Supplementary Materials

The electoral consequences of policy-making in coalition governments

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A Descriptives

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the party-level analysis

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Range
Vote Share	249.00	13.69	10.91	10.30	0.00	58.63	58.63
Vote Share$_{t-1}$	247.00	17.37	10.20	16.60	0.00	58.63	58.63
Party Pledge Count	259.00	14.24	22.39	5.00	0.00	157.00	157.00
Party Pledge Share	205.00	0.48	0.26	0.50	0.00	1.00	1.00
Economic Growth (Change)	232.00	-1.54	5.10	-1.10	-22.40	11.40	33.80
Cabinet ideological distance (log.)	244.00	0.85	0.53	0.74	0.01	2.09	2.08
No. Cabinet Parties	255.00	3.36	1.14	3.00	2.00	6.00	4.00
Minority Cabinet	255.00	0.15	0.35	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
East Dummy	259.00	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the issue-level analysis

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Range
Vote Share	2156.00	15.34	10.46	13.23	1.30	58.63	57.33
Vote Share$_{t-1}$	2365.00	17.56	10.02	16.71	2.73	58.63	55.90
Party Pledge Count	2585.00	1.07	2.76	0.00	0.00	33.00	33.00
Party Pledge Share	2585.00	0.21	0.35	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
Pledge Salience	1024.00	34.44	32.94	25.74	2.00	433.00	431.00
Agreement Salience	2222.00	5.91	5.47	4.02	0.00	33.33	33.33
Manifesto Salience	2090.00	6.29	6.29	4.20	0.00	44.93	44.93
Economic Growth (Change)	2321.00	-1.58	5.33	-1.10	-22.40	11.40	33.80
Cabinet ideological distance (log.)	2123.00	0.85	0.56	0.72	0.01	2.09	2.08
No. Cabinet Parties	2222.00	3.29	1.08	3.00	2.00	6.00	4.00
Minority Cabinet	2222.00	0.17	0.37	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00

B Document Selection and Sample

We purposefully selected coalition agreements based on suggestions made in prior comparative studies (Bergman, 2000; Klüver and Bäck, 2019; Klüver, Bäck and Krauss, 2023). We only include post-electoral and inter-electoral agreements that have been negotiated after the seat shares and bargaining leverages of the cabinet parties have been determined.

Generally, we follow the guidelines laid out by Bergman (2000, p. 214) to select specific documents: First, cabinet parties must consider the document as central and binding for their upcoming legislative activities. Second, given its importance for the policy agenda, parties must have invested considerable time and effort to produce the document during the coalition formation period. And third, the coalition agreement needs to be deliberately published by the coalition.

For most West European and some Central and East European countries, our country selection has been primarily driven by established scholars in the field (Klüver and Bäck, 2019; Mueller and Strom, 2000). In countries like the Czech Republic, Germany, or the Netherlands, cabinets openly publish one clearly specified coalition agreement that contains both procedural regulations and policy propositions. Some other cases also negotiate and publish comparable documents, but do not label them as coalition agreements. In countries like Austria, Sweden, or Norway, we therefore relied on 'government programs' or 'government declarations' - which essentially are programmatic agreements that are negotiated and published shortly after cabinet formation.

In some countries located in Central and Eastern Europe, we combined multiple documents that together reflect the typical coalition agreement described above. Here, the 'coalition agreement' itself is often rather short and technical. It does not lay out the policy agenda of the newly formed cabinet. In such cases, we relied on a combination of the technical agreement with complementary public documents that contained the policy agenda of a government. Note that the coders only evaluated policy pledges and ignored technical regulations to maintain comparability across documents and countries. Interestingly, some of the technical coalition agreements, such as in Latvia, explicitly referenced the documents we used to measure policy-performance. These auxiliary documents are often labeled and published 'government programs'.

Table 3: Country Sample

Country	First Election	Last Election
AUT	1999	2013
BEL	2003	2014
CZE	2002	2013
DEU	2002	2013
DNK	2001	2011
EST	1999	2015
FIN	2003	2015
GBR	2010	2010
IRL	2002	2007
ISL	2003	2013
LTU	2000	2008
LUX	2004	2013
LVA	1998	2014
NLD	2002	2012
NOR	2005	2013
POL	2005	2007
ROU	2008	2012
SVN	2004	2014
SWE	2006	2014

Table 4: Full Sample of Coded Agreements I

Country & Cabinet Name	Election Year	Cabinet Parties	Pledges Mentioned
AT 2000 Schuessel I	1999	2	87.00
AT 2003 Schuessel II	2002	2	89.00
AT 2007 Gusenbauer I	2006	2	77.00
AT 2008 Faymann I	2008	2	110.00
AT 2013 Faymann II	2013	2	188.00
BE 2003 Verhofstadt II	2003	4	49.00
BE 2007 Verhofstadt IV	2007	5	84.00
BE 2008 Leterme I	2007	5	84.00
BE 2011 Di Rupo I	2010	6	0.00
BE 2014 Michel I	2014	4	193.00
CZ 2002 Spidla I	2002	3	85.00
CZ 2004 Gross I	2002	3	0.00
CZ 2007 Topolanek II	2006	3	77.00
CZ 2010 Necas I	2010	3	205.00
CZ 2012 Necas II	2010	2	143.00
CZ 2014 Sobotka I	2013	3	150.00
DE 2002 Schroeder II	2002	2	130.00
DE 2005 Merkel I	2005	2	142.00
DE 2009 Merkel II	2009	2	254.00
DE 2013 Merkel III	2013	2	263.00
DK 2001 Fogh Rasmussen I	2001	2	27.00
DK 2005 Fogh Rasmussen II	2005	2	59.00
DK 2007 Fogh Rasmussen III	2007	2	65.00
DK 2009 Loekke Rasmussen I	2007	2	10.00
DK 2011 Thorning Schmidt I	2011	3	75.00
EE 2002 Kallas I	1999	2	0.00
EE 2003 Parts I	2003	3	14.00
EE 2005 Ansip I	2003	3	10.00
EE 2007 Ansip II	2007	3	68.00
EE 2011 Ansip IV	2011	2	92.00
EE 2014 Roivas I	2011	2	13.00
EE 2015 Roivas II	2015	3	146.00
FI 2003 Jaatteenmaki I	2003	3	55.00
FI 2003 Vanhanen I	2003	3	0.00
FI 2007 Vanhanen II	2007	4	39.00
FI 2010 Mari Kiviniemi I	2007	4	2.00
FI 2011 Katainen I	2011	6	155.00
FI 2014 Stubb I	2011	5	15.00
FI 2015 Sipila I	2015	3	111.00
IE 2002 Ahern II	2002	2	181.00
IE 2007 Ahern III	2007	3	687.00
IE 2009 Cowen II	2007	3	87.00

Table 5: Full Sample of Coded Agreements II

Country & Cabinet Name	Election Year	Cabinet Parties	Pledges Mentioned
IS 2003 Oddsson IV	2003	2	17.00
IS 2007 Haarde II	2007	2	35.00
IS 2009 Sigurdardottir I	2007	2	6.00
IS 2009 Sigurdardottir II	2009	2	39.00
IS 2013 Gunnlaugsson I	2013	2	33.00
LT 2004 Brazauskas II	2000	4	6.00
LT 2008 Kubilius II	2008	4	19.00
LU 2004 Juncker III	2004	2	0.00
LU 2009 Juncker IV	2009	2	111.00
LU 2013 Bettel I	2013	3	188.00
LV 2000 Berzins I	1998	4	55.00
LV 2002 Repse I	2002	4	6.00
LV 2004 Emsis I	2002	3	9.00
LV 2004 Kalvitis I	2002	4	16.00
LV 2006 Kalvitis III	2006	4	19.00
LV 2007 Godmanis II	2006	3	17.00
LV 2009 Dombrovskis I	2006	4	14.00
LV 2010 Dombrovskis III	2010	1	3.00
LV 2011 Dombrovskis IV	2011	1	3.00
LV 2014 Straujuma I	2014	1	3.00
LV 2014 Straujuma II	2014	1	1.00
NL 2002 Balkenende I	2002	3	92.00
NL 2003 Balkenende II	2003	3	64.00
NL 2007 Balkenende IV	2006	3	199.00
NL 2010 Rutte I	2010	2	112.00
NL 2012 Rutte II	2012	2	168.00
NO 2005 Stoltenberg II	2005	3	160.00
NO 2009 Stoltenberg III	2009	3	95.00
NO 2013 Solberg I	2013	2	228.00
PL 2006 Kaczynski I	2005	3	53.00
PL 2006 Marcinkiewicz II	2005	3	98.00
PL 2007 Tusk I	2007	2	1.00
RO 2008 Boc I	2008	2	0.00
RO 2009 Boc II	2008	2	0.00
RO 2014 Ponta III	2012	4	6.00
SE 2006 Reinfeldt I	2006	4	285.00
SE 2010 Reinfeldt II	2010	4	114.00
SE 2014 Loefven I	2014	2	118.00
SI 2004 Jansa I	2004	4	0.00
SI 2008 Pahor I	2008	4	0.00
SI 2012 Jansa II	2011	5	203.00
SI 2013 Bratusek I	2011	4	22.00
SI 2014 Cerar I	2014	2	31.00
UK 2010 Cameron I	2010	2	258.00

C Visualization of Sample Properties

Figure 3: Average number of commitments per country, total and fulfilled



Figure 4: Distribution of commitments over issue areas



Figure 5: Average number of commitments mentioned and mentioned and fulfilled per country



Figure 6: Distribution of mentioned pledges per issue area (y-axis cropped at 50 due to outliers)



D Coding and Coder Reliability

We relied on international coders with native language skills and country expertise to identify policy pledges in coalition agreements. These coders are predominantly recruited from undergraduate and graduate students of social sciences that visited the host university of the project. We predominantly hired 2 to 3 coders per country to share the workload, enable exchange among the coders, and enable us to assess inter-coder reliability scores.

While human coding is associated with a high degree of validity, the reliability of hand-coding has been criticized (Mikhaylov, Laver and Benoit, 2012). In order to ensure reliability, all coders received thorough training. Coders were trained on an example document and received detailed instructions which described the variables and the coding process. They were also supervised throughout the three data collection stages within the project (1. hard pledge identification; 2. hard pledge fulfillment evaluation; and 3. linking hard pledges from the agreement to party promises from election manifestos). In addition, we conduced reliability tests and computed inter-coder reliability rates for correctly recognizing hard pledges across two independent coders which often exceed 70% (i.e. Austria 90%, Czech Republic 70%, Germany 77%, Finland 66%, Ireland 86%, Latvia 70%, Lithuania 69%; table 6 in the appendix displays inter-coder reliability scores for all countries).

In the initial coding stage, country experts carefully analyzed each sentence of a coalition agreement and classified it into one of three categories: no pledge, soft pledge and hard pledge. Examples of more general statements that do *not constitute a pledge* are for instance descriptions of the overall state of the economy, recaps of policy actions that have been taken by previous governments, or descriptions of why a policy field is important to the coalition partners. *Soft pledges* by contrast are promises whose fulfilment cannot be verified objectively. Examples of soft pledges include e.g. proclaiming the intent to make a certain policy more fair (criteria that can not be verified objectively), as well as statements to "consider" or "support" certain ambiguous policy efforts. A *hard pledge*, our primary unit of interest, is by contrast defined as "a commitment to carry out some action or produce some outcome, where an objective estimation can be made as to whether or not the action was indeed taken or the outcome produced" (Royed, 1996, 79). In other words, hard pledges convey an objectively testable policy promise which is under the purview of the government. The conceptualization and focus on hard policy pledges follows the standards established in prior research on election pledges (e.g. Artés, 2013; Costello

and Thomson, 2008; Matthieß, 2020; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014*b*; Thomson et al., 2017).

For each hard pledge identified by the coders, they then evaluated the pledge fulfillment in the second stage. The fulfillment of policy commitments was coded based on national legislative databases, other official statistics (obtained from national statistical offices, Eurostat or government reports and websites) and quality newspaper articles. Given the broad cross-country sample, we agreed with each coder upon a set of appropriate sources. As a general guideline, we asked coders to first consult reliable newspapers for a first indication of what policy commitments actually have been realized. Second, coders checked the national legislative databases for a list of key terms describing the policy commitments in order to identify bills or government decisions potentially enacting the policy commitments. Third, further sources such as the national statistical offices, Eurostat or government reports are consulted to check if a policy commitment was enacted. Coders were asked to save up to two sources per pledge and consult with the project supervisors in case of contradictory or unclear assessments.

In the third stage, coders were asked to check if a hard pledge from the coalition agreement (be it fulfilled or unfulfilled) has been mentioned by any coalition party in the respective election manifesto. We relied on digitized party programs by the Manifesto project (Volkens et al., 2017) and instructed coders to search for keyterms associated with an agreement pledge. Importantly, we asked for a 'cautious' coding and instructed coders to search for the precise agreement pledge. For example, if the agreement pledge contained the introduction of an emissions tax of 3 percent but a party only campaigned on more progressive environmental regulations without specifying this policy, we did not consider this as a pledge clearly attributable to the party. Overall, 55 percent (or 7'299 out of 13'756 unique hard pledges) of all hard pledges identified by the coders could be attributed to a specific party.

Table 6: Inter-coder cross validation

Country	Correlation (overall in percent)
Austria	90.45
Belgium	65.15
Czech Republic	70.93
Denmark	44.95
Germany	77.62
Estonia	67.23
Finland	66.09
Greece	50.15
Iceland	56.06
Ireland	86.21
Latvia	70.56
Lithuania	69.31
Luxembourg	42.60
Netherlands	56.37
Norway	70.53
Poland	56.47
Portugal	71.95
Romania	88.81
Slovenia	54.64
Sweden	72.34
UK	80.48

E Regression Tables: Lagged Dependent Variable Approach

This section contains regression tables where a party's **vote share** at an upcoming election serves as our main dependent variable while we control for the current vote share. They constitute the basis for the visualization of figures 1 and 2 in the main manuscript. Table 7 contains the models for the pooled data with and without country fixed effects. Tables 8 and 9 present the results for the data at party-issue level. All standard errors are clustered by countries.

Table 7: LDV models with and without country fixed effects for party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Share (0-100)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	0.892		−1.513		2.981		1.851	
	(2.096)		(2.947)		(2.373)		(3.340)	
Party Pledge Count		0.028		0.015		−0.010		−0.024
		(0.038)		(0.033)		(0.028)		(0.026)
Prime Minister Party			−4.436**	−1.706			−2.289	−2.148
			(2.062)	(2.040)			(2.572)	(1.324)
Lagged Vote Share	0.786***	0.788***	0.782***	0.794***	0.804***	0.820***	0.805***	0.827***
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.056)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.173	−0.115	−0.143	−0.095	−0.101	−0.088	−0.083	−0.067
	(0.106)	(0.089)	(0.114)	(0.105)	(0.164)	(0.118)	(0.170)	(0.122)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.558	−0.833	−0.107	−0.919	−0.353	−0.227	−0.276	−0.567
	(2.513)	(1.476)	(2.270)	(1.507)	(1.461)	(1.197)	(1.602)	(1.167)
No. Cabinet Parties	−0.188	0.263	−0.394	0.193	−0.614	−0.531	−0.636	−0.449
	(1.828)	(0.882)	(1.461)	(0.770)	(0.629)	(0.501)	(0.605)	(0.391)
Minority Cabinet	−3.521**	−2.698*	−2.790**	−2.204*	−1.676	−1.777	−1.335	−1.307
	(1.449)	(1.535)	(1.297)	(1.138)	(1.384)	(1.411)	(1.142)	(1.132)
Party Pledge Share:Prime Minister Party			7.641*				3.704	
			(4.217)				(4.543)	
Party Pledge Count:Prime Minister Party				0.079				0.109
				(0.099)				(0.096)
East					−1.672	−2.298*	−1.386	−1.834
					(1.564)	(1.166)	(1.410)	(1.231)
Constant					1.476	2.857	2.026	3.020
					(2.440)	(1.866)	(2.729)	(1.889)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	None	None	None	None
Observations	172	217	172	217	172	217	172	217
R^2	0.685	0.665	0.690	0.666	0.644	0.631	0.645	0.635
Adjusted R^2	0.634	0.623	0.635	0.621	0.629	0.619	0.626	0.620

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: LDV models with country fixed effects for issue-party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Share (0-100)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.573		−0.258		−0.869		−0.189	
	(0.583)		(0.864)		(0.947)		(0.828)	
Party Pledge Count		0.028		0.090		−0.226*		−0.077
		(0.109)		(0.225)		(0.115)		(0.243)
Manifesto salience			0.030	0.008				
			(0.022)	(0.016)				
Pledge salience					−0.005	−0.007		
					(0.013)	(0.012)		
Agreement Salience							0.016	−0.023
							(0.016)	(0.018)
Lagged Vote Share	0.824***	0.823***	0.824***	0.823***	0.851***	0.854***	0.823***	0.823***
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.021	−0.021	−0.020	−0.021	0.004	−0.003	−0.021	−0.021
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.115)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.930	−0.955	−0.914	−0.956	0.890	0.878	−0.928	−0.961
	(1.382)	(1.397)	(1.389)	(1.398)	(1.968)	(1.969)	(1.379)	(1.399)
No. Cabinet Parties	1.663	1.633	1.677	1.639	−0.550	−0.502	1.663	1.640
	(0.983)	(0.993)	(0.983)	(0.999)	(1.831)	(1.828)	(0.982)	(0.995)
Minority Cabinet	3.183	3.221	3.157	3.212	1.458	1.596	3.168	3.235
	(1.905)	(1.906)	(1.913)	(1.906)	(2.022)	(2.022)	(1.906)	(1.896)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.057					
			(0.067)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.005				
				(0.010)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.014			
					(0.015)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.007*		
						(0.003)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.058	
							(0.069)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.010
								(0.011)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
Observations	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	725	725	1,716	1,716
R^2	0.721	0.721	0.721	0.721	0.723	0.725	0.721	0.721
Adjusted R^2	0.717	0.717	0.717	0.716	0.713	0.715	0.717	0.716

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: LDV models without fixed effects for issue-party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Share (0-100)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.655		−0.471		−0.383		−0.211	
	(0.643)		(0.894)		(1.011)		(0.846)	
Party Pledge Count		−0.096		−0.104		−0.347**		−0.234
		(0.120)		(0.228)		(0.159)		(0.262)
Manifesto salience			0.031	0.025				
			(0.024)	(0.018)				
Pledge salience					−0.005	−0.011		
					(0.011)	(0.010)		
Agreement Salience							0.043*	0.022
							(0.025)	(0.028)
Lagged Vote Share	0.813***	0.815***	0.813***	0.816***	0.840***	0.844***	0.812***	0.816***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.003	0.050	0.040	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.191)	(0.185)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Cabinet ideological distance	0.126	0.089	0.126	0.078	1.409	1.346	0.115	0.086
	(0.958)	(0.976)	(0.959)	(0.981)	(1.295)	(1.276)	(0.956)	(0.987)
No. Cabinet Parties	−0.011	0.005	−0.008	0.010	−0.209	−0.122	−0.010	−0.003
	(0.562)	(0.567)	(0.562)	(0.568)	(0.723)	(0.703)	(0.562)	(0.568)
Minority Cabinet	1.490	1.485	1.504	1.481	1.433	1.575	1.506	1.459
	(1.210)	(1.212)	(1.211)	(1.216)	(1.311)	(1.289)	(1.207)	(1.213)
East	−0.040	−0.058	−0.050	−0.072	0.303	0.231	−0.033	−0.073
	(1.280)	(1.254)	(1.289)	(1.254)	(1.770)	(1.691)	(1.278)	(1.241)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.039					
			(0.066)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.001				
				(0.011)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.014			
					(0.017)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.008**		
						(0.004)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.079	
							(0.073)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.009
								(0.012)
Constant	0.557	0.463	0.383	0.304	−0.822	−0.761	0.362	0.394
	(2.080)	(2.064)	(2.067)	(2.075)	(2.499)	(2.417)	(2.035)	(2.047)
Fixed Effects	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Observations	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	725	725	1,716	1,716
R^2	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.675	0.677	0.673	0.673
Adjusted R^2	0.672	0.672	0.672	0.672	0.671	0.673	0.672	0.672

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

F Regression Tables: Vote Ratio

This section contains regression tables that use the **vote ratio** as outcome variable. This is a relative measure of vote share change based on the party vote share during elections after cabinet termination ($t1$) relative to the vote share at the previous election ($t0$) as the dependent variable:

Vote Ratio ($t1$) = (Vote share($t1$))/(Vote share($t0$))

If the vote ratio is 1, a cabinet party was able to maintain exactly the same electoral support as in the prior election. A value below 1 indicates electoral losses, while values above 1 show electoral gains.

Table 10 contains the party-level models, both with and without country fixed effects. Tables 11 and 12 contain the analysis on the issue-level. All standard errors are clustered by countries.

Table 10: OLS models for vote ratio with and without country fixed effects for party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Ratio							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	0.022		−0.172		0.144		0.019	
	(0.127)		(0.148)		(0.154)		(0.198)	
Party Pledge Count		0.002		0.001		−0.001		−0.002*
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Prime Minister Party			−0.382***	−0.112			−0.279*	−0.173**
			(0.084)	(0.120)			(0.148)	(0.083)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.011**	−0.007	−0.009	−0.006	−0.005	−0.005	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.080	−0.082	−0.045	−0.092	−0.020	−0.012	−0.015	−0.039
	(0.111)	(0.066)	(0.091)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.095)	(0.074)
No. Cabinet Parties	0.046	0.064	0.026	0.057	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.008
	(0.089)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.019)
Minority Cabinet	−0.227**	−0.152	−0.162**	−0.113	−0.098	−0.107	−0.051	−0.063
	(0.105)	(0.131)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.076)
Party Pledge Share:Prime Minister Party			0.623***				0.410	
			(0.182)				(0.257)	
Party Pledge Count:Prime Minister Party				0.003				0.006
				(0.006)				(0.006)
East					−0.097	−0.137*	−0.058	−0.094
					(0.100)	(0.079)	(0.095)	(0.082)
Constant					0.745***	0.854***	0.824***	0.893***
					(0.118)	(0.066)	(0.144)	(0.087)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	None	None	None	None
Observations	172	217	172	217	172	217	172	217
R^2	0.189	0.151	0.214	0.154	0.031	0.031	0.050	0.048
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.049	0.080	0.044	−0.005	0.004	0.003	0.012
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: OLS models for vote ratio with country fixed effects for issue-party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Ratio							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.037		−0.022		−0.048		−0.003	
	(0.036)		(0.045)		(0.060)		(0.042)	
Party Pledge Count		0.002		0.007		−0.003		−0.001
		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.005)		(0.009)
Manifesto salience			0.002	0.001				
			(0.002)	(0.001)				
Pledge salience					−0.0004	−0.0004		
					(0.001)	(0.001)		
Agreement Salience							0.001	−0.001
							(0.001)	(0.001)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.080	−0.082	−0.079	−0.082	0.0003	−0.003	−0.080	−0.082
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.063)	(0.064)
No. Cabinet Parties	0.109**	0.107**	0.110**	0.108**	0.004	0.005	0.109**	0.107**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Minority Cabinet	0.189	0.192	0.188	0.191	0.073	0.078	0.188	0.192
	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.120)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.003					
			(0.004)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.0005				
				(0.0004)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.0004			
					(0.001)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.0002		
						(0.0001)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.005	
							(0.003)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.0003
								(0.0003)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
Observations	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	725	725	1,716	1,716
R^2	0.194	0.193	0.195	0.194	0.208	0.208	0.195	0.194
Adjusted R^2	0.184	0.182	0.183	0.182	0.180	0.180	0.183	0.182

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: OLS models for vote ratio without fixed effects for issue-party level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Ratio							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.055		−0.041		−0.009		−0.017	
	(0.042)		(0.044)		(0.072)		(0.039)	
Party Pledge Count		−0.007		−0.005		−0.013*		−0.012
		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.010)
Manifesto salience			0.003	0.002*				
			(0.002)	(0.001)				
Pledge salience					−0.0002	−0.0004		
					(0.001)	(0.001)		
Agreement Salience							0.002	0.001
							(0.002)	(0.001)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.019	−0.022	−0.019	−0.023	0.040	0.038	−0.020	−0.022
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.051)
No. Cabinet Parties	0.045	0.046	0.045	0.046	0.023	0.026	0.046	0.046
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Minority Cabinet	0.096	0.095	0.097	0.095	0.052	0.057	0.097	0.094
	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.085)
East	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.037	−0.041	0.004	0.003
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.003					
			(0.004)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.0003				
				(0.0004)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.001			
					(0.001)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.0003*		
						(0.0002)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.006	
							(0.004)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.0003
								(0.0004)
Constant	0.720***	0.715***	0.707***	0.703***	0.716***	0.727***	0.710***	0.714***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Fixed Effects	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Observations	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	725	725	1,716	1,716
R^2	0.030	0.029	0.031	0.030	0.022	0.026	0.031	0.029
Adjusted R^2	0.026	0.025	0.027	0.025	0.011	0.015	0.026	0.024

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G Regression Tables for alternative Outcome: Vote Differential

This section contains three tables for the dependent variable **vote differential**, which we calculated by subtracting a party's vote share at the election after government termination from its vote share at the election before government formation. Table 13 contains the models for the party-level data with and without country fixed effects. Tables 14 and 15 present the results for the data at issue-party-level. All standard errors are clustered by country.

Table 13: OLS models for vote differential with and without country fixed effects for party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Differential							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	0.273		−1.716		3.072		1.991	
	(1.877)		(2.855)		(2.394)		(3.345)	
Party Pledge Count		−0.007		−0.027		−0.026		−0.041
		(0.043)		(0.039)		(0.031)		(0.031)
Prime Minister Party			−4.042*	−2.576			−2.641	−2.576*
			(2.145)	(2.023)			(2.564)	(1.332)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.155	−0.115	−0.128	−0.085	−0.110	−0.083	−0.087	−0.058
	(0.113)	(0.086)	(0.120)	(0.105)	(0.159)	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.121)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.825	−0.799	−0.476	−0.925	−0.900	−0.720	−0.897	−1.108
	(2.719)	(1.591)	(2.555)	(1.563)	(1.459)	(1.178)	(1.606)	(1.126)
No. Cabinet Parties	0.745	0.755	0.516	0.627	0.324	0.235	0.269	0.292
	(1.922)	(0.943)	(1.525)	(0.778)	(0.553)	(0.459)	(0.519)	(0.382)
Minority Cabinet	−2.982*	−2.894*	−2.290	−2.144*	−1.136	−1.363	−0.640	−0.790
	(1.494)	(1.586)	(1.417)	(1.177)	(1.317)	(1.400)	(1.093)	(1.111)
Party Pledge Share:Prime Minister Party			6.407				3.524	
			(4.298)				(4.565)	
Party Pledge Count:Prime Minister Party				0.121				0.123
				(0.095)				(0.089)
East					−1.692	−2.447**	−1.279	−1.867*
					(1.479)	(1.073)	(1.333)	(1.117)
Constant					−4.826***	−2.237*	−4.033*	−1.796
					(1.555)	(1.275)	(2.050)	(1.546)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	None	None	None	None
Observations	172	217	172	217	172	217	172	217
R^2	0.135	0.099	0.144	0.107	0.034	0.028	0.040	0.042
Adjusted R^2	0.0004	−0.009	−0.002	−0.009	−0.001	0.0003	−0.007	0.006

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: OLS models for vote differential with country fixed effects for issue-party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Differential							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.632		−0.412		−0.597		−0.454	
	(0.564)		(0.842)		(0.987)		(0.817)	
Party Pledge Count		−0.036		−0.047		−0.335*		−0.197
		(0.115)		(0.261)		(0.174)		(0.294)
Manifesto salience			0.042*	0.026				
			(0.023)	(0.018)				
Pledge salience					−0.002	−0.009		
					(0.014)	(0.012)		
Agreement Salience							0.010	−0.013
							(0.017)	(0.015)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.013	−0.013	−0.012	−0.013	0.033	0.028	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Cabinet ideological distance	−1.034	−1.063	−1.017	−1.066	0.868	0.890	−1.032	−1.068
	(1.462)	(1.486)	(1.468)	(1.491)	(2.032)	(2.049)	(1.459)	(1.492)
No. Cabinet Parties	2.095*	2.084*	2.114*	2.102*	−0.045	0.017	2.095*	2.094*
	(1.023)	(1.032)	(1.021)	(1.035)	(1.808)	(1.801)	(1.022)	(1.034)
Minority Cabinet	3.780*	3.796*	3.750*	3.781*	2.143	2.226	3.773*	3.807*
	(2.033)	(2.043)	(2.038)	(2.046)	(2.269)	(2.277)	(2.035)	(2.035)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.054					
			(0.063)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.001				
				(0.012)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.008			
					(0.016)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.009*		
						(0.004)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.028	
							(0.068)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.013
								(0.013)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
Observations	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	725	725	1,716	1,716
R^2	0.179	0.178	0.180	0.179	0.182	0.189	0.179	0.179
Adjusted R^2	0.168	0.167	0.168	0.166	0.153	0.160	0.167	0.167

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: OLS models for vote differential without fixed effects for issue-party-level data

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Differential							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.653		−0.616		−0.073		−0.478	
	(0.681)		(0.966)		(1.043)		(0.922)	
Party Pledge Count		−0.163		−0.227		−0.431*		−0.340
		(0.131)		(0.281)		(0.226)		(0.314)
Manifesto salience			0.043	0.046**				
			(0.026)	(0.021)				
Pledge salience					−0.007	−0.016*		
					(0.010)	(0.009)		
Agreement Salience							0.037	0.037
							(0.026)	(0.031)
Econ. Growth Change	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.072	0.063	0.012	0.012
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.199)	(0.192)	(0.146)	(0.145)
Cabinet ideological distance	−0.302	−0.364	−0.301	−0.378	1.304	1.219	−0.309	−0.368
	(1.057)	(1.076)	(1.058)	(1.082)	(1.303)	(1.294)	(1.057)	(1.087)
No. Cabinet Parties	0.928*	0.925*	0.925*	0.917*	0.506	0.596	0.929*	0.910*
	(0.522)	(0.525)	(0.522)	(0.526)	(0.612)	(0.606)	(0.521)	(0.525)
Minority Cabinet	2.125	2.088	2.129	2.065	2.320	2.452	2.130	2.048
	(1.336)	(1.329)	(1.340)	(1.330)	(1.582)	(1.557)	(1.337)	(1.326)
East	−0.171	−0.262	−0.181	−0.287	0.414	0.241	−0.164	−0.281
	(1.416)	(1.381)	(1.423)	(1.377)	(1.873)	(1.752)	(1.413)	(1.364)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.029					
			(0.069)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				0.002				
				(0.014)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.009			
					(0.017)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.009*		
						(0.005)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.043	
							(0.074)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.011
								(0.015)
Constant	−5.615***	−5.490***	−5.829***	−5.691***	−6.166***	−5.691***	−5.799***	−5.586***
	(1.438)	(1.395)	(1.469)	(1.422)	(2.053)	(1.818)	(1.382)	(1.322)
Fixed Effects	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Observations	1,716	1,716	1,716	1,716	725	725	1,716	1,716
R^2	0.032	0.034	0.033	0.036	0.037	0.046	0.033	0.036
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.031	0.029	0.032	0.026	0.035	0.028	0.031
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

H Issue areas

Table 16: Issue areas

Issue Area	CMP Policy Codes	Left Position	Right Position
Agriculture	406: Protectionism (positive) 407: Protectioism (negative) 703: Agriculture and Farmers (positive)	406: Protectionism (positive) 703 Farmers	407: Protectioism (negative)
Civil Rights	201: Freedom and human rights 202: Democracy 603: Traditional Morality (positive) 604: Traditional Morality (negative) 605: Law and order 705: Underprivileged minority groups 706: Non-economic demographic groups	201: Freedom and human rights 202: Democracy 604: Traditional Morality (negative) 705: Underprivileged minority groups 706: Non-economic demographic groups	603: Traditional Morality (positive) 605: Law and order (positive)
Education	506: Education expansion 507: Education limitation	506: Education expansion	507: Education limitation
Environment	416: Anti-growth economy (positive) 501: Environmental protection 410: Economic growth: Positive	416: Anti-growth economy (positive) 501: Environmental protection	410: Economic growth: Positive
European Integration	108: EC/EU (positive) 110: EC/EU (negative)	108: EC/EU (positive)	110: EC/EU (negative)
Decentralization	301: Decentralization 302: Centralization	301: Decentralization	302: Centralization
Immigration	601: National way of life (positive) 602: National way of life (negative) 607: Multiculturalism (positive) 608: Multiculturalism (negative)	602: National way of life (negative) 607: Multiculturalism (positive)	601: National way of life (positive) 608: Multiculturalism (negative)

Social welfare	503: Equality: positive 504: Welfare state expansion 505: Welfare state limitation	503: Equality: positive 504: Welfare state expansion	504: Welfare state limitation
Defence	104: Military (positive) 105: Military (negative)	105: Military (negative)	104: Military (positive)
Economy	401: Free market economy 402: Incentives 403: Market regulation 404: Economic planning 409: Keynesian demand management 412: Controlled economy 413: Nationalization 414: Economic orthodoxy	403: Market regulation 404: Economic planning 409: Keynesian demand management 412: Controlled economy 413: Nationalization	401: Free market economy 402: Incentives: Positive 414: Economic orthodoxy
International Politics	101: Foreign and special relations (positive) 102: Foreign and special relations (negative) 103: Anti-imperialism (positive) 106: Peace (positive) 107: Internationalism (positive) 109: Internationalism (negative)	101: Foreign and special relations (positive) 103: Anti-imperialism 106: Peace (positive) 107: Internationalism (positive)	102: Foreign and special relations (negative) 109: Internationalism (negative)

I Replication using West European Countries

To assess if the null-effects are driven by the diverse country sample, the following tables replicate the main analysis using the LDV approach on West European countries only. This makes our sample more comparable to that of Matthieß (2020), who assesses the effect of party manifesto pledge performance among mostly Western democracies. We do not find any substantial differences when replicating the main analysis among West European democracies.

Table 17: Replication of party-level LDV models among West European countries

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Share (0-100)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	3.558		0.448		5.822		5.435	
	(5.165)		(5.096)		(4.058)		(4.482)	
Party Pledge Count		0.049		0.037		0.002		−0.001
		(0.042)		(0.041)		(0.026)		(0.026)
Prime Minister Party			−6.644	1.027			1.214	0.332
			(4.767)	(3.482)			(3.533)	(2.157)
Lagged Vote Share	0.803***	0.785***	0.800***	0.789***	0.809***	0.827***	0.803***	0.822***
	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.071)	(0.059)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.174	−0.159	−0.156	−0.156	−0.077	−0.006	−0.083	−0.016
	(0.176)	(0.158)	(0.178)	(0.177)	(0.256)	(0.241)	(0.265)	(0.249)
Cabinet ideological distance	2.251	0.006	3.059**	−0.050	0.881	0.740	0.771	0.320
	(1.604)	(1.860)	(1.348)	(2.111)	(1.552)	(1.395)	(1.414)	(1.121)
No. Cabinet Parties	−2.575	−0.528	−2.525	−0.357	−0.939	−0.483	−0.673	−0.182
	(2.028)	(1.224)	(1.860)	(1.290)	(0.853)	(0.598)	(0.770)	(0.464)
Minority Cabinet	−1.260	−0.053	−1.444	−1.350	−0.100	0.621	−1.250	−0.312
	(1.671)	(1.890)	(1.458)	(1.450)	(1.096)	(0.681)	(1.049)	(0.776)
Party Pledge Share:Prime Minister Party			16.128				2.223	
			(9.086)				(6.368)	
Party Pledge Count:Prime Minister Party				0.068				0.112*
				(0.112)				(0.066)
Constant					−0.449	1.182	−1.146	0.478
					(1.962)	(2.065)	(1.938)	(2.036)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	None	None	None	None
Observations	96	121	96	121	96	121	96	121
R^2	0.772	0.765	0.780	0.768	0.734	0.736	0.738	0.744
Adjusted R^2	0.722	0.726	0.725	0.725	0.716	0.722	0.714	0.725
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Replication of issue-party-level LDV models with fixed effects among West European countries

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Share (0-100)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	0.528		0.725		−0.080		0.707	
	(0.601)		(1.057)		(1.097)		(1.038)	
Party Pledge Count		0.110		0.226		−0.144		0.088
		(0.098)		(0.243)		(0.102)		(0.251)
Manifesto salience			−0.005	−0.011				
			(0.021)	(0.014)				
Pledge salience					0.005	0.004		
					(0.008)	(0.009)		
Agreement Salience							−0.012	−0.037
							(0.016)	(0.023)
Lagged Vote Share	0.827***	0.825***	0.827***	0.823***	0.826***	0.827***	0.827***	0.824***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.145	−0.145	−0.145	−0.145	−0.009	−0.011	−0.145	−0.145
	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.214)	(0.207)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Cabinet ideological distance	1.283	1.302	1.286	1.306	2.567	2.628	1.288	1.313
	(1.575)	(1.559)	(1.580)	(1.550)	(1.907)	(1.874)	(1.572)	(1.566)
No. Cabinet Parties	−1.334	−1.357	−1.341	−1.378	−3.044	−3.044	−1.343	−1.373
	(1.399)	(1.387)	(1.403)	(1.400)	(2.063)	(2.043)	(1.401)	(1.405)
Minority Cabinet	2.344	2.392	2.336	2.365	0.570	0.758	2.333	2.411
	(2.807)	(2.735)	(2.812)	(2.725)	(2.046)	(2.010)	(2.808)	(2.702)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.019					
			(0.072)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.008				
				(0.011)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.012			
					(0.008)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.006*		
						(0.003)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.016	
							(0.073)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.004
								(0.012)
Fixed Effects	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country	Country
Observations	1,045	1,045	1,045	1,045	507	507	1,045	1,045
R^2	0.775	0.776	0.775	0.776	0.755	0.756	0.775	0.776
Adjusted R^2	0.772	0.772	0.771	0.772	0.745	0.747	0.771	0.772

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: Replication of issue-party-level LDV models without fixed effects among West European countries

	Dependent variable:							
	Vote Share (0-100)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Party Pledge Share	−0.102		0.145		−0.047		0.125	
	(0.664)		(1.023)		(0.940)		(1.013)	
Party Pledge Count		−0.043		−0.046		−0.240		−0.188
		(0.124)		(0.248)		(0.149)		(0.294)
Manifesto salience			0.012	0.006				
			(0.012)	(0.016)				
Pledge salience					0.005	0.002		
					(0.008)	(0.007)		
Agreement Salience							−0.004	−0.019
							(0.014)	(0.020)
Lagged Vote Share	0.841***	0.842***	0.841***	0.842***	0.822***	0.824***	0.841***	0.842***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Econ. Growth Change	−0.047	−0.047	−0.045	−0.046	0.144	0.138	−0.047	−0.047
	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.292)	(0.288)	(0.211)	(0.211)
Cabinet ideological distance	1.065	1.042	1.071	1.040	1.829	1.803	1.065	1.060
	(1.072)	(1.088)	(1.076)	(1.092)	(1.686)	(1.667)	(1.070)	(1.099)
No. Cabinet Parties	−0.153	−0.149	−0.151	−0.148	−0.141	−0.074	−0.152	−0.164
	(0.622)	(0.631)	(0.621)	(0.630)	(0.905)	(0.860)	(0.622)	(0.629)
Minority Cabinet	2.089	2.074	2.124	2.073	2.493*	2.605**	2.107	2.057
	(1.334)	(1.313)	(1.322)	(1.311)	(1.300)	(1.270)	(1.319)	(1.298)
Party Pledge Share:Manifesto salience			−0.037					
			(0.054)					
Party Pledge Count:Manifesto salience				−0.0002				
				(0.012)				
Party Pledge Share:Pledge salience					0.016**			
					(0.008)			
Party Pledge Count:Pledge salience						0.006		
						(0.004)		
Party Pledge Share:Agreement Salience							−0.027	
							(0.064)	
Party Pledge Count:Agreement Salience								0.012
								(0.013)
Constant	−0.744	−0.718	−0.813	−0.755	−1.658	−1.501	−0.718	−0.557
	(1.875)	(1.953)	(1.871)	(2.002)	(2.742)	(2.692)	(1.902)	(2.007)
Fixed Effects	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Observations	1,045	1,045	1,045	1,045	507	507	1,045	1,045
R^2	0.744	0.744	0.744	0.744	0.717	0.718	0.744	0.744
Adjusted R^2	0.742	0.742	0.742	0.742	0.712	0.713	0.742	0.742

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01