Logics of War

Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts

Appendices

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Appendix A: Universe of Cases

The primary purpose of this appendix is to present the universe of cases used in the statistical analysis, which, as chapter 4 discusses, differs from existing datasets to address various potential concerns about specific observations. This discussion sets the stage for most of the robustness checks that I carry out in the statistical analysis. In addition, given the centrality of war duration for my analysis, this appendix also includes a short discussion of those cases in which the coding procedure for determining war duration here—which focuses on the date on which hostilities begin and end—produces a recorded duration that differs noticeably from that reported in the Correlates of War dataset.

Universe of Cases

The starting point for identifying a universe of cases is the Correlates of War interstate war dataset, available online at http://www.correlatesofwar.org. This dataset contains 95 wars, including a total of 17 added in a recent update. Most of these wars are unproblematic, but a few merit further discussion. Those in which there are potential problems are flagged using a flag variable, for which the general coding rule is below:

Flag: identify cases that should be excluded from some analyses and reason for exclusion
- =0 if the case is unproblematic: use in all analyses
- =1 if it is uncertain that the battle death threshold has been breached
- =2 if the head of state on one side actively opposed his country's participation in the war
- =3 if the case is a multilateral war that could be disaggregated into multiple overlapping conflicts or if the case results from such a disaggregation
- =4 if the case is a war that could be divided temporally into multiple separate conflicts or if the case results from such a disaggregation

=5 if the case arguably should be treated as an internationalized civil war

All positive values for the flag coding could be interpreted in multiple ways, and thus in practice additional rules were established to determine whether the coding applies in a specific case. Those rules are delineated at the start of each section discussing specific flag codings below.[1] Fortuitously, there are no cases in the dataset for which more than one of the concerns captured by the flag variable is pertinent; thus, there is no need to provide a system to deal with multiple positive codings. To facilitate analysis, the dataset contains a variable called "default" that equals 1 for cases that are included in default analyses and 0 for others. It is thus possible using this variable and the flag variable to splice the dataset in different ways in robustness checks. Table 1 at the end of the appendix lists flag and default codings for all cases.

Battle Deaths (flag=1)

COW's threshold of 1000 battle deaths for a case to qualify as a war is of course arbitrary, but it is relatively reasonable: most conflicts that participants view as wars meet the threshold, and few cases that are seen as conflicts short of war surpass it. One problem with this rule, however, is that for low-level conflicts, especially in the developing world, historical records simply do not provide sufficient information to determine the exact number of deaths in a given series of clashes. In these circumstances, it is often impossible to know whether or not a specific case in fact met the threshold. At a qualitative level, these cases are easy to ignore, but in statistical work they have just as much potential influence over results as any other in the dataset. To the extent that their inclusion or exclusion drives results, then, we would lose quite a bit of confidence in the resulting findings. In practice, as robustness checks in the statistical work in chapters three, four, and five demonstrate, this concern is not borne out, but the only way to know this was to look.

The rule that questionable cases be flagged does not provide a complete system for identifying those cases. In practice, cases receive this coding under two scenarios. In the first, composite

[1]It is of course logically possible for multiple flag codings to be pertinent in a single observation. In practice, however, this situation arises only twice in the dataset, in the Second Laotian War Phase 2 and the War of the Communist Coalition, which could receive flag codings of both 3 and 5. Given the rarity of this problem, I retain a single flag variable.

estimates of deaths in the war meet or exceed 1000, but those estimates are not backed up by information on specific encounters, either because no information for the number of deaths in individual encounters exists or because the death counts from those encounters for which deaths totals are reported falls well short of 1000. In these cases, the available information simply is insufficient to determine with certainty whether the threshold was met. The second scenario covers cases that are typically included in lists of wars but for which available information indicates that death totals in fact fell short of the threshold.

Twelve cases receive this flag coding, nine because precise death totals are unknowable and three because there is good reason to think that the case failed to meet the threshold. Most of these cases come from the nineteenth century, and all are relatively minor wars, meaning that information about them is quite limited. The seven cases covered under the first scenario are the Franco-Spanish War, the Ecuadorian-Colombian War, the Spanish-Chilean War, the Second, Third, and Fourth Central American Wars, the Lithuanian-Polish War, and the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Straits conflicts between Taiwan and China. All of these cases are included in the default analysis. The three cases flagged for the second reason are the Franco-Thai War of 1893, the Falklands War, and the Cenepa Valley conflict of 1995. Neither Clodfelter nor secondary sources (Smyth 1994; Tuck 1995; Tips 1996) provide any significant reason to believe that deaths in the Franco-Thai conflict even remotely approached the threshold, especially during the period during which COW reports that the two countries were at war; indeed, the case no longer appears as of the 2010 update of the Correlates of War dataset.[2] In the Falklands War, COW at one point reported a total of 910 battle deaths, below their own threshold for inclusion as a war, although more recent updates report a total of 1001. Clodfelter (2007, pg. 696) reports total deaths of 964 KIA, or 1001 including British deaths from "other causes." Because the battle death threshold is arbitrary and

[2]Specifically, in the Paknam Incident at the center of the conflict, fewer than 30 people died (the vast majority Thai). This incident marks the start of the war for COW; after this clash, the French gunships proceeded north to Bangkok, where they trained their guns on the palace. They thus induced the Thai king to agree to a ceasefire that neither side subsequently violated; COW's end date to the conflict is the date on which the two sides signed a formal treaty in which the Thais capitulated on the territorial issues in dispute. There was admittedly some additional fighting prior to COW's coded start date; this fighting is notable primarily because it provided the French *casus belli* (specifically, the French complained that the Thais had killed a French officer while he was on patrol in what legally was quite unambiguously Thai territory). However, every indication is that these earlier clashes were no more than isolated incidents; there is no indication that combined death totals came anywhere near to 1000.

this war clearly comes extremely close to meeting it, I retain the war in the dataset, but I obviously also flag it to permit me to determine that results are not dependent upon this case. Finally, in the Cenepa Valley conflict of 1995, virtually all sources identify fewer than 100 deaths through battle; COW's justification for the inclusion of the case relies entirely on personal communication with two people, with no definite estimate of deaths (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Given this disjuncture, the case receives a flag coding of 1 and is omitted from the primary analysis, although I include it in the dataset to allow for robustness checks.

Involuntary Involvement (flag=2)

The second flag coding concerns cases in which the head of state on one side opposed his country's involvement in the war. Given the theoretical assumption of central state control over the fighting forces, developments in these cases may deviate from the causal logic discussed here in unpredictable ways. To receive this coding, it must be the case that available evidence indicates that formal leaders sincerely opposed fighting throughout the conflict. Thus, cases like the Boxer Rebellion, in which the Chinese leadership disavowed the Boxers once defeat was certain, do not meet the standards for this flag coding.

Five cases—most involving the encroachment of a European colonial power onto a peripheral state whose government had been weakened by that encroachment—receive this coding: the Anglo-Egyptian War, the Second Spanish-Moroccan War, the Franco-Turkish War, and the (post-World War I) Greco-Turkish War. In the Anglo-Egyptian War, the Khedive (head of state) was trapped in Alexandria, which the British controlled, and was forced to repudiate General Arabi's nationalist uprising (Vogt 1992; Featherstone 1993). In the Second Spanish-Moroccan War, the Spanish and the French had completely undermined the Sultan's control over the region around the Spanish enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla. The Rif tribesmen who rebelled against the Spanish were thus outside of the Sultan's control; indeed, Ayache (1981, pp. 143-144) notes that the Sultan encouraged them to submit to the Spanish. The Franco-Turkish War occurred after World War I, at a time when the victorious allies were partitioning the defeated Ottoman Empire. With his allies and army defeated and the British in Constantinople, the Sultan saw no opportunity for resistance and thus favored

accepting whatever terms the British and French intended to impose. Nationalists under Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), however, began to violently oppose French control over Cilicia (in southern Anatolia), leading to an extended conflict that ultimately convinced the French to withdraw (and also ultimately allowed the nationalists to supplant the old guard as leaders of Turkey) (Sonyel 1975). This situation is also the reason for flagging the Greco-Turkish War, although as that war both started and ended later it spent less of its time during the period when control over the Turkish state was contested.[3] Finally, in the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan, available information suggests that the initial Pakistani incursion was carried out without the authorization or knowledge of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; this case is thus flagged given this possibility.

Disaggregating Multilateral Wars (flag=3)

The third flag coding allows for alternate approaches to disaggregating multilateral wars. Most statistical studies of war now disaggregate World War II, and many disaggregate other conflicts. It makes sense to disaggregate those multilateral wars in which developments on fronts are substantially independent (although they obviously will never be entirely independent) and in which the major participants are different. The specific requirements for disaggregation is that fighting occur on separate fronts, that the primary military belligerent on at least one side be different on the different fronts, and that significant political issues in dispute be different across fronts. Using that rubric as a measuring stick, it is worth discussing the multilateral wars in which disaggregation might be an option.

In the nineteenth century, there were relatively few multi-front multilateral wars; indeed, there are only two—the Crimean War and the Seven Weeks War—that might plausibly be disaggregated, as in all other multilateral conflicts all fighting took place on a single front. In the Crimean War, the only potentially defensible disaggregation would separate the Russo-Turkish dyad from Russia's dyad with the western powers. Russia and the Ottoman Empire fought separate engagements to the

[3]The Archigos dataset of leaders lists Ataturk as the leader of Turkey from January 11, 1922, after the end of the Franco-Turkish War but roughly halfway through the Greco-Turkish War (under the start and end dates coded for this conflict here; see the discussion of duration below). As the discussion of the Franco-Turkish War in chapter 7 demonstrated, however, Kemal was the effective power in Turkey from early in the conflict with the French, even if legal authority officially still rested with the Porte.

east of the Black Sea (Russian gains on that front provided the capital exchanged for the Crimea at the end of the war), and the Turks played a relatively limited role in the siege of Sevastopol. At the same time, however, the eastern fighting is generally viewed as a sidelight to the war as a whole, and it started only several years into the conflict, although Russia and Turkey had been at war during the entire period. Moreover, the central political issue at stake—containing Russian expansion—was constant across fronts, although its meaning for the Turks was admittedly different from the meaning for their allies, as they were the ones who would lose territory in the event of failure.[4] For these reasons, the Crimean War is not disaggregated. The Seven Weeks War, however, is broken into two separate conflicts, one an Austro-Prussian War and one an Austro-Italian War. The political issues in dispute on the two fronts were entirely separate (the Prussians sought to exclude Austria from Germany, while the Italians sought to acquire Venetia), and military events on the two fronts were relatively independent. Indeed, the Italians attempted to continue the war after the Austro-Prussian armistice, although that attempt did not last long, as the Austrians had already agreed to concede Venetia and the it rapidly became clear that the Italians were unable to defeat the Austrians without outside assistance (Wawro 1996). Thus, the default approach in the dataset is to disaggregate the Seven Weeks War into two separate conflicts.

The next conflict chronologically for which this flag coding is relevant is the Boxer Rebellion, although in this case the effect is to decrease the number of cases in the dataset. Specifically, COW includes both the Boxer Rebellion and a concurrent Russo-Chinese War in the dataset. The Russo-Chinese War references purely bilateral fighting that occurred in Manchuria at basically the same time that coalition forces were advancing toward and then occupying Beijing. In this case, the political issue at stake was the same on the two fronts, and Russia was a major participant in the drive on Beijing.[5] Thus, treating these two conflicts as separate is inappropriate under the coding rules, meaning that the default approach here is to merge the two together.

In the twentieth century, the World Wars provide the main multilateral conflicts that might be disaggregated. In World War I, there is an obvious division between the western and eastern

[4]There was also some fighting between the Russians and the British well away from the Black Sea region, most notably in the Baltic. As these engagements were quite limited and the participants and issues were the same as those at play in the Crimea, there is no justification for viewing these actions as separate conflicts.

[5]For details of this case, see Lensen (1967) and Tan (1967).

fronts, as the actors, issues, and outcomes differed greatly between the two. Reiter and Stam (2002) also include a German-Belgian War, in which they code Germany as winning quickly. While the Germans did take much of Belgium (including Brussels), they did not conquer the entire country, and the Belgians continued to fight alongside the French and the British in the continuous western front. The decision here is thus not to generate a separate Belgian War. A number of other possible conflicts could also be drawn out, although existing work has not done so. Colonial conflicts, such as the Anglo-German clashes in Africa, are omitted because the participants were also clashing in Europe. A potential Japanese-German War related to the Japanese appropriation of German possessions in China does not meet the death threshold. The remaining potential conflicts occur in southeast Europe, relating primarily to the war in the Balkans. Existing studies have omitted these conflicts, most likely because of the difficulty of identifying defensible lists of participants and start and end dates. Between Serbia's partial exit from the war (their territory was conquered but their army fought on) and the state of partial war that existed for several years around Salonika as a result of Greek neutrality, it is very difficult to parse the fighting into a clear list of conflicts. For this reason, I follow the existing literature in omitting these potential wars, while acknowledging that this solution is less than ideal.

World War II most obviously requires disaggregation. Even in the least disaggregated version of the data, the European (German) and Asian/Pacific (Japanese) wars are kept separate. In Asia, the default coding also distinguishes between the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War, in which the United States was Japan's primary opponent; these two wars are combined in robustness checks. In Europe, different studies have provided a number of different disaggregations. All recent studies include Polish, Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian, French, Italo-Greek, Yugoslav, Western, and Eastern wars. Bennett & Stam (1996) also include wars involving Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Denmark and a German-Greek War. Subsequent studies have dropped the Czechoslovak, Austrian, and German-Greek conflicts on the grounds that the first two were not wars and the third should be subsumed under the Italo-Greek conflict (Goemans 2000; Slantchev 2004). I agree with these decisions. I also omit the German-Danish War on the grounds that resistance in Denmark was extremely limited (fighting in the south lasted no more than a couple hours) and the central

government in Copenhagen capitulated immediately once aware of the German fait accompli. The remaining conflicts are all included. In the west, the Norwegian campaign was relatively separate (although the British did attempt to aid Norway), and both the Netherlands and Belgium fell before the British and the French could provide significant aid. Indeed, given the small size of the British Expeditionary Force, the French carried the vast bulk of the responsibility for ensuring their own survival; viewing that conflict as separate thus makes sense. The Italo-Greek conflict clearly progressed as a separate war, with British and, much more importantly, German intervention along the way. The German invasion of Yugoslavia, like the invasions of the Low Countries, occurred so swiftly that no outside help could reach the Yugoslavs. Finally, the fighting between Germany and the western powers was substantially different from the clash in the East against the Soviet Union, justifying coding it as a separate war.

This coding is also potentially relevant for some of the Arab-Israeli Wars, depending on how one views the central political issue at stake. To the extent that the central issue at stake is the existence of the Israeli state, there is no variation across fronts in the Palestine War (Israeli War of Independence), the Six Day War, or the Yom Kippur War. If one views the issue instead as a struggle for territory, then in all these cases (but not the other Arab-Israeli Wars) there is a case for subdividing the conflict into a southern war (Israel vs. Egypt) and a northern war (Israeli vs. all its other opponents). The primary approach here is to keep these conflicts unified, but I include additional observations to permit robustness checks.

The 2010 update of the COW wars dataset introduced two new conflicts for which a flag coding of 3 is clearly relevant. The Second Phase of the Laotian Civil War and the War of the Communist Coalition in Cambodia both involved the spillover of the Vietnam War into neighboring countries, with the international components basically concerning the same issues as the international conflict. (Separately, as I discuss below, to the extent that one views these conflicts as separate from the Vietnam War, the argument for doing so would concern the civil conflict in each country, in which case they should be coded as internationalized civil wars, with a flag coding of 5.) Given multiple issues with these cases, I omit them from the default analysis, although both are included in robustness checks.

Disaggregating Wars over Time (flag=4)

The fourth flag coding concerns wars that were fought on a single primary front but might be disaggregated temporally. As was discussed in chapter two in the section on measuring war duration, most breaks within wars last no more than a couple weeks and are intended to give the two sides an opportunity to negotiate, ending when they establish that no mutually acceptable agreement exists. When the break lasts more than a month, however, there is a more credible argument that the two sides have found a (potentially tacit) agreement that both prefer to continued fighting but that for some reason subsequently breaks down. For there to be multiple coded conflicts, I require that the break between fighting be greater than six months and that the renewal of fighting involve a substantial change in the issues at stake. Under this coding, I also discuss situations in which the main issue at stake remains the same but the participants change (a situation that arises in the Sardinian conquest of Italy).

This coding is relevant for five cases: the Austro-Sardinian War of 1848-1849, the Sardinian conquest of the Papal States and the Two Sicilies, the Manchurian War between China and Japan, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War. The Austro-Sardinian War took place in the context of the Revolutions of 1848, in which uprisings forced Austrian troops out of a number of Italian cities. In the initial round of fighting, a number of Italian principalities, headed by Sardinia-Piedmont, sought to drive the Austrians out of Italy. Their effort ended in failure, with the Austrians restoring their position in Milan and Venice. Nine months later, the Sardinians made another attempt but were crushed in the Battle of Novara. Fighting in both stages was sufficient to meet the casualty threshold. The consistent war aim, however, indicates that this case should not be subdivided under the coding rules. That said, I include an additional two observations corresponding to the two periods of fighting to permit robustness checks. Turning to the second case, the Sardinian conquests, which brought about Italian unification, are treated as separate wars in COW, but one could easily argue that they should be merged. The Sardinian invasion of the Papal States was undertaken with a goal of proceeding thence to the Two Sicilies to prevent Giuseppe Garibaldi (who had led a group of insurgents to take Sicily and then had moved to the Italian mainland) from establishing himself as a viable alternative to the Piedmontese Court. Thus, although the

Papal States and the Two Sicilies did not coordinate their defenses, the political issue (Italian unification) was effectively the same and the Sardinian troops moved quickly from one conquest to the next. Given the absence of coordination between the two victims, the default approach here is to consider the two wars as separate conflicts, but it makes sense to check robustness to combining the two cases into a single observation. The Sino-Japanese Manchurian War constitutes three separate incidents, two of which partially overlapped temporally. In 1931, the Japanese used the Mukden Incident to seize much of Manchuria; while this occupation was in process, they also intervened militarily to put an end to an anti-Japanese boycott in Shanghai. Following both these incidents, the two countries returned to relative peace for almost a year before the Japanese decided to supplement their new Manchurian territory by seizing the province of Jehol. Given the gap in time between the two periods of fighting and the change in Japanese aims, a case can be made that they should be considered separate wars. The default approach here is indeed to disaggregate them along these lines. In Vietnam, Reiter and Stam (2002) advocate separating the interstate phase of the conflict between an extended period of American involvement, ending with the 1973 agreements, and the subsequent North Vietnamese conquest of the South. This approach is of course open to question, but the basic tension created by the temporary American involvement is undeniable, especially with respect to the question of how the war ended (for the US, it was a negotiated exit; for South Vietnam, the war ended through conquest). Under these circumstances, I follow Reiter and Stam in splitting the war into two phases as the default approach. Finally, COW codes the Persian Gulf War as beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and continuing from that point until the end of the ground war. During much of that period, however, no fighting was happening, as the Kuwaitis ceased resistance quite early on while the rest of the world waited to see whether sanctions would work. I thus follow Slantchev (2004) in splitting the war into two periods, one the brief Iraq-Kuwait clash and the other Iraq's war against the coalition.

Internationalized Civil Wars (flag=5)

The final flag coding covers wars that might better be viewed as primarily civil conflicts in which another country had at least a limited involvement. This issue is most obviously relevant in the La

Plata War between Brazil and Argentina.[6] In this conflict, Brazil allied with Argentine dissidents led by Justo José de Urquiza to overthrow President Juan Manuel de Rosas. The start of the war involved a joint intervention in an ongoing conflict in Uruguay (where Montevideo had been besieged for an incredible seven years); with that potential obstacle taken care of, Urquiza's forces marched on Buenos Aires. Mindful of general dislike for the Brazil (a traditional rival of Argentina), the allies kept the role of Brazilian forces to a minimum; thus, their effective contribution was primarily to post ships near the capital to prevent Rosas from moving out to meet Urquiza. The final battle outside Buenos Aires, in which Urquiza's forces swept Rosas's army from the field and forced the Argentine president into exile, took place with at best minimal Brazilian involvement. Under these circumstances, there are significant questions as to whether the war should be considered an interstate conflict. The default approach here is therefore to exclude it.

The second case to receive this flag coding is the Lebanon War between Israel and Syria, in which the Israelis intervened in a Lebanese civil war in which the Syrians were already involved. Both Israel and Syria acted as normal states, but their allies (the Christian Phalangist militias on Israel's side and the PLO on Syria's side) were less predictable (Dupuy and Martell 1986). Because one can identify a distinct phase of the Lebanese conflict that coincided with the direct clashes of Israeli and Syrian troops, the decision here is to include this war in the default analyses but to check the effects of its exclusion.

This issue became more pertinent in COW's 2010 update, which in addition to extending the dataset to the post-1991 period also introduced a number of additional cases from history, almost all of which involve the internationalization of internal conflict. In two cases—the Second Laotian War Phase 2 and the War of the Communist Coalition—a flag coding of 3 is more pertinent, given that the international conflict essentially involved the spillover of the Vietnam War into Laos and Cambodia, respectively. As both cases also involved significant internal conflict both prior to and after internationalization, they arguably also could receive a flag coding of 5. Including or excluding these cases from robustness checks into the handling of potential internationalized civil wars has no substantive effect on results, however.

[6]Discussion of this war is based primarily on Lynch (1981), supplemented by Ferns (1960) and MacLean (1995).

Separately, a number of new cases involve international conflicts that are closely connected to larger civil wars. Both the Estonian and the Latvian Wars of Liberation occurred in the context of the far larger Russian Civil War and thus receive a flag of 5, although both are included in the default dataset. In the War of Angola, which COW codes as running from Angolan independence until early 1976, fighting followed almost immediately upon the termination of an independence struggle with the Portuguese and was followed by a protracted civil war. This case thus also merits a flag coding of 5, although given the short period of peace that preceded Angolan independence and the direct intervention of Angola's neighbors it is included in the default dataset. Similarly, in the Bosnian War of Independence, Bosnia's independence was followed immediately by the outbreak of war among the constituent members of the former Yugoslav state; it thus could be seen as a continuation of the civil war that preceded it. Given that the prior fighting occurred primarily in Croatia, however, it makes more sense to see the Bosnian War as a separate conflict among independent states; the case does have a flag of 5 to capture the possible objection given the prior civil war, however. Finally, the NATO-backed overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 relied strategically on backing a pre-existing rebel force—the Northern Alliance—with air strikes and limited special forces involvement; as such, NATO's intervention arguably should have been considered as the internationalization of a pre-existing war.

Duration

The dates used in this dissertation come from preliminary data produced by the War Initiation and Termination (WIT) project.[7] For purposes of clarity, this section discusses those cases in which WIT and COW differ by at least a month on start or end dates, highlighting those cases in which the difference is potentially controversial. In the vast majority of cases in which significant differences arise, the reason for the difference is COW's use of declarations of war or peace agreements to mark the beginning or end of fighting; WIT by contrast uses the dates on which fighting begins and ends, which sometimes can differ substantially from key diplomatic events (especially peace agreements).

[7]Note that the WIT data used in this dissertation are preliminary and subject to change as disagreements among coders are resolved.

Specifically, in the Franco-Spanish (61 days), Franco-Mexican (32 days), Pacific (93 days), Sino-French (66 days), first (i.e. 1897) Greco-Turkish (61 days), Russo-Chinese (44 days), Third Central American (45 days), First Balkan (33 days), Franco-Turkish (48 days), Polish-Lithuanian (51 days), Sino-Soviet (56 days), Israel-Syria (72 days) and Second World (319 days) Wars disagreements arise because COW's start or end date reflects diplomatic developments rather than the initiation or termination of direct military hostilities.

In other cases, COW codes the war as concluding with a significant military development (frequently the capture of one side's capital), despite the fact that fighting continues thereafter. Thus, in the Italo-Sicilian War (73 days), COW's end date corresponds to the surrender of the main Neapolitan army, but other units continued to resist elsewhere for a few months. Similarly, COW codes the Italo-Ethiopian War (285 days) as ending with Mussolini's declaration of victory in Rome following the capture of Addis Ababa, although resistance by Ethiopian forces loyal to Haile Selassie continued for another nine months. The largest gap in the dataset arises because COW codes the Vietnamese-Cambodian War (2945 days) as ending with the capture of Phnom Penh, despite the fact that the Cambodians retreated and launched guerrilla resistance that continued for ten years. In the Second Greco-Turkish War, by contrast, COW codes hostilities as beginning with limited clashes during the Greek occupation of Izmir (Smyrna); however, as there was no organized Turkish resistance at the time, WIT uses the date of the Greek invasion into the Anatolian interior over a year later. This disagreement thus explains the gap of 414 days between COW and WIT.

Finally, in the Spanish-Moroccan War of 1909, very little information exists as to when fighting between the two sides ended. The 138 day difference in WIT and COW durations is thus a consequence of the selection of different dates from the conflicting and incomplete historical record on which to code the war as ending.

Table 1: Codings for the Flag and Default Variables

War	Year	Flag	Default
Franco-Spanish	1823	1	1
1st Russo-Turkish	1828	0	1
Mexican-American	1846	0	1
Austro-Sardinian	1848	4	1
Austro-Sardinian I	1848	4	0
Austro-Sardinian II	1849	4	0
1st Schleswig-Holstein	1848	0	1
Roman Republic	1849	0	1
La Plata	1851	5	1
Crimean	1853	0	1
Anglo-Persian	1856	0	1
Franco-Austrian	1859	0	1
1st Spanish-Moroccan	1859	0	1
Papal States	1860	4	1
Two Sicilies	1860	4	1
Conquest of Italy	1860	4	0
Franco-Mexican	1862	0	1
Ecuadorian-Colombian	1863	1	1
2nd Schleswig-Holstein	1864	0	1
Paraguayan	1864	0	1
Spanish-Chilean	1865	1	1
Austro-Prussian	1866	3	1
Austro-Italian	1866	3	1
Seven Weeks	1866	3	0
Franco-Prussian	1870	0	1
1st Central American	1876	0	1
2nd Russo-Turkish	1877	0	1
Pacific	1879	0	1
Anglo-Egyptian	1882	2	1
Sino-French	1884	0	1
2nd Central American	1885	1	1

Table continues next page.

War	Year	Flag	Default
Franco-Thai	1893	1	0
1st Sino-Japanese	1898	0	1
1st Greco-Turkish	1897	0	1
Spanish-American	1898	0	1
Boxer Rebellion (joint)	1900	3	1
Boxer (minus Russo-Chinese)	1900	3	0
Russo-Chinese	1900	3	0
Russo-Japanese	1904	0	1
3rd Central American	1906	1	1
4th Central American	1907	1	1
2nd Spanish-Moroccan	1909	2	1
Italo-Turkish	1911	0	1
First Balkan	1912	0	1
Second Balkan	1913	0	1
World War I	1914	3	0
WWI: Western Front	1914	3	1
WWI: Eastern Front	1914	3	1
Estonian War of Liberation	1919	0	1
Latvian War of Liberation	1919	0	1
Russo-Polish	1919	0	1
Hungarian-Allies	1919	0	1
Franco-Turkish	1919	2	1
2nd Greco-Turkish	1920	2	1
Polish-Lithuanian	1920	1	1
Sino-Soviet	1929	0	1
Manchurian	1931	4	0
Mukden Incident	1931	4	1
Jehol	1933	4	1
Chaco	1932	0	1
Saudi-Yemeni	1934	0	1
Italo-Ethiopian	1935	0	1
2nd Sino-Japanese	1937	0	1

Table continues next page.

War	Year	Flag	Default
Chankufeng	1938	0	1
Nomonhan	1939	0	1
World War II	1939	3	0
WWII: Poland	1939	3	1
WWII: Norway	1940	3	1
WWII: Netherlands	1940	3	1
WWII: Belgium	1940	3	1
WWII: France	1940	3	1
WWII: Greece	1940	3	1
WWII: Yugoslavia	1940	3	1
WWII: Western	1940	3	1
WWII: Eastern	1940	3	1
WWII: Pacific	1941	3	1
Russo-Finnish	1939	0	1
Vichy France-Thailand	1940	0	1
First Kashmir	1947	0	1
Palestine	1948	3	1
Palestine (North)	1948	3	0
Palestine (Egypt)	1948	3	0
Korean	1950	0	1
Offshore Islands	1954	1	1
Russo-Hungarian	1956	0	1
Suez	1956	0	1
Ifni War	1957	0	1
Taiwan Straits	1958	1	1
Assam	1962	0	1
Vietnam	1964	4	0
Vietnam I	1964	4	1
Vietnam II	1974	4	1
Second Kashmir	1965	0	1
Six Days	1967	3	1
Six Days (North)	1967	3	0

Table continues next page.

War	Year	Flag	Default
Six Days (Egypt)	1967	3	0
2nd Laotian War Phase 2	1968	5	0
War of Attrition	1969	0	1
Football War	1969	0	1
War of the Communist Coalition	1970	5	0
Bangladesh	1971	0	1
Yom Kippur	1973	3	1
Yom Kippur (North)	1973	3	0
Yom Kippur (Egypt)	1973	3	0
Turko-Cypriot	1974	0	1
War over Angola	1975	5	1
Vietnam-Cambodia	1977	0	1
Ogaden	1977	0	1
Uganda-Tanzania	1978	0	1
1st Sino-Vietnamese	1979	0	1
Iran-Iraq	1980	0	1
Falklands	1982	1	1
Israel-Syria	1982	5	1
Aouzou Strip	1987	0	1
2nd Sino-Vietnamese	1987	0	1
Gulf War	1990	4	0
Iraq-Kuwait	1990	4	1
Gulf II	1991	4	1
War of Bosnian Independence	1992	5	1
Armenia-Azerbaijan	1993	0	1
Cenepa Valley	1995	1	0
Badme Border War	1998	0	1
Kosovo War	1999	0	1
Kargil War	1999	2	1
Afghanistan	2001	5	1
Iraq	2003	0	1

Appendix B: Coding Conquest and Settlement

This appendix covers the coding rules and coding decisions used in this dissertation to identify the way in which war ends. As no such data previously existed for interstate wars, both the rules and the data are novel and thus merit discussion. Recall from the theoretical discussion that settlement can occur tacitly: if two countries are at war and stop fighting while both are clearly capable of continuing the battle, they do so because both believe that further fighting is not in their interest given the political division of the stake that previous fighting has produced. This possibility means that it is difficult to identify clear rules for identifying settlement. It is thus preferable to focus on conquest and to identify settlement as a residual category of wars that ended without either side being conquered.

The coding rules therefore must identify specific criteria whereby to identify conquest. Conquest occurs when one side becomes incapable of continuing its military resistance in effective fashion. Incapability in turn typically arises because the loser's military has been defeated so decisively that it ceases to be able to act as an effective military force, thus permitting the victor to impose its preferred settlement. However, as with any data collection effort in the social sciences, there are inevitable marginal cases about which different researchers might disagree. Under these circumstances, the best option is to generate multiple conquest codings to determine the robustness of findings to alternate decisions on contestable cases.

Conquest I: primary conquest coding
= 1 if for the loser either

the military disperses, ceases to exist, or surrenders
or the political leadership no longer can control the military
or the enemy can entirely occupy the loser's territory without opposition
= 0 otherwise

The second and third listed components to the primary coding criteria for conquest result in conquest being coded as occurring in a few cases that otherwise would be coded as settlement. In particular, the second criterion is pertinent for the Boxer Rebellion, in which the Chinese Imperial Court fled just prior to the occupation of Beijing, leaving outlying Chinese forces without clear orders and thus effectively ending the main period of fighting (although the occupying powers were forced to engage in subsequent pacification efforts). The third criterion is relevant for the Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was continuing to resist Serbia and Greece on its western border but was forced to surrender in the face of an unopposed Rumanian occupation of the country.[8]

Conquest II: restrictive conquest coding
=1 if prior to the end of fighting the loser's military ceases to exist as a viable fighting force
=0 otherwise

The more restrictive coding excludes from conquest the cases discussed above as well as a few others (such as the Franco-Prussian War and the Pacific War in World War II) in which the loser's military surrendered in return for certain minimal political concessions. Political concessions generally concern the nature of the subsequent government; guarantees of personal safety or free passage to neutral countries for leaders or members of the armed forces are not sufficient for a coding of settlement under this coding rule. The survival of a portion of the army in a foreign country from which it will not be able to contest the conquest of the country also is not sufficient to lead to a coding of settlement under this rule.

Conquest III: expansive conquest coding
=1 if Conquest I=1 or
if 1) the war involves a clearly defined territorial stake, 2) the loser is militarily evicted from that territory to a geographically separate region, and 3) the end of fighting follows closely (within one month) upon that eviction

[8]Changing the conquest coding for these two cases does not change the substantive results of the statistical analysis.

=0 otherwise

The expansive rule allows for conquest in cases in which the loser retains an effective military force, but not in the (clearly-defined and geographically separate) territorial region in dispute. It thus covers cases such as the Falklands War (Argentines on the Falklands forced to surrender) or the post-WWI Greco-Turkish War (Greeks pushed out of Anatolia). In these cases, the loser could theoretically continue the war but might lack the means to reintroduce troops to the contested region, meaning that the winner is able to implement its preferred division of the issue of stake unilaterally. In cases in which the main issues at stake are not territorial or in which the territory in dispute is not well-defined or geographically isolated from other regions controlled by the defeated side, this coding rule results in identical codings to those of the primary coding rule.

Applying these coding rules to the 126 (sometimes overlapping) wars identified in Appendix A reveals that most wars end through settlement, but that a substantial number do end in military conquest. In particular, under the primary coding rule, there are 92 cases of settlement compared to 34 of conquest; of the 104 wars that are used in the default analyses, 76 end through settlement. The restrictive coding rule results in the inclusion of an additional ten of the total 126 cases in the settlement category (seven if the focus is on the cases used in default analyses), while the expansive rule results in an additional seven of the 126 cases being coded as conquest (also seven in the restricted dataset). It is encouraging to note that, although disagreements are certainly possible as to the optimal operationalization of conquest, changes in operationalization do not dramatically affect results: over 85% of wars are coded as ending in the same way under all three coding rules.

The remainder of this appendix discusses coding decisions for all the cases in the dataset. All cases are listed, but discussions are included only in cases in which a plausible argument could be made that conquest occurred under at least one of the coding rules. In many cases, of course, the war ends with an obvious political agreement with both countries' armies still in the field; in these cases, no discussion is necessary. Coding was conducted based on information in Kohn (1999) and Clodfelter (2007), supplemented in most cases by secondary sources. Codings for the three versions of the conquest variable are summarized in Table 2 at the end of the appendix. For explanations of why overlapping wars are listed (e.g. World War II and the component units of World War II),

see Appendix A.

Franco-Spanish

The Franco-Spanish War is clearly conquest under any of the coding rules. The war ended with the French capture of the final Spanish stronghold at Cadiz and the release of the Spanish King, whom the liberals had held in captivity. The army of the liberals ceased to exist as an effective force following this French victory, and there is no evidence that the liberals received any significant concessions for their surrender. (The French on their own accord did induce King Ferdinand to promise leniency, but he quickly reneged on that promise.)

First Russo-Turkish

Mexican-American

An argument could be made that this case resembles conquest, but it ultimately fails to meet any of the three definitions. The Americans did take Mexico City, but the Mexican army withdrew from the city and continued to exist as a fighting force (if not a particularly effective one). As the Americans did not occupy the entire country and the Mexican government remained in command of the army (although formal control over the government changed several times over the course of the war), none of the conditions for conquest under coding one are met. The case does not meet the conditions for Conquest III because the territorial area in dispute was neither clearly defined (the Americans were vague in their demands) nor geographically separate.

Austro-Sardinian

Austro-Sardinian I

Austro-Sardinian II

First Schleswig-Holstein

Roman Republic

This case clearly constitutes conquest under the primary coding, in that the French and Austrians occupied the entire territory of the Papal States (with the French striking the final blow by taking Rome). The French entry into Rome precipitated the collapse of the liberal government (which formally went out of existence) and the flight of the remnants of its army. The flight and escape of the army complicates coding under the restrictive conquest rule. With the collapse of the republic Garibaldi and the army aimed merely to escape and thereby hold open the option of reconstituting at a later date should auspicious circumstances present themselves, meaning that they had no intent of trying to reverse the immediate course of events.[9] Nevertheless, the case does not meet the rules for conquest under the restrictive coding, meaning that the war is coded as ending through settlement in that case.

La Plata

The La Plata War ended with the defeat of Rosas's forces and the entry of the victorious army into Buenos Aires. The main complication here is that much of the victorious army was composed of rebelling Argentines rather than Brazilians, but this point is covered by the flag coding (see Appendix A). As Rosas's army ceased to exist after the battle (forcing Rosas to flee to British protection), the case clearly constitutes conquest under all coding rules.

Crimean

Although the capture of Sevastopol helped to precipitate the end to the war, this case does not meet the criteria for conquest under the expansive coding rule. Sevastopol (and the Crimea more generally) was not a territorial desideratum in the war: the main British aim was to contain Russian expansionism, while other stated aims concerned the management of Christian minorities

[9]In this context, it is worth noting that Garibaldi's loyalties were more to Italy than to the Roman Republic, which he saw as one forum in which to advance the Italian national cause. In this regard, then, survival was intended to permit something like the subsequent actions by Garibaldi and the Thousand in overrunning the Neapolitan territories; Garibaldi was never active in the territory of the Papal States again.

in the Ottoman Empire.

Anglo-Persian

Franco-Austrian (a.k.a. Italian Unification or Second Austro-Sardinian)

First Spanish-Moroccan

Italo-Roman

The Italo-Roman War ended with the Pope's forces in general defeat and thus clearly constitutes conquest. The primary complication is that following the Roman Republic War French troops had remained as a garrison in Rome; not wanting to alienate the French, the Italians stayed away from the capital. Confident in the French defense of Rome, however, the pope had used all his forces outside the city; their defeat thus left him with no real army, thus providing clear grounds under all three coding rules for coding this case as ending through conquest.

Italo-Sicilian

This case clearly ended through conquest: the Italians forced the Neapolitan troops back into various fortresses, which were then besieged and forced to surrender. The Neapolitan troops were admittedly provided guarantees for personal safety (and King Francis was permitted to depart under French protection), but these guarantees do not reach the level of political concessions that would justify a coding of settlement under the restrictive rule.

Conquest of Italy (Italo-Roman + Italo-Sicilian)

This case is coded as ending through conquest under all coding rules for the reasons discussed above.

Franco-Mexican

While the French managed to take Mexico City and install Maximilian as emperor, they never fully pacified the country, and ultimately they departed in the face of continued costly resistance and an American threat to intervene. The war thus ended on a settlement under which the French abandoned Maximilian in return for an end to fighting. The case does not meet the criteria for the expansive conquest coding because the French were not forced out of the country militarily.

Ecuadorian-Colombian

Details on this war are very limited, but a decisive Colombian victory in the major battle was not enough to bring about conquest. It appears that the Ecuadorians were able to create a second army (the battle took place in Colombian territory), and the war ended with a negotiated agreement.

Second Schleswig-Holstein

The war ended when the German powers demonstrated their ability to occupy the Danish islands, which the Danes had previously thought would prove impervious. In this sense, therefore, the war ended when it became apparent that further fighting would inevitably end in conquest. The Danish army did not surrender, however, and it remained a viable fighting force; thus this case is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Lopez (a.k.a. Triple Alliance or Paraguayan)

This case is coded as ending through conquest under all coding rules. The war ended with the Brazilians (with limited Argentine involvement) in occupation of effectively all of Paraguay, and with Lopez's army dispersed and dispirited following his death in battle. The Brazilians admittedly did subsequently negotiate with the new Paraguayan government, but these negotiations were in fact an anti-Argentine move arising from competing territorial claims and interests.

Spanish-Chilean

Seven Weeks (a.k.a. Austro-Prussian)

Although the consensus is that the Prussians could have taken Vienna following the Battle of Königgrätz, they did not do so, and the Austrian army remained an effective (if poorly placed) fighting force. The war thus clearly ended through settlement under any of the coding rules. (Note with respect to the third rule that no territory was clearly in dispute and that in any event there was no way in which the Austrians could clearly be excluded from any territory without the Prussians conquering Austria in full.)

Austro-Prussian (component of Seven Weeks)

See the above discussion.

Austro-Italian (component of Seven Weeks)

Franco-Prussian

This case presents coding challenges: when the war ended, the French still held Paris, but its fall was inevitable and the war ended with the capitulation of French forces in Paris in return for the limited concession that some could retain their arms (which they needed to oppose the Paris Commune) and that the victorious Germans would not physically occupy the capital. (Technically, the final fighting occurred along the Swiss border, where a French contingent not covered by the surrender agreement fought and lost in an encounter with the Germans; they then fled across the border into Switzerland, where they were interned. These events do not affect coding decisions under any coding rule, however.) Because the French army surrendered, the case constitutes conquest under the primary coding rule (and thus under the expansive rule as well). The existence of limited concessions, however, means that it is coded as settlement under the restrictive rule.

First Central American

In this war, an alliance of Guatemala and Honduras invaded El Salvador and forced the Salvadoran president to step down in favor of an ally of Guatemalan President Justo Rufino Barrios.

At the time that Valle of El Salvador agreed to step down, his army remained an effective fighting force, although it appears that complete defeat appeared inevitable. As the Salvadoran army remained in the field and did not surrender, however, the case is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Second Russo-Turkish

Pacific (a.k.a. Ten Cents)

This war ended through conquest under the primary and expansive coding rules but not under the restrictive rule. The key question is how fighting in the Chilean-Peruvian dyad ended, as the Bolivians had withdrawn from the war militarily well before Peru stopped fighting. Peru refused to concede after Chile overran contested border territory and even after the Chileans succeeded in taking Lima, but the Chileans refused to back off from their demands and the Peruvian generals who were leading guerrilla resistance ultimately concluded that further resistance would be futile and thus capitulated. The conquest coding under the primary and expansive coding rules is unproblematic, but the case creates some problems for the restrictive rule. By the time of the final capitulation, the Chileans had put in place a new Peruvian government that had demonstrated some independence by refusing to make certain concessions. Thus, although the capitulation was not made in return for political concessions, the generals could have confidence that Chilean demands would be limited. Under these circumstances, the case is coded as not constituting conquest under the restrictive coding rule.

Anglo-Egyptian

This war ended with the complete defeat of the Egyptian army resisting the British at Tel-el-Kebir. That defeat ended with the surrender of the remaining Egyptian fighting force, thus clearly justifying a coding of conquest under the primary and expansive coding rules. The British did promise to depart Egypt quickly (a promise they famously would repeat for the next half-century without actually departing), but this promise was not made as a concession to facilitate

the surrender of the defeated Egyptian forces, meaning that this case is also coded as ending through conquest under the restrictive coding rule.

Sino-French

This war ended following a French defeat at Longsan, in what is now Vietnam. The defeat was humiliating and forced the French to retreat out of the city; however, they were not forced out of Indochina militarily, meaning that the case fails to meet the requirements for conquest under the expansive coding rule.

Second Central American

This war ended suddenly with the death of Guatemalan President Barrios in battle, which precipitated the withdrawal of Guatemalan forces from Salvadoran territory. Although Barrios's death clearly shortened the war, both sides retained effective fighting forces, and the obvious settlement was a return to the status quo ante. One could of course argue that Barrios's death cut the lines of communication with the leadership, but other figures were available and would have been able to organize resistance had the Salvadorans attempted to invade Guatemalan territory. Thus, the case is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Franco-Thai

This case is generally excluded from analyses (see Appendix A), but when it is included it is coded as ending through settlement. The French had shown themselves to be militarily superior, but they had not imposed any serious defeats on the Thais, and the Thai army continued to exist as a fighting force, if a thoroughly intimidated one. Moreover, the army remained in contact with the government, and two French warships clearly were insufficient to occupy an entire country. While the French territorial aims were fairly clearly delineated, they had not forced the Thais to abandon that territory, nor would it have been difficult for the Thai army to cross back into that territory in the event that they had done so.

First Sino-Japanese

First Greco-Turkish

Spanish-American

This case is coded as ending through settlement under the primary and restrictive codings and conquest under the expansive coding. Given that Spain's homeland was untouched in the war, the two settlement codings are unproblematic. With respect to the expansive coding rule, fighting occurred in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, with Cuba being the most important territorial region in dispute. In both Cuba and Puerto Rico Spanish troops capitulated, leaving both islands under American control; in the Philippines the Spanish abandoned Manila but remained capable of action, although in practice they did very little. Given the centrality of Cuba to the war, the capitulation of Spanish troops on that island is viewed as more important that the potential for further fighting in the Philippines; once off the islands, of course, it would have been extremely difficult for the Spanish to return.

Boxer Rebellion (joint)

This case is coded as ending through conquest under the primary coding because the Imperial Court, in fleeing from the advancing coalition forces, lost contact with the Chinese army, which then ceased to resist (with substantial portions reverting to brigandage). As the Chinese army continued to exist, however, the case is coded as ending through settlement under the restrictive coding.

Boxer Rebellion (only) and Sino-Russian

These cases—the component conflicts of the combined Boxer Rebellion in the dataset—receive the same codings as the Boxer Rebellion, for the same reasons.

Russo-Japanese

Although Japanese territorial aims in this war were fairly clearly delineated, the territory in question was not geographically separate enough to impose a serious obstacle to a Russian return. Thus, the Russo-Japanese War ended through settlement under all versions of the conquest variable.

Third Central American

Although information on this war is limited, it is clear that all sides still had effective forces in the field at the time that they agreed to an armistice; the war is thus coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Fourth Central American

This case is problematic because the Nicaraguans conquered Honduras but were gearing up for an invasion of El Salvador (who had already entered the fighting) at the time that the war ended. Specifically, the Nicaraguans invaded Honduras, scattering the Honduran army and capturing Tegucigalpa, at which point they installed a new Honduran president. The Salvadorans entered the war on the side of the Hondurans but were not able to provide effective assistance, and indeed the Salvadoran army does not appear to have been fully engaged in the fighting at the time of the armistice. Nonetheless, most sources agree that Nicaraguan President Zelaya intended to invade El Salvador but ultimately was convinced not to, which would constitute a negotiated termination to the war in that dyad. Because the negotiated outcome to the fighting postdated the conquest of Honduras, the war is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Second Spanish-Moroccan

Details about this case are extremely limited, meaning that it is difficult to determine exactly how the fighting ended. Moreover, as was discussed in Appendix A, this case is unusual in that the Rif tribesmen with whom the Spanish fought were not under the control of the Moroccan Sultan. The war apparently ended when the Spanish managed to take a particular mountain summit, but in practice it seems that violence merely lessened without completely ending; indeed, the Spanish ultimately experienced over a decade of continual low-level violence. Given limited information,

codings here are uncertain, but the continuation of subsequent violence provides grounds to believe that the tribesmen retained an effective fighting force, leading me to code the war as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Italo-Turkish (a.k.a. Tripolitanian)

This war is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules. It clearly did not meet the requirements for conquest under the primary or restrictive coding rules, but an argument could be made with respect to the expansive rule, as the Italians entered the war to acquire Ottoman territories of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (modern Libya), which in turn were isolated from the rest of the Ottoman Empire by Egypt (controlled by the British, and through which the Turks were not permitted free passage). The Italians announced that they had annexed Tripolitania and Cyrenaica prior to gaining effective control over the interior, where tribesmen commanded by Ottoman officers continued to resist them (and indeed maintained that resistance long after the formal conclusion of the war). Thus, the Italians never succeeded in driving the Ottomans out of the territory in dispute; the war ultimately ended when the Italians seized some Aegean islands and, more importantly, when Ottoman attention was distracted by the approach of the First Balkan War. Thus, the war ended through a settlement under which the Ottoman Empire agreed to remove its forces from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in return for an end to the war and the return of the seized Aegean islands; the Italians also accepted war termination without formal transfer of sovereignty. (Both sides ultimately reneged on their agreement, the Ottomans by allowing their officers in Libya to resign from the army and remain to fight the Italians, and the Italians by refusing to return the islands, and the two countries soon returning to hostilities in the context of World War I.) In summary, the war is coded as ending through settlement under the expansive coding of conquest as well because Italy could not effectively kick the Ottoman forces out of the contested territory.

First Balkan

The First Balkan War clearly ended through settlement under the primary and restrictive coding rules; more questions exist for the expansive coding rule. For the primary rule, the Turkish army

continued in existence, and the allies never took Constantinople, so the end of the war clearly does not approach conquest. For the expansive rule, the aim of the war was to seize the Ottoman Empire's European territory (Macedonia—then larger than today—and Thrace; Albania declared independence in the (correct) supposition that the European powers would then deter conquest by Serbia or Montenegro). For Greece and Serbia, the war effectively ended when there were no Turkish forces left in the field of operations to fight; for Bulgaria it ended following the fall of the besieged city of Adrianople, but a front still existed at Chataldzha outside Constantinople. The Turks were thus reduced to a minuscule piece of European territory (smaller than Turkey today possesses), from which a reconquest of the disputed areas would have been impossible. Moreover, the fall of Adrianople—the last remaining Ottoman possession beyond Chataldzha—precipitated the end of the war. For these reasons, the case is coded as conquest under the expansive coding rule.

Second Balkan

The Second Balkan War is coded as ending through conquest under the primary (and therefore also the expansive) coding rule, but not under the restrictive rule. The war started as a dispute over the spoils of the First Balkan War, with Bulgaria clashing with its erstwhile allies Serbia and Greece. The Serbs and the Greeks advanced fairly quickly, but the Bulgarians ultimately managed to salvage the situation, especially on the front with the Greeks, on whom they inflicted a fairly significant defeat. Once the war started, however, the Turks used the opportunity to reacquire Adrianople, while the Romanians invaded to enforce a claim to Southern Dobrudja (having already extorted Northern Dobrudja from the Bulgarians in the first war). As the entire Bulgarian army had been dedicated to the defense of the western border, the Romanians encountered no resistance and quickly occupied much of the country, with a clear ability to occupy the rest at any time. Under these circumstances, the Bulgarians had no choice but to capitulate. Because the Bulgarian army remained in the field, however, the war does not meet the restrictive rule for conquest.

World War I

World War I ended through settlement under all coding rules. At the time that the fighting stopped, there was an implicit promise that peace terms would resemble Wilson's Fourteen Points; that the Entente ultimately broke that implicit promise with the harsh Versailles terms and that the Germans were forced to accept those imposed terms because of the disintegration of their army after the armistice do not change the fact that the end to fighting occurred on the basis of an understanding that there would be some political concessions. As a note, the lack of a clear territorial region in dispute means that this case could not meet the requirements for the expansive conquest coding without also meeting the requirements for the primary coding.

WWI: Western

See above.

WWI: Eastern

This case also is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules, although here as on the Western Front one side's army was in a process of collapse. Although Brest-Litovsk was harsh, it was still negotiated, and the Russians retained an army that would have been able to resist even harsher terms had they needed to.

Estonian War of Liberation

Latvian War of Liberation

Russo-Polish

Hungarian-Allies

This war clearly ended through conquest under any coding rule. Although the Hungarians succeeded in repelling Czechoslovak advances, the Romanians successfully invaded, ultimately overrunning Budapest and forcing the communist government of Béla Kun into exile. Hungary thus

was left with its capital and most of its country occupied by foreign armies, with its official army no longer in existence, and with its government in flight.

Second Greco-Turkish

This case clearly does not end through conquest under the primary or restrictive coding rules, but it does end in conquest under the expansive rule. In the war, Greece attempted to solidify its claim to territory in Anatolia with an ethnic Greek population, while the Turks attempted to reclaim Anatolia. Turkish victories ultimately forced the Greeks to abandon Anatolia. There was some discussion of a continuation of the war designed to reclaim Greek Thrace (which the Ottoman Empire had lost to Bulgaria in the First Balkan War and which Bulgaria had lost to Greece in the Second Balkan War), but they ultimately made no attempt, while the Greeks were in no position to attempt to return to the Turkish mainland.

Franco-Turkish

The French ultimately chose to withdraw from Cilicia (territory in southern Anatolia) because the costs of the war were too high. Because the withdrawal was a political choice rather than military eviction, the war clearly ends through settlement under any coding rule.

Lithuanian-Polish

This war is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules. The Poles hoped to annex Lithuania but ultimately settled for acquiring Vilnius; the Lithuanians hoped to keep Vilnius but ultimately were forced to live without it. As both were forced to make concessions, and as both countries retained armies in the field, the war clearly ended through settlement under any coding rule.

Sino-Soviet

Manchurian

The Manchurian War and its component conflicts are all coded as ending without conquest. The Japanese repeatedly succeeded in taking control of contested territory, in the first case in Manchuria and Shanghai and in the second in Jehol (adjacent to Manchurian territory already seized). Because the territory that the Japanese acquired was not geographically separated and because Chinese forces remained in existence to oppose further Japanese advances, the case clearly does not meet the requirements for conquest under any coding rule.

Mukden Incident (component of Manchurian)

See above.

Jehol (component of Manchurian)

See above.

Chaco

Saudi-Yemeni

This war clearly ended in settlement under the primary and restrictive codings. An argument could be made for the expansive coding that the territorial region in dispute was Najran, and that the Saudis had effectively evicted the Yemenis from that province. In practice, however, there do not appear to have been significant geographical obstacles to passage into and out of Najran, and the war ended not with the capture of that province but following further Saudi advances into indisputably Yemeni territory. Thus, the war is coded as ending through settlement under this coding rule as well.

Italo-Ethiopian

This case ended through conquest under any coding rule. The Italians invaded Ethiopia and took Addis Ababa, forcing Emperor Haile Selassie into exile. The coded end to the war came with the surrender of the remaining forces nominally under the Emperor's command (as he was out

of the country, Ras Desta and other Rases had effective decision-making power), which occurred without concessions (indeed, the Italians executed several Ethiopian commanders).

Sino-Japanese

Coding the nature of war termination in this case is tricky and depends on whether it is amalgamated with the US-Japan Pacific War in World War II (see below for coding decisions in the event of amalgamation) and also on how one deals with the Soviet/Mongolian intervention in August of 1945. In practice, facing the prospect of an American invasion of the home islands, the Japanese began to withdraw their forces from China, while the Chinese had no intention of participating in the subsequent invasion. Thus, left to their own devices the war would have ended when the Japanese abandoned the continent in return for a tacit Chinese agreement not to try to follow them. This process was complicated, however, by the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, which rapidly mopped up the skeletal remaining Japanese forces on the continent. This development clearly does not by itself merit a coding of conquest under the primary or restrictive coding rules, but following the invasion Japan clearly was evicted from the continent and had no easy was to return, meaning that it does lead to a coding of conquest under the expansive rule.

Chankufeng (a.k.a. Lake Khasan)

Nomonhan (a.k.a. Khalkhin Gol)

World War II

World War II is unified into a single conflict only in robustness checks (see Appendix A). Given that the wars in the Pacific and in Europe were clearly unrelated, one could make an argument for basing codings on either the European War (on the grounds that it was more important) or the Pacific War (on the grounds that it ended last); the approach here is to take the second option. As a result, the war is coded as ending through conquest under the primary and expansive coding rules but not under the restrictive rule. See below for specific coding rationales.

WWII: Poland

This case clearly ended through conquest. The remaining Polish forces surrendered without receiving any sort of concessions; indeed, the Germans incarcerated much of the Polish army, while the Polish officers who fell into Soviet hands were generally executed.

WWII: Norway

This case also ends through conquest: Germany overran Norway and imposed a government under Quisling; the Norwegians could not continue effective resistance. Complications do arise because of the British presence (British forces were withdrawn by sea), but such complications are inevitable to some degree once we disaggregate multilateral wars.

WWII: Netherlands

This case is clearly conquest under all three coding rules: the Germans quickly overran Dutch territory, forcing the army to surrender. The Dutch government went into exile, where it continued its diplomatic stance of war but could not maintain any effective military resistance.

WWII: Belgium

The Belgian case clearly is conquest under the primary and expansive coding rules, but it is more open to question under the restrictive rule. Unlike Wilhelmina in the Netherlands, King Leopold formally surrendered to the Germans, inviting charges of treason. However, he does not appear to have gained any real concessions (the Germans kept him under house arrest and then deported him to Germany, and German policy with respect to Belgium was not appreciably different from that with respect to the Netherlands). Thus, this case is coded as ending through conquest under the restrictive coding rule as well.

WWII: France

This case closely resembles the Franco-Prussian case in several respects, in that the French

armies were decisively defeated and had no hope of reversing the military situation but remained formally in the field at the time of the capitulation. The case is further complicated by the German decision to permit the French to retain the rump Vichy regime (the Germans also made other concessions, such as promises not to use the French navy against the British). Under these circumstances, this case clearly ended through settlement under the restrictive coding rule. As the French army surrendered and the Vichy government existed at the whim of Hitler (the Germans ultimately occupied the rest of France in November 1942, without opposition), however, the case is coded as ending through conquest under the other two coding rules.

WWII: Western

This case was clearly conquest under any coding rule, for the same reasons that apply in the WWII: Eastern war (see below).

WWII: Greece

This case clearly ended through conquest under all three coding rules. Although the Greeks succeeded in holding off the Italian invasion, German intervention was too much, even with British assistance. The Germans compelled the surrender of all Greek troops remaining in Greece (including those in Crete, which was invaded through a massive paratroop drop).

WWII: Yugoslavia

This case also constitutes conquest under all coding rules. The Yugoslavs were unprepared for a German invasion (the country had been cooperating with Germany up until the government was overthrown, prompting Germany's invasion just a few days later). The armed forces thus crumbled in the face of the German attack. That Yugoslav partisan warfare subsequently arose and ultimately proved a serious obstacle to stable German control over the region is not relevant for this coding decision.

WWII: Eastern

This case clearly ended through conquest under all coding rules. The Soviets occupied Berlin and eastern Germany (while their allies occupied the western part of the country) and German leaders and members of the armed forces were incarcerated without any political concessions.

WWII: Pacific

This case is coded as ending through conquest under the primary and expansive coding rules but not under the restrictive rule. For the primary rule, the Japanese surrender provides grounds for a coding of conquest, as the Japanese were merely acknowledging the inevitable in accepting occupation. Under the restrictive coding rule, however, the limited American concession to permit the emperor to remain in a ceremonial role is sufficient for a coding of settlement.

Russo-Finnish

Franco-Thai

First Kashmir

Palestine

Palestine (Northern)

Palestine (Egypt)

Korean

Offshore Islands

This case clearly ended through settlement under the primary and restrictive coding rules. The expansive coding rule presents a greater challenge, however, as the Chinese managed to capture a

number of islands held by Taiwan, after which point the fighting ended quickly with the Taiwanese militarily unable to return. For this reason, the war is coded as ending through conquest under the expansive coding rule.

Russo-Hungarian

This case clearly ended through conquest. The Soviets pummeled the Hungarian resistance and forced its surrender across the board; when fighting ended no effective military force existed to oppose Soviet plans.

Sinai (a.k.a. Suez)

Ifni

Taiwan Straits

Assam (a.k.a. Sino-Indian)

One might argue that this case should meet the requirements for conquest under the expansive coding rule on the grounds that the territory in question was clearly delimited (the region of conflicting border claims) and the Chinese overran that territory and more, and that furthermore the Himalayas presented an obstacle to any Indian return to the territory in question. In practice, however, the limited regions in which border claims differed were not clearly set off by geographical features, meaning that the territory in question lacked the geographical delimitation required for a coding of conquest under this rule. Moreover, the war ended not when the Chinese took control of that territory but when they demonstrated their ability to strike into the Indian heartland.

Vietnamese

The ambiguities of this case provide a clear justification for splitting it into multiple stages. American (and non-South Vietnamese allied) exit from the war was negotiated and clearly meets

the qualifications for settlement, while South Vietnamese exit was militarily imposed and clearly conquest (see below). Because the final military event of the war was the conquest of Saigon, the war is coded as ending through conquest under all versions of the coding rule when the case is amalgamated for robustness checks.

Vietnam I (American period)

This phase of the war clearly ends through settlement under all three coding rules. The Americans and their allies were unable to pacify the country, but the Vietnamese could not evict them from it, either. The American departure thus was not militarily necessary; instead, it was a political decision arising from a cost-benefit calculation.

Vietnam II (North conquers South)

This case ended with the occupation of Saigon and the flight of remaining South Vietnamese loyalists into exile; it thus clearly constitutes conquest under any coding rule.

Second Kashmir

Six Day

Although the Israelis inflicted crushing defeats on all three of their opponents in this war, in no case did their opponent's fighting force fully surrender, dissipate, or otherwise cease to exist. Thus, this case is coded as ending through settlement under all coding rules.

Six Day (North)

See above.

Six Day (Egypt)

See above.

Second Laotian War Phase 2

This case covers the period of international involvement—associated with the Vietnam War—in the Laotian civil war. The case is coded as ending with the withdrawal of all international forces, at which point the conflict reverts to civil war status. As such, using this end date, it should be coded as ending through settlement.

Israeli-Egyptian (a.k.a. War of Attrition)

Football

War of the Communist Coalition

This case is the Cambodian analogue to the Second Laotian War Phase 2; the same basic argument explains why the observation is coded as ending through settlement in those analyses in which it appears.

Bangladesh

This case is coded as ending through conquest under the expansive coding rule and through settlement under the other two. The primary issue in the war was the future of East Pakistan, from which India aimed to evict the Pakistani forces so as to permit the local independence movement to break away and create the state of Bangladesh. Although the Pakistanis escalated the war through attacks on India's western border, the war ended with the surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. As Pakistan had no easy way of returning to Bangladesh, this case clearly constitutes conquest under the expansive coding. Because West Pakistan was effectively untouched and the main Pakistani forces remained undefeated, however, the war clearly ends through settlement under the more restrictive coding rules.

Yom Kippur

Yom Kippur (North)

Yom Kippur (Egypt)

Turco-Cypriot

War over Angola

This conflict covers the fighting in the initial year after Angolan independence; it ends with the withdrawal of international forces. As such, it is coded as ending through settlement.

Vietnamese-Cambodian

Whether this case is coded as ending through conquest or settlement depends on when it is coded as ending (see Appendix A). Using the primary dates adopted here, it clearly ends through settlement, as the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia in return for an end to the fighting. COW's dates, however, have it ending with the Vietnamese capture of Phnom Penh, which forced the Cambodian forces to flee to the northwest. If one views the war as ending at this point, then it clearly ends through conquest under the primary and expansive coding rules. It does not meet the restrictive coding rule, however, but pointing to that problem raises the further problem that the war does not end in 1979; I thus refrain from adopting a coding under the restrictive rule for this case (conquest is coded as missing in the alternative codings).

Ethiopian-Somalian (a.k.a. Ogaden)

This case does not merit a conquest coding under the expansive rule because, although the Ethiopians succeeded in evicting the Somalis from the disputed territory, there was no clear geographic obstacle to passage from Ethiopian to Somali territory and vice versa.

Ugandan-Tanzanian

This case clearly constitutes conquest under all coding rules. The war ended with the Tanzanians

capturing Kampala and forcing Idi Amin and his remaining bodyguards to flee to Sudan; Amin's Libyan allies had previously been airlifted out of the country. With these departures, no effective army remained to oppose the Tanzanians.

First Sino-Vietnamese

Iran-Iraq

Lebanon (a.k.a. Israel-Syria)

This case is messy given the presence of multiple militias, but there are no grounds for coding Israel as conquering Syria under any of the coding rules. With respect to the expansive coding rule, Israel did not evict the Syrians from Lebanon, and in any event the absence of geographical obstacles to a Syrian return would have militated against a conquest coding had that happened.

Aouzou Strip

Second Sino-Vietnamese

Persian Gulf

Although the coalition victory was militarily decisive, it did not meet the requirements for conquest under any of the three coding rules. The Iraqi army remained as a viable (if heavily battered) fighting force, as was evident from its ability to put down the subsequent Shi'a and Kurdish insurrections. Coalition forces remained in the south of the country, and Hussein remained in effective command. A stronger case could be made for the conquest under the expansive rule, as Kuwait constituted a clearly defined territorial aim. However, the lack of clear geographic obstacles to an Iraqi reinvasion means that in this case too the war is coded as ending through settlement.

Iraq-Kuwait (component of Persian Gulf)

This case is coded as ending through conquest under all coding rules. The Iraqis occupied Kuwait quite quickly, and in response to brutal tactics the Emir (from exile) ordered a cessation of all unconventional resistance. The only question would arise with respect to the restrictive coding rule, as a portion of the Kuwaiti army escaped across the border to Saudi Arabia, where it ultimately joined in the coalition's attack. Because the Kuwaiti army had no real hope of returning to its territory without outside assistance, however, this survival is not sufficient to code this stage of the war as ending through settlement under the coding rule.

Persian Gulf II (component of Persian Gulf)

See above.

War of Bosnian Independence

Armenia-Azerbaijan

This war ended with the Armenia capture of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-majority region in Azerbaijan. It clearly does not meet the standards for conquest under either the primary or the restrictive coding rules. Despite the centrality of Nagorno-Karabakh to the conflict and the war termination after Armenia's capture of it, the case also does not meet the requirements for conquest under the expansive coding rule because the region in question was not geographically separated from Azerbaijan.

Cenepa Valley

Badme Border War

Although the war was fought over a small contested geographical area, the fact that this area lay along the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea meant that the war could not end in conquest under the expansive coding rule unless it did so under the primary coding rule, which it obviously did not.

Kosovo

Although the war was followed by the NATO occupation of Kosovo, this case clearly did not end through conquest under any coding rule, as Serbia clearly still had forces in the field capable of fighting, and the occupation of Kosovo (which, given that it abuts Serbia, would not have been sufficient for a coding of conquest under the expansive rule anyway) followed rather than preceded Milosevic's capitulation.

Kargil

The Indian reconquest of the areas initially occupied by Pakistan, which precipitated war termination in this case, clearly did not meet the standard for conquest under even the expansive coding rule, as the admittedly clearly delineated territory over which the two sides fought—Kashmir—bordered both countries, meaning that the Pakistanis could have attempted to force their way back in had they so desired.

Afghanistan

This conflict ended with the Northern Alliance/NATO capture of Kabul and Kandahar and the subsequent eviction of the rump of the Taliban from the country into Pakistan. These events clearly meet the definition of conquest under the conventional and expansive coding rules. Thus, as with the end of fighting in the Roman Republic War discussed above, this case does not meet the requirements for conquest under the restrictive coding rule.

Iraq

This case covers the conventional phase of the Iraq War, which was followed by a period of relative peace prior to the outbreak of the insurgency. This phase of the conflict clearly ended in conquest under any coding rule, as the Iraqi army surrendered in its entirety, Baghdad and the other major cities were occupied, and Saddam Hussein was forced into hiding.

Table 2: Codings of Conquest under Different Coding Rules

War	Year	Conquest Primary Coding	Conquest Restrictive Coding	Conquest Expansive Coding
Franco-Spanish	1823	Yes	Yes	Yes
1st Russo-Turkish	1828	No	No	No
Mexican-American	1846	No	No	No
Austro-Sardinian	1848	No	No	No
Austro-Sardinian I	1848	No	No	No
Austro-Sardinian II	1849	No	No	No
1st Schleswig-Holstein	1848	No	No	No
Roman Republic	1849	Yes	No	Yes
La Plata	1851	Yes	Yes	Yes
Crimean	1853	No	No	No
Anglo-Persian	1856	No	No	No
Franco-Austrian	1859	No	No	No
1st Spanish-Moroccan	1859	No	No	No
Papal States	1860	Yes	Yes	Yes
Two Sicilies	1860	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conquest of Italy	1860	Yes	Yes	Yes
Franco-Mexican	1862	No	No	No
Ecuadorian-Colombian	1863	No	No	No
2nd Schleswig-Holstein	1864	No	No	No
Paraguayan	1864	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spanish-Chilean	1865	No	No	No
Austro-Prussian	1866	No	No	No
Austro-Italian	1866	No	No	No
Seven Weeks	1866	No	No	No
Franco-Prussian	1870	Yes	No	Yes
1st Central American	1876	No	No	No
2nd Russo-Turkish	1877	No	No	No
Pacific	1879	Yes	No	Yes
Anglo-Egyptian	1882	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sino-French	1884	No	No	No

Cases in *italics* are excluded from default analyses; see Appendix A. Table continues next page.

War	Year	Conquest Primary Coding	Conquest Restrictive Coding	Conquest Expansive Coding
2nd Central American	1885	No	No	No
Franco-Thai	1893	No	No	No
1st Sino-Japanese	1894	No	No	No
1st Greco-Turkish	1897	No	No	No
Spanish-American	1898	No	No	Yes
Boxer Rebellion (joint)	1900	Yes	No	Yes
Boxer (minus Russo-Chinese)	1900	Yes	No	Yes
Russo-Chinese	1900	Yes	No	Yes
Russo-Japanese	1904	No	No	No
3rd Central American	1906	No	No	No
4th Central American	1907	No	No	No
2nd Spanish-Moroccan	1909	No	No	No
Italo-Turkish	1911	No	No	No
First Balkan	1912	No	No	Yes
Second Balkan	1913	Yes	No	Yes
World War I	1914	No	No	No
WWI: Western Front	1914	No	No	No
WWI: Eastern Front	1914	No	No	No
Estonian War of Liberation	1919	No	No	No
Latvian War of Liberation	1919	No	No	No
Russo-Polish	1919	No	No	No
Hungarian-Allies	1919	Yes	Yes	Yes
Franco-Turkish	1919	No	No	No
2nd Greco-Turkish	1920	No	No	Yes
Polish-Lithuanian	1920	No	No	No
Sino-Soviet	1929	No	No	No
Manchurian	1931	No	No	No
Mukden Incident	1931	No	No	No
Jehol	1933	No	No	No
Chaco	1932	No	No	No
Saudi-Yemeni	1934	No	No	No

Cases in *italics* are excluded from default analyses; see Appendix A. Table continues next page.

War	Year	Conquest Primary Coding	Conquest Restrictive Coding	Conquest Expansive Coding
Italo-Ethiopian	1935	Yes	Yes	Yes
2nd Sino-Japanese	1937	No	No	Yes
Chankufeng	1938	No	No	No
Nomonhan	1939	No	No	No
World War II	1939	Yes	No	Yes
WWII: Poland	1939	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Norway	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Netherlands	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Belgium	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: France	1940	Yes	No	Yes
WWII: Greece	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Yugoslavia	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Western	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Eastern	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
WWII: Pacific	1941	Yes	No	Yes
Russo-Finnish	1939	No	No	No
Vichy France-Thailand	1940	No	No	No
First Kashmir	1947	No	No	No
Palestine	1948	No	No	No
Palestine (North)	1948	No	No	No
Palestine (Egypt)	1948	No	No	No
Korean	1950	No	No	No
Offshore Islands	No	No	Yes	
Russo-Hungarian	1956	Yes	Yes	Yes
Suez	1956	No	No	No
Ifni	1957	No	No	No
Taiwan Straits	1958	No	No	No
Assam	1962	No	No	No
Vietnam	1964	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vietnam I	1964	No	No	No
Vietnam II	1974	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cases in *italics* are excluded from default analyses; see Appendix A. Table continues next page.

War	Year	Conquest Primary Coding	Conquest Restrictive Coding	Conquest Expansive Coding
Second Kashmir	1965	No	No	No
Six Days	1967	No	No	No
Six Days (North)	1967	No	No	No
Six Days (Egypt)	1967	No	No	No
2nd Laotian War Phase 2	1968	No	No	No
War of Attrition	1969	No	No	No
Football War	1969	No	No	No
War of the Communist Coalition	1970	No	No	No
Bangladesh	1971	No	No	Yes
Yom Kippur	1973	No	No	No
Yom Kippur (North)	1973	No	No	No
Yom Kippur (Egypt)	1973	No	No	No
Turko-Cypriot	1974	No	No	No
War over Angola	1975	No	No	No
Vietnam-Cambodia	1977	No	No	No
Ogaden	1977	No	No	No
Uganda-Tanzania	1978	Yes	Yes	Yes
1st Sino-Vietnamese	1979	No	No	No
Iran-Iraq	1980	No	No	No
Falklands	1982	No	No	Yes
Israel-Syria	1982	No	No	No
Aouzou Strip	1987	No	No	No
2nd Sino-Vietnamese	1987	No	No	No
Gulf War	1990	No	No	No
Iraq-Kuwait	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gulf II	1991	No	No	No
War of Bosnian Independence	1992	No	No	No
Armenia-Azerbaijan	1993	No	No	No
Cenepa Valley	1995	No	No	No
Badme Border War	1998	No	No	No
Kosovo War	1999	No	No	No

Cases in *italics* are excluded from default analyses; see Appendix A. Table continues next page.

War	Year	Conquest Primary Coding	Conquest Restrictive Coding	Conquest Expansive Coding
Kargil War	1999	No	No	No
Afghanistan	2001	Yes	No	Yes
Iraq	2003	Yes	Yes	Yes

Cases in *italics* are excluded from default analyses; see Appendix A.

Appendix C: Additional Statistical Robustness Checks

This appendix contains additional statistical results to substantiate claims made but not demonstrated in the main text of *Logics of War*. In the text, I make claims about robustness with respect to changes to the universe of cases and to the use of alternate measures for key concepts, and also mention results from a number of additional tests. These claims concerned robustness of my findings to changes in the universe of cases (adding, dropping, or reformatting wars in various ways), alternate measures of pre-war capability shifts, the use of Correlates of War data for the duration and death dependent variables, the substitution of variables capturing different conceptions of military conquest, an alternate approach to testing the claim about the relationship between intensity and war duration, additional robustness checks for the regime variables, a variety of claims about other control variables, and robustness of results to alternate statistical specifications. This document works through these claims in sequence. Note that I treat the government spending results more as a robustness check to the core duration and deaths findings rather than as a central element of the analysis, and thus do not present further robustness checks for that analysis; in general, given the more limited N, results are unsurprisingly less completely robust, though the general picture remains quite consistent as one changes various aspects of the analysis.

In all, these robustness checks constitute hundreds of additional regressions, typically with no real change to the results. Where possible, I present results graphically, typically focusing on results for the power shift variable that is of central interest for my analysis. In cases where this is not feasible or where I suspect the reader would be interested in seeing the full table, I provide the

full table of results. This robustness checks section of the analysis .do file contains the commands necessary to run every regression conducted here.

The Universe of Cases

I identify five reasons why a case might potentially be problematic: because there is reason to doubt that violence reached the standard 1000 death threshold to be considered a war, because the central government of a war participant sincerely disavowed the fighting while it was happening, because different scholars might disagree about whether to disaggregate a multilateral war into component conflicts, because different scholars might disagree about whether to consider a period of violence separated by a lull in fighting to be one war or two, and because the conflict might be better described as an internationalized civil war than an interstate war. In every case except the involvement of a government that opposed the fighting, some marginal cases are both included in the main analysis (raising questions about whether the results stand up if they are omitted), while others are omitted (raising questions about whether the results would change with them included). There are thus nine possible ways in which the universe of cases might be changed, for each of the different regressions presented in the main text. Presenting results for all of these changes would obviously be overwhelming, so instead I present results graphically for the main variable of interest, the size of the capability shift that preceded the war.

Table 3 lists the set of changes in order. Figure 1 contains results for the capability shift variable when rerunning models in the main analysis using the different universe of cases. Results are organized by model: model 2.4.1 is model 1 of table 2.4. For every robustness check, I graph the point estimate and confidence intervals for the capability shift variable under every change to the universe of cases. If the confidence interval overlaps with the vertical line at zero, then the capability shift variable misses statistical significance in the regression in question; otherwise it remains statistically significant. Consistent with what was reported in the main text, the results are remarkably stable across changes to the universe of cases, with the notable exception of robustness check 5 for model 2 of table 2.5, which is examining the relationship between commitment problems and the use of risky military strategies. In this case, the reaggregation of the component wars of

World War II into a single conflict removed half of the observations of the use of maneuver in the default dataset, and once these cases are removed the variable becomes insignificant with the opposite sign. Otherwise, there are a few cases in which the capability shift variable narrowly ceases to be significant at the .05 level (in particular in models 2.4.3 and 2.4.5, which examine duration until conquest, a less central effect for my argument), but the coefficient retains a quite similar value. Overall, then, with the one obvious exception, these robustness checks suggest that possibly arbitrary decisions about the universe of cases are not driving my results.

Table 3: Robustness Checks Related to the Universe of Cases

	Robustness Checks for the Universe of Cases
1	Excluding cases that may not have met the death threshold
2	Including COW wars excluded from the main analysis because they appear not to have met the death threshold
3	Excluding wars in which one side's government opposed the fighting
4	Further disaggregating multilateral wars not disaggregated in the main analysis
5	Reaggregating multilateral wars that were disaggregated in the main analysis
6	Further disaggregating wars in which an extended pause might be coded as war termination and reinitiation
7	Reaggregating wars in which an extended pause was coded as war termination and reinitiation
8	Including one case (the La Plata War) excluded in the main analysis as an internationalized civil war
9	Excluding cases that were arguably internationalized civil wars

Alternate Measures of Pre-War Capability Shifts

I also note that findings are robust to using different measures of the size of the pre-war shift in capabilities, the central proxy for the extent of commitment problem concerns. The primary measure examines the shift in relative capabilities for all important participants in the war from ten years prior to the war until the year prior. I also examine the shift over five years prior to the war, as well as restricting the measure to the shift in a primary dyad in the war, or only for participants who were involved in the war in the opening month. In addition, in the main analysis, I estimate



Figure 1: Results from robustness checks related to the universe of cases

the size of the shift for a few cases of countries that would otherwise have had missing data; I check however to ascertain whether this decision is unduly influencing results. Table 4 lists the relevant robustness checks. Again, I rerun the central regressions using these alternate measures, reporting the results graphically in figure 2. To summarize, the shifting power variable is always in the predicted direction, and retains statistical significance in the vast majority of cases. The choice of measure does matter somewhat for the analysis of duration until conquest (again less central to my argument), where findings are weaker (albeit still near conventional significance levels) when examining the five-year rather than the ten-year shift in capabilities, and in the analysis of military strategy, where the findings are conversely slightly weaker when using the ten-year shift. Alternate approaches to handling cases in which a participant entered the system between five and ten years prior to the war appear if anything to strengthen the main findings.

Robustness to Using Correlates of War Duration and Death Data

Because of concerns about the standard Correlates of War data for war duration and battle deaths, I collected my own data. The decision to use this data does not however drive my results. Tables

Table 4: Robustness Checks Related to the Measurement of Commitment Problems

	Robustness Checks for the Measurement of Pre-War Capability Shifts
1	Shift over ten years among all major participants (primary measure)
2	Shift over five years among all major participants
3	Shift over ten years for all initial participants
4	Shift over five years for all initial participants
5	Shift over ten years in the central dyad in the war
6	Shift over five years in the central dyad in the war
7	Shift over ten years among all major participants, substituting the five-year shift in cases that would otherwise have been coded missing
8	Shift over ten years among all major participants, shifting observations in which the size of the shift was estimated to missing values



Figure 2: Results from robustness checks related to the universe of cases

5 and 6 below contain the results from relevant regressions when substituting COW duration or COW deaths data for my own.[10] As is clear from examining the results for the relevant regressions, the decision not to use COW data is not driving my results.

Robustness to Using Alternate Measures of Conquest

For the competing risks analysis, I distinguish between conquest and settlement as types of war termination. This variable is also important in table 2.5 when I examine the determinants of the type of war termination. In some cases, of course, deciding whether war ended through conquest or settlement is open to debate. I thus generated alternate expansive and restrictive codings of conquest. Table 7 presents the results of relevant regressions when using the restrictive conquest coding, while table 8 presents the same results when substituting the expansive coding. Results are again quite stable across models, though the interactive effect in model 2 of table 2.4 is weaker when using the restrictive coding of conquest.

Alternate Approaches to Testing the Intensity Hypothesis

I test the effects of war intensity on the speed of settlement using an interaction term that is designed to separate out the effects of intensity in informational and in commitment problem wars. It is also possible, however, to test this argument by bifurcating the sample into relatively long and relatively short wars and running the analysis separately. If I am correct that informational wars tend to be short (especially when they are intense), then increased war intensity will be associated with quicker war termination, and in particular quicker settlement, in the subsample of wars less than a year long. By contrast, if longer wars are disproportionately driven by commitment problems for which increased war intensity is less relevant, then the same relationship will not hold in the subsample of wars longer than a year. Table 9 presents results of this alternate approach to testing the argument. Model 1 replicates model 1 of table 2.4. Model 2 conducts the same analysis on the

[10]For deaths data, I use COW figures wherever possible. For observations that differ from COW (most commonly cases in which I disaggregate COW wars into multiple component conflicts), to avoid having missing data I substitute my coding for the deaths variable.

subset of relatively short wars. Consistent with predictions, increased intensity is now associated with quicker settlement. Model 3 runs the same analysis using a Cox proportional hazard model only on the subset of wars that end through settlement prior to one year (also omitting short wars that end through conquest); the relationship remains the same. This model reveals however that the strong effect of commitment problems in model 2 reflects the significant number of commitment problem conflicts that end through conquest in less than a year, rather than commitment problems being present among wars that settle in just a little less than one year. Model 4 presents results analogous to model 2 for the sample of relatively long wars (duration over one year). Now intensity is associated with *increased* war duration, contrary to the naive prediction of an informational model but consistent with the argument that intensity promotes settlement in informational wars but not in the commitment problem conflicts that constitute a disproportionate share of the longer wars.

Alternate Measures of Regime Type

In the main text, I discuss various coding decisions with respect to the regime variables. Specifically, I observe that the results are robust to using alternate measures of the losing political regime, discuss different operationalizations of the initiator democracy variable, and note that there is no evidence of a non-linear regime effect in the competing risks regressions as well. In several cases, the relevant changes are in fact trivial. Thus, for example, in the primary analysis there is only one case—the Palestine War—in which there is any significant degree of regime difference among the various participants on the losing side; unsurprisingly, making changes to the coding in this one case has no substantive impact for the results.[11] Similarly, changing the threshold for an initiator to be considered democratic affects only a small number of cases—for example, moving the threshold from a Polity score of 7 to a Polity score of 6 adds two incidents of democratic initiation, in the Roman Republic and Second Spanish-Moroccan Wars. Both of these conflicts were short and not

[11]The main text also mentions World War II and Vietnam as cases with markedly different regimes on the losing side. Both of these conflicts are disaggregated in the main analysis, however, World War II into component conflicts (separating Japan from its allies) and Vietnam over time (with the United States uninvolved a second war that ends with South Vietnam's defeat).

very deadly. It is thus unsurprising that results for the variable are slightly stronger after the change; that said, the variable remains insignificant in the competing risks analysis.

Table 10 presents results to substantiate two other regime claims. The first is that substituting the initiator's Polity score for a democracy dummy weakens the results. Models 1 and 2 of table 10 replicate models 2 and 4 of table 2.2 with the initiator's Polity score substituted in. In both cases, the Polity score is both statistically insignificant and substantively weak, contrary to the prediction that more democratic initiators will select into relatively short and easy wars. Models 3 and 4 examine the possibility of nonlinear regime effects in the competing risks analysis, focusing in particular on duration until settlement, the area in which the supposed reluctance of leaders of losing partial democracies to settle should be apparent. If partially democratic losers are particularly averse to settlement, then we should expect a negative coefficient for the linear regime score and a positive one for the quadratic term. In reality, the relationship is the opposite in both the analysis of war duration (model 3) and total deaths (model 4).

Alternate Control Variables

I also examined the robustness of the results given a wide range of changes to control variables. Specifically, I substituted a dummy variable that takes a value of one whenever a major power is involved in the war for the standard one, which only takes a value of one when there is a major power involved on both sides. Second, I substituted the standard 1-6 contiguity score for the contiguity dummy used in the main analysis. Third, I replaced the strategy scale, which follows Bennett and Stam in assigning a value between 1 and 8, with strategy dummies that capture the different possible strategy combinations observed in the data. Fourth, I substituted variables capturing ideological difference for ones capturing cultural difference. Fifth, I substituted total energy consumption and historical GDP estimates for the iron/steel production figures used to proxy for economic development in the analysis of strategy choice in table 2.5. There is unfortunately no concise way to report results using these alternate measures in a format that would be at all transparent to the reader, even in a supplemental appendix. For readers interested in seeing the actual results, the Stata .do file that replicates the main analysis contains a series of regressions at the end that conduct

the relevant robustness checks. To summarize, however, while results for the control variable in question sometimes change, results for the primary variables of interest remain quite stable when these changes are made, consistent with the general pattern of robustness observed throughout this project.

Alternate Statistical Specifications

In the main text of the book, I also note that the results are representative of what one would find when using alternate reasonable statistical specifications. This section substantiates this observation by reporting findings under different modeling choices, in particular substituting parametric duration specifications for Cox models in duration models in which the dependent variable is any form of war termination, substituting Cox specifications for competing risks analysis in duration models in which the dependent variable is war termination through settlement, and substituting ordinary least squares or negative binomial regressions for duration models in regressions in which the dependent variable is battle deaths or total government spending.

One potential concern is that the choice of duration specifications is driving results. The main analysis uses a Cox proportional hazard specification for regressions in which the dependent variable is war termination, and a competing risks model in cases in which the dependent variable is war duration until settlement. The primary alternative to Cox duration models is more parametric specifications, of which the Weibull is most common. Ancillary tests suggest that the lognormal parametric regression is most appropriate given the data, but given the familiarity many readers will have with the Weibull I also use that. In the tests that examine the timing of settlement, as opposed to conquest, the primary analysis uses competing risks models. An alternate approach is to switch back to the Cox specification, while treating cases that end through conquest as censored.

Another possible concern is the use of duration models for regressions in which the dependent variable is not strictly temporal, specifically deaths and government spending. In practice, the key feature of dependent variables in an event history framework is that they are strictly positive, a feature that holds for both time spent fighting and for deaths and expenditures in war. Substantively, additional deaths and additional spending, just like additional time spent fighting, represents a

continued missed opportunity to resolve the issues at stake in the war. I thus argue that the use of event history analysis in these cases is appropriate. Nonetheless, a skeptical reader might wish to know whether results are robust to using alternate statistical specifications, such as ordinary least squares regression or, for the analysis of deaths, a negative binomial regression that can account for the count nature of the dependent variable.

Table 11 replicates models 1 and 2 from table 2.2, demonstrating that the results for key variables are unchanged when using either a Weibull or a log-normal specification. Interpretation of results for the log-normal specification is the opposite of that for typical proportional hazard duration models, with positive coefficients associated with increased rather than decreased expected duration. Results in each case for the capability shift variable are thus substantively quite similar to those reported in the book. Results for war intensity and loser regime type are by contrast somewhat weaker, though in each case I would argue that the most important test concerns the timing of settlement rather than war duration in general.

Table 12 replicates models 3 and 4 of table 2.2, which examine the determinants of total battle deaths. Models 1 and 2 replicate model 4, using a Weibull and a lognormal specification, respectively; to save space I do not report results replicating model 3, which are quite comparable. Models 3 and 4 present replications using OLS, with the dependent variable the log of total battle deaths in the war. (The logarithmic transformation is necessary because of highly skewed nature of the battle death data, with a few major outliers, most obviously the World Wars.) Models 5 and 6 report analogous results using a negative binomial specification, now with the simple count of total battle deaths as the dependent variable. Results for the capability shift variable are again quite consistent—the one technical change is in model 3, when the capability shift variable marginally missed significance at the .05 level ($p = .051$). War intensity and democratic initiation are both robustly associated with quicker war termination; the loser's regime type again proves less robust, albeit in the predicted direction.

Table 13 continues with the replication of models 5 and 6, which examine the determinants of total government spending, specifically military spending in the war as a percentage of prewar GDP. Models 1 and 2 present results using the Weibull and lognormal specifications, respectively;

in each case, the models correspond to model 6 of table 2.2, though results from the analysis that corresponds to model 5 are effectively identical. Models 3 and 4 report results from OLS regressions; again, larger prewar shifts in capabilities are associated with higher expected costs from war.[12] In each case, war intensity and democratic initiation are not associated with changes in government spending at a statistically significant level, consistent with the reported findings in the book. Loser regime type is omitted because of a lack of significant variation—in particular, none of the loser's for whom I have data on government spending were remotely democratic.

Finally, table 14 presents results from models in which the dependent variable is war termination through settlement. These models correspond to the competing risks regressions reported in table 2.4 of the book. For these models, I report results using a Cox specification in which wars that end through conquest are treated as censored.[13] Model 1 reports results for war duration until settlement; model 2 reports results for battle deaths prior to settlement; and model 3 reports results for total spending prior to settlement. The results are analogous to those reported in the main text, with two minor exceptions: capability shift in model 3 and loser regime type in model 2 are both now significant at the $p < .1$ level rather than the $p < .05$ level.

[12]Because government spending as a share of total GDP is not a count variable, negative binomial regression, as used in table 12 would be inappropriate.

[13]Because only event history models allow me to distinguish between settlement and conquest as forms of war termination, it is not feasible to run robustness checks using ordinary least squares or other non-event history models.

Table 5: Duration Analysis Robustness Checks (COW Duration Data)

	(1) 2.2.1	(2) 2.2.2	(3) 2.3.1	(4) 2.4.1	(5) 2.4.2	(6) 2.4.3
Power Shift	-1.33*	-1.46**	-1.46**	-3.26**	-9.78*	3.76**
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.89)	(4.28)	(1.09)
log(War Intensity)		0.13	0.14	0.064	0.29†	0.079
		(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.23)
Intensity × shift					-1.02†	
					(0.62)	
Dem. Initiator		0.44	0.43	0.28	0.25	-0.075
		(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.72)
Loser Regime		0.034	-0.025	0.064*	0.071**	-0.031
		(0.021)	(0.071)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.035)
(Loser Regime)^2			0.0033			
			(0.0037)			
Terrain	-2.51**	-2.40**	-2.40**	-1.50*	-1.75*	1.29
	(0.55)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.88)
Contiguity	0.16	0.14	0.095	0.16	0.19	-0.26
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.59)
Relative Cap.	1.68†	1.62	1.46	-0.77	-0.97	1.96
	(0.99)	(1.08)	(1.07)	(1.17)	(1.13)	(2.41)
# of war participants	0.033	-0.0030	0.011	-0.23	-0.33	0.41
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.55)
Military strategy	-0.44**	-0.40*	-0.35*	0.13	0.058	-0.67**
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Major Power War	-0.92*	-1.32**	-1.37**	-0.61	-0.73	-0.56
	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.62)	(1.01)
Cultural Difference	-0.39	-0.28	-0.26	0.55	0.53	-1.58**
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.56)
Observations	86	77	77	77	77	77
N_fail	86	77	77	52	52	25

Robust standard errors, † < .1, *< .05,**< .01

Table 6: Deaths Analysis Robustness Checks (COW Death Data)

	(1) 2.2.3	(2) 2.2.4	(3) 2.3.2	(4) 2.4.4	(5) 2.4.5
Power Shift	-1.36**	-1.19*	-1.17*	-3.48**	3.42**
	(0.48)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.87)	(1.12)
log(War Intensity)		-0.35*	-0.34*	-0.20†	-0.079
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.27)
Dem. Initiator		0.46	0.53		
		(0.38)	(0.38)		
Loser Regime		0.043*	-0.024	0.10**	-0.033
		(0.021)	(0.076)	(0.028)	(0.035)
(Loser Regime)^2			0.0038		
			(0.0038)		
Terrain	-1.46**	-1.66*	-1.57*	-2.58**	1.27
	(0.52)	(0.65)	(0.68)	(0.90)	(0.90)
Contiguity	-0.33	0.023	0.019	0.34	-0.20
	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.67)
Relative Cap.	0.34	-0.013	-0.19	-0.76	0.44
	(0.97)	(1.06)	(1.07)	(1.40)	(2.16)
# of war participants	-0.18	-0.13	-0.14	-0.16	0.49
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.40)
Major Power War	-1.38**	-1.56**	-1.58**	-0.62	-0.58
	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.92)
Military strategy	-0.16	-0.18	-0.13	0.39*	-0.49*
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.22)
Cultural Difference	-0.53*	-0.74**	-0.73**	0.68†	-1.52**
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.54)
Total Population	-0.33	-1.57**	-1.55**	-2.02*	-0.20
	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.93)	(1.16)
Observations	86	77	77	77	77
N_fail	86	77	77	52	25

Robust standard errors, † $<$ .1, * $<$ .05,** $<$ .01

Table 7: Robustness Checks Using the Restrictive Coding of Military Conquest

	(1) 2.4.1	(2) 2.4.2	(3) 2.4.3	(4) 2.4.4	(5) 2.4.5	(6) 2.5.5
Power Shift	-3.05**	-5.43	5.04**	-3.15**	4.62**	3.16**
	(0.84)	(4.02)	(1.72)	(0.81)	(1.57)	(1.01)
log(War Intensity)	0.13	0.22	0.12	-0.19	-0.12	0.092
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.34)	(0.14)
Intensity × shift		-0.38				
		(0.60)				
Dem. Initiator	0.49	0.46	0.42	0.24	0.022	-0.33
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(1.23)	(0.42)	(1.11)	(0.52)
Loser Regime	0.070**	0.071**	-0.073	0.10**	-0.078	-0.078*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.036)
Terrain	-1.28*	-1.34*	1.73	-1.90†	1.43	1.26
	(0.64)	(0.64)	(1.18)	(0.97)	(1.23)	(0.88)
Contiguity	0.033	0.059	-0.42	0.11	-0.19	-0.061
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.66)	(0.30)	(0.80)	(0.47)
Relative Cap.	-1.71	-1.79	2.89	-1.48	1.64	1.08
	(1.13)	(1.12)	(2.43)	(1.37)	(2.42)	(1.61)
# of war participants	0.36*	0.33*	-0.84*	0.34†	-0.42	-0.25
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.41)	(0.18)	(0.45)	(0.25)
Major Power War	-0.94†	-1.01†	-0.24	-0.91*	-0.30	-0.048
	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.88)	(0.45)	(0.91)	(0.52)
Military strategy	0.12	0.093	-0.73*	0.34*	-0.52†	-0.62*
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.33)	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Cultural Difference	0.43	0.42	-1.76**	0.50	-1.66**	
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.58)	(0.45)	(0.63)	
Total Population				-1.98†	-1.08	
				(1.11)	(1.19)	
Constant						0.58
						(2.23)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77
N_fail	59	59	18	59	18	

Robust standard errors, † < .1, *< .05,**< .01

Table 8: Robustness Checks Using the Expansive Coding of Military Conquest

	(1) 2.4.1	(2) 2.4.2	(3) 2.4.3	(4) 2.4.4	(5) 2.4.5	(6) 2.5.5
Power Shift	-3.00**	-10.7*	3.61**	-3.90**	3.45**	2.88**
	(0.87)	(4.61)	(0.98)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(0.86)
log(War Intensity)	0.094	0.36†	-0.024	-0.25	-0.15	0.045
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.098)
Intensity × shift		-1.21†				
		(0.68)				
Dem. Initiator	-0.38	-0.39	0.56	-0.65	0.65	0.085
	(0.62)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.56)	(0.65)	(0.51)
Loser Regime	0.049†	0.057†	0.0036	0.10*	-0.0094	-0.012
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Terrain	-1.85*	-2.08*	1.52†	-3.48**	1.86*	1.29†
	(0.81)	(0.83)	(0.80)	(1.19)	(0.82)	(0.69)
Contiguity	0.080	0.12	-0.28	0.43	-0.44	-0.26
	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.46)	(0.34)	(0.52)	(0.40)
Relative Cap.	-1.42	-1.59	0.89	-1.03	-0.13	-0.040
	(1.36)	(1.30)	(1.43)	(1.44)	(1.40)	(1.29)
# of war participants	-0.058	-0.17	0.23	0.047	0.29	0.24
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.53)	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.24)
Major Power War	-0.67	-0.82	-0.56	-0.52	-0.92	-0.15
	(0.61)	(0.65)	(0.76)	(0.55)	(0.78)	(0.52)
Military strategy	0.11	0.039	-0.64†	0.42*	-0.47†	-0.23
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Cultural Difference	0.59†	0.56	-1.33**	0.95†	-1.47**	
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.49)	(0.48)	
Total Population				-3.13*	0.063	
				(1.51)	(1.16)	
Constant						-1.05
						(1.54)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77
N_fail	47	47	30	47	30	

Robust standard errors, † < .1, *< .05,**< .01

Table 9: Alternate Approach to Testing the Effects of War Intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2.4.1	< 1 yr.	< 1 yr.	> 1 yr.
Power Shift	-3.29**	-3.67**	0.28	-6.76*
	(0.91)	(1.37)	(1.64)	(2.95)
log(War Intensity)	0.11	0.31**	0.40*	-1.18*
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.56)
Dem. Initiator	0.45	0.30	0.73	-0.56
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.46)	(3.18)
Loser Regime	0.065*	0.099*	0.088*	0.27*
	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.11)
Terrain	-1.43*	-0.81	-2.49†	-4.69
	(0.67)	(0.92)	(1.49)	(5.81)
Contiguity	0.15	-0.23	-0.052	1.60*
	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.46)	(0.75)
Relative Cap.	-1.25	-2.42	0.43	-8.32
	(1.27)	(1.69)	(2.71)	(9.29)
# of war participants	-0.22	-0.10	0.54	3.72
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.50)	(4.03)
Major Power War	-0.72	-0.27	0.66	-7.36
	(0.61)	(0.82)	(1.01)	(7.53)
Military strategy	0.14	0.59*	-0.016	-0.81
	(0.16)	(0.30)	(0.65)	(0.92)
Cultural Difference	0.56	0.72†	0.060	4.66
	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.47)	(3.23)
Observations	77	58	39	19
N_fail	52	39	39	13

Robust standard errors, † $< .1$, * $< .05$,** $< .01$

Table 10: Robustness Checks Related to the Measurement of Regime Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2.2.2	2.2.4	2.4.1	2.4.4
Power Shift	-1.72**	-1.62**	-3.31**	-3.61**
	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.89)	(0.93)
log(War Intensity)	0.17	-0.49**	0.090	-0.26*
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Dem. Initiator			0.37	0.014
			(0.43)	(0.44)
Initiator Polity	0.0016	0.0066		
	(0.021)	(0.020)		
Loser Regime	0.051**	0.055*	0.17*	0.19*
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.085)	(0.083)
(Loser Regime)^2			-0.0055	-0.0048
			(0.0044)	(0.0039)
Terrain	-2.54**	-1.68*	-1.68*	-2.77*
	(0.58)	(0.69)	(0.74)	(1.08)
Contiguity	0.018	0.18	0.20	0.37
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Relative Cap.	0.45	-0.59	-0.98	-0.59
	(1.10)	(1.06)	(1.28)	(1.41)
# of war participants	0.026	0.0056	-0.23	-0.11
	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.24)
Major Power War	-1.10*	-1.77**	-0.76	-0.62
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.61)	(0.55)
Military strategy	-0.49**	-0.23	0.092	0.34†
	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Cultural Difference	-0.18	-0.84**	0.51	0.71
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.47)
Total Population		-2.16**		-2.63*
		(0.62)		(1.24)
Observations	77	77	77	77
N_fail	77	77	52	52

Robust standard errors, † < .1, *< .05,**< .01

Table 11: Alternate Specifications for Analysis of War Duration (Parametric Specifications)

	Weibull		Log-Normal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2.2.1	2.2.2	2.2.1	2.2.2
Power Shift	-1.49**	-1.70**	1.38†	1.65*
	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.78)	(0.81)
log(War Intensity)		0.16		-0.16
		(0.11)		(0.11)
Dem. Initiator		0.71*		-0.62†
		(0.34)		(0.37)
Loser Regime		0.035		-0.035
		(0.022)		(0.025)
Terrain	-2.70**	-2.47**	3.28**	2.84**
	(0.55)	(0.61)	(0.66)	(0.71)
Contiguity	-0.067	-0.081	-0.25	-0.084
	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.40)
Relative Cap.	1.24	0.89	-1.45	-0.86
	(1.08)	(1.19)	(1.45)	(1.53)
# of war participants	0.013	-0.066	0.014	0.072
	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Military strategy	-0.45**	-0.56**	0.54**	0.52**
	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Major Power War	-0.74†	-1.03*	0.72	0.92
	(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.59)	(0.63)
Cultural Difference	-0.50†	-0.40	0.55†	0.56†
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.33)
Constant	-0.98	0.32	1.00	-0.18
	(1.17)	(1.57)	(1.45)	(1.71)
$\ln(p)$	-0.23**	-0.18*		
	(0.065)	(0.072)		
$\ln(\sigma)$			0.30**	0.26**
			(0.073)	(0.081)
Wars	86	77	86	77

Robust standard errors, † < .1, * < .05, ** < .01

Table 12: Alternate Specifications for Analysis of Total Battle Deaths

	Weibull	Log-Normal	OLS		Neg. Binomial	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2.2.4	2.2.4	2.2.3	2.2.4	2.2.3	2.2.4
Power Shift	-1.08*	2.05*	2.01†	2.05*	2.69**	1.29†
	(0.55)	(0.84)	(1.03)	(0.91)	(0.81)	(0.71)
log(War Intensity)	-0.35**	0.35**		0.35**		0.54**
	(0.12)	(0.11)		(0.12)		(0.15)
Dem. Initiator	0.78*	-0.97*		-0.97†		-1.02*
	(0.35)	(0.49)		(0.53)		(0.47)
Loser Regime	0.028	-0.046		-0.046		-0.041†
	(0.019)	(0.032)		(0.035)		(0.024)
Terrain	-0.34	1.00	1.59†	1.00	2.66**	0.20
	(0.58)	(0.74)	(0.87)	(0.81)	(0.75)	(0.78)
Contiguity	-0.051	0.24	0.73	0.24	0.28	0.022
	(0.21)	(0.42)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.27)
Relative Cap.	-1.05	1.62	0.90	1.62	0.069	1.53
	(1.04)	(1.53)	(1.70)	(1.65)	(1.58)	(1.34)
# of war participants	-0.081	0.15	0.055	0.15	0.20	0.096
	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.23)
Military strategy	-0.52**	0.45†	0.29	0.45†	0.63**	0.78**
	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Major Power War	-2.40**	2.83**	3.12**	2.83**	3.57**	3.32**
	(0.51)	(0.77)	(0.88)	(0.83)	(0.64)	(0.65)
Cultural Difference	-1.18**	1.65**	0.91*	1.65**	1.07*	1.55**
	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.29)
Constant	-5.39**	6.11**	4.51*	6.11**	4.08*	8.00**
	(1.86)	(2.00)	(2.10)	(2.16)	(1.67)	(2.20)
$\ln(p)$	-0.32**					
	(0.076)					
$\ln(\sigma)$		0.43**				
		(0.077)				
$\ln(\alpha)$					0.78**	0.46**
					(0.098)	(0.11)
Observations	77	77	86	77	86	77
Wars	77	77				

Robust standard errors, † < .1, * < .05,** < .01

Table 13: Alternate Specifications for Analysis of Government Spending

	Weibull	Log-Normal	OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2.2.6	2.2.6	2.2.5	2.2.6
Capability Shift	-2.07*	2.19*	1.30*	1.32*
	(1.05)	(1.04)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Intensity	-0.48	0.34		-0.14
	(0.33)	(0.22)		(0.13)
Democratic Initiator	0.32	-0.35		-0.39
	(0.59)	(0.50)		(0.31)
Terrain	-0.97	0.79	0.54	0.45
	(1.49)	(1.20)	(0.77)	(0.76)
Contiguity	0.32	-0.11	-0.13	0.065
	(0.54)	(0.62)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Relative Capabilities	1.48	-1.87	-2.48†	-2.70*
	(2.43)	(2.12)	(1.25)	(1.25)
# of War Participants	-0.32†	0.50**	0.49*	0.57*
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Total GDP of Allies	0.00000019	-0.00000029	-0.00000046	-0.00000058
	(0.00000028)	(0.00000033)	(0.00000050)	(0.00000051)
Own GDP	0.00000025	-0.000000079	0.00000024	0.00000031
	(0.00000029)	(0.00000029)	(0.00000030)	(0.00000030)
Constant	-0.94	-0.92	0.27	-0.70
	(2.63)	(2.12)	(0.63)	(1.06)
$\ln(p)$	-0.032			
	(0.11)			
$\ln(\sigma)$		0.13		
		(0.089)		
Observations	49	49	49	49

Robust standard errors, † < .1, *< .05,**< .01

Table 14: Censored Cox in Lieu of Competing Risks Analysis (Table 2.4)

	(1) 2.4.1	(2) 2.4.4	(3) 2.4.6
Capability Shift	-3.30**	-2.17**	-5.19†
	(0.80)	(0.72)	(2.67)
Intensity	0.24	-0.24†	-1.23**
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.37)
Democratic Initiator	0.55	0.61	0.30
	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.48)
Loser Regime Type	0.067*	0.044†	
	(0.027)	(0.024)	
Terrain	-2.83**	-0.66	-0.74
	(0.87)	(0.69)	(1.91)
Contiguity	0.15	0.16	1.01†
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.57)
Relative Capabilities	0.67	-0.63	-3.73
	(1.47)	(1.28)	(3.39)
# of War Participants	-0.087	-0.23	-0.26
	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.31)
Major Power War	-1.47†	-1.47*	
	(0.79)	(0.70)	
Military Strategy	-0.28	-0.056	
	(0.24)	(0.19)	
Clash of Civilizations	0.20	-0.59†	
	(0.35)	(0.31)	
Total GDP of Allies			-0.00000022
			(0.00000030)
Own GDP			0.0000010*
			(0.00000048)
Wars	77	77	49
Settlements	52	52	31

Robust standard errors, † < .1, *< .05,**< .01

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