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

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Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989-2007

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Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989–2007

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This article presents the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, covering the years between 1989 and 2007. PAM identifies more than 51 elements that have appeared in peace agreements and collects data that can be used to analyse and compare peace accords. The matrix also monitors the extent to which the agreements have been implemented. Because of these capabilities, PAM is ideal for researchers who want to examine aspects of peace agreements and the implementation of particular provisions, which either help or hinder peace processes in post-accord periods. PAM is also useful for facilitators and mediators who are engaged in the peace process, both prior to and after an agreement is signed, as it provides information on how other countries have previously attempted peace processes. PAM data can be a very useful tool to design better peace accords and to ensure the implementation of accords.

Keywords: Peace Accords Matrix; comparative peace processes; sustainable peace; a tool for practitioners

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Introduction

When peace agreements are negotiated to end armed conflicts, signatories of the accord expect that the implementation of accords will bring social, political and economic changes in the society and will address their legitimate concerns. However, peace agreements are hard to implement and implementation is hard to track. After the Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April 1998, it took more than 12 years to see the provisions regarding police reform implemented. The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland was established on 3 June 1998. This commission submitted its report on 9 September 1999. The commission then formulated an implementation plan in 2001. A decade after the implementation plan was formulated, a 13,000 strong police force had been reduced to 7500. A total of 30 per cent of this new police force was comprised of recruits who had Catholic religious backgrounds. The implementation plan of 2001 sought to achieve more balance in a Catholic–Protestant police force by 2011. Yet such an objective only became attainable when the recruitment plan (one that followed a 50–50 Catholic–Protestant recruitment standard) was introduced. After a decade, the

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Police Service of Northern Ireland is now generally reflective of the composition of the community it serves.

The government of Nepal and the Maoist rebels negotiated a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2006 to resolve a decade-long communist insurgency through transitional power-sharing provisions. The 2006 CPA handled issues ranging from socio-economic reform, truth and reconciliation commissions, state restructuring, to elections for the Constituent Assembly (CA) in order to draft a new constitution. The interim constitution of 2007 that incorporated the 2006 CPA contained a provision for a transitional power-sharing government. This government was formed on 1 April 2007. The Seven-Party Alliance and Nepal Communist Party Maoists (CPN-M), or the eight parties, formed a power-sharing government under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. In the interim government, CPN-M held five out of 22 cabinet positions. The Maoists also shared legislative power in the interim legislature, holding 83 of 330 seats in the interim parliament. The power-sharing government was designed to remain in power until the time the final constitution was promulgated by the CA. Yet political uneasiness followed the Maoist party's victory in the CA elections. Other political parties perceived the Maoists as a threat when the party reneged on its verbal agreement to support the interim prime minister for Nepal's presidency. This led to a delay in the formation of a national unity government. As a way out of the political impasse, parties agreed to a constitutional amendment that provided for the formation of a majoritarian government. Between the CA elections in April 2008 and January 2013 four different majoritarian governments were formed. Such an unstable governing coalition was unable to garner the political consensus necessary to draft a new constitution and complete the peace process. This inability is due to the fact that the parties differ ideologically on major issues such as the form of government, the electoral system and the restructuring of the state. While parties have successfully avoided resumption of armed conflict so far, the peace process is still precarious.

Data from Nepal suggest that the provisions of the settlement are not often implemented in a timely manner. Furthermore, many provisions of the accord are renegotiated prior to their implementation. Peace processes do not end once peace accords are signed. Instead, they evolve through further negotiations and renegotiations regarding the implementation of accord provisions. Sisk calls these extended bargaining processes that unfold over time.[1] Similarly, the data from Northern Ireland indicate that a great deal of time was needed to implement the provisions of that accord. Translating words of an accord into deeds does not happen in a short span of time. If implementation takes too long, the peace process remains vulnerable and the outcome is more likely to fall short of the constituency's expectations. Empirical studies on the recurrence of civil war following negotiated settlements suggest that almost half of conflicts terminated though the signing of peace accords fail within five years.[2] According to Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, peace lasts, on average, three and a

[1]Timothy D. Sisk, *International Mediation in Civil Wars: Bargaining with Bullets* (London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009).

[2]Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993', *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (1995): 681–90. While Licklider specifically considered negotiated settlements and the failure of the peace processes, Joshi and Mason found that, between 1945 and 2005, about 48% of conflicts eventually returned to conflict – see Madhav Joshi and T. David Mason, 'Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post-Civil War States', *International Interactions* 37 no. 4 (2011): 388–413. By using UCDP peace agreement data, Melander reported 65 conflict dyads out of 116 eligible signatory dyads did

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half years before conflict is resumed.[3] This often occurs because many provisions of the accord are either not implemented or the delayed implementation fails to deliver the expectations articulated at the time of the signing of the accord.

Peace agreements and implementation of peace agreements

While the topics of power-sharing provisions and third-party peacekeeping have dominated research on post-civil war peacebuilding and peace duration following negotiated settlements, very few studies actually consider various provisions in accords and whether those provisions are implemented. While Licklider argues that negotiated settlements are unstable due to the unwillingness of rival groups to implement compromises,[4] Walter's work demonstrates that negotiated settlements can be successful when credible third-parties are involved in the peace process.[5] Doyle and Sambanis were the first to use peace agreement variables to explain successful peacebuilding.[6] They argued that the presence of a peace agreement in itself suggests that rival parties are committed and willing to end the hostility. Along with this commitment to end hostility, a peace agreement also provides avenues for international involvement, including peacekeeping operations. In their empirical analysis, Doyle and Sambanis found support for the relationship between UN peacekeeping operations and successful peacebuilding. In their studies Hartzell[7] and Hartzell and Hoddie[8] contend that institutional power-sharing arrangements (political power-sharing, territorial power-sharing, economic power-sharing and military power-sharing) create stronger incentives for former rivals to maintain the peace. Hartzell and Hoddie also suggest that the more power-sharing institutions an agreement contains, the more likely that peace will be durable following a negotiated settlement.[9] It is not the destruction of an opponent's military capability, but rather the agreement to share power that prolongs peace.[10] In their study, DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen focused on the

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Footnote 2 continued
not renew conflict at any point in time – see Erik Melander, 'Does Amnesty Benefit Peace? Amnesty Provisions and Peace Agreement Success in Ending Civil Wars' (unpublished manuscript, 2011).

[3]Carolina A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, 'Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables', *International Organization* 55 no. 1 (2003): 183–208, quote at p. 195.

[4]Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements'.

[5]Barbara F. Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement', *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (1997): 335–64; Barbara F. Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[6]Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000): 779–801; Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[7]Carolina A. Hartzell, 'Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 1 (1999): 3–22.

[8]Carolina A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, 'Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management', *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 318–32; Carolina A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

[9]Hartzell and Hoddie, 'Institutionalizing Peace'.

[10]Carolina A. Hartzell, 'Settling Civil Wars: Armed Opponents' Fates and the Duration of the Peace', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 4 (2009): 347–65.

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stability of peace agreements negotiated between 1989 and 2005.[11] Their work specifically examined political power-sharing, territorial power-sharing and military power-sharing. In their empirical analysis, they found that military integration and the presence of autonomy provisions increased the duration of peace agreements, while political power-sharing provisions had a negative, though insignificant, impact on peace agreement duration. These studies, however, do not consider whether the provisions were actually implemented.

The post-accord period is fragile and the implementation of an accord does not occur immediately. According to Walter, credible commitment problems are inherent in negotiated settlements of civil wars.[12] These problems leave parties doubtful about their physical safety as well as their ability to promote their political and economic interests. Transitioning from war to peace involves the disarmament and demobilisation of rival groups' armed forces, which reveals vulnerability. And the process itself makes the weaker side susceptible to surprise attacks. Third-party security guarantees and power-sharing arrangements are, therefore, critical to ensuring a sustainable peace.[13] While vulnerability makes conflict imminent, some studies suggest that balancing vulnerability between parties can benefit a negotiated settlement. In her study of the implementation of the Liberian peace accords, Bekoe theorised that balanced vulnerability was achieved in the peace agreement by concessions made on military, political or economic power-sharing.[14] According to Bekoe, mutual vulnerability creates stronger incentives for rival leaders to implement the accords. Bekoe used this theoretical framework to explain the comparative peace processes in Mozambique, Angola and Liberia.[15] In Mozambique, the administrative control of *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) constituted mutual vulnerability. While the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 asked for the the extension of state administration and demobilisation of the state and the rebel group, *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), the first proceeded while the second did not, making the rebel more vulnerable.[16]

From their study of 16 civil war cases that ended in negotiated settlement between 1980 and 1997, Downs and Stedman concluded that the successful implementation of peace accords was largely dependent upon the legacy of the conflict and the willingness of external actors to provide implementation support.[17] Walter in her seminal works on the importance of third-party security guarantees for the successful settlement of civil wars codes an agreement as implemented when the national unity government is installed and a partial demobilisation takes place.[18] Yet Walter's study does not fully address the implementation of peace agreements on two accounts. First, the focus of her study is the security-guarantee

[11]Karl DeRouen, Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen, 'The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 4 (2009): 367–87.
[12]Walter, 'The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement'; Walter, *Committing to Peace*.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Dorina A. Bekoe, 'Toward a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The Case of Liberia', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 38, nos 2–3 (2003): 256–94.
[15]Dorina A. Bekoe, 'Mutual Vulnerability and the Implementation of Peace Agreements: Examples from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia', *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no. 2 (2005): 43–68.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Downs, George and Stephen John Stedman, 'Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation', in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements,* Donald Rotchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 43–69.
[18]Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

role provided by third-party actors during the peace process phase. And second, her coding of implementation conflates lack of violence with a good faith effort to implement the accord. Hoddie and Hartzell contend that the complete implementation of military power-sharing significantly improves the prospects for peace in post-accord countries.[19] Their study considers implementation of military power-sharing as a credible sign that the signatories of an accord are committed to peace. In their study, Jarstad and Nilsson examined whether the political, territorial and military pacts provided in specific accords were implemented.[20] They examined 83 peace agreements that had been brokered between 1989 and 2004 and found that costly signals, in the forms of territorial and military power-sharing, increase the prospects of peace. Jarstad and Nilsson did not find support for third-party actors, both UN Peacekeeping and non-UN Peacekeeping, which is contrary to what Walter found.[21] One of the reasons why third-party security guarantees were not significant in Jarstad and Nilsson's study is perhaps related to the fact that parties can trust each other and can feel secure when military and territorial provisions of the accord are implemented. Indeed, implementation of an accord in itself is a confidence building measure. Therefore, implementation of an accord does not only provide evidence of belligerent parties' commitment to peace and the development of democracy, but it can also reduce the amount of external involvement, which is often ineffective and expensive.

Current studies regarding power-sharing arrangements and provision of third-party security guarantees help to explain the stability of peace in post-conflict states. Nevertheless, these two types of provisions are not the only provisions in accords that account for the success of a peace process. Melander's work suggests that amnesty provisions in accords make peace more durable because they incentivise rebel leaders to remain committed to the peace process.[22] While understanding the reasons former belligerent parties may choose to return to conflict after signing a peace accord is important, it is more important to understand whether the provisions of the accord were implemented. Typically, various provisions of an accord seek to address the main causes of conflict, create institutional mechanisms to allow access to state power and economic resources, empower minority or oppressed groups, compensate victims and employ other mechanisms to avoid future conflict, either by demobilising rival groups' combatants or integrating them into the armed force. The inclusion of these elements into peace accords suggests how important these issues are for parties to make successful transitions from war to peace. However, the mere existence of such provisions does not preclude the recurrence of conflict unless those provisions are implemented. Implementation of the provisions of an accord is very crucial for successful peacebuilding, which also requires sincere commitment by the signatories along with building a supportive environment so that social, economic and political changes stipulated in the accord can materialise. Furthermore, the way in which provisions are implemented over time provides important information for practitioners involved in actual negotiations. This knowledge can help practitioners to understand how contentious issues were dealt with in other accords and how such accords were implemented.

[19]Matthew Hoddie and Carolina A. Hartzell, 'Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements', *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 3 (2003): 303–20.
[20]Anna K. Jarstad and Desirée Nilsson, 'From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 3 (2008): 206–23.
[21]Walter, *Committing to Peace*.
[22]Melander, 'Does Amnesty Benefit Peace?'.

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The need for a Peace Accords Matrix database

Within the community of peace scholars who focus their work on sustainable peace after peace accords are signed, very few provisions (political power-sharing, territorial power-sharing, economic power-sharing, military power-sharing and amnesty provisions) are individually considered in relation to the recurrence of armed conflict. A limited amount of literature examines the provisions within peace accords and how they are implemented. The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) database identifies and examines 51 different provisions in peace accords and the extent to which those provisions were implemented. This provides a rich source of information for scholars studying peace processes that can be very useful for comparatively explaining why some peace processes succeed while others do not. The database can also be useful for those involved in actual peace processes, either to initiate or attempt to reactive stalled peace processes.

The database

The Peace Accords Database is a unique source of comparable data on the comprehensive peace agreements (CPA) signed between 1989 and 2007. PAM identifies 35 CPAs that meet two operational definitions:

(1) the major parties in the conflict are involved in a negotiation process; and,
(2) substantive issues underlying the dispute are included in the negotiation process.

Accords that do not meet these two operational criteria are not included in the database. Also, an agreement can still be coded as comprehensive even if the signing parties return to conflict. The database provides access to the text of peace accords, codes 51 different provisions and the status of the implementation of those provisions in the post-accord period. The database provides information on the action taken to implement each provision of the accord and the end result. For example, if the demobilisation of combatants, either from the rebels or the state or both, is part of the accord, the implementation information provides annual updates regarding institutional mechanisms adopted to initiate the demobilisation process, when the demobilisation was initiated and completed, and an estimate of the number of demobilised combatants (when such data are available). The database provides updates on the implementation status of provisions for 10 years after the signing of the accord. This amount of time is due in part to the fact that many provisions of accords require more time to implement. For example, the police reform provision in Northern Ireland's 1998 agreement took more than 10 years to implement. Similarly, socio-economic reforms take time, such as in South Africa where such reforms were initiated only after the final constitution was promulgated in 1996. The 10-year update captures almost all progress in terms of the implementation of the provisions of accords. It also captures any setbacks, as happened in Angola and Cambodia when demobilised combatants were recalled and violence resumed.

Data collections

The database is comprised of provisions of peace accords and the implementation status of those provisions. The texts of the accords are available for download from the database and the accords have been carefully studied in order to identify different provisions. The first portion of the database covers the accords and includes the actual texts of the peace agreements, and is organised by themes. For instance, if the belligerent parties in peace

negotiations had agreed on a transitional power-sharing government, then that provision of the accord is listed under power-sharing transitional government. Similarly, if the accord has amnesty provisions, the text of those provisions is provided. All together the database encompasses 51 different provisions of peace accords, which are grouped into six different categories: ceasefire, institutions, security, rights, external arrangements, and other topics.

Once the accord's provisions are analysed under different categories and themes, qualitative data on the implementation of those provisions are collected. In this endeavour, we try to collect as much comprehensive data as possible from primary sources. Sisk has succinctly argued that bargaining continues even after an accord is signed;[23] parties to a peace process will constantly negotiate and renegotiate over how to implement ambiguous provisions of peace accords. We try to capture this process in our qualitative implementation data. Nonetheless, we do provide statistical figures (e.g. the number of arms collected in the disarmament process, the number of combatants demobilised, the number of rebel combatants integrated into the military or police and the number of reintegrated combatants, etc.) when available. While our database can be easily translated into a dataset for statistical analysis purposes, our qualitative focus is aimed at providing dynamic progress within the implementation of peace accords. Practitioners, facilitators and mediators involved in the negotiation and implementation processes should find the comparative data on peace agreement implementation invaluable in their attempt to deal with contentious issues in peace processes.

In our efforts to collect comprehensive implementation data, we consult various sources. The primary source for PAM is the United Nations (UN) and its various information outlets. The UN provides information from its specific missions, the Secretary General's report to the Security Council, as well as the UN yearbook for all the peace processes with which it is involved. Other UN agencies such as the UNHCR provide information on issues related to refugees and internally displaced populations (IDPs). Too much reliance on UN-provided information could lead to biases because the UN tends to report its successes. Therefore, we also consult the LexisNexis academic database for all English-language newspapers published around the world. Obviously, this produces thousands of articles, depending on the international attention focused on a particular peace process. This inundation of information could erroneously influence a coding decision by human coders. Therefore, we mostly look for information on particular provisions of an accord when we use the LexisNexis academic database to avoid potential biases coming from the availability of information. Our other sources include the reports generated by commissions and committees established by individual accords. We also consult the US State Department's Human Rights Report, Human Rights Watch Annual Report, reports from International Crisis Group, CIA Factbook and prominent English-language newspapers published locally (in the area where the peace process is taking place). We further consult radio news transcripts (e.g. BBC Monitoring Service). We rely on secondary sources only when primary source information is not available or not sufficient.

An obvious implication of consulting a wide range of resources for data collection is inter-coder reliability. For each peace process and its implementation, at least two coders work at different time intervals for the purpose of establishing inter-coder reliability. Also, our coders, based on the codebook, know exactly what to code in the accord section and what to look for in the implementation section for each provision we are trying to

[23]Sisk, *International Mediation in Civil Wars*.

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identify.[24] Involvement of more than one coder in the data collection process and also utilisation of the codebook helps to establish inter-coder reliability. Once the data collection process is complete, the database is internally reviewed. Following the internal review process, at least two external experts are asked to review each peace process. The experts we consult are all authorities on the particular peace process that they review. Our internal review process, as well as our consultations with external reviewers, makes the PAM database uniquely reliable and comprehensive.

The matrix

The database we have developed is unique because we look for 51 different provisions within accords and then record the year-by-year implementation status of each provision. This database is distinctive in its web-based interface that enables researchers, policy makers, journalists and students to find in-depth information on particular peace processes, compare two or more peace accords in their entirety or compare all peace processes on specific provisions. For example, by choosing a specific country, the database produces a matrix with a hyperlinked tick mark next to provisions that are included in the accord. Each tick mark leads to a new window that provides the text from the accord related to that provision and the year-by-year status of its implementation. The interface is also capable of generating a matrix for all the accords in the website, which can provide valuable information to those interested in comparative peace processes. Those interested in particular provisions of the accord can generate a matrix and compare cases on that particular provision across CPAs. Appendix 1 provides information regarding peace agreements currently available in the database, and Appendix 2 provides comparative data on 33 peace processes across 51 different accord provisions.

Distribution of provisions across peace accords

So far we have outlined the merits of this database, and focused especially on how this database can improve research on peace processes. We have described the depth and breadth of the database, the data collection process, issues related to validity and the web-based interface of the database. The UCDP/PRIO armed conflict data categorise internal conflicts in terms of territorial or government incompatibility.[25] Among 33 cases in our database, 13 CPAs were signed to resolve territorial incompatibility and 20 CPAs to resolve government incompatibility. We also found that 28 CPAs had either a ceasefire provision or parties negotiated a ceasefire agreement leading to the CPA in contrast to five CPAs that did not have a ceasefire provision. In this section, we highlight the distribution of cases among five different categories.

Institutional provisions

Institutional provisions include both short-term and long-term institutional reforms. The long-term institutional reforms are those that are expected to persist beyond the completion of the peace process. For example, executive branch reforms, civil

[24]The definition for each provision and codebook is available on PAM's website.
[25]See Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed Conflict, 1946–2011', *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 4 (2012): 565–75.

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administration reforms, constitutional reforms, political party and electoral system reforms are all intended to last long-term. Other provisions, like establishing a transitional power-sharing government, truth and reconciliation mechanisms and dispute resolution mechanisms are intended only for the purpose of completing the peace process. Unlike previous coding of power-sharing government for the use of a proportional electoral system, the PAM codes transitional power-sharing as an arrangement whereby guaranteed positions are allocated to qualifying parties in a new government at cabinet level or above while political actors work on establishing a normalising political process. Among 13 different institutional provisions that we focus on in the CPAs, political party/electoral reform is the most common provision (24 out of 33), and territorial power-sharing is the least common provision (three out of 33). As shown in Figure 1, issues related to power-sharing transitional governments, political party/electoral reforms, constitutional reforms, decentralisation and dispute resolution are the most common types of institutional reforms that belligerent parties agree on in the CPAs.

Security-related issues

In the database, we have included eight different security-related issues that range from military reform (downsizing, integration of rebel combatants or other reforms) to provisions regarding paramilitary groups. The current literature surrounding civil war settlements and post-civil war peace processes generally ignores other security-related provisions except for military power-sharing. In the database, we have analysed provisions related to other critical security-related issues such as police reform, demobilisation,



Figure 1. Institutional reforms in CPAs.
Notes: P-S Govt (Powersharing Government) E.B. Reform (Executive Branch Reform) L.B. Reform (Legislative Branch Reform).

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

Figure 2. Security-related issues in CPAs.

disarmament, reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian lives, prisoner release and paramilitary groups. All security-related provisions of CPAs are presented in Figure 2, which suggests how common each type of provision is and its significance for a successful peace process. Security-sector reform, which includes military reform, police reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, has gained currency among policy makers as a necessary tool of peacebuilding. Our database allows comparison of security-sector-related provisions and how implementation of such provisions contributes to successful peacebuilding. In many cases, however, accords do not call for extensive security-sector reforms. For example, the accord in Bangladesh focused on integrating the ex-combatants into the police force, and emphasised their demobilisation and reintegration back to society. In the case of Mozambique, all security-related provisions were part of the accord and were subsequently implemented, which contributed to successful peacebuilding.

Provisions related to rights

Human rights, ethnic and minority rights, and issues related to internally displaced persons and refugees often dominate debates surrounding successful peacebuilding in societies emerging out of violent conflicts. However, there are other equally important provisions in accords related to amnesties, citizenship, children and women and compensating victims of conflict. For a divided society going through a reconciliation process, issues related to language, national symbols and media reforms are also equally important. The PAM database provides 15 different rights-related provisions (see Figure 3). These types of provisions are salient issues that fundamentally address political empowerment and the grievances of minorities and victims. Yet, among the 15 different rights-related provisions, the most common, among the 33 CPAs, are IDPs (24), human rights (22), refugees (22), amnesty (18) and education (16).

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

Figure 3. Various rights provisions in CPAs.

Comparative data from the PAM database demonstrate that belligerent parties are less likely to negotiate over issues related to women and children and reparations as compared to commonly negotiated institutional and security issues. As a matter of fact, many CPAs remain silent on how to compensate the victims of conflict, as indicated in Figure 3. Even in the agreements where those provisions were negotiated, the implementation data suggest that very few efforts were made to truly compensate victims. Without addressing victims of conflict and vulnerable groups, such as children and women, peace processes are less likely to succeed.

Provisions related to external arrangements

The PAM database includes seven different provisions regarding external arrangements, including, but not limited to, UN transitional authority, peacekeeping missions and the withdrawal of foreign troops from conflict zones (see Figure 4). These external arrangements are unique in the sense that they look beyond UN peacekeeping missions in the peace process and provide data on other areas of third-party involvement. Among CPA provisions related to third-party arrangements, we also provide data on regional peacekeeping forces and international arbitration on issues such as land, loss and damage. There are very few cases of robust international involvement in terms of UN transitional authority or parties seeking arbitration. However, belligerent parties frequently look for unbiased international or internal verification of the peace process, UN peacekeeping and the withdrawal of (foreign) troops. As shown in Figure 4, the most common external arrangement provision is a United Nations, international or internal verification process (25 out of 33 cases), followed by withdrawal of (foreign) troops (15 out of 33 cases), and a UN Peacekeeping provision (12 out of 33 cases).

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

Figure 4. External arrangements in CPAs.
Notes: UN Tran. Authority (United Nations transitional Authority) UN, Intl, or Internal Ver. (United Nations, International or International Verification) Intl Arbit. Comm. on Land (International arbitration commission on land) Arbit. Comm. on Damage and Loss (Arbitration commission to address damage and loss).

Other provisions in CPAs

The extensive nature of the database is indicated by the fact that it is able to incorporate institutional, security, rights and third-party provisions into the CPA. We have also identified eight other types of provisions in accords, such as implementation datelines, socio-economic developments, referenda on independence, ratifications of the CPAs, arms embargos, donor support, Natural Resource and provisions to review the agreement (see Figure 5). Issues related to socio-economic development are very important for successful peacebuilding as most conflicts channel socio-economic grievances that need to be addressed in the post-accord phase. The implementation timeline depicts how parties prioritised implementation of CPA provisions over a period of months or years. The data suggest that the international community's financial and technical support is needed for the accord's implementation.

To this point, we have discussed the richness of PAM data and how it is situated within the existing literature and in relation to similar databases. Now, we turn to how information of the accord implementation can be harnessed to test peacebuilding theories empirically, inform policy communities and help design future peace accords. In peacebuilding research, scholars have suggested that spoilers are one of the main challenges in war-to-peace transitions.[26] Spoiler violence is more likely, especially surrounding elections, when

[26]See John Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5–53; and Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, eds., *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006).

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

Figure 5. Other important issues in CPAs.

combatants are not systematically disarmed and demobilised. A situation in which combatants are not demobilised creates incentives for others to use violence for political purposes, which subsequently influences a perpetrator's electoral performance. This has serious implications for the success of peace processes including efforts to build democratic institutions in post-civil war states. By analysing PAM data on Mozambique (1992), Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1992) and Nepal (2006), we make the case for sequencing the implementation of certain provisions to achieve greater peacebuilding success.

These four post-cold war cases are very similar in that, in each case, the left-leaning party was in the government or was a powerful rebel group. As shown in Table 1, every accord provided for holding post-conflict elections. In every case, third-party security guarantees existed either in the form of a UN Observer Mission, as in El Salvador, or a UN Transitional Authority, as in Cambodia. Power-sharing governments were in place in Cambodia and Nepal, but belligerent parties in Cambodia and Nepal continuously used violence before and after elections. In Cambodia, election results became so contentious leading to the formation of the power-sharing government, which ended in a bloody coup in 1997. The outcome of elections in Nepal was so surprising to the established and the rebel parties that they did not find common ground to continue with the power-sharing agreement as provided in the 2006 CPA. According to the CPA, the power-sharing government had to promulgate the new constitution, which had not yet materialised. The common denominator in these two peace processes, which experienced post-accord violence, was the lack of demobilisation and disarmament processes before elections.[27] In

[27]After the peace process stalled in Nepal, former Prime Ministers Madhav Kumar Nepal, admitted that it was a mistake to proceed with CA elections without disarming the Maoist party. 'No New Constitution without Completion of Peace Process: Nepal', *Republica*, January 12, 2012.

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Table 1. Containing post-accord violence for successful peace processes.

Variables/Country	Mozambique	Cambodia	El Salvador	Nepal
Post-conflict elections	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Third-party security	UN peacekeeping mission	UN transitional authority	UN observer mission	UN mission in Nepal
Power-sharing government	No	Yes	No	Yes
Disarmament and demobilisation before election	Yes	No	Yes	No
Post-accord violence	No	Yes	No	Yes

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Mozambique, *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) engaged in some violent activities which delayed the demobilisation process and as a result the elections were postponed. As a matter of fact, RENAMO proposed moving into elections with its armed forces intact. Because the head of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique was bold enough to make the case for demobilisation and disarmament of combatants from both sides as a condition for having elections, violence was effectively curbed early in the process. Similarly, in El Salvador, *Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front* (FMLN) was not recognised as a political party and therefore could not run for elections until its arms caches were destroyed and verified by the UN. In Cambodia, all four parties to the Paris agreement did not fully demobilise their combatants, and the UN proceeded with elections by suggesting that a minimum level of security had been achieved. The demobilisation process was suspended just before the post-conflict elections. As a result, all sides used violence before and after elections, which led to electoral disputes and a near collapse of the peace process. In Nepal, the military returned to the barracks and Maoist combatants were in cantonments. However, the Maoists had not given up their plan of a people's war[28] and formed a paramilitary organisation, the Young Communist League (YCL), which incorporated many People's Liberation Army (PLA) members.[29] The YCL members were mobilised for various violent activities in order to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation before and after elections, which substantially influenced the elections in favour of the Maoist Party. In Nepal and Cambodia, the peace process and democratic trajectory were seriously damaged by allowing armed groups to remain mobilised. These armed groups used violence to gain and maintain support in the period leading up to elections. Had disarmament and demobilisation been completed before elections, the peacebuilding experience of Nepal and Cambodia would be very different. The comparative experiences of these four peace processes drawn from the PAM database,

[28]International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?* Asia Report no. 132 (18 May 2007), 12.

[29]Jenny Anderson, 'Report from the Field, January 2009: The Constituent Assembly Election, Nepal, Rukum District (Kol, Rangis, and Kandra VDC)', *Himalaya* 26, nos 1–2 (2009): 55–7, quote at p. 55. As the PLA members went through a Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process and were offered a financial package, YCL members organised various protest activities asking for similar financial packages. CPN-M directed some PLA members to work for YCL in order to foment an urban insurrection for the purposes of capturing state power. The party had promised to treat PLA members similar to those who were in cantonment, see 'YCL Members Lock Party Offices in West Nepal', *Republica*, February 6, 2012.

provide important insights on sequencing the implementation of peace agreement provisions. Disarmament and demobilisation are important in order to curb spoiler violence. Peace processes that require disarmament and demobilisation before elections would have a positive impact on peacebuilding strategies. This has important insights for actors involved in peace agreement design and sequencing the implementation of peace accord provisions.

Conclusion

Understanding how different provisions of CPAs are implemented is extremely important for peace research and for developing better policies for implementation of peace agreements. Using best practices for the implementation of peace agreements is vital as implementation will influence the success or failure of the larger peace process. In terms of peace research, current literature regarding peace processes overempahsises political, military, economic and territorial power-sharing provisions in accords. Furthermore, only a few studies look at how such provisions were implemented and how implementation actually contributed to successful peace processes. The database we introduce in this article not only considers the gamut of provisions included in peace accords but also how those provisions are implemented. The comparative understanding of peace processes that our database provides will help peace practioners address contentious issues and prepare belligerent parties to engage in negotiations. Similarly, the database we have introduced will help explain how peace processes progress, and which obstacles could derail a peace process during implementation. The chance that a conflict will reoccur increases when the provisions of the accord are not implemented. By providing implementation information for different provisions of the accord, this database opens up a new venue of research related to implementation of accords, factors that influence successful implementation of accords, sequencing the implementation of accord provisions and how such sequencing leads to successful peace process and democratisation of post-conflict socities. Empirical evidence of how accord provisions are implemented would also help advance peace research regarding the variaion in the quality of peace among post-civil war states.

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John Darby was Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. Prof. Darby passed away on 2 June 2012 in Portstewart, Northern Ireland. An expert in peace processes, he was the founding director of the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), which carries on his legacy of bringing rigorous scholarship to bear on issues emerging from the practice of peacebuilding.

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Appendix 1

Information is available on the Peace Accords Matrix website for the following agreements (peaceaccords.nd.edu):

(1) Angola: Lusaka Protocol, 15 November 1994.
(2) Angola: Luena Memorandum of Understanding, 4 April 2002.
(3) Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT), 2 December 1997.
(4) Bosnia and Herzegovina: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 November 1995.
(5) Burundi: Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi, 2 November 2003.
(6) Cambodia: Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, 23 October 1991.
(7) Congo: Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, 29 December 1999.
(8) Croatia: Erdut Agreement, 12 November 1995.
(9) Djibouti: Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord, 12 May 2001.
(10) Djibouti: Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale, 26 December 1994.
(11) El Salvador: Chapultepec Peace Agreement, 16 January 1992.
(12) Ethiopia: Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 12 December 2000.
(13) Guatemala: Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace, 29 December 1996.
(14) Guinea-Bissau: Abuja Peace Agreement, 1 November 1998.
(15) India: Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord), 20 February 1993.
(16) Indonesia: MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005.
(17) Lebanon: Taif Accord, 22 October 1989.
(18) Liberia: Accra Peace Agreement, 18 August 2003.
(19) Macedonia: Ohrid Agreement, 13 August 2001.
(20) Mali: National Pact, 6 January 1991.
(21) Mozambique: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, 4 October 1992.
(22) Nepal: Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 21 November 2006.
(23) Niger: Agreement between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, 15 April 1995.
(24) Papua New Guinea: Bougainville Peace Agreement, 30 August 2001.
(25) Philippines: Mindanao Final Agreement, 2 September 1996.
(26) Rwanda: Arusha Accord, 4 August 1993.
(27) Sierra Leone: Lomé Peace Agreement, 7 July 1999.
(28) Sierra Leone: Abidjan Peace Agreement, 30 November 1996.
(29) South Africa: Interim Constitution, 17 November 1993.
(30) Sudan: Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 9 January 2005.
(31) Tajikistan: General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, 27 June 1997.
(32) Timor-Leste (East Timor): Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor, 5 May 1999.
(33) Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland's Good Friday Agreement, 10 April 1998.

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Appendix 2. Provisions in comprehensive peace agreements (1989–2007).

Country & Peace Agreement Year	Croatia (1995)	Timor-Leste (1999)	El Salvador (1992)	South Africa (1993)	Northern Ireland (1998)	Mozambique (1992)	Bangladesh (1997)	Angola (2002)	Cambodia (1991)	Sierra Leone (1996)	Sierra Leone (1999)	Guinea-Bissau (1998)	Indonesia - Aceh (2005)	Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000)	Angola (1994)	Burundi (2002)	Papua New Guinea (2001)	Djibouti (1994)	Niger (1995)	Djibouti (2001)	Liberia (2003)	Lebanon (1989)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)	Macedonia (2001)	Mali (1991)	Rwanda (1993)	Republic of Congo (1999)	Sudan (2005)	Guatemala (1996)	India (1993)	Philippines (1996)	Tajikistan (1997)	Nepal (2006)
Cease-fire			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Institutions																																	
Power-sharing – transitional government	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓	✓
Executive branch reform	✓			✓	✓	✓										✓	✓					✓	✓			✓		✓			✓	✓	✓
Legislative branch reform				✓																		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓				✓	✓
Constitutional changes		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓					✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Inter-ethnic state relations	✓				✓		✓																✓			✓		✓					✓
Boundary demarcation													✓	✓			✓						✓	✓				✓		✓			
Electoral or political reform			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
Territorial power-sharing						✓																	✓										
Decentralisation/federalism	✓			✓	✓		✓						✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓								
Civilian administration Reform			✓				✓	✓		✓					✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓			✓	✓		✓		
Truth or reconciliation mechanism			✓	✓						✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓				✓				✓	✓	✓		✓				
Dispute resolution committee			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓					
Judiciary reform			✓	✓	✓				✓	✓			✓			✓	✓					✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Security																																	
Military reform			✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Police reform	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓				✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Demobilisation	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Disarmament	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Reintegration			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓

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Appendix 2 – *continued*

Country & Peace Agreement Year	Croatia (1995)	Timor-Leste (1999)	El Salvador (1992)	South Africa (1993)	Northern Ireland (1998)	Mozambique (1992)	Bangladesh (1997)	Angola (2002)	Cambodia (1991)	Sierra Leone (1996)	Sierra Leone (1999)	Guinea-Bissau (1998)	Indonesia - Aceh (2005)	Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000)	Angola (1994)	Burundi (2002)	Papua New Guinea (2001)	Djibouti (1994)	Niger (1995)	Djibouti (2001)	Liberia (2003)	Lebanon (1989)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)	Macedonia (2001)	Mali (1991)	Rwanda (1993)	Republic of Congo (1999)	Sudan (2005)	Guatemala (1996)	India (1993)	Philippines (1996)	Tajikistan (1997)	Nepal (2006)
Prisoner release			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓				✓	
Paramilitary groups	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
Rights																																	
Human rights	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓					✓		✓		✓		✓	✓
Amnesty				✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓										✓				
Refugees	✓		✓			✓	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓		✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	✓	
Internally displaced persons	✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
Indigenous minority rights							✓									✓								✓					✓	✓			
Right of self-determination		✓			✓												✓																✓
Citizenship	✓			✓	✓								✓							✓			✓			✓		✓				
Women					✓		✓				✓					✓					✓							✓				✓	✓
Children				✓			✓									✓					✓							✓	✓			✓	✓
Education reform				✓	✓		✓			✓	✓					✓			✓	✓		✓		✓			✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Official language and symbol				✓	✓			✓					✓		✓				✓					✓				✓	✓		✓		
Cultural protections				✓			✓						✓						✓				✓					✓	✓	✓	✓		
Media			✓			✓		✓		✓			✓		✓	✓			✓	✓		✓		✓				✓	✓			✓	
Minority rights																		✓										✓					✓
Reparations											✓									✓					✓				✓	✓			✓
Other topics																																	
Economic and social development	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Ratification mechanism				✓	✓	✓										✓	✓					✓		✓				✓			✓		

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Appendix 2 – *continued*

Country & Peace Agreement Year	Croatia (1995)	Timor-Leste (1999)	El Salvador (1992)	South Africa (1993)	Northern Ireland (1998)	Mozambique (1992)	Bangladesh (1997)	Angola (2002)	Cambodia (1991)	Sierra Leone (1996)	Sierra Leone (1999)	Guinea-Bissau (1998)	Indonesia - Aceh (2005)	Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000)	Angola (1994)	Burundi (2002)	Papua New Guinea (2001)	Djibouti (1994)	Niger (1995)	Djibouti (2001)	Liberia (2003)	Lebanon (1989)	Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)	Macedonia (2001)	Mali (1991)	Rwanda (1993)	Republic of Congo (1999)	Sudan (2005)	Guatemala (1996)	India (1993)	Philippines (1996)	Tajikistan (1997)	Nepal (2006)
Donor support	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓		✓
Detailed timeline For implementation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Natural resource usage			✓				✓			✓	✓		✓			✓	✓		✓									✓	✓		✓		✓
Independence referendum		✓			✓												✓											✓					
Affirmation of adherence to arms embargo									✓																			✓					
Provisions for review of agreement			✓	✓	✓					✓	✓					✓	✓											✓			✓		✓
External arrangements																																	
UN transitional authority		✓							✓																								
UN, international or internal verification		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
International arbitration commission on land														✓									✓										
Arbitration commission to address damage and loss													✓	✓		✓																	
UN peacekeeping force	✓	✓				✓			✓		✓			✓	✓	✓					✓		✓			✓		✓					
Regional peacekeeping force											✓	✓		✓		✓	✓				✓											✓	
Withdrawal of troops		✓				✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓					✓	✓		✓	✓		✓					