Online Appendix

A.1 Additional Data Summary

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Territory-Years
V-Dem electoral democracy index	0.201	0.171	3116
Internal war onset	0.018	0.134	3234
ln(Revenues/pop.) growth	0.098	0.297	830
ln(Income/pop.) growth	0.015	0.062	2365
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.596	0.491	3234
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.080	0.271	3234

Figure A.1: Political Outcomes Within 40 Years of Independence



Notes: Figure 1 plots a local polynomial function and 95% confidence interval for democracy and for internal war onset in the four decades preceding and following independence, starting in 1919. Panel A includes 55 countries, excluding 11 countries with at least a decade of missing democracy data. Panel B contains all 66 countries in the core sample, with no missing data.

For each dependent variable, the columns in Tables A.2 through A.5 present (1) for each country (2) the average value of the variable during non-autonomous colonial years, (3) the average value during colonial autonomy years, (4) the average value during post-independence years, (5) the difference in average values between colonial autonomy years and other colonial years (parentheses present rank among all countries), and (6) the difference in average values between post-independence years and colonial autonomy years (parentheses present rank among all countries). Countries denoted with * were autonomous for all years between 1941 and independence. Countries denoted with ** never gained autonomy prior to independence, and Column 6 for these countries equals post-independence average minus pre-independence average. Internal war in Table A.3 equals 1 in the first war year, 0 for peace years, and is set to missing for ongoing conflicts. Therefore, the numbers reflect the percentage of peaceful years in which a new conflict occurred.

Table A.2: Summary of Democracy Levels

Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy–Colonial (rank)	Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank)
Algeria**	0.08	-	0.16	-	0.08 (21)
Angola**	0.01	-	0.07	-	0.06 (26)
Bahrain*	-	0.02	0.06	-	0.03 (35)
Benin	0.07	0.15	0.17	0.08 (22)	0.02 (38)
Bhutan*	-	0.03	0.04	-	0.02 (39)
Botswana**	0.08	-	0.67	-	0.59 (1)
Burkina Faso	0.16	0.24	0.23	0.08 (23)	-0.01 (47)
Burundi	0.04	0.14	0.13	0.09 (21)	-0.01 (48)
Cambodia	0.06	0.09	0.18	0.02 (38)	0.09 (17)
Cameroon	-	-	0.17	-	-
Central African Republic	0.11	0.24	0.14	0.13 (9)	-0.1 (61)
Chad	0.11	0.28	0.15	0.17 (4)	-0.13 (62)
Congo	0.09	0.2	0.14	0.11 (16)	-0.06 (56)
Congo, DR**	0.02	-	0.18	-	0.16 (11)
Cote d'Ivoire	0.09	0.14	0.18	0.05 (29)	0.04 (33)
Cyprus**	0.09	-	0.57	-	0.48 (2)
Djibouti	0.07	0.11	0.18	0.04 (32)	0.07 (25)
Fiji**	0.27	-	0.56	-	0.29 (5)
Gabon	0.08	0.16	0.19	0.08 (24)	0.03 (36)
Gambia	0.14	0.31	0.47	0.16 (5)	0.16 (12)
Ghana	0.11	0.31	0.22	0.19 (2)	-0.09 (59)
Guinea**	0.09	-	0.14	-	0.05 (30)
Guinea-Bissau**	0.01	-	0.12	-	0.1 (14)
Guyana	0.27	0.3	0.31	0.04 (33)	0 (43)
India**	0.19	-	0.61	-	0.42 (3)
Indonesia	0.03	0.16	0.21	0.13 (10)	0.06 (27)
Israel**	-	-	0.68	-	-
Jamaica	0.3	0.54	0.54	0.23 (1)	0 (44)
Jordan*	-	0.1	0.13	-	0.03 (37)
Kenya	0.09	0.13	0.22	0.04 (34)	0.09 (18)
Kuwait*	-	0.15	0.2	-	0.06 (28)
Laos	0.1	0.2	0.18	0.11 (17)	-0.03 (51)
Lesotho	0.06	0.19	0.16	0.13 (11)	-0.03 (52)
Libya**	0.02	-	0.1	-	0.08 (22)
Madagascar	0.06	0.14	0.23	0.08 (25)	0.08 (23)
Malawi	0.03	0.19	0.17	0.16 (6)	-0.02 (50)
Malaysia**	0.07	-	0.27	-	0.2 (7)
Mali	0.1	0.17	0.18	0.08 (26)	0 (45)
Mauritania	0.11	0.27	0.18	0.16 (7)	-0.09 (60)
Mauritius	0.28	0.36	0.77	0.08 (27)	0.41 (4)
Morocco**	0.05	-	0.15	-	0.1 (15)
Mozambique**	0.03	-	0.08	-	0.05 (31)
Myanmar	0.14	0.19	0.2	0.05 (30)	0.01 (41)
Nepal*	-	0.01	0.11	-	0.1 (16)
Niger	0.04	0.14	0.15	0.1 (19)	0.01 (42)
Nigeria	0.15	0.18	0.23	0.03 (36)	0.05 (32)
Pakistan**	-	-	0.18	-	-
Philippines*	-	0.12	0.32	-	0.2 (8)
Rwanda**	0.03	0.16	0.21	0.12 (13)	0.06 (29)
Senegal	0.19	0.24	0.41	0.05 (31)	0.17 (9)
Sierra Leone	0.14	0.26	0.25	0.12 (14)	-0.01 (49)
Singapore	0.24	0.32	0.34	0.08 (28)	0.02 (40)
Somalia**	0.1	-	0.19	-	0.09 (19)
Sri Lanka	0.34	0.35	0.62	0.01 (39)	0.27 (6)
Sudan	0.09	0.22	0.19	0.13 (12)	-0.04 (54)
Swaziland	0.07	0.18	0.14	0.12 (15)	-0.05 (55)
Syria*	-	0.13	0.17	-	0.04 (34)
Tanzania	0.07	0.18	0.26	0.11 (18)	0.08 (24)
Togo	0.07	0.22	0.14	0.15 (8)	-0.08 (58)
Trinidad and Tobago	0.29	0.47	0.64	0.19 (3)	0.17 (10)
Tunisia**	0.04	-	0.18	-	0.13 (13)
Uganda	0.08	0.19	0.19	0.1 (20)	0 (46)
United Arab Emirates*	-	-	0.03	-	-
Vietnam**	0.24	0.27	0.2	0.03 (37)	-0.07 (57)
Zambia	0.11	0.15	0.23	0.04 (35)	0.09 (20)
Zimbabwe*	-	0.26	0.23	-	-0.03 (53)

Table A.3: Summary of Internal War Onset Frequency

Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy–Colonial (rank)	Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank)
Algeria	7%	-	0%	-	-7% (59)
Angola	5%	-	100%	-	95% (1)
Bahrain	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Benin	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Bhutan	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Botswana	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Burkina Faso	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Burundi	0%	0%	4%	0% (t2)	4% (14)
Cambodia	0%	0%	9%	0% (t2)	9% (9)
Cameroon	6%	0%	0%	-6% (36)	0% (t20)
Central African Republic	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Chad	0%	0%	14%	0% (t2)	14% (4)
Congo	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Congo, DR	0%	-	8%	-	8% (11)
Cote d'Ivoire	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Cyprus	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Djibouti	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Fiji	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Gabon	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Gambia	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Ghana	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Guinea	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Guinea-Bissau	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Guyana	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
India	17%	-	5%	-	-12% (62)
Indonesia	0%	33%	22%	33% (1)	-11% (61)
Israel	14%	-	0%	-	-14% (64)
Jamaica	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Jordan	-	0%	2%	-	2% (18)
Kenya	6%	0%	0%	-6% (37)	0% (t20)
Kuwait	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Laos	0%	0%	11%	0% (t2)	11% (6)
Lesotho	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Libya	0%	-	0%	-	0% (t20)
Madagascar	6%	0%	0%	-6% (38)	0% (t20)
Malawi	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Malaysia	13%	-	0%	-	-12% (63)
Mali	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Mauritania	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Mauritius	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Morocco	8%	-	4%	-	-4% (58)
Mozambique	4%	-	25%	-	21% (2)
Myanmar	0%	0%	21%	0% (t2)	21% (3)
Nepal	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Niger	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Nigeria	0%	0%	8%	0% (t2)	8% (12)
Pakistan	0%	-	3%	-	3% (15)
Philippines	-	0%	9%	-	9% (10)
Rwanda	5%	-	4%	-	-
Senegal	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Sierra Leone	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Singapore	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Somalia	0%	-	3%	-	3% (16)
Sri Lanka	0%	0%	6%	0% (t2)	6% (13)
Sudan	0%	0%	11%	0% (t2)	11% (7)
Swaziland	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Syria	-	0%	2%	-	2% (19)
Tanzania	0%	0%	3%	0% (t2)	3% (17)
Togo	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Trinidad and Tobago	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Tunisia	8%	-	0%	-	-8% (60)
Uganda	0%	0%	10%	0% (t2)	10% (8)
United Arab Emirates	-	0%	0%	-	0% (t20)
Vietnam	17%	-	3%	-	-
Zambia	0%	0%	0%	0% (t2)	0% (t20)
Zimbabwe	-	0%	14%	-	14% (5)

Table A.4: Summary of Revenue Growth

Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy–Colonial (rank)	Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank)
Algeria**	21%	-	-	-	-
Angola**	13%	-	-	-	-
Bahrain*	-	-	-	-	-
Benin	-	-	-	-	-
Bhutan*	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana**	-	-	-	-	-
Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	-
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-
Cambodia	-	-	-	-	-
Cameroon	-	-	4%	-	-
Central African Republic	16%	23%	4%	7% (1)	-20% (18)
Chad	-2%	-	8%	-	-
Congo	-	-	-	-	-
Congo, DR**	11%	-	-	-	-
Cote d'Ivoire	-	-	9%	-	-
Cyprus**	17%	-	6%	-	-12% (13)
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-
Fiji**	9%	-	-	-	-
Gabon	7%	-	33%	-	-
Gambia	-	-	-	-	-
Ghana	18%	12%	16%	-7% (7)	4% (6)
Guinea**	-	-	-	-	-
Guinea-Bissau**	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana	9%	5%	3%	-4% (6)	-2% (9)
India**	19%	-	7%	-	-12% (14)
Indonesia	-	-	10%	-	-
Israel**	20%	-	33%	-	13% (4)
Jamaica	10%	10%	8%	0% (3)	-2% (10)
Jordan*	-	-	-	-	-
Kenya	12%	-	-	-	-
Kuwait*	-	-	-	-	-
Laos	-	-	-	-	-
Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-
Libya**	-	-	-	-	-
Madagascar	15%	0%	5%	-15% (8)	5% (5)
Malawi	13%	-49%	-	-61% (12)	-
Malaysia**	21%	-	6%	-	-14% (16)
Mali	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritius	8%	-6%	8%	-15% (9)	15% (3)
Morocco**	-	-	-	-	-
Mozambique**	7%	-	-	-	-
Myanmar	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal*	-	-	-	-	-
Niger	-	-	-	-	-
Nigeria	16%	0%	21%	-16% (10)	21% (2)
Pakistan**	-	-	3%	-	-
Philippines*	-	-	4%	-	-
Rwanda**	-	-	-	-	-
Senegal	-	-	4%	-	-
Sierra Leone	13%	17%	5%	4% (2)	-12% (15)
Singapore	-	-	6%	-	-
Somalia**	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	18%	16%	1%	-2% (5)	-14% (17)
Sudan	-	-	-	-	-
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-
Syria*	-	-	18%	-	-
Tanzania	15%	-	-	-	-
Togo	-	0%	4%	-	4% (7)
Trinidad and Tobago	9%	8%	6%	-1% (4)	-2% (11)
Tunisia**	12%	-	4%	-	-8% (12)
Uganda	17%	-	-	-	-
United Arab Emirates*	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam**	-	-	-	-	-
Zambia	12%	-8%	55%	-20% (11)	62% (1)
Zimbabwe*	-	11%	12%	-	1% (8)

Table A.5: Summary of Economic Growth

Country	Colonial avg.	Autonomy avg.	Post-indep. avg.	Autonomy–Colonial (rank)	Post-indep.–Autonomy (rank)
Algeria**	3%	-	2%	-	-1% (24)
Angola**	2%	-	-4%	-	-6% (51)
Bahrain*	-	3%	1%	-	-2% (32)
Benin	-2%	2%	1%	4% (1)	-1% (25)
Bhutan*	-	-	-	-	-
Botswana**	2%	-	9%	-	7% (2)
Burkina Faso	3%	3%	1%	0% (8)	-1% (26)
Burundi	2%	-16%	2%	-18% (34)	19% (1)
Cambodia	-	2%	2%	-	0% (15)
Cameroon	2%	2%	2%	0% (9)	-1% (27)
Central African Republic	2%	2%	-1%	0% (10)	-3% (41)
Chad	2%	2%	0%	0% (11)	-2% (33)
Congo	2%	2%	2%	0% (12)	0% (16)
Congo, DR**	3%	-	-1%	-	-4% (44)
Cote d'Ivoire	2%	1%	1%	0% (13)	0% (17)
Cyprus**	-	-	-	-	-
Djibouti	1%	2%	-3%	1% (3)	-5% (47)
Fiji**	-	-	-	-	-
Gabon	3%	3%	1%	0% (14)	-2% (34)
Gambia	3%	-1%	1%	-4% (28)	2% (10)
Ghana	1%	2%	0%	1% (4)	-2% (35)
Guinea**	3%	-	1%	-	-1% (28)
Guinea-Bissau**	5%	-	0%	-	-5% (48)
Guyana	-	-	-	-	-
India**	-2%	-	2%	-	3% (8)
Indonesia	2%	-	3%	-	-
Israel**	-	-	4%	-	-
Jamaica	8%	6%	1%	-2% (26)	-4% (45)
Jordan*	-	-	3%	-	-
Kenya	1%	2%	2%	1% (5)	0% (18)
Kuwait*	-	1%	-6%	-	-7% (53)
Laos	-	1%	1%	-	0% (19)
Lesotho	4%	0%	3%	-4% (29)	3% (9)
Libya**	-	-	4%	-	-
Madagascar	2%	2%	-1%	0% (15)	-3% (42)
Malawi	2%	-4%	2%	-6% (31)	6% (4)
Malaysia**	6%	-	4%	-	-3% (43)
Mali	2%	2%	1%	0% (16)	0% (20)
Mauritania	3%	2%	2%	0% (17)	0% (21)
Mauritius	3%	-3%	4%	-6% (32)	7% (3)
Morocco**	0%	-	2%	-	1% (13)
Mozambique**	2%	-	-3%	-	-4% (46)
Myanmar	-	-	2%	-	-
Nepal*	-	-	1%	-	-
Niger	2%	2%	-1%	0% (18)	-2% (36)
Nigeria	3%	0%	1%	-4% (30)	2% (11)
Pakistan**	-	-	2%	-	-
Philippines*	-	-	3%	-	-
Rwanda**	2%	-5%	2%	-7% (33)	6% (5)
Senegal	2%	1%	0%	0% (19)	-2% (37)
Sierra Leone	3%	2%	1%	-1% (24)	-1% (29)
Singapore	0%	2%	6%	1% (6)	4% (6)
Somalia**	2%	-	0%	-	-2% (38)
Sri Lanka	-2%	-2%	2%	0% (20)	4% (7)
Sudan	2%	2%	0%	0% (21)	-2% (39)
Swaziland	5%	7%	2%	1% (7)	-5% (49)
Syria*	-	-	3%	-	-
Tanzania	1%	1%	1%	0% (22)	-1% (30)
Togo	2%	1%	1%	0% (23)	0% (22)
Trinidad and Tobago	3%	7%	1%	3% (2)	-6% (52)
Tunisia**	1%	-	3%	-	2% (12)
Uganda	0%	-1%	0%	-1% (25)	1% (14)
United Arab Emirates*	-	2%	-3%	-	-5% (50)
Vietnam**	-	3%	1%	-	-2% (40)
Zambia	3%	0%	-1%	-3% (27)	0% (23)
Zimbabwe*	-	2%	2%	-	-1% (31)

A.2 Alternative Time Periods and Measures

The first two appendix regression tables alter the time sample used in Table 2. Table A.6 only includes the first 10 years before and after independence for each territory. Table A.7 lengthens the time sample to cover 1919 to 1989. Democracy and internal wars have reasonably good coverage dating back to the end of World War I, and Table A.7 provides estimates over a longer panel than in most comparative political science research.

Table A.6: Within 10 Years of Independence

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.00677	0.00330	0.0488	0.0202**
	(0.00844)	(0.0162)	(0.0735)	(0.00996)
Territory-years	1,171	1,223	330	973
R-squared	0.939	0.145	0.349	0.216
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0190***	-0.0354**	0.101	0.00654
	(0.00669)	(0.0177)	(0.0673)	(0.00836)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00753	-0.0205	0.124	0.0243**
	(0.0104)	(0.0181)	(0.104)	(0.0112)
Territory-years	1,171	1,223	330	973
R-squared	0.940	0.148	0.354	0.217
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table A.6 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using a restricted time sample: within a decade either before or after independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a linear link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. A logit model does not converge for the Column 2 specifications because of separation. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Expanded Time Sample: 1919–1989

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.00592	-0.629	0.0432	0.00319
	(0.00423)	(0.555)	(0.0375)	(0.00612)
Territory-years	4,387	1,244	1,324	2,520
R-squared	0.968		0.365	0.132
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0109***	-2.043**	0.0759	0.0112
	(0.00363)	(0.886)	(0.0472)	(0.00697)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.00129	-1.121*	0.0655	0.00738
	(0.00481)	(0.593)	(0.0433)	(0.00644)
Territory-years	4,387	1,244	1,324	2,520
R-squared	0.969		0.367	0.133
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table A.7 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1919 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.8 disaggregates the data in a different way than in Table 2. It replaces the colonial autonomy variable with the last five years of colonial rule, and also disaggregates the first five years of independence from the remainder of post-independence years. Similar to Table 2, it shows that the last five years of colonial rule (like the closely related colonial autonomy period) are associated with considerable democratic gains, whereas neither of the post-independence periods are.

Table A.8: Disaggregating Near-Independence Periods

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Last five colonial years$_{t-1}$	0.0278***	0.670	0.0171	-0.0119*
	(0.00372)	(0.663)	(0.0254)	(0.00640)
First five independence years$_{t-1}$	0.00281	0.0556	0.0571	-0.00514
	(0.00445)	(0.795)	(0.0840)	(0.00684)
Subsequent independence years$_{t-1}$	0.00123	-0.724	0.0207	-0.00730
	(0.00373)	(1.413)	(0.0417)	(0.00983)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.964		0.372	0.117
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table A.8 estimates Equation 1 with two additional indicators: the last five years of colonial rule, and the first five years of post-independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.9 uses alternative measures for internal war, revenues, and income. Column 1 replaces Correlates of War's internal war data with Brecke (1999). Column 2 replaces the revenue measure with normalized revenues, albeit at the cost of a smaller sample. Column 3 replaces Maddison's GDP data with Penn World Table (PWT; Feenstra et al. 2015), which tends to be of higher quality but has relatively scant coverage during the colonial era. Tables A.16 and A.17 present results with alternative democracy measures.

Table A.9: Alternative Measures

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule		
DV:	Brecke war onset	ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth	ln(PWT income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.556	0.00366	0.000974
	(0.442)	(0.00469)	(0.00129)
Territory-years	2,116	573	1,824
R-squared		0.298	0.119
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule		
DV:	Brecke war onset	ln(Norm. rev./pop.) growth	ln(PWT income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.432	-0.00150	0.00209
	(0.386)	(0.00519)	(0.00196)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.406	0.00299	0.00166
	(0.491)	(0.00537)	(0.00140)
Territory-years	2,116	573	1,824
R-squared		0.298	0.120
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table A.9 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but with different measures of the dependent variables, described above. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Column 1 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. Columns 2 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.10 lags independence by 10 years to examine whether the estimates differ when assuming that effects of independence may not have been immediate. In these regressions, a country that gained independence in 1960, for example, would be coded as colonized until 1970 and independent afterwards, thus treating the first decade of independence as one in which post-colonial effects may have yet to take hold. The coefficient estimate for independence is negative in the democracy regression in Column 1—as in Panel A of Table 2, but here is statistically significant. There is also a systematic negative association between lagged independence and internal warfare, which results from pooling decolonization wars and frequent conflict in countries' first years of (factual) post-independence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) into the pre-independence category when independence is lagged by 10 years. This result is consistent with Wimmer and Min's (2006) evidence that transitions from colonial rule exhibited particularly high conflict propensity.

Table A.10: Independence Lagged 10 Years

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent$_{t-10}$	-0.00975***	-1.676***	-0.0352	-0.00143
	(0.00300)	(0.625)	(0.0482)	(0.00674)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.371	0.115
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table A.10 estimates Equation 1 with the post-independence variable replaced by independence lagged by 10 years. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.3 Alternative Specifications for Time Series Models

Table A.11 accounts for several sources of time-varying, unit-specific heterogeneity by including every other dependent variable as a covariate, albeit at the cost of smaller samples due to missing data.

Table A.11: Time-Varying Covariates

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.00352	-0.0286	0.00759	0.00938
	(0.0124)	(0.0337)	(0.0367)	(0.00895)
Democracy level$_{t-1}$	0.916***	-0.0433	0.103	0.0349
	(0.0434)	(0.0870)	(0.0920)	(0.0268)
Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$	-0.00254	0.0115	0.0685**	0.00477
	(0.00850)	(0.0327)	(0.0293)	(0.0121)
ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$	-0.0124	0.0043	-0.0634	0.0193
	(0.00810)	(0.0336)	(0.0690)	(0.0202)
ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$	0.0735**	-0.152	1.001***	0.0771
	(0.0348)	(0.137)	(0.258)	(0.0872)
Territory-years	612	613	575	594
R-squared	0.971	0.199	0.624	0.177
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0418***	-0.0296	0.0791*	-0.0121
	(0.0149)	(0.0287)	(0.0453)	(0.0112)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.0194	-0.0454	0.0502	0.00274
	(0.0148)	(0.0465)	(0.0412)	(0.0124)
Democracy level$_{t-1}$	0.892***	-0.0262	0.0620	0.0421
	(0.0413)	(0.0946)	(0.0991)	(0.0291)
Internal war incidence$_{t-1}$	0.000458	0.00817	0.0737**	0.00400
	(0.00799)	(0.0323)	(0.0308)	(0.0121)
ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$	-0.00984	0.00266	-0.0610	0.0185
	(0.00750)	(0.0347)	(0.0691)	(0.0203)
ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$	0.0773**	-0.153	1.010***	0.0753
	(0.0315)	(0.138)	(0.258)	(0.0874)
Territory-years	612	613	575	594
R-squared	0.972	0.201	0.627	0.179
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Peace years and cubic splines	NO	YES	NO	NO

Notes: Panel A of Table A.11 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding controls for the other dependent variables. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a linear link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. A logit model does not converge for the Column 2 specifications because of separation. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.12 controls for the percentage of each territory's land neighbors that are independent in a given year. Relative to the core sample, adding this control drops all island territories.

Table A.12: Spatial Dependence: Controlling for Neighbors' Independence

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-5.25e-05	0.129	0.0228	0.00777
	(0.00497)	(0.874)	(0.0472)	(0.00805)
Territory-years	2,637	924	579	2,057
R-squared	0.948		0.334	0.112
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0172***	-1.885	0.0657	0.0118
	(0.00450)	(1.299)	(0.0609)	(0.00856)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00754	-0.553	0.0398	0.0120
	(0.00614)	(1.076)	(0.0543)	(0.00775)
Territory-years	2,637	924	579	2,057
R-squared	0.948		0.335	0.113
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table A.12 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding a control for the percentage of land neighbors with political independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

In an unpublished paper, Achen (2000) shows that lagged dependent variables can induce bias in models if there is serial correlation. Although he advises omitting a lagged dependent variable, subsequent methodological research rejects that conclusion. Beck and Katz (2011, 336) argue: "there is nothing atheoretical about the use of a lagged dependent variable, and there is nothing that should lead anyone to think the use of a lagged dependent variable causes incorrect harm. It may cause 'correct' harm, in that it may keep us from incorrectly concluding that x has a big effect when it does not, but that cannot be a bad thing." Keele and Kelly (2006) conclude on the basis of their Monte Carlo simulations that "if the process was dynamic, OLS with an LDV provided estimates that were superior to the other models or estimators even in the presence of minor residual autocorrelation" (18) because omitting the lagged dependent variable induces omitted variable bias, while also offering the caveat that "If the model residuals are strongly autocorrelated, including a lag will produce biased estimates."[8] However, Wilkins (2018) rejects even this limited critique of including a lagged dependent variable: "[Keele and Kelly] find that a regression of Y_t on X_t and Y_{t-1} produces estimates with relatively low bias compared with other models (such as just regressing Y_t on X_t), except under high levels of autocorrelation in the error term (high values of ϕ). But the problems in estimating the coefficient of the independent variable, β, arise because neither Achen (2000) nor Keele and Kelly (2006) specify the correct regression model, given the data-generating process." Wilkins shows that adding a second-order lag for the dependent variables and for the explanatory variables produces less biased estimates than specifications without the lagged dependent variable even under high autocorrelation. Table A.13 follows Wilkins' (2018) advice to add second-order lags for the continuous dependent variables, and computes long-run multipliers to interpret the estimated effects of independence and of colonial autonomy.

[8]They also suggest that "many of the problems that LDVs may cause with" the dependent variables that Achen (2000) studies "probably occur because the data are nonstationary," which we address in Section 2.4.

Table A.13: Second-Order Lags

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule		
DV:	Democracy level	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.0232***	-0.00465	0.0121
	(0.00727)	(0.0904)	(0.0107)
Independent$_{t-2}$	-0.0308***	0.0375	-0.00860
	(0.00709)	(0.117)	(0.0107)
Democracy level$_{t-1}$	1.136***		
	(0.0242)		
Democracy level$_{t-2}$	-0.218***		
	(0.0299)		
ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$		-0.0952	
		(0.0575)	
ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-2}$		-0.0155	
		(0.0240)	
ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$			0.110**
			(0.0502)
ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-2}$			0.0239
			(0.0372)
Territory-years	3,106	791	2,307
R-squared	0.966	0.364	0.119
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
		Long-run multiplier	
Independent	-.0918389	.0295807	.0040514
	(.0711658)	(.044642)	.0077799
	Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule		
DV:	Democracy level	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0249***	0.0403	-0.00163
	(0.00686)	(0.0644)	(0.0106)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-2}$	-0.0140*	0.0102	0.0156
	(0.00793)	(0.0848)	(0.0114)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.0392***	0.00529	0.00355
	(0.0101)	(0.133)	(0.0158)
Independent$_{t-2}$	-0.0408***	0.0431	0.00392
	(0.00995)	(0.167)	(0.0145)
Democracy level$_{t-1}$	1.128***		
	(0.0246)		
Democracy level$_{t-2}$	-0.218***		
	(0.0302)		
ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-1}$		-0.0960	
		(0.0594)	
ln(Rev./pop.) growth$_{t-2}$		-0.0155	
		(0.0238)	
ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-1}$			0.108**
			(0.0507)
ln(Income/pop.) growth$_{t-2}$			0.0228
			(0.0375)
Territory-years	3,106	791	2,307
R-squared	0.966	0.364	0.121
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
		Long-run multiplier	
Colonial autonomy	.1198398**	.0453713	.0161139*
	(.0500776)	(.0529125)	(.0086798)
Independent	-.0174411	.0435736	.008595
	(.0608931)	(.0524533)	(.0081141)

Notes: Panel A of Table A.13 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, in each case adding a second-order lag for the explanatory and dependent variables. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects, clusters standard errors by territory, and uses a linear link. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Bertrand et al. (2004) analyze a different possible concern with time series data stemming from serial correlation causing incorrect standard error estimates. Specifically, they allege that standard practice in applied economics research at the time of their publication yielded insufficiently conservative standard error estimates. This concern does not appear to be problematic for our results for two reasons. First, Bertrand et al. (2004, 273) show that unit-clustered standard errors, which we use in every specification, perform well when the number of clusters is as large as in our sample. Second, even if our standard errors are downwardly biased, the direction of the bias would make it less likely to find null results.

Table A.14: Ignoring Time Series Information

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level (first difference)	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.00339*	-0.00139	0.0156	0.00183
	(0.00181)	(0.00743)	(0.0233)	(0.00473)
Territory-years	124	132	38	110
R-squared	0.413	0.567	0.634	0.575
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Autonomous vs. non-autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level (first difference)	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0257**	-0.00670	0.0482	-0.00344
	(0.00993)	(0.0198)	(0.0580)	(0.00998)
Territory-years	78	80	22	68
R-squared	0.536	0.500	0.558	0.482
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Each panel in Table A.14 uses data from every country with outcome data for both values of the explanatory variable. Each model contains two observations for every country in the regression, and every specification contains territory fixed effects and territory-clustered standard error estimates. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Despite these concerns, Table A.14 presents results from a conservative procedure that Bertrand et al. (2004, 267) show leads to reliable standard error estimates in small samples: ignore the time series information when estimating the standard errors. Rather than analyze individual years, they aggregate the data into one pre-treatment and one post-treatment observation for every unit, although we use three categories to distinguish colonial autonomy from other colonial years (as well as from post-independence). To account for the different times at which units change treatment status and the resultant time-varying heterogeneity, they recommend regressing the dependent variable on year fixed effects and then running models that include two observations for each unit: one pre-treatment residual and one post-treatment residual produced by the auxiliary regression. Panel A of Table A.14 compares the post-independence average with the pre-independence average. Panel B compares the colonial autonomy average with the non-autonomous colonial average. It does not separately estimate a coefficient for post-independence because this technique

is designed for binary treatment variables. There are exactly two observations for each country in each regression, and countries with missing data for all years in either the pre- or the post-period in each specification are dropped. The democracy specifications use the first difference of democracy to account for high autocorrelation of the dependent variable (the main models account for this by including a lagged dependent variable). The results resemble those in Table 2.

Imai and Kim (2016) raise a different concern. Even absent unit-specific time-varying confounders, standard two-way fixed effects models will be biased if treatment effects are heterogeneous. Tables A.18 through A.23 address this concern by disaggregating colonial institutions. Additionally, Table A.15 presents estimates using Imai and Kim's weighted differences-in-differences estimator that corrects for bias from heterogeneous treatment effects. As in Table A.14, analyzing the first difference of democracy levels accounts for high autocorrelation in democracy levels, and Panel B does not provide separate estimates of post-independence because the method is designed for binary treatment variables. Notably, these models produce somewhat more conservative estimates than the original specifications because reweighting the units increases variance. The p-value for colonial autonomy in the democracy regression slightly exceeds conventional levels of statistical significance (p-value=0.1005).

Table A.15: Weighted Fixed Effects Estimator

	Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level (first difference)	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.020914	-0.0018214	0.00075485	0.024510
	(0.015398)	(0.0227571)	(0.20134641)	(0.017182)
Territory-years	3116	2982	871	2451
Territory-years w/ non-zero weight	858	854	173	676
	Panel B. Autonomous vs. non-autonomous colonial rule			
DV:	Democracy level (first difference)	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0142057	-0.033057***	0.034209	0.005583
	(0.0086428)	(0.011566)	(0.058197)	(0.012861)
Territory-years	1191	1238	460	653
Territory-years w/ non-zero weight	693	624	212	428

Notes: Table A.15 presents coefficient estimates and standard error estimates (which allow heteroskedasticity across units and arbitrary autocorrelation) estimated using Imai and Kim's (2016) weighted differences-in-differences estimator. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.4 Alternative Democracy Subcomponents and Indices

Tables A.16 and A.17 examine different aggregate democracy indices from V-Dem and subcomponents of the electoral democracy index. The V-Dem codebook describes the 10 aggregated democracy indices evaluated in Table A.16. For Table A.17, the freedom of association variable answers the following question: "To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?" Clean elections captures: "To what extent are elections free and fair?" Freedom of expression denotes: "To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?" Elected officials expresses: "Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?" Finally, suffrage is "What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?"

Table A.16: Alternative V-Dem Aggregate Democracy Indices

DV:	Additive polyarchy	Multiplicative polyarchy	Liberal democracy	Liberal component	Participatory democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0185***	0.0132**	0.0129***	0.0184***	0.00960***
	(0.00607)	(0.00541)	(0.00376)	(0.00647)	(0.00258)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00155	0.00640	0.00247	0.00408	0.00354
	(0.00733)	(0.00391)	(0.00358)	(0.00516)	(0.00286)
Territory-years	3,116	3,116	3,046	3,064	3,104
R-squared	0.956	0.958	0.970	0.965	0.975
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A.16, continued

DV:	Participatory component	Deliberative democracy	Deliberative component	Egalitarian democracy	Egalitarian component
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0154***	0.0131***	0.0226**	0.0118***	0.0224***
	(0.00404)	(0.00421)	(0.00875)	(0.00337)	(0.00693)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00937**	0.000176	-0.00325	0.00278	0.00984**
	(0.00426)	(0.00386)	(0.00684)	(0.00306)	(0.00479)
Territory-years	3,122	3,116	3,145	3,091	3,120
R-squared	0.968	0.968	0.957	0.978	0.978
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table A.16 estimates Equation 2 using various V-Dem aggregated democracy indices as the dependent variable. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.17: Disaggregating Democracy

	Panel A. Colonial autonomy				
DV:	Freedom of association	Clean elections	Freedom of expression	Elected officials	Suffrage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.00288	0.0100	0.0117**	0.115***	0.0375*
	(0.00818)	(0.00737)	(0.00549)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.0113*	-0.00505	-0.00440	0.0641***	0.0202
	(0.00607)	(0.00965)	(0.00440)	(0.0216)	(0.0151)
Territory-years	3,145	3,122	3,145	3,105	3,145
R-squared	0.959	0.893	0.967	0.846	0.941
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Panel B. Five years before independence				
DV:	Freedom of association	Clean elections	Freedom of expression	Elected officials	Suffrage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Last 5 colonial years$_{t-1}$	0.0289***	0.0347***	0.0246***	0.131***	0.0711***
	(0.00628)	(0.00921)	(0.00510)	(0.0165)	(0.0147)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.000827	0.00436	0.000894	0.0683***	0.0349**
	(0.00613)	(0.00900)	(0.00441)	(0.0177)	(0.0137)
Territory-years	3,145	3,122	3,145	3,105	3,145
R-squared	0.960	0.894	0.968	0.849	0.943
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table A.17 estimates Equation 2 using each of the five subcomponents of the V-Dem electoral democracy index as the dependent variable, and Panel B replaces colonial autonomy in Equation 2 with the last five years of colonial rule. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every column uses a linear link and includes a lagged dependent variable. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.5 Supporting Information for Varieties of Colonialism

The following details the sources for the different conditioning variables:

- British colonialism: We use a broad definition of British colonies, including territories over which Britain gained control as League of Nations mandates after World War I (e.g., Tanganyika/Tanzania) and exerted minimal internal control (e.g., Kuwait). This is somewhat broader than Lange's (2009) definition of British colonies because he does not include any of Britain's Middle Eastern colonies.
- Length of colonial rule: We use Olsson's (2009) colonial onset and independence data to calculate the length of Western European colonial rule.
- State antiquity: A territory's combined years with government above local level between 0 CE and 1500, with the cutoff year following Hariri (2012). Data from Putterman (2008).
- European settlers: We use logged European population percentage for the closest available data point to the year of independence. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide most of the data points, and Paine (forthcoming) describes the settlers variable in more detail.
- Disrupted colonial rule during World War II: Lawrence (2013) provides this data for French colonies and we coded it ourselves for the other empires.

Tables A.18 through A.23 add interaction terms for various conditioning variables to estimate models of the

form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot Independence_{i,t-1}$$
$$+ \beta_3 \cdot Autonomy_{i,t-1} \cdot C_i + \beta_2 \cdot Independence_{i,t-1} \cdot C_i + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad \text{(A.3)}$$

where C_i is the country-specific conditioning variable. Because the static conditioning variables are perfectly collinear with the unit fixed effects, the models do not contain the lower-order conditioning term. For the three binary conditioning variables, the corresponding regression table provides marginal effect estimates for each of colonial autonomy and independence for both values of the conditioning variable. For the continuous conditioning variables, the table presents marginal effect estimates for the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the variable values.

Table A.18: Varieties of Colonialism: Sub-Saharan Africa

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0130*	-2.820***	0.0737	0.0424**
	(0.00733)	(1.074)	(0.0472)	(0.0163)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*SSA	0.00904		-0.0319	-0.0446**
	(0.00974)		(0.0575)	(0.0173)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00784	-2.920**	0.0141	0.0263*
	(0.00777)	(1.240)	(0.0574)	(0.0146)
Independent$_{t-1}$*SSA	-0.00590	3.375**	0.0552	-0.0206
	(0.00525)	(1.460)	(0.0356)	(0.0151)
Territory-years	3,116	991	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.373	0.120
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | SSA=0	0.0130*	0.330**	0.0737	0.0424**
	(0.00733)	(0.163)	(0.0472)	(0.0163)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | SSA=1	0.0220***		0.0418	-0.00223
	(0.00726)		(0.0535)	(0.00657)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | SSA=0	0.00784	-0.486*	0.0141	0.0263*
	(0.00777)	(0.264)	(0.0574)	(0.0146)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | SSA=1	0.00195	0.00183	0.0692	0.00576
	(0.00529)	(0.00332)	(0.0431)	(0.00645)

Notes: Table A.18 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and Sub-Saharan Africa because this combination perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.19: Varieties of Colonialism: British Colonial Rule

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.00846	-1.492	0.0940**	0.00170
	(0.00535)	(1.546)	(0.0430)	(0.00568)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*British colony	0.0156*		-0.0475	0.0167
	(0.00798)		(0.0445)	(0.0122)
Independent$_{t-1}$	-0.00120	-0.591	0.0251	0.00311
	(0.00531)	(0.759)	(0.0450)	(0.00601)
Independent$_{t-1}$*British colony	0.0132***	0.0307	0.0208	0.0122
	(0.00392)	(1.215)	(0.0438)	(0.00888)
Territory-years	3,116	1,003	830	2,365
R-squared	0.963		0.372	0.118
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | British col.=0	0.00846		0.0940**	0.00170
	(0.00535)		(0.0430)	(0.00568)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | British col.=1	0.0241***	0.00842	0.0465	0.0184
	(0.00684)	(0.0139)	(0.0475)	(0.0112)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | British col.=0	-0.00120	-0.0693	0.0251	0.00311
	(0.00531)	(0.101)	(0.0450)	(0.00601)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | British col.=1	0.0120*	-0.00149	0.0458	0.0153
	(0.00677)	(0.00398)	(0.0510)	(0.00941)

Notes: Table A.19 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and British colonial rule because Autonomy*non-British rule perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on British colonialism=0 is 0.119. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.20: Varieties of Colonialism: Length of Colonial Rule

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0143**	2.501	0.0411	0.0123
	(0.00544)	(2.048)	(0.0671)	(0.0114)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*Length of colonial rule	5.82e-06	-0.0637**	3.24e-05	-1.66e-05
	(3.46e-05)	(0.0290)	(0.000166)	(4.59e-05)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.000955	-0.771	0.0618	0.00902
	(0.00582)	(1.228)	(0.0592)	(0.00856)
Independent$_{t-1}$*Length of colonial rule	1.58e-05	0.00153	-0.000101	-5.82e-06
	(1.63e-05)	(0.00972)	(0.000135)	(3.61e-05)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.117
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Colonial rule=64 years	0.0147***	-7.76e-10	0.0431	0.0113
	(0.00454)	(9.24e-09)	(0.0593)	(0.00912)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Colonial rule=80 years	0.0148***	-6.22e-07	0.0437	0.0110
	(0.00447)	(2.35e-06)	(0.0574)	(0.00860)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Colonial rule=144 years	0.0152***	-0.00525	0.0457	0.00994
	(0.00482)	(0.00479)	(0.0509)	(0.00695)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Colonial rule=64 years	0.00197	-1.94e-10	0.0554	0.00865
	(0.00558)	(3.14e-08)	(0.0537)	(0.00721)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Colonial rule=80 years	0.00222	-4.57e-08	0.0537	0.00855
	(0.00554)	(1.60e-07)	(0.0524)	(0.00695)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Colonial rule=144 years	0.00323	-0.00222	0.0473	0.00818
	(0.00553)	(0.00431)	(0.0481)	(0.00635)

Notes: Table A.20 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.21: Varieties of Colonialism: State Antiquity

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0147**	-8.365***	0.0770	0.0105
	(0.00623)	(2.005)	(0.0476)	(0.00919)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*State antiquity	0.00170	8.264***	-0.202*	0.00108
	(0.0188)	(2.769)	(0.101)	(0.0226)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00305	0.0543	0.0651	0.00443
	(0.00571)	(0.926)	(0.0463)	(0.00662)
Independent$_{t-1}$*State antiquity	-0.000173	-2.161	-0.0716	0.0261*
	(0.00710)	(1.722)	(0.0529)	(0.0137)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.373	0.118
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | State antiquity=0	0.0147**	-0.00345	0.0770	0.0105
	(0.00623)	(0.00354)	(0.0476)	(0.00919)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | State antiquity=0.11	0.0148***	-0.00697	0.0548	0.0106
	(0.00512)	(0.00616)	(0.0435)	(0.00750)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | State antiquity=0.56	0.0156*	-0.109	-0.0364	0.0111
	(0.00802)	(0.0690)	(0.0539)	(0.00838)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | State antiquity=0	0.00305	0.000192	0.0651	0.00443
	(0.00571)	(0.00319)	(0.0463)	(0.00662)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | State antiquity=0.11	0.00303	-0.00116	0.0572	0.00731
	(0.00557)	(0.00566)	(0.0459)	(0.00626)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | State antiquity=0.56	0.00295	-0.0740	0.0250	0.0191**
	(0.00610)	(0.0724)	(0.0517)	(0.00820)

Notes: Table A.21 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.22: Varieties of Colonialism: European Settlers

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0171**	-39.40***	0.0560	0.00112
	(0.00690)	(4.724)	(0.0458)	(0.00662)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.00143	-8.303***	0.00751	-0.00445*
	(0.00211)	(1.195)	(0.0125)	(0.00261)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00553	-0.938	0.0480	0.00777
	(0.00566)	(1.057)	(0.0425)	(0.00706)
Independent$_{t-1}$*ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.00154	-0.131	0.00276	-0.000332
	(0.00119)	(0.303)	(0.00678)	(0.00220)
Territory-years	3,116	1,023	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.118
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Eu. pop. %=0.0%	0.0106	-0.0620	0.0214	0.0216*
	(0.00681)	(0.0751)	(0.0610)	(0.0115)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Eu. pop. %=0.1%	0.0140***	-0.0331	0.0395	0.0110
	(0.00484)	(0.0215)	(0.0453)	(0.00704)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Eu. pop. %=0.9%	0.0169**	-0.0129	0.0549	0.00179
	(0.00668)	(0.0119)	(0.0453)	(0.00649)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Eu. pop. %=0.0%	-0.00156	-0.0250	0.0353	0.00930
	(0.00695)	(0.0759)	(0.0562)	(0.00938)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Eu. pop. %=0.1%	0.00213	-0.0155	0.0419	0.00850
	(0.00569)	(0.0212)	(0.0470)	(0.00652)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Eu. pop. %=0.9%	0.00530	-0.00772	0.0475	0.00782
	(0.00563)	(0.0120)	(0.0426)	(0.00691)

Notes: Table A.22 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on Eu. pop. % = 0.0% is 0.126. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

Table A.23: Varieties of Colonialism: Disrupted Colonial Rule During WWII

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0183***	-2.276**	0.0569	0.00732
	(0.00575)	(1.081)	(0.0462)	(0.00809)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*WWII disruption	-0.0133*		-0.0557	0.0124
	(0.00756)		(0.0387)	(0.0115)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00367	0.392	0.0519	0.00361
	(0.00581)	(1.006)	(0.0473)	(0.00662)
Independent$_{t-1}$*WWII disruption	-0.00233	-2.434*	-0.0749**	0.0251**
	(0.00354)	(1.363)	(0.0354)	(0.0105)
Territory-years	3,116	989	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.120
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | WWII disruption=0	0.0183***		0.0569	0.00732
	(0.00575)		(0.0462)	(0.00809)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | WWII disruption=1	0.00500	0.240	0.00119	0.0198**
	(0.00618)	(0.176)	(0.0332)	(0.00865)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | WWII disruption=0	0.00367	0.00165	0.0519	0.00361
	(0.00581)	(0.00355)	(0.0473)	(0.00662)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | WWII disruption=1	0.00135	-0.394*	-0.0229	0.0287***
	(0.00579)	(0.226)	(0.0457)	(0.0101)

Notes: Table A.23 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and British colonial rule because Autonomy*non-disruption perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. The p-value in Column 1 for colonial autonomy conditional on WWII disruption=0 is 0.421. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.6 Supporting Information for Endogeneity of Independence Timing

***Sample for Panel B of Table 3*:** The 14 French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.

***Sample for Panel C of Table 3*:** The regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The 16 minor colonies are as follows, with the major colony in parentheses: Morocco and Tunisia (Algeria), Burundi and Rwanda (DRC), Gambia and Sierra Leone (Ghana/Nigeria), Bhutan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka (India), Cambodia and Laos (Vietnam), and Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia (Zimbabwe). Pakistan is excluded because it did not exist as a separate colony until just prior to independence. We did not separately code which French Sub-Saharan African countries met the minor colony definition, and none of these are included in Panel C.

A.7 Decolonization Wars and Guerrilla Regimes

Another strategy for addressing endogeneity is to separate out the colonies that generate the starkest concerns about endogenous independence timing: countries in which a guerrilla regime inherited the state at independence following a major decolonization war. In these colonies, we are nearly certain that conflict influenced the timing of decolonization, since the colonial regime was forced to cede control to its previous opponents, often after a period of military stalemate or failure. In the eight countries in our sample for which that happened, independence was essentially an exercise in military surrender rather than in constitutional transfer. Table A.24 shows that the positive relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy remains among non-guerrilla countries. Unsurprisingly, there is no relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy for the guerrilla regimes. The body of the article discussed how major decolonization wars usually prevented colonizers from granting autonomy. In Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, colonial autonomy preceded the major liberation war, and we would not expect autonomy to promote democracy here because colonial autonomy was exclusive to whites and contributed to the decolonization struggle. Autonomy in Indonesia in the 1940s and in Vietnam in the 1950s represented late attempts to mitigate violence, making

democratic gains unlikely because autonomy reacted to violence.

Table A.24: Guerrilla Takeover at Independence

DV:	Democracy level	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth	ln(Income/pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$	0.0174***	-1.307	0.0473	0.0119
	(0.00522)	(0.900)	(0.0485)	(0.00776)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$*Guerrilla regime	-0.0183**		-0.00201	-0.0157
	(0.00752)		(0.0464)	(0.0138)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00367	-0.452	0.0435	0.00960
	(0.00585)	(0.754)	(0.0462)	(0.00658)
Independent$_{t-1}$*Guerrilla regime	-0.00334	-1.582	-0.0627***	-0.00740
	(0.00465)	(2.049)	(0.0200)	(0.0119)
Territory-years	3,116	1,000	830	2,365
R-squared	0.962		0.372	0.117
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Guerrilla=0	0.0174***	0.0422	0.0473	0.0119
	(0.00522)	(0.0576)	(0.0485)	(0.00776)
Colonial autonomy$_{t-1}$ | Guerrilla=1	-0.000886		0.0453*	-0.00372
	(0.00613)		(0.0233)	(0.0112)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Guerrilla=0	0.00367	-0.00626	0.0435	0.00960
	(0.00585)	(0.0131)	(0.0462)	(0.00658)
Independent$_{t-1}$ | Guerrilla=1	0.000327	-0.364	-0.0192	0.00220
	(0.00564)	(0.447)	(0.0438)	(0.0119)

Notes: Table A.24 estimates Equation A.3 using the same sample as Table 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. The bottom of the table presents marginal effect estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. Column 2 omits the interaction between colonial autonomy and guerrilla regimes because this combination perfectly predicts no war, and country-years that equal 1 on that interaction are dropped. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

A.8 Comparing Post-Independence to the "High" Colonial Period

The main results compare independent countries to the colonial counterfactual generated by post-1945 colonial rule. However, some theories suggest the effects of colonialism differed during the "high" colonial period between roughly 1919 and 1945. These decades are widely considered to have provided a brief period of relatively consolidated colonial rule (Abernethy, 2000, 104-132). Despite our lack of evidence that independence produced considerably different outcomes than late colonial rule, perhaps post-independence outcomes diverged from those during the high colonial period. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced no new internal wars between 1919 and 1945, though it was quite conflict-prone before and after.

Unfortunately, we cannot compare post-independence to the high colonial counterfactual using a two-way fixed effects strategy because very few countries gained independence between 1919 and 1945 (only Egypt and Iraq). This makes it impossible to distinguish the effect of high colonial rule from global trends—e.g., after-effects of World War I, the global depression, and World War II—and therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that international trends unrelated to colonialism influenced any differences in outcomes. Econometrically, collinearity disables estimating year fixed effects in models that compare post-independence to pre-1945 colonialism, and even a time trend variable would be uninformative because of the lack of overlap between the pre- and post-periods in these regressions.

Caveats aside, Table A.25 estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years (although uses the same country sample as Table 2). The table presents suggestive evidence that post-independence differences are stronger when comparing to this earlier period. Independent countries have been considerably more likely to fight internal wars than were territories in the high colonial period. Despite the small size of most colonial militaries, it appears that they were largely successful at keeping the peace in these early years before nationalism swept across the globe. Therefore, although colonial transitions may have been particularly violent (Wimmer and Min 2006), the period in between the world wars was not.

By contrast, post-independence outperforms high colonialism when analyzing revenues and democracy. Despite Young's (1994) characterization of strong *bula mutari* colonial fiscal regimes, Table A.25 shows instead that post-independence regimes have more effectively raised revenues. The post-independence pe-

riod has also been more democratic than the high colonial period.[9] Despite democratic shortcomings in the post-colonial world, Mamdani's (1996) discussion of the despotism of the colonial era finds some support when focusing on this earlier colonial period.

However, once again, we cannot exclude the possibility that global trends unrelated to colonialism drive any of these results. Furthermore, sparse income data prior to 1945 makes it impossible to run the income regressions.

Table A.25: Changing the Counterfactual: Post-Independence vs. High Colonial Period

DV:	Democracy level (first difference)	Internal war onset	ln(Rev./pop.) growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent$_{t-1}$	0.00477**	1.305**	0.0619***
	(0.00219)	(0.512)	(0.0202)
Territory-years	3,542	1,587	996
R-squared	0.030		0.039
Territory FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	NO	NO	NO
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table A.25 estimates Equation 1 but uses a different sample that contains (1) colonized years between 1919 and 1945 and (2) post-independence years. Therefore, because the models include an indicator for post-independence, the omitted basis category is colonized years between 1919 and 1945. Every model contains territory fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1 and 3 use a linear link and include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 uses a logit link, and contains a lagged internal war incidence variable, peace years, and cubic splines. $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

[9]Column 1 uses the first-difference in democracy levels rather than democracy level. This is because the unit-root tests failed to reject the null of non-stationarity for level, but did reject this null for the first-difference. The results of the unit root tests differ from those for Table 2 because of the absence of year fixed effects in the Table A.25 regressions, in addition to a different sample.

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