Dataverse Appendix for:
Separate but Unequal: Ethnocentrism and Racialization Explain the "Democratic" Peace in Public Opinion

Brian C Rathbun
University of Southern California
brathbun@usc.edu

Christopher Sebastian Parker
University of California, Santa Barbara
csp@ucsb.edu

Caleb Pomeroy
Stanford University
calebpom@stanford.edu

April 10, 2024

B1 Full Instrumentation **2**
B1.1 Qualtrics Survey 2
B1.2 Prolific Survey 4

B2 Simple as Black and White? The Absence of an Independent Race Effect **6**

B3 Results by Respondent Race **6**

B4 Threat and Immorality Mechanisms for Prolific Survey **7**

B5 Determining the Characteristics to "Fix" in the Survey Experiments **7**

B6 Tables for Word Embedding Results **17**

B1 Full Instrumentation

B1.1 Qualtrics Survey

- **Gender.** What is your gender?
  - Male
  - Female
  - Non-binary/other
- **Age.** What year were you born? Please enter the full, four digit year.
  - (Numeric entry)
- **Education.** What is the highest degree or level of education that you have completed?
  - Some high school
  - High school graduate
  - Some college
  - 2-year college
  - 4-year college
  - Graduate degree
- **Race.** What race do you consider yourself to be? (Select the option that best applies)
  - Black / African American
  - Asian
  - American Indian
  - Pacific Islander
  - Multiracial
  - Hispanic / Latino(a)
  - White / Caucasian
- **Ideology.** Below is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from "extremely conservative" to "extremely liberal." Where would you place yourself on this scale?
  - Extremely conservative
  - Conservative
  - Slightly conservative
  - Moderate or 'middle of the road'
  - Slightly liberal
  - Liberal
  - Extremely liberal
- **PID.** Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or as an independent? (Select the option that best applies)

- Strongly Republican
- Republican
- Independent but lean Republican
- Independent
- Independent but lean Democrat
- Democrat
- Strongly Democrat

- **Hawkishness.** How much do you agree or disagree with the following? [5-point (dis)agree scale]
  - Rather than simply countering our opponents' thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of an opponent's power.
  - American military strength is the best way to ensure world peace.
  - The U.S. must demonstrate its resolve so that others do not take advantage of it.

- **Ethnocentrism.** How much do you agree or disagree with the following? [7-point (dis)agree scale]
  - Most other cultures are backward compared with my culture.
  - My culture should be the role model for other cultures.
  - I am not really interested in the customs and values of other countries.

- **Social dominance.** How much do you agree or disagree with the following? [7-point (dis)agree scale]
  - If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
  - We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.

- **Authoritarianism.** How much do you agree or disagree with the following? [7-point (dis)agree scale]
  - Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your weakness, so it's best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them.
  - The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order.
  - People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws they don't agree with.
  - What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.
  - Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
  - Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize and confront established authorities.
  - Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else.

- **Racial resentment.** How much do you agree or disagree with the following? [7-point (dis)agree scale]

- Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black Americans should do the same without any special favors.
- Over the past few years black Americans have gotten less than they deserve.
- It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough. If black Americans would only try harder they could be just as well off as white Americans.
- Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

B1.2 Prolific Survey

- **Gender.** What is your gender?
  - Male
  - Female
  - Non-binary/other
- **Age.** What year were you born? Please enter the full, four digit year.
  - (Numeric entry)
- **Education.** What is the highest degree or level of education that you have completed?
  - Some high school
  - High school graduate
  - Some college
  - 2-year college
  - 4-year college
  - Graduate degree
- **Race.** What race do you consider yourself to be? (Select the option that best applies)
  - Black / African American
  - Asian
  - American Indian / Native American
  - Multiracial
  - White / Caucasian
- **Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.** Are you Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino?
  - Yes
  - No
- **Ideology.** Below is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from "extremely conservative" to "extremely liberal." Where would you place yourself on this scale?
  - Extremely conservative
  - Conservative

- Slightly conservative
- Moderate or 'middle of the road'
- Slightly liberal
- Liberal
- Extremely liberal

- **PID.** Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or as an independent? (Select the option that best applies)
  - Strongly Republican
  - Republican
  - Independent but lean Republican
  - Independent
  - Independent but lean Democrat
  - Democrat
  - Strongly Democrat

- **Ethnocentrism.** How much do you agree or disagree with the following? [5-point (dis)agree scale]
  - The world would be a much better place if all other cultures modeled themselves on my culture.
  - There are many cultures in which life is as good as in ours.
  - I don't believe that my cultural group is any better than any other.
  - I feel that, in general, the basic values of my cultural group are fairer, more decent, and more reasonable than those of many others.
  - Our cultural group is NOT more deserving and valuable than others
  - The values, way of life, and customs of most other cultures are probably just as good as those of my own.
  - I suspect that the lifestyle of my cultural group probably gives more opportunity for people to live happy and fulfilling lives than the lifestyle of most other groups would.
  - The idea that my culture is superior to others is completely ridiculous and unreasonable.
  - If people from other cultures understood the true value of our culture, I think that most of them would prefer to live in our culture.
  - In general, other cultures do not have the inner strength and resilience of our culture.
  - It is simply NOT true that our culture and our customs are any better than other cultures and other customs.
  - On the whole, people from my culture tend to be better people than people from other cultures.

The above items come from the 12-item superiority subscale from Bizumic et al. (2009). We note one modification to the scale: five of the original items included mention of the term "ethnic" alongside culture. We removed the term "ethnic" from these five items (given our use of racial bullet points in the experiment) to avoid tipping off respondents to the experiment's purpose.

B2 Simple as Black and White? The Absence of an Independent Race Effect

Our results beg an obvious question: why was the effect of race missed before? In addition to the disciplinary "norm against noticing," our results point to an empirical barrier that might obstruct cursory attempts to statistically identify race effects: we find a notable absence of an independent race effect on support for strikes.

Although our primary aim is to estimate eliminated effects, our experimental designs provide the opportunity to estimate a main effect of race, regardless of regime type assignment. In the Qualtrics sample, the starkest potential contrast is the white condition relative to a nonwhite baseline. In the Prolific sample, we excluded the white factor to maximize power to detect the nonwhite effect at the core of our theory, but we can still estimate a main effect of support for strike for respondents in the nonwhite relative to no racial information condition. Interestingly, we find a lack of evidence that nonwhite assignments meaningfully shift support for strikes relative to white or no racial information assignments, respectively (Qualtrics: $t = 1.43, p = .152$; Prolific: $t = 0.51, p = .608$). That is, respondents in both the Qualtrics and Prolific surveys do not – on average and all else equal – express stronger support for strikes against nonwhite countries.

This absence of finding is worth belaboring. When scholars point out the importance of racialization beyond understandings of race as an independent variable, this is precisely the situation they warn against. A cursory analysis of these results would indicate that racism does not exist in these samples, given the lack of main effect for the race factor. But, with the extra step of natural versus controlled mediator arms, we can find a more subtle, implicit, and likely constitutive mechanism at work: presumed racial connotations associated with democracy. The democratic peace has connotations of whiteness and cultural superiority baked into the very concept, an effect that would be masked in a standard 2×2 fully-crossed factorial design. Thus, in addition to the *theoretical* "norm against noticing" race in mainstream IR, these results also warn against simplistic experimental designs that might have failed to detect race effects when scholars tried to notice race in the past.

B3 Results by Respondent Race

Ultimately, the statistical power required to detect effects in the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework precludes firm conclusions about whether respondents answer differently based on self-identified race. Our Qualtrics sample ($N = 1626$) includes 448 nonwhite respondents, and our Prolific sample ($N = 2659$) includes 524 nonwhite respondents. Regardless, Figures B1 and B2 present our survey results for white and nonwhite identifying respondents. The results broadly align with the substantive results found in the full sample, indicating no substantial difference. But, we do not attempt to draw conclusions given our inability to adjudicate between nonwhite respondents with ethnocentric tendencies and statistical power constraints. It is of course also possible for nonwhite identifying respondents to feel a sense of cultural superiority as westerners vis-à-vis nonwhite individuals and countries abroad and respond to democracy and racial primes in the same manner as white identifying respondents. Racialized assumptions can affect even nonwhite members of western societies, an important question for future research.



Figure B1: *Nonwhite Respondent Results for Qualtrics Sample.* Tables B1-B3 present these results numerically.



Figure B2: *Nonwhite Respondent Results for Prolific Sample.* Tables B4-B6 present these results numerically.

B4 Threat and Immorality Mechanisms for Prolific Survey

In the paper's main text and Supplementary Material, we analyze the threat perception and perceptions of immorality effects that Tomz and Weeks (2013) use as mediators. Here, we present the full tables associated with those analyses. Tables B7-B9 display the full regression results associated with Supplementary Material Figure A12, and Tables B10-B12 display the full regression results associated with Figure A13.

B5 Determining the Characteristics to "Fix" in the Survey Experiments

A basic concern driving our argument is that when researchers experimentally vary democracy, they activate not only beliefs about democracies per se but so too a host of associated beliefs, such as the target country's power, wealth, culture, and so on. Methodologically, such studies display a lack of "information equivalence" across conditions (Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey, 2018), namely the inability

Table B1: Estimation of Experimental Results (All Nonwhite Respondents, Qualtrics Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.04*	3.63*	3.80*
	[3.64; 4.44]	[3.28; 3.99]	[3.43; 4.16]
Effect of Democracy	−0.38	−0.09	−0.29
	[−0.92; 0.16]	[−0.64; 0.45]	[−0.85; 0.27]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.40	0.24
		[−0.13; 0.94]	[−0.30; 0.78]
Eliminated Effect		−0.29	−0.09
		[−1.05; 0.48]	[−0.87; 0.69]
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	155	302	301
RMSE	1.70	1.70	1.70

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

to distinguish the causal work done by democracy versus any number of associated country traits not controlled in the experiment, but which piggyback on manipulated factors. To demonstrate such information inequivalence, Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey (2018) replicate the Tomz and Weeks (2013) survey instrument, including measures of a number of post-treatment beliefs associated with the target country.

Unless carefully dealt with, informational equivalence might also undermine our own study since race also carries with it assumptions about other factors that might influence the willingness to use force. We use the Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey (2018) study to determine which factors might pose threats to inference, which helps to guide our decisions about which country characteristics to "fix" in our experiments. Specifically, we seek to estimate the degree to which other factors mediate the relationship between a democratic treatment and our dependent variable of interest. The mediation process is the following: respondents are assigned to a regime type, that regime type evokes beliefs about other factors, and those factors (and regime type) contribute to support for preventive strikes. Our task is to estimate the degree to which the effect of democracy increases, decreases, or perhaps remains the same when we account for these other factors. Even if respondents view democracies as rich, for instance, this may or may not have a downstream effect on preferences for preventive strikes.[1]

A factor analysis of post-treatment variables in Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey (2018) reveals two distinct dimensions; one is ethnocultural and another is strategic. The former includes perceptions of race and religion, namely the extent to which subjects believe that the target country's population is predominately white and Christian. The latter includes questions that probe strategic concerns, namely whether subjects believe the target country is a U.S. ally, U.S. trading partner, possesses wealth in terms of GDP per capita, has large oil reserves, conducts joint military exercises with the U.S., invests heavily in American businesses, and spends heavily on its military. Together, the breadth of these post-treatment measures provides unique leverage on the ethnocultural versus strategic engines of the democratic peace.

Most importantly, how much of democracy's effect disappears when we take into account what democracy implies: a western country similar to the country in which respondents live? To compare the mechanistic strength of strategic versus ethnocultural concerns, we use sequential-g to estimate

[1]The full sample consists of 3,080 U.S.-based adults recruited via MTurk on July 1–3, 2015. Relevant for our purposes are the subjects assigned to the basic democracy condition.

Table B2: Estimation of Experimental Results (Nonwhite Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median, Qualtrics Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.28*	3.61*	3.80*
	[3.72; 4.84]	[3.16; 4.06]	[3.33; 4.28]
Effect of Democracy	−0.52	0.39	0.13
	[−1.26; 0.23]	[−0.33; 1.11]	[−0.61; 0.88]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.67	0.48
		[−0.04; 1.39]	[−0.25; 1.21]
Eliminated Effect		−0.91	−0.65
		[−1.94; 0.12]	[−1.70; 0.40]
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	−0.00
Num. obs.	89	163	163
RMSE	1.77	1.67	1.69

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Table B3: Estimation of Experimental Results (Nonwhite Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median, Qualtrics Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = White	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.70*	3.67*	3.79*
	[3.16; 4.24]	[3.06; 4.27]	[3.21; 4.37]
Effect of Democracy	−0.18	−0.48	−0.70
	[−0.97; 0.60]	[−1.31; 0.35]	[−1.53; 0.13]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.03	−0.09
		[−0.77; 0.84]	[−0.88; 0.69]
Eliminated Effect		0.30	0.52
		[−0.84; 1.44]	[−0.62; 1.66]
R^2	0.00	0.02	0.03
Adj. R^2	−0.01	−0.01	0.00
Num. obs.	66	139	138
RMSE	1.60	1.71	1.70

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Table B4: Estimation of Experimental Results (All Nonwhite Respondents, Prolific Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.90*	3.65*
	[3.60;4.20]	[3.37;3.94]
Effect of Democracy	−0.63*	−0.15
	[−1.04;−0.22]	[−0.55;0.25]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.25
		[−0.17;0.66]
Eliminated Effect		−0.48
		[−1.05;0.09]
R^2	0.03	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.01
Num. obs.	258	524
RMSE	1.68	1.66

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

Table B5: Estimation of Experimental Results (Nonwhite Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median, Prolific Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.25*	3.64*
	[3.87;4.64]	[3.26;4.01]
Effect of Democracy	−1.00*	0.04
	[−1.52;−0.48]	[−0.49;0.58]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.62*
		[0.08;1.16]
Eliminated Effect		−1.04*
		[−1.78;−0.30]
R^2	0.09	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.08	0.04
Num. obs.	145	294
RMSE	1.59	1.62

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

the average controlled direct effect (ACDE) of democracy when fixing each of these two distinct mediators (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2016).[2] The estimation procedure first regresses the outcome variable (support for strike) onto the treatment variable, post-treatment mediators of interest, and post-treatment intermediate confounders (i.e., covariates that are consequences of the treatment that affect

[2]We conduct the sequential-g analysis using the `DirectEffects` package (Blackwell et al., 2021) in the R statistical computing environment (R Core Team, 2021).

Table B6: Estimation of Experimental Results (Nonwhite Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median, Prolific Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	3.47*	3.67*
	[3.01;3.92]	[3.23;4.11]
Effect of Democracy	−0.19	−0.38
	[−0.85;0.46]	[−0.98;0.22]
Natural Mediator Arm		−0.20
		[−0.84;0.43]
Eliminated Effect		0.19
		[−0.69;1.07]
R^2	0.00	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.01	−0.00
Num. obs.	113	230
RMSE	1.75	1.70

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest.

both the mediator and outcome). Then, the procedure subtracts the estimate of the mediator(s) from this first stage model from the outcome variable in a second stage model that excludes the post-treatment variables, effectively "demediating" the outcome variable from the mechanistic effect of interest. The intuition is straightforward: if we fix (i.e., remove) the effect of a given mediator and the treatment's direct effect decreases (i.e., the ACDE), then that mediator *matters* in explaining the treatment's effect. Thus, smaller ACDEs indicate stronger mechanisms.[3]

Figure B3 displays the ATE of democracy from a baseline model (which includes pre-treatment covariates), alongside estimates of democracy from models that fix strategic versus ethnocultural concerns (the ACDEs). The model that fixes ethnocultural concerns leads to a 34.9% decrease in the treatment effect, whereas the model that fixes strategic concerns reveals a modest 10.4% decrease in the effect of democracy. Table B13 displays the full model results associated with this figure.[4] Although the ATE of democracy of −0.44 narrowly falls within the 95% CI of the ACDE of democracy fixing ethnocultural concerns, the substantive shift is sufficiently noteworthy that we decided to fix religion as Christian in our survey experiments as this might serve as a confounder of the effects of both race (based on the very high correlation of this perception with Christianity indicated in the factor analysis) and democracy (based on the large mediation effect of the combined ethnocultural variable in our analysis).

[3]We note that individuals assigned to the democracy condition – that is, those randomly told that the target state is a democracy – are more likely to believe that the population of that country is majority white in comparison to subjects assigned to the nondemocracy condition ($M = 2.51$ versus $M = 1.93$, $p < .001$).

[4]See Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey (2018) for a full description of the other regression variables.

Table B7: Estimation of Threat Perception Results Including Demographic Covariates (Full Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Threat Perception	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.67*	4.50*
	[4.28;5.05]	[4.22;4.77]
Effect of Democracy	−0.43*	−0.28*
	[−0.60;−0.27]	[−0.45;−0.12]
Male	−0.09	−0.11
	[−0.26;0.08]	[−0.22;0.01]
White	−0.07	0.03
	[−0.29;0.14]	[−0.13;0.18]
Republican	0.02	−0.04
	[−0.08;0.11]	[−0.11;0.03]
Conservative	0.01	0.09*
	[−0.10;0.11]	[0.02;0.16]
Less than College	−0.02	0.12
	[−0.19;0.15]	[−0.00;0.24]
Age	0.01	0.00
	[−0.00;0.01]	[−0.00;0.01]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.06
		[−0.11;0.22]
Eliminated Effect		−0.16
		[−0.40;0.08]
R^2	0.02	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	1327	2659
RMSE	1.56	1.54

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha =$ .05 level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table B8: Estimation of Threat Perception Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Threat Perception	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.78*	4.66*
	[4.19; 5.36]	[4.26; 5.07]
Effect of Democracy	−0.59*	−0.36*
	[−0.83; −0.35]	[−0.59; −0.13]
Male	−0.05	−0.14
	[−0.29; 0.20]	[−0.31; 0.04]
White	−0.12	0.09
	[−0.42; 0.18]	[−0.12; 0.31]
Republican	0.07	−0.01
	[−0.05; 0.19]	[−0.10; 0.08]
Conservative	−0.08	0.01
	[−0.22; 0.06]	[−0.09; 0.11]
Less than College	0.01	0.12
	[−0.23; 0.25]	[−0.05; 0.29]
Age	0.01*	0.01
	[0.00; 0.02]	[−0.00; 0.01]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.07
		[−0.16; 0.30]
Eliminated Effect		−0.23
		[−0.56; 0.10]
R^2	0.05	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.02
Num. obs.	656	1329
RMSE	1.54	1.54

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table B9: Estimation of Threat Perception Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Threat Perception	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.68*	4.56*
	[4.11; 5.25]	[4.15; 4.97]
Effect of Democracy	−0.28*	−0.21
	[−0.52; −0.04]	[−0.44; 0.03]
Male	−0.14	−0.13
	[−0.38; 0.10]	[−0.30; 0.04]
White	0.02	0.01
	[−0.30; 0.34]	[−0.22; 0.23]
Republican	−0.05	−0.10
	[−0.20; 0.11]	[−0.20; 0.01]
Conservative	0.08	0.14*
	[−0.08; 0.23]	[0.04; 0.25]
Less than College	−0.04	0.12
	[−0.29; 0.20]	[−0.05; 0.29]
Age	−0.00	−0.00
	[−0.01; 0.01]	[−0.01; 0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		0.05
		[−0.19; 0.28]
Eliminated Effect		−0.08
		[−0.42; 0.25]
R^2	0.01	0.02
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	671	1330
RMSE	1.57	1.54

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table B10: Estimation of Immorality Results Including Demographic Covariates (Full Sample)

	Dependent Variable: Perceived Immorality	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.76*	4.81*
	[4.34; 5.18]	[4.51; 5.11]
Effect of Democracy	0.51*	0.26*
	[0.33; 0.70]	[0.08; 0.45]
Male	0.01	0.07
	[−0.18; 0.19]	[−0.06; 0.20]
White	−0.00	−0.05
	[−0.24; 0.23]	[−0.22; 0.11]
Republican	−0.01	0.01
	[−0.11; 0.09]	[−0.06; 0.08]
Conservative	−0.12*	−0.17*
	[−0.23; −0.01]	[−0.25; −0.09]
Less than College	−0.09	−0.13
	[−0.28; 0.10]	[−0.26; 0.00]
Age	−0.01	−0.00
	[−0.01; 0.00]	[−0.01; 0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		−0.11
		[−0.29; 0.08]
Eliminated Effect		0.25
		[−0.01; 0.51]
R^2	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	1327	2659
RMSE	1.72	1.71

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table B11: Estimation of Immorality Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Above Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Perceived Immorality	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.19*	4.44*
	[3.57; 4.82]	[4.01; 4.87]
Effect of Democracy	0.61*	0.18
	[0.35; 0.87]	[−0.08; 0.43]
Male	0.02	0.06
	[−0.25; 0.30]	[−0.13; 0.25]
White	0.05	−0.19
	[−0.27; 0.37]	[−0.41; 0.04]
Republican	−0.02	−0.01
	[−0.16; 0.12]	[−0.11; 0.08]
Conservative	−0.04	−0.07
	[−0.19; 0.11]	[−0.18; 0.04]
Less than College	0.03	−0.06
	[−0.23; 0.29]	[−0.24; 0.13]
Age	−0.01*	−0.00
	[−0.02; −0.00]	[−0.01; 0.00]
Natural Mediator Arm		−0.16
		[−0.42; 0.09]
Eliminated Effect		0.44*
		[0.08; 0.81]
R^2	0.04	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.02
Num. obs.	656	1329
RMSE	1.70	1.69

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.

Table B12: Estimation of Immorality Results Including Demographic Covariates (Respondents Below Ethnocentrism Median)

	Dependent Variable: Perceived Immorality	
	Country Race Unspecified	Country Race = Nonwhite
(Intercept)	4.97*	4.69*
	[4.35; 5.60]	[4.24; 5.15]
Effect of Democracy	0.40*	0.33*
	[0.14; 0.66]	[0.08; 0.59]
Male	0.07	0.22*
	[−0.20; 0.33]	[0.04; 0.41]
White	−0.20	−0.03
	[−0.55; 0.16]	[−0.28; 0.21]
Republican	0.04	0.08
	[−0.11; 0.20]	[−0.03; 0.19]
Conservative	−0.16	−0.20*
	[−0.32; 0.00]	[−0.31; −0.08]
Less than College	−0.23	−0.22*
	[−0.50; 0.03]	[−0.41; −0.04]
Age	−0.00	0.00
	[−0.01; 0.01]	[−0.00; 0.01]
Natural Mediator Arm		−0.08
		[−0.35; 0.19]
Eliminated Effect		0.07
		[−0.30; 0.43]
R^2	0.03	0.03
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.03
Num. obs.	671	1330
RMSE	1.70	1.69

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Column names indicate experimental arm. Row names indicate various estimated effects of interest, alongside demographic control variables.



Figure B3: *Dafoe et al Reanalysis: Ethnocultural Concerns Deflate Democracy's Effect.* Coefficient on democracy from a baseline model (ATE) versus models fixing strategic and ethnocultural concerns (ACDEs). Democracy's effect decreases by 34.9% when fixing ethnocultural concerns, whereas fixing strategic concerns reveals a substantively smaller 10.4% reduction in democracy's effect. 95% CIs generated from 5,000 bootstrapped replications using sequential-g estimation. Table B13 presents these results numerically.

Table B13: Dafoe et al (2018) Reanalysis Results

	Dependent Variable: Support for Strike		
	Effect of Democracy (ATE)	Effect of Democracy (Fixing Ethnocultural Concerns)	Effect of Democracy (Fixing Strategic Concerns)
(Intercept)	3.00*	2.92*	2.97*
	[2.57;3.44]	[2.48;3.35]	[2.52;3.42]
Democracy Treatment	−0.44*	−0.28*	−0.39*
	[−0.60;−0.27]	[−0.46;−0.10]	[−0.57;−0.21]
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
	[−0.01;0.01]	[−0.01;0.01]	[−0.01;0.01]
Gender	0.02	0.04	0.03
	[−0.14;0.19]	[−0.12;0.20]	[−0.14;0.19]
Education	−0.07	−0.06	−0.07
	[−0.16;0.01]	[−0.15;0.02]	[−0.16;0.01]
Party ID	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*
	[0.02;0.11]	[0.01;0.10]	[0.02;0.11]

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level.

B6 Tables for Word Embedding Results

Figure 5 of the main text displays cosine estimates from our word embedding analysis. Table B14 presents the numeric results associated with that figure. Further, Figures A14-A17 of the Supplementary Material display cosine estimates from various robustness checks on the quotidian (i.e., pretrained GloVe) embeddings, as well as a preliminary extension to British elites. Tables B15-B18 present the numeric results associated with those figures. For more information on confidence intervals and uncertainty estimates in a word embeddings context, see Caliskan, Bryson and Narayanan (2017) and Kozlowski, Taddy and Evans (2019).

Table B14: Word Embedding Estimates: Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language

	Unexposed to Race	Averaged with White Vector	Averaged with Nonwhite Vector
Total Similarity of Democracy	0.43*		
	[0.32; 0.52]		
Direct Similarity of Democracy Fixing Race		0.49*	0.26*
		[0.37; 0.57]	[0.15; 0.35]
Similarity of Democracy Eliminated by Race		−0.06	0.17*
		[−0.21; 0.10]	[0.02; 0.32]

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Cosine similarities between democratic terms and peace terms (the "dependent variable"). Column names indicate democracy terms unexposed to versus averaged with white and nonwhite terms. Row names indicate various cosine similarity estimates inspired by the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework.

Table B15: Word Embedding Estimates: Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (300 dimensions)

	Unexposed to Race	Averaged with White Vector	Averaged with Nonwhite Vector
Total Similarity of Democracy	0.37*		
	[0.26; 0.47]		
Direct Similarity of Democracy Fixing Race		0.42*	0.18*
		[0.29; 0.51]	[0.07; 0.27]
Similarity of Democracy Eliminated by Race		−0.05	0.19*
		[−0.21; 0.12]	[0.03; 0.35]

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Cosine similarities between democratic terms and peace terms (the "dependent variable"). Column names indicate democracy terms unexposed to versus averaged with white and nonwhite terms. Row names indicate various cosine similarity estimates inspired by the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework.

Table B16: Word Embedding Estimates: Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (dyadic terms)

	Unexposed to Race	Averaged with White Vector	Averaged with Nonwhite Vector
Total Similarity of Democracy	0.56*		
	[0.51; 0.61]		
Direct Similarity of Democracy Fixing Race		0.56*	0.47*
		[0.50; 0.61]	[0.40; 0.52]
Similarity of Democracy Eliminated by Race		−0.00	0.09*
		[−0.08; 0.07]	[0.01; 0.18]

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Cosine similarities between democratic terms and peace terms (the "dependent variable"). Column names indicate democracy terms unexposed to versus averaged with white and nonwhite terms. Row names indicate various cosine similarity estimates inspired by the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework.

Table B17: Word Embedding Estimates: Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (war-peace dimension)

	Unexposed to Race	Averaged with White Vector	Averaged with Nonwhite Vector
Total Similarity of Democracy	0.20*		
	[0.12; 0.27]		
Direct Similarity of Democracy Fixing Race		0.22*	0.04
		[0.11; 0.29]	[−0.02; 0.11]
Similarity of Democracy Eliminated by Race		−0.02	0.16*
		[−0.13; 0.10]	[0.05; 0.26]

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Cosine similarities between democratic terms and peace terms (the "dependent variable"). Column names indicate democracy terms unexposed to versus averaged with white and nonwhite terms. Row names indicate various cosine similarity estimates inspired by the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework.

Table B18: Word Embedding Estimates: Racialization of the Democratic Peace in the English Language (British Parliamentary speeches)

	Unexposed to Race	Averaged with White Vector	Averaged with Nonwhite Vector
Total Similarity of Democracy	0.29*		
	[0.15; 0.41]		
Direct Similarity of Democracy Fixing Race		0.38*	0.09
		[0.24; 0.47]	[−0.03; 0.21]
Similarity of Democracy Eliminated by Race		−0.09	0.19*
		[−0.26; 0.09]	[0.02; 0.37]

Note: * indicates null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval at the $\alpha = .05$ level. Cosine similarities between democratic terms and peace terms (the "dependent variable"). Column names indicate democracy terms unexposed to versus averaged with white and nonwhite terms. Row names indicate various cosine similarity estimates inspired by the Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2018) framework.

References

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell and Maya Sen. 2016. "Explaining Causal Findings without Bias: Detecting and Assessing Direct Effects." *American Political Science Review* 110(3):512–529.

Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell and Maya Sen. 2018. "Analyzing Causal Mechanisms in Survey Experiments." *Political Analysis* 26(4):357–378.

Bizumic, Boris, John Duckitt, Dragan Popadic, Vincent Dru and Stephen Krauss. 2009. "A Cross-Cultural Investigation into a Reconceptualization of Ethnocentrism." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 39(6):871–899.

Blackwell, Matthew, Avidit Acharya, Maya Sen, Shiro Kuriwaki and Jacob Brown. 2021. *DirectEffects: Estimating Controlled Direct Effects for Explaining Causal Findings*. R package version 0.2.1.
URL: *https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=DirectEffects*

Caliskan, Aylin, Joanna J Bryson and Arvind Narayanan. 2017. "Semantics Derived Automatically from Language Corpora Contain Human-like Biases." *Science* 356(6334):183–186.

Dafoe, Allan, Baobao Zhang and Devin Caughey. 2018. "Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments." *Political Analysis* 26(4):399–416.

Kozlowski, Austin C, Matt Taddy and James A Evans. 2019. "The Geometry of Culture: Analyzing the Meanings of Class Through Word Embeddings." *American Sociological Review* 84(5):905–949.

R Core Team. 2021. *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing*. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
URL: *https://www.R-project.org/*

Tomz, Michael R and Jessica LP Weeks. 2013. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review* 107(4):849–865.