Supplemental Information for: Does job insecurity shape policy preferences? An experimental manipulation of labor market risk

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1 Additional Background and Motivation

In this section, we elaborate on our definition and conceptualization of "job insecurity," and provide more detail on competing notions of insecurity. We also discuss how our findings relate to previous work in the risk-focused literature.

1.1 Discussion of Labor Market Risk

Differences in individuals' exposure to labor market risk are critical to understanding politics, preferences, and partisanship. Not all jobs are equally secure, and heterogeneity in individuals' risk of job loss has implications for policy preferences. Rueda's canonical (2005) insider-outsider model of partisanship and policy-making highlights this point. In Rueda's words, insiders are "those workers with highly protected jobs" who "are sufficiently protected not to feel greatly threatened by high levels of unemployment" (Rueda 2005, 62). In contrast, outsiders are "either unemployed or hold jobs characterized by low salaries and low levels of protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privileges" (Rueda 2005, 62). With insiders caring more about personal job security and outsiders caring more about unemployment and job precariousness, the interests of those at higher risk diverge from those at lower risk of joblessness.

Indeed, not all employment situations are equally secure. Burgoon and Dekker (2010) explicitly show that temporary employment is associated with greater subjective job insecurity. Further, Marx (2014) shows that temporary workers, compared to full-time, exhibit higher demand for redistribution and support for certain left parties. This demonstrates that less-secure forms of employment affect policy preferences differently than full-time employment. It also supports the notion that temporary employment in particular entails a higher degree of insecurity for many.

Further, not all who are unemployed are equally *in*secure (particularly in the context of our focus on the United States, as shown by Rehm et al. 2012). Among those individuals not currently employed full-time, there is variation in labor market vulnerability. To illustrate the importance of this variation, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports monthly statistics on a variety of un- or under-employment situations, including individuals temporarily laid off, permanent job loses, long-term unemployed, part-time employees for "economic reasons" (those who would prefer full-time employment, those whose hours were reduced, or those who are unable to find full-time jobs), as well as those who are no longer in the labor market because they have stopped looking for a job.[1] From a macro-perspective, understanding the status and causes of these different situations is important not only to validly estimate labor market trends but also because different policy tools will be better able to serve different forms of joblessness.

[1] https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm

1.2 Operationalization of Job Insecurity

Individual-level economic insecurity is a function of several factors, including labor market (in)security (e.g., Osberg 2015). Labor market insecurity itself can be thought of as a function of multiple factors, including (1) risk of job loss, (2) likelihood of (not) finding another similar job, (3) loss of income while unemployed, and (4) uncertainty over content/quality of one's job. Our theory and research design focus on the first of these components: *cognitive job insecurity*. As defined by Anderson and Pontusson (2007, 214), cognitive job insecurity is "the individual's estimate of the probability that he or she will lose their job...in the near future." Cognitive job insecurity is one's perception of their risk of job loss. Our theory hinges on individuals' perceptions of labor market risk because it is through individuals' cognitive processes that macroeconomic information shapes policy preferences. Below, we elaborate on the advantages of our measure of cognitive job insecurity.

First, our operationalization of job insecurity allows for direct comparison to findings in previous work. Constructs of subjective job insecurity similar (or nearly identical) to ours are commonly employed in the study of policy preferences, behavior, and psychology (for example, see well-cited works including Berglund et al. 2014; Burgoon and Dekker 2010; Dominitz and Manski 1997; Mohr 2000; Sverke and Hellgren 2002). In part, this is due to data availability. Both the General Social Survey (GSS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) have included a measure of cognitive job insecurity on several survey waves in recent decades: e.g., "do you think it is likely that you will lose your job or be laid off in the next 12 months." This construct is commonly used in survey research for good reason— it is preferred to the alternatives for theoretical consistency and transparency (also see Marx and Picot 2020). Eliciting individuals' expectations about future insecurity with probabilistic survey and experimental questions (like ours) is a validated technique and yields more informative responses than qualitative questions (for example, Ashford et al. 1989; Dominitz and Manski 1997; Manski 1990; Marx and Picot 2020; Savage 1971).

Second, our construct of job insecurity has the advantages of parsimony and validity. Subjective *expectations* of job loss robustly predict the probability of subsequent *actual* job loss, which means that subjective evaluations are informed by "real" or objective labor market risk. This has been demonstrated in Australia and Germany (Dickerson and Green 2012), in the UK (Campbell et al. 2007), and—most relevant to our study—in the US (Stephens 2004). Importantly, subjective perceptions of job insecurity reflect private information about an individual (skills, abilities, knowledge, characteristics, etc.), the specific employment situation (protections, wages, competition, etc.), their workplace (management, organizational-level factors, etc.), and larger context (local economic or occupational-level insecurity), all of which contribute to the realization of job loss (Lowe 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2010). Thus, our use of cognitive job insecurity as a subjective and perceptual measure is informative and analytically meaningful.

Moreover, the advantages of our conceptualization are clear when compared to the alternatives. First, we could measure respondents' *objective* job insecurity—commonly operationalized by one's occupational unemployment rate (c.f., Compton and Lipsmeyer 2019; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; Rehm 2009). This allows for the nuanced study of macro-level risk context (i.e., Rehm 2016). At the micro-level, it is advantageous to use an objective construct of insecurity because auxiliary statistical data can be used as a proxy for respondents' likelihood of unemployment in circumstances where surveying subjective insecurity is not possible. However, neither advantage is relevant in our case. Further, objective job insecurity does not uniformly or universally lead to subjective job insecurity (van Vuuren et al. 2010). Most importantly for our study, however, objective job insecurity cannot be (ethically or feasibly) manipulated in a survey experiment. We cannot increase or decrease a respondent's actual level of (un)employment nor can we increase or decrease a respondent's actual risk of future unemployment. Thus, for both practical reasons and conceptual validity, we prefer cognitive job insecurity. Rather than a contemporaneous indicator of one's objective labor market insecurity, some work on social policy preferences has successfully leveraged past experiences with insecurity, including Margalit (2013) and Hacker et al. (2013). Considering how this may affect our research question, it seems plausible that individuals with heterogeneous experiences in the frequency or duration of unemployment may process macroeconomic information differently, or they may vary in their cognitive or affective job insecurity. These are interesting and important questions for future research.

Another approach would be to evaluate respondents' *affective* job insecurity, that is, how "worried" one is about future joblessness or under-employment. In the study of economic insecurity generally (e.g., Mughan 2007), and labor market insecurity specifically (e.g., Anderson and Pontusson 2007; Melcher 2021), affective insecurity is an important predictor of policy preferences. Although affective job insecurity (worry about joblessness) is partly explained by cognitive job insecurity (perceived likelihood of joblessness), it is also influenced by a variety of other contextual and psychological factors (see, Anderson and Pontusson 2007). These other factors are extraneous to our theoretical mechanism. Furthermore, the relationship between cognitive job insecurity and affective job insecurity is neither direct nor unconditional (Jiang et al. 2020). Thus, for theoretical parsimony and construct validity, we prefer cognitive job insecurity.

Regarding our measurement of sociotropic (macroeconomic) risk, it could be argued that a country-average unemployment rate is an abstract measure of risk. This aggregate indicator of insecurity, however, has two advantages. First, macroeconomic indicators provide information about sociotropic risk. Beginning with Kinder and Kiewiet (1979), sociotropic concern has been understood as "citizens' assessments of the nation's economic predicament" (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 130). Thus, we believe the national unemployment rate is a valid construct for our concept of sociotropic insecurity. Second, the national unemployment rate (as compared to alternative macro-indicators like growth or inflation) is directly relevant to unemployment insurance.

1.3 Relating Our Findings to Existing Literature

Our findings suggest that induced job insecurity does *not* translate into preferences for more generous unemployment insurance policy. One explanation for this appears to be partisanship. The policy preferences of (right-leaning) Republicans are more sensitive to our treatment(s) than (left-leaning) Democrats. It would not be surprising at all to find that right-leaning respondents preferred less generous or inclusive unemployment insurance—of course they do! What *is* surprising about our results is that Republicans respond to sociotropic risk information (whether positive or negative) with *less* support for unemployment insurance. Why both positive and negative sociotropic risk information prompts this response among conservatives is the puzzle, in our view.

One explanation may have to do with the trade-offs between social investment and compensatory policy. Preemptive skill development may be preferred by some individuals to reactionary compensation for individuals who find themselves out of a job— this boils down to a question about individuals' preferences over investment versus compensation. Null results in our experiment might be explained by respondents' preference for social investment policies (such as education or employment protection) over compensatory unemployment insurance. In particular, this might be the case among left-leaning Democrats, whose support for unemployment insurance generosity is not significantly or substantively moved by our treatments. Among right-leaning Republicans, however, it is less clear that support for social investment would result in their preference for *less* generous unemployment insurance in response to *both* positive and negative sociotropic information.

Further, in the United States, and "right to work" states, in particular, comparatively meager employment protection laws exist and labor union strength is historically low. The primary policy tool to insure against economic insecurity from joblessness is unemployment insurance. Put differently, given the policy context of the US, we might expect Americans to be less acutely aware of (or have fully formed preferences over) the trade-offs between investment and compensation compared to other developed contexts with more robust employment protections. This is, ultimately, an empirical question, however.

A second explanation may have to do with moral values. Many studies have considered asymmetries in the values associated with left-right ideology, and this literature helps contextualize our findings. Importantly, conservative/right ideologues rely more on: principles of (small) size of government and traditional moral values (Goren 2012); values of, among others, dogmatism (unwillingness to compromise), cognitive rigidity (Jost 2017); and they tend to exhibit greater attitudinal stability and certainty with less attitudinal ambivalence compared to liberals (Jost and Krochik 2014). Conservatives' reliance on the principle of small government is combined with a tendency to believe in the importance of individualistic causes and decreased perceptions of the importance of societal causes, pity, or intentions to help (Zucker and Weiner 1993). Some combination

of these values and principles may explain our findings. In particular, when presented with information about sociotropic risk (good or bad), ideological conservatives may reflexively rely on the principle of small government and belief in economic individualism in forming a preference over policy, tending to prefer less generosity and less inclusivity as a result. While we could theorize on the combination of values or principles which may explain our findings, we are unable to explore this question empirically within the data available. Better understanding how ideology (and underlying values and morals) moderate information about one's risk environment should be a priority in future work.

A third explanation for our asymmetric partisan results could simply be that we have empirically identified a ceiling effect among Democrats. A ceiling effect in support for unemployment insurance generosity would be evidenced by right-leaning Republicans (typically less supportive of social policy) being more sensitive to economic insecurity and thereby responding with a *larger* increase in support for unemployment insurance than left-leaning Democrats exposed to the same treatment. Because Democrats are generally already strongly supportive of social policy, an economic shock would have little or no effect on their support— they are already about as supportive as they could possibly be. Our findings about Republicans, however, offer a different puzzle. Compared to Democrats, we find a stronger response from Republicans, but not in the direction of greater support for unemployment insurance in response to economic insecurity. Republicans who are exposed to the *in*secure treatment report *less* support for unemployment insurance generosity than Republicans who were not exposed to that treatment. This would suggest that Republicans exposed to any sort of sociotropic information (positive or negative) respond by retrenching their support for unemployment insurance generosity, not by increasing support.

We are not the first to find that social policy preferences of partisans' in the US respond asymmetrically to economic insecurity. Margalit (2013) finds that (negative) economic shocks have a larger *positive* impact on Republicans' support for social policy than on Democrats. The reason for this is not obvious. In Margalit's words: "It is not *ex-ante* obvious why the impact of economic shocks on the welfare preferences of right-of-center voters is more significant" (2013, 96). To explain this unexpected result, Margalit explores three possibilities: (1) personal characteristics differ across partisan ID, (2) differences in circumstances such as skill or education that may, and finally, (3) a ceiling effect. Empirically, Margalit (2013, 98) explores each option and finds only limited evidence for a ceiling effect, concluding that: "These patterns suggest the ceiling effect accounts for some of the partisan difference in responses to the shocks. Nonetheless, a nontrivial share of the variation remains unexplained."

While our results align with Margalit's to the extent that Republicans' policy preferences are more sensitive to economic insecurity shocks than Democrats', our findings notably diverge from Margalit's in the direction of that effect. Margalit's results (at least partly) support the notion of a ceiling effect, whereby Republicans *increase* their support relatively more than those who are generally more supportive of such policies. As dis-

cussed above, our results are not consistent with this interpretation, because we find that Republicans *reduce* their support in response to insecurity (and security).

Given our findings, one might question whether our results falsify some of the risk-focused literature. This is not our view. Rather, our findings add evidence in favor of a nuanced and conditional model of economic insecurity and policy preferences. The risk-focused literature has already moved towards a model of risk and policy preferences that recognizes context-conditionality (regarding policy institutions, in particular, see, Compton and Lipsmeyer 2019; Gingrich and Ansell 2012). Given our findings, we hope that more work will be done within the risk-focused literature to better understand how ideology (and underlying values and morals) or other individual-level characteristics condition or moderate the relationship between insecurity and policy preferences, ultimately in a manner that incorporates context-conditionality as well.

1.4 Case Selection and Generalizability

We view our case selection of the United States to be a most-likely critical case, according to Eckstein's (1975) typology. The influence of personal economic insecurity should be larger in the US context compared to other developed democracies where policy provides more comprehensive and generous insurance against economic risks (Compton and Lipsmeyer 2019). In other contexts, with greater institutionalized security through policy (Osberg and Sharpe 2014; Pallage et al. 2013), we would expect respondents' policy preferences to be comparatively less responsive to personal insecurity and more responsive to sociotropic insecurity. In this study, we test whether information about sociotropic risk shapes policy preferences through its effect on personal insecurity. We would not expect this mechanism to operate as strongly in contexts with greater institutionalized security because personal insecurity should be (1) less influential or salient where social insurance is more comprehensive, and, (2) more resistant to short-term fluctuations where labor protection is more robust.

Even so, there may exist substantial heterogeneity *within* the US, most notably because individual states are tasked with providing unemployment insurance. To this end, regional-specific differences might be driving our results. To assess this, in this section we examine three different ways of breaking out respondents by region or regional-specific differences.

First, in Figure 1 we replicate our main results but separate respondents by each of the five US Census regions they reside in: the Northeast ($N = 179$), Southeast ($N = 215$), Midwest ($N = 183$), Southwest ($N = 102$) and West ($N = 170$). While the CCES records respondents' state, rather than region, a state-by-state comparison is not possible due to small sample sizes in some states. As shown in Figure 1, even despite the fairly large confidence intervals due to a smaller number of respondents per region, there is some interesting heterogeneity in our results. In terms of self-perceived labor market

insecurity, the Southeast (red triangle) is the most different than the other regions for the secure relative to the control and insecure relative to the secure treatment results. For unemployment insurance generosity, the biggest source of heterogeneity appears to be the Southwest (cyan diamond), while for duration eligibility both the Southwest and Northeast (blue circle) appear to have the strongest or most atypical results compared to the other Census regions. There does not appear to be much heterogeneity in terms of restrictive eligibility, and overall the confidence intervals for each region always overlap with the confidence intervals of at least one other region. One explanation for spatial heterogeneity in sensitivity to our treatments could be variation in context— either in macroeconomic risk or state-level policy.



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity

(b) Unemployment insurance generosity

(c) Duration eligibility

(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 1: Main results, splitting by US Census regions

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Circle: Northeast, Triangle: Southeast, Solid Square: Midwest, Diamond: Southwest, Hollow Square: West.

Next, to consider policy context, we parse the analysis states' "right-to-work" poli-

cies.[2] Our sample includes 405 respondents residing in a right-to-work state and 444 respondents residing in a state that is not classified as a right-to-work state. As shown in Figure 2, which replicates our findings in the main manuscript, we do see some interesting heterogeneity across right-to-work (RtW) status. Those in RtW states respond more strongly to the insecurity prompt concerning their self-perceived labor market insecurity than those not in a RtW state. This result comports with prior research on the role of institutionalized security through policy (for example, Compton and Lipsmeyer 2019; Gingrich and Ansell 2012). In states with fewer employment protections (RtW states), respondents' perceptions of their own job insecurity are more sensitive to macroeconomic information. In contrast, those in non-RtW states tend to prefer less generous unemployment insurance, duration eligibility, and restrictive eligibility when receiving the insecurity treatment (relative to both the control and secure groups). We do not find any statistically significant difference for those living in a RtW state, in contrast. In states with greater employment protections (non-RtW states), respondents presented with the insecure treatment indicate a retrenchment in support for unemployment insurance. One explanation for this result could be a preference among residents in non-RtW states for greater social investment to reduce the likelihood of unemployment rather than compensatory policy to cushion the losses of joblessness (see, Busemeyer and Garritzmann 2019).

Lastly, we consider whether macroeconomic context may play a role. Using official state-level unemployment rates in November 2020 (the month this survey was administered), we separate respondents into macroeconomic risk quartiles (e.g., respondents living in the states with the 0-25% lowest unemployment, 26-50%, etc.). As shown in Figure 3, the results in the main paper regarding self-perceived labor market insecurity line up with all four quartiles shown (i.e., the insecurity treatment causes an increase in self-perceived insecurity), although this effect appears to be largest for those living in states with the third quartile of unemployment (the lavender square). For changes in unemployment insurance generosity, duration eligibility, and restrictiveness eligibility, most of the quartiles have nearly identical effects, with one exception; respondents in the bottom quartile of state unemployment (meaning those states with the *lowest* unemployment rates) appear to prefer less duration eligibility, restrictive eligibility, and unemployment insurance generosity when given the insecurity treatments. Residents in states with relatively lower sociotropic or macroeconomic risk (low unemployment rates) appear less sensitive to the insecurity prompt. This result seems to align with the findings of Lau and Heldman (2009), that high sociotropic insecurity substantially increases the effect of personal economic insecurity on policy attitudes.

To summarize our findings in this section: first, we find some evidence of heterogeneity in our results in the Southeast, Southwest, and Northeast. Second, when examining policy context through coding whether respondents live in right-to-work states, we find that our overall results grow stronger; individuals living in right-to-work states (and

[2]We obtained this list from https://nrtwc.org/facts/state-right-to-work-timeline-2016/, accessed July 10, 2022.



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity



(b) Unemployment insurance generosity



(c) Duration eligibility



(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 2: Main results, splitting by right-to-work status

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Circle: Respondent does not live in a right-to-work state, Triangle: Respondent lives in a right-to-work state



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity



(b) Unemployment insurance generosity



(c) Duration eligibility



(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 3: Main results, splitting by state unemployment quartiles

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Circle: bottom quartile, Triangle: second quartile, Solid Square: third quartile, Diamond: top quartile.

who may be less shielded from labor market fluctuations) are more sensitive to our insecurity treatments. Last, to analyze the broader macroeconomic context, we find that those residing in lower unemployment states respond to insecurity with less support for expansive unemployment insurance.

2 Difference of Means

In Table 1 we show means for several covariates as well as difference of means tests to see if the two treatment groups differ from the control group. We find that these covariates are balanced across treatment and control groups with two exceptions— slight differences emerge between the number of Republican and Democratic respondents. Given this, in the "Results: Adding Controls" section below we include these (as well as several other) covariates and find that our conclusions in the main manuscript hold.

Table 1: Balance between treated and control groups

	Means			Difference-in-Means	
Variable	Control (N=297)	Lower Insecurity Treatment (N=280)	Higher Insecurity Treatment (N=272)	Control vs. Higher	Control vs. Lower
Female	0.42	0.44	0.43	-0.36 (0.71)	-0.14 (0.89)
Age	52.46	50.21	53.28	-0.60 (0.55)	1.64 (0.10)
Republican	0.24	0.29	0.30	-1.75 (0.08)	-1.39 (0.17)
Democrat	0.44	0.35	0.36	1.89 (0.06)	2.16 (0.03)
Catholic	0.17	0.18	0.22	-1.51 (0.13)	-0.26 (0.80)
Protestant	0.39	0.40	0.34	1.29 (0.20)	-0.24 (0.81)
Non-white	0.24	0.27	0.28	-1.08 (0.28)	-0.80 (0.42)
Latinx	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.53 (0.60)	1.54 (0.12)

t-statistics with p-values in parentheses shown for difference in means tests. Two-tailed tests.

3 Results: Employed-Only

The analysis presented in the main manuscript includes *all* respondents regardless of labor market status (employed, unemployed, retired, students, etc.). To explore the robustness of our main findings, in Figure 4, we replicate all four figures from our main analysis

while now only including those respondents who indicated they were either full- or part-time employed.



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity



(b) Unemployment insurance generosity



(c) Duration eligibility



(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 4: Main results, *only* full/part-time employed respondents

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

4 Results: Gender-, Education, and Race-Specific Differences

In the main paper we showed difference-of-means plots as well as plots where we split out respondents by partisan identification. Below we replicate our plots from the main paper, but now investigate gender, education, and race-specific differences. We examine

these subgroups because they are politically salient in the US context and because we have valid measures for these groups within the survey.

In Figure 5 we replicate our results but split respondents by gender. As is clear from the figure, there are no statistically significant differences between gender for any of the results. However, treatment effects, especially for the self-perceived labor market insecurity and unemployment insurance generosity responses, appear to be larger for male respondents than female respondents. In fact, the only statistically significant results (from zero) we observe appear to be coming from male respondents. For the other three plots in Figure 5 (unemployment insurance generosity, duration eligibility, and restrictiveness eligibility) none of the effects are statistically significant no matter whether we look at men or women. Thus, if anything men might be more sensitive to the different treatment prompts, although these differences are small.

In Figure 6 we show our results, now splitting by education—whether the respondent has less than a bachelor's degree or whether the respondent completed at least a bachelor's. Similar to our results for gender there do not appear to be any large differences between these two groups. We do find evidence of statistically significant results only for those with less than a bachelor's degree (for self-perceived labor market insecurity; this suggests that those with less education might feel more insecure given our insecurity prompt) and those with at least a bachelor's appear to want less duration eligibility when given the insecurity prompt relative to the control group.

Last, in Figure 7 we again parse our findings, this time separating by white versus non-white respondents. The results across these two groups are near-identical, although interestingly non-white respondents appear to have responded more strongly to our insecurity treatment (relative to the control) than white respondents. Given that non-white racial and ethnic minorities in the United States face greater labor market insecurity and labor market discrimination, it is not surprising that these respondents are more sensitive to the insecure treatment. Confidence intervals are often much smaller for white respondents than non-white respondents, but that is likely driven by the differences in respondents between groups ($N = 627$ for white and $N = 222$ for non-white).

5 Results: Adding Controls

In the main paper we presented difference-of-means plots, which did not include any control variables since the treatment and control statuses were randomly assigned to respondents. Below we recreate the analyses in the main manuscript but include the following control variables: dichotomous variables equal to one if the respondent is female, a Republican, a Democrat, and non-white, the age of the respondent, the discount rate of the respondent, the level of risk acceptance of the respondent, and a six-point education scale. The results in our main analysis remain robust to the inclusion of these control variables. For instance, while we find evidence that the insecure treatment, relative to



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity



(b) Unemployment insurance generosity



(c) Duration eligibility



(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 5: Main results, splitting by gender

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Circle: male, Triangle: female.



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity



(b) Unemployment insurance generosity



(c) Duration eligibility



(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 6: Main results, splitting by education

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Circle: less than bachelor's degree, Triangle: bachelor's degree or higher.



(a) Self-perceived labor market insecurity



(b) Unemployment insurance generosity



(c) Duration eligibility



(d) Restrictiveness eligibility

Figure 7: Main results, splitting by white/non-white respondents

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown. Circle: white, Triangle: non-white.

both the control and secure treatments, leads to a greater feeling of self-perceived insecurity among respondents (see Models 2 and 3 in Table 2), we find no evidence that the differences in our treatment effects lead to any statistically significant changes in terms of unemployment generosity (see Table 3), duration eligibility (Table 4), and restrictiveness eligibility (Table 5).

Table 2: Results for Self-Perceived Insecurity (with Controls)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Secure Relative to Control	-0.076	(0.171)				
Insecure Relative to Control			0.590**	(0.203)		
Insecure Relative to Secure					0.665***	(0.195)
Female	-0.083	(0.180)	-0.100	(0.194)	-0.167	(0.202)
Age	-0.021***	(0.005)	-0.015*	(0.006)	-0.018**	(0.006)
Republican	-0.198	(0.234)	0.051	(0.267)	-0.504*	(0.236)
Democrat	-0.013	(0.214)	0.177	(0.234)	0.015	(0.246)
Non-White	0.478*	(0.224)	0.670*	(0.262)	0.748**	(0.253)
Discount Rate	-0.004	(0.042)	-0.069	(0.048)	-0.000	(0.046)
Risk Acceptance	0.024	(0.040)	0.048	(0.049)	0.023	(0.045)
Education	-0.048	(0.064)	-0.053	(0.072)	-0.122	(0.068)
Constant	2.356***	(0.467)	2.217***	(0.570)	2.482***	(0.565)
N	354		336		340	
R^2	0.07		0.08		0.12	

Note: Regression with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* \ p < 0.10$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$.

Some of the effects of the control variables are also worth discussing. There appears to be no statistically significant gender difference for either the three unemployment policy dimensions or self-perceived insecurity. In Table 2, we find that the two largest drivers across the board for control variables appear to be age—older respondents have less self-perceived insecurity, all else equal—and non-white—non-white respondents have higher levels of self-perceived insecurity. In contrast, in the other three tables we do not find much of any statistically significant effect of either age nor white/non-white status (perhaps except for slightly more restrictiveness eligibility preferred by older respondents in Table 5).

Instead, the control variables in the other tables seem to indicate that Republican respondents tend to prefer more restrictive eligibility, less duration eligibility, and less

Table 3: Results for Unemployment Generosity (with Controls)

	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Secure Relative to Control	-0.044	(0.123)				
Insecure Relative to Control			-0.159	(0.121)		
Insecure Relative to Secure					-0.121	(0.117)
Female	-0.193	(0.125)	-0.015	(0.121)	-0.144	(0.124)
Age	-0.003	(0.004)	-0.003	(0.003)	-0.002	(0.004)
Republican	-0.503**	(0.162)	-0.579***	(0.159)	-0.928***	(0.160)
Democrat	0.419**	(0.154)	0.433**	(0.140)	0.317*	(0.138)
Non-White	-0.043	(0.147)	-0.063	(0.145)	0.035	(0.135)
Discount Rate	0.071*	(0.034)	0.074*	(0.033)	0.054	(0.034)
Risk Acceptance	-0.031	(0.029)	-0.027	(0.029)	-0.025	(0.027)
Education	0.117**	(0.042)	0.103*	(0.041)	0.093*	(0.042)
Constant	4.296***	(0.333)	4.225***	(0.322)	4.513***	(0.331)
N	561		572		545	
R^2	0.10		0.11		0.16	

Note: Regression with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* \ p < 0.10$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$.

unemployment generosity, while Democratic respondents prefer more of these policies, all else equal. Other interesting findings are that those with higher discount rates tend to prefer less restrictiveness eligibility, more duration eligibility, and more unemployment generosity, and that education tends to be associated with greater duration eligibility and unemployment generosity, although only the latter rises to conventional levels of statistical significance (and then only in one of the three models in Table 3).

Table 4: Results for Duration Eligibility (with Controls)

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Secure Relative to Control	-0.080	(0.122)				
Insecure Relative to Control			-0.159	(0.126)		
Insecure Relative to Secure					-0.079	(0.128)
Female	-0.245	(0.131)	-0.171	(0.127)	-0.156	(0.128)
Age	-0.003	(0.004)	0.002	(0.004)	-0.001	(0.004)
Republican	-0.470**	(0.172)	-0.560***	(0.169)	-0.899***	(0.175)
Democrat	0.508***	(0.153)	0.422**	(0.150)	0.347*	(0.149)
Non-White	-0.009	(0.153)	-0.010	(0.156)	0.053	(0.141)
Discount Rate	0.098**	(0.035)	0.084*	(0.035)	0.114***	(0.033)
Risk Acceptance	-0.010	(0.030)	0.027	(0.030)	-0.012	(0.027)
Education	0.098*	(0.045)	0.078	(0.044)	0.020	(0.043)
Constant	4.085***	(0.336)	3.841***	(0.349)	4.232***	(0.360)
N	562		573		545	
R^2	0.11		0.10		0.15	

Note: Regression with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* \ p < 0.10$, $** \ p < 0.05$, $*** \ p < 0.01$.

6 Results: Additional Hypothesis Tests

In our pre-analysis plan we had several hypotheses not explicitly tested in our research note. While we tested hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, and 2c, below we test the following additional hypotheses.

Table 5: Results for Restrictiveness Eligibility (with Controls)

	Model 10		Model 11		Model 12	
	b	se	b	se	b	se
Secure Relative to Control	0.080	(0.137)				
Insecure Relative to Control			-0.105	(0.139)		
Insecure Relative to Secure					-0.180	(0.136)
Female	-0.252	(0.143)	-0.207	(0.138)	-0.127	(0.140)
Age	-0.013**	(0.004)	-0.008	(0.004)	-0.013**	(0.004)
Republican	-0.789***	(0.187)	-1.002***	(0.180)	-0.861***	(0.185)
Democrat	0.374*	(0.168)	0.259	(0.154)	0.364*	(0.158)
Non-White	0.044	(0.163)	0.144	(0.162)	0.178	(0.149)
Discount Rate	0.093*	(0.037)	0.082*	(0.037)	0.093**	(0.035)
Risk Acceptance	0.045	(0.032)	0.022	(0.032)	-0.005	(0.031)
Education	-0.001	(0.050)	0.010	(0.045)	0.006	(0.047)
Constant	4.214***	(0.352)	4.131***	(0.347)	4.453***	(0.368)
N	562		573		545	
R^2	0.13		0.13		0.15	

Note: Regression with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* \; p < 0.10$, $** \; p < 0.05$, $*** \; p < 0.01$.

6.1 Additional Experimental Expectations

Below we show the results for additional expectations with respect to our experimental treatments.

- **Hypothesis 3:** Respondents receiving the higher insecurity treatment will rank the importance of generosity of UI benefit amounts and strictness of UI eligibility criteria higher and will rank the importance of duration of UI benefits and cost of the UI program lower. These results are shown in Table 6, using an "exploded" logit model. Since each respondent was asked to rank—from 1 to 4, with 1 being most important and 4 least important—each policy, exploded logistic regression estimates ordered logits for each of the four policies, where each dependent variable is the rank of that particular policy for respondent i. As shown in Table 6, we find no statistically significant evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3, although the coefficients on benefit generosity and duration eligibility are in the expected direction.

Table 6: Results for Hypothesis 3

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Insecure Treatment	0.262	(0.152)	-0.098	(0.151)	-0.139	(0.150)	0.003	(0.151)
Secure Treatment	0.417**	(0.152)	-0.089	(0.152)	-0.239	(0.151)	-0.024	(0.153)
τ_1	-0.378***	(0.110)	-1.431***	(0.121)	-1.152***	(0.117)	-1.538***	(0.123)
τ_2	0.756***	(0.112)	0.333**	(0.110)	-0.397***	(0.110)	-0.668***	(0.110)
τ_3	2.104***	(0.135)	1.668***	(0.128)	0.685***	(0.112)	0.368***	(0.109)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* \, p < 0.10$, $** \, p < 0.05$, $*** \, p < 0.01$.

- **Hypothesis 4a**: The effects of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on preferences for UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's discount rate. As shown in Figure 8, we find no evidence that the insecurity prompt is conditional on the respondent's discount rate.

- **Hypothesis 4b**: The effects of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on the ranked importance of UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's discount rate. These results are shown in Table 7. Higher discount rate values mean that a respondent is very willing to give up something today. We find no evidence that either the insecure or secure prompts have an interactive effect with the discount rate.

- **Hypothesis 5a**: The effects of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on preferences for UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's risk orientation. These results are shown in Figure 9. We find no evidence that either type



Figure 8: Results for Hypothesis 4a

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

Table 7: Results for Hypothesis 4b

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Insecure Treatment	0.942	(0.527)	-0.052	(0.526)	-0.889	(0.526)	0.184	(0.523)
Secure Treatment	0.145	(0.541)	-0.342	(0.532)	-0.692	(0.538)	0.931	(0.540)
Discount Rate	-0.038	(0.054)	0.021	(0.054)	-0.037	(0.054)	0.053	(0.052)
Insecure×Discount Rate	-0.102	(0.073)	-0.006	(0.072)	0.107	(0.071)	-0.025	(0.072)
Secure×Discount Rate	0.038	(0.074)	0.038	(0.074)	0.065	(0.074)	-0.137	(0.075)
τ_1	-0.664	(0.401)	-1.279**	(0.397)	-1.417***	(0.402)	-1.167**	(0.386)
τ_2	0.484	(0.401)	0.480	(0.395)	-0.659	(0.400)	-0.294	(0.383)
τ_3	1.840***	(0.407)	1.819***	(0.401)	0.418	(0.399)	0.746	(0.384)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $*\ p < 0.10$, $**\ p < 0.05$, $***\ p < 0.01$.

of prompt is conditional on risk orientation across our three unemployment policy aspects.



Figure 9: Results for Hypothesis 5a

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

- **Hypothesis 5b**: The effect of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on the ranked importance of UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's risk orientation. These results using an exploded logit are shown in Table 8. Higher values of risk correspond with a greater tolerance for risk-taking. Similar to our other conditional hypotheses, we find no evidence of an interactive relationship between risk and our security/insecurity treatments.

6.2 Subjective Economic Insecurity Expectations

In this section, we present results for a series of expectations we have about economic insecurity that do not involve our experimental treatments.

- **Hypothesis 6a, 6b, and 6c**: Respondents with greater subjective economic insecurity will support more generous UI weekly benefit amounts (6a), a longer duration of UI eligibility (6b), and will support less restrictive UI eligibility criteria (6c). These results are shown in Figure 10. We find evidence in support of all three of these

Table 8: Results for Hypothesis 5b

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Insecure Treatment	0.833*	(0.351)	-0.244	(0.354)	-0.645	(0.355)	0.098	(0.349)
Secure Treatment	0.720*	(0.357)	-0.749*	(0.367)	-0.475	(0.365)	0.546	(0.372)
Risk	0.064	(0.045)	0.012	(0.045)	-0.061	(0.046)	-0.011	(0.043)
Insecure×Risk	-0.116	(0.064)	0.031	(0.066)	0.103	(0.065)	-0.020	(0.064)
Secure×Risk	-0.063	(0.065)	0.131	(0.068)	0.051	(0.067)	-0.112	(0.068)
τ_1	-0.058	(0.248)	-1.375***	(0.254)	-1.471***	(0.259)	-1.593***	(0.249)
τ_2	1.084***	(0.251)	0.408	(0.249)	-0.709**	(0.255)	-0.736**	(0.243)
τ_3	2.454***	(0.264)	1.747***	(0.258)	0.380	(0.253)	0.310	(0.242)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $*\ p < 0.10$, $**\ p < 0.05$, $***\ p < 0.01$.

hypotheses, as indicated by the positive coefficients across each of the three models (benefits, duration, and strictness).

- **Hypothesis 7**: Respondents with greater subjective economic insecurity will rank the importance of generosity of UI weekly benefit amounts and strictness of UI eligibility criteria higher, and will rank the importance of duration of UI benefits and cost of the UI program lower. These results are shown in Table 9 using an exploded logit. Interestingly, while we find that increased economic insecurity leads to increased restrictiveness eligibility and less duration eligibility—as our hypothesis expected—we find that greater economic insecurity leads to a lower ranking for benefit generosity. We also find that economic insecurity does not have a statistically significant effect on the ranking of program cost.

Table 9: Results for Hypothesis 7

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Economic Insecurity	-0.131**	(0.044)	-0.123**	(0.044)	0.177***	(0.044)	0.023	(0.043)
τ_1	-0.859***	(0.115)	-1.692***	(0.135)	-0.689***	(0.113)	-1.412***	(0.128)
τ_2	0.276*	(0.109)	0.108	(0.108)	0.095	(0.108)	-0.564***	(0.113)
τ_3	1.741***	(0.142)	1.373***	(0.128)	1.193***	(0.120)	0.406***	(0.111)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $*\ p < 0.10$, $**\ p < 0.05$, $***\ p < 0.01$.



Figure 10: Results for Hypotheses 6a, 6b, and 6c

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

6.3 Risk Tolerance Expectations

- **Hypothesis 8a, 8b, and 8c**: Respondents with lower risk tolerance will support more generous UI weekly benefit amounts (8a), a longer duration of UI eligibility (8b), and will support less restrictive UI eligibility criteria (8c). We test these three hypotheses in Figure 11. The results indicate that while increased risk (i.e., lower risk tolerance) leads to lower benefit amounts and increased duration and restrictiveness, none of the coefficients are statistically significant.

- **Hypothesis 9**: Respondents with a lower risk tolerance will rank the importance of UI program dimensions differently than respondents with a higher risk tolerance. A test of this hypothesis is shown in Table 10, which shows that for the most part risk tolerance is unassociated with the ranking of the UI program dimensions. We find some evidence that those with higher risk acceptance tend to rank duration eligibility higher, although this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels.



Figure 11: Results for Hypotheses 8a, 8b, and 8c

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

Table 10: Results for Hypothesis 9

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Risk Acceptance	0.005	(0.026)	0.062*	(0.027)	-0.010	(0.027)	-0.049	(0.027)
τ_1	-0.560***	(0.149)	-1.061***	(0.156)	-1.094***	(0.156)	-1.772***	(0.164)
τ_2	0.572***	(0.149)	0.715***	(0.152)	-0.335*	(0.151)	-0.917***	(0.154)
τ_3	1.932***	(0.167)	2.049***	(0.169)	0.747***	(0.152)	0.126	(0.151)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $*\ p < 0.10$, $**\ p < 0.05$, $***\ p < 0.01$.

6.4 Discount Rate Expectations

- **Hypothesis 10a, 10b, 10c**: Respondents with a lower discount rate will support more generous UI weekly benefit amounts (10a), a longer duration of UI eligibility (10b), and will support less restrictive UI eligibility criteria (10c). These results are shown in Figure 12. Surprisingly, we find the opposite; as discount rate *increases* respondents tend to support more generous UI weekly benefit amounts, a longer duration of UI eligibility, and less restrictive UI eligibility criteria.



Figure 12: Results for Hypotheses 10a, 10b, and 10c

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

- **Hypothesis 11**: Respondents with a lower discount rate will rank the importance of UI program dimensions differently than respondents with a higher discount rate. Results for this hypothesis test are shown in Table 11. We find no evidence in support of this hypothesis, with perhaps the exception of respondents with a higher discount rate who tend to rank benefit generosity lower, although this effect is only statistically significant at the 0.10 level.

6.5 Altruism Expectations

- **Hypothesis 12a, 12b, 12c**: Respondents with a higher propensity for altruism will support more generous UI weekly benefit amounts (12a), a longer duration of UI el-

Table 11: Results for Hypothesis 11

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Discount Rate	-0.067*	(0.029)	0.033	(0.029)	0.027	(0.029)	-0.000	(0.030)
τ_1	-1.065***	(0.217)	-1.140***	(0.217)	-0.834***	(0.216)	-1.529***	(0.225)
τ_2	0.070	(0.214)	0.618**	(0.214)	-0.078	(0.214)	-0.659**	(0.218)
τ_3	1.417***	(0.223)	1.956***	(0.225)	0.993***	(0.216)	0.379	(0.218)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$.

igibility (12b), and will support less restrictive UI eligibility criteria (12c). As shown in Figure 13, we find support for all three of these hypotheses, although the largest magnitude appears to be for benefits and duration of the UI program. In other words, as a respondent's altruism increases, they support expanding all three UI aspects (benefits, strictness, and duration).

- **Hypothesis 13**: Respondents with a higher propensity for altruism will rank the importance of UI program dimensions differently than respondents with a lower propensity for altruism. Results for this hypothesis test are shown in Table 12, once again using exploded logistic regression. While we find no statistically significant evidence that increased altruism affects the ranking for either duration eligibility or restrictiveness eligibility, we do find that more altruistic individuals tend to rank benefit generosity as less important, and program cost as more important, although the latter effect is only weakly statistically significant.

Table 12: Results for Hypothesis 13

	Benefit Generosity		Duration Eligibility		Restrictiveness Eligibility		Program Cost	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Altruism	-0.078**	(0.030)	-0.007	(0.030)	0.019	(0.029)	0.063*	(0.030)
τ_1	-1.180***	(0.240)	-1.426***	(0.244)	-0.882***	(0.234)	-1.066***	(0.240)
τ_2	-0.045	(0.236)	0.341	(0.239)	-0.129	(0.233)	-0.196	(0.235)
τ_3	1.305***	(0.243)	1.668***	(0.248)	0.956***	(0.235)	0.845***	(0.237)

Note: Exploded logistic regression shown with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests. $* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$.



Figure 13: Results for Hypotheses 12a, 12b, and 12c

Note: Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals shown

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8 Registered Pre-Analysis Plan

Below is our original pre-registered analysis plan submitted in February 2021.

Pre-Analysis Plan for: "Support for What? Economic Insecurity and Multidimensional Social Policy Preferences"

Author names omitted for anonymity

February 2021

1 Study Information

According to decades of research on political behavior, economic or labor-market risk should motivate support for social welfare policy, especially social insurance (e.g., Compton and Lipsmeyer 2019; Cusack, Iversen and Rehm 2006; **?**). Public policy research, on the other hand, has focused on the design and administration of public policy (e.g., Capano et al. 2019; Howlett 2009; Hurd and Moynihan 2018), and the impacts of design choices on social and economic outcomes (e.g., Jacobs and Mettler 2018; Laenen 2018; Rosenthal 2019; Soss 1999). Complex social programs transferring cash benefits to households, such as unemployment insurance, exhibit notable variation in benefit entitlements, duration of eligibility, and stringency of qualification criteria (Kvist, Straubinger and Freundt 2013; Pallage, Scruggs and Zimmermann 2013; Pfeifer 2012). Despite the acknowledged complexity of policy design, however, relatively little is known about individuals' preferences or relative support for these multiple dimensions of social programs.

Motivated by both the recent rise of economic insecurity and the recognition that researchers know relatively little about the formation of multidimensional social policy preferences, we ask whether individuals hold distinct preferences over multiple dimensions of social policy design. Put simply, *do individuals have multidimensional policy preferences?* Further, *how does labor-market risk shape these preferences?* Drawing from research in psychology and behavioral economics on the cognitive consequences of job insecurity (e.g., Cahlíková and Cingl 2017; Carvalho, Meier and Wang 2016; Emberland and Rundmo 2010; Haushofer et al. 2021; Hetschko and Preuss 2020; Shoss 2017), we argue that individual exposure to labor market risk can shape preferences for social policy generally, and for unemployment insurance specifically. We further develop expectations about the differential effects of job insecurity on individuals' preferences over three di-

mensions of unemployment insurance program design: (1) duration of benefit eligibility, (2) generosity of weekly benefit amounts, and (3) the restrictiveness of program eligibility. In addressing these questions, we extend previous research on job insecurity and social policy preferences that has largely focused on either support for redistribution generally (e.g., Marx 2014) or on individuals' overall support for government effort or spending on social programs (e.g., Mughan 2007; Paskov and Koster 2014).

2 Study Design

We will test our expectations using a survey experiment in the nationally representative 2020 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in which we manipulate labor market risk to determine multidimensional preferences for unemployment insurance (UI).[1] Our questions asked to respondents are described below.

2.1 Correlates of Social Policy Preferences

We randomize the order of the following four questions presented to respondents:

Risk Orientation This question proxies for a respondent's risk acceptance: "*Are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?*" Respondents are instructed to place themselves on a ruler widget with one label stating the respondent is "completely unwilling to take risks" while the other states "very willing to take risks".

Discount Rate This question is designed to proxy the discount rate of respondents: "*Are you a person who is generally willing to give up something today in order to receive even more of something in the future?*" Respondents are instructed to place themselves on a ruler widget with one label stating the respondent is "Completely unwilling to give up something today" while the other states "Very willing to give up something today".

Altruism This question is designed to proxy a respondent's propensity for altruism: "*Are you a person who is willing to share with others without expecting anything in return?*" Respondents are instructed to place themselves on a ruler widget with one label stating the respondent is "Completely unwilling to share" while the other states "Very willing to share".

Political Sophistication Following Alt, Lassen and Marshall (2016), we measure political sophistication by asking respondents about the current national unemployment rate: "*The unemployment rate US is typically measured by the share of people who want to work but don't*

[1] The CCES is held both pre- and post election. We implemented our questions on the latter wave.

have a job. Over the last 25 years, the unemployment rate has been between 3.5 and 14.7%. What is your best estimate of the current unemployment rate in the United States?" Respondents may provide any numerical response (including decimals).

2.2 Manipulation of Labor Market Insecurity

We designed the next portion of the survey to manipulate labor market risk. Respondents are randomly asked just one of these three question wordings, and we record which is asked. Responses are made using a 7-increment scale widget with labels for endpoints (where 1 is "Not at all likely", and 7 is "very likely").[2]

Condition 1 (Neutral): The current unemployment rate is 7.9%. Using the scale below, do you think it is likely that you will lose your job or be laid off in the next 12 months?

Condition 2 (Higher Insecurity): The current unemployment rate is 7.9%, which is expected to go up in the coming months. Using the scale below, do you think it is likely that you will lose your job or be laid off in the next 12 months?

Condition 3 (Lower Insecurity): The current unemployment rate is 7.9%, which is expected to go down in the coming months. Using the scale below, do you think it is likely that you will lose your job or be laid off in the next 12 months?

2.3 Unemployment Insurance Policy Preferences

The third portion of our survey module consists of a grid with split labels with three parts. First, respondents are shown the following prompt:

"*Unemployment insurance is provided by each US state and territory to individuals who are unemployed. Making up about 1.2% of state government budgets, unemployment insurance benefits are:*

1. *Available only to people who meet eligibility criteria*
2. *Ordinarily paid for a maximum of 26 weeks in most states*
3. *Equal to about 40% of someone's prior weekly wage*

[2]There are two additional check boxes: one for "Currently unemployed" and one for "Not sure".

There is some talk about reforming unemployment insurance policies. Keeping in mind that changes to the policy might increase or decrease the total cost of the program, what changes would you prefer?"

Given this prompt, respondents are then tasked with selecting (on a 7 point scale) from the following (presented in random order):

1. "Much lower benefit amount per week" vs "much higher benefit amount per week"
2. "Many fewer weeks of benefit payments" vs "Many more weeks of benefit payments"
3. "Much more restrictive eligibility criteria" vs "Much less restrictive eligibility criteria"

2.4 Unemployment Insurance Policy Priorities

Our final question asks respondents to prioritize certain aspects of unemployment insurance policies. The prompt asks, "*If you could reform unemployment insurance policies, how would you rank the importance of the following? Drag your choices onto the numbered boxes on the left to rank each of the characteristics.*" Respondents then drag the following choices into their preferred ranked order:

- Benefit amount per week
- Weeks of benefit payments
- Strictness of eligibility criteria
- Cost of the program

3 Data Collection and Timeline

At the time of this writing, the CCES has been carried out, but we have not seen—nor do we have any access to—the survey data. We will use the post-election survey wave of the CCES. We will also use basic socio-demographic data asked of all respondents to the survey. Since the pre-survey CCES aims for about 1000 respondents, due to attrition we expect somewhere between 750 and 1000 respondents in the post-election CCES wave. Both authors have prior IRB certifications, and our survey questions were implemented as part of the University of Colorado Boulder's survey module, which underwent IRB approval through that institution.

4 Hypotheses & Analysis

We plan to test a number of hypotheses using our survey questions and the embedded experiment. Hypotheses will be tested using four outcome measures:

1. Respondents' support for *generosity of weekly UI benefit amount* on a seven point ordinal scale.
2. Respondents' support for *duration of UI benefit eligibility* on a seven point ordinal scale
3. Respondents' support for *more restrictive UI eligibility criteria* on a seven point ordinal scale
4. Respondents' rank ordering of the importance of four dimensions of UI policy design: Weekly benefit amount; Weeks of benefit payments (duration); Strictness of eligibility criteria; and Cost of the program

4.1 Experimental Expectations

Our primary hypotheses of interest will be tested by manipulating labor market risk as described above in Section 2.2.

Hypothesis 1 Respondents receiving the higher insecurity treatment will report a higher likelihood of losing their job or being laid off in the next 12 months, when compared to respondents receiving the lower insecurity treatment or the control condition.

The following hypotheses will be tested using the manipulation of labor market risk (Section 2.2) and the outcomes of interest described in Section 2.3.

Hypothesis 2a Respondents receiving the higher insecurity treatment will support *more generous UI weekly benefit amounts*, when compared to respondents receiving the lower insecurity treatment or the control condition.

Hypothesis 2b Respondents receiving the higher insecurity treatment will support a *longer duration of UI eligibility*, when compared to respondents receiving the lower insecurity treatment or the control condition.

Hypothesis 2c Respondents receiving the higher insecurity treatment will support *less restrictive UI eligibility criteria*, when compared to respondents receiving the lower insecurity treatment or the control condition.

The following hypothesis will be tested using the manipulation of labor market risk (Section 2.2) and the outcomes of interest described in Section 2.4.

Hypothesis 3 Respondents receiving the higher insecurity treatment will rank the importance of generosity of UI benefit amounts and strictness of UI eligibility criteria *higher*, and will rank the importance of duration of UI benefits and cost of the UI program *lower*.

The following hypotheses will be tested using the manipulation of labor market risk (Section 2.2), the "Discount Rate" question described in Section 2.1, and the outcomes of interest described in Section 2.4.

Hypothesis 4a The effects of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on preferences for UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's *discount rate*

Hypothesis 4b The effects of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on the ranked importance of UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's *discount rate*

The following hypotheses will be tested using the manipulation of labor market risk (Section 2.2), the "Risk Orientation" question described in Section 2.1, and the outcomes of interest described in Section 2.4.

Hypothesis 5a The effects of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on preferences for UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's *risk orientation*

Hypothesis 5b The effect of receiving the higher insecurity treatment on the ranked importance of UI program dimensions will be conditional on the respondent's *risk orientation*

4.2 Subjective Economic Insecurity Expectations

The following hypotheses will be tested using the outcomes described in Sections 2.3 (Hypotheses 6a-6c) and 2.4 (Hypotheses 7), and respondents' subjective evaluations of their economic insecurity. Subjective economic security will be measured using multiple (non-experimental) survey instruments asked of all respondents about their (a) retrospective macroeconomic evaluation, (b) retrospective household financial evaluation, (c) change in work status during the Covid pandemic, and (d) available liquid assets.

Hypothesis 6a Respondents with greater subjective economic insecurity will support *more generous UI weekly benefit amounts*

Hypothesis 6b Respondents with greater subjective economic insecurity will support a *longer duration of UI eligibility*

Hypothesis 6c Respondents with greater subjective economic insecurity will support *less*

restrictive UI eligibility criteria

Hypothesis 7 Respondents with greater subjective economic insecurity will rank the importance of generosity of UI weekly benefit amounts and strictness of UI eligibility criteria *higher*, and will rank the importance of duration of UI benefits and cost of the UI program *lower*.

4.3 Risk Tolerance Expectations

The following hypotheses will be tested with our "Risk Orientation" question described in Section 2.1.

Hypothesis 8a Respondents with *lower risk tolerance* will support *more generous UI weekly benefit amounts*

Hypothesis 8b Respondents with *lower risk tolerance* will support a *longer duration of UI eligibility*

Hypothesis 8c Respondents with *lower risk tolerance* will support *less restrictive UI eligibility criteria*

Hypothesis 9 Respondents with a lower risk tolerance will rank the importance of UI program dimensions differently than respondents with a higher risk tolerance

4.4 Discount Rate Expectations

The following hypotheses will be tested with our "Discount Rate" question described in Section 2.1.

Hypothesis 10a Respondents with a *lower discount rate* will support *more generous UI weekly benefit amounts*

Hypothesis 10b Respondents with a *lower discount rate* will support a *longer duration of UI eligibility*

Hypothesis 10c Respondents with a *lower discount rate* will support *less restrictive UI eligibility criteria*

Hypothesis 11 Respondents with a lower discount rate will rank the importance of UI program dimensions differently than respondents with a higher discount rate

4.5 Altruism Expectations

The following hypotheses will be tested with our "Altruism" question described in Section 2.1.

Hypothesis 12a Respondents with a *higher propensity for altruism* will support *more generous UI weekly benefit amounts*

Hypothesis 12b Respondents with a *higher propensity for altruism* will support a *longer duration of UI eligibility*

Hypothesis 12c Respondents with a *higher propensity for altruism* will support *less restrictive UI eligibility criteria*

Hypothesis 13 Respondents with a higher propensity for altruism will rank the importance of UI program dimensions differently than respondents with a lower propensity for altruism

4.6 Controls

Although primary hypotheses are experimental (Section 4.1), we intend to include a number of controls in additional models of individual support for unemployment insurance policy dimensions or priorities as a robustness check. In all models testing our non-experimental hypotheses (Sections 4.2-4.5), we will include controls for the following respondent characteristics, in addition to the variables described in Section 2.1:

- Gender
- Partisanship and Ideology
- Age
- Education level
- Religiosity

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