# Overcoming Impeachment Hurdles: Elite Polarization, Mass Mobilization and Corruption Scandals

**Online Appendix**

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## Appendix 1: Analytical steps and raw data

*Table 1A. Planned analytical steps and robustness tests*

| | Stage | Issue | Analytical steps & robustness tests |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pre-analysis | Use of QCA for non-configurational, non-equifinal research questions | Developing configurational hypotheses |
| 2 | Pre-analysis | Ratio of variables to cases is high | Choice of 44 cases for five variables is within the accepted recommendations |
| 3 | Pre-analysis | Non-transparent and non-justifiable calibration thresholds | Theoretical and empirical justification for calibration (Results section). Calibration thresholds provided |
| 4 | Pre-analysis | Skewness of raw and/or set data, leading to distorted necessity or sufficiency relations | Skewness tests performed on raw and set data show within the acceptable 80:20 threshold (Oana et al., 2021) |
| 5 | Analysis | Contradiction to necessity | Necessity analysis carried out before sufficiency analysis for single variables and disjunctions |
| 6 | Analysis | Simultaneous subset relations between outcome and non-outcome | Enhanced intermediate solution used |
| 7 | Analysis | Consistency threshold for necessity and sufficiency analysis is low | Consistency threshold for necessity 0.9 (RoN: 0.5, Cov: 0.6) and sufficiency above 0.8 |
| 8 | Post-analysis | Results sensitive to raw consistency thresholds and frequency thresholds | Sensitivity range tests as well as fit-oriented and case-oriented robustness tests are carried out |
| 9 | Post-analysis | Empirical results do not match theoretical expectations | Theory evaluation of the hypotheses is carried out |
| 10 | Post-analysis | Empirical results are clustered by world region | Cluster analysis is carried out |

## *Raw data*

*Variable abbreviations:* out1 (lower house vote), out2 (removal from office), elip (elite ideological polarization), elap (elite affective polarization), csca (corruption scandal), les (legislative shield), and mam (mass mobilization).

| Country | President | Year | President's party | out 1 | out 2 | elip | elap | csc a | les | mam |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Ilir Meta | 2021 | Socialist Movement for Integration | 1 | 0 | 5.27 | 0.67 | 0 | -11.66 | 4999 |
| Brazil | Fernando Collor de Mello | 1992 | National Reconstruction Party | 1 | 1 | 5.63 | 2.91 | 1 | -25.2 | 860100 |
| Brazil | Dilma Rousseff | 2016 | Workers' Party | 1 | 1 | 6.35 | 2.71 | 1 | -6.76 | 110706 |
| Brazil | Michel Temer | 2017a | Brazilian Democratic Movement Party | 0 | 0 | 6.35 | 2.71 | 1 | -20.5 | 110706 |
| Brazil | Michel Temer | 2017 b | Brazilian Democratic Movement Party | 0 | 0 | 6.35 | 2.71 | 1 | -20.5 | 110706 |
| Central African Republic | Ange-Félix Patassé | 2002 | Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People | 0 | 0 | 3.62 | 1.08 | 0 | -9.56 | 5000 |
| Chile | Sebastián Piñera | 2019 | National Renewal | 0 | 0 | 6.23 | 3.04 | 0 | -20.16 | 0 |
| Chile | Sebastián Piñera | 2021 | National Renewal | 1 | 0 | 6.23 | 3.04 | 1 | -20.16 | 0 |
| Czech Republic | Václav Klaus | 2013 | None | 1 | 0 | 5.09 | 3.11 | 1 | -66.66 | 100000 |
| Czech Republic | Miloš Zeman | 2019 | Party of Civic Rights | 1 | 0 | 4.71 | 3.05 | 0 | -66.66 | 455505 |
| Ecuador | Abdalá Bucaram | 1997 | Ecuadorian Roldosist Party | 1 | 1 | 3.62 | 2.13 | 1 | -43.46 | 0 |
| Ecuador | Lucio Gutierrez | 2005 | Patriotic Society Party | 1 | 1 | 6.01 | 1.46 | 0 | -49.66 | 0 |
| Indonesia | Abdurrahm an Wahid | 2001 | National Awakening Party | 1 | 1 | 4.70 | 3.00 | 1 | 24.04 | 11000 |
| Lithuania | Rolandas Paksas | 2004 | Liberal Democratic Party | 1 | 1 | 6.08 | 2.92 | 1 | -21.96 | 50 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Madagascar | Albert Zafy | 1996 | National Union for Democracy and Development | 1 | 1 | 5.41 | 2.12 | 1 | -10.06 | 1695100 |
| Pakistan | Pervez Musharraf | 2008 | None | 1 | 1 | 5.59 | 1.00 | 0 | -12.76 | 1200 |
| Paraguay | Raúl Cubas Grau | 1999 | Colorado Party | 1 | 1 | 7.57 | 0.64 | 0 | -10.36 | 0 |
| Paraguay | Fernando Lugo | 2012 | Christian Democratic Party | 1 | 1 | 8.55 | 1.04 | 1 | -32.86 | 0 |
| Peru | Pedro Pablo Kuczynski | 2017 | Peruvians for Change | 0 | 0 | 7.87 | 2.48 | 1 | -52.86 | 0 |
| Peru | Pedro Pablo Kuczynski | 2018 | Peruvians for Change | 1 | 1 | 7.87 | 2.48 | 1 | -19.6 | 0 |
| Peru | Martín Vizcarra | 2019 | Peruvians for Change | 0 | 0 | 7.87 | 2.48 | 1 | -19.6 | 0 |
| Peru | Martín Vizcarra | 2020 | Peruvians for Change | 1 | 1 | 7.87 | 2.48 | 1 | -19.6 | 0 |
| Peru | Pedro Castillo | 2021 | Free Peru | 0 | 0 | 7.87 | 2.48 | 0 | -33.4 | 0 |
| Peru | Pedro Castillo | 2022 | Free Peru | 1 | 1 | 7.87 | 2.48 | 1 | -33.4 | 0 |
| Philippines | Joseph Estrada | 2000 | Force of the Filipino Masses | 1 | 1 | 7.21 | 2.70 | 1 | -39.56 | 258000 |
| Philippines | Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo | 2005 | Partner of the Free Filipino | 0 | 0 | 6.95 | 2.23 | 1 | -3.86 | 70000 |
| Romania | Ion Iliescu | 1994 | Romanian Social Democratic Party | 0 | 0 | 5.33 | 1.26 | 0 | -23.56 | 82000 |
| Romania | Traian Basescu | 2007 | None | 1 | 0 | 5.87 | 1.33 | 0 | -66.66 | 5000 |
| Romania | Traian Basescu | 2012 | None | 1 | 0 | 5.72 | 1.55 | 0 | -66.66 | 5000 |
| Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1993 | None | 1 | 1 | 4.86 | 2.56 | 0 | -37.56 | 10000 |
| Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1997 | None | 0 | 0 | 2.88 | 2.34 | 0 | -51.96 | 5000 |
| Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1998 | None | 0 | 0 | 2.88 | 2.34 | 0 | -66.66 | 5000 |
| Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1999 | None | 0 | 0 | 3.65 | 2.60 | 0 | -29.16 | 5000 |
| South Korea | Roh Moo-hyun | 2004 | Our Party | 1 | 1 | 6.54 | 3.52 | 1 | 8.7 | 10000 |
| South Korea | Park Geun-hye | 2016 | The Grand National Party | 1 | 1 | 6.74 | 3.00 | 1 | 7.2 | 10000 |
| Taiwan | Chen Shui-bian | 2006 | Democratic Progressive Party | 0 | 0 | 6.57 | 2.51 | 1 | -17.36 | 501250 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | Viktor Yanukovych | 2014 | Party of Regions | 1 | 1 | 6.30 | 1.55 | 0 | -18.46 | 1500 |
| United States of America | Bill Clinton | 1998 | Democratic Party | 1 | 0 | 6.77 | 3.00 | 0 | -19.06 | 0 |
| United States of America | Donald Trump | 2019 | Republican Party | 1 | 0 | 6.79 | 1.99 | 0 | -16.06 | 0 |
| United States of America | Donald Trump | 2021 | Republican Party | 1 | 0 | 6.79 | 1.99 | 0 | -16.06 | 0 |
| Venezuela | Carlos Andres Perez | 1993 | Democratic Action | 1 | 1 | 5.23 | 3.00 | 1 | -18.36 | 0 |
| Zambia | Frederick Chiluba | 2001 | Movement for Multi-party Democracy | 0 | 0 | 5.61 | 1.00 | 1 | 20.64 | 4000 |
| Zambia | Levy Mwanawasa | 2003 | Movement for Multi-party Democracy | 0 | 0 | 5.61 | 1.00 | 1 | -20.66 | 4000 |
| Zimbabwe | Robert Mugabe | 2017 | Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front | 1 | 1 | 3.27 | 0.26 | 0 | 6.34 | 50150 |

**Appendix 2: Calibration**

In crisp-set QCA, only a cross-over threshold needs to be determined. This is in contrast to fuzzy-set QCA, where a cross-over threshold, in addition to fully-in and fully-out thresholds, needs to be identified. For binary variables (0, 1) such as outcome 1 (i.e., lower house vote), outcome 2 (removal from office) and corruption scandal, the cross-over threshold is naturally 0.5.

For the other variables, calibration needs to be justified based on theoretical grounds. Legislative shield ranges between – 66.66 and 24.04 with the cross-over threshold set at 0.1. This means that positive numbers indicate the president's party (and their coalition) has enough legislative seats to block impeachment. This ensures the inclusion of South Korean President Park Geun-hye, who was impeached despite her party holding 7.2% of the seats over the impeachment threshold required by the Constitution. The same applies to elite ideological polarization on a 0 (left ideology) to 10 (right ideology), with 5 being identified as the cross-over threshold. Elite affective polarization's threshold is set at 1.001 to ensure that only elites' severe personal attacks or tactics of demonization against their opponents are considered as polarization when they are used at least "about half of the time", "usually" or "always" to avoid the inclusion of cases when such personal attacks or demonization are less frequent (i.e., "usually not"

or "never"). It is worth noting that we reversed the coding of affective polarization to be interpreted in a way that higher values mean more polarization.

In the case of mass mobilization, a distinction is drawn between negligible participants in protests (less than 10,000 participants over two years) and non-negligible numbers of over 10,000 participants. Examples of small protests include those against Ilir Meta in Albania, who witnessed minimal protests (around 5,000) calling for the political removal of officials. Such a decision is theoretically motivated, given the literature on how protest size has a greater effect and leads to more pressure on both the executive and/or legislative organs (Hager et al., 2022). Our decision is also empirically motivated to mitigate skewed set data, given that 28 cases witnessed no mobilization at all.

| **Variable** | **Raw values** | **Set values (cross-over)** |
|---|---|---|
| Hurdle 1: Lower house vote | 0 (no lower house vote) – 1 (pro-impeachment lower house vote) | 0.5 |
| Hurdle 2: Removal from office | 0 (non-removal from office) – 1 (removal from office) | 0.5 |
| Elite affective polarization | 0.4 (high affective polarization) – 3.7 (low polarization) | 1.001 |
| Elite ideological polarization | 2.87 (low ideological polarization) – 8.55 (high ideological polarization) | 5 |
| Legislative shield | -66.66 (no shield) – 24.04 (strong shield) | 0.1 |
| Mass mobilization | 0 (no mobilization) – 1,695,100 (high mobilization) | 10,000 |
| Corruption scandal | 0 = no scandal, 1 = scandal | 0.5 |

## Appendix 3: Set data

| Case | out1 | out2 | elip | elap | mam | les | csca |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meta2021 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Collor_de_Mello1992 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Rousseff2016 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Temer2017a | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Temer2017b | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Patasse2002 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pinera2019 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pinera2021 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Klaus2013 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Zeman2019 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Bucaram1997 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Gutierrez2005 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wahid2001 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Paksas2004 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Zafy1996 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Musharraf2008 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Grau1999 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lugo2012 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Kuczynski2017 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Kuczynski2018 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Vizcarra2019 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Vizcarra2020 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Castillo2021 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Castillo2022 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Estrada2000 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Macapagal_Arroyo2005 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Iliescu1994 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Basescu2007 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Basescu2012 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1993 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1997 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1998 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1999 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Moo_hyun2004 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Geun_hye2016 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sui_Bian2006 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Yanukovych2014 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton1998 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trump2019 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trump2021 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Perez1993 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Chiluba2001 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Mwanawasa2003 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Mugabe2017 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

Notes: Variable abbreviations are as follows: out1 (lower house vote), out2 (removal from office), elip (elite ideological polarization), elap (elite affective polarization), mam (mass mobilization), les (legislative shield), and csca (corruption scandal).

**Appendix 4: Skewness tests for set data**

Below, we calculate the percentage of in-set cases after the calibration threshold. We conduct two sets of skewness tests, given that the number of cases in the first stage (pre-lower house vote) differs from that in the second stage, where only cases that witnessed a positive lower house vote are included in the second-stage analysis. This is done to avoid redundant cases that did not even pass the first hurdle. The distribution of some variables, such as corruption scandals, is somewhat even. Other variables, such as elite ideological and affective polarization, are skewed; however, given the theoretical justification for the calibration explained above, this is understandable. For example, on a 0–10 left-right scale, we chose 5 as the midpoint on the ideological scale as our threshold. The data here indicate that the political parties in the countries under consideration tend to be more right-leaning on the ideological scale. As a robustness test, we replicate the results using different thresholds to demonstrate that our findings are not sensitive to changes in the calibration thresholds.

| **Hurdle 1: Lower house vote** | |
|---|---|
| **Variable** | **In-set cases** |
| Outcome: Lower house vote | 29 / 44 = 65.91 % |
| Elite affective polarization | 35 / 44 = 79.55 % |
| Elite ideological polarization | 35 / 44 = 79.55 % |
| Legislative shield | 5 / 44 = 11.36 % |
| Mass mobilization | 16 / 44 = 36.36 % |
| Corruption scandal | 24 / 44 = 54.55 % |
| **Hurdle 2: Removal from office** | |
| **Variable** | **In-set cases** |
| Outcome: Removal from office | 20 / 29 = 68.97 % |
| Elite affective polarization | 21 / 29 = 72.41 % |
| Elite ideological polarization | 24 / 29 = 82.76 % |
| Legislative shield | 4 / 29 = 13.79 % |
| Mass mobilization | 11 / 29 = 37.93 % |
| Corruption scandal | 16 / 29 = 55.17 % |

## Appendix 5: Necessity analysis of impeachment

### *Outcome 1: Lower house vote*

*Single variables*

| | inclN | RoN | covN |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elite_ide_polar | 0.828 | 0.450 | 0.686 |
| 2 elite_aff_polar | 0.724 | 0.391 | 0.600 |
| 3 mass_mobilization | 0.379 | 0.848 | 0.688 |
| 4 leg_shield | 0.138 | 0.975 | 0.800 |
| 5 corrupt_scandal | 0.552 | 0.714 | 0.667 |
| 6 ~elite_ide_polar | 0.172 | 0.897 | 0.556 |
| 7 ~elite_aff_polar | 0.276 | 0.972 | 0.889 |
| 8 ~mass_mobilization | 0.621 | 0.615 | 0.643 |
| 9 ~leg_shield | 0.862 | 0.263 | 0.641 |
| 10 ~corrupt_scandal | 0.448 | 0.774 | 0.650 |

*Disjunctions*

There are no combinations with the following cut-off values: incl.cut = 0.9, ron.cut = 0.5, cov.cut = 0.6

***Outcome 2: Removal from office***

*Single variables*

| | inclN | RoN | covN |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elite_ide_polar | 0.800 | 0.385 | 0.667 |
| 2 elite_aff_polar | 0.800 | 0.615 | 0.762 |
| 3 mass_mobilization | 0.450 | 0.900 | 0.818 |
| 4 leg_shield | 0.200 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| 5 corrupt_scandal | 0.700 | 0.867 | 0.875 |
| 6 ~elite_ide_polar | 0.200 | 0.960 | 0.800 |
| 7 ~elite_aff_polar | 0.200 | 0.840 | 0.500 |
| 8 ~mass_mobilization | 0.550 | 0.611 | 0.611 |
| 9 ~leg_shield | 0.800 | 0.308 | 0.640 |
| 10 ~corrupt_scandal | 0.300 | 0.696 | 0.462 |

*Disjunctions*

| | inclN | RoN | covN |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elite_aff_polar + leg_shield | 0.950 | 0.500 | 0.792 |

## Appendix 6: Sufficiency analysis of lower house vote

*Figure 6A: Polarized lower house vote (Subtype 1)*




*Figure 6B: Polarized lower house vote (Subtype 2)*



*Figure 6C: Polarized lower house vote (Subtype 3)*




*Figure 6D: Polarized lower house vote (Subtype 4)*



*Figure 6E: Scandalized lower house vote*




*Figure 6F: Mobilized lower house vote*



*Enhanced parsimonious solution (lower house vote)*

M1: ~elap*mam + ~elip*mam*~csca + ~elip*~les*csca + ~elap*~les*csca + elip*elap*~mam*~les*~csca -> out_lower_chamber_vote

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 ~elap*mam | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.172 | 0.103 |
| 2 ~elip*mam*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.103 | 0.069 |
| 3 ~elip*~les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.034 | 0.034 |
| 4 ~elap*~les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.103 | 0.069 |
| 5 elip*elap*~mam*~les*~csca | 0.900 | 0.900 | 0.310 | 0.310 |
| Full solution | 0.950 | 0.950 | 0.655 | |

Cases

1 ~elap*mam Zeman2019, Wahid2001, Klaus2013, Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016

2 ~elip*mam*~csca Zeman2019, Yeltsin1993, Mugabe2017

3 ~elip*~les*csca Bucaram1997

4 ~elap*~les*csca Pinera2021, Perez1993, Klaus2013

5 elip*elap*~mam*~les*~csca Meta2021, Gutierrez2005, Musharraf2008, Grau1999, Castillo2021, Basescu2007, Basescu2012, Yanukovych2014, Trump2019, Trump2021

## Appendix 7: Sufficiency analysis of removal from office

*Figure 7A: Polarized removal from office*




*Figure 7B: Mobilized removal from office*



*Figure 7C: Scandalized removal from office*



*Enhanced parsimonious solution (removal from office)*

M1: elap*csca + les*csca + (~elip*elap) -> out_removal

M2: elap*csca + les*csca + (elap*mam) -> out_removal

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU | (M1) | (M2) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | elap*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.500 | 0.250 | 0.450 | 0.300 |
| 2 | les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 | 0.150 |
| 3 | ~elip*elap | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.150 | 0.000 | 0.100 | |
| 4 | elap*mam | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.300 | 0.000 | 0.100 | |
| | M1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.750 | | | |
| | M2 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.750 | | | |

Cases

1 elap*csca Bucaram1997, Paksas2004, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2020, Castillo2022, Collor_de_Mello1992, Rousseff2016, Zafy1996, Estrada2000

2 les*csca Wahid2001, Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016

3 ~elip*elap Bucaram1997, Yeltsin1993, Mugabe2017

4 elap*mam Yeltsin1993, Mugabe2017, Collor_de_Mello1992, Rousseff2016, Zafy1996, Estrada2000

**Appendix 8: Deviant coverage cases**

This section presents the scores for the unexplained cases in both outcomes on three variables: economic crisis, presidential powers, and electoral democracy. This aims to show that their non-explanation is not due to the omission of particular variables from the analysis. We present the scores below, along with an explanation of how we operationalize each of these variables.

Economic crisis

- Mean of percentage change in GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) over three years (i.e., two years before (non-)impeachment, along with the year of impeachment.
- Source: GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) variable, World Development Indicators

Presidential power

- Coding: 0 = low presidential powers, 1 = high presidential powers (Source: prespow2 dataset)

Electoral democracy index

- Coding: 0 = low democracy, 1 = high (Source: V-Dem, v2x_polyarchy)

*Hurdle 1: Lower house vote*

| **Case** | **Economic crisis** | **Presidential power** | **Electoral democracy** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton (1998) | 4.6 | 0.344 | 0.87 |
| Castillo (2022) | 2.5 | 0.53 | 0.74 |
| Kuczynski (2018) | 4.2 | 0.53 | 0.80 |
| Lugo (2012) | 3.8 | 0.24 | 0.61 |
| Paksas (2004) | 11.3 | 0.38 | 0.82 |
| Vizcarra (2020) | -1.5 | 0.53 | 0.81 |
| Collor de Mello (1992) | 1.3 | 0.69 | 0.84 |
| Estrada (2000) | 1.6 | 0.4 | 0.59 |
| Rousseff (2016) | -2.8 | 0.69 | 0.74 |
| Zafy (1996) | 0.08 | 0.4 | 0.55 |

*Hurdle 1: Removal from office*

| **Case** | **Economic crisis** | **Presidential power** | **Electoral democracy** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perez (1993) | 5.7 | 0.25 | 0.75 |
| Grau (1999) | 0.2 | 0.245 | 0.54 |
| Gutierrez (2005) | 6.2 | 0.83 | 0.7 |
| Musharraf (2008) | 4.5 | 0.53 | 0.4 |
| Yanukovych (2014) | 5.3 | 0.7 | 0.4 |

## Appendix 9: Necessity analysis of non-impeachment

### *Outcome 1: Anti-impeachment lower house vote*

*Single conditions*

| | inclN | RoN | covN |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elite_ide_polar | 0.733 | 0.273 | 0.314 |
| 2 elite_aff_polar | 0.933 | 0.300 | 0.400 |
| 3 mass_mobilization | 0.333 | 0.718 | 0.312 |
| 4 leg_shield | 0.067 | 0.907 | 0.200 |
| 5 corrupt_scandal | 0.533 | 0.556 | 0.333 |
| 6 ~elite_ide_polar | 0.267 | 0.875 | 0.444 |
| 7 ~elite_aff_polar | 0.067 | 0.814 | 0.111 |
| 8 ~mass_mobilization | 0.667 | 0.471 | 0.357 |
| 9 ~leg_shield | 0.933 | 0.167 | 0.359 |
| 10 ~corrupt_scandal | 0.467 | 0.649 | 0.350 |

*Disjunctions:* There are no disjunctions using the following cut-off values: incl.cut = 0.9, ron.cut = 0.5, cov.cut = 0.6

### *Outcome 2: Non-removal from office*

*Single conditions*

| | inclN | RoN | covN |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elite_ide_polar | 0.889 | 0.238 | 0.333 |
| 2 elite_aff_polar | 0.556 | 0.333 | 0.238 |
| 3 mass_mobilization | 0.222 | 0.667 | 0.182 |
| 4 leg_shield | 0.000 | 0.862 | 0.000 |
| 5 corrupt_scandal | 0.222 | 0.481 | 0.125 |
| 1 ~elite_ide_polar | 0.111 | 0.857 | 0.200 |
| 2 ~elite_aff_polar | 0.444 | 0.840 | 0.500 |
| 3 ~mass_mobilization | 0.778 | 0.500 | 0.389 |
| 4 ~leg_shield | 1.000 | 0.200 | 0.360 |
| 5 ~corrupt_scandal | 0.778 | 0.727 | 0.538 |

*Disjunctions:* There are no disjunctions using the following cut-off values: incl.cut = 0.9, ron.cut = 0.5, cov.cut = 0.6

## Appendix 10: Sufficiency analysis of non-impeachment

### *Outcome 1: Anti-impeachment lower house vote (Truth table)*

| # | elip | elap | mam | les | csca | Out | N | Cons | PRI | Cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Chiluba2001 |
| 29 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Iliescu1994 |
| 17 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | Pinera2019, Clinton1998 |
| 30 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0.5 | 0.5 | Collor_de_Mello1992, Rousseff2016, Temer2017a, Temer2017b, Zafy1996, Estrada2000, Macapagal_Arroyo2005, Sui_Bian2006 |
| 26 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0.375 | 0.375 | Paksas2004, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2017, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2019, Vizcarra2020, Castillo2022, Mwanawasa2003 |
| 25 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0.1 | 0.1 | Meta2021, Gutierrez2005, Musharraf2008, Grau1999, Castillo2021, Basescu2007, Basescu2012, Yanukovych2014, Trump2019, Trump2021 |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | Patasse2002, Yeltsin1997, Yeltsin1998, Yeltsin1999 |
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Zeman2019 |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Wahid2001 |
| 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Bucaram1997 |
| 13 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Yeltsin1993 |
| 15 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Mugabe2017 |
| 22 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Klaus2013 |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | Pinera2021, Perez1993 |
| 24 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016 |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 16 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 20 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 27 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 14 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 19 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 31 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 32 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |

Notes: Consistency threshold = 0.9. N frequency = 1. Abbreviations are as follows: elip (elite ideological polarization), elap (elite affective polarization), mam (mass mobilization), les (legislative shield), csca (corruption scandal), out (anti-impeachment lower house vote). N (number of cases), Cons. (consistency), PRI (proportional reduction of necessity). (*) refers to deviant consistency cases.

***Enhanced intermediate solution (outcome: anti-impeachment lower house vote)***

M1: elip*elap*mam*~csca + ~elip*elap*~mam*~csca + elip*elap*~mam*les*csca -> ~out_lower_chamber_vote

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elip*elap*mam*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.067 | 0.067 |
| 2 ~elip*elap*~mam*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.267 | 0.267 |
| 3 elip*elap*~mam*les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.067 | 0.067 |
| M1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.400 | |

| Cases | |
|---|---|
| 1 elip*elap*mam*~csca | Iliescu1994 |
| 2 ~elip*elap*~mam*~csca | Patasse2002,Yeltsin1997,Yeltsin1998,Yeltsin1999 |
| 3 elip*elap*~mam*les*csca | Chiluba2001 |

***Enhanced parsimonious solution (outcome: anti-impeachment lower house vote)***

M1: elip*mam*~csca + ~elip*~mam*~csca + elip*elap*les*csca -> ~out_lower_chamber_vote

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elip*mam*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.067 | 0.067 |
| 2 ~elip*~mam*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.267 | 0.267 |
| 3 elip*elap*les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.067 | 0.067 |
| M1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.400 | |

| Cases | |
|---|---|
| 1 elip*mam*~csca | Iliescu1994 |
| 2 ~elip*~mam*~csca | Patasse2002,Yeltsin1997,Yeltsin1998,Yeltsin1999 |
| 3 elip*elap*les*csca | Chiluba2001 |

***Outcome 2: Non-Removal from office (Truth table)***

| # | elip | elap | mam | les | csca | OUT | N | Cons. | PRI | Cases |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Zeman2019 |
| 17 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Clinton1998 |
| 22 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Klaus2013 |
| 25 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0.55 | 0.55 | Meta2021, Gutierrez2005, Musharraf2008, Grau1999, Basescu2007, Basescu2012, Yanukovych2014, Trump2019, Trump2021 |
| 18 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0.5 | 0.5 | Pinera2021, Perez1993 |
| 26 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | Paksas2004, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2020, Castillo2022 |
| 30 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Collor_de_Mello1992, Rousseff2016, Zafy1996, Estrada2000 |
| 24 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016 |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Wahid2001 |
| 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Bucaram1997 |
| 13 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Yeltsin1993 |
| 15 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | Mugabe2017 |
| 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 7 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 19 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 23 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 11 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 14 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 16 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 20 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 21 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 27 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 28 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 29 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 31 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ? | 0 | - | - | |
| 32 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ? | 0 | - | - | |

Notes: Consistency threshold = 1.0. N frequency = 1. Abbreviations are as follows: elip (elite ideological polarization), elap (elite affective polarization), mam (mass mobilization), les (legislative shield), csca (corruption scandal), out (non-removal from office). N (number of cases), Cons. (consistency), PRI (proportional reduction of necessity). (*) refers to deviant consistency cases.

***Enhanced intermediate solution (outcome: non-removal from office)***

M1: ~elap*~les*~corrupt_scandal + *~elap*mam*~les -> ~out_removal

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 ~elap*~les*~corrupt_scandal | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.222 | 0.222 |
| 2 elip*~elap*mam*~les | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.111 | 0.111 |
| M1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.333 | |

| Cases | |
|---|---|
| 1 ~elap*~les*~corrupt_scandal | Zeman2019; Clinton1998 |
| 2 elip*~elap*mam*~les | Klaus2013 |

***Enhanced parsimonious solution (outcome: non-removal from office)***

M1: ~elap*mam*~les + ~elap*~les*~corrupt_scandal -> ~out_removal

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 ~elap*mam*~les | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.222 | 0.111 |
| 2 ~elap*~les*~corrupt_scandal | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.222 | 0.111 |
| M1 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.333 | |

| Cases | |
|---|---|
| 1 ~elap*mam*~les | Zeman2019; Klaus2013 |
| 2 ~elap*~les*~corrupt_scandal | Zeman2019; Clinton1998 |

**Appendix 11: Sensitivity and fit-oriented robustness tests**

Sensitivity tests are used to examine the degree to which the results are sensitive to changes in the consistency, frequency, or calibration thresholds. We report these in the table below. The results stand all the robustness tests except for the consistency and frequency cut-off tests. Additionally, the fit-oriented robustness test reveals a high degree of overlap (0.95 for outcome 1 and 0.67 for outcome 2) between the original enhanced intermediate solution and the test solution after adjusting the calibration of elite affective polarization and elite ideological polarization.

| **Robustness test** | **Result** |
|---|---|
| *Outcome 1: Lower house vote* | |
| Raw consistency robustness | Lower bound NA, Threshold 0.9, Upper bound 0.9 |
| Frequency cut-off robustness | Lower bound 1, Threshold 1, Upper bound 1 |
| Sensitivity range calibration: mass mobilization | Lower bound 6000, Threshold 10000, Upper bound NA |
| Sensitivity range calibration: elite affective polarization | Lower bound 1.001, Threshold 1.001, Upper bound 1.401 |
| Sensitivity range calibration: elite ideological polarization | Lower bound 4.8, Threshold 5, Upper bound 5.2 |
| Fit-oriented robustness | RF_cov (0.948), RF_cons (1.0), RF_SC_minTS (0.905), RF_SC_maxTS (0.905) |
| *Outcome 2: Removal from office* | |
| Raw consistency robustness | Not relevant given the highest possible consistency (i.e., 1.0) used |
| Frequency cut-off robustness | Lower bound 1, Threshold 1, Upper bound 1 |
| Sensitivity range calibration: mass mobilization | Lower bound 1000, Threshold 10000, Upper bound NA |
| Sensitivity range calibration: elite affective polarization | Lower bound 1.001, Threshold 1.001, Upper bound 1.401 |
| Sensitivity range calibration: elite ideological polarization | Lower bound 4.9, Threshold 5, Upper bound 5.2 |
| Fit-oriented robustness | RF_cov (0.667), RF_cons (1.0), RF_SC_minTS (0.667), RF_SC_maxTS (0.667) |

Note: Sensitivity tests are not relevant for corruption scandals, as this is a binary variable. The same also applies to the legislative shield, considering the lack of theoretical justifications for increasing the threshold over the legislative majority required by the Constitution.

*Figure 11A: Fit-oriented robustness test for pro-impeachment lower house vote*




*Figure 11B: Fit-oriented robustness test for removal from office*



## Appendix 12: Theory evaluation

### *Outcome 1: Pro-impeachment lower house vote*

Case Parameters

| | RCR_typ | RCR_dev | RCC_Rank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robustness_Case_Ratio | 0.9 | 1 | 4 |

Case Types

Robust Typical Cases (IS*MIN_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression: corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield + ~corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization + ~corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*~mass_mobilization + corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*~mass_mobilization + corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 18 / 44 = 40.91 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 18 / 29 = 62.07 %

Case Names:
Meta2021 Pinera2021 Zeman2019 Bucaram1997 Gutierrez2005 Wahid2001 Musharraf2008 Grau1999 Basescu2007 Basescu2012 Yeltsin1993 Moo_hyun2004 Geun_hye2016 Yanukovych2014 Trump2019 Trump2021 Perez1993 Mugabe2017

Robust Deviant Cases (IS*MIN_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression: corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield + ~corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization + ~corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*~mass_mobilization + corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*~mass_mobilization + corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 1 / 44 = 2.27 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 1 / 15 = 6.67 %

Case Names:
Castillo2021

Shaky Typical Cases (IS*~MIN_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression:
~corrupt_scandal*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
~elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 1 / 44 = 2.27 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 1 / 29 = 3.45 %

Case Names:
Klaus2013

Shaky Deviant Cases(IS*~MIN_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression:
~corrupt_scandal*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
~elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 0 / 44 = 0 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 0 / 15 = 0 %

Case Names:
No cases in this intersection

Possible Typical Cases (~IS*MAX_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression:
elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*mass_mobilization*~leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 1 / 44 = 2.27 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 1 / 29 = 3.45 %

Case Names:
Paksas2004

Possible Deviant Cases (~IS*MAX_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression:
elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*mass_mobilization*~leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 0 / 44 = 0 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 0 / 15 = 0 %

Case Names:
No cases in this intersection

Extreme Deviant Coverage Cases (~IS*~MAX_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression: ~mass_mobilization*leg_shield +
~elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*~mass_mobilization +
~elite_ide_polar*~mass_mobilization*~corrupt_scandal +
elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*mass_mobilization +
elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*leg_shield +
elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*corrupt_scandal +
elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal +
~elite_aff_polar*~mass_mobilization*~corrupt_scandal +
~elite_aff_polar*leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal +
elite_aff_polar*leg_shield*corrupt_scandal

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 9 / 44 = 20.45 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 9 / 29 = 31.03 %

Case Names:
Collor_de_Mello1992 Rousseff2016 Zafy1996 Lugo2012 Kuczynski2018 Vizcarra2020
Castillo2022 Estrada2000 Clinton1998

Irrelevant Cases (~IS*~MAX_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression: ~mass_mobilization*leg_shield +
~elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*~mass_mobilization +
~elite_ide_polar*~mass_mobilization*~corrupt_scandal +
elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*mass_mobilization +
elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*leg_shield +
elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*corrupt_scandal +
elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal +
~elite_aff_polar*~mass_mobilization*~corrupt_scandal +

~elite_aff_polar*leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal +
elite_aff_polar*leg_shield*corrupt_scandal

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 14 / 44 = 31.82 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 14 / 15 = 93.33 %

Case Names:
Temer2017a Temer2017b Patasse2002 Pinera2019 Kuczynski2017 Vizcarra2019
Macapagal_Arroyo2005 Iliescu1994 Yeltsin1997 Yeltsin1998 Yeltsin1999 Sui_Bian2006
Chiluba2001 Mwanawasa2003

### *Outcome 2: Removal from office*

CaseParameters

| | RCR_typ | RCR_dev | RCC_Rank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robustness_Case_Ratio | 0.667 | NaN | 3 |

CaseTypes

Robust Typical Cases (IS*MIN_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression: corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield +
elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 10 / 29 = 34.48 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 10 / 20 = 50 %

Case Names:
Bucaram1997 Wahid2001 Zafy1996 Lugo2012 Kuczynski2018 Vizcarra2020 Castillo2022
Moo_hyun2004 Geun_hye2016 Mugabe2017

Robust Deviant Cases (IS*MIN_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression: corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield +
elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 0 / 29 = 0 %

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 0 / 9 = 0 %

Case Names:
No cases in this intersection

Shaky Typical Cases (IS*~MIN_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression:
~corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 5 / 29 = 17.24 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 5 / 20 = 25 %

Case Names:
Collor_de_Mello1992 Rousseff2016 Paksas2004 Estrada2000 Yeltsin1993

Shaky Deviant Cases(IS*~MIN_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression:
~corrupt_scandal*elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*~leg_shield*mass_mobilization +
corrupt_scandal*~elite_aff_polar*~elite_ide_polar*leg_shield*mass_mobilization

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 0 / 29 = 0 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 0 / 9 = 0 %

Case Names:
No cases in this intersection

Possible Typical Cases (~IS*MAX_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression:

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 0 / 29 = 0 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 0 / 20 = 0 %

Case Names:
No cases in this intersection

Possible Deviant Cases (~IS*MAX_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression:

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 0 / 29 = 0 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 0 / 9 = 0 %

Case Names:
No cases in this intersection

Extreme Deviant Coverage Cases (~IS*~MAX_TS and Y > 0.5):

Boolean Expression: elite_ide_polar*~corrupt_scandal +
~elite_aff_polar*~mass_mobilization + ~elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield +
~elite_aff_polar*~corrupt_scandal + ~mass_mobilization*leg_shield +
~mass_mobilization*~corrupt_scandal + elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*leg_shield

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 5 / 29 = 17.24 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y > 0.5: 5 / 20 = 25 %

Case Names:
Gutierrez2005 Musharraf2008 Grau1999 Yanukovych2014 Perez1993

Irrelevant Cases (~IS*~MAX_TS and Y < 0.5):

Boolean Expression: elite_ide_polar*~corrupt_scandal +
~elite_aff_polar*~mass_mobilization + ~elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield +
~elite_aff_polar*~corrupt_scandal + ~mass_mobilization*leg_shield +
~mass_mobilization*~corrupt_scandal + elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*leg_shield

Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases: 9 / 29 = 31.03 %
Cases in the intersection/Total number of cases Y < 0.5: 9 / 9 = 100 %

Case Names:
Meta2021 Pinera2021 Klaus2013 Zeman2019 Basescu2007 Basescu2012 Clinton1998
Trump2019 Trump2021

## Appendix 13: Sufficiency analysis replication using simulated data (Hurdle 2: removal from office)

Table 13A: Simulated set data

| case | out3 | elip | elap | mam | les | csca |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meta2021 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Collor_de_Mello1992 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Rousseff2016 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Pinera2021 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Klaus2013 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Zeman2019 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Bucaram1997 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Gutierrez2005 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wahid2001 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Paksas2004 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Zafy1996 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Musharraf2008 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Grau1999 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lugo2012 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Kuczynski2018 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Vizcarra2020 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Castillo2022 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Estrada2000 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Basescu2007 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Basescu2012 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1993 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Moo_hyun2004 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Geun_hye2016 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Yanukovych2014 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinton1998 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trump2019 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trump2021 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Perez1993 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Mugabe2017 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Meta2021_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Collor_de_Mello1992_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Rousseff2016_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Temer2017a_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Temer2017b_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Patasse2002_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pinera2019_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Pinera2021_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Klaus2013_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Zeman2019_sim | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Bucaram1997_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Gutierrez2005_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Wahid2001_sim | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Paksas2004_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Zafy1996_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Musharraf2008_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Grau1999_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lugo2012_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kuczynski2017_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Kuczynski2018_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vizcarra2019_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Vizcarra2020_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Castillo2021_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Castillo2022_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Estrada2000_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Macapagal_Arroyo2005_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Iliescu1994_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Basescu2007_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Basescu2012_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1993_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1997_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1998_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yeltsin1999_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Moo_hyun2004_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Geun_hye2016_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Sui_Bian2006_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Yanukovych2014_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinton1998_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trump2019_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Trump2021_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Perez1993_sim | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chiluba2001_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Mwanawasa2003_sim | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mugabe2017_sim | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Notes: Variable abbreviations are as follows: out1 (lower house vote), out2 (removal from office), elip (elite ideological polarization), elap (elite affective polarization), mam (mass mobilization), les (legislative shield), and csca (corruption scandal).

***Enhanced intermediate analysis for removal from office***

M: ~elip*elap*mam + elap*~les*csca + elap*mam*les*csca → out_removal

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 ~elip*elap*mam | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.100 | 0.100 |
| 2 elap*~les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.500 | 0.500 |
| 3 ~elap*mam*les*csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.150 | 0.150 |
| Full solution | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.750 | |

Cases

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 ~elip*elap*mam | Yeltsin1993, Mugabe2017 |
| 2 elap*~les*csca | Bucaram1997, Paksas2004, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2020, Castillo2022, Collor_de_Mello1992, Rousseff2016, Zafy1996, Estrada2000 |
| 3 ~elap*mam*les*csca | Wahid2001, Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016 |

***Enhanced intermediate analysis for non-removal from office***

M: ~elip*~mam*~csca + elap*~les*~csca + ~mam*les*~csca +
*~elap*mam*~les -> ~out_removal

| | Cons. | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 ~elip*~mam*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.170 | 0.113 |
| 2 ~elap*~les*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.151 | 0.132 |
| 3 ~mam*les*~csca | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.094 | 0.057 |
| 4 elip*~elap*mam*~les | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.019 | 0.019 |
| Full solution | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.377 | |

Cases
1 ~elip*~mam*~csca
Zeman2019_sim, Wahid2001_sim, Patasse2002_sim, Bucaram1997_sim, Yeltsin1993_sim, Yeltsin1997_sim, Yeltsin1998_sim, Yeltsin1999_sim, Mugabe2017_sim
2 ~elap*~les*~csca
Zeman2019_sim, Zeman2019, Clinton1998, Pinera2019_sim, Pinera2021_sim, Klaus2013_sim, Clinton1998_sim, Perez1993_sim
3 ~mam*les*~csca
Wahid2001_sim, Mugabe2017_sim, Moo_hyun2004_sim, Geun_hye2016_sim, Chiluba2001_sim
4 elip*~elap*mam*~les
Klaus2013

## Appendix 14: Replication of sufficiency analysis using public disapproval

### *Data on public disapproval*

| | country | president | year | Executive disapproval (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Brazil | Fernando Collor de Mello | 1992 | 54.72 |
| 2 | Brazil | Dilma Rousseff | 2016 | 50.93 |
| 3 | Brazil | Michel Temer | 2017a | 62.66 |
| 4 | Brazil | Michel Temer | 2017b | 62.66 |
| 5 | Chile | Sebastián Piñera | 2019 | 53.15 |
| 6 | Chile | Sebastián Piñera | 2021 | 63.95 |
| 7 | Czech Republic | Václav Klaus | 2013 | 51.44 |
| 8 | Czech Republic | Miloš Zeman | 2019 | 71.84 |
| 9 | Ecuador | Abdalá Bucaram | 1997 | 45.35 |
| 10 | Ecuador | Lucio Gutierrez | 2005 | 51.64 |
| 11 | Pakistan | Pervez Musharraf | 2008 | 58.78 |
| 12 | Paraguay | Raúl Cubas Grau | 1999 | 62.544 |
| 13 | Paraguay | Fernando Lugo | 2012 | 34.208 |
| 14 | Peru | Pedro Pablo Kuczynski | 2017 | 58.844 |
| 15 | Peru | Pedro Pablo Kuczynski | 2018 | 48.066 |
| 16 | Peru | Martín Vizcarra | 2019 | 44.453 |
| 17 | Peru | Martín Vizcarra | 2020 | 36.231 |
| 18 | Peru | Pedro Castillo | 2021 | 59.449 |
| 19 | Philippines | Joseph Estrada | 2000 | 43.265 |
| 20 | Philippines | Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo | 2005 | 65.016 |
| 21 | Romania | Traian Basescu | 2012 | 66.659 |
| 22 | Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1997 | 49.130 |
| 23 | Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1998 | 53.757 |
| 24 | Russia | Boris Yeltsin | 1999 | 58.25 |
| 25 | South Korea | Roh Moo-hyun | 2004 | 54.11 |
| 26 | South Korea | Park Geun-hye | 2016 | 54.85 |
| 27 | Taiwan | Chen Shui-bian | 2006 | 69.8 |
| 28 | Ukraine | Viktor Yanukovych | 2014 | 33.73 |
| 29 | United States of America | Bill Clinton | 1998 | 44.146 |
| 30 | United States of America | Donald Trump | 2019 | 58.784 |
| 31 | United States of America | Donald Trump | 2021 | 48.198 |
| 32 | Venezuela | Carlos Andres Perez | 1993 | 35.98 |

Source: Executive Approval Database

***Enhanced intermediate solution for lower house vote***

| | | inclS | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | elite_ide_polar*~exec_disapprov*~leg_shield | 0.889 | 0.889 | 0.381 | 0.095 |
| 2 | ~elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*exec_disapprov*~leg_shield | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.048 | 0.048 |
| 3 | elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*exec_disapprov*corrupt_scandal | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.190 | 0.190 |
| 4 | elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal | 0.875 | 0.875 | 0.333 | 0.238 |
| 5 | elite_aff_polar*~exec_disapprov*~leg_shield*corrupt_scandal | 0.833 | 0.833 | 0.238 | 0.048 |
| | Full solution | 0.905 | 0.905 | 0.905 | |

Cases

1) elite_ide_polar*~exec_disapprov*~leg_shield

Clinton1998, Perez1993, Yanukovych2014, Trump2021, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2019, Vizcarra2020, Estrada2000

2) ~elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*exec_disapprov*~leg_shield

Zeman2019

3) elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*exec_disapprov*corrupt_scandal

Pinera2021, Klaus2013, Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016

4) elite_ide_polar*elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield*~corrupt_scandal

Yanukovych2014, Trump2021, Gutierrez2005, Musharraf2008, Grau1999, Castillo2021, Basescu2012, Trump2019

5) elite_aff_polar*~exec_disapprov*~leg_shield*corrupt_scandal

Bucaram1997, Lugo2012,Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2019, Vizcarra2020, Estrada2000

### *Enhanced intermediate solution for removal from office*

| | inclS | PRI | covS | covU |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield*corrupt_scandal | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.500 | 0.214 |
| 2 elite_ide_polar*~exec_disapprov*~leg_shield*corrupt_scandal | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.357 | 0.071 |
| 3 elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*exec_disapprov*leg_shield *corrupt_scandal | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.143 | 0.143 |
| Full solution | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.714 | |

Cases

1) elite_aff_polar*~leg_shield*corrupt_scandal

Bucaram1997, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2020, Estrada2000, Collor_de_Mello1992, Rousseff2016

2) elite_ide_polar*~exec_disapprov*~leg_shield*corrupt_scandal

Perez1993, Lugo2012, Kuczynski2018, Vizcarra2020, Estrada2000

3) elite_ide_polar*~elite_aff_polar*exec_disapprov*leg_shield*corrupt_scandal

Moo_hyun2004, Geun_hye2016

## Appendix 15: Logistic regression of impeachment hurdles

| | Hurdle 1: Lower House Vote | | | | | Hurdle 2: Removal from Office | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Elite ideological polarization | 0.149 | 0.530 | 0.163 | -0.084 | 0.027 | -0.043 | -0.022 | -0.011 | -0.134 | -0.294 |
| | (0.282) | (0.401) | (0.299) | (0.441) | (0.303) | (0.291) | (0.394) | (0.315) | (0.413) | (0.341) |
| Elite affective polarization | -0.105 | -0.035 | 1.035 | -0.073 | 1.338 | 0.184 | 0.190 | 1.306 | 0.214 | 1.800* |
| | (0.454) | (0.475) | (0.665) | (0.459) | (1.159) | (0.461) | (0.467) | (0.801) | (0.471) | (1.032) |
| Corruption scandal | -0.140 | 4.809 | -5.814** | -0.267 | -0.235 | 1.210 | 1.459 | -3.225 | 1.166 | 1.275 |
| | (0.835) | (3.448) | (2.605) | (0.867) | (0.863) | (0.828) | (3.248) | (2.265) | (0.843) | (0.911) |
| Legislative shield | 0.001 | -0.003 | -0.008 | 0.0004 | 0.008 | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.018 | 0.023 | 0.035* |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.021) |
| Mass mobilization (log) | -0.039 | -0.033 | -0.071 | -0.308 | -0.530 | -0.052 | -0.052 | -0.079 | -0.171 | -0.668** |
| | (0.074) | (0.079) | (0.081) | (0.386) | (0.358) | (0.074) | (0.075) | (0.078) | (0.381) | (0.332) |
| Elite affective polarization X corruption scandal | | | -2.644** | | | | | -2.205** | | |
| | | | (1.107) | | | | | (1.074) | | |
| Elite ideological polarization X mass mobilization (log) | | | | 0.043 | | | | | 0.019 | |
| | | | | (0.061) | | | | | (0.060) | |
| Elite affective polarization X mass mobilization (log) | | | | | -0.197 | | | | | -0.248* |
| | | | | | (0.137) | | | | | (0.128) |
| Elite ideological polarization X corruption scandal | | -0.829 | | | | | -0.041 | | | |
| | | (0.550) | | | | | (0.515) | | | |
| Constant | -0.088 | -2.111 | 1.896 | 1.635 | 4.477 | 0.650 | 0.534 | 2.301 | 1.368 | 6.409* |
| | (2.037) | (2.571) | (2.377) | (3.244) | (3.863) | (2.118) | (2.579) | (2.388) | (3.127) | (3.786) |
| Observations | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 |
| Log Likelihood | -27.650 | -26.421 | -24.066 | -27.387 | -26.316 | -27.102 | -27.099 | -24.647 | -27.051 | -24.677 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 67.299 | 66.842 | 62.132 | 68.773 | 66.632 | 66.203 | 68.197 | 63.295 | 68.102 | 63.354 |

*Note:* *p**p***p<0.01

We would like to point out that, given the small sample, the results need to be carefully interpreted. Given that we theorize impeachment in the revised manuscript as a multi-hurdle process, we report results for both outcomes: lower house vote and removal from office. Models 1 and 6 are the base models without any interaction effects, while models 2 – 5 and models 7 – 10 report interaction effects. A few observations are in order. First, elite ideological polarization correlates positively with lower house vote and negatively with removal from office. The opposite applies to elite affective polarization, which correlates negatively with lower house vote and positively with removal from office. In some ways, this is in line with the results reported in Table 4 in the main text, where affective polarization only contributes to removal from office. However, neither ideological nor affective polarization is statistically significant. Second, in terms of the interaction effects, only elite ideological polarization and mass mobilization correlate positively with both lower house vote and removal from office. In contrast, the other interactions are negatively correlated with both hurdles.

## Appendix 16: llustrative cases of polarized impeachment: Donald Trump (2019 & 2021) and Dilma Rousseff (2016)

### *The impeachment of Donald Trump in 2019 and 2021*

The impeachment trials of Donald Trump in 2019 represent polarized impeachment (subtype 1) for being mainly driven by elite affective and ideological polarization and the absence of a legislative shield in the House. Trump was the first U.S. president to be impeached twice. In the words of Iyengar (2021: 98), "heightened polarization has made it almost impossible for partisans to abandon their party's candidates." In a "hyperpolarized" climate, as in the United States, impeachment is pushed by the out-group, Democrats in this case, which leads the in-group Republicans to defend the president regardless of the grounds for impeachment (Hollis-Brusky, 2021).

The first impeachment in December 2019 centered around allegations that Trump had abused his power by soliciting foreign interference in the 2020 presidential election, specifically by pressuring Ukraine to investigate Joe Biden and his son Hunter. This was rooted in a phone call that Trump had in July 2019 with newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in which Trump presumably conditioned military aid to Ukraine on the announcement of politically beneficial investigations. Trump was also charged with obstruction of Congress for blocking investigation efforts. However, getting the impeachment trial off the ground was an uneasy process. For a long time, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi has resisted mounting calls from her Democratic Party fellows to approve impeachment inquiries against Trump. In the words of Pelosi, "The facts drove the timing and the decision…and that's what I've said all along — when we get the facts, we will

be ready. And we're ready" (Heather Caygle, Bresnahan, John et al., 2019).

Polarization was evident in how both the Democratic and Republican parties viewed the case. On the one hand, Democrats viewed Trump's request for Ukraine to investigate Joe Biden as a clear abuse of presidential power. On the other hand, Republicans defended the president's actions as legitimate exercises of executive discretion, framing the inquiry as a politically-motivated process. In fact, "Donald Trump inspired the most polarized presidential job approval ratings in modern American history, but his new record was only the latest extension of a long-term trend" (Jacobson, 2020: 763).

At the time, the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives with 233 seats out of 435, leading to a vote largely along party lines: 230-197 in favor of impeachment. However, the Republican-controlled Senate (53 Republicans out of 100 seats) acquitted Trump, with only one Republican, Mitt Romney, breaking ranks to vote for conviction on one of the articles.[1] Such partisan alignment showed how the impeachment was used as a "partisan" weapon rather than a tool of accountability.

The second impeachment occurred in January 2021, following the storming of the U.S. Capitol by Trump supporters on January 6, itself a manifestation of clear partisan polarization and rivalry (Myrick & Wang, 2024). The charge this time was "incitement of insurrection," asserting that Trump had incited the violent attack aimed at overturning the 2020 election results. Again, there was divergent

[1] House Resolution 755, 160th Congress:

https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hres755/BILLS-116hres755enr.pdf

partisan disagreement on how to characterize Trump's involvement in the January 6 insurrection. Whereas Democrats viewed it as a direct attack on democracy, Republicans were more cautious and conservative in their interpretation of the events, with many following Trump's rhetoric in highlighting electoral fraud. In the words of Gerhardt (2022: 767),

> Perhaps the most important option for leaders and lawyers is to make clear to everyone what higher power(s) they serve, especially when the Congress and nation face possible constitutional crises. Is it their party and their own political ambitions, or is it the institution to which they have been elected, the clients they represent, and the Constitution and rule of law? It should be incumbent for every official to make crystal clear the principles, not the party, that they serve. The deep polarization of the American people, leading to deep polarization in Congress, makes such reforms unlikely, unless or until voters from both parties agree on the importance of having representatives and senators who are able not to see each other as enemies of the republic but instead as partners, who are genuinely committed to working together for the common good of the United States.

This does not negate the fact that there has been a concerted effort by the Democrats to rally Republicans around impeachment by emphasizing constitutional duty and the protection of democratic institutions. House Speaker Pelosi, for instance, called Trump "a clear and present danger to the nation that we all love" (Mangan, 2021). Democrats such as Representative Jamie Raskin of Maryland highlighted that the attack had targeted Congress itself, threatening the lives of Republican and Democratic members alike. This led to a number of Republicans deciding to vote for impeachment including Liz Cheney, House Republican Conference Chair.

The House, still under Democratic control, swiftly moved to impeach with a 232-197 vote, including support from 10 Republicans. Despite this bipartisan support

in the House, the Senate, evenly split 50-50 but controlled by Democrats through Vice President Kamala Harris's tie-breaking vote, fell short of the two-thirds majority required to convict, with a 57-43 vote. Justifying their vote, many Republican Senators said they could not punish a president who had already left office, despite having the ability to make him ineligible for future re-election. Trump celebrated his acquittal by saying that his impeachment was part of a "witch hunt." A similar polarization trend could also be observed at the mass level, with support for (or opposition to) impeaching Trump following partisan lines regardless of the facts of the case (Bose & Burnett, 2022). In short, the deep polarization increased loyalty to party lines in the U.S. Senate, thereby shaping the outcomes of both Trump's impeachment trials(Jacobson, 2020; Healy, 2022).

### *The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016*

The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff was prompted by the Petrobras corruption scandal and occurred under the shadow of elite affective polarization. Rousseff's impeachment proceedings took place in a context of high ideological polarization between the right and left at both mass and elite levels (Moreira et al., 2020). Polarization was not, nonetheless, an outcome of the impeachment but part of a social opening with the massive protests in June 2013 that led to the emergence of right and left-wing groups with mostly opposed societal visions (Bringel & Pleyers, 2019; Vrydagh & Jiménez-Martínez, 2020). For example, Aécio Neves, from the PSDB, refused to accept his loss against Rousseff in the 2014 presidential run-off elections and tried to interrupt the PT's fourth consecutive term in power, alleging that he was defeated by a "criminal organization" (Limongi, 2015; Nunes & Melo, 2017). This polarization manifested itself in the sweeping victory of Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 presidential elections, putting an end to the PT's rule that had lasted since 2004.

Petrobras is a huge majority-state-owned company, being Brazil's largest enterprise and a symbol of the country's entrenched economic nationalism. The scandal began in 2014 and involved dozens of high-level business people and politicians as part of a widespread investigation alleging that millions had been kicked back to officials of Petrobras and politicians, especially for members of the ruling PT (Sotero, 2018).

The malfeasance was revealed by a federal investigation called Lava Jato ("Car Wash"). The huge scheme to defraud Petrobras did not fully come to light,

however, until after the narrow reelection of President Rousseff in 2014. By the time of her second inauguration, Rousseff's approval rating had collapsed to 14 percent, with almost two-thirds of Brazilians blaming her for Petrobras's troubles. During the investigation, contracts to develop the so-called pre-salt oil reserves found offshore in 2007 came to light (Watts, 2017). Federal prosecutors also discovered mismanagement in the electricity-generating sector, in the pension funds for workers of state-owned companies, as well as in the Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). The latter had provided billions of dollars in subsidized financing to Petrobras and other influential business owners, such as the billionaire Eike Batista, whose wealth plummeted spectacularly in 2013 (Sotero, 2018).

Given Petrobras's size and therefore the breadth of its reach within the country's economy, the company's tribulations would cut back Brazil's GDP by 0.75 percent in 2015 (Sotero, 2018). Therefore, the Brazilian economy plunged into a recession with strikingly climbing inflation. As a result, there was a deepening crisis of confidence coalesced around the perception of macroeconomic mismanagement by the Rousseff administration during its first term (Sotero, 2018). In early December 2014, the general popular discontentment, together with the strong support for the Federal investigation, led Rousseff to become the target of impeachment proceedings. However, those were not due to any alleged involvement within the Petrobras scandal but on charges suggesting she had improperly employed funds from state banks to mask budget shortfalls (Watts, 2017).

Testimony given under plea-bargain agreements by several individuals implicated that the Petrobras scandal, which included two former senior

managers of the corporation and therefore the CEO of one of the implicated construction companies, exposed a cartel-like criminal conspiracy founded and run from within the corporation after 2003 (Sotero 2018). Dilma Rousseff was, during that time, the chair of the company's board of directors as Minister of Mines and Energy and Chief of Staff of the Lula administration. For almost a decade, Petrobras' managers allegedly acted with senior executives of firms that supplied goods and services to Petrobras (including Brazil's largest construction companies) to inflate prices of Petrobras contracts for the non-public gain of the scheme's operators and to finance campaigns of dozens of politicians, mainly from the PT and its partners within the government coalition, most notably the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) (Prado & Carson, 2018; Lima-de-Oliveira, 2020).

According to Sotero (2018), more than 30 individuals were arrested during the Car Wash operation. By that time, over 50 members and former members of Congress had been targeted by prosecutors in criminal investigations—among them the president of the Senate, Renan Calheiros; the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Brazil's legislature), Eduardo Cunha; and Lula's former Minister of Finance, Antonio Palocci, who served briefly as Rousseff's Chief of Staff before being ousted in a very separate lobbying scandal. Also targeted was the previous Minister of Mines and Energy in Rousseff's first term, Edison Lobão, a protégé of former president José Sarney, and former president Fernando Collor de Mello, who had returned as a senator from Alagoas a decade after his 1992 impeachment as president on corruption charges, of which he was later cleared by the Supreme Court.

Already in the second year of the investigation, public prosecutors had formally accused 110 people of corruption, concealment, and other financial crimes. On March 4, 2016, Lula's home was raided by police, and he was formally charged for having hidden his ownership of a seaside luxury apartment acquired because of his ties to a construction firm. Shortly after, together with Rousseff's extremely low popularity, the Ex-President named Lula her Chief of Staff, ostensibly to use his still-wide political influence to assist her during the country's depression. However, a federal judge both blocked Lula's appointment and released a wiretapped phone conversation between them, which arguably indicated that Rousseff had made the appointment to shield Lula from prosecution. That caused an immense public outrage so that more than 3 million Brazilians across the country joined protests calling for Rousseff's resignation or removal later that month (Época, 2016).

As of March 2015, several protests against the government brought together hundreds of thousands of people across the country to ask, among other demands, for the impeachment or the resignation of Rousseff (Mourão, 2019). Protest waves in Brazil started in 2013, with specific claims regarding bus fare rates, and unfolded to a broader discontent with the government of President Rousseff, especially after the narrow reelection of 2014 (Doval & Actis, 2016; Avritzer, 2017). In the beginning, these mass protests in 2013 could not be directly linked to any political parties or civil society organizations (Nunes & Melo, 2017). However, due to an increasing generalized opposition against the leftist government of the PT, the corruption scandals and economic crisis evolved into mass political demonstrations. Opposition elites supported the protest wave and, therefore, gained popularity and validation in mainstream media (Mourão, 2019).

The economic retraction, together with the unexpected political instability already in the first six months of Rousseff's second mandate, is an important reason for the unpopularity of the Head of State (Doval and Actis 2016). Besides, protests against the realization of the World Cup in 2014 accompanied the first arrests of the Car Wash Operation. As Nunes and Melo (2017: 285) highlighted, "[f]irst, the socio-economic profile of the protesters was always far from representative: surveys done by DataFolha showed that most protesters were older, highly educated, and with higher income." Rousseff's low approval ratings reflected unpopularity in the whole political spectrum, but most notably among the conservatives. Even though there have always been conservative civil society actors in Brazil, these groups gained significant influence during the recent protest waves. Conservative groups increased their legitimacy during the protests in favor of the impeachment of President Rousseff. Most groups supported an anti-left and anti-corruption campaign, focusing on traditionalism and moral norms. Controversially, the same groups contributed to a high polarization of the political spectrum and the Brazilian society, with an ambivalent appeal for conservatism (as, for example, in the claims supporting military interventions) and democratic values against political malfeasance (Bülow, 2018).

The three main conservative civil society groups, namely, *Vem Pra Rua* (Come to the Streets), *Movimento Brasil Livre* (Movement Free Brazil), and the *Revoltados On-Line* (Rebels Online) organized protests in São Paulo, reinforcing their ideological differences despite their shared distaste towards Rousseff's government (Bedinelli & Martin, 2015). The first two groups were more moderate and advocated against corruption practices and impunity in the Brazilian government. Even though the groups claimed to have a non-partisan character, the protestors were opposed to both Lula and Dilma's mandates and defending a

minimum State intervention in the economy, as well as in civil society. Despite the alleged reason of these civil society groups for protesting was corruption, they did not occupy the streets later on after the accusations against Michel Temer and Eduardo Cunha came to light, suggesting that the protests were, in fact, ideologically motivated to end the PT's government era (Calegari, 2017b).

Nonetheless, the third group, *Revoltados On-Line,* was more conservative, inducing intense controversy surrounding these protests in favor of the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. Darlington (2015) wrote, "A sea of protesters dressed in the green and yellow of the Brazilian flag used decades-old rallying cries to fire up their ranks, singing rock songs that date back to protests of the country's one-time military dictatorship." The group also claimed to support a future candidacy of President Jair Bolsonaro, who would put the country back on track through military intervention. Jair Bolsonaro became infamous during the impeachment trial of President Rousseff, honoring Colonel Carlos Brilhante Ustra. As illustrated by Watts (2016)

> arguably the lowest point was when Jair Bolsonaro, the far-right deputy from Rio de Janeiro, dedicated his *yes* vote to Carlos Brilhante Ustra, the colonel who headed the Doi-Codi torture unit during the dictatorship era. Rousseff, a former guerrilla, was among those tortured. Bolsonaro's move prompted left-wing deputy Jean Wyllys to spit towards him. Eduardo Bolsonaro, his son and also a deputy, used his time at the microphone to honor the general responsible for the military coup in 1964.

As a response to the public discontent, the PMDB, which was the most important party within the Chamber of Deputies, withdrew from the government's ruling coalition. Despite having been charged with corruption and concealment himself, PMDB's Cunha had become one of the strongest

advocates of Rousseff's impeachment on grounds associated with her government's allegedly unethical accounting practices. According to Nunes & Melo (2017: 286), "[c]ongressional opposition, movements against the government in civil society, and sectors of the media quickly saw him [Cunha] as the actor capable of interrupting the long PT cycle [in the government]."

Until September 2015, 37 impeachment requests were filed in the Chamber of Deputies against President Rousseff (Passarinho & Alegretti, 2015). Eduardo Cunha, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, was himself investigated in Operation Lava Jato by the Federal Police as well. The allegations consisted of Cunha receiving bribes from Petrobras and of keeping secret accounts in Switzerland. Consequently, Cunha was in danger of losing his mandate, as the Chamber's Ethics Council filed a lawsuit against him (Avritzer 2017). Rumors surfaced about attempts to reach an agreement between the deputy and the PT, in order to end this process, which he vigorously denied. If PT members announced their support for the loss of Cunha's mandate in the Ethics Council, he would accept the impeachment request as an instrument of blackmail (Passarinho & Alegretti, 2015).

However, Eduardo Cunha first accepted the request written by Hélio Bicudo and by lawyers Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaina Conceição Paschoal. The pro-impeachment social movements decided to adhere to Bicudo's request, which also had the support of right-wing parliamentarians and civil society, organizing a petition in support of the impeachment of the President of the Republic (Rios et al., 2017b; Bülow, 2018). In response to the opening of the case, Rousseff stated that the arguments presented by the lawyers were inconsistent and unfounded and that she had not performed any unlawful act (G1, 2016).

The formal impeachment proceedings of Dilma Rousseff, the 36th president of Brazil, started on December 2, 2015.[2] The process began with a petition filed by the justice prosecutor Hélio Bicudo and the two lawyers Miguel Reale Júnior and Janaína Paschoal (Fernandes, 2015). The petition was then accepted by the former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha. Rousseff was accused of criminal administrative misconduct and disregard for the federal budget. The petition claimed that she violated Article 85, items V and VI, of the Brazilian Constitution and also the Fiscal Responsibility Law, Article 36.[3] Further, Rousseff was also accused of criminal responsibility for failing to act on the scandal at the Brazilian national petroleum company, Petrobras, on account of allegations uncovered by the Operation Car Wash investigation.

Former President Dilma Rousseff was president of the Petrobras board of directors during the period covered by the investigation. During her presidency, she approved Petrobras' controversial acquisition of the Pasadena Refining System (Nunes and Melo 2017). The primary concern was that the former president did not properly distance herself from the suspects in that investigation. Yet, the Petrobras charges were not (formally) included in the impeachment because Prosecutor-General Rodrigo Janot successfully argued that a sitting

[2] Nunes and Melo (2017) reinforce that, even though the impeachment process occurred on a legal basis, there were some credible conspiracy allegations. Besides, the allegations leading to the impeachment of President Rousseff accepted by Cunha were a common practice among politicians in Brazil. Joaquim Barbosa, who was the former Supreme Federal Court Minister – who punished the PT's leaders during previous corruption scandals – affirmed: "that was staged. All of the steps had already been planned since 2015. Those procedures there [in Parliament] were conducted only as a formality" (Bergamo 2016).

[3] "Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988"[Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil 1988] (in Portuguese). Presidência da República do Brasil. 5 October 1988. Retrieved 9 June 2017. Art. 85: Acts of the President of the Republic which are counter to the Federal Constitution, and especially with respect to: V - probity of the administration; VI - budgetary law.

president could not be investigated while in office for crimes committed before the election.

As of the acceptance of the filed petition, a special commission was formed in the Chamber of Deputies to decide on its admissibility. The script started with the testimony of the plaintiffs and followed up with the presentation of her defense. Meanwhile, street demonstrations for and against the impeachment periodically took place across the country (Darlington, 2015; Mourão, 2019). The largest street protest in favor of the impeachment of President Rousseff counted on more than 500 thousand people. In comparison, a few days later, around 100 thousand people occupied the streets supporting the President and her mandate (Nunes and Melo 2017). The committee's report decided in favor of President Dilma's impeachment, with 38 deputies approving the report, while 27 expressed their opposition.

On April 17, 2016, the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies approved the report with 367 votes in favor and 137 against. Once formally impeached, the Senate subsequently voted to suspend Rousseff's powers for the duration of the trial, and Vice President Michel Temer became acting president. On August 31, 2016, the Senate removed President Rousseff from office by a 61–20 vote, finding her guilty of breaking Brazil's budget laws.

## Appendix 17: Case study: The non-impeachment of Michel Temer (2017)

Michel Temer, Brazil's president, survived two impeachment attempts in August and October 2017. Here, we focus on the first impeachment attempt. The current literature explains this puzzle in terms of Temer providing concessions to the elite, thus buying their support, something that his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff, failed to do. While this argument is intuitive, we also highlight two factors. First is the lack of massive mobilization compared to that that erupted against Rousseff. The second factor lies in the fact that he was a temporary president, thus giving little incentive for the elite to impeach him. The elite, therefore, were able to buy time until his temporary term came to an end. In the lines below, we elaborate on this argument.

Temer actually served as Vice-President to Dilma Rousseff and was sworn in as the 37th president of Brazil in 2016 after the latter's impeachment. Temer's interim administration was involved in a scandal with Romero Jucá, a newly appointed minister and the president's confidant. Jucá was forced to step down amid accusations that he had sought to obstruct Operation Car Wash's investigations. This came to light after the press released a taped conversation in which he stated that "the government has to be changed in order to stop this

bleeding" (Sotero, 2018). Amid the scandal, many alleged that Jucá was proposing to use Rousseff as a scapegoat.

Temer was himself accused of corruption by an executive from the construction company Odebrecht of soliciting campaign donations in 2014 for his party, the PMDB (Rios et al., 2017a). He faced trial along with Rousseff in the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) in a complaint filed by Senator Aécio Neves, who was narrowly defeated by Rousseff in the 2014 presidential run-off election and complained of campaigning irregularities. On June 9, 2017, the court rejected the allegations in a 4–3 vote. Consequently, he remained in office, and both Temer and Rousseff were able to retain their political rights.

Temer's political power, nevertheless, grew increasingly tenuous as he became the target of another corruption scandal. In May 2017, a secretly recorded conversation between Temer and Joesley Batista, the chairman of a meatpacking company, was leaked. Temer was accused of approving an offer to bribe Cunha. Threatened with impeachment, Temer denied the accusations and refused to resign. In late June 2017, he was officially charged with corruption. However, two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies had first to vote to suspend him from office to face trial. When the deputies voted on August 2, 2017, only 227 of 513 were in favor of impeaching Temer, not enough to proceed with the impeachment trial.

Temer's party, the PMDB, has been the largest in Brazil since the re-democratization period, with a broad base of support in the Chamber of Deputies. During the early stages of his trial, parties directed their deputies to vote against holding an impeachment trial. For example, the conservative deputy Aguinaldo Ribeiro, of the Progressive Party, said that he did not believe Temer was guilty, adding that "you don't mess with anyone's honor without having concrete proof" (Bretas & Gasparini, 2017). Another conservative congressman, Deputy José Rocha, said the PR is against impeachment, arguing that "no country that seeks prosperity can turn its back on the principles of institutional stability and legal security" (Bretas & Gasparini, 2017). It is worth noting that such logic and argumentation, nevertheless, did not resonate with the conservative parties during Rousseff's impeachment (Nunes & Melo, 2017).

Despite these accusations, there were no significant protests against Temer's government. Smaller demonstrations only occurred in 2017, mainly due to several budgetary cuts in ministries and other corruption scandals (Calegari, 2017a). While Temer's public approval ratings were dismal, especially as the October 2018 presidential elections approached, opinion polling showed Lula to be the leading candidate for the country's highest office. However, a few months before

the election, the STF denied a call for participation from Lula, prohibiting him from pursuing his final appeal options outside of prison.

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