not to say
10. Briefly, can you explain why you believe in these promises to this degree? (`open_clientelist_text` in SL_followup_qual_dataset.csv) [Open-ended response]
11. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? *(Drag the slider buttons below to any number between 1-10 you believe represents your level of agreement with each statement.)* [10-point sliding scale from Strongly disagree (1) - Strongly agree (10), with intermediate categories labeled on the slider.]
    (a) My vote would matter in the election described above (`slider_vote_matters`)
    (b) I am likely to have good options for candidates/parties to vote for in the above election (`slider_good_options`)
    (c) Politics is too complicated for someone like me to understand (`slider_politics_complicated`)
    (d) Those who govern this country are interested in what people like me think (`slider_govt_interested`)
    (e) People like me can make a difference in politics (`slider_make_difference`)
    (f) The election above chooses political representatives in a fair way (`slider_election_fair`)
    (g) Women candidates are likely to get elected in the above election (`slider_women_elected`)
12. Which of the following things do you think candidates in the election described above would be most likely to prioritize if elected? *(Choose one.)*
    - Development policies that help the whole country (`priority_elected_country_wide_development`)
    - Development policies that benefit specific neighborhoods or chiefdoms
        - (`priority_elected_neighborhood_chiefdom_development`)
    - Development policies that benefit large districts (`priority_elected_district_level_development`)

- Their own relationships with party leaders (`priority_elected_party_leader_relationships`)
- Their relationships with business leaders (`priority_elected_business_leader_relationships`)
- Development policies that help women in particular (`priority_elected_women_focused_development`)

13. Which of the following things do you think candidates in the election described above would be most likely to campaign on before the election to try and win support? *(Choose one.)*

    - Development policies that help the whole country (`priority_campaign_country_wide_development`)
    - Development policies that benefit specific neighborhoods or chiefdoms
      - (`priority_campaign_neighborhood_chiefdom_development`)
    - Development policies that benefit large districts (`priority_campaign_district_level_development`)
    - Their own relationships with party leaders (`priority_campaign_party_leader_relationships`)
    - Their relationships with business leaders (`priority_campaign_business_leader_relationships`)
    - Development policies that help women in particular (`priority_campaign_women_focused_development`)

Thank you for completing the survey. In order to compensate you for your time, we will need your phone number to send airtime to your number. It may take up to 7 days to process but will reach you shortly. Please note that you will not be contacted by the research team for any purpose other than compensation on this number, and your number will be deleted after the amount has been sent to your number. Your answers to the survey are also not linked to your phone number. Please enter the local phone number (starting with '0') on which you would like to receive airtime below: (enter phone number).

To confirm eligibility for compensation, please re-enter your age here (in years): (enter age).

J A Possibly Complementary Relationship Between Elite Mechanisms and Voter Learning

For the most part, as we have described, there was a relative lack of elite adjustment to the new electoral rules in the lead-up to the June 2023 elections. During those weeks leading up to the June 2023 elections, we observed many parliamentary candidates campaigning on their own individual name recognition, with posters calling on voters to select them even though voters would not be able to select their names on the actual ballot under the new closed-list PR rules. This lack of adjustment was confirmed by candidates and election observers in interviews and is in keeping with other studies that have argued that adjustment to electoral rules may take two to three election cycles, even among elites (Taagepera, 2002). Our main treatment effects above are, by design, driven by information delivered directly to citizens, rather than through candidate shifts in strategies. The study also took place in an environment in which elite mechanisms are less likely to be the main drivers of changes in voter behavior, because of this relative lack of elite adjustment to the new rules.

Nevertheless, even if some individual candidates did not adjust their strategies, it is possible that parties as a whole increased their mobilization efforts to some degree in places where their potential power was most affected by the new rules, as would be expected by the literature. In this section, we thus further explore whether these efforts complement or substitute for the influence of voter learning on behavior. We did not pre-register any expectations about complementary or substitution relationships between elite and voter mechanisms, nor design our study specifically around it, so all analyses in this section should be considered exploratory. One can imagine multiple possibilities: On the one hand, in districts most affected by the new rules, parties may engage in more mobilization thus exposing both treatment and control respondents in those districts to information about the upcoming elections and thus substituting for (i.e., reducing) the treatment effect of our intervention on mobilization and attitudes towards different types of appeals in those districts. On the other hand, in districts most affected by the new rules, parties may engage in more campaigning while our treatment may simultaneously help treated respondents understand fully that the stakes in their district are higher and that particularistic promises are less credible because of the switch in the rules, thus leading to the treatment effects of our intervention being amplified in those districts.

To explore these possibilities, we did the following: We began by taking the 2018 election results at the constituency level and aggregating them to the newly defined 2023 MMDs. Using these aggregated 2018 vote shares, we then calculated how many seats each party would have won under the MMD closed-list PR system, with a minimum threshold of 11.9%. Importantly, this calculation assumes that voter behavior in 2023 would have mirrored that of 2018 (i.e., no change in elite strategy or mobilization efforts), given that 2018 constituencies are nested within 2023 districts. This gave us the number of seats that each party would hypothetically win under PR in each district. Next, we compared these predicted seat share allocations under PR with the actual constituency-level seat allocations from the 2018 election, which were conducted under first-past-the-post rules. Specifically, we calculated the seat share difference for each party within each district, comparing the predicted number of seats they would win under PR to the actual seats they won under FPTP, capturing how much the shift to PR might alter the balance of power. Finally, to determine which districts were most impacted by the switch to PR, we created a "Max Seat Share Difference" variable, which reflects the largest absolute change in seat share that any party in a district would experience between the FPTP and PR systems.

The expectation is that, according to existing theories, parties should engage in more campaigning and mobilization in places where seat shares could really shift under the new rules, in order to stem the losses for some parties and to capitalize/maintain the gains for other parties. The question is whether this increased elite activity amplifies or reduces the treatment effects of voter learning on participation and support for particularistic appeals. Figure J.1 shows variation in "Max Seat Share Difference" across districts across Sierra Leone.

Again, we treat Tables J.1-J.2 as exploratory. We interact max seat share difference at the district level with treatment to look at whether or not treatment effects on participation and appeals support are moderated in districts where there might be expected to be more elite mobilization because a greater seat share change should be expected under the new rules. Table J.1 looks at the moderation of treatment effects on our main measures of participation. The coefficients on the triple interaction between the voter



Figure J.1: District-Level Max Seat Share Differences under PR

learning treatment, the size of likely seat share difference, and women are not statistically significant but they are large for both voting (column 1) and commitment to waiting in line (column 2), suggesting that voter learning and elite responses to strategically important districts might have complementary effects on women's participation. The main effect of having a larger potential seat share difference, in the absence of treatment, on wait time is also positive and significant (row two, column 2), suggesting that voters generally (or at least men) are more committed to voting in these consequential districts where there is likely to be more elite mobilization too.

Table J.2 looks at the moderation of treatment effects on the appeal of particularistic campaign promises. Here, too, voter learning and our constructed indicator of elite strategy are complementary. The negative effect of voter learning about the new rules on support for a particularistic promise is much larger in places where parties stand to experience the most change in seats due to the new rules.

Together, this exploratory analysis suggests that aggregate-level electoral consequences that are likely to induce elite effort are complementary to the effects of voter learning about electoral appeals on voter behavior. Where elite mechanisms operate, voter learning about how rules work is likely to amplify the effects of electoral reform on voter behavior. That said, given how little elites had adjusted their mobilization strategies and how few and far between elite mechanisms operated in this context, we believe that the direct mechanics of voter learning are playing the largest role in driving our observed effects on participation and reactions to particularistic promises.

Table J.1: Effects on Participation by Maximum Seat Share Difference under PR and Gender

	Dependent variable:	
	Would vote	Vote Wait Time
	(1)	(2)
Treated	0.084	-0.904
	(0.056)	(1.181)
Seat Share Diff. under PR	0.035	8.120**
	(0.167)	(3.526)
Female	0.044	-0.805
	(0.057)	(1.194)
Treated×Seat Share Diff.	-0.314	-0.410
	(0.225)	(4.765)
Treated×Female	-0.137	1.378
	(0.080)	(1.683)
Seat Share Diff.×Female	-0.156	-2.988
	(0.230)	(4.848)
Treated×Seat Share Diff.×Female	0.476	4.289
	(0.324)	(6.813)
Number of Children	-0.002	0.018
	(0.005)	(0.114)
Married	0.017	0.183
	(0.026)	(0.541)
Constant	0.886***	3.449***
	(0.043)	(0.912)
Observations	735	724

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controls for the imbalanced covariates (number of children and marital status) are displayed.

Table J.2: Treatment Effects on Approval of Appeals (Moderated by Max Seat Share Difference)

	Dependent variable: Strong Approval of Particularistic Appeals
Treated	0.067
	(0.062)
Seat Share Diff. under PR	0.369**
	(0.187)
No. of Children	0.001
	(0.008)
Married	-0.014
	(0.040)
SLPP voter	0.323***
	(0.041)
Swing voter	0.085*
	(0.046)
Treated × Seat Share Diff.	-0.688***
	(0.252)
Constant	0.440***
	(0.049)
Observations	735
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Controls for the imbalanced covariates (number of children and marital status) are displayed.