Supplementary Material for: Separate but Unequal: Ethnocentrism and Racialization Explain the "Democratic" Peace in Public Opinion

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A1 Reanalyses of Previous Studies

As described in the main text, we supplement our original analyses with reanalyses of past studies. Specifically, we consider whether ethnocentrism moderates the treatment effect of democracy in past survey experiments on the democratic peace. If ethnocultural chauvinism drives the democratic peace, then respondents higher in ethnocentrism should disproportionately drive the treatment effect of "democracy" in past research. Here, we report the details of reanalyses of two pioneering studies of the democratic peace in public opinion. Tomz and Weeks (2013) and Johns and Davies (2012) present widely-cited survey experimental evidence that the U.S. and British publics are more pacific towards hypothetical democracies than nondemocracies. Importantly, these studies included measures of respondents' racial views and ethnocentric tendencies, measures that did not substantially factor into the original reporting of the studies' findings. This section brings those tendencies to the forefront, with the expectation that ethnocentrism drives the pacifying effect of joint democracy.

A1.1 Johns and Davies (2012)

We first reanalyze a prominent survey fielded by Johns and Davies (2012) in the United Kingdom on a sample of 1,035 British adults recruited by YouGov between January-February, 2010.[1] Respondents were given the following information:

> Today the British government has presented evidence to the United Nations that Country A has been developing a secret nuclear weapons program which it intends to use against its neighbors in the region. The government is making the case for air strikes against factories associated with this program. Professor Andrew Lincoln, a leading expert on military strategy, has estimated that the planned British air strikes would result in the deaths of around **[one hundred civilians / three thousand civilians / sentence omitted]**. The **[democratically-elected President / unelected dictator]** of Country A, a predominantly **[Christian / Islamic]** country of around 20 million people, has strenuously denied the British government's allegations.

Although the prompt also randomized casualties and religion, we are interested in the regime type randomization (namely a democratically-elected President versus an unelected dictator). Following the prompt, respondents were asked: "On a scale from 0 (strongly oppose) to 6 (strongly support), how do you feel about British air strikes in this case?" We retain this DV on a numeric scale (as in the original paper), where higher values indicate a pacifying effect of democracy. The primary finding was that respondents were *less likely to strike a hypothetical democracy* (ATE $= -6.3$, $p < .05$).

Furthermore, Johns and Davies included the following self-report measures of ethnocentrism, gathered on five-point scales from "disagree strongly" to "agree strongly":

- I am not really interested in the customs and values of other countries.
- Allowing immigrants into Britain enriches British culture (rc).
- Most asylum seekers who come to Britain should be sent home immediately.

The first item derives from the generalized ethnocentrism scale (Neuliep and McCroskey, 1997). The second and third relate to immigration, an issue that strongly correlates with measures of ethnocentrism, much more so than issues such as foreign aid, protectionism, and anti-terrorism (Bizumic, Monaghan

[1] Note that Johns and Davies also recruited a first wave of British adults but the first wave did not include our required ethnocentrism questions. Thus, we reanalyze the second wave.



Figure A1: *Johns and Davies (2012) Reanalysis: Ethnocentrism Moderates the Democratic Peace Effect.* Ethnocentrism and regime type assignment display a negative interaction ($p = .013$) such that individuals are less likely to strike democracies at increasing levels of ethnocentrism. $N = 1{,}021$. Table A1 presents the full model results.

and Priest, 2021). We reduce the items to single-dimensional factor scores, but the results below are robust to additive representation.[2]

If ethnocentrism drives the democratic peace in public opinion, then ethnocentrism should moderate the treatment effect of democracy. Figure A1 displays the relationship between support for strikes and the interaction between observed ethnocentrism and randomized regime type. The results are striking. Although individuals higher in ethnocentrism are more likely to prefer aggression on average, they are significantly less likely to support the use of force against democracies in particular (coef $= -0.34$, $p = .015$).[3] At lower levels of ethnocentrism, there is no statistical difference in support by regime type. This moderation effect indicates substantial treatment heterogeneity, with ethnocentrism explaining the pacifying effect of democracy.

Furthermore, we split respondents at the ethnocentrism median to estimate conditional average treatment effects. We find that respondents below the ethnocentrism median do not significantly differentiate between democracies and nondemocracies (coef $= -.88$, $p = 0.18$). By contrast, subjects above the median are less likely to support strikes against democracies, albeit only at the $\alpha = .10$ level (coef $= -0.40$, $p = .087$).

A1.1.1 Full Regression Results

Table A1 presents the full regression results for Figure A1.[4] Again, the interaction term shows that ethnocentrism significantly moderates the treatment effect of democracy. See Johns and Davies (2012) for a full description of the various regression variables.

[2] Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.78$, SS loadings $= 1.68$.

[3] The results are also robust to dichotomization of the DV.

[4] We generate all tables using the `texreg` package (Leifeld, 2013) in the R statistical computing environment (R Core Team, 2021).

Table A1: Johns and Davies Reanalysis: Ethnocentrism Moderates Democracy's Treatment Effect

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike
(Intercept)	3.66^{***}
	(0.73)
Democracy	-1.49^{*}
	(0.74)
Christian	-0.14
	(0.10)
Casualties (=100)	-0.05
	(0.12)
Casualties (=3000)	-0.22
	(0.12)
Social Dominance	-0.06
	(0.07)
Ethnocentrism	-0.24^{***}
	(0.05)
Nationalism	0.21
	(0.13)
Authoritarian	-0.33^{**}
	(0.10)
gender	-0.04
	(0.12)
ConID	-0.06
	(0.17)
LibID	-0.12
	(0.13)
milpac	-0.37^{**}
	(0.14)
Age 65+	0.39^{***}
	(0.10)
Democracy x Ethnocentrism	-0.34^{*}
	(0.14)
Democracy x Authoritarian	0.33
	(0.18)
Democracy x Social Dominance	0.01
	(0.10)
R^2	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.11
Num. obs.	1021

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

A1.1.2 Lack of Interaction with Other Individual Differences

Finally, we show that the moderating effect of ethnocentrism is unique. As our argument hinges on the presence of a heterogeneous treatment effect based on individual-level differences not susceptible to experimental treatment, this raises the possibility of omitted variable bias. Perhaps it is a construct related to ethnocentrism that actually drives the pattern of results. The Johns and Davies survey includes measures of two strong candidates: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO).

Authoritarianism was measured with the following items on a five-point (dis)agree scale:

- People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences
- Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values
- People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives (rc)
- People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government (rc)

Social dominance was captured using the following items on a five-point (dis)agree scale:

- We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally (rc)

- It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others
- Some people are just more deserving than others.

Figure A2 displays the interaction between SDO and the democracy treatment, whereas Figure A3 displays the interaction between RWA and the democracy treatment. We find that neither variable interacts with the democracy treatment at the $\alpha = .05$ level (see also Table A1). The lack of interaction of these traits with the democracy treatment suggests that neither trait accounts for the pattern of results we see. RWA actually works in the opposite direction. It is those low, not high, in authoritarianism who indicate a greater reluctance to use force against democracies. High authoritarians do not distinguish by targets. All of this indicates that ethnocentrism moderates the democratic peace effect in this sample of the British public.



Figure A2: *Johns and Davies Social Dominance Orientation Moderation.* Table A1 presents the full model results.



Figure A3: *Johns and Davies Right Wing Authoritarianism Moderation.* Table A1 presents the full model results.

A1.2 Tomz and Weeks (2013)

Does ethnocentrism explain the "democratic" peace in another established democracy? While many countries have a troubled history with race, the UK results could be an outlier for multiple reasons. Therefore, we reanalyze a second prominent survey fielded by Tomz and Weeks (2013) on a sample of 1,273 American adults recruited by YouGov in October-December, 2010.[5] The study first introduced respondents to the issue of nuclear proliferation, followed by experimental interventions through bullet-point descriptions of the situation and proliferating country:

- A country is developing nuclear weapons and will have its first nuclear bomb within six months. The country could then use its missiles to launch nuclear attacks against any country in the world.
- The country **[has / has not]** signed a military alliance with the United States.
- The country **[has / does not have]** high levels of trade with the United States.
- The country **[is a democracy and shows every sign that it will remain a democracy / is not a democracy and shows no sign of becoming a democracy]**.
- The country's nonnuclear military forces are half as strong as U.S. nonnuclear forces.
- The country's motives remain unclear, but if it builds nuclear weapons, it will have the power to blackmail or destroy other countries.
- The country has refused all requests to stop its nuclear weapons program.

Note that although alliance status and trade levels were randomized, we are again interested in the regime type factor. Following treatment, subjects responded to the primary DV:

> By attacking the country's nuclear development sites now, the United States could prevent the country from making any nuclear weapons. Would you favor or oppose using the U.S. military to attack the country's nuclear development sites?

Responses were gathered on a five point scale from "favor strongly" (=1) to "oppose strongly" (=5), where higher values in the democracy condition indicate a negative, pacifying effect of democracy on support for a strike. Following Tomz and Weeks, we use the dichotomized version of the DV, with "favor strongly" and "favor somewhat" coded as 1, and 0 otherwise.[6] The key finding from this study is that respondents were *less likely to support strikes against a fellow democracy* (ATE $= -11.4$, 95% CI$[-17.0, -5.9]$).

Furthermore, Tomz and Weeks fielded items described as measures of "ethnocentrism" in the paper's supplementary appendix, which provide a useful (albeit coarse) test of our expectations. First, respondents were asked: "What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?," with the following items:

- Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes (rc).
- Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.
- Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally.

[5] Although Tomz and Weeks (2013) also fielded a survey in the United Kingdom, we focus on the U.S. survey because the former did not include ethnocentrism questions.

[6] See, e.g., p. 858, Table 5.

Choices were gathered as yes/no dichotomous responses, scaled such that larger values indicate greater ethnocentrism.[7] As mentioned above, prior research suggests that ethnocentrism correlates more strongly with attitudes towards immigration than other policy issues.

Further, a second question probed legacies of discrimination with the following: "Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities in employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action?" Responses were gathered on a four-point scale from "strongly support" to "strongly oppose." We use factor analysis to reduce all responses down to a single ethnocentrism dimension, but the results below are robust to additive representation.[8]

If ethnocentrism drives the democratic peace effect, as our Johns and Davies reanalysis indicates, then we should again find a negative interaction between ethnocentrism and the regime type treatment. Figure A4 displays these moderation results. Just as we found in the UK sample above, ethnocentrism in this U.S. sample displays a negative, significant interaction with democracy: individuals are less likely to strike democracies than nondemocracies at higher levels of ethnocentrism (coef $= -0.32$, $p = .032$).[9] At lower levels of ethnocentrism, respondents *do not* discriminate between democracies and nondemocracies. By contrast, respondents at the highest level of ethnocentrism express 18.1% greater support for strikes against nondemocracies, a substantively large difference.



Figure A4: *Tomz and Weeks (2013) Reanalysis: Ethnocentrism Moderates the Democratic Peace Effect.* Ethnocentrism and regime type assignment display a negative interaction ($p = .032$) such that individuals are less likely to strike democracies at increasing levels of ethnocentrism. $N = 1{,}266$. Table A2, column 2 presents the full model results.

Furthermore, we again estimate conditional average treatment effects by splitting respondents at the ethnocentrism median. Respondents above the median entirely explain democracy's effect (interaction coef $= -0.53$, $p = .033$). By contrast, the ATE for subjects at or below the ethnocentrism median is statistically indistinguishable from zero (coef $= -0.19$, $p = 0.28$).

[7] The wording of these questions appears to come from the Cooperative Election Study. For more details on the CES, see: http:/dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/24416.

[8] Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.68$, SS loadings $= 1.67$.

[9] This result is robust to the full, five-point Likert scale, though the p-value on the interaction between ethnocentrism and democracy slightly increases to $p = .057$.

Table A2: Tomz and Weeks Reanalysis: Ethnocentrism Moderates Democracy's Treatment Effect

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	−0.24	−0.25	−0.35
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Democracy	−0.47***	−0.45***	−0.28
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.24)
Ally	−0.29*	−0.28*	−0.29*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Trading Partner	−0.22	−0.21	−0.21
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Male	0.23	0.22	0.23
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
White	−0.25	−0.25	−0.24
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
College	−0.23	−0.24	−0.23
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Hawkishness	1.08***	1.07***	1.21***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.21)
Ethnocentrism	0.59***	0.77***	0.59***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Democracy × Ethnocentrism		−0.32*	
		(0.15)	
Democracy × Hawkishness			−0.26
			(0.28)
AIC	1540.09	1537.49	1541.25
BIC	1591.53	1594.07	1597.83
Log Likelihood	−760.05	−757.74	−759.62
Deviance	1520.09	1515.49	1519.25
Num. obs.	1266	1266	1266

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

A1.2.1 Full Regression Results and Comparison to Hawkishness

Table A2 presents the full logistic regressions for the moderation effect reported in Figure A4. Although model 1 shows that ethnocentrism generally explains more aggressive responses, model 2 shows that respondents higher in ethnocentrism are significantly less likely to support the use of force against *democracies* in particular, evidenced by the negative interaction. For a sense of the theoretical importance of this finding, model 3 shows a lack of interaction between the democracy condition and foreign policy hawkishness. In fact, ethnocentric respondents settle at more aggressive positions towards nondemocracies than do hawks, striking given that hawkishness is the best-established predictor of aggression in the foreign policy opinion literature. That is, just as we found with RWA and SDO in the Johns and Davies (2012) analysis above, ethnocentrism does unique explanatory work in the case of the "democratic" peace. All of the above suggests strong treatment heterogeneity. Democracy matters but only at increasing levels of ethnocentrism, noteworthy given that ethnocentrism should play no role in the democratic peace in theory. See Tomz and Weeks (2013) for a full description of the other regression variables.

A1.2.2 Within-Subjects Results

In addition to the moderation analysis, Tomz and Weeks (2013) successfully recruited approximately 1,000 subjects in the original wave to complete a second survey wave. In the survey's second wave, subjects were assigned to the opposite regime type as in the first wave, thus producing a within-subjects design that yielded a similar treatment effect (ATE $= -11.5$, 95% CI$[-14.7, -8.3]$). These data are



Figure A5: *Tomz and Weeks Panel Reanalysis: Ethnocentrism Explains Democratic Peace Tendencies.* Individuals higher in ethnocentrism are much more likely to display a combination of restraint towards democracies and support for the use of force against nondemocracies in the same scenario, relative to individuals lower in ethnocentrism. $N = 998$. Table A3 displays the full model results.

valuable because, rather than estimate a moderation effect as above, we can simply model whether subjects display democratic peace tendencies – that is, we assign a 1 to subjects who refused to strike democracies but chose to strike nondemocracies, 0 otherwise. We use logistic regression to model these democratic peace tendencies (the dependent variable) as a function of the same ethnocentric views described above (the independent variable). Figure A5 displays the results. The figure shows further evidence that ethnocentrism strongly explains democratic peace tendencies, an approximately two and a half-fold increase in democratic peace tendencies when moving from the lowest to highest end of the ethnocentrism scale (coef $= 0.40$, $p < .001$).

Table A3: Tomz and Weeks Panel Reanalysis: Ethnocentrism Explains Democratic Peace Tendencies

	Model 1
(Intercept)	-1.93^{***}
	(0.33)
Alliance Treatment	0.22
	(0.16)
Trade Treatment	0.45^{**}
	(0.16)
Male	0.24
	(0.17)
Age	-0.00
	(0.01)
Ethnocentrism	0.40^{***}
	(0.10)
AIC	972.38
BIC	1001.81
Log Likelihood	-480.19
Deviance	960.38
Num. obs.	998

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Democratic peace tendencies serve as the dependent variable, namely a 1 if the subject supported a strike against a nondemocracy *and* no strike against a democracy, 0 others.

A2 Original Survey Experiments

A2.1 Survey 1: Qualtrics Sample

A2.1.1 Sample Characteristics

Figure A6 displays the demographic profile for the Qualtrics sample. Figure A7 displays the distribution of the factor-reduced and raw additive ethnocentrism scores for our Qualtrics sample.



Figure A6: *Qualtrics Sample Characteristics.*

A2.1.2 Full Regression Results

Figure 2 of the main text presents coefficients for the paper's primary estimates using the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework, including the average treatment effect of democracy (relative to nondemocracy), the average controlled direct effect of democracy fixing the country to white versus nonwhite, and the amount of democracy's treatment effect eliminated by fixing those racial characteristics. Table A4 presents the results from the OLS models with robust standard errors used to estimate those effects. Further, Table A5 presents the same results for subjects above the ethnocentrism median, whereas Table A6 displays the results for subjects at or below the ethnocentrism median.



Figure A7: *Qualtrics Sample – Distribution of Ethnocentrism Scores.*

Table A4: Estimation of Experimental Results (Full Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.05*	3.80*	3.90*
	[3.85; 4.25]	[3.59; 4.02]	[3.70; 4.10]
Effect of Democracy	−0.31*	−0.31*	−0.19
	[−0.59; −0.03]	[−0.61; −0.01]	[−0.48; 0.09]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.24	0.15
		[−0.05; 0.53]	[−0.13; 0.43]
Eliminated Effect		−0.00	−0.12
		[−0.41; 0.40]	[−0.52; 0.28]
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.00
Num. obs.	539	1086	1079
RMSE	1.65	1.71	1.68

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Finally, the key results from our Qualtrics survey are that subjects above the ethnocentrism median drive the treatment effect of democracy, and the provision of nonwhite information entirely eliminates the democratic peace effect for these respondents. Figure A8 shows that these results are robust to inclusion of standard individual covariates in the regression models, namely gender (male versus non-male), race (white versus nonwhite identifying), party ID (higher values = more Republican), political ideology (higher values = more conservative), education (no college degree versus bachelor's degree or higher), and age (an increasing numeric value). Further, Tables A7, A8, and A9 present the full tables of results associated with these estimates for the full sample, high ethnocentrism subset, and low ethnocentrism subset, respectively. Confidence intervals are estimated at the 95% level.

Table A5: Estimation of Experimental Results (Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.37*	3.94*	3.91*
	[4.08; 4.65]	[3.66; 4.22]	[3.64; 4.18]
Effect of Democracy	−0.52*	−0.24	0.12
	[−0.92; −0.12]	[−0.66; 0.18]	[−0.26; 0.51]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.43*	0.46*
		[0.03; 0.83]	[0.07; 0.85]
Eliminated Effect		−0.28	−0.65*
		[−0.86; 0.30]	[−1.20; −0.09]
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	274	549	534
RMSE	1.67	1.72	1.63

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Table A6: Estimation of Experimental Results (Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.71*	3.64*	3.89*
	[3.44; 3.99]	[3.32; 3.96]	[3.61; 4.18]
Effect of Democracy	−0.09	−0.31	−0.51*
	[−0.47; 0.30]	[−0.73; 0.12]	[−0.93; −0.09]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.07	−0.18
		[−0.35; 0.49]	[−0.57; 0.22]
Eliminated Effect		0.22	0.42
		[−0.35; 0.79]	[−0.15; 0.99]
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	265	537	545
RMSE	1.59	1.68	1.69

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

A2.1.3 Comparison to Other Individual Differences

The results in Figure 2 of the main text use a median split to show that respondents higher in ethnocentrism tend to drive democracy's treatment effect. Here, we show that the treatment effect does not substantially differ for other potential predictors of intergroup aggression, including militant internationalism, SDO, RWA, and ideological conservatism. Table A10 reports estimates of democracy's treatment effect for individuals above the median on each of these individual differences. We find a striking lack of heterogenous effect for these other differences. Furthermore, the final column shows that individuals above the racial resentment median do show a significant treatment effect for democracy. However, racial resentment does not significantly interact with the eliminated effect. We do not display

Table A7: Estimation of Experimental Results Including Demographic Covariates (Full Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.38*	3.79*	3.99*
	[3.74; 5.03]	[3.33; 4.25]	[3.53; 4.45]
Effect of Democracy	−0.31*	−0.28	−0.22
	[−0.58; −0.03]	[−0.58; 0.01]	[−0.50; 0.07]
Male	0.26	0.19	0.32*
	[−0.03; 0.55]	[−0.02; 0.40]	[0.11; 0.52]
White	0.16	0.06	0.14
	[−0.21; 0.52]	[−0.20; 0.31]	[−0.11; 0.39]
Republican	−0.02	0.02	0.08*
	[−0.12; 0.09]	[−0.06; 0.09]	[0.01; 0.15]
Conservative	0.06	0.04	0.01
	[−0.07; 0.19]	[−0.05; 0.13]	[−0.08; 0.10]
Less than College	0.09	0.20	0.14
	[−0.23; 0.42]	[−0.03; 0.43]	[−0.09; 0.36]
Age	−0.02*	−0.01*	−0.01*
	[−0.02; −0.01]	[−0.02; −0.00]	[−0.02; −0.01]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.26	0.15
		[−0.03; 0.55]	[−0.13; 0.43]
Eliminated Effect		−0.03	−0.08
		[−0.43; 0.38]	[−0.48; 0.31]
R^2	0.04	0.03	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.03
Num. obs.	539	1086	1079
RMSE	1.64	1.70	1.65

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table A8: Estimation of Experimental Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	5.38*	4.30*	4.38*
	[4.49; 6.28]	[3.66; 4.93]	[3.73; 5.03]
Effect of Democracy	−0.52*	−0.24	0.08
	[−0.92; −0.13]	[−0.67; 0.18]	[−0.30; 0.46]
Male	0.00	0.04	0.30*
	[−0.42; 0.42]	[−0.25; 0.34]	[0.01; 0.59]
White	0.55*	0.19	0.29
	[0.01; 1.08]	[−0.17; 0.55]	[−0.06; 0.65]
Republican	−0.04	0.01	0.03
	[−0.18; 0.11]	[−0.09; 0.11]	[−0.07; 0.13]
Conservative	−0.00	−0.05	−0.01
	[−0.19; 0.19]	[−0.18; 0.07]	[−0.14; 0.12]
Less than College	−0.10	0.20	−0.12
	[−0.62; 0.41]	[−0.15; 0.55]	[−0.47; 0.23]
Age	−0.02*	−0.01	−0.02*
	[−0.04; −0.01]	[−0.02; 0.00]	[−0.02; −0.01]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.45*	0.45*
		[0.05; 0.85]	[0.06; 0.84]
Eliminated Effect		−0.29	−0.63*
		[−0.87; 0.29]	[−1.18; −0.09]
R^2	0.08	0.03	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.02	0.04
Num. obs.	274	549	534
RMSE	1.64	1.72	1.61

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.



Figure A8: *Qualtrics Sample – Ethnocentrism Drives the "Democratic" Peace Effect.* Results from our replication and extension of Tomz and Weeks (2013) within Acharya, Blackwell and Sen's (2018) causal mechanisms framework. The models report the same estimates as figure 2 of the main text but include standard demographic covariates. Tables A7-A9 present these results numerically.

the full table here given the verbosity of estimating interaction models for each of these individual differences (which amount to three-way interactions for each of these six traits), but we do note that whereas median split ethnocentrism strongly interacts with the effect of democracy eliminated by nonwhite (coef $= -1.06$, $p < .01$), we find no meaningful interaction between the eliminated effect and militant internationalism (coef = 0.29, $p = .48$), social dominance orientation (coef = 0.48, $p = .25$), right wing authoritarianism (coef = -0.07, $p = .87$), conservative political ideology (coef $= -0.20$, $p = .64$), and racial resentment (coef = 0.11, $p = .79$).

A2.2 Survey 2: Prolific Sample

A2.2.1 Sample Characteristics

Figure A9 displays the demographic profile of our sample recruited from Prolific. Figure A10 displays the distribution of the factor-reduced and raw additive ethnocentrism scores for our Prolific sample.

A2.2.2 Full Regression Results

Figure 3 of the main text presents coefficients for the paper's primary estimates using the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework. Table A11 presents the results from the OLS models with robust standard errors used to estimate those effects. Further, Table A12 presents the same results for subjects above the ethnocentrism median, whereas Table A13 displays the results for subjects at or below the ethnocentrism median.

Finally, Figure A11 shows that the results from Figure 3 of the main text are robust to inclusion of standard individual covariates in the regression models, namely gender (male versus nonmale), race (white versus nonwhite identifying), party ID (higher values = more Republican), political ideology (higher values = more conservative), education (no college degree versus bachelor's degree or higher), and age (an increasing numeric value). Further, Tables A14, A15, and A16 present the full tables of results associated with these estimates for the full sample, high ethnocentrism subset, and low ethnocentrism subset, respectively. Confidence intervals are estimated at the 95% level.

Table A9: Estimation of Experimental Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.38*	3.27*	3.66*
	[2.52; 4.24]	[2.60; 3.94]	[3.01; 4.31]
Effect of Democracy	−0.04	−0.27	−0.55*
	[−0.42; 0.34]	[−0.69; 0.15]	[−0.96; −0.14]
Male	0.44*	0.30*	0.33*
	[0.04; 0.85]	[0.00; 0.59]	[0.03; 0.63]
White	−0.05	0.04	0.05
	[−0.55; 0.44]	[−0.33; 0.41]	[−0.31; 0.41]
Republican	0.01	−0.01	0.16*
	[−0.13; 0.16]	[−0.12; 0.10]	[0.05; 0.27]
Conservative	0.05	0.13*	−0.05
	[−0.12; 0.23]	[0.00; 0.26]	[−0.18; 0.08]
Less than College	0.22	0.15	0.30
	[−0.22; 0.66]	[−0.18; 0.48]	[−0.02; 0.61]
Age	−0.00	−0.01	−0.01*
	[−0.02; 0.01]	[−0.02; 0.00]	[−0.02; −0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.10	−0.18
		[−0.32; 0.51]	[−0.56; 0.21]
Eliminated Effect		0.23	0.52
		[−0.34; 0.80]	[−0.04; 1.08]
R^2	0.02	0.04	0.05
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.02	0.04
Num. obs.	265	537	545
RMSE	1.59	1.67	1.67

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table A10: Estimation of Experimental Results (Respondents Above Median for Other Individual Differences)

	Ethnocentrism	Militant Internationalism	SDO	RWA	Conservative	Racial Resentment
(Intercept)	4.37*	4.59*	4.25*	4.33*	4.02*	4.21*
	[4.08; 4.65]	[4.28; 4.90]	[3.94; 4.57]	[4.02; 4.65]	[3.68; 4.36]	[3.93; 4.48]
Effect of Democracy	−0.52*	−0.30	−0.23	−0.44	−0.18	−0.50*
	[−0.92; −0.12]	[−0.72; 0.12]	[−0.67; 0.22]	[−0.89; 0.01]	[−0.67; 0.31]	[−0.89; −0.11]
R^2	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.02
Num. obs.	274	254	215	252	194	267
RMSE	1.67	1.70	1.66	1.81	1.73	1.63

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. The dependent variable is support for strike. Here, we re-estimate the treatment effect of democracy by alternative measures of individual differences (the column names). For example, individuals high (i.e., above the median) in militant internationalism are no more or less likely to support strikes against democracies relative to nondemocracies (a null effect of −0.30).



Figure A9: *Prolific Sample Characteristics.*



Figure A10: *Prolific Sample – Distribution of Ethnocentrism Scores.*

Table A11: Estimation of Experimental Results (Full Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.85*	3.76*
	[3.71;3.99]	[3.62;3.89]
Effect of Democracy	−0.56*	−0.31*
	[−0.75;−0.37]	[−0.50;−0.12]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.09
		[−0.10;0.28]
Eliminated Effect		−0.25
		[−0.52;0.02]
R^2	0.02	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.01
Num. obs.	1327	2659
RMSE	1.76	1.76

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.



Figure A11: *Prolific Sample – A Predominantly Nonwhite Population Deflates the "Democratic" Peace Effect*. Results from our replication and extension of Tomz and Weeks (2013) within Acharya, Blackwell and Sen's (2018) causal mechanisms framework. The models report the same estimates as figure 3 of the main text but include standard demographic covariates. Tables A14-A16 present these results numerically.

A2.2.3 Threat and Immorality Mechanisms

In addition to the main effect of democracy on support for a strike, Tomz and Weeks (2013) find that two mediators do substantial explanatory work in transmitting the treatment effect: subjects find democracies less threatening while also believing that a strike against a fellow democracy would be more immoral, relative to a nondemocracy. In our second survey, we measured these two variables in order to assess whether country race affects these mechanisms, in addition to the overall effect on support for a strike. Following treatment, subjects were asked the following, with each gathered on seven-point

Table A12: Estimation of Experimental Results (Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.14*	4.03*
	[3.95;4.33]	[3.84;4.21]
Effect of Democracy	−0.72*	−0.27
	[−0.98;−0.45]	[−0.53;0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.11
		[−0.15;0.38]
Eliminated Effect		−0.45*
		[−0.83;−0.08]
R^2	0.04	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.02
Num. obs.	656	1329
RMSE	1.73	1.74

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Table A13: Estimation of Experimental Results (Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.56*	3.48*
	[3.37;3.76]	[3.29;3.67]
Effect of Democracy	−0.40*	−0.34*
	[−0.67;−0.13]	[−0.60;−0.07]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.08
		[−0.19;0.35]
Eliminated Effect		−0.07
		[−0.44;0.31]
R^2	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	671	1330
RMSE	1.76	1.75

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Table A14: Estimation of Experimental Results Including Demographic Covariates (Full Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.52*	3.42*
	[3.08;3.95]	[3.11;3.72]
Effect of Democracy	−0.58*	−0.34*
	[−0.76;−0.39]	[−0.52;−0.15]
Male	−0.05	−0.07
	[−0.24;0.14]	[−0.21;0.06]
White	0.01	0.02
	[−0.23;0.24]	[−0.15;0.18]
Republican	−0.01	0.00
	[−0.11;0.09]	[−0.07;0.08]
Conservative	0.10	0.12*
	[−0.00;0.21]	[0.05;0.20]
Less than College	0.36*	0.30*
	[0.17;0.55]	[0.16;0.43]
Age	−0.00	−0.01*
	[−0.01;0.00]	[−0.01;−0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.09
		[−0.11;0.28]
Eliminated Effect		−0.24
		[−0.51;0.02]
R^2	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	1327	2659
RMSE	1.75	1.74

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

scales that ranged from "strongly disagree" (=1) to "strongly agree" (=7).

- If the U.S. does not attack the nuclear development sites, the country's nuclear weapons would pose a serious security threat to the U.S. and its allies.
- It would be morally wrong for the U.S. to attack the country's nuclear development sites.

Here, we present the same three quantities we estimated in the main text for the democracy treatment on strike but instead use these threat perception and immorality measures as the outcome variables.

Figures A12 and A13 display the results. The effect of democracy with no racial information (the ATE) replicates Tomz and Weeks's main finding: respondents view democracies as less threatening and believe an attack would be more immoral, relative to nondemocracies. However, by assigning subjects racial information (namely fixing the country to nonwhite), subjects view that democracy as more threatening and believe a strike would be less immoral, relative to providing no racial information. Further, this effect is strongest for the immorality mechanism. Whereas the point estimate of threat perception for the nonwhite estimate falls narrowly within the ATE's 95% CI, the point estimate for immorality falls significantly below the ATE's CI. Indeed, whereas the eliminated effect is not significant for threat perception, the effect of democracy fixing nonwhite so strongly deflates the immorality DV that the eliminated effect is significant at the $\alpha = .10$ level in the full sample, similar to our finding of the eliminated effect for the strike DV in the main text. All of this indicates that perceptions of the target country's race – notably when that democracy is nonwhite – relieves respondents of moral restraints associated with striking the country. Dataverse Appendix Tables B7-B9 provide the full regression results associated with Figure A12, and Tables B10-B12 display the full regression results associated with Figure A13.

Table A15: Estimation of Experimental Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.89*	3.82*
	[3.24;4.53]	[3.36;4.27]
Effect of Democracy	−0.73*	−0.29*
	[−1.00;−0.47]	[−0.55;−0.02]
Male	−0.06	−0.10
	[−0.34;0.21]	[−0.30;0.09]
White	0.02	0.15
	[−0.30;0.33]	[−0.08;0.38]
Republican	0.02	0.06
	[−0.11;0.15]	[−0.04;0.16]
Conservative	−0.01	−0.04
	[−0.17;0.14]	[−0.15;0.07]
Less than College	0.32*	0.27*
	[0.06;0.59]	[0.08;0.46]
Age	0.00	−0.00
	[−0.01;0.01]	[−0.01;0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.11
		[−0.16;0.38]
Eliminated Effect		−0.45*
		[−0.82;−0.07]
R^2	0.05	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.03
Num. obs.	656	1329
RMSE	1.73	1.74

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.



Figure A12: *Threat Mediator from Tomz and Weeks.* Dataverse Appendix Tables B7-B9 present these results numerically.

Table A16: Estimation of Experimental Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.52*	3.53*
	[2.87; 4.16]	[3.09; 3.97]
Effect of Democracy	−0.41*	−0.38*
	[−0.67; −0.14]	[−0.64; −0.12]
Male	−0.09	−0.17
	[−0.35; 0.18]	[−0.36; 0.02]
White	0.11	0.00
	[−0.24; 0.46]	[−0.24; 0.25]
Republican	−0.08	−0.10
	[−0.23; 0.07]	[−0.21; 0.00]
Conservative	0.17*	0.22*
	[0.02; 0.32]	[0.11; 0.33]
Less than College	0.41*	0.35*
	[0.14; 0.67]	[0.17; 0.54]
Age	−0.01*	−0.01*
	[−0.02; −0.00]	[−0.02; −0.01]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.07
		[−0.20; 0.34]
Eliminated Effect		−0.03
		[−0.40; 0.34]
R^2	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	671	1330
RMSE	1.74	1.72

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.



Figure A13: *Immorality Mediator from Tomz and Weeks.* Dataverse Appendix Tables B10-B12 present these results numerically.

A2.3 Data Collection and Ethical Considerations

The paper's original surveys were deemed exempt by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Southern California (# UP-15-00333). Subjects were recruited from online recruitment pools, that is, subjects opt-in to these pools in order to participate in surveys. Subjects first completed an online consent form, and the surveys concluded with an online debriefing form. Deception came in the form of assigning certain individuals to hypothetical democracies versus nondemocracies, as well as white or

nonwhite or no racial information conditions. At the debrief stage, the true purpose of the survey was revealed, and all subjects were provided with the opportunity to opt-out of the study and to have their data removed from the analysis. No subject requested the opt-out option. To ensure confidentiality, we did not collect personally identifiable information (like names or email addresses). Our instrument and materials derive from past work on this topic (e.g., Tomz and Weeks, 2013; Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey, 2018), and the experimental interventions were brief in duration. Finally, subjects recruited by Qualtrics were compensated directly by Qualtrics at market rates, whereas subjects recruited by Prolific were compensated at an average rate of $9 (USD) per hour. We chose this rate in line with current market rates on Prolific.

A3 Embedding Analysis

A3.1 Robustness Checks

Here, we probe the robustness of the embedding results with a number of alternative analyses. First, the analysis in the main text uses embeddings trained in 200 dimensions. To ensure that our results are robust to different dimensions, Figure A14 presents the same analysis for the GloVe model trained in 300 dimensions. The results are substantively similar. Second, we include additional terms in the democracy dictionary ("our", "us", "we", "their", "them", "they") to explicitly designate a dyadic democratic peace phenomenon and repeat the analysis. Figure A15 shows that the pattern of results is substantively the same as the pattern observed in the main text. Finally, rather than simply correlate democracy with peace, an alternative way to think about our analysis is to "project" democracy terms onto a peace-war dimension (see Kozlowski, Taddy and Evans, 2019 for more on this procedure). To do so, we subtract the average location of war terms ("war", "disharmony", "disagreement", "hostility") from the average location of the peace terms, thus creating a peace-war dimension. Figure A16 displays the results of this alternative analysis, which again yields substantively similar results. All of these robustness checks increase our confidence that the democratic peace is racialized in the English language.



Figure A14: *Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (300 dimensions)*. Dataverse Appendix Table B15 presents these results numerically.



Figure A15: *Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (Dyadic Terms)*. Dataverse Appendix Table B16 presents these results numerically.



Figure A16: *Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (War-Peace Dimension)*. Dataverse Appendix Table B17 presents these results numerically.

A3.2 Nearest Neighbors to the Racialized Democracy Vectors

In the main text, we find that the addition of nonwhite terms to the democracy term vector deflates the association between democracy and peace. Here, we seek to better understand the substantive reasons for why this might be the case. Specifically, we use the `nss()` function in R's `conText` package (see Rodriguez, Spirling and Stewart, 2023) to examine the terms that appear closest to the racialized democracy vectors (also known as this vector's "nearest neighbors"). Given that these vectors are formed from the averages of race and democracy terms, we expect and find that both racialized vectors share many democracy terms, like "democratic" and "election."

Importantly, however, this analysis reveals that, in the nonwhite democracy vector, racial terms appear far more prominently: "non-white" is the 11th closest term and "non-european" is the 14th closest term. By contrast, for the white democracy vector, race appears far less prominently: "western" is the 22nd closest term and "european" is the 35th closest term. In other words, while both vectors are close to democratic terms like "elect" and "democracy," the racial terms are more salient for nonwhite democracies whereas whiteness is already assumed for white democracies. This speaks to our point that

whiteness is baked into democracy. It also provides a further check on the possibility that we are simply picking up perceived civil war and instability among nonwhite democracies, something we preliminarily assess in Figure A15. No conflict terms are nearest neighbors to either vector. It is a more subtle and implicit association, as our argument maintains.

A3.3 Preliminary Extension to British Elites

Although our paper focuses on public opinion – a key mechanism in the democratic peace literature – a natural question is whether our argument and results might extend to political elites. Here, we conduct an analysis of United Kingdom parliamentary speeches. We locally fit a word embedding model to every available speech in the Hansard from 1945 to 2000, for a total of approximately 516,975,807 words. We obtained the raw texts from Goet (2019). We use the global vectors for word representation (GloVe) model to estimate the embeddings from these raw texts (Pennington, Socher and Manning, 2014), perhaps the most commonly used model in the social sciences (Rodriguez and Spirling, 2022). This model was developed by Stanford's natural language processing group and is the same model used to estimate the pre-trained embeddings we analyze in our paper's main text.

To estimate the embeddings, we first lowercase the terms and retain only terms that occur at least ten times in the corpus. To calculate the term co-occurrence matrix, we use a skip gram window of five words before and after a given target feature. As model hyperparameters, we train the embeddings in 200 dimensions with an x_{max} (i.e., maximum number of term co-occurrences used in the weighting function) of 15. Note that, in contrast to the pre-trained GloVe embeddings, the terms "nonwestern" and "noncaucasian" appear fewer than ten times in the corpus, so we drop these terms (and their antonyms) from the dictionaries for this analysis. Finally, we use an algorithm convergence tolerance of 0.001, a learning rate of 0.1, and fit the model over 15 iterations. All of these choices are quite standard in embeddings research (Rodriguez and Spirling 2022).

Figure A17 presents the results of this elite-level analysis. Notably, the patterns are substantively identical to our public-level analysis. These results provide initial indication that our argument extends beyond the mass public, an important area for future work.



Figure A17: *Racialization of the Democratic Peace in UK Parliamentary Speeches.* The same quantities estimated above and in figure 5 of the main text but, here, at the elite-level of British parliamentary speeches. Dataverse Appendix Table B18 presents these results numerically.

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