Appendix, Chapter 1

Overview of Surveys and Data Collection

We designed two original survey instruments and contracted the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) to administer the 15-minute, internet-administered survey to 4576 adult Americans from June 18, 2019 through July 8, 2019.[1] The second wave was administered from September 10, 2020 through October 14, 2020. NORC drew the full samples from two sources. First, they pulled a nationally representative probability-based panel of approximately 1000 respondents from their proprietary AmeriSpeak Panel.[2] NORC augmented this sample with an additional roughly 3500 respondents from the independent public opinion research firm Dynata. These additional respondents were drawn from Dynata's proprietary non-probability panel, which is "managed to allow the selection of samples to reflect the target population" and has a margin of sampling error of +/- 3 percentage points with a 95% level of confidence. NORC also drew an over-sample of veterans from both the AmeriSpeak and Dynata panels, resulting in a total number of 900 veterans in our data.[3]

For both waves, NORC weighted the responses in two stages. First, for the AmeriSpeak Panel, NORC incorporated the appropriate probability of selection for sampling strata based on age, race/Hispanic ethnicity, education, and gender and then accounted for nonresponse and made ration adjustments to population benchmarks. Then, NORC used a hybrid calibration approach to account for potential bias associated with the Dynata non-probability sample before weighting the full sample to key demographic variables and party identification based on external data available from other national surveys such as health insurance, internet access, voting behavior, and housing type from the American Community Survey (ACS) or the Current Population Survey (CPS).

We conducted a number of data quality assurance checks before testing our data. First, NORC identified and removed any survey respondents who repeatedly returned to previous screens and those who took an unreasonably short amount of time to complete the survey. We also conducted a number of robustness checks on the resulting data, including analyzing our core results after removing both 10 and 20 percent of the sample who completed the survey fastest. Additionally, we attempted to

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[1] This study was funded with a generous grant from Robert and Marion Oster.

[2] For technical information on the AmeriSpeak panel, see here: https://amerispeak.norc.org/about-amerispeak/Pages/Panel-Design.aspx

[3] Our oversample of veterans provides us with a more precise estimate of the veteran population for comparison with the civilian population.

identify potential "straightliners" who did not vary their answers and raced through the survey. We identified approximately 8 percent of respondents who may have used this technique. Our results did not substantively change when we removed these respondents from our sample. Unless otherwise reported, all reported results rely on analysis of the full sample, but our findings were robust to different specifications.

In addition, we conducted sensitivity analyses for three major events that occurred while the first survey wave was in the field that could have impacted respondents' views on the military. On June 26, two service members were killed in Afghanistan, on June 29, negotiations between the US and the Taliban resumed, and on July 2, a Navy SEAL accused of war crimes was found not guilty. Two additionally notable events, the suspended raid on Iran and the firing of Shanahan during the Secretary of Defense confirmation process, happened at the beginning of the survey timeframe. For the June 26, June 29, and July 2 dates, a series of survey-weighted t-tests showed little statistical significance before and after the key events. In the cases where there was a statistically significant difference, there was no substantively significant difference in the results or findings. These three key events did not appear to have a substantial impact on survey responses.

The survey instruments themselves draw on a variety of sources, including the standard demographic questions and well-established Gallup questions exploring public confidence in institutions and leaders of institutions.[4] We also included questions from the TISS Study on the Gap between the Military and Society from the late-1990s, itself an extension of the decades-long surveys conducted by Ole Holsti (Holsti 1996; Feaver and Kohn 2001).

We included a number of questions to help us understand different aspects of confidence in the military and to identify different mechanisms that could explain why public confidence may vary. For instance, we asked our respondents to register the extent to which they agreed or disagreed (using the standard Likert scale, strongly agree-strongly disagree) with a range of statements, each a claim that the military has a particular positive or negative quality (e.g., the military has become too partisan, the military is good at what it does, the military shares my values, etc.). The list was adapted from previous studies,[5] with newly added questions aimed at asking about the perks that society grants the military and veterans.

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[4] In addition to the standard Gallup confidence question, we also asked respondents to report their confidence in the military on a 10-point scale.

[5] Robinson 2018; Ohanian 1990; Goldsmith et al., 2000; Newell and Goldsmith 2001; Schake and Mattis 2016

Finally, to move beyond previous research, we developed several survey experiments that explore how the public responds to both positive and negative priming that taps into distinct alternative clusters of determinants of confidence: operational effectiveness, ethical professional standards, and partisan identity (Burbach 2017; Robinson 2018).

The questions and survey experiments discussed above can be seen in the following survey instruments, one for each wave:

These files are archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Wave 1 Instrument (June 18, 2019 through July 8, 2019)

Wave 2 Instrument (September 10, 2020 through October 14, 2020)

All additional documents, including data and code files are available on the Harvard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link **here**.

Appendix, Chapter 2

Logistic Regression Models

The table embedded in the following link displays the specification and the results of the underlying multivariate model used for the demographic predictions displayed in the book's text as Figures 2.9 and 2.10:

Appendix Table 1: ***Model, Figures 2.9 and 2.10***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the link below includes the results of the multivariate model for confidence in the four primary military branches and was used to create the estimates of the public's confidence in the military displayed in Table 2.5 of the book's text. The base category for the Service categorical variable is the Army. As a result, service-specific coefficients should be interpreted relative to confidence in the Army. As discussed in the text, our results suggest that most members of the public place lower levels of confidence in the Army than they do in other military branches. Since Wave 2 was conducted in the fall of 2020, it is possible that media coverage of the events in and near Lafayette Square earlier in the summer contributed to these differences. Although most soldiers involved were members of the National Guard and not active duty Army personnel, media coverage did not always clearly make this distinction. Nevertheless, it is possible that other, more durable factors are driving the differences in public assessments of the military displayed here:

Appendix Table 2: ***Model, Table 2.5***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Demographic Predictions

Below are the discrete values used for the demographic predictions depicted in Figure 2.10.

Asian Female Student:

Democrat = 1, Republican = 0, Ideology = 0 (liberal)
Male = 0, White = 0, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 1
Income = 1 (low), Education = 3 (some college), Unemployed = 0, Married = 0

Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0,
Social (contact in military) = 0, Family (member in military) = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 1
Catholic = 0, Christian = 0, No Religion = 1
City = 0, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Black Low-income Single Female:

Democrat = 1, Republican = 0, Ideology = 1 (moderate)
Male = 0, White = 0, Black = 1, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 2, Education = 2 (high school graduate), Unemployed = 0, Married = 0
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 1
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 1, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 0, No Religion = 1
City = 1, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

CA White Collar Male Worker:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 0, Ideology = 1
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 5 (high), Education = 4 (bachelor's), Unemployed = 0, Married = 0
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 1
Catholic = 0, Christian = 0, No Religion = 1
City = 1, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Hispanic Male Migrant Worker:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 0, Ideology = 1
Male = 1, White = 0, Black = 0, Hispanic = 1, Asian = 0
Income = 1, Education = 1 (less than high school), Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 1, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 1
Catholic = 1, Christian = 0, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 1

Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

CA Liberal Male Ph.D.:

Democrat = 1, Republican = 0, Ideology = 0
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 4, Education = 5 (post-graduate degree, Unemployed = 0, Married = 0
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 1, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 1
Catholic = 0, Christian = 0, No Religion = 1
City = 1, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

NE Boomer Woman:

Democrat = 1, Republican = 0, Ideology = 1
Male = 0, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 4, Education = 3, Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 1, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 0, No Religion = 1
City = 0, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Midwest Soccer Mom:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 0, Ideology = 1
Male = 0, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 4, Education = 3, Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 1, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 1
Midwest = 1, South = 0, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 1, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Black Female Non-commissioned Officer:

Democrat = 1, Republican = 0, Ideology = 0
Male = 0, White = 0, Black = 1, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 3, Education = 2, Unemployed = 0, Married = 0

Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 1
Active Duty = 1, Veteran = 0, Social = 1, Family = 1
Midwest = 0, South = 1, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 1, No Religion = 0
City = 1, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Post-911 White Male Veteran:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 1, Ideology = 2 (conservative)
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 3, Education = 3, Unemployed = 0, Married = 0
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 1
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 1, Social = 1, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 1
Catholic = 1, Christian = 0, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 1
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Hispanic Male Marine:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 0, Ideology = 0
Male = 1, White = 0, Black = 0, Hispanic = 1, Asian = 0
Income = 3, Education = 3, Unemployed = 0, Married = 0
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 1, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 1, Veteran = 0, Social = 1, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 1
Catholic = 1, Christian = 0, No Religion = 0
City = 1, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

NASCAR Dad:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 1, Ideology = 2
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 3, Education = 3, Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 1, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 1, Family = 1
Midwest = 0, South = 1, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 1, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 1
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

NE White Collar Worker:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 1, Ideology = 1
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 4, Education = 4, Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 0, Generation X = 1, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 0, Family = 0
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 1, No Religion = 0
City = 1, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Male Midwestern Farmer:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 1, Ideology = 2
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 2, Education = 2, Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 1, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 1, Family = 0
Midwest = 1, South = 0, West = 0
Catholic = 1, Christian = 0, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 1
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Female Fox News Watcher:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 1, Ideology = 2
Male = 0, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 3, Education = 2, Unemployed = 0, Married = 1
Silent = 0, Boomer = 1, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 0, Social = 1, Family = 1
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 1, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Male Republican Korean War Veteran:

Democrat = 0, Republican = 1, Ideology = 2
Male = 1, White = 1, Black = 0, Hispanic = 0, Asian = 0
Income = 4, Education = 3, Unemployed = 0, Married = 0

Silent = 0, Boomer = 1, Generation X = 0, Millennial = 0
Active Duty = 0, Veteran = 1, Social = 1, Family = 1
Midwest = 0, South = 0, West = 0
Catholic = 0, Christian = 0, No Religion = 0
City = 0, Rural = 0
Survey Experiment Assignment = 1 (control)

Appendix, Chapter 3

The table at the following link contains the results for a multivariate analysis of whether a respondent believes that "most members of the military look like me" and level of confidence in the military as depicted in Figure 3.1. The variable, "Looks Like Me", takes the value of 1 when the respondent indicated that "some" or "most" military members look like they do and 0 otherwise.

Appendix Table 3: ***Model, Figure 3.1***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table below reproduces the analysis contained in Table 3.2 while excluding the approximately 15 percent of respondents who completed the survey in under ten minutes. As noted, there are no statistical differences between these results and the results presented in the text of the book, and the results in every row differ by less than 3 percentage points. Although not reported in all cases, I did not observe any bias from "speedsters" that raised questions about the core findings of the book.

Table 3.2b: Accuracy of Responses to Knowledge Questions (2019), (with respondents who completed the survey in under 10 minutes excluded)

Question	% Correct	% Incorrect	Total
Which of the Following is not a military service?	94% (1800)	6% (113)	100% (1913)
Which service has the most personnel?	84% (1556)	16% (307)	100% (1863)
Which of the following ranks from highest to lowest the number of American combat fatalities: Vietnam (1962-1975), Gulf War (1991), Afghanistan (2001-2019), Iraq (2003-2019)?	28% (551)	72% (1385)	100% (1936)
In which of the following countries has a U.S. service member died since the beginning of 2017? Check all that apply.	13% (232)	87% (1621)	100% (1853)
Who is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces?	84% (3181)	16% (605)	100% (3786)

Are women currently allowed to serve in combat arms units in the U.S. military?	83% (3168)	17% (632)	100% (3800)
What does the acronym MRE stand for?	64% (2434)	36% (1354)	100% (3788)
What was the last declaration of war by the United States?	39% (1469)	61% (2307)	100% (3776)
Overall Average (Knowledge Scale)	65%	35%	100% (3752)

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of confidence with knowledge of military affairs, as depicted in Figure 3.2.

Appendix Table 4: ***Model, Figure 3.2***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of confidence with education level and party identity interactions, corresponding with the results presented in Figure 3.3.

Appendix Table 5: ***Model, Figure 3.3***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of perceived Republican make-up of the military with education level and party identity interactions, corresponding with the results presented in Figure 3.4.

Appendix Table 6: ***Model, Figure 3.4***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The following table at the next link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of military confidence with the level of attention a respondent pays to military news, as depicted in Figure 3.9.

Appendix Table 7: ***Model, Figure 3.9***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix, Chapter 4

Model, Figure 4.3

The table below contains the results of a multivariate analysis of confidence in the military with confidence in other public institutions across a pooled data set from 1974 to 2021. This model was used to generate the predictions depicted in Figure 4.3.

Table 8: Confidence in Other Institutions and Confidence in the Military

	Confidence
Confidence_Institutions	3.598***
	(0.051)
Black	-0.152***
	(0.035)
Woman	-0.087***
	(0.025)
Education	-0.280***
	(0.010)
Age	0.006***
	(0.001)
Democrat	-0.070**
	(0.033)
Republican	0.490***
	(0.034)
Year	0.031***
	(0.001)
War_year	0.375***
	(0.027)
Constant	-62.362***
	(1.930)
Observations	40,953
Log Likelihood	-23627.56
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001*

By Year Predictions
Below are the discrete values used for the predictions depicted in Figure 4.3.

1974: Confidence_Institutions = 0, Black = 0, Woman = 0, Democrat = 0, Republican = 0, Year = 1974, War_Year = 0

2021: Confidence_Institutions = 0, Black = 0, Woman = 0, Democrat = 0, Republican = 0, Year = 2021, War_Year = 1

As noted in the main text, I also conducted regressions for each year of the sample. While not reported individually, these results collectively were consistent with step function-like jumps in confidence coinciding with the Gulf War and September 11th.

Principal Component Analysis
Below we display the scree plot we conducted as part of our principal component analysis. Consistent with the prevailing convention in the field, we treated all components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (in this case, #1 and #2) as the principal components for all subsequent analyses.

Appendix Figure 1:



The figure below visually displays the component loadings for our institutional characteristic questions when placed along the axes associated with our two principal components. This visual representation illustrates well how all the institutional characteristics bunch together relatively closely along component 1, with the variable – "Too Partisan" – operating somewhat differently than the other characteristics along component 2.

We interpret this evidence as suggesting that most respondents do not neatly differentiate between these individual characteristics when assessing their feelings for the military. However, there is evidence that some members of the public are beginning to consider their perceptions of the military's partisanship when evaluating their trust in the military. As noted in the text of chapter 4, partisanship appears to be a secondary consideration for most respondents. Nevertheless, the fact that even some consider the military's partisan stance when determining whether or not they trust the institution breaks with traditional notions of a non-partisan military and raises some concern.

Appendix Figure 2:



Models, Figure 4.9

The table below displays the baseline results of a multivariate analysis of confidence in the military with attribute questions removed and only the control variables included.

Many of the same patterns we observed in chapters 2 and 4 are apparent in these baseline models, but the effects of most demographic variables remain muted (with the exception of veterans and active duty troops). Recall from Tables 4.1-4.3 that Democrats and Republicans often had their own preferred institutions, agencies, or professions. As a result, some of the predictive power of demographic variables falls away when multiple organizations are pooled together. Yet the attributes we included in Figure 4.9 (and in analyses of individual institutions, agencies, and professions) remain highly correlated with public confidence, suggesting that they may explain at least part of why the public holds certain institutions in relatively higher or lower regard.

Appendix Figure 3: ***Baseline Model, Figure 4.9 (with No Attribute variables)***

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix, Chapter 5

Analysis of "Ethical Generals" Experimental Treatments, by Party

As discussed in chapter 5, both Democrats and Republicans responded to the "Ethical Generals" experimental treatment in an unexpected way. Although our survey design prevents us from definitively explaining this surprising result, the evidence in Table 9 below sheds some light on why Democrats may not have responded to treatments suggesting that senior military officers are more ethical than their civilian counterparts.

Telling Democrats that the military has a comparatively low level of unethical behavior among its senior ranks had the paradoxical effect of making Democrats less likely to think the military was truthful, with a drop of 12 percentage points. In other words, our survey provides at least some evidence that Democratic respondents simply did not find this prompt plausible. Independents, on the other hand, did respond to the treatment. Although overall confidence among Independents only increased by five percentage points, Independents became 16 percentage points more likely to say that the military is truthful and that it wins the wars it fights as well as 13 points more likely to say that the military is ethical. Republicans also became slightly more likely to say that the military is ethical and truthful when told that senior military officers are ethical. Thus, the decline in overall confidence among Republicans after receiving the "ethical generals" prompt was not because it made Republicans somehow think the military was less ethical or truthful. Something else must be going on but given the limits of the data, one can only speculate as to what it might be.

Appendix Table 9. Percentage Point Change for the "Ethical Generals" Condition Compared to the Control Condition for Institutional Attributes

	Overall	Dem	Ind	Rep
Too Partisan	-1%	+1%	+5%	-2%
Good at Job	-4%	-3%	-2%	-6%
Wins Wars	+1%	-6%	+16%	-1%
Ethical	+3%	-5%	+13%	+4%
Truthful	0%	-12%	+16%	+1%
Shares Values	+5%	+5%	+3%	-1%
Total	-6%	-10%	+5%	-11%

As Appendix Table 10 shows, however, this surprising result was limited to the "ethical generals" prompt. All three partisan groups showed uniformly negative responses to the "unethical generals" prompt, with especially strong results among Democratic respondents. When told that senior military officers had exhibited unethical behavior, Democrats' assessments of the military as ethical and truthful dropped by 28 and 20 percentage points, respectively. They also reported that the military was worse at its job (-16% points), less likely to win wars (-18% points), and more partisan (+7% points). Republican assessments also became consistently more negative, though slightly less than Democrats, while Independents' assessments of the military changed primarily in terms of partisanship (+9% points) and competence (-12% points).

Appendix Table 10. Percentage Point Change for the "Unethical Generals" Condition Compared to the Control Condition for Institutional Attributes

	Overall	Dem	Ind	Rep
Too Partisan	+4%	+7%	+9%	+1%
Good at Job	-12%	-16%	-12%	-6%
Wins Wars	-9%	-18%	+3%	-6%
Ethical	-15%	-28%	0%	-9%
Truthful	-11%	-20%	-4%	-5%
Shares Values	-6%	-9%	+3%	-11%
Total	-14%	-23%	-9%	-9%

Causal Mediation

As discussed in chapter 5 and displayed in Table 5.4, we also used structural equation models to estimate causal mediation effects. This statistical technique allows us to explore how much of the aggregate changes in public confidence can be explained by changes in respondents' assessments of military attributes.

We reported all statistically significant results (p-value < 0.10) in the text of chapter 5. In Table 11 below, we report the full results of our aggregate causal mediation analysis for all treatments designed to examine how the military's performance and its professional ethics shape public confidence in the military. Positively-signed results are relatively straightforward in their interpretation. For example, 40% of the total decrease in confidence due to the "Lost War" treatment is caused by a decreased assessment of competence, and 28% is explained by a decreased assessment of whether the military shares the public's values.

Negatively-signed percentages, on the other hand, indicate that the explanatory effect of the mediating variable moved in the opposite direction from the aggregate change in confidence. Although these negative results are less intuitive, they can nevertheless provide additional insight as the "Truthful" mediator for the "Lost War" treatment again illustrates. The -9% result for the "Truthful" mediator suggests that changes in assessments of the military's truthfulness actually caused a small increase in confidence among some respondents. In other words, some respondents likely saw the "Lost War" treatment as reason to believe the military was more truthful and granted it more confidence as a result despite the lost war itself. Granted, this result is quite small – only 9% of the aggregate 9% drop (less than 1% total). Nevertheless, it does indicate that at least a few respondents saw the "Lost War" prompt not as a referendum on the military's performance during the war in Afghanistan, but rather as a referendum on whether military leaders were telling the public the truth about the war.

Appendix Table 11: Average Causal Mediation Effects (2019, 2020)

Treatment	Too Partisan		Competent		Ethical		Truthful		Shares Values		Total	
	% Mediated	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*(Decrease) % Mediated*	*p*
Won War (2019)	-5%	0.70	-37%	0.45	3%	0.82	-1%	0.89	38%	0.20	-1%	0.99
Lost War (2019)	-4%	0.27	**40%*** **	**0.00**	4%	0.34	**-9%***	0.09	**28%** **	**0.04**	**60%*** **	**0.01**
Good Ethics (2019)	1%	0.6	**52%***	**0.08**	-19%	0.27	2%	0.72	-25%	0.24	11%	0.85
Bad Ethics (2019)	**1%*** **	**0.01**	**28%*** **	0.00	**19%**	**0.00**	**1%*** **	**0.00**	**14%** **	**0.05**	**63%*** **	**0.00**
COVID Success (2020)	1%	0.73	9%	0.66	15%	0.25	6%	0.19	5%	0.49	35%	0.90
COVID Failure (2020)	27%	0.14	-22%	0.74	47%	0.16	32%	0.13	27%	0.38	112%	0.41
NG Order (2020)	3%	0.68	20%	0.46	13%	0.56	-5%	0.44	-3%	0.83	28%	0.66
NG Inflamed (2020)	0%	0.99	6%	0.76	-3%	0.69	**-9%***	**0.07**	3%	0.84	-3%	0.94

Appendix, Chapter 6

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of support for the border deployment mission and controls for demographic variables and treatment effects, corresponding with the results presented in Figure 6.5. Although the patterns reported in the text still hold, the size of the effect is reduced (but still significant) among GOP respondents who received the "military opposes" cue when controlling for demographic variables and slightly increased among Democrats. Nevertheless, any military cues against the mission still had roughly similar results within the parties.

Appendix Table 12

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of respondents' perceptions of how much partisanship divides the United States and explores whether these views vary by party and by level of confidence in the military. In the aggregate, there is no relationship between confidence and the dependent variable. Among Republicans, however, there is a small and weakly significant effect.

Appendix Table 13

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Table 14 displays the results of multivariate analysis for respondents' perceptions of the degree of partisanship in the military and explores whether these views vary by party and by level of confidence in the military. As the table shows, there is no significant relationship between confidence and perceptions of military partisanship for Democrats or Independents, but Republicans with high confidence are more likely to think the military is less divided by partisanship. It is worth noting that these results were taken before several cultural flashpoints emerged and conservative pundits began criticizing the military for embracing the "woke" agenda. It is possible that these views have shifted since that time.

Appendix Table 14

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Causal Mediation Effects

As discussed in chapter 6 displayed in Table 6.9, we also used structural equation models to estimate causal mediation effects. This statistical technique allows us to explore how much of the aggregate changes in public confidence can be explained by changes in respondents' assessments of military attributes.

Chapter 6 reports all statistically significant results (p-value < 0.10) in the text. In Appendix Table 15 below, we report the full results of our aggregate causal mediation analysis for all treatments designed to examine how military partisanship, or perceptions of partisanship, shapes public confidence in the military.

Appendix Table 15. Causal Mediation Effects, by Party

Treatment	Party	Too Partisan		Competent		Ethical		Truthful		Shares Values		Total	
		% Mediated	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*	*% Mediated*	*p*
GOP Mil (2019)	**DEM**	-15%	0.13	55%	0.21	19%	0.27	**-6%*** **	**0.01**	**25%***	**0.1**	(-7) 79%	0.18
GOP Mil (2020)		6%	0.18	**37%** **	**0.05**	24%	0.13	5%	0.16	**20%***	**0.07**	**(-7) 93%** **	**0.03**
DEM Mil (2019)		6%	0.94	-444%	0.11	24%	0.85	5%	0.85	24%	0.85	(+2) -384%	0.34
DEM Mil (2020)		2%	0.63	6%	0.46	6%	0.44	0%	0.95	3%	0.62	(+14) 17%	0.44
Partisan (2019)		12%	0.33	-31%	0.53	-17%	0.25	0%	0.20	14%	0.52	(+3) -22%	0.77
Partisan (2020)		-15%	0.41	28%	0.42	19%	0.46	8%	0.30	17%	0.22	(-7) 57%	0.40
GOP Mil (2019)	**GOP**	4%	0.44	-113%	0.72	11%	0.81	-10%	0.93	106%	0.53	(+1) -2%	0.99
GOP Mil (2020)		-2%	0.60	18%	0.82	-10%	0.63	-70%	0.16	-12%	0.42	(-3) -75%	0.61
DEM Mil (2019)		**9%*** **	**0.00**	**29%*** **	**0.00**	**10%***	**0.09**	**-7%** **	**0.04**	**8%*** **	**0.01**	**(-13) 50%*** **	**0.01**
DEM Mil (2020)		**8%*** **	**0.01**	8%	0.70	0%	0.25	-6%	0.43	**16%***	**0.09**	(-12) 27%	0.48
Partisan (2019)		**1%*** **	**0.01**	-59%	0.15	-3%	0.93	-20%	0.72	-5%	0.27	(+3) -86%	0.26
Partisan (2020)		5%	0.55	41%	0.68	-30%	0.48	-153%	0.08	0%	0.99	(-2) -137%	0.52
GOP Mil (2019)	**IND**	29%	0.43	-29%	0.48	10%	0.52	-12%	0.56	101%	0.51	(+2) 99%	0.60
GOP Mil (2020)		42%	0.51	-2%	0.73	-73%	0.85	-60%	0.72	-10%	0.83	(-1) -104%	0.86
DEM Mil (2019)		19%	0.19	51%	0.23	4%	0.67	8%	0.47	-93%	0.52	(-6) -12%	0.94
DEM Mil (2020)		46%	0.45	6%	0.81	66%	0.49	74%	0.38	203%	0.12	(+2) 394%	0.23
Partisan (2019)		**22%** **	**0.02**	-21%	0.15	0%	0.99	-5%	0.66	12%	0.84	(+15) 8%	0.91
Partisan (2020)		-7%	0.74	**34%***	**0.09**	5%	0.48	40%	0.14	**38%** **	**0.05**	(+8) 110%	0.13

Appendix, Chapter 7

The table below replicates Table 7.1, but uses the Gallup question rather than the direct "Yes/No" confidence question. As noted in the book text, this result is slightly smaller in size than the result from the direct question. However, we included the results from the direct question in the book text because it most closely follows best practices in the existing social sciences literature.

Table 7.1a: Public Confidence in the Military as Revealed by the Social Desirability List Experiment, Gallup Question (2020)

Response Value, *y*	Control		Treatment	
	N	%	N	%
0	162	7%	139	6%
1	398	18%	238	11%
2	635	29%	508	23%
3	633	28%	670	30%
4	298	13%	391	17%
5	96	4%	239	11%
6			70	3%
Total	2223	100%	2256	100%
Mean (*y*)	2.36		2.87	
Difference	0.51			
Gallup Question	0.69			
Total Effect	**0.18**			

Tables 16-17 below display the distribution of responses across treatments and treatment effects by demographic categories.

Appendix Table 16: Distribution Across Treatments by Demographic Variables

Variable	Control (n = 2194)	Treatment (n = 2253)	Total (n = 4447)
Veteran	7%	7%	7%
Family in Military	42%	45%	43%
No Family in Military	58%	55%	57%
Democrat	43%	44%	44%
Republican	39%	38%	38%
Liberal	29%	30%	29%
Conservative	31%	30%	30%
Age (18-29)	21%	20%	21%
Age (30-44)	25%	26%	26%
Age (45-59)	24%	25%	24%
Age (60+)	30%	29%	30%
Men	48%	49%	49%
Women	52%	51%	51%
High School or Less	39%	38%	38%
College or Vocational	48%	49%	49%
Graduate School	13%	13%	13%
White	63%	62%	63%
Black	12%	12%	12%
Hispanic	18%	16%	17%
Asian	4%	5%	4%
Northeast	18%	17%	17%
Midwest	21%	20%	21%
South	38%	39%	38%

West	23%	24%	24%

Appendix Table 17: Raw Treatment Effects by Demographic Variables

Variable	Control	Treatment	Difference	Direct	Effect	Gallup	G Effect	Diff
Veteran	2.37	3.11	0.74	0.89	0.15	0.85	0.11	0.04
Non-veteran	2.35	2.84	0.51	0.77	0.26	0.67	0.16	0.10
Family in Military	2.35	2.95	0.60	0.81	0.21	0.74	0.14	0.07
No Family in Military	2.39	2.83	0.44	0.77	0.33	0.66	0.22	0.11
Democrat	2.38	2.84	0.46	0.71	0.25	0.59	0.13	0.12
Independent	2.15	2.67	0.52	0.73	0.21	0.61	0.09	0.12
Republican	2.41	3.07	0.66	0.89	0.23	0.81	0.15	0.08
Liberal	2.43	2.75	0.32	0.65	0.33	0.57	0.25	0.08
Moderate	2.46	2.93	0.47	0.82	0.35	0.69	0.22	0.13
Conservative	2.26	3.03	0.77	0.88	0.11	0.81	0.04	0.07
Age (18-29)	2.30	2.67	0.37	0.70	0.33	0.56	0.19	0.14
Age (30-44)	2.40	2.82	0.42	0.76	0.34	0.65	0.23	0.11
Age (45-59)	2.38	2.93	0.55	0.82	0.27	0.72	0.17	0.10
Age (60+)	2.35	3.05	0.70	0.83	0.13	0.76	0.06	0.07
Man	2.36	2.99	0.63	0.81	0.18	0.71	0.08	0.10
Woman	2.35	2.73	0.38	0.76	0.38	0.65	0.27	0.11
High School or Less	2.21	2.65	0.44	0.77	0.33	0.66	0.22	0.11
Some College	2.39	3.00	0.61	0.79	0.18	0.69	0.08	0.10
Graduate School	2.68	2.90	0.22	0.78	0.56	0.70	0.48	0.08
White	2.36	2.98	0.62	0.82	0.20	0.72	0.10	0.10
Black	2.37	2.73	0.36	0.70	0.34	0.59	0.23	0.11
Hispanic	2.29	2.58	0.29	0.72	0.43	0.63	0.34	0.09
Asian	2.44	2.78	0.34	0.82	0.48	0.70	0.36	0.12

Northeast	2.43	2.82	0.39	0.77	0.38	0.65	0.28	0.10
Midwest	2.21	2.90	0.69	0.77	0.08	0.67	-0.02	0.10
South	2.33	2.84	0.51	0.81	0.30	0.71	0.20	0.10
West	2.48	2.88	0.40	0.76	0.36	0.67	0.27	0.09

Tables 18 and 19 are additional tests we conducted to confirm that correlation between the items in our list experiment did not bias our statistical results. We identified no evidence suggesting that was the case.

Appendix Table 18: Test for Design Effects

y Value	$\hat{\pi}_{y0}$	SE	$\hat{\pi}_{y1}$	SE
0	6.1	0.7	1.2	1.0
1	9.4	1.3	8.5	1.7
2	14.0	1.9	14.5	2.0
3	15.2	1.9	13.3	1.7
4	4.0	1.4	9.4	1.1
5	1.2	0.7	3.1	0.5
Total	49.9		50.1	
Bonferroni-adjusted *p*-value 1.00				

Appendix Table 19: Multivariate Analysis of the List Experiment and the Direct Question (Wave 2)

Direct Question	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Expected diff-in-means	Actual diff-in-means	95% Conf. interval
Confidence (0)	2.52 (0.03)	3.06 (0.03)	1.00	0.54 (0.04)	[0.45, 0.63]
N	1787	1803			
No confidence (1)	2.09 (0.06)	2.25 (0.07)	0.00	0.16 (0.10)	[-0.02, 0.39]
N	422	435			

Appendix, Chapter 8

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis of whether respondents say they would advise a close friend to join the military by level of confidence in the military (Table 8.1). Even when controlling for demographics and all other explanatory variables from chapters 2-4, our “Confidence in the military” variable remains strongly significant.

Appendix Table 20

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the following link contains the results of a multivariate analysis for two related questions. The first column shows results for a question about whether respondents say they would be proud if a close friend joined the military and level of confidence in the military, and the second column shows the results for a question about whether respondents would be disappointed under the same circumstances (Figure 8.2). Even when controlling for demographics and all other explanatory variables from chapters 2-4, our “Confidence in the military” variable has a positive and strongly significant relationship with “Proud” answers and a negative and strongly significant relationship with “Disappointed” responses.

Appendix Table 21

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the following link contains the results of multivariate analysis of whether respondents say they would advise a close friend to join the military, with separate models for each of our measures of respondents’ personal connection to the military: (1) Veteran status; (2) Social Contact with a service member within the last month; (3) Social Contact with a service member within the last year; and (4) a Family member who serves or has served (Table 8.3). In all cases, these measures of respondents’ personal connection to the military are positive and strongly significant, even when controlling for demographics and all other explanatory variables from chapters 2-4.

Appendix Table 22

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table displays a model similar to those in Appendix Table 22 but instead includes every measure of personal connection to the military in the same model. With all variables in the same model, each remains positively related with respondents' willingness to recommend that a friend or family member join the military; however, only our "Contact within the Last Year" and "Family" member who served variables remain weakly significant. Still, not much can be made of these results since these connection variables are closely related. Since each of these measures is highly correlated with the others, it is difficult to suss out exactly which type of connection matters more. More importantly for our purposes, however, respondents' "Confidence in the Military" remains a positive and strongly significant predictor of whether they are willing to recommend military service to a friend or family member (Figure 8.5). These results hold even when controlling for demographics, military connections, and all other explanatory variables from chapters 2-4.

Appendix Table 23

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Table 24 shows the results of multivariate analysis for the relationship between respondents' attitudes about military pay by confidence level (Table 8.5). Confidence is a strong predictor of respondents' attitudes regarding military pay, with greater levels of confidence associated with disagreement that the military receives "Too Much Pay" and agreement that the military received "Too Little Pay."

Appendix Table 24

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table displays similar results when respondents are faced with a tradeoff between funding for the State Department and Department of Defense. Even when controlling for demographic variables and other explanatory variables, "Confidence in the Military" is associated with a greater willingness to cut the State Department's budget in order to fund the Military (Table 8.6). Similarly, high levels of confidence are related to greater unwillingness to cut the Department of Defense's budget to fund the State Department.

Appendix Table 25

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Table 26 shows similar models, but it instead uses the 4-point measure of “Confidence in the Military” as the primary explanatory variable. This change has no substantive impact on our results, with strong and statistically significant results mirroring those from the previous table.

Appendix Table 26

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix, Chapter 9

The correlation matrix for the items in the Importance and Usefulness batteries is reported in Appendix Table 27.

Appendix Table 27

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Principal Component Analysis

Below we display the scree plot we conducted as part of our principal component analysis. Consistent with the prevailing convention in the field, we treated all components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (in this case, #1 through #4) as principal components for our subsequent analysis.

Appendix Figure 4:



Factor Loadings, revealing four latent factors, are reported in Appendix Table 28.

Appendix Table 28

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The table at the following link displays the results of our multivariate analysis exploring the relationship between respondents' confidence in the military and their attitudes about the importance and usefulness of military missions in the aggregate (Figure 9.1). Even when controlling for demographics and all other explanatory variables from chapters 2-4, the relationship between our "Confidence in the Military" variable and respondents' attitudes about the "Importance" and "Usefulness" of military missions is positive and strongly significant.

Appendix Table 29

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Table 30 displays the results for four similar models that explore the relationship between respondents' confidence in the military and how they assess the Importance of the four types of missions we identified: (1) Realpolitik; (2) Humanitarian; (3) Homeland Security; and (4) Armed Social Work (Figure 9.2). Confidence in the military is a positive and significant predictor of whether respondents will believe that all four types of military missions are important.

Appendix Table 30

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table drills down into respondents' assessments of the Importance of two specific domestic missions, using the military to "Redress Discrimination" or using the military for "Disaster Relief" (Figure 9.3). As column 2 shows, confidence is positively and significantly related with respondents' willingness to state that "Disaster Relief" is an Important military mission. However, there is no significant relationship between respondents' confidence in the military and their belief that using the military to "Redress Discrimination" is an important military mission.

Appendix Table 31

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table examines whether confidence in the military is associated with respondents' beliefs about whether diplomacy or military force creates more foreign policy problems (Table 9.3). After controlling for demographic variables, we found no statistical relationship between confidence in the military and these variables.

Appendix Table 32

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Table 33 displays multivariate results exploring the relationship between confidence in the military and willingness to support the use of the military to attack overseas threats (Table 9.4). Even after controlling for demographic factors, we found that confidence is a strong and significantly significant predictor of whether a respondent would support drone attacks or the use of special operations forces to address overseas threats.

Appendix Table 33

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table shows the results for similar models that explore the relationship between confidence and support for several military missions: (1) Military Strikes Against Iran; (2) Use of the Military Domestically Under the Insurrection Act; and (3) Use of the Military to Enforce Security Along the U.S. Southern Border. We found large, positive, and statistically significant relationships between confidence and support for each of these missions (Figure 9.7).

Appendix Table 34

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Table 35 drills down into the relationship between confidence and support for the Border Mission, with a focus on party as a mediating factor (Figure 9.7). Although we observe a strong and significant relationship between confidence in the

military and support for the border mission overall, conditioning on party shows a clear difference in the way confidence mediates support for the Border Security mission. We found no statistically significant relationship between confidence in the military and support for the mission among Democrats, but we observed a very large and significant relationship between these variables among Republicans. (*Note: Although we used an Ordered Logit model in Appendix Table 34 and an OLS regression model for Appendix Table 35, the results are substantively the same regardless of which model we use.*)

Appendix Table 35

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table explores the relationship between confidence in the military and retrospective evaluations of past military missions, specifically whether or not respondents believe the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were mistakes (Table 9.5). Although we found no relationship between confidence in the military and respondents' evaluations of the war in Afghanistan, confidence in the military was a strong and significant predictor of attitudes about the wisdom of the war in Iraq. Respondents with more confidence in the military were more likely to report that they believed the Iraq War was a mistake.

Appendix Table 36

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

These results showed that the relationship between confidence and evaluations of past actions does not appear to carry over to current decisions about military policy (Table 9.6). As Appendix Table 37 shows, confidence in the military was not a statistically significant predictor of support for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan or Iraq.

Appendix Table 37

This file is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix, Chapter 10

Appendix Tables 38a and 38b explore the relationship between confidence in the military and support for granting special privileges to the military, as discussed in Table 10.1. These results are mixed, with some evidence that confidence level is statistically related with support for special privileges for members of the military.

Appendix Table 38a **Appendix Table 38b**

These files are archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next two tables look more directly at attitudes about whether non-serving civilians should be expected to thank service members for their military service, with a focus on respondents' military status (Table 10.2). Appendix Table 39a shows that there is some evidence that confidence in the military is related to beliefs about public shows of support for the troops. Especially among civilians, confidence is strongly predictive of the belief that civilians need to thank members of the military for their service; this relationship also holds among post-9/11 veterans, though this result is somewhat weaker. However, Appendix Table 39b shows that there is no relationship between confidence and the belief that thanking service members somehow creates an obstacle to more meaningful interactions or conversations. (*Note: due to a clerical error, the printed copy of the book reports that confidence is statistically significant for all three columns in both tables. However, confidence in the military is not statistically significant for Pre-9/11 veterans in Appendix Table 39a or in any model in Appendix Table 39b.*)

Appendix Table 39a **Appendix Table 39b**

These files are archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next three tables explore the relationship between confidence in the military and beliefs that the military is superior to civilian society (Table 10.3). With only one exception out of nine models, confidence in the military is strongly and significantly associated with the belief that members of the military should be put on a pedestal above civilian society.

Appendix Table 40a **Appendix Table 40b** **Appendix Table 40c**

These files are archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Appendix Tables 41a and 41b display the results of multivariate analysis to explore the relationship between confidence in the military and respondents' beliefs about the military's role in policymaking. In all cases save one, confidence in the military is positively and significantly related to the belief that the military should have a greater say in the making of policy (Table 10.5). The only exception is the question of whether civilians or the military should have the final say in decisions about when to use military force. In this case, we find no evidence that confidence is related to respondents' views about whether elected civilians should have the final say on whether or not to use military force.

Appendix Table 41a **Appendix Table 41b**

These files are archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

The next table displays the results of several models exploring whether confidence in the military is related to respondents' views on whether the military should be publicly criticized (Table 10.8). Once again, confidence in the military has a positive and statistically significant relationship with attitudes suggesting that public criticism of the military is inappropriate.

Appendix Table 42

This files is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.

Finally, Appendix Table 43 explores whether confidence predicts respondents' attitudes about military leaders' performance of their duties during the war in Afghanistan (Table 10.11). In all cases, we found a positive and statistically significant relationship between confidence in the military and the military's execution, advice, and civil-military integration.

Appendix Table 43

This files is archived on the Havard dataverse and also temporarily available at the embedded link.