Thorin M. Wright and Paul F. Diehl
"Unpacking Territorial Disputes: Domestic Political Influences and War."
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In this online appendix, we present the results of several robustness checks and supplemental analysis for our article. The replication materials necessary to reproduce the following results are available, along with the replication materials for the analysis presented in the main article, on jcr.sagepub.com as well as http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/twrigh11.

First, we present the first differences of predicted probabilities presented in Figures 1 and 2 of the main article. Figure A1 displays the first differences of predicted probabilities for escalation to war within 5 years compared to the base category (where dummies are set to zero and continuous variables are set to their mean, which translates to joint-autocratic dyads fighting over something other than territory), as well as mixed dyads compared to other conditions. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the differences in probabilities are significant and positive, as expected. When compared to the base group of non-territorial, jointly autocratic MIDs, the likelihood of war over territory for mixed regimes is significantly greater. This significance holds when compared to joint autocracies involved in territorial MIDs as well as mixed regime dyads involved in non-territorial MIDs.

Figure A1: First Differences of Pred. Probabilities for Figure 1 in Article.



In Figure A2, we display the first differences of each dyadic-category's predicted probability compared to the base condition (in which all binaries are set to zero and continuous variables are set to their mean) and find that the differences in predicted probabilities for territorial MIDs fought by democratic-strongman dyads are significant, while the different probabilities for democratic-boss dyads barely miss significance at .10 level.

Figure A2: First Differences of Predicted Probabilities of Figure 2 in Article.



Next, we present an additional set of models for our first set of analysis that covers the period of 1816-2001. In Table A1, we present similar models to Table 2 in the main article, but restrict our sample to only territorial MIDs. As shown in Table A1, the results are substantively similar in the restricted sample to those presented in the main article, with mixed dyads more likely to escalate to war during territorial MIDs than institutionally similar dyads, in all models except for Model A3.

Table A1: Logits of Mixed Dyads and War during Territorial MIDs, 1816-2001

	(A1) All Dyads War/5 years	(A2) Rival Dyads War/5 years	(A3) All Dyads War	(A4) Rival Dyads War
Mixed Regime Dyad	0.438***	0.707***	0.192	0.478*
	(0.150)	(0.183)	(0.188)	(0.255)
Capability Ratio	0.055	0.685**	-0.493	0.244
	(0.276)	(0.332)	(0.362)	(0.466)
Count of Territorial MIDs	0.008	0.014	-0.064***	-0.037**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	-1.309***	-1.875***	-1.405***	-2.260***
	(0.144)	(0.199)	(0.174)	(0.270)
Observations	953	698	953	698

Two-Tailed Significance: *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1; One-Tailed Significance: † p<0.1

Next, we present a series of penalized logit models for both sets of analysis. This method (Firth, 1993), allows for the use of maximum-likelihood estimators without losing perfect predictors. Thus for models where joint democracy or other regime combinations have been excluded due to perfect prediction in the main article, we were able to test the robustness of our results. We conducted penalized logit analyses for the key models in the paper ("firthlogit" in Stata). Our results are substantively similar, even including the perfect predictors. Tables A2 and A3 of this appendix display the results of the penalized logit models, which include an interaction for terrXjtdem, allowing the lower order term for territorial MIDs to be the effect of jointly autocratic territorial MIDs. As can be seen, the positive and significant effect of territorial MIDs involving mixed regime dyads holds as before in many models, albeit some of them only in one-tailed tests.

We also conducted a full interaction model employing the Weeks' categories of autocratic regimes. Table A4 of the memo displays these results. The key variables for our argument are the interactions between territorial MID and ``Dem-Boss" and "Dem-Strongman" dyads. We include interactions between territory and the Dem-Boss, Dem-Strongman, Dem-Junta, Dem-Machine, and Joint Democracy dyads, leaving the lower order term for territorial MIDs to represent territorial MIDs of jointly autocratic dyads and all other mixed regime dyads.[1] Although the results of the penalized logit model in Table A4 are not quite as supportive of our argument that strongmen would be more war prone against democracies, it does indicate support for our overall argument that more personalistic autocratic regimes (Dem-Boss dyads in this set of models) will be more war prone against democracies when fighting over territory. In Table A5, we present the sub-sample analysis of territorial MIDs, and also find substantively similar results as those presented in the main article.

[1] An analysis that includes an interaction for territorial MIDs and mixed dyads included with the other interactions yields similar, but slightly weaker, results; the result for the "Terr X Dem-Boss" variable is significant in only a 1-tailed test for both models and the "Terr X Dem-Strongman" is no longer significant. The interaction between territorial MIDs and mixed dyads is not significant.

Table A2: Penalized Logits of Mixed Dyads, Territory, and War, 1816-2001

	(A5) All Dyads War/5 years	(A6) Rival Dyads War/5 years	(A7) All Dyads War	(A8) Rival Dyads War
Mixed Regime Dyad	-0.516***	-0.746***	-0.427*	-0.922***
	(0.161)	(0.199)	(0.231)	(0.315)
Terr. MID X Mixed	0.752***	1.219***	0.529*	1.247***
	(0.220)	(0.269)	(0.297)	(0.403)
Territorial MID	0.747***	0.298	1.198***	0.501*
	(0.150)	(0.188)	(0.197)	(0.263)
Terr. MID X Joint Dem.	-1.323	-1.061	-1.308	-0.748
	(1.648)	(1.655)	(1.653)	(1.665)
Joint Democracy	-2.685***	-2.499***	-1.787**	-1.558*
	(0.827)	(0.833)	(0.834)	(0.842)
Capability Ratio	0.388*	0.725***	0.214	0.517
	(0.200)	(0.240)	(0.266)	(0.345)
Count of Territorial MIDs	0.023**	0.023**	-0.029*	-0.022
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Rivalry	-0.227*		-0.688***	
	(0.124)		(0.157)	
Constant	-1.894***	-2.028***	-2.394***	-2.790***
	(0.135)	(0.155)	(0.174)	(0.221)
Observations	2,788	1,892	2,788	1,892

Two-Tailed Significance: *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1; One-Tailed Significance: † p<0.1

Table A3: Penalized Logits of Mixed Dyads and War During Territorial MIDs, 1816-2001

	(A9) All Dyads War/5 years	(A10) Rival Dyads War/5 years	(A11) All Dyads War	(A12) Rival Dyads War
Mixed Regime Dyad	0.243†	0.465**	0.115	0.335†
	(0.154)	(0.187)	(0.192)	(0.255)
Joint Democracy	-4.024***	-3.575**	-3.087**	-2.242
	(1.426)	(1.432)	(1.429)	(1.437)
Capability Ratio	0.211	0.699**	-0.161	0.305
	(0.288)	(0.342)	(0.369)	(0.471)
Count of Territorial MIDs	0.031***	0.025**	-0.024	-0.029
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Rival	-0.597***		-1.003***	
	(0.180)		(0.211)	
Constant	-0.871***	-1.730***	-0.912***	-2.169***
	(0.167)	(0.197)	(0.187)	(0.265)
Observations	953	698	953	698

Two-Tailed Significance: *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1; One-Tailed Significance: † p<0.1

Table A4: Penalized Logits of Mixed Dyads and War, full MID Sample, 1946-1999

	(A13) War/5 years	(A14) War
Territorial MID	1.568***	2.048***
	(0.279)	(0.381)
Terr X Dem-Boss	1.779**	2.700*
	(0.732)	(1.486)
Terr X Dem-Junta	-1.708	-0.575
	(1.229)	(1.706)
Terr X Dem-Strongman	0.731†	-1.139
	(0.549)	(0.768)
Terr X Dem-Machine	-3.000**	-2.056
	(1.500)	(1.609)
Terr X Jt. Dem	-2.861*	-2.867*
	(1.669)	(1.690)
Dem-Boss	-1.077	-1.435
	(0.697)	(1.478)
Dem-Junta	0.167	0.037
	(0.888)	(1.491)
Dem-Strongman	0.857*	1.678***
	(0.493)	(0.647)
Dem-Machine	0.095	0.214
	(0.470)	(0.765)
Joint Democracy	-0.184	0.406
	(0.864)	(0.896)
Mixed Regime Dyad	0.375	-0.130
	(0.264)	(0.363)
Capability Ratio	0.973***	0.577
	(0.349)	(0.453)
Count of Territorial MIDs	0.016	-0.015
	(0.013)	(0.020)
Rivalry	-0.141	-0.690**
	(0.236)	(0.275)
Constant	-3.684***	-3.813***
	(0.317)	(0.402)
Observations	1,629	1,629

Two-Tailed Significance: *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1; One-Tailed Significance: † p<0.1

Table A5: Penalized Logits of Mixed Dyads and War during Territorial MIDs, 1946-1999

	(A15) All Dyads War/5 years	(A16) Rival Dyads War/5 years	(A17) All Dyads War	(A18) Rival Dyads War
Dem-Boss	0.545†	-0.197	1.254***	0.315
	(0.339)	(0.388)	(0.429)	(0.479)
Dem-Junta	-1.761**	-2.057**	-0.541	-0.649
	(0.893)	(0.925)	(0.927)	(0.945)
Dem-Strongman	1.549***	1.305***	0.606	0.154
	(0.388)	(0.398)	(0.598)	(0.586)
Dem-Machine	-3.014**	-3.501**	-1.758	-2.329
	(1.451)	(1.457)	(1.472)	(1.472)
Joint Democracy	-2.933**	-2.512*	-2.425*	-1.731
	(1.438)	(1.452)	(1.442)	(1.461)
Mixed Regime Dyad	0.651**	1.222***	-0.063	0.639
	(0.318)	(0.366)	(0.412)	(0.466)
Capability Ratio	1.243***	1.711***	0.400	0.667
	(0.440)	(0.531)	(0.531)	(0.666)
Count of Territorial MIDs	0.014	0.003	-0.013	-0.023
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Rivalry	-0.541*		-1.030***	
	(0.295)		(0.320)	
Constant	-2.014***	-2.812***	-1.518***	-2.680***
	(0.319)	(0.342)	(0.331)	(0.396)
Observations	579	460	579	460

Two-Tailed Significance: *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1; One-Tailed Significance: † p<0.1