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Minority presidential governments on manifolds: theoretical expectations, Latin American reality and policy results on the ground

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Tese de Doutorado em Ciência Política

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Appendixes

This file contains Appendixes 1 and 2 to the PhD Dissertation "*Minority presidential governments on manifolds: theoretical expectations, Latin American reality and policy results on the ground".*

All references to sections located in the main text will bear the corresponding section number, while references to sections in the Appendixes will be recorded with the corresponding title "A.1.nn" (sections in Appendix 1) or "A.2.nn" (in Appendix 2).

Tables and figures have been numbered in sequence to those in the main text, so their lists begin respectively at Table 22 and Figure 11.

Appendix 1 - Detailed data

In this appendix, we present an abridged version of the data used in the analytical endeavor, organized in tables for systematic visualization according to the study´s theoretical underpinnings. Full primary data and transformation procedures are displayed in the supplementary online material.

A.1.1 Minority governments – occurrence and performance – detailed data

In country-years

Table 22 below shows the results of minority governments´ occurrence, deploying, by each country-year, the presidential coalition´s seat shares in each chamber, as well as the fuzzy values representing the policy performance indicator (for the year the government stayed in office and the following – lagged – year). From the 228 country-years of minority governments, performance data were missing for Argentina (1984 to 1987) and Panama (2018), leaving 223 country-years for full performance assessments. Among the remaining results, 8 regarded the year 2018 (the last year of our time span), for which there are no logically coherent values for the lagged performance. So, the lagged performance yields 216 units of analysis[1].

[1] The difference of only 7 units is due to the already missing value for 2018 performance in Panama (which was previously discarded in the contemporary performance series).

The raw data for all cabinet composition, legislative shares and coalition membership for all governments considered in the sample (including majoritarian ones), from which those Tables where filtered, are available in the online supplementary material.

Table 1 - Minority governments in "third wave" Latin America – occurrence and performance – analytical year-to-year specification

CTR	YR	PCT.LOW	PCT.HIGH	Policy Performance (same year)	Policy Performance (lagged)
AR	1984	50,7874	39,13043	-	-
AR	1985	51,1811	39,13043	-	-
AR	1986	51,1811	39,13043	-	-
AR	1987	51,1811	37,77778	-	0
AR	1988	46,06299	39,13043	0	0,66
AR	1989	48,8189	44,44444	0,66	0,66
AR	1990	48,8189	54,34783	0,66	1
AR	1991	48,4375	54,34783	1	1
AR	1992	46,09375	54,16667	1	0,66
AR	1993	46,09375	62,5	0,66	1
AR	1994	49,80545	62,5	1	0
BO	1984	36,15385	37,03704	0	0,66
BO	1985	36,15385	37,03704	0,66	0,66
BO	1986	33,07692	59,25926	0,66	0
BO	1987	33,07692	59,25926	0	0,66
BO	1988	33,07692	59,25926	0,66	0,66
BO	1989	30,76923	33,33333	0,66	0,66
BO	2004	30,76923	44,44444	0	0
BO	2005	47,69231	59,25926	0	0
BO	2006	55,38462	44,44444	0	0,66
BO	2007	55,38462	44,44444	0,66	0,66
BO	2008	60,76923	48,14815	0,66	1
BO	2009	55,38462	44,44444	1	0
BR	1986	41,75365	63,76812	1	0
BR	1990	24,18033	17,33333	0,66	0,66
BR	1991	16,50099	19,75309	0,66	0
BR	1992	34,66135	41,97531	0	0,66
BR	1993	33,66534	43,20988	0,66	1
BR	2002	45,4191	49,38272	0,66	0,66
BR	2003	48,34308	38,2716	0,66	0,66
BR	2006	58,2846	49,38272	0,66	0
BR	2010	56,53021	48,14815	0,66	0,66
BR	2018	48,92788	51,85185	0	-
CL	1990	50,83333	46,80851	1	1
CL	1991	50,83333	46,80851	1	1
CL	1992	50,83333	46,80851	1	1
CL	1993	50,83333	46,80851	1	0,66
CL	1994	57,5	45,65217	0,66	0,66

CL	1995	57,5	45,65217	0,66	0,66
CL	1996	57,5	45,65217	0,66	1
CL	1997	57,5	45,65217	1	1
CL	1998	57,5	41,66667	1	0
CL	1999	57,5	41,66667	0	0,66
CL	2000	57,5	41,66667	0,66	0,66
CL	2001	57,5	41,66667	0,66	1
CL	2002	49,16667	41,66667	1	0,66
CL	2003	49,16667	41,66667	0,66	0,66
CL	2004	49,16667	41,66667	0,66	0,66
CL	2005	49,16667	41,66667	0,66	0
CL	2006	52,5	47,36842	0	0,66
CL	2007	52,5	47,36842	0,66	0,66
CL	2008	52,5	47,36842	0,66	0
CL	2009	52,5	47,36842	0	1
CL	2010	45,83333	42,10526	1	1
CL	2011	45,83333	42,10526	1	1
CL	2012	43,33333	42,10526	1	0,66
CL	2013	43,33333	42,10526	0,66	0,66
CL	2018	46,45161	44,18605	0,66	-
CO	1987	49,24623	50,87719	1	0,66
CO	1988	49,24623	50,87719	0,66	1
CO	2003	16,49485	13,46154	0,66	0,66
CO	2004	16,49485	13,46154	0,66	0,66
CO	2005	16,49485	13,46154	0,66	1
CO	2006	16,49485	13,46154	1	0,66
CO	2007	33,83085	36,30573	0,66	0
CO	2008	33,83085	36,30573	0	1
CR	1978	47,36842	-	1	0
CR	1979	47,36842	-	0	0
CR	1980	47,36842	-	0	0
CR	1981	47,36842	-	0	0
CR	1994	49,12281	-	0	0
CR	1995	49,12281	-	0	0,66
CR	1996	49,12281	-	0,66	0
CR	1997	49,12281	-	0	0,66
CR	1998	40,35088	-	0,66	0,66
CR	1999	47,36842	-	0,66	0,66
CR	2000	47,36842	-	0,66	0,66
CR	2001	47,36842	-	0,66	1
CR	2002	33,33333	-	1	1
CR	2003	33,33333	-	1	0,66
CR	2004	33,33333	-	0,66	0,66
CR	2005	33,33333	-	0,66	1
CR	2006	43,85965	-	1	1
CR	2007	43,85965	-	1	0,66
CR	2008	43,85965	-	0,66	0
CR	2009	43,85965	-	0	0,66
CR	2010	42,10526	-	0,66	0,66
CR	2011	42,10526	-	0,66	0,66

CR	2012	42,10526	-	0,66	0
CR	2013	42,10526	-	0	0,66
CR	2017	36,84211	-	1	0,66
DR	1997	10,83333	3,333333	0,66	0,66
DR	1998	10,83333	3,333333	0,66	0,66
DR	1999	32,88591	13,33333	0,66	1
DR	2000	32,88591	13,33333	1	0,66
DR	2003	48,66667	90,625	0,66	0
DR	2004	48,66667	90,625	0	1
DR	2005	27,33333	6,25	1	1
DR	2006	27,33333	6,25	1	0,66
SV	1988	36,66667	-	0,66	0,66
SV	1994	46,42857	-	1	0,66
SV	1995	46,42857	-	0,66	0,66
SV	1996	46,42857	-	0,66	0
SV	1997	33,33333	-	0	0
SV	1998	33,33333	-	0	1
SV	1999	33,33333	-	1	0,66
SV	2000	34,52381	-	0,66	0
SV	2001	34,52381	-	0	1
SV	2002	34,52381	-	1	0,66
SV	2003	32,14286	-	0,66	0,66
SV	2004	32,14286	-	0,66	0,66
SV	2005	32,14286	-	0,66	0,66
SV	2006	40,47619	-	0,66	0,66
SV	2007	40,47619	-	0,66	0
SV	2008	40,47619	-	0	0
SV	2009	42,85714	-	0	0,66
SV	2010	42,85714	-	0,66	0,66
SV	2011	42,85714	-	0,66	0
SV	2012	38,09524	-	0	0,66
SV	2013	36,90476	-	0,66	0
SV	2014	36,90476	-	0	0
SV	2015	36,90476	-	0	0
SV	2016	36,90476	-	0	0,66
SV	2017	36,90476	-	0,66	0
SV	2018	27,38095	-	0	-
HN	2002	47,65625	-	1	1
HN	2003	47,65625	-	1	1
HN	2004	47,65625	-	1	1
HN	2005	47,65625	-	1	1
HN	2006	48,4375	-	1	0
HN	2007	48,4375	-	0	0,66
HN	2008	48,4375	-	0,66	0
HN	2009	35,15625	-	0	0,66
HN	2014	37,5	-	0,66	0,66
HN	2015	37,5	-	0,66	0,66
HN	2016	37,5	-	0,66	1
HN	2017	37,5	-	1	1
HN	2018	47,65625	-	1	

MX	1998	47,8	60,15625	1	1
MX	1999	47,8	60,15625	1	1
MX	2000	47,8	60,15625	1	0,66
MX	2001	44,6	39,84375	0,66	0,66
MX	2002	44,6	39,84375	0,66	0,66
MX	2003	44,6	39,84375	0,66	0
MX	2004	29,4	35,9375	0	0,66
MX	2005	29,4	35,9375	0,66	0
MX	2006	29,4	35,9375	0	0
MX	2007	41,4	40,625	0	0
MX	2008	41,4	40,625	0	0
MX	2009	41,4	40,625	0	0,66
MX	2010	28,6	40,625	0,66	0
MX	2011	28,6	40,625	0	0
MX	2012	28,6	40,625	0	0,66
MX	2013	48,2	47,65625	0,66	0
MX	2014	48,2	47,65625	0	0
MX	2015	48,2	47,65625	0	0,66
MX	2016	50	47,65625	0,66	0
MX	2017	50	47,65625	0	0
MX	2018	50	47,65625	0	-
PA	1995	44,44444	-	0	0,66
PA	1996	44,44444	-	0,66	0,66
PA	1997	41,66667	-	0,66	1
PA	1998	41,66667	-	1	0,66
PA	2000	33,80282	-	0	0,66
PA	2001	33,80282	-	0,66	1
PA	2002	33,80282	-	1	0,66
PA	2003	29,57746	-	0,66	1
PA	2004	29,57746	-	1	0,66
PA	2009	25,64103	-	1	1
PA	2012	19,71831	-	0,66	0,66
PA	2013	19,71831	-	0,66	1
PA	2014	32,39437	-	1	0,66
PA	2015	18,30986	-	0,66	1
PA	2016	21,12676	-	1	0,66
PA	2017	21,12676	-	0,66	-
PA	2018	21,12676	-	-	-
PY	1994	46,91358	44,44444	1	0,66
PY	1995	46,91358	44,44444	0,66	0,66
PY	1996	46,91358	44,44444	0,66	0,66
PY	1997	46,91358	44,44444	0,66	0
PY	1998	46,91358	44,44444	0	0,66
PY	2004	53,57143	37,77778	0,66	0
PY	2005	53,57143	37,77778	0	0,66
PY	2006	53,57143	37,77778	0,66	0,66
PY	2007	53,57143	37,77778	0,66	1
PY	2008	53,57143	37,77778	1	1
PY	2010	42,35294	42,22222	0,66	0
PY	2011	42,35294	42,22222	0	0,66

PY	2017	58,75	45,65217	1	1
PY	2018	58,75	45,65217	1	
PE	1984	54,44444	43,33333	1	0,66
PE	1985	54,44444	43,33333	0,66	1
PE	2001	46,66667	-	0,66	1
PE	2002	46,66667	-	1	0,66
PE	2003	46,66667	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2004	46,66667	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2005	37,5	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2006	37,5	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2007	30	-	0,66	1
PE	2008	30	-	1	1
PE	2009	30	-	1	0,66
PE	2010	30	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2011	30	-	0,66	1
PE	2012	45,38462	-	1	1
PE	2013	45,38462	-	1	0,66
PE	2014	25,38462	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2015	25,38462	-	0,66	0,66
PE	2016	25,38462	-	0,66	0
PE	2017	13,95349	-	0	0,66
PE	2018	36,43411	-	0,66	
UY	1985	41,41414	45,16129	1	0,66
UY	1986	41,41414	45,16129	0,66	1
UY	1987	41,41414	45,16129	1	0
UY	1988	41,41414	45,16129	0	0,66
UY	1989	41,41414	45,16129	0,66	0
UY	1994	39,39394	41,93548	1	0,66
UY	2003	33,33333	35,48387	0	0,66
UY	2004	33,33333	35,48387	0,66	1
VE	1979	43,07692	47,72727	0	0
VE	1980	43,07692	47,72727	0	0,66
VE	1981	43,07692	47,72727	0,66	1
VE	1982	43,07692	47,72727	1	0,66
VE	1983	43,07692	47,72727	0,66	0
VE	1989	49,25373	47,82609	0	0,66
VE	1990	49,25373	47,82609	0,66	1
VE	1991	49,25373	47,82609	1	1
VE	1993	48,25871	47,82609	0,66	0

OBS: CTR = Country (AR = Argentina; BO = Bolivia; BR = Brazil; CL – Chile; CO = Colombia; CR = Costa Rica; DR = Dominican Republic;SV = El Salvador; HN = Honduras; MX = Mexico; PA = Panama; PE = Peru; PY = Paraguay; UY = Uruguay; VE = Venezuela)

YR = Year

PCT.LOW = Percentage of seats in the lower house held by parties in presidential cabinet coalition

PCT.HIGH = Percentage of seats in the upper house held by parties in presidential cabinet coalition

Policy performance = Fuzzy value of policy performance indicator (for the year the government stayed in office)

Policy performance (lagged) = Fuzzy value of policy performance indicator (for the year following the one the given government stayed in office).

Source: The author

In mandates

The grouping of minority governments´country-years into mandates, according to the criteria laid down in section 5.1.4, is reflected on Table 23 below The first column brings a code composed by the country code, the president´s name, the (occasional) sequence of full presidential terms by one single president[2], the sequential number of mandates into which a full electoral mandate was broken down according to the disaggregation criteria[3], and finally the initial and final years of each mandate considered in the list[4]. The other two columns display the fuzzy values representing the policy performance indicator (for the year the government stayed in office and the following – lagged – year).

Out of the 223 country-years for performance assessments (216 for lagged performance), clustering in mandates according to the stated criteria resulted in 97 segments or time periods (92 for lagged performance) to be taken as units of analysis for causal assessment.

Table 2 - Minority governments in "third wave" Latin America – occurrence and performance – analytical specification clustered in mandates

Mandate	Policy Performance (same year)	Policy Performance (lagged)
AR-ALFONSIN-1-1988-1988	0	0
AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989	0,66	0,66
AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994	0,66	0,66
BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989	0,66	0,66
BO-MESA-1-2004-2004	0	0

[2] That is, if a given president was elected two times for a full mandate, as in the case of Brazil´s Lula, who was elected for two terms (2003-2006 and 2007-2010, who were reflected in the table as "BR-LULA-1" and "BR-LULA-2". If the president hasn´t been elected more than once, this numeric mark does not figure in the code.

[3] If the full electoral mandate has only one segment to record (whatever its length), it´ll be coded as "1".

[4] In the case of a president elected just once, his several mandates are numbered sequentially after his name (ex: BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991; BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992). If he has been elected twice or more, his full terms are numbered after his name, and then the number of each broken-down mandate is added (ex: Chile´s Piñera has been elected for two non-consecutive terms; the first term was divided in three segments "CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010", "CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012", "CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013"; the second term had only one segment, so it was coded as "CL-PINERA-2-1-2018-2018").

BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009	0,66	1
BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984	0	0,66
BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985	0,66	0,66
BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005	0	0
BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002	0,66	0,66
BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991	0,66	0,66
BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992	0	0,66
BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993	0,66	1
BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003	0,66	0,66
BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006	0,66	0
BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010	0,66	0,66
BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986	1	0
BR-TEMER-1-2018-2018	0	-
CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993	1	1
CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009	0	0,66
CL-FREI-1-1994-1996	0,66	0,66
CL-FREI-2-1997-1999	1	1
CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005	0,66	0,66
CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010	1	1
CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012	1	1
CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013	0,66	0,66
CL-PINERA-2-1-2018-2018	0,66	-
CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988	1	1
CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003	0,66	0,66
CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006	1	1
CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008	0	0,66
CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007	1	1
CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009	0	0
CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981	0	0
CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013	0,66	0,66
CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997	0	0,66
CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003	1	1
CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005	0,66	0,66
CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001	0,66	0,66
CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017	1	0,66
DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000	0,66	0,66
DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006	1	0,66
DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004	0,66	1
HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017	0,66	1
HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-2-2018-2018	1	-
HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005	1	1
HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009	0	0,66
HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008	0,66	0,66
MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009	0	0
MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012	0	0,66
MX-FOX-1-2001-2005	0,66	0,66
MX-FOX-2-2006-2006	0	0
MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017	0,66	0
MX-PENA_NIETO-2-2018-2018	0	-

MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999	1	1
MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000	1	0,66
PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013	0,66	1
PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003	1	1
PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004	1	0,66
PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996	0	0,66
PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998	1	1
PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009	1	1
PA-VARELA-1-2014-2017	0,66	0,66
PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984	1	0,66
PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985	0,66	1
PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011	1	1
PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013	1	1
PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016	1	1
PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017	0	0,66
PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004	0,66	0,66
PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006	0,66	0,66
PE-VIZCARRA-1-2018-2018	0,66	-
PY-CARTES-1-2017-2018	1	1
PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008	0,66	0,66
PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011	0,66	0,66
PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997	0,66	0
PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998	0	0,66
SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996	0,66	0,66
SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999	0	0
SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988	0,66	0,66
SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003	0,66	0,66
SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011	0	0,66
SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012	0	0,66
SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013	0,66	0
SV-SACA-1-2004-2005	0,66	0,66
SV-SACA-2-2006-2008	0,66	0,66
SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2018 (*)	0	0
UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003	0	0,66
UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004	0,66	1
UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994	1	0,66
UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989	1	1
VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989	0	0,66
VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991	0,66	1
VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994	0	0,66
VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979	0	0
VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983	0,66	0
VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993	0,66	0

(*) This mandate is assessed for lagged performance during in the period 2014-2017

OBS: Country codes: AR = Argentina; BO = Bolivia; BR = Brazil; CL – Chile; CO = Colombia; CR = Costa Rica; DR = Dominican Republic; SV = El Salvador; HN = Honduras; MX = Mexico; PA = Panama; PE = Peru; PY = Paraguay; UY = Uruguay; VE = Venezuela)

Policy performance = Fuzzy value of policy performance indicator (for the period the government stayed in office)

Policy performance (lagged) = Fuzzy value of policy performance indicator (for the period the given government stayed in office, lagged by one year).

Source: The author

A.1.2 Case matrixes and fuzzy variables – descriptive layout

The final fuzzy values for the causal conditions and the outcomes, both for the contemporary analysis and the lagged one, are shown in this section.

In mandates

For analyzing the results produced by minority government actions in the same years that correspond to the considered mandate during which they occurred, the fuzzy values found are listed in Table 24 below (a mirror-image of the one inputted into the QCA model to produce the actual truth tables).

Table 3 - Case lists (input for truth tables) - Contemporary results – in mandates

MANDATE	PWRP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	LONG	OUTCOME
AR-ALFONSIN-1-1988-1988	0,33	0,33	0	0,6	1	0
AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989	0,33	0,26	1	0,59	0	0,66
AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994	0,33	0,66	1	0,47	1	0,66
BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	1	0,66
BO-MESA-1-2004-2004	0,33	0,75	0	0,75	0	0
BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,22	1	0,66
BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984	0,33	0,66	0	0,36	1	0
BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0	0,66
BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005	0,33	0,66	1	0,74	0	0
BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002	1	0,19	1	0,88	0	0,66
BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991	1	0,66	0	0,94	1	0,66
BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992	1	0,66	0	0,94	1	0
BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993	1	0,66	0	0,93	1	0,66
BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003	1	0,19	0	0,91	1	0,66
BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006	1	0,11	1	0,95	0	0,66
BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010	1	0,12	1	0,96	0	0,66
BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986	1	0,66	1	0,39	1	1
BR-TEMER-1-2018-2018	0,75	0,33	1	0,73	0	0
CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993	1	0,51	1	0,99	1	1
CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009	1	0,1075	1	1	1	0
CL-FREI-1-1994-1996	1	0,51	1	0,99	1	0,66
CL-FREI-2-1997-1999	1	0,09	1	0,99	1	1
CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005	1	0,15	1	0,99	1	0,66
CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010	1	0,22	1	1	1	1

CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012	1	0,22	1	1	1	1
CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013	1	0,27	1	1	1	0,66
CL-PINERA-2-1-2018-2018	1	0	1	1	1	0,66
CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988	0,33	0,75	1	0,75	1	1
CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003	1	0,75	0	0,86	1	0,66
CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006	1	0,75	0	0,86	1	1
CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008	1	0,75	0	0,86	1	0
CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007	0	0,53	1	1	1	1
CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009	0	0,53	1	1	1	0
CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981	0	0,33	1	0,97	1	0
CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013	0	0,32	1	1	1	0,66
CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997	0	0,12	1	0,99	1	0
CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003	0	0,57	0	1	1	1
CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005	0	0,57	0	1	1	0,66
CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001	0	0,16	1	1	1	0,66
CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017	0	0,52	0	1	1	1
DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	1	0,66
DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1	1
DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004	0,33	0,75	1	0,03	1	0,66
HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	1	0,66
HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-2-2018-2018	0,75	0,75	1	0,07	1	1
HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1	1
HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009	0,75	0,75	0	0,14	0	0
HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008	0,75	0,75	1	0,04	1	0,66
MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	1	0
MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012	0,33	0,25	0	0,53	1	0
MX-FOX-1-2001-2005	0,33	0,19	0	0,54	1	0,66
MX-FOX-2-2006-2006	0,33	0,33	0	0,54	0	0
MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017	0,33	0,66	1	0,31	1	0,66
MX-PENA_NIETO-2-2018-2018	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0	0
MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999	0,33	0,66	1	0,22	1	1
MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000	0,33	0,23	1	0,51	0	1
PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013	1	0,75	0	0,55	1	0,66
PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003	1	0,75	0	0,52	1	1
PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004	1	0,75	0	0,53	0	1
PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996	1	0,75	1	0,51	1	0
PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998	1	0,75	1	0,51	1	1
PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009	1	0,75	0	0,53	0	1
PA-VARELA-1-2014-2017	1	0,75	0	0,57	1	0,66
PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984	0,33	0,66	1	0,32	1	1
PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985	0,33	0,75	1	0,32	0	0,66
PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011	1	0,75	0	0,87	1	1
PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013	1	0,75	1	0,95	1	1
PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016	1	0,75	0	0,94	1	1
PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017	1	0,75	0	1	1	0
PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004	1	0,75	1	0,91	1	0,66
PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006	1	0,75	0	0,96	1	0,66
PE-VIZCARRA-1-2018-2018	1	0,75	0	1	0	0,66

PY-CARTES-1-2017-2018	1	0,75	1	0,41	1	1
PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008	1	0,75	0	0,63	1	0,66
PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011	1	0,75	1	0,86	1	0,66
PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997	1	0,75	1	0,53	1	0,66
PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998	1	0,75	1	0,49	0	0
SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996	0,33	0,69	1	0,13	1	0,66
SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	1	0
SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1	0,66
SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003	0,33	0,66	0	0,17	1	0,66
SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011	0,33	0,05	1	0,36	1	0
SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012	0,33	0,13	0	0,4	1	0
SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013	0,33	0,13	0	0,45	1	0,66
SV-SACA-1-2004-2005	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	1	0,66
SV-SACA-2-2006-2008	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	1	0,66
SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2018	0,33	0,076	0	0,44	1	0
UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003	1	0,1	0	1	1	0
UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004	1	0,53	0	1	0	0,66
UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994	1	0,24	0	1	0	1
UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989	1	0,12	1	1	1	1
VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989	0,33	0,75	1	0,95	1	0
VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991	0,33	0,75	1	0,98	1	0,66
VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994	0,33	0,75	0	0,96	1	0
VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979	0,33	0,75	1	0,92	1	0
VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983	0,33	0,75	1	0,895	1	0,66
VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993	0,33	0,75	1	0,96	0	0,66

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn't finish its full term.

The following Figures 12 to 13 show the histogram for the frequency of each fuzzy value for every causal condition and for the (contemporary) outcome in the same analysis, as well as the scatterplot of every causal condition against the outcome in each case.



Figure 1 - Contemporary analysis - Histograms for outcome and conditions – In mandates

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term.



Figure 2- Contemporary analysis - Scatterplots conditions vs. Outcome – In mandates

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term.

Now turning to the case matrix in mandates for lagged values (results produced in the following years to the government's action), it's reflected in Table 25 below (also the one inputted into the QCA model to get the truth tables).

Table 4 - Case lists (input for truth tables) - Contemporary results – in mandates

MANDATE	PWRP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	LONG	OUTCOME_ LAGGED
AR-ALFONSIN-1-1987-1988	0,33	0,33	0	0,6	1	0
AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989	0,33	0,26	1	0,59	0	0,66
AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994	0,33	0,66	1	0,47	1	0,66
BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	1	0,66
BO-MESA-1-2004-2004	0,33	0,75	0	0,75	0	0
BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,22	1	1
BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984	0,33	0,66	0	0,36	1	0,66
BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0	0,66
BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005	0,33	0,66	1	0,74	0	0
BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002	1	0,19	1	0,88	0	0,66
BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991	1	0,66	0	0,94	1	0,66
BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992	1	0,66	0	0,94	1	0,66
BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993	1	0,66	0	0,93	1	1
BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003	1	0,19	0	0,91	1	0,66
BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006	1	0,11	1	0,95	0	0
BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010	1	0,12	1	0,96	0	0,66
BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986	1	0,66	1	0,39	1	0
CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993	1	0,51	1	0,99	1	1
CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009	1	0,11	1	1	1	0,66
CL-FREI-1-1994-1996	1	0,51	1	0,99	1	0,66
CL-FREI-2-1997-1999	1	0,09	1	0,99	1	1
CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005	1	0,14	1	0,99	1	0,66
CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010	1	0,22	1	1	1	1
CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012	1	0,22	1	1	1	1
CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013	1	0,27	1	1	1	0,66
CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988	0,33	0,75	1	0,75	1	1
CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003	1	0,75	0	0,86	1	0,66
CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006	1	0,75	0	0,86	1	1
CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008	1	0,75	0	0,86	1	0,66
CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007	0	0,53	1	1	1	1
CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009	0	0,53	1	1	1	0
CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981	0	0,33	1	0,97	1	0
CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013	0	0,32	1	1	1	0,66
CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997	0	0,12	1	0,99	1	0,66
CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003	0	0,57	0	1	1	1
CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005	0	0,57	0	1	1	0,66
CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001	0	0,16	1	1	1	0,66
CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017	0	0,52	0	1	1	0,66
DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	1	0,66

DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1	0,66
DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004	0,33	0,75	1	0,03	1	1
HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	1	1
HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1	1
HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009	0,75	0,75	0	0,14	0	0,66
HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1	0,66
MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	1	0
MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012	0,33	0,25	0	0,53	1	0,66
MX-FOX-1-2001-2005	0,33	0,194	0	0,54	1	0,66
MX-FOX-2-2006-2006	0,33	0,33	0	0,54	0	0
MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017	0,33	0,66	1	0,31	1	0
MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999	0,33	0,66	1	0,22	1	1
MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000	0,33	0,23	1	0,51	0	0,66
PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013	1	0,75	0	0,545	1	1
PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003	1	0,75	0	0,52	1	1
PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004	1	0,75	0	0,53	0	0,66
PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996	1	0,75	1	0,51	1	0,66
PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998	1	0,75	1	0,51	1	1
PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009	1	0,75	0	0,53	0	1
PA-VARELA-1-2014-2016	1	0,75	0	0,56	1	0,66
PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984	0,33	0,66	1	0,32	1	0,66
PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985	0,33	0,75	1	0,32	0	1
PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011	1	0,75	0	0,87	1	1
PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013	1	0,75	1	0,95	1	1
PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016	1	0,75	0	0,94	1	1
PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017	1	0,75	0	1	1	0,66
PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004	1	0,75	1	0,905	1	0,66
PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006	1	0,75	0	0,96	1	0,66
PY-CARTES-1-2017-2017	1	0,75	1	0,41	1	1
PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008	1	0,75	0	0,62	1	0,66
PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011	1	0,75	1	0,86	1	0,66
PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997	1	0,75	1	0,53	1	0
PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998	1	0,75	1	0,49	0	0,66
SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996	0,33	0,69	1	0,13	1	0,66
SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	1	0
SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1	0,66
SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003	0,33	0,66	0	0,17	1	0,66
SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011	0,33	0,05	1	0,36	1	0,66
SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012	0,33	0,13	0	0,4	1	0,66
SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013	0,33	0,13	0	0,45	1	0
SV-SACA-1-2004-2005	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	1	0,66
SV-SACA-2-2006-2008	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	1	0,66
SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2017	0,33	0,06	0	0,46	1	0
UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003	1	0,1	0	1	1	0,66
UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004	1	0,53	0	1	0	1
UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994	1	0,24	0	1	0	0,66
UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989	1	0,12	1	1	1	1
VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989	0,33	0,75	1	0,95	1	0,66

VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991	0,33	0,75	1	0,98	1	1
VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994	0,33	0,75	0	0,96	1	0,66
VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979	0,33	0,75	1	0,92	1	0
VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983	0,33	0,75	1	0,89	1	0
VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993	0,33	0,75	1	0,96	0	0

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term.

Finally, the histograms for the fuzzy values of causal conditions and lagged outcome, together with the scatterplots of conditions against the lagged outcome are as follows in Figures 14 and 15.





Figure 3 - Lagged analysis - Histograms for outcome and conditions – In mandates

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term





Figure 4 - Lagged analysis - Scatterplots conditions vs. Outcome – In mandates

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term.

In country-years

For full disclosure, this section brings the case matrix which would have resulted from generating the fuzzy values of causal conditions and outcomes on a country-year basis, following the procedures described in sections 3.1.3, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2[5]. Those data enable easy replication under a country-year perspective.

Cases associating the conditions with their outcome during the same year they occurredare listed in Table 26 below.

Table 5 - Case lists (input for truth tables) - Contemporary results – in country-years

CTR	YR	PRWP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	OUTCOME
AR	1988	0,33	0,33	0	0,6	0
AR	1989	0,33	0,26	1	0,59	0,66
AR	1990	0,33	0,66	1	0,43	0,66
AR	1991	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	1
AR	1992	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	1
AR	1993	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	0,66

[5] Since the "Long mandate" criterion discussed in section 3.4 would be inconsistent with a country-year framework (given its dependency on a one-year-only duration), this condition is not considered here. Anyway, whatever replication wishing to filter out any desired country-year may do so at will from the provided tables.

AR	1994	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	1
BO	1984	0,33	0,66	0	0,36	0
BO	1985	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	1986	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	1987	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0
BO	1988	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	1989	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	2004	0,33	0,75	0	0,75	0
BO	2005	0,33	0,66	1	0,74	0
BO	2006	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0
BO	2007	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0,66
BO	2008	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0,66
BO	2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,15	1
BR	1986	1	0,66	1	0,39	1
BR	1990	1	0,66	0	0,94	0,66
BR	1991	1	0,66	0	0,94	0,66
BR	1992	1	0,66	0	0,94	0
BR	1993	1	0,66	0	0,93	0,66
BR	2002	1	0,19	1	0,88	0,66
BR	2003	1	0,19	0	0,91	0,66
BR	2006	1	0,11	1	0,95	0,66
BR	2010	1	0,12	1	0,96	0,66
BR	2018	0,75	0,33	1	0,73	0
CL	1990	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1991	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1992	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1993	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1994	1	0,51	1	0,99	0,66
CL	1995	1	0,51	1	0,99	0,66
CL	1996	1	0,51	1	0,99	0,66
CL	1997	1	0,09	1	0,99	1
CL	1998	1	0,09	1	0,99	1
CL	1999	1	0,09	1	0,99	0
CL	2000	1	0,09	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2001	1	0,18	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2002	1	0,18	1	0,99	1
CL	2003	1	0,18	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2004	1	0,18	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2005	1	0,07	1	1	0,66
CL	2006	1	0,07	1	1	0
CL	2007	1	0,07	1	1	0,66
CL	2008	1	0,07	1	1	0,66
CL	2009	1	0,22	1	1	0
CL	2010	1	0,22	1	1	1
CL	2011	1	0,22	1	1	1
CL	2012	1	0,22	1	1	1
CL	2013	1	0,27	1	1	0,66
CL	2018	1	0	1	1	0,66
CO	1987	0,33	0,75	1	0,74	1
CO	1988	0,33	0,75	1	0,75	0,66

CO	2003	1	0,75	0	0,86	0,66
CO	2004	1	0,75	0	0,86	0,66
CO	2005	1	0,75	0	0,86	0,66
CO	2006	1	0,75	0	0,86	1
CO	2007	1	0,75	0	0,86	0,66
CO	2008	1	0,75	0	0,86	0
CR	1978	0	0,33	1	0,94	1
CR	1979	0	0,33	1	0,97	0
CR	1980	0	0,33	1	0,98	0
CR	1981	0	0,33	1	0,98	0
CR	1994	0	0,12	1	0,99	0
CR	1995	0	0,12	1	0,99	0
CR	1996	0	0,12	1	0,99	0,66
CR	1997	0	0,12	1	0,99	0
CR	1998	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	1999	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	2000	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	2001	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	2002	0	0,57	0	1	1
CR	2003	0	0,57	0	1	1
CR	2004	0	0,57	0	1	0,66
CR	2005	0	0,57	0	1	0,66
CR	2006	0	0,53	1	1	1
CR	2007	0	0,53	1	1	1
CR	2008	0	0,53	1	1	0,66
CR	2009	0	0,53	1	1	0
CR	2010	0	0,32	1	1	0,66
CR	2011	0	0,32	1	1	0,66
CR	2012	0	0,32	1	1	0,66
CR	2013	0	0,32	1	1	0
CR	2017	0	0,52	0	1	1
DR	1997	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	0,66
DR	1998	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	0,66
DR	1999	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	0,66
DR	2000	0,33	0,75	0	0,04	1
DR	2003	0,33	0,75	1	0,03	0,66
DR	2004	0,33	0,75	1	0,03	0
DR	2005	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1
DR	2006	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1
SV	1988	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	0,66
SV	1994	0,33	0,75	1	0,11	1
SV	1995	0,33	0,66	1	0,14	0,66
SV	1996	0,33	0,66	1	0,14	0,66
SV	1997	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	0
SV	1998	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	0
SV	1999	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	1
SV	2000	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	0,66
SV	2001	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0
SV	2002	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	1
SV	2003	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66

SV	2004	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66
SV	2005	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66
SV	2006	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	0,66
SV	2007	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	0,66
SV	2008	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	0
SV	2009	0,33	0,05	1	0,28	0
SV	2010	0,33	0,05	1	0,4	0,66
SV	2011	0,33	0,05	1	0,4	0,66
SV	2012	0,33	0,13	0	0,4	0
SV	2013	0,33	0,13	0	0,45	0,66
SV	2014	0,33	0,13	0	0,45	0
SV	2015	0,33	0,04	0	0,45	0
SV	2016	0,33	0,04	0	0,45	0
SV	2017	0,33	0,04	0	0,48	0,66
SV	2018	0,33	0,13	0	0,38	0
HN	2002	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2003	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2004	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2005	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2006	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2007	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	0
HN	2008	0,75	0,75	1	0,05	0,66
HN	2009	0,75	0,75	0	0,14	0
HN	2014	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	0,66
HN	2015	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	0,66
HN	2016	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	0,66
HN	2017	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	1
HN	2018	0,75	0,75	1	0,07	1
MX	1998	0,33	0,66	1	0,21	1
MX	1999	0,33	0,66	1	0,23	1
MX	2000	0,33	0,23	1	0,51	1
MX	2001	0,33	0,23	0	0,53	0,66
MX	2002	0,33	0,23	0	0,54	0,66
MX	2003	0,33	0,17	0	0,54	0,66
MX	2004	0,33	0,17	0	0,54	0
MX	2005	0,33	0,17	0	0,54	0,66
MX	2006	0,33	0,33	0	0,54	0
MX	2007	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	0
MX	2008	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	0
MX	2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	0
MX	2010	0,33	0,33	0	0,53	0,66
MX	2011	0,33	0,33	0	0,53	0
MX	2012	0,33	0,1	0	0,53	0
MX	2013	0,33	0,66	1	0,34	0,66
MX	2014	0,33	0,66	1	0,34	0
MX	2015	0,33	0,66	1	0,24	0
MX	2016	0,33	0,66	1	0,26	0,66
MX	2017	0,33	0,66	1	0,38	0
MX	2018	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0
PA	1995	1	0,75	1	0,51	0

PA	1996	1	0,75	1	0,51	0,66
PA	1997	1	0,75	1	0,51	0,66
PA	1998	1	0,75	1	0,51	1
PA	2000	1	0,75	0	0,51	0
PA	2001	1	0,75	0	0,51	0,66
PA	2002	1	0,75	0	0,53	1
PA	2003	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PA	2004	1	0,75	0	0,53	1
PA	2009	1	0,75	0	0,53	1
PA	2012	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PA	2013	1	0,75	0	0,56	0,66
PA	2014	1	0,75	0	0,56	1
PA	2015	1	0,75	0	0,56	0,66
PA	2016	1	0,75	0	0,56	1
PA	2017	1	0,75	0	0,6	0,66
PY	1994	1	0,75	1	0,53	1
PY	1995	1	0,75	1	0,53	0,66
PY	1996	1	0,75	1	0,53	0,66
PY	1997	1	0,75	1	0,53	0,66
PY	1998	1	0,75	1	0,49	0
PY	2004	1	0,75	0	0,59	0,66
PY	2005	1	0,75	0	0,53	0
PY	2006	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PY	2007	1	0,75	0	0,62	0,66
PY	2008	1	0,75	0	0,86	1
PY	2010	1	0,75	1	0,86	0,66
PY	2011	1	0,75	1	0,86	0
PY	2017	1	0,75	1	0,41	1
PY	2018	1	0,75	1	0,41	1
PE	1984	0,33	0,66	1	0,32	1
PE	1985	0,33	0,75	1	0,32	0,66
PE	2001	1	0,75	1	0,75	0,66
PE	2002	1	0,75	1	0,95	1
PE	2003	1	0,75	1	0,96	0,66
PE	2004	1	0,75	1	0,96	0,66
PE	2005	1	0,75	0	0,96	0,66
PE	2006	1	0,75	0	0,96	0,66
PE	2007	1	0,75	0	0,84	0,66
PE	2008	1	0,75	0	0,84	1
PE	2009	1	0,75	0	0,84	1
PE	2010	1	0,75	0	0,88	0,66
PE	2011	1	0,75	0	0,93	0,66
PE	2012	1	0,75	1	0,96	1
PE	2013	1	0,75	1	0,94	1
PE	2014	1	0,75	0	0,94	0,66
PE	2015	1	0,75	0	0,93	0,66
PE	2016	1	0,75	0	0,96	0,66
PE	2017	1	0,75	0	1	0
PE	2018	1	0,75	0	1	0,66
UY	1985	1	0,12	1	1	1

UY	1986	1	0,12	1	1	0,66
UY	1987	1	0,12	1	1	1
UY	1988	1	0,12	1	1	0
UY	1989	1	0,12	1	1	0,66
UY	1994	1	0,24	0	1	1
UY	2003	1	0,1	0	1	0
UY	2004	1	0,53	0	1	0,66
VE	1979	0,33	0,75	1	0,92	0
VE	1980	0,33	0,75	1	0,94	0
VE	1981	0,33	0,75	1	0,86	0,66
VE	1982	0,33	0,75	1	0,89	1
VE	1983	0,33	0,75	1	0,89	0,66
VE	1989	0,33	0,75	1	0,95	0
VE	1990	0,33	0,75	1	0,98	0,66
VE	1991	0,33	0,75	1	0,98	1
VE	1993	0,33	0,75	1	0,96	0,66
VE	1994	0,33	0,75	0	0,96	0

OBS: CTR = Country (AR = Argentina; BO = Bolivia; BR = Brazil; CL – Chile; CO = Colombia; CR = Costa Rica; DR = Dominican Republic;SV = El Salvador; HN = Honduras; MX = Mexico; PA = Panama; PE = Peru; PY = Paraguay; UY = Uruguay; VE = Venezuela)

YR = Year

PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition)

Source: The Author

Turning now to the country-year results produced by minority governments in the following year of their tenure, the empirical tabled list of cases is reflected in Table 27.

Table 6 - Case lists (input for truth tables) - Lagged results – In country-years

In fuzzy values

CTR	YR	PRWP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	OUTCOME _LAGGED
AR	1987	0,33	0,33	0	0,6	0
AR	1988	0,33	0,33	0	0,6	0,66
AR	1989	0,33	0,26	1	0,59	0,66
AR	1990	0,33	0,66	1	0,43	1
AR	1991	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	1
AR	1992	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	0,66
AR	1993	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	1
AR	1994	0,33	0,66	1	0,48	0
BO	1984	0,33	0,66	0	0,36	0,66
BO	1985	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66

BO	1986	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0
BO	1987	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	1988	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	1989	0,33	0,75	0	0,23	0,66
BO	2004	0,33	0,75	0	0,75	0
BO	2005	0,33	0,66	1	0,74	0
BO	2006	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0,66
BO	2007	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	0,66
BO	2008	0,33	0,33	1	0,24	1
BO	2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,15	0
BR	1986	1	0,66	1	0,39	0
BR	1990	1	0,66	0	0,94	0,66
BR	1991	1	0,66	0	0,94	0
BR	1992	1	0,66	0	0,94	0,66
BR	1993	1	0,66	0	0,93	1
BR	2002	1	0,19	1	0,88	0,66
BR	2003	1	0,19	0	0,91	0,66
BR	2006	1	0,11	1	0,95	0
BR	2010	1	0,12	1	0,96	0,66
CL	1990	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1991	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1992	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1993	1	0,51	1	0,99	0,66
CL	1994	1	0,51	1	0,99	0,66
CL	1995	1	0,51	1	0,99	0,66
CL	1996	1	0,51	1	0,99	1
CL	1997	1	0,09	1	0,99	1
CL	1998	1	0,09	1	0,99	0
CL	1999	1	0,09	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2000	1	0,09	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2001	1	0,18	1	0,99	1
CL	2002	1	0,18	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2003	1	0,18	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2004	1	0,18	1	0,99	0,66
CL	2005	1	0,07	1	1	0
CL	2006	1	0,07	1	1	0,66
CL	2007	1	0,07	1	1	0,66
CL	2008	1	0,07	1	1	0
CL	2009	1	0,22	1	1	1
CL	2010	1	0,22	1	1	1
CL	2011	1	0,22	1	1	1
CL	2012	1	0,22	1	1	0,66
CL	2013	1	0,27	1	1	0,66
CO	1987	0,33	0,75	1	0,74	0,66
CO	1988	0,33	0,75	1	0,75	1
CO	2003	1	0,75	0	0,86	0,66
CO	2004	1	0,75	0	,86	0,66
CO	2005	1	0,75	0	0,86	1
CO	2006	1	0,75	0	0,86	0,66
CO	2007	1	0,75	0	0,86	0

CO	2008	1	0,75	0	0,86	1
CR	1978	0	0,33	1	0,94	0
CR	1979	0	0,33	1	0,97	0
CR	1980	0	0,33	1	0,98	0
CR	1981	0	0,33	1	0,98	0
CR	1994	0	0,12	1	0,99	0
CR	1995	0	0,12	1	0,99	0,66
CR	1996	0	0,12	1	0,99	0
CR	1997	0	0,12	1	0,99	0,66
CR	1998	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	1999	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	2000	0	0,16	1	1	0,66
CR	2001	0	0,16	1	1	1
CR	2002	0	0,57	0	1	1
CR	2003	0	0,57	0	1	0,66
CR	2004	0	0,57	0	1	0,66
CR	2005	0	0,57	0	1	1
CR	2006	0	0,53	1	1	1
CR	2007	0	0,53	1	1	0,66
CR	2008	0	0,53	1	1	0
CR	2009	0	0,53	1	1	0,66
CR	2010	0	0,32	1	1	0,66
CR	2011	0	0,32	1	1	0,66
CR	2012	0	0,32	1	1	0
CR	2013	0	0,32	1	1	0,66
CR	2017	0	0,52	0	1	0,66
DR	1997	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	0,66
DR	1998	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	0,66
DR	1999	0,33	0,75	0	0,03	1
DR	2000	0,33	0,75	0	0,04	0,66
DR	2003	0,33	0,75	1	0,03	0
DR	2004	0,33	0,75	1	0,03	1
DR	2005	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	1
DR	2006	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	0,66
SV	1988	0,33	0,75	0	0,05	0,66
SV	1994	0,33	0,75	1	0,11	0,66
SV	1995	0,33	0,66	1	0,14	0,66
SV	1996	0,33	0,66	1	0,14	0
SV	1997	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	0
SV	1998	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	1
SV	1999	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	0,66
SV	2000	0,33	0,66	0	0,14	0
SV	2001	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	1
SV	2002	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66
SV	2003	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66
SV	2004	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66
SV	2005	0,33	0,66	0	0,18	0,66
SV	2006	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	0,66
SV	2007	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	0
SV	2008	0,33	0,66	1	0,18	0

SV	2009	0,33	0,05	1	0,28	0,66
SV	2010	0,33	0,05	1	0,4	0,66
SV	2011	0,33	0,05	1	0,4	0
SV	2012	0,33	0,13	0	0,4	0,66
SV	2013	0,33	0,13	0	0,45	0
SV	2014	0,33	0,13	0	0,45	0
SV	2015	0,33	0,04	0	0,45	0
SV	2016	0,33	0,04	0	0,45	0,66
SV	2017	0,33	0,04	0	0,48	0
HN	2002	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2003	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2004	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2005	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	1
HN	2006	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	0
HN	2007	0,75	0,75	1	0,03	0,66
HN	2008	0,75	0,75	1	0,05	0
HN	2009	0,75	0,75	0	0,14	0,66
HN	2014	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	0,66
HN	2015	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	0,66
HN	2016	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	1
HN	2017	0,75	0,75	0	0,06	1
MX	1998	0,33	0,66	1	0,21	1
MX	1999	0,33	0,66	1	0,23	1
MX	2000	0,33	0,23	1	0,51	0,66
MX	2001	0,33	0,23	0	0,53	0,66
MX	2002	0,33	0,23	0	0,54	0,66
MX	2003	0,33	0,17	0	0,54	0
MX	2004	0,33	0,17	0	0,54	0,66
MX	2005	0,33	0,17	0	0,54	0
MX	2006	0,33	0,33	0	0,54	0
MX	2007	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	0
MX	2008	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	0
MX	2009	0,33	0,33	1	0,54	0,66
MX	2010	0,33	0,33	0	0,53	0
MX	2011	0,33	0,33	0	0,53	0
MX	2012	0,33	0,1	0	0,53	0,66
MX	2013	0,33	0,66	1	0,34	0
MX	2014	0,33	0,66	1	0,34	0
MX	2015	0,33	0,66	1	0,24	0,66
MX	2016	0,33	0,66	1	0,26	0
MX	2017	0,33	0,66	1	0,38	0
PA	1995	1	0,75	1	0,51	0,66
PA	1996	1	0,75	1	0,51	0,66
PA	1997	1	0,75	1	0,51	1
PA	1998	1	0,75	1	0,51	0,66
PA	2000	1	0,75	0	0,51	0,66
PA	2001	1	0,75	0	0,51	1
PA	2002	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PA	2003	1	0,75	0	0,53	1
PA	2004	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66

PA	2009	1	0,75	0	0,53	1
PA	2012	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PA	2013	1	0,75	0	0,56	1
PA	2014	1	0,75	0	0,56	0,66
PA	2015	1	0,75	0	0,56	1
PA	2016	1	0,75	0	0,56	0,66
PY	1994	1	0,75	1	0,53	0,66
PY	1995	1	0,75	1	0,53	0,66
PY	1996	1	0,75	1	0,53	0,66
PY	1997	1	0,75	1	0,53	0
PY	1998	1	0,75	1	0,49	0,66
PY	2004	1	0,75	0	0,59	0
PY	2005	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PY	2006	1	0,75	0	0,53	0,66
PY	2007	1	0,75	0	0,62	1
PY	2008	1	0,75	0	0,86	1
PY	2010	1	0,75	1	0,86	0
PY	2011	1	0,75	1	0,86	0,66
PY	2017	1	0,75	1	0,41	1
PE	1984	0,33	0,66	1	0,32	0,66
PE	1985	0,33	0,75	1	0,32	1
PE	2001	1	0,75	1	0,75	1
PE	2002	1	0,75	1	0,95	0,66
PE	2003	1	0,75	1	0,96	0,66
PE	2004	1	0,75	1	0,96	0,66
PE	2005	1	0,75	0	0,96	0,66
PE	2006	1	0,75	0	0,96	0,66
PE	2007	1	0,75	0	0,84	1
PE	2008	1	0,75	0	0,84	1
PE	2009	1	0,75	0	0,84	0,66
PE	2010	1	0,75	0	0,88	0,66
PE	2011	1	0,75	0	0,93	1
PE	2012	1	0,75	1	0,96	1
PE	2013	1	0,75	1	0,94	0,66
PE	2014	1	0,75	0	0,94	0,66
PE	2015	1	0,75	0	0,93	0,66
PE	2016	1	0,75	0	0,96	0
PE	2017	1	0,75	0	1	0,66
UY	1985	1	0,12	1	1	0,66
UY	1986	1	0,12	1	1	1
UY	1987	1	0,12	1	1	0
UY	1988	1	0,12	1	1	0,66
UY	1989	1	0,12	1	1	0
UY	1994	1	0,24	0	1	0,66
UY	2003	1	0,1	0	1	0,66
UY	2004	1	0,53	0	1	1
VE	1979	0,33	0,75	1	0,92	0
VE	1980	0,33	0,75	1	0,94	0,66
VE	1981	0,33	0,75	1	0,86	1
VE	1982	0,33	0,75	1	0,89	0,66

VE	1983	0,33	0,75	1	0,89	0
VE	1989	0,33	0,75	1	0,95	0,66
VE	1990	0,33	0,75	1	0,98	1
VE	1991	0,33	0,75	1	0,98	1
VE	1993	0,33	0,75	1	0,96	0
VE	1994	0,33	0,75	0	0,96	0,66

OBS: CTR = Country (AR = Argentina; BO = Bolivia; BR = Brazil; CL – Chile; CO = Colombia; CR = Costa Rica; DR = Dominican Republic;SV = El Salvador; HN = Honduras; MX = Mexico; PA = Panama; PE = Peru; PY = Paraguay; UY = Uruguay; VE = Venezuela)
YR = Year
PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition)

Source: The Author

A.1.3 Analysis of Necessity – summarized data

The empirical results for the analysis of necessity are shown in the Tables 28 to 31 below, which encompass the causal combinations that surpassed the consistency threshold (0,9), whith their respective consistency (covN) and relevance of necessity (RoN) values. First come the results for the contemporary (same year) outcome of governments, both for the outcome and its negation, followed by the same results for the lagged outcome of minority presidential cabinets.

Table 7 - Analysis of necessity for the outcome - Contemporary results – In mandates

Combinations Found	inclN	RoN	covN
PWRP + LONG	0,9638	0,1486	0,5864
RECP + 40PC	0,9072	0,3817	0,6318
RECP + ACCT	0,9111	0,4092	0,6443
~RECP + LONG	0,931	0,2262	0,5913
RECP + LONG	0,9181	0,2292	0,5852
~40PC + LONG	0,9095	0,1917	0,5689
40PC + LONG	0,9588	0,1562	0,5857
ACCT + LONG	0,9282	0,2381	0,5936
PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC	0,9261	0,2907	0,6095
PWRP + RECP + ~40PC	0,9172	0,3537	0,6267
PWRP + ~RECP + ~ACCT	0,9215	0,3768	0,6375
PWRP + RECP + ~ACCT	0,9095	0,3941	0,6377
PWRP + RECP + ~LONG	0,9083	0,2477	0,5857
~PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9504	0,239	0,606
~PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9123	0,2226	0,5799
PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9452	0,2108	0,5944

PWRP + 40PC + ~ACCT	0,9458	0,229	0,6004
PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,946	0,172	0,5833
~PWRP + ~ACCT + LONG	0,9014	0,2788	0,5921
~RECP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9308	0,1829	0,578
PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9037	0,2421	0,5813
PWRP + ~40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9197	0,2636	0,5971
~PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9024	0,2204	0,5738
~PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9091	0,2655	0,5919

Source: The Author
Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term..

Table 8 - Analysis of necessity for negation of the outcome - Contemporary results

Combinations Found	inclN	RoN	covN
PWRP + LONG	0,9233	0,1121	0,4282
RECP + LONG	0,9082	0,1808	0,4413
40PC + LONG	0,9042	0,1524	0,4311
ACCT + LONG	0,9166	0,118	0,4269
~PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC	0,9047	0,3106	0,4826
PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC	0,9047	0,2458	0,4602
PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC	0,903	0,185	0,4402
~PWRP + ~RECP + LONG	0,9228	0,1431	0,4367
~PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9347	0,2015	0,4595
~PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9133	0,182	0,4439
PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9401	0,1809	0,4556
~PWRP + ~40PC + LONG	0,9102	0,1314	0,4278
~PWRP + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9123	0,2914	0,4792
~RECP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,937	0,2407	0,4731
~RECP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9021	0,2234	0,4517
RECP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9289	0,1696	0,4472
RECP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9069	0,1583	0,434
~RECP + ~40PC + LONG	0,9464	0,0829	0,4305
~RECP + ~ACCT + LONG	0,9256	0,1376	0,4364
~RECP + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9061	0,3609	0,5021
~40PC + ~ACCT + LONG	0,913	0,1426	0,4322
~40PC + ACCT + ~LONG	0,931	0,2349	0,4684
PWRP + RECP + 40PC + ~ACCT	0,9134	0,1187	0,4257
~PWRP + RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9324	0,2482	0,4735
~PWRP + RECP + 40PC + ~LONG	0,9018	0,1738	0,4363
PWRP + RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,903	0,1739	0,4369
PWRP + RECP + 40PC + ~LONG	0,9135	0,1401	0,4317
PWRP + RECP + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9039	0,1865	0,4411
PWRP + 40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,917	0,135	0,4319

PWRP + 40PC + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9183	0,1481	0,4362
~RECP + ~40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9085	0,2489	0,463
~PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,904	0,2111	0,4487

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term.

Table 9 - Analysis of necessity for the outcome - Lagged results

Combinations Found	inclN	RoN	covN
PWRP + LONG	0,9715	0,1588	0,6561
RECP + ACCT	0,9137	0,4643	0,72
~RECP + LONG	0,9371	0,2395	0,6582
RECP + LONG	0,9379	0,243	0,6598
~40PC + LONG	0,915	0,2589	0,651
40PC + LONG	0,9205	0,2089	0,6393
~ACCT + LONG	0,9128	0,3128	0,6666
ACCT + LONG	0,9551	0,1621	0,647
~PWRP + RECP + 40PC	0,9313	0,3475	0,6885
PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC	0,9285	0,2887	0,6681
PWRP + RECP + ~40PC	0,9126	0,315	0,6673
PWRP + RECP + 40PC	0,9674	0,2711	0,6853
PWRP + ~RECP + ~ACCT	0,9222	0,4157	0,7068
PWRP + RECP + ~ACCT	0,9193	0,4403	0,7141
~PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9276	0,2717	0,6623
~PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9446	0,2898	0,6778
PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9159	0,2397	0,6457
PWRP + 40PC + ~ACCT	0,9455	0,2578	0,6686
PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9422	0,2774	0,6726
RECP + 40PC + ~ACCT	0,9155	0,3677	0,6864
RECP + 40PC + ~LONG	0,9154	0,3778	0,6898
~PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~ACCT	0,9037	0,3312	0,6675
PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9074	0,2865	0,6551
PWRP + ~40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9094	0,3121	0,6644
~RECP + ~40PC + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9031	0,2632	0,6452
~RECP + 40PC + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9177	0,2649	0,6544

Source: The Author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition) ; LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term.

Table 10 - Analysis of necessity for the negation of the outcome – Lagged results

Combinations Found	inclN	RoN	covN
PWRP + LONG	0,9195	0,0919	0,3583
~RECP + LONG	0,9121	0,1458	0,3696
RECP + LONG	0,907	0,1474	0,3681
40PC + LONG	0,9002	0,1297	0,3607
ACCT + LONG	0,9593	0,0985	0,3749
~PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC	0,9337	0,3194	0,4326
~PWRP + RECP + 40PC	0,929	0,2155	0,3963
PWRP + ~RECP + 40PC	0,9334	0,1802	0,3875
PWRP + RECP + 40PC	0,902	0,1564	0,3686
PWRP + ~RECP + ACCT	0,9011	0,2582	0,3987
~PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9297	0,1696	0,383
~PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9409	0,1772	0,3895
PWRP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9502	0,154	0,3865
PWRP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9126	0,1677	0,3759
~PWRP + ~40PC + LONG	0,9103	0,1084	0,359
~PWRP + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9009	0,2655	0,401
~RECP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9181	0,2052	0,3889
~RECP + 40PC + ~ACCT	0,9349	0,2946	0,4243
~RECP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9316	0,2178	0,398
RECP + ~40PC + ACCT	0,9418	0,1435	0,3804
RECP + 40PC + ~ACCT	0,913	0,2316	0,395
RECP + 40PC + ACCT	0,9245	0,153	0,3763
~RECP + 40PC + ~LONG	0,9355	0,3374	0,4399
~40PC + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9067	0,2062	0,3848
~PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~ACCT	0,9058	0,2115	0,386
~PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9082	0,228	0,3919
~PWRP + RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9354	0,2167	0,3991
PWRP + ~RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9046	0,1818	0,3768
PWRP + RECP + ~40PC + ~LONG	0,9085	0,1633	0,3731
PWRP + RECP + ACCT + ~LONG	0,9153	0,1757	0,3792
~PWRP + 40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9014	0,2736	0,4038
PWRP + 40PC + ~ACCT + ~LONG	0,9306	0,1305	0,3725

Source: The Author
Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition) ; LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn't finish its full term.

A.1.4 Truth table construction – final shape

The empirical results found for the cases, organized into a truth table, are displayed below, together with the list of cases, both for the desired outcome and its negation.

From the cases shown in section 6.2.1 (and in section A.1.2 in this Appendix 1), we can draw the truth tables shown in Tables 32 to 39 below. For each circumstance (outcome vs. negation; contemporary vs. lagged results), in the first table each causal configuration ("CASE NO." in the first column) is depicted by its causal factors (columns 2 to 6) and its outcome (column 7). The following columns include the number of cases in each column ("n"), the consistency score ("incl"), the proportional reduction of inconsistency score ("PRI") and the proportion of the PRI over consistency ("PRI as % incl"). The second table associates the "CASE NO." to the list of cases that fell under the corresponding causal configuration, according to the specification in section 5.1.4. So, the descriptive case code begins with the country code in two digits[6], followed by the president´s surname in capital letters, the (occasional) number of full presidential terms the same president has held (if there´s only one, there´ll be no digit in the code, by the number of each term segment (mandate) considered (if there´s only one, with the digit 1), and the beginning and final year of that segment. For instance, the mandate code "CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993" means that the Chilean president Aylwin, having been elected only for one term, had one segment of his mandate (the earlier one, regardless of others being recorded following it) included as a unit of analysis spanning from 1990 to 1993. On the other hand, coding "DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000" amounts to showing that the Dominican president Fernandez Reyna has achieved at least two full presidential terms at the polls, and the first full mandate had its first segment from 1997 to 2000.

Table 11 - Truth table for the outcome - Contemporary results - values

CASE_NO	PWRP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	LONG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	PRI.as.pct .Consist
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0,517	0,1748	0,3381
3	0	0	0	1	0	?	1	0,1983	0	0
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0,5343	0,3345	0,6261
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	1	0,5021	0,3218	0,6409
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	2	0,7593	0,5771	0,76

[6] AR = Argentina; BO = Bolivia; BR= Brazil; CL = Chile; CO = Colombia; CR = Costa Rica; DR = Dominican Republic; SV = El Salvador; HN = Honduras; MX = Mexico; PA = Panama; PY = Paraguay; PE = Peru; UY = Uruguay; VE = Venezuela

7	0	0	1	1	0	?	2	0,6584	0,478	0,726
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	0,5501	0,3559	0,647
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,44	0,2759	0,627
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	8	0,6779	0,5125	0,756
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	1	0,1679	0	0
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	4	0,5845	0,4115	0,704
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,5833	0,3929	0,6736
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	7	0,9122	0,861	0,9439
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	2	0,5589	0,3216	0,5754
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	7	0,6484	0,4897	0,7552
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	1	0,7543	0,6588	0,8734
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	2	0,561	0,2585	0,4608
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0,6004	0,3817	0,6357
24	1	0	1	1	1	0	8	0,7876	0,7046	0,8946
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,4885	0,4141	0,8477
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	1	0,7533	0,4886	0,6486
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	4	0,7535	0,6704	0,8897
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	14	0,6768	0,5447	0,8048
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,4385	0,1437	0,3277
30	1	1	1	0	1	1	5	0,8755	0,8093	0,9244
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	0,8238	0,7385	0,8965

Source: The author
Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; incl: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; PRI as % incl: PRI / incl (in percent)

Table 12- Truth table for the outcome - Contemporary results – Case list

CASE_ NO	cases
1	
2	SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012,SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013,SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2018
3	MX-FOX-2-2006-2006
4	AR-ALFONSIN-1-1988-1988,MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012,MX-FOX-1-2001-2005
5	MX-PENA_NIETO-2-2018-2018
6	BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009,SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011
7	AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989,MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000
8	CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981,CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013,CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997,CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001,MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009
9	BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985

10	BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989,BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006,SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999,SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988,SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003,SV-SACA-1-2004-2005
11	BO-MESA-1-2004-2004
12	CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003,CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005,CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017,VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994
13	PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985
14	AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994,DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004,MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017,MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999,PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984,SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996,SV-SACA-2-2006-2008
15	BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005,VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993
16	CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988,CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007,CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983
17	
18	
19	UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994
20	BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003,UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003
21	
22	
23	BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002,BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006,BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010,BR-TEMER-1-2018-2018
24	CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009,CL-FREI-2-1997-1999,CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005,CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010,CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012,CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013,CL-PINERA-2-1-2018-2018,UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989
25	HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009
26	HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017
27	PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004,PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009,PE-VIZCARRA-1-2018-2018,UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004
28	BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991,BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992,BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993,CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003,CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006,CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008,PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013,PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003,PA-VARELA-1-2014-2017,PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011,PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016,PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017,PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006,PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008
29	PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998
30	BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986,HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-2-2018-2018,HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005,HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008,PY-CARTES-1-2017-2018
31	
32	CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993,CL-FREI-1-1994-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998,PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013,PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004,PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011,PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997

Source: The author

Table 13 - Truth table for the negation of the outcome - Contemporary results - Values

CASE_NO	PWRP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	LONG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	PRI.as.pct.Consist
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0,8977	0,8252	0,9192
3	0	0	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	1
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0,766	0,6655	0,8688
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	1	0,7637	0,6782	0,888
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	2	0,6696	0,4196	0,6266
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	2	0,6872	0,522	0,7596
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	0,7266	0,6085	0,8375
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,78	0,7155	0,9173

10	0	1	0	0	1	0	8	0,6569	0,4807	0,7318
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	1
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	4	0,7095	0,5885	0,8295
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,7255	0,6	0,827
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	7	0,4534	0,1342	0,296
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	2	0,7871	0,6725	0,8544
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	7	0,66	0,5066	0,7676
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	1	0,5256	0,3412	0,6492
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	2	0,8302	0,7132	0,8591
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	4	0,6386	0,4408	0,6903
24	1	0	1	1	1	0	8	0,4494	0,2341	0,5209
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,6385	0,5859	0,9176
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	1	0,7519	0,4856	0,6458
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	4	0,4737	0,2963	0,6255
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	14	0,5989	0,4349	0,7262
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,9057	0,8562	0,9453
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	5	0,4613	0,175	0,3794
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	8	0,4981	0,2359	0,4736

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME (negative outcome); n: number of cases in each line; incl: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; PRI as % incl: PRI / incl (in percent)

Table 14 - Truth table for the negation of the outcome - Contemporary results – Case list

CASE_NO	cases
1	
2	SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012,SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013,SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2018
3	MX-FOX-2-2006-2006
4	AR-ALFONSIN-1-1988-1988,MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012,MX-FOX-1-2001-2005
5	MX-PENA_NIETO-2-2018-2018
6	BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009,SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011
7	AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989,MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000
8	CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981,CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013,CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997,CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001,MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009
9	BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985
10	BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989,BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006,SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999,SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988,SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003,SV-SACA-1-2004-2005
11	BO-MESA-1-2004-2004

12	CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003,CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005,CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017,VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994
13	PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985
14	AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994,DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004,MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017,MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999,PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984,SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996,SV-SACA-2-2006-2008
15	BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005,VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993
16	CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988,CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007,CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983
17	
18	
19	UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994
20	BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003,UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003
21	
22	
23	BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002,BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006,BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010,BR-TEMER-1-2018-2018
24	CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009,CL-FREI-2-1997-1999,CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005,CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010,CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012,CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013,CL-PINERA-2-1-2018-2018,UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989
25	HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009
26	HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017
27	PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004,PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009,PE-VIZCARRA-1-2018-2018,UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004
28	BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991,BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992,BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993,CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003,CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006,CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008,PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013,PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003,PA-VARELA-1-2014-2017,PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011,PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016,PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017,PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006,PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008
29	PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998
30	BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986,HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-2-2018-2018,HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005,HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008,PY-CARTES-1-2017-2018
31	
32	CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993,CL-FREI-1-1994-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998,PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013,PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004,PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011,PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997

Source: The author

Table 15 - Truth table for the outcome - Lagged results - Values

CASE_NO	PWRP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	LONG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	PRI.as.pct.Consist
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0,6771	0,2937	0,4338
3	0	0	0	1	0	?	1	0,319	0	0
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0,7168	0,4148	0,5787
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	2	0,7996	0,6715	0,8398
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	2	0,6959	0,5317	0,764
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	0,6349	0,4567	0,7193
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,6067	0,3516	0,5795
10	0	1	0	0	1	1	8	0,8173	0,6689	0,8184

11	0	1	0	1	0	?	1	0,2701	0	0
12	0	1	0	1	1	1	4	0,857	0,6724	0,7846
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,7945	0,6907	0,8694
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	7	0,8059	0,7326	0,909
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	2	0,3785	0,1939	0,5123
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	7	0,628	0,497	0,7914
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	1	0,7463	0,6047	0,8103
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	2	0,8302	0,601	0,7239
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	0,5741	0,326	0,5678
24	1	0	1	1	1	1	7	0,8234	0,7504	0,9113
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,7423	0,5786	0,7795
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	1	0,8818	0,7225	0,8193
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0,7692	0,6545	0,8509
28	1	1	0	1	1	1	14	0,9178	0,8634	0,9407
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,8098	0,5882	0,7264
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	0,7482	0,6434	0,8599
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	8	0,774	0,6741	0,8709

Source: The author

Obs: : PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition; LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term); OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; incl: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; PRI as % incl: PRI / incl (in percent)

Table 16 - Truth table for the outcome – Lagged results – Case list

CASE_NO	
1	
2	SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012,SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013,SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2017
3	MX-FOX-2-2006-2006
4	AR-ALFONSIN-1-1987-1988,MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012,MX-FOX-1-2001-2005
5	
6	BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009,SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011
7	AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989,MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000
8	CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981,CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013,CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997,CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001,MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009
9	BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985
10	BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989,BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006,SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999,SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988,SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003,SV-SACA-1-2004-2005
11	BO-MESA-1-2004-2004

12	CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003,CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005,CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017,VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994
13	PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985
14	AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994,DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004,MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017,MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999,PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984,SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996,SV-SACA-2-2006-2008
15	BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005,VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993
16	CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988,CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007,CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983
17	
18	
19	UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994
20	BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003,UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003
21	
22	
23	BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002,BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006,BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010
24	CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009,CL-FREI-2-1997-1999,CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005,CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010,CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012,CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013,UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989
25	HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009
26	HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017
27	PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004,PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009,UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004
28	BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991,BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992,BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993,CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003,CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006,CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008,PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013,PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003,PA-VARELA-1-2014-2016,PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011,PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016,PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017,PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006,PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008
29	PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998
30	BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986,HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005,HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008,PY-CARTES-1-2017-2017
31	
32	CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993,CL-FREI-1-1994-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998,PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013,PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004,PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011,PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997

Source: The author

Table 17 - Truth table for the negation of the outcome - Lagged results - Values

CASE_NO	PWRP	RECP	40PC	ACCT	LONG	OUT	n	incl	PRI	PRI.as.pct. Consist
1	0	0	0	0	0	?	0			
2	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0,8657	0,7063	0,8159
3	0	0	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	1
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0,7992	0,5852	0,7322
5	0	0	1	0	0	?	0			
6	0	0	1	0	1	?	2	0,5903	0,3285	0,5565
7	0	0	1	1	0	?	2	0,6546	0,4683	0,7154
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	0,6405	0,465	0,726
9	0	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,78	0,6374	0,8172
10	0	1	0	0	1	0	8	0,6248	0,3202	0,5125
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	1

12	0	1	0	1	1	0	4	0,7044	0,3228	0,4583
13	0	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,5411	0,3093	0,5716
14	0	1	1	0	1	0	7	0,4667	0,2652	0,5682
15	0	1	1	1	0	?	2	0,8505	0,8061	0,9478
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	7	0,6312	0,5013	0,7942
17	1	0	0	0	0	?	0			
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0			
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	1	0,5746	0,3372	0,5868
20	1	0	0	1	1	?	2	0,7006	0,2966	0,4234
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0			
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0			
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	3	0,7083	0,5385	0,7603
24	1	0	1	1	1	0	7	0,4296	0,1941	0,4518
25	1	1	0	0	0	?	1	0,6115	0,3648	0,5966
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	1	0,6921	0,2775	0,401
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0,5629	0,3455	0,6138
28	1	1	0	1	1	0	14	0,4518	0,0885	0,1959
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,7283	0,4118	0,5654
30	1	1	1	0	1	0	4	0,5346	0,3407	0,6373
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0			
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	8	0,5158	0,3015	0,5845

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn't finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME (negative outcome); n: number of cases in each line; incl: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; PRI as % incl: PRI / incl (in percent)

Table 18 - Truth table for the negation of the outcome - Lagged results – Case list

CASE_NO	cases
1	
2	SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012,SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013,SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2017
3	MX-FOX-2-2006-2006
4	AR-ALFONSIN-1-1987-1988,MX-CALDERON-2-2010-2012,MX-FOX-1-2001-2005
5	
6	BO-MORALES-1-1-2006-2009,SV-FUNES-1-2009-2011
7	AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989,MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000
8	CR-CARAZO-1-1978-1981,CR-CHINCHILLA-1-2010-2013,CR-FIGUERES-1-1994-1997,CR-RODRIGUEZ-1-1998-2001,MX-CALDERON-1-2007-2009
9	BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985
10	BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989,BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006,SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999,SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988,SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003,SV-SACA-1-2004-2005
11	BO-MESA-1-2004-2004
12	CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003,CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005,CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017,VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994
13	PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985

14	AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994,DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004,MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017,MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999,PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984,SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996,SV-SACA-2-2006-2008
15	BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005,VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993
16	CO-BARCO_VARGAS-1-1987-1988,CR-ARIAS-1-2006-2007,CR-ARIAS-2-2008-2009,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-1-1989-1989,VE-ANDREZ_PEREZ-2-1990-1991,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-1-1979-1979,VE-HERRERA_CAMPINS-2-1980-1983
17	
18	
19	UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994
20	BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003,UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003
21	
22	
23	BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002,BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006,BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010
24	CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009,CL-FREI-2-1997-1999,CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005,CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010,CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012,CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013,UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989
25	HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009
26	HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017
27	PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004,PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009,UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004
28	BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991,BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992,BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993,CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003,CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006,CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008,PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013,PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003,PA-VARELA-1-2014-2016,PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011,PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016,PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017,PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006,PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008
29	PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998
30	BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986,HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005,HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008,PY-CARTES-1-2017-2017
31	
32	CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993,CL-FREI-1-1994-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998,PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013,PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004,PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011,PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997

Source: The author

A.1.5 Analysis of Sufficiency and minimization – summarized data

Consistent solutions found

The preliminary empirical results for the analysis of sufficiency are shown here. Table 40 encompasses all causal paths in the truth tables that overcame the consistency threshold (0,8), individually. Those who do not surpass the frequency threshold (3) are shown with the outcome value as "?" ; for those last ones, while excluded from the main analysis, they may support any further assessment regarding some singularity to those cases, such as "vital niches or populations of relatively newly created" units of analysis (Greckhamer & Misangyi & Fiss, 2013, p. 67). .

Table 19 - Analysis of sufficiency - causal configurations involved

ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR THE OUTCOME – CONTEMPORARY RESULTS									
PWRP	**RECP**	**40PC**	**ACCT**	**LONG**	**OUT**	**n**	**incl**	**PRI**	**CASE LIST**
0	1	1	0	1	1	7	0,9122	0,861	AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994,DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004,MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017,MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999,PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984,SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996,SV-SACA-2-2006-2008
1	1	1	0	1	1	5	0,8755	0,8093	BR-SARNEY-1-1986-1986,HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-2-2018-2018,HN-MADURO_JOEST-1-2002-2005,HN-ZELAYA-1-2006-2008,PY-CARTES-1-2017-2018
1	1	1	1	1	1	8	0,8238	0,7385	CL-AYLWIN-1-1990-1993,CL-FREI-1-1994-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-1-1995-1996,PA-PEREZ_BALLADARES-2-1997-1998,PE-HUMALA-1-2012-2013,PE-TOLEDO-1-2001-2004,PY-LUGO-1-2010-2011,PY-WASMOSY-1-1994-1997

ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR THE NEGATION OF THE OUTCOME – CONTEMPORARY RESULTS									
PWRP	**RECP**	**40PC**	**ACCT**	**LONG**	**OUT**	**n**	**incl**	**PRI**	**CASE LIST**
0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0,8977	0,8252	SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012,SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013,SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2018
0	0	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	MX-FOX-2-2006-2006
0	1	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	BO-MESA-1-2004-2004
1	0	0	1	1	?	2	0,8302	0,7132	BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003,UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003
1	1	1	0	0	?	1	0,9057	0,8562	PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998

ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR THE OUTCOME – LAGGED RESULTS									
PWRP	**RECP**	**40PC**	**ACCT**	**LONG**	**OUT**	**n**	**incl**	**PRI**	**CASE LIST**
0	1	0	0	1	1	8	0,8173	0,6689	BO-ESTENSORRO-1-1986-1989,BO-SUAZO-1-1984-1984,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-1-1-1997-2000,DR-FERNANDEZ_REYNA-2-1-2005-2006,SV-CALDERON_SOL-2-1997-1999,SV-DUARTE_FUENTES-1-1988-1988,SV-FLORES_PEREZ-1-2000-2003,SV-SACA-1-2004-2005
0	1	0	1	1	1	4	0,857	0,6724	CR-PACHECO-1-2002-2003,CR-PACHECO-2-2004-2005,CR-SOLIS-1-2017-2017,VE-CALDERA-1-1994-1994
0	1	1	0	1	1	7	0,8059	0,7326	AR-MENEM-1-1-1990-1994,DR-MEJIA-1-2003-2004,MX-PENA_NIETO-1-2013-2017,MX-ZEDILLO-1-1998-1999,PE-BELAUNDE-1-1984-1984,SV-CALDERON_SOL-1-1994-1996,SV-SACA-2-2006-2008
1	0	0	1	1	?	2	0,8302	0,601	BR-LULA-1-1-2003-2003,UY-BATTLE-1-2003-2003
1	0	1	1	1	1	7	0,8234	0,7504	CL-BACHELET-1-1-2006-2009,CL-FREI-2-1997-1999,CL-LAGOS-1-2000-2005,CL-PINERA-1-1-2010-2010,CL-PINERA-1-2-2011-2012,CL-PINERA-1-3-2013-2013,UY-SANGUINETTI-1-1-1985-1989
1	1	0	0	1	?	1	0,8818	0,7225	HN-HERNANDEZ_ALVARADO-1-1-2014-2017
1	1	0	1	1	1	14	0,9178	0,8634	BR-COLLOR-1-1990-1991,BR-COLLOR-2-1992-1992,BR-COLLOR-3-1993-1993,CO-URIBE-1-1-2003-2003,CO-URIBE-1-2-2004-2006,CO-URIBE-2-1-2007-2008,PA-MARTINELLI-1-2012-2013,PA-MOSCOSO-1-2000-2003,PA-VARELA-1-2014-2016,PE-GARCIA-2-1-2007-2011,PE-HUMALA-2-2014-2016,PE-KUCZYNSKI-1-2017-2017,PE-TOLEDO-2-2005-2006,PY-DUARTE_FRUTOS-1-2004-2008

ANALYSIS OF SUFFICIENCY FOR THE NEGATION OF THE OUTCOME – LAGGED RESULTS									
PWRP	**RECP**	**40PC**	**ACCT**	**LONG**	**OUT**	**n**	**incl**	**PRI**	**CASE LIST**
0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0,8657	0,7063	SV-FUNES-2-2012-2012,SV-FUNES-3-2013-2013,SV-SANCHES_CEREN-1-2014-2017
0	0	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	MX-FOX-2-2006-2006
0	1	0	1	0	?	1	1	1	BO-MESA-1-2004-2004
0	1	1	1	0	?	2	0,8505	0,8061	BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005,VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any

method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME (negative outcome); n: number of cases in each line; incl: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score)

Full minimization results

Now, the output of minimization procedures is presented in full. All tables are direct printouts from the QCA R package´s console produced by the corresponding *minimize* function. The list of cases associated to each minimized solution is presented by the footnotes at the corresponding tables in section 6.2.5.

Directional expectations for intermediate solutions are theoretically discussed in section 6.2.5[7].

Table 20 - Minimization for the outcome – contemporary results

```
[1] "CONSERVATIVE"
M1: PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG + RECP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG -> OUTCOME

                          inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------------
1   PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG  0.850  0.780  0.232  0.093
2  RECP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG  0.887  0.844  0.179  0.040
-------------------------------------------------
                    M1  0.861  0.807  0.272
```

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"
M1: 40PC*~ACCT + PWRP*RECP*40PC -> OUTCOME

                   inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------
1      40PC*~ACCT  0.726  0.643  0.228  0.069
2  PWRP*RECP*40PC  0.782  0.673  0.260  0.102
-------------------------------------------
               M1  0.743  0.655  0.329
```

```
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"
From C1P1:
```

[7] Expectations are specified through conditional expressions in the parameter "dir.exp" (for positive outcomes: "(PWRP+RECP+40PC)*~ACCT*LONG"; for their negation: "(PWRP+RECP+40PC)*ACCT*~LONG").

```
M1:    PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG + RECP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG -> OUTCOME

                          inclS   PRI   covS   covU
------------------------------------------------
1   PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG  0.850  0.780  0.232  0.093
2  RECP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG  0.887  0.844  0.179  0.040
------------------------------------------------
                    M1  0.861  0.807  0.272
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Table 21 - Minimization for the outcome – lagged results

```
[1] "CONSERVATIVE"
M1:      ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT*LONG      +      RECP*~40PC*ACCT*LONG      +
PWRP*~RECP*40PC*ACCT*LONG -> OUTCOME_LAGGED

                             inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------------------
1      ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.812  0.704  0.180  0.118
2       RECP*~40PC*ACCT*LONG  0.924  0.875  0.230  0.200
3  PWRP*~RECP*40PC*ACCT*LONG  0.823  0.750  0.178  0.146
-------------------------------------------------------
                         M1  0.877  0.819  0.527
```

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"

M1:   PWRP*~RECP*LONG   +   RECP*~40PC*LONG   +   (~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT)   ->
OUTCOME_LAGGED
M2:   PWRP*~RECP*LONG   +   RECP*~40PC*LONG   +   (~PWRP*40PC*~ACCT)   ->
OUTCOME_LAGGED

                                        -------------------
```

```
                     inclS   PRI   covS   covU   (M1)   (M2)
-------------------------------------------------------------
1   PWRP*~RECP*LONG  0.836  0.713  0.346  0.166  0.171  0.166
2   RECP*~40PC*LONG  0.894  0.838  0.313  0.146  0.146  0.191
-------------------------------------------------------------
3  ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT  0.791  0.671  0.216  0.016  0.069
4  ~PWRP*40PC*~ACCT  0.819  0.744  0.130  0.018         0.072
-------------------------------------------------------------
                M1   0.844  0.772  0.606
                M2   0.853  0.788  0.608
```

```
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"

From C1P1, C1P2:

M1:              ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT*LONG    +    RECP*~40PC*ACCT*LONG    +
PWRP*~RECP*40PC*ACCT*LONG -> OUTCOME_LAGGED

                              inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------------
1      ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.812  0.704  0.180  0.118
2       RECP*~40PC*ACCT*LONG  0.924  0.875  0.230  0.200
3  PWRP*~RECP*40PC*ACCT*LONG  0.823  0.750  0.178  0.146
-----------------------------------------------------------
                         M1   0.877  0.819  0.527
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn't finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Table 22 - Minimization for the negation of the outcome – contemporary results

```
[1] "CONSERVATIVE"

M1: ~PWRP*~RECP*~40PC*~ACCT*LONG -> ~OUTCOME

                                 inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------------------------
```

```
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~40PC*~ACCT*LONG  0.898  0.825  0.122    -
-------------------------------------------------------
                            M1  0.898  0.825  0.122
```

```
1] "PARSIMONIOUS"
M1: ~RECP*~ACCT -> ~OUTCOME

               inclS   PRI   covS   covU
----------------------------------------
1  ~RECP*~ACCT  0.745  0.584  0.340    -
----------------------------------------
           M1  0.745  0.584  0.340
```

```
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"
From C1P1:

M1:    ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT -> ~OUTCOME

                          inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT       0.801  0.680  0.279    -
-----------------------------------------------------
                     M1  0.801  0.680  0.279
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Table 23 - Minimization for the negation of the outcome – lagged results

```
[1] "CONSERVATIVE"
M1: ~PWRP*~RECP*~40PC*~ACCT*LONG -> ~OUTCOME_LAGGED

                                inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~40PC*~ACCT*LONG  0.866  0.706  0.146    -
-------------------------------------------------------
                            M1  0.866  0.706  0.146
```

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"
M1: ~RECP*~ACCT -> ~OUTCOME_LAGGED

                inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------
1  ~RECP*~ACCT  0.720  0.472  0.384    -
-----------------------------------------
            M1  0.720  0.472  0.384
```

```
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"
From C1P1:

M1:    ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT  -> ~OUTCOME_LAGGED

                          inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT      0.753  0.538  0.300    -
-----------------------------------------------------
                      M1  0.753  0.538  0.300
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Minimization with Enhanced Standard Analys - ESA

We attempted logical minimization also applying Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA), where untenable assumptions are excluded from the minimization algorithm, that is, where logical remainders that are materially impossible or contradict theoretical expectations and, therefore, should not be construed as a feasible expected solution to be assumed (Duşa, 2019, pp. 185 *et seqs.*). The former are non-existent in our empirical universe (there´s no theoretical or historical reason to postulate that any combination among the chosen conditions is materially or logically impossible). To gauge the latter, we built expressions who meant the direct

refutation of our hypotheses[8] and applied them as the exclusion criterion for any row to be heeded in the minimization.

Minimization results showed very little changes *vis-à-vis* the usage of Standard Analysis: parsimonious solutions changed slightly in their parameters of fit; intermediate ones changed only for the negation of the outcomes (contemporary and lagged), but every ESA intermediate solution did not surpass the 0,8 consistency threshold. That was to be expected, given the similarities between the exclusion criteria and the directional expectations as formulated in their complete, structured version[9]. Given this very limited impact, we did not see reasons to substitute ESA for the standard approach. The full ESA results, however, are displayed in Tables 46 to 48 below as direct printouts from the R QCA package. Conservative solutions are the same as the standard ones, of course, since they´re not affected by the adoption of ESA, and so they do not appear in the tables.

Table 24 - Minimization results with ESA – Outcome (contemporary results)

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"

M1: PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG + (~PWRP*40PC*~ACCT) -> OUTCOME
M2: PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG + (RECP*40PC*~ACCT) -> OUTCOME

                                          ------------------
                       inclS   PRI   covS   covU   (M1)   (M2)
-------------------------------------------------------------
1  PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG  0.850  0.780  0.232  0.093  0.163  0.093
-------------------------------------------------------------
2     ~PWRP*40PC*~ACCT  0.759  0.655  0.144  0.014  0.075
3      RECP*40PC*~ACCT  0.810  0.734  0.204  0.004         0.065
-------------------------------------------------------------
                   M1  0.799  0.727  0.307
                   M2  0.811  0.737  0.297

[1] "INTERMEDIATE"
```

[8] Respectively, for positive outcomes: ("~PWRP*~RECP*^~40PC+ ~ACCT+~LONG"), and for their negation: ("~PWRP*~RECP*^~40PC+ ACCT+LONG").

[9] *Sometimes, the enhanced parsimonious solution can be identical with the intermediate solution, a reason for which many users confuse the two. But this is a special situation, when directional expectations filter out untenable remainders as well as the difficult counterfactuals. However this is not always guaranteed, therefore the two should not be confused.* (Duşa, 2019, p. 190)

```
From C1P1, C1P2:

M1:    PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG + RECP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG -> OUTCOME

                          inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------------
1   PWRP*RECP*40PC*LONG  0.850  0.780  0.232  0.093
2  RECP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG  0.887  0.844  0.179  0.040
-------------------------------------------------
                    M1  0.861  0.807  0.272
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Table 25 - Minimization results with ESA – Outcome (lagged results)

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"

M1:  RECP*~40PC*LONG  +  PWRP*~RECP*ACCT*LONG  +  (~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT)  ->
OUTCOME_LAGGED
M2: RECP*~40PC*LONG + PWRP*~RECP*ACCT*LONG + (~PWRP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG) ->
OUTCOME_LAGGED

                                                 ------------------
                          inclS   PRI   covS   covU   (M1)   (M2)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
1        RECP*~40PC*LONG  0.894  0.838  0.313  0.146  0.146  0.210
2   PWRP*~RECP*ACCT*LONG  0.826  0.706  0.305  0.166  0.171  0.166
-----------------------------------------------------------------
3       ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT  0.791  0.671  0.216  0.035  0.090
4  ~PWRP*40PC*~ACCT*LONG  0.813  0.743  0.103  0.011         0.066
-----------------------------------------------------------------
                     M1  0.844  0.772  0.606
                     M2  0.854  0.790  0.582
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"
From C1P1, C1P2:
```

```
M1:              ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT*LONG    +    RECP*~40PC*ACCT*LONG    +
PWRP*~RECP*40PC*ACCT*LONG -> OUTCOME_LAGGED

                               inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-------------------------------------------------------
1      ~PWRP*RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.812  0.704  0.180  0.118
2       RECP*~40PC*ACCT*LONG  0.924  0.875  0.230  0.200
3  PWRP*~RECP*40PC*ACCT*LONG  0.823  0.750  0.178  0.146
-------------------------------------------------------
                          M1  0.877  0.819  0.527
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Table 26 - Minimization results with ESA – Negation of the Outcome (contemporary results)

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"

M1: ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG -> ~OUTCOME

                            inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.787  0.632  0.207    -
-----------------------------------------------------
                       M1  0.787  0.632  0.207
```

```
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"
From C1P1:

M1:    ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG -> ~OUTCOME

                            inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.787  0.632  0.207    -
-----------------------------------------------------
                       M1  0.787  0.632  0.207
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of

relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Table 27 - Minimization results with ESA – Negation of the Outcome (lagged results)

```
[1] "PARSIMONIOUS"


M1: ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG -> ~OUTCOME_LAGGED


                            inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.736  0.501  0.235    -
-----------------------------------------------------
                       M1  0.736  0.501  0.235
```

```
[1] "INTERMEDIATE"


From C1P1:


M1:    ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG -> ~OUTCOME_LAGGED


                            inclS   PRI   covS   covU
-----------------------------------------------------
1  ~PWRP*~RECP*~ACCT*LONG  0.736  0.501  0.235    -
-----------------------------------------------------
                       M1  0.736  0.501  0.235
```

Source: The author

Obs: PWRP: Powerful President (condition regarding Presidential Powers); RECP: Reconcilable Party Goals (condition regarding Reconcilability of Party Goals); 40PC: Government holds 40 pct or more of relevant houses (condition regarding Legislative Thresholds); ACCT: Accountability (condition); LONG: Excludes one-year mandates: in election years; or headed by vice-presidents in lieu of the elected president; or headed by nominees chosen by any method to replace an elected slate who didn´t finish its full term; OUT = OUTCOME; n: number of cases in each line; inclS: consistency score; PRI: proportional reduction of inconsistency score; covS: raw coverage for the coverage score for the individual solution and the solutions taken as a whole; covU: unique coverage score for each individual solution (when more than one are provided by minimization)

Appendix 2 – Detailed information on operationalization and data sources

In this appendix, we present and discuss in detail the operationalization and data sources for the outcomes and causal factors in our model.

A.2.1 Outcome: good policy performance

The overall procedure

As already sketched in section 3.1.3, our chosen policy performance indicators are, first, the percent rate of economic growth, on an year-on-year basis over the previous year; second, the percent of change in household consumption share of GDP, also on an year-on-year basis over the previous year[10]. We might establish for each of those dimensions a simple Boolean yardstick of good performance if the government in question yields higher results than the region´s average rate[11], and zero if that condition doesn´t hold.

As for the "average" regional performance, it´s clear that all Latin American countries are to be eligible, in principle, to compose it. However, there are a few cases of extreme (negative) outperforming cases who might distort the final average to such an extreme that the full average becomes meaningless[12]. In this sense, any such big outlier would make the average so disproportional to the actual performance of most countries that variability would be null (that is, every government would score higher than the average), frustrating our intent at measuring government features that distinguish them positively from others. To cope with that, we used the traditional

[10] Regarding that last item, one could think about using its absolute values. However, the absolute rates of income inequality are affected by the whole accumulated trajectory of the country, and governments in two different countries would start their years from very different departure points. On the other hand, the relative change in the variables seems much more levelled among countries, allowing for a clearer view on the specific effects of contemporary government policy (growth rates are themselves measures of relative changes, and have the same effect).

[11] We could have imagined thresholds for fuzzy values (such as 1 to results better than one standard deviation above the average, 0,66 between that point and the average, and so on). However, the complexity will be structured in the composite index; for individual components, beating Latin American averages seems an already harsh test.

[12] Although they´ll not be included in our conceptual basket, inflation rates provide the best illustration to that point. Venezuela in 2017 and 2018 scored inflation rates of 862,6 % and astounding 130.060,3 % according to the IMF, while the biggest rate among all the other countries amounted to 25,0 % and 47,1 % respectively. But there are other examples, mostly around the hyperinflationary waves in the 80´s and 90´s.

statistical procedure of identifying extreme outliers in a dataset (those who are distant from the first and third quartiles by more than 3 times the interquartile range – Byrne, 2002[13]) and removed them from the sample used to compute Latin American average in the corresponding year[14].

That said, those Boolean performance scores regarding each one its corresponding socio-economic feature will be summarized into one single logical condition which captures only clearly good results (those cases where at least market-oriented or equality-oriented achievements were found). So, the good policy performance indicator will be a fuzzy variable structured into three thresholds: 1 if both component indicators score 1; 0,66 it happens to only one; and 0 otherwise[15]. That deployment of thresholds follows the abovementioned logic of competing goals in economic policy: if "market-friendly" results as high growth add to "pro-poor" reduction of inequality, the economic results can be considered clearly better (and policy approaches more comprehensive) than if only one subset of such results is achieved.

Those steps will be performed twice[16], using the values to the year each government is in office and the values to the following year, to take into account the possible time lag in the effects of government policy. So, two positive outcomes are to be assessed independently: the immediate results and the one-year lagged results.

The negative outcome means anything that does not correspond to such good performance – by design, the fuzzy value 0 to our outcome condition already means precisely those cases where no such results were found, since it encompasss cases where neither growth nor inequality reduction were achieved.

Within the Latin American framework, two countries must be individually assessed for their suitability for our purposes. The first one is Venezuela, to be checked against the common sense perception that oil revenues impact the country´s

[13] *In Tukey's terminology a step is 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. An outlier is a case more than one step above or below the appropriate quartile value – away from the boundaries of the midbox. Far outliers are two or more steps away from the boundaries of the midbox.* (Byrne, 2002, p. 111)

[14] From the overall 697 cases on the sample (17 countries, periods of democratic rule from 1978 to 2018), only 16 country-years were discarded for GDP growth rates (never excluding more than two cases at any year), and 15 country-years for income inequality rates (likewise). If inflation rates were considered, 47 cases would have been excluded from the same country-years (not involving more than four cases at any year).

[15] So, our fuzzy variable is entirely defined in its values by theoretical reasoning, which makes QCA calibration as such unnecessary, since the empirical values in each case will always coincide with one of those thresholds.

[16] That is, by means of two different truth tables.

economy to such extent that government decisions may be irrelevant, in practice, to affect economic outcomes, or at least much less relevant than in any other Latin American country (which would render this case as irrelevant in the logical sense). Whatever the common sense may be, though, we can see no empirical grounds for that assumption. In his thorough review of the economic and fiscal effects of natural resource exports in the region, Rossignolo (2015, p. 16) shows that Venezuelan dependence on oil (66,7 % of exports) is the highest among Latin American commodity exporters, but not too much far away from Ecuador (54,8%), or Colombia (48,9%), or from the Bolivian dependency on natural gas (52,4 %) or Chilean on copper (47,4 %) [17], all of them subject to extreme price volatility [18]. The macroeconomic impact of commodity prices is obviously huge, but can´t be singled out in Venezuela as having an outlier effect on the economy regarding the other commodity export countries[19] - in fact, other countries such as Chile, Colombia and Peru, suffer very strong effects from commodity price shocks (Roch, 2017); even the institutional profile of a state-owned company running most of the commodity output is similar to most countries in the region [20]. As a share of GDP, Venezuela´s commodity exports were 25 % in 2014, less than Bolivia´s (around 27 %) and slightly more than in Chile, Ecuador or Paraguay (around 22%, 21% and 18%)[21]. It´s true that fiscal revenues from natural resources oscillated between 9,4% and 21,1 % of GDP from 2001 to 2012 (with a windfall of up to 25,9 % in the 2006-2007 oil boom), against a Latin American average ranging from 2,2 % to 6,4% in the same period, and Venezuelan budgetary reliance on oil revenues as a share of total public revenues is the greatest in the continent (Hanni & Jiménez & Ruelas, 2018, p. 23) However, Bolivia also got such revenues not lower than 9,1 % of GDP from 2006 onwards,

[17] All data for 2013, except Venezuela (figures for 2011).

[18] See Rossignolo, 2015, Figure 6 and Table 2, p. 19-20

[19] Remarkably, Venezuela is (together with Argentina) singled out as an example of deliberate macroeconomic intervention by the government to sustain an alleged currency overvaluation in the period 2001-2013 (Rossignolo, 2015, pp. 25-26). Moreover, broader internal policymaking capacity affects the performance of the oil extraction sector itself, thus having a direct effect on the financial and economic impact of oil production and exports (Smith, 2020)

[20] *A la inversa de lo que acontece con el sector minero, en el sector de hidrocarburos las empresas estatales (como PEMEX, PDVSA, PetroEcuador, YPF o YPFB) y mixtas con participación estatal mayoritaria (como Petrobras y Ecopetrol) siguen desempeñando un papel preponderante, en consonancia con la tendencia internacional observada en la mayoría de los países exportadores de hidrocarburos en los que la participación directa del Estado a través de empresas petroleras públicas y mixtas, así como el mayor desarrollo relativo de los regímenes fiscales petroleros en el diseño de instrumentos fiscales y contractuales que aseguran la progresividad de la participación estatal de la rentas del sector, es creciente.* (Rossignolo, 2015, p. 46)

[21] All figures from Balakrishnan & Lizarazo & Santoro & Toscani, & Vargas (2021, p. 52).

while Chile reached peaks of 8,3 % and 8,1 % in 2006 and 2007 (Rossignolo, 2015, pp. 54-55)[22]. So, commodity impacts in Venezuela are certainly higher than elsewhere, but this does not mean that they circumvent or render meaningless the overall economic management by the government[23]. Indeed, the work by Puente, Daza, Rios and Rodríguez (2009, especially pp. 259-261) emphasizes the crucial role that policymaking processes had in shaping – usually in a very inefficient and inequitative way - the effects of oil booms and busts on the overall economy and the public services. Following Campello and Zucco (2020), the relations between economic volatility and other effects from commodity exports, on one side, and political effects on the other, are a clear object of study regardless of the individual country. So, we keep Venezuela in our sample.

The other individual assessment for a possible irrelevant case would be the Chilean performance after the 2010 earthquake, in order to check whether its effects might have rendered any policy measures helpless in changing reality. Here, the answer is also negative: according to an IMF formal evaluation (IMF, 2010), the Chilean economy was "remarkably resilient" in 2009 and 2010 (growth was temporarily restricted immediately after the seismic event in February 2010, but amounted to a positive 5,85% at the end of that year), and government measures played a very important role in ushering the country through the aftershocks of both the 2008 global financial crisis and the devastation arising from the earthquake[24]. So, there´s no evidence that the exogenous event has made government initiatives irrelevant so as to be excluded from our concerns.

Data sourcing for GDP

[22] In another compilation, Venezuelan fiscal revenues from commodities, as a share of GDP, were closer to Mexico´s and smaller than those enjoyed by Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ecuador from 2000 to 2016 (Hanni & Jiménez & Ruelas, 2018, p. 22).

[23] That may be the reason for policy appraisals and prescriptions as to the fiscal policy of Latin American countries regarding natural resources are usually designed with the whole cluster of such countries in mind (Balakrishnan, & Lizarazo & Santoro & Toscani, & Vargas, 2021; Hanni & Jiménez & Ruelas, 2018; Vieyra & Masson, 2014; Gelos & Werner, 2014)

[24] *Fiscal policy played a critical countercyclical role, drawing on the public savings accumulated prior to the global crisis. The 2009 fiscal stimulus helped support an early recovery of economic activity. The planned withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus was delayed by the demands on government spending placed by the devastating earthquake of February 2010. The government has adopted a prudent approach to financing the emergency spending through reprioritization of other expenditure, temporary tax increases, efficiency gains, and some debt issuance.* (IMF, 2010, p. 11)

As for the data sources, the World Bank (IBRD, 2022)[25] has the most comprehensive series for GDP growth on an annual basis, both in absolute values (including GDP in nominal and constant prices) and in percent change, to all countries in the region, dating as far back as 1980. The missing values that must be covered by alternative sources involve GDP growth in Venezuela from 2015 to 2021, which are absent and must be sourced from the IMF World Economic Outlook database by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2022)[26]. In all those repositories, we could pick series with values at market prices, based on constant local currency, which circumvents the effects of local currency inflation on the nominal growth rates displayed.

The tricky issue of income inequality

Finally, we must discuss how to operationalize income inequality in the descriptive and theoretical models. The most immediately recalled candidates to those purposes are previously calculated Gini coefficients. However, those present extreme empirical and conceptual shortcomings.

First consider their availability: the newly developed series[27] in the World Inequalities Database (WIL, 2022)[28] generated by the World Inequalities Lab[29], seems at first sight adequate, but Latin American data show the same value from 1980 to 2000 for almost all countries[30], which would obviously mislead the results and interpretation. Besides, for Latin American countries, WIL database has only pre-tax national income distribution data, which is much less affected by direct and short-term policy measures than post-tax national income information (which is available only for OECD countries). Other possible sources are equally scarce in their coverage: SEDLAC data (CEDLAS, 2022[31]) present only scattered years (possibly the years when household surveys were performed in each country), making impossible to assess the year-on-year variation which is at the core of our research design; SWIID cross-country inequality tables (Solt, 2016; 2020) are better endowed with country-

[25] https://data.worldbank.org/topic/economy-and-growth?view=chart
[26] Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/index.aspx.
[27] Namely, the Gini Index (Adults / Total population) for Pre-tax national income.
[28] https://wid.world/data/
[29] https://inequalitylab.world/en/
[30] Probably due to the usage of the same household survey or other source to assign weights to income distribution, or other imputed parameter for the computation.
[31] CEDLAS (2022), Inequality series, available at https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022_inequality_LAC.xlsx

years, but still scattered and showing large gaps in data availability across the years (besides presenting, for each country-year, several possible measurements for the same variables – that is, several lines covering the same country-year – according to their original source, which might be an asset for users who focus on the Ginis per se, but not for our need of a single comparable metric); CEPAL data (CEPAL, 2022) begin at year 2000 at most[32], and even so miss all or most data points for several countries such as Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua, as well as many intermediate points for the other countries; the academic "All the Ginis dataset" (Milanovic, 2014) covers data only up to 2013 (which would jeopardize at least the last 5 years of possible data points within our time frame), and his main source for Latin America is the SEDLAC repository itself; the database from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP, 2022) is also limited to less than 45% of the country-years of interest (besides a highly irregular distribution among countries, making some of them like Paraguay and Dominican Republic almost absent from the sample)[33].

Some later attempts have been made to unify different data sources on income inequality into better curated time series composed from different sources, using quality criteria to select the best available Gini calculation for each country-year. That includes the UNU-Wider World Income Inequality Database (UNU-Wider, 2022), as well as the database from Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan (2013), who refers to the former as one of their main data sources[34] but has very little data points after the 2000 decade. However well compiled those series might have been, they all face one major setback (which, to their credit, they present very transparently in technical documentation): each data provider has its own conceptualization of income inequality, and the blending of several sources (even when selected under relevant

[32] Several old printed editions of the *Anuário Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe* (https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/2/discover?sort_by=dc.date.issued_dt&order=desc&locale-attribute=es) offer data on household income distribution in quintiles for previous years, but in irregular intervals for each country, incurring in the same limitations already mentioned for SEDLAC data.

[33] Other attempts at proxying income inequality through economic hard data are equally limited: all of the mentioned databases who offer household income data by deciles or quintiles – World Inequalities Database, SEDLAC and CEPAL repositories - face exactly the same availability limitations (in fact, those tend to be the very starting point for calculating Gini indexes); the Penn World Table database (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2015), brings the "Share of labour compensation in GDP at current national prices", but their display suffers from the same problem of yielding the same values until 1993 for most countries (besides not addressing the distributive effects of peasant household income, which might be relevant in smaller Latin American economies). For other assessments of the available datasets regarding income inequality, see Rossi (2016) and Galbraith & Choi & Halbach & Malinowska & Zhang (2015).

[34] We couldn´t find the original dataset quoted as the other main reference for Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan´s Gini tables (Deininger & Squire, 1996).

criteria) means the risk of comparing very different underlying realities within the same country (when different sources are used) and across countries (when different methodologies are employed by the primary compilers). That involves estimates based either on income or in consumption, and in the last case on the measurement of consumption versus the measurement of expenditure; the different criteria for assessing some components of income/consumption, such as imputed rent from owner-occupied dwellings, income in-kind and income from home production; and the choice between households, household *per capita*, individuals, or adult individuals as the basic statistical unit; the use of pre- or post-tax income as the very object of measurement (UNU-WIDER, 2022a; Gradín, 2021; Gradín, 2021a; Deininger & Squire, 1996; Altimir, 1987; Beccaria, 2007; Alvaredo & Bourguignon & Ferreira & Lustig, 2023)[35]. Finally, income estimates based on household surveys most often underestimate by a heavy margin the incomes of richer individuals and households, both due to under-reaching those sources in actual survey interviews and to voluntary or involuntary underreporting by those surveyed, specially with regard to incomes generated by financial assets (Piketty, 2020; Calderón, 2022; Altimir, 1987; Alvaredo & Bourguignon & Ferreira & Lustig, 2023; Amarante & Jiménez, 2015, p. 19). All that means the strong risk of large heterogeneity in the very meaning of each data point in such composite series, which might be perfectly acceptable to other long-term, statistically-based research, but poses unsurmountable obstacles to our case-oriented, year-on-year evaluation of inequality changes.

Another conceptual caveat regarding Gini coefficients must be explained: while our goals are measuring short-term, cabinet-attributable results on the issue, inequality trends in capitalist economies have shown to be multicausal, running along contraposed convergence and divergence causal factors [36] (Piketty, 2014) and "sustained in persistent structures that are reproduced in the long run" (Vommaro & Baisotti, 2022, p. 2). Sure, those factors are affected by government policy, but in a

[35] Besides some idyosincratic features such as the fact that Argentine income surveys cover only urban populations (Alvaredo & Bourguignon & Ferreira & Lustig, 2023)

[36] On behalf of convergence in wealth distribution, Piketty (2014) points that two structural (and long-term) factors are the diffusion of knowledge and the investment in training and skill, all of them take several years (more probably, generations) to mature; on the opposite direction, the political powers that a few top earners acquire to pull the institutional and organizational strings to protect their own share of income flows and established wealth, compounded by the mere (and hugely impactful) fact that the rate of return on capital tends to be higher than the overal growth rate to the economy, which means that concentrated wealth strongly tends to become even more concentrated along time in a structural process.

less stringent and direct way than the other macroeconomic variables are[37]. Not surprisingly, those features have a much longer time horizon than the typical macroeconomic policy toolset, since they may take decades to show[38]. Sáinz (2022) presents a rather exhaustive compilation of government measures with strong impact on inequality in Latin America, almost none of them formulated or implemented in the short run, requiring at least one full presidential term, and more frequently a sequence of several like-minded presidential mandates (presented as longer-term historical "moments" measured in a few critical decades). So, a full-blown depiction of income measurements (as an ideal Gini coefficient would show) would probably show confounding trends in the short run.

All those problems with Gini coefficients push us towards a blunter measurement of inequality trends in government policy, whose sensitivity to short-term measures and methodological consistency in data collection might at least write off some of the losses brought by a less stringent measurement design.

For that, we propose the "household consumption" variable in national accounts (or, more precisely, the share of GDP that household consumption, added to consumption of "Non-profit institutions serving households", represents at each country-year). From an empirical point of view, household consumption is actually one component of GDP computation, so, since GDP statistical sources are reliable and consistent enough (as already discussed above), we can use other variables[39] from the same repository as our original GDP data (IBRD, 2022)[40].

"Household consumption" means a statistical estimate of most final goods and services acquired by families and individuals (not including organizations and legal

[37] Specially when, as shown in this section for Latin American economies, the direct measurements available cover pre-tax income distribution, instead of after-tax distribution (which might reflect more intensely some specific policy measures as tax changes and government cash transfers and subsidies)

[38] *In particular, the reduction of inequality that took place in most developed countries between 1910 and 1950 was above all a consequence of war and of policies adopted to cope with the shocks of war. Similarly, the resurgence of inequality after 1980 is due largely to the political shifts of the past several decades, especially in regard to taxation and finance. The history of inequality is shaped by the way economic, social, and political actors view what is just and what is not, as well as by the relative power of those actors and the collective choices that result. It is the joint product of all relevant actors combined*. (Piketty, 2014, p. 20)

[39] Indicator "'Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)", code NE.CON.PRVT.ZS. There are very few blanks in the time series during the country-years of interest (namely, Argentina 1982-1986, Nicaragua 1990-1993, Panama 2018, Uruguay, 2016-2018).

[40] As for methodological uniformity, those data points show to the sum of the amounts measured for the conceptual variables "P31S14 Final consumption expenditure of households" and "P31S15 Final consumption expenditure of non-profit institutions serving households" in the Standardized System of National Accounts (Lequiller & Blades, 2014, p. 131-141)

persons, corporate or otherwise) to meet their everyday needs, whether being paid in cash or received in kind. Any other intermediate goods acquired by households, as well as any other kind of financial, land, real estate or capital asset acquisition, are by definition excluded from it[41]. It also does not encompass some services provided free of charge by governments that are clearly carried out for the benefit of individual households (mainly public education and public healthcare)[42] – missing an important distributional element of government policies[43], which unfortunately coundn´t be found in our statistical sources[44]. Although there´s a loss there, it´s by no means clear that any survey-based Gini coefficient (either income- or expenditure-based) would be able to capture the effects of those services on inequality either. On the other hand, the variable captures other welfare drivers that are relevant in the Latin American context but difficult to measure otherwise (and also absent from many of the attempts at producing indicators like Ginis), such as the proceeds of subsistence farming and informal labor, or the welfare effects of house ownership. (Lequiller & Blades, 2014, pp. 131-141).

Our data points also include another variable which tallies the same kinds of consumption performed by "Non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs)", which are units formed by groups of households in order to supply services to themselves or to other households on a non-commercial basis (essentially, as a kind of shared consumption performed directly by households that can be identified and accounted for as such). This group does not encompass all institutions with non-commercial aims, being instead circumscribed to those mainly financed by households' donations or regular subscriptions (which will result in their being only a small sector in the national accounts).

The reason for choosing household consumption (in this extended computation including NPISHs consumption) as a proxy for income inequality

[41] "*The sums saved by households are available to finance the gross fixed capital formation of other sectors (machinery, factories, transport equipment, roads, railways, communication networks, etc.) and also, in part, the GFCF of households themselves (purchases of housing). Since the end of World War II, there has been a noticeable causal link between the level of household saving and the size of the rise in GDP*. (Lequiller & Blades, 2014, p. 172)

[42] Although the share of such public services paid for by fees and partial payments is depicted in household consumption.

[43] That bears the risk of it overestimating distributional consumption in countries that chose private education and health systems (Lequiller & Blades, 2014, p. 181. Piketty, 2014, p. 92)

[44] We could not find any reliable comparative series which depicts the SNA variable "Individual consumption expenditure of general government (P31S13)" individually (it is presented only accumulated with other types of general government expenditure who can´t be traced to providing individual households with direct services).

measure, as blunt as it indeed is, lies on some stylized economic facts in capitalist economies. The main factor is that, although every individual (even the richest one) raises his or her consumption upon an increase of its disposable income, it must be assumed that poorer households consume a bigger share of their acquired income than richer ones[45] (who, even consuming more after an income increase, will allocate even more of that increase to savings and acquiring capital goods – Piketty, 2014, pp. 175-176[46]). Besides, richer households can benefit from a share of their spending (either consumption or asset acquisitions) to be provided through corporate conveyors, benefits and perks, which show up in corporate or public sector accounting (Piketty, 2014, pp. 176-177)[47] – at least, in a much higher proportion than poor households can. So, an overall increase in household consumption as a proportion of GDP embeds, tendentially, a greater relative increase in poor households´ material well-being measured in consumption[48]. If government policy allows for such increases, chances

[45] Presenting that economic theory assumption in Keynes´ classical formulation:

> *Além disso, quanto mais rica for a comunidade, mais tenderá a ampliar a lacuna entre a sua produção efetiva e a potencial; e, portanto, mais óbvios e maléficos os defeitos do sistema econômico. Assim, uma comunidade pobre tenderá a consumir a maior parte da sua produção de modo que um investimento modesto será suficiente para lhe garantir o pleno emprego, ao passo que uma comunidade rica terá de descobrir oportunidades de investimento muito mais amplas, para que possa conciliar a propensão para a poupança dos seus membros mais ricos com o emprego dos seus membros mais pobres.* (Keynes, 1996, pp. 64-65)

A simpler presentation states:

> *Los estudios económicos han mostrado que la renta es el principal determinante del consumo y del ahorro. Los ricos ahorran más que los pobres, tanto en términos absolutos como en términos porcentuales. Las personas muy pobres no pueden ahorrar nada; más bien, si tienen alguna riqueza o pueden pedir préstamos, tienden a desahorrar. Es decir, tienden a gastar más de lo que ganan, reduciendo así el ahorro acumulado o endeudándose más.* (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2001, p. 416).

There´s no denying that other post-keynesian paradigms have been put forward, postulating that such Keynesian consumption function applies only to household data and in the short-run, while in the long run the average propensity to consume is relatively constant. However, all seem based on Fisher´s model whereby consumption is based on the income the consumer expects over his entire lifetime. (Mankiw, 2010, pp.499 and 506). Even if we assume that, there´s little grounds for positing that Latin American poorer inhabitants will hold brighter expectations for future income than their richer counterparts.

[46] In another snapshot to the same phenomenon, wealth and savings are extremely concentrated among households, even more than income. For Mexico, Negrete (2023, p. 19) points that only 19,1% of households surveyed declared any kind of financial assets, and the upper 1% of households in terms of income held 87,9% of the total amount of declared savings.

[47] A feature which becomes even more important in Latin American underdeveloped economies with low institutionalization regarding the accountability of public resources, tax and accounting compliance, which can be said of much of our country-years of interest.

[48] In Latin America, Amarante and Jiménez (2015, p. 18) emphasize: "de conformidad con la evidencia existente para otros países, el ingreso se distribuye en forma más inequitativa que el consumo en la región (CEPAL, 2014b)". Indirectly, that´s another suggestion that a higher share of accrued income in higher-income households is allocated to savings.

are that its ultimate results are favoring (at least in the short run) income allocation on behalf of the poorer segments.

Other reasons also apply. Since only the aggregate amount of consumption is considered, this variable doesn´t incurr on the several methodological and measurement risks affecting Gini coefficients that we described in the previous paragraphs. Its time horizon is also very commensurate with our phenomenon of interest: changes in overall consumption patterns (which compound the effects of aggregate growth, inflation, job creation, wage rises, fiscal transfers, supply chains, and many others, over every individual in the economy) are probably more quickly affected by government policies (which change over presidential cabinets) than the final income distribution pattern (for one, this pattern will depend heavily on previous wealth distribution figures, which will condition much of the remaining flows from capital income, as well as the economic and political resources with which the richer strata are endowed to deflect or react to government distributive measures[49]).

An entirely relevant concern might be that of correlation: if both aggregates (GDP growth, as compared to the measure of income inequality calculated out of some of its components) come from the same sources, could they be correlated in some way ? From a theoretical point of view, the previous paragraphs state the case for their relative independence, since they move according to different dynamics. Empirically, we can corroborate those claims, since the correlation coefficient ("r" from Pearson) to the Latin American countries[50] in the relevant time frame (1978-2018) for the percents of GDP change and income inequality reductio showed an

[49] "*Tanto el ingreso como el consumo reflejan flujos de recursos y ello entraña diversas limitaciones. Por esto se sugiere que la riqueza quizás sea un mejor indicador del acceso de los hogares a recursos, ya que incluye la consideración de los activos financieros y no financieros que pueden transarse en el mercado. Se trata de una variable de existencia que es a la vez generadora de flujos de ingresos. A través de las herencias, la riqueza también es un poderoso medio de trasmisión intergeneracional. Los países en desarrollo han realizado notables esfuerzos por cuantificar la desigualdad en términos de riqueza a partir de información de registros tributarios o de encuestas especiales donde se releva la tenencia de activos y deudas (encuestas financieras). [..]*

Con este tipo de información es posible analizar la distribución y concentración de la riqueza, e ir más allá de la desigualdad de ingresos o consumo. En los países de los que existe información, los estudios señalan que la desigualdad en la distribución de la riqueza es considerablemente mayor que en la distribución de los ingresos (Davies y Shorrocks, 2000; Davies y otros, 2008; FMI, 2013) (véase el gráfico I.3). Estos relevamientos están poco extendidos en América Latina y solo se han llevado a cabo en Chile, Colombia y el Uruguay" (Amarante & Jiménez, 2015, pp. 18-19)

[50] Except the ones who did not figure in our assessment: Ecuador (excluded *ex ante* for theoretical reasons), Guatemala and Nicaragua (fully excluded due to lack of data).

average value of -0,11, ranging from -0,43 to 0,21[51], meaning a very low correlation between the two variables.

To be sure, that is by no means a claim to measure income inequality proper by national accounts figures, an endeavor which has been attempted much more cautiously and shown promising but as yet very limited results (Alvaredo & Bourguignon & Ferreira & Lustig, 2023, pp. 33-36). Our attempt is conceptually much less ambitious: changes in household consumption share of GDP are telltales of government policy mixes that point towards (or against) redistribution favoring the poorer strata of economic agents, nothing more. Besides, we make no obfuscation of the chosen indicator´s downsides, of which there are many. First, by looking at the aggregate level, we have no actual data on how the added consumption was actually distributed among households (having to rely instead on the theoretical assumption that it accrues more to lower income households). More seriously, increasing consumption by poor strata might be distributionally offset by an overall increase in income inequality in which richer households allocate an even greater share of accrue income in savings and capital acquisitions, aggravating wealth inequality. Besides, increasing consumption in the short run is not the only virtuous economic policy choice even from the point of view of inequality: some years of higher savings geared to increasing productive capacity in a distributionally sound way (that is, where the final allocation of property rights and of claims to the increased output generated by the added capacity are more evenly distributed among social groups) may be at least as desirable as levelling up consumption immediately.

Regardless, our assessment of government policy results should not be attempted without some kind of evaluation of income inequality mitigation, according to criteria that are consistent with the time frame of our main unit of analysys (the actions of a minority presidential cabinet in one country for one year). Given the shortcomings of Gini-based indicators, our real choice is between this (admittedly limited) household consumption metrics and having no inequality indicator at all. We clearly opt for the former.

[51] The individual country coefficients were 0,205668117876278 (AR), -0,302601930339928 (BO), -0,393988346292908 (BR), 0,0552116491010608 (CL), -0,120088459707802 (CO), 0,160401036086444 (CR), -0,0660085622033714 (DR), -0,0860843533063648 (SV), -0,183890618330372 (HN), 0,14114461013266 (MX), -0,431505201961572 (PA), -0,18967299677622 (PY), -0,206509676905222 (PE), 0,188907508814797 (UY) and -0,133163794316282 (VE).

Lastly, it must be set in an explicit fashion that there´s no conceptual overlapping between household consumption and GDP metrics: the former is obviously a part of the latter in statistical terms, but they show different effects of government policy and may evolve in different directions. A large GDP growth may happen across the board, leading to increasing material welfare to all members of society, or may be centered in investment and exports while household consumption lags behind (which, in capitalist economies, suggests an increase in income and wealth concentration). On the other hand, an overall empoverishment (such as in a war) may destroy physical capital and inhibit productive investment faster than the overall consumption falls, leading to a rising share of consumption over a shrinking GDP. That is, as blunt and computationally interconnected as they may be, the two variables operationalize two independent socioeconomic concepts.

Empirical outreach

Considering all variables and their specific treatment, as sketched in the sections above, we managed to collect reliable data on 664 out of the possible 697 country-years of economic management (the 17 countries in the sample from 1978 to 2018), with a 95,26% coverage[52]. The missing values are concentrated in the first decades, and in some countries (namely, Argentina and Nicaragua). While any missing data point is detrimental to our research aims (by reducing the amount of cases available to assess government performance and loosening the within-region heterogeneity of any Latin American average as benchmark), dropping cases of absent data (specially in this modest, less than five per cent proportion) is still less detrimental than dropping entire variables. Indeed, since each component for the overall outcome represents one necessary conceptual dimension of good policy, missing it while keeping the other might bias the assessment of such phenomenon from the theoretical point of view adopted in the study. So, we must acknowledge that this lower than exhaustive empirical coverage, albeit the widest found in current data infrastructure, is the best possible outreach to this study given our resources and limitations. As chapter 6 will show, it can still support meaningful analysis on the workings of minority governments and their logic.

[52] Structured source data and a summary to the policy performance results in fuzzy terms are available in the supplementary data repository, as well as in the consolidated table in section A.1.1 in Appendix 1.

On the "non-symmetrical" shape of the calibrated scores

Arguments in section 3.1.3 regarding the nature of "not good results" establish theoretical foundations for something that might seem counter-intuitive: the absence of a partial non-membership in the "good results" set (say, a hypothetical 0,33 value). This kind of "symmetry"[53] in the fuzzy value assignments may be common in QCA-based studies, but it cannot reflect adequately the theoretical landscape of our study. As discussed above, development theory revolves around two major phenomena, growth and inequality, and its main debate in the overall appraisal of development strategies regards the traditional prevalence of one (growth) against the other (inequality) - or, as clearly stated as our theoretical choice, its later evolution through the equal wheighing of both as benchmarks for policy success. So, while full achievement by scoring high in both dimensions can be clearly differentiated from the partial results of getting just one (either growth or inequality), and those could also be differentiated from the failure of getting none, there would be no sound criteria with which to select one or another of the two dimensions as the "least bad" to be reached alone. Finding granularity in "bad" performances might be feasible through multidimensional measures of growth and inequality that could incorporate in a theoretically coherent way other social or economic indicators (such as inflation, unemployment, investment rates, and others) whose partial combinations supported a graded equivalence to partial set-theoretical memberships. Alas, those measures could not be found by our research, as this whole section 3.1 describes.

That choice is fully compatible with QCA methodological structures. As already mentioned in the previous paragraph, scores that are equidistant from the 0,5 benchmark are by far the most common feature in QCA studies; however, there´s no logical or methodological requirement that they are shaped like that[54]. Ragin (2009, p. 91) forcefully states that the number of levels in a fuzzy set may be whatever is needed by theoretical demands, and the intervals between them must not be constant

[53] In the numerical sense (that is, having scores symmetrically distant from the 0,5 maximum ambiguity threshold), not in the logical sense regarding cause-effect relationships.

[54] *Fuzzy sets can take on many forms, some of which are shown in Table 5.1* [FMRB: All "symmetrical"]. *Note that the examples should not preclude other conceivable scales. [..] Note that there is no right or wrong with regards to the calibration scale. Crisp sets can be useful, especially for concepts with binary distinctions (a case is either inside or outside the set). Likewise, if the data allows for a more fine-grained calibration, then a continuous fuzzy set has its advantages. But there can also be substantive reasons to use other calibration scales, different from the ones suggested in Table 5.1*. (Mello, 2021, p. 78)

or equal[55]. What´s crucial for the calibration scaling is that it unequivocally distinguishes between membership and non-membership[56], and, as a consequence, between relevant and irrelevant variation in the underlying measurement[57], with substantive and theoretical knowledge as the fundamental guidance for such appraisals (Mello, 2021, p. 76). As a matter of fact, relevant studies conceptualize their calibration in "non-symmetrical" shapes: Ioana-Elena , Schneider and Thomann (2021, p. 41) use a five-point scale ("fully in" = 1; "almost but not fully in" = 0.9; "more in than out" = 0.67; more out than in" = 0.33, and "fully out" = 0)[58]; Mello (2021, pp. 95-96) provides a scale where there are only fuzzy continuous values in

[55] *The number of levels in fuzzy sets of this type is determined by the researcher. For example, a researcher might construct a fuzzy set with five or eight levels, instead of four or six. Also, it is not necessary to use equal intervals between the levels. For example, based on substantive knowledge a researcher might develop a five-value scheme using the scores 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 1.0. This scheme would signal that while there are cases that are fully in the set (1.0), there are no cases that are "mostly but not fully in" (e.g., with fuzzy membership scores of 0.8).* (Ragin, 2009, p. 91)

[56] *Note also that crisp sets and fuzzy sets both evolve around the same fundamental distinction between a case's membership or non-membership in a given set. Regardless of how nuanced a fuzzy set is, the essential question remains: what distinguishes cases that are rather inside (scores above 0.5) from those that are rather outside a given set (scores below 0.5).* (Mello, 2021, p. 78)

[57] *Qualitative anchors make it possible to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation. Variation in GNP per capita among the unambiguously rich countries is not relevant to membership in the set of rich countries, at least from the perspective of fuzzy sets. If a country is unambiguously rich, then it is accorded full membership, a score of [1]. Similarly, variation in GNP per capita among the unambiguously not-rich countries is also irrelevant to degree of membership in the set of rich countries because these countries are uniformly and completely out of the set of rich countries*. (Ragin, 2009, p. 92)

These examples clarify a crucial feature of fuzzy sets central to their calibration—the fact that in order to calibrate a fuzzy set it is necessary for researchers to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation.[..] When calibrating a fuzzy set, variation that is irrelevant to the set must be truncated so that the resulting membership scores faithfully reflect the target set's label. This requirement also establishes a close connection between theoretical discourse and empirical analysis. (Ragin, 2008, pp. 83-84)

Another advantage of calibrated measures is that they allow us to distinguish between meaningful and less relevant variation in the uncalibrated raw data. When transforming raw data into sets, we can specify which variation to emphasize. For example, let us suppose we expect the economic strength of a country to be a relevant factor in explaining its performance in the implementation of certain policies. We know that there are economic differences between, say Switzerland and Denmark. But on a global scale, both of these countries would be considered economically strong, which means that we may assign them the same fuzzy score (1, or full membership in the set of strong economies). However, for countries with weaker economies, even small differences in GDP per capita mean a lot more in terms of economic development. With the calibration procedure, we can emphasize such differences by delineating the relevant variation based on our own -substantive knowledge of the research area, as will be explained below. (Mello, 2021, pp. 75-76)

[58] *To measure this set, we could add up the students' scores on the two qualitatively measure d variables inTable 2.2. The resulting index of in-class performance 'inclass' ranges from 2 to 6. We can recode this index into a fuzzy set which we call CLASS, for example as follows: 6=fully in(1) 5 =almost but not fully in (0.9) 4 =more in than out (0.67) 3 =more out than in (0.33) 2 =fully out (0)*. (Ioana-Elena & Schneider & Thomann, 2021, p. 41)

the membership side (from 0,51 to 1) and 0, absent any other score for non-membership, on the basis that this distribution is the one who his theoretical frame[59]; Freitag and Schlicht (2009) employ only one intermediate point (0,4) besides the two extreme membership conditions (0 and 1)[60]. From the algorithmic point of view (i.e., the possibility that "unbalanced" populations along the scale prevents solutions to be generated by QCA), there´s no *ex ante* assumption that some specific empirical distribution makes for unfeasible truth tables, except for extremely concentration of cases above or below the maximum ambiguity threshold of 0,5 (Emmenegger & Schraff & Walter, 2014, p. 25[61]; Ioana-Elena & Schneider & Thomann, 2021, p. 48[62]) – something, by the way, that could happen even with a "well-behaved" four- or six-value scale if the empirical distributiou happens to cluster on one side of the scale (Basurto & Speer, 2012, p. 168[63]). Our empirical distribution, as depicted in section 6.1, never shows less than 23% of outcomes as "in" or "out" any set.

So, since we deploy a clear theoretical logic for structuring outcome valuation in three distinct levels of membership in the good policy results set (full membership,

[59] *The cross-over effectively means that countries with at least one fatality receive scores above 0.51 and above (and are thus considered rather inside the set). [..] Hence, the fuzzy set fatalities is another example of an asymmetric condition (see Example 1). Moreover, the condition is conceptualized in a way that allows for scores between 0.51 and 1, but not for scores larger than 0 and less than 0.51 (since either there are civilian or military deaths or there are none).* (Mello, 2021, p. 78)
I calibrated this data starting with a qualitative criterion – distinguishing "primarily between leaders who experienced casualties and those who did not" (Mello 2020, 15). This means that government leaders without any casualties received fuzzy values of 0, while those with casualties received fuzzy values between 0.51 and 1.0. (Mello, 2021, p. 95)

[60] *The indicators for the autonomy of the Hauptschule and for the onset of tracking were not measured by interval-scaled data but rather by categorical differences among the sub-national education laws. Calibration of fuzzy memberships in the set "autonomous Hauptschule" thus depends on three different categories of Hauptschule regulations: Brandenburg is coded with a 0 because the Hauptschule does not exist. A second category is coded with 0.4 for those cases where the Hauptschule only exists in alliance to other schools: Graduation from the Hauptschule still exists, albeit only in conjunction with other school types, allowing for mobility. Cases with a completely autonomous Hauptschule, however, are coded with a 1.* (Freitag & Schlicht, 2009, p. 58)

[61] *As long as scores remain on the same side of the point of maximum ambiguity, the results of the Truth Table Analysis seem to be rather robust. This is important to note for scholars criticising the often unavoidable degree of arbitrariness in specific fuzzy set scores*. (Emmenegger & Schraff & Walter, 2014, p. 25)

[62] *There is no established, fixed threshold for what constitutes problematic skewness. However, as a rule of thumb, we neither want less than 20 per cent of our cases to be more in than out of the set, nor do we want less than 20 per cent of the cases to be more out than in the set.* (Ioana-Elena & Schneider & Thomann, 2021, p. 41)

[63] *After the revision, there may still be fuzzy sets with a skewed distribution of cases (e.g., all cases could be concentrated in the lower half of a fuzzy set). This happens when the researcher has not encountered empirical instances of some logically possible configurations of conditions and con sequently one corner of the property space of conditions remains empty. Such limited diversity may be in itself an issue of interest for future inquiry. (Ragin 2000:168–69, 198–201)*. (Basurto & Speer, 2012, p. 168

partial membership "more in than out" and full non-membership), with no support for any other categorization, and given that there is full methodological backing to such scaling, we stick to it regardless of its unfrequent appearance in the literature.

A.2.2 Decisiveness: presidential legislative powers

To operationalize our concepts of presidential legislative powers, we follow the framework already laid down by Montero (2009, mostly ch. 4)[64]: a full specification of powers and regulations (either constitutional or granted by legislative by-laws) that directly or indirectly affect presidential capacity to influence legislative activity, summarized in an institutional legislative powers index ("*Indice de Potencia Institucional Legislativa – IPIL*")[65]. After reviewing antecedent surveys of the same concepts, she proposes a collection of 14 variables to be compounded into an overall additive index (converted into a 0-1 scale), finding it reasonably correlated with all but one of the precedent indexes (Montero, 2009, p. 183). We´ll fully adopt the conceptual and empirical inputs from Montero´s model, but not the intermediate grouping of variables (which she structures on a sequential division along the basic legislative procedure) nor the final algorithm for adding up the concepts. That choice comes from a different theoretical design (we´re combining legislative with other presidential powers into one single political dimension, to explain outcomes that go far beyond formal lawmaking outputs) and from a different methodological context (we´re discussing causal relations in necessity/sufficiency terms, instead of evaluating statistical relationships between continuous variables[66]).

[64] The database mentioned by Doyle and Elgie (2014) might seem more exhaustive in terms of variables involved in producing the indexes, as well as more widespread in the literature. However, their measures are built by statistically combining data from several other repositories, while Montero presents her data according to this specific theoretical framework, closely adherent to the conceptualization made here. Negretto (2013) presents another significant time series on overall presidential powers (labeled "legislative" and "non-legislative") for Latin American polities along time. His indexes, however, are a composite that includes several other features not used in our conceptualization (including the summation of legislative and budgetary prerogatives in the "legislative powers" index). Those features explain the choice on behalf of Montero´s data, even in the face of other seemingly more resourceful repositories. For an in-depth discussion of individual countries´ presidential powers in the legislative procedures, see the several country chapters in Alemán and Tsebelis (2016). Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power (2018, chapter 5) present another large slate of presidential legislative powers, but their data cover only three Latin American cases (even so, without reference to changes along time).

[65] In Montero´s model, that index combines with party system variables to explain numerical legislative process variables (basically, the traditional "success" and "dominance" rates).

[66] That strategy was already suggested as profitable in early reviews of Montero´s book:

> *Por outro lado, se tomados de maneira desagregada, os indicadores do índice podem, separadamente, também ser vistos como variáveis explicativas. É dizer, os*

So, we present in Tables 49 and 50 below the individual indicators (taken strictly as presented by Montero), while their combination into higher-level constructs was shown in section 3.3.1. According to the conceptual foundations stated there, we´ll group them into two clusters: those prerogatives that allow unilateral action by presidents (even if, in some cases, temporary or subject to some congressional *ex post* ratification) and those who entail only a better position for presidents at the negotiating table in parliament. Numerical cases (both in their raw values and converted into fuzzy variables), as well as the logic for the direct calibration of each one into fuzzy values, are available in the online supplementary material.

Table 28 - Legislative powers - Related directly to negotiation (Montero, 2009)

	DESCRIPTION	HOW IT AFFECTS PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Exclusive initiative (p. 120)	The range of issues in which legislative initiative belongs exclusively to the president.	In these issues, the president can choose when to change the *status quo* by introducing legislation (even if parliament can amend the draft bills received)
Agenda-setting in the floor – default procedure (p. 125)	Actors who select the bills who will be voted on in each plenary session	Concentrated procedures (few actors with decision power) are more likely to give presidents more weight on the floors´s agenda[67]
Agenda-setting in the floor – requirements for overriding (p. 128)	The kind of majority needed to override the default procedures and insert bills on the plenary vote in a given session	Higher majority requirements favor the president, since they make it harder to change the default agenda (which assumedly bends towards him[68])

> *indicadores ajudam a responder qual (ou quais) desses conjuntos de atributos do desenho institucional podem ser eles mesmos, comparativamente, as causas individuais ou combinadas que determinam o sucesso legislativo.* (Santos, 2010, p. 113)

[67] That assumption is made by Montero considering a high frequency of majority coalitions (which correlate with parliamentary leadership also aligned to the coalition). For minority presidents, it must be relativized: under an oppositional majority, concentrated decision-making is the least favorable position to the president (the typical landscape of "divided government" in the United States Congress). Otherwise, for multiparty, fragmented legislatures (the most frequent scenario in our empirical scope), the expectations assume that the president (and his coalition) tends to be a relevant player, able to influence parliamentary leadership at large, and thus to be in a better position than in a very decentralized procedure where access to the floor is distributed proportionally to a party´s share of seats, or on a first-come, first-served basis - although this advantage is clearly smaller than if the president holds a majority status and organizes a "legislative cartel" in his coalition (Amorim Neto & Cox & McCubbins, 2003). Anyway, concentrating parliamentary powers in some agents (the Speaker, committee chairs, parliamentary whip) is seen by the literature as a strong way to tackle coordination problems and empowering presidential influence on the legislature (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Palermo, 2000, p. 8; Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999, p. 21-23; Lyne, 2008, p. 295; Nobrega Jr., 2008, p.13)

[68] The same caveats apply.

Committee membership selection (p. 135)	How committee members are selected	Concentrated procedures (few actors with decision power) are more likely to give presidents more weight on committees´ nomination[69]
Direct recall of a bill to plenary vote (p.139)	Stringency of requirements for sending a bill directly to floor consideration, bypassing committees gatekeeping power	Committees are the legislature´s main informational and negotiating resource. Any enfeeblement to their grip on decision-making (in this case, their gatekeeping power) is a reinforcement of presidential relative power
Committee prerogatives on bills (p. 142)	Committee powers on legislative process (to issue opinions, to veto, to approve by delegation of the floor)	Committees are the legislature´s main informational and negotiating resource. Any enfeeblement to their grip on decision-making is a reinforcement of presidential relative power
Presidential urgency requests (p. 146)	Executive ability to impose urgency consideration of bills, shorter than the standard legislative procedure	Presidential priorities get earlier responses, and substitute for those set by the chambers themselves
Bicameral symmetry (p. 153)	Degree of similarity in the decision-making powers of both chambers, in bicameral systems	A fully symmetrical bicameral structure means another veto point, requiring presidents to double any political investment in the legislative process.
Resolution of disagreement between chambers (p. 156 and 158)[70]	Whether one chamber´s decision prevails over another, or they must agree to approve a bill.	The more consensual the required process, the more symmetrical will the bicameral structure be.[71] So, joint resolution potentiates any one of the chambers as veto points, raising the need for presidential negotiations in both of them.
Summons of extraordinary congressional sittings (p. 178)	Who can summon extraordinary legislative sessions and prevent adjournments (the president, or some leadership or majority threshold in parliament, or both concurring)	If presidents alone can summon extraordinary sessions, they hold sole discretion over any extension of parliamentary time for consideration of bills, thus controlling an important factor in pushing their own angenda.

OBS: Page numbers in the first column refer to the page where the criterion is presented (both conceptually and in its empirical values) in Montero (2009).

Source: Montero, 2009

[69] The same caveats apply. Here, the direct election of members by the floor may allow log-rolling directly among individual members, resulting in the self-selection membership that is seen by the distributive literature as a powerful independence factor from the Executive by the US Congress (Mayhew, 1974)

[70] Montero presents originally two scales referring to disagreements involving bill refusal and bill modification. We take the former, since the latter is simply an ordering of values regarding which chamber has prevalence in case of disagreement, which is immaterial to our purposes.

[71] Montero acknowledges that this indicator may be seen as part of a symmetry measurement, but detaches it from all the others due to other theoretical considerations in her model. Since the information is relevant and there´s no way to simply reinsert it on an overall symmetry index, we must consider both indicators individually. There´s a potential loophole here: if there´s a prevailing chamber and the president holds a majority there (his minority status stemming from the other chamber), the asymmetry might be beneficial to the Executive. However, this particular configuration can´t be incorporated in an *ex ante* classification criterion; so, we must rely on the more likely case, that is, unsucsessful legislative results for the president in both chambers;

Table 29 - Legislative powers - Related to unilateral action (Montero, 2009)

	DESCRIPTION	HOW IT AFFECTS PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Veto powers - total (p. 163)	Whether the president has the prerogatives to veto legislation, and the majority requirements to override it	Vetoes (and the mere threat of them) are key to the presidential stance in legislative negotiations, and they´ll be the stronger the more legislators are required to strike them down.
Veto powers – partial or line item (p. 166)	Whether the presidential veto (if any) can be imposed on parts of approved bills (or, on the contrary, it can only be applied to the whole piece of legislation brought to presidential sanction)[72]	Partial vetoes favor the president, since allows more flexible negotiating strategies over bills[73].
Decree powers (p. 172)	The reach of formal presidential powers to legislate unilaterally by decree (involving both the prerequisites for such actions and the effects of further congressional decisions over them)	If decree powers can be used in a vast number of issues and circumstances, and/or if they suffer little interference from congress such as the possibility of being revoked, presidential power to adopt unilateral decisions is nearly unfettered.

OBS: Page numbers in the first column refer to the page where the criterion is presented (both conceptually and in its empirical values) in Montero (2009).

Source: Montero, 2009

A few clarifications are needed regarding those indicators. First, direct democracy features such as the calling of plebiscites and referenda are not considered, following the precedents of Montero (2009) and Amorim Neto (1998). Indeed, while the powers to invoke such mechanisms could at first sight be seen as enhancing presidential powers in pursuing unilateral courses of action, they tend to be used "under extreme state of affairs" (Amorim Neto, 1998, p. 2), and they still face extreme uncertainty in the literature as to their expected institutional and political meaning, specially when they are initiated from above, by the extant institutional authorities (Altman, 2010, 2019). So, including them in our analysis would introduce a highly unstable, theoretically uncertain variable. The other point regards the factors linked to bicameralism (symmetry and disagreeement resolution): bicameral conditions *per se* will not be taken as a specific causal condition in our model. However, those indicators are, substantively, a clear influence on the presidential legislative stances,

[72] This partial or line item veto feature is considered regardless of the time frame involved, that is, regardless of the non-vetoed portion of a partially vetoed bill entering into force immediately or having to await for the legislative consideration of the veto for that.

[73] "*It is much more potent than the blunt package veto, because it allows presidents to undo (and therefore stop before they are started) legislative logrolls. For instance, if the president excises a legislator's favorite project, then that legislator has little incentive to enter into a deal with a second legislator. In sum, the partial veto complicates dealmaking and should thus severely limit the ability of legislatures to solve collective action problems and overturn presidential edicts.*" (Morgenstern & Polga-Hecimovich & Shair-Rosenfield, 2013, p. 60);

objectively described, and as such they shouldn´t be excluded from consideration – that is, presidents facing symmetrical bicameral congresses face more hurdles in their legislative negotiations than those negotiating with just one chamber (Albala & Couto, 2023)[74]. So, they ought to be included in the model as one more feature of legislative negotiating powers.

Finally, as per data sources, Montero (2009) provides a comprehensive survey of each indicator[75]. For several instances, Montero´s data did not cover periods encompasses by constitutions enacted after 2009 or before the specific document used as her source: under those circumstances, we compiled the resulting information directly from the original texts of constitutions and legislative standing orders, as indicated in the supplementary data. The only cases where such primary sources could not be found were some internal legislative process regulations in Colombia (from 1997 to 1991[76]) and Dominican Republic[77], which we recorded with the same values as the ones applicable to the following constitutional periods in their respective countries.

A.2.3 Decisiveness: presidential budgetary powers

To assess what those budgetary powers are in operational terms, we follow mostly Wehner (2010), which is an explicit attempt to build an unified, cross-country framework[78], which was expanded and refined methodologically by Kim (2015a).

[74] Precisely because of that, the value of each indicator will be assigned 1 if the legislature in question is unicameral.

[75] Other partial repositories offering some information on strictly constitutional prerogatives (not including most powers embedded in in legislative standing orders) are available: in Shugart and Carey (1992), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997); Payne & Zovatto & Florez & Zavala (2007, pp. 87-96), Fish and Kroenig (2009, on veto and initiative powers), Cheibub (2002, p. 290, for veto powers), PNUD (2004, p. 76, for initiative, veto and decreee powers), the V-Dem repository (Coppedge et. al., 2022a; Chaisty & Power, 2018, for veto powers), Freudenreich (2016, p. 10), Negretto (2013), Amorim Neto (2006, for decree and veto powers), Altman and Castiglioni (2008, p. 8), on veto powers; Melo (2009, p. 35-36), and the databases mentioned in Heller and Branduse (2014, pp. 341). Morgenstern, Negri and Pérez-Liñan (2008) publish only aggregate measures for legislative powers, summing up in one indicator the different features encompassed by Shugart & Carey (1992). Our choice was to use Montero´s sourcing as consistently as possible, filling the occasional blanks with primary data collection.

[76] The following criteria: Agenda-setting in the floor – default procedure; Agenda-setting in the floor – requirements for overriding; Committee membership selection, and Direct recall of a bill to plenary vote.

[77] The following criteria: Agenda-setting in the floor – default procedure; Agenda-setting in the floor – requirements for overriding; Committee membership selection; Direct recall of a bill to plenary vote, and Committee prerogatives on bills.

[78] "*Existing comparative work on legislative budgeting contributes selected country studies (Coombes 1976; LeLoup 2004), but lacks systematic analysis on the basis of a common framework. Moreover, while the literature on the US Congress is extensive, legislative budgeting*

Not that there has not been previous attempts to systematically collect and organize information regarding budget institutions before (see Lienert, 2005, 2010, as well as the several other data surveys mentioned in this section). Wehner, however, remains the most elaborate conceptual framework for structuring and explaining the relevant information to date, incorporating and refining previous attempts in a systematic fashion. His 2010 book is usually the main source referred by later works on budget institutions. Empirically, Wehner´s works focus on data for OECD member countries, but his framework influences most surveys and other repositories where Latin American data are available[79].

The author divides budgetary control into "a critical number of institutional prerequisites", grouped in "formal authority" and "organisational characteristics" (p. 46).

Regarding the first group, three main factors embody budgetary formal powers. The first power is the "reversionary state", that is, what happens by default if the presidential draft budget is not approved by congress. The consequences of rejecting the budget bill have a very strong impact on the relative position of president and congress in its negotiation[80]: the reversionary point can be totally favorable to the president´s expenditure choice (the adoption of the president´s draft bill); entirely against his interest (a complete refusal of spending authorization, taking to some kind of shutdown); or intermediate positions (the temporary or definitive adoption of the

in parliamentary systems and developing countries in particular remains understudied (Oppenheimer 1983)." (Wehner, 2010, p. 44).

[79] In some cases, other repositories may have slightly different specifications of values to each variable or condition, but they´re reconcilable to the categories presented by Wehner (or, alternatively, their own categories may be used, without loss of theoretical meaning). Sáez, Montero and López (2005, pp. 234-244) have an even more granular typology of budgetary powers, but they offer time-specific, fragmented data, unavailable for all countries and years in our time frame; the widespread usage of Wehner´s categories for coding by most surveys is clearly determinant in choosing his more parsimonious set of concepts.

[80] Cox (2014) see the reversionary state as the key to maintaining the legislature's power over the purse. He warns that deliberate de-engineering of the budget process (by creating reversionary points and their triggers that favor the executive) is the surest and strongest way to circumvent legislative abilities to check on the Executive (without openly challenging parliamentary rights of budget approval and amendment, something politically costly). His case study is the 17th century English Westminster parliament, whose actual control over the Crown consolidated only after a long procedural battle which created reversionary points that gave the Commons an upper hand in the final decision over the possible disbursements by the King. Previous empirical research by that same author (Cox, 2012) claimed that executive-favorable reversions lower the life expectancy of democracies, a phenomenon that becomes more and more disseminated (Cox, 2012a), sometimes under the guise of "rationalizing parliamentarism", and which he deplores as "fiscal autocracy countervailing the better-known waves of electoral democracy". Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power (2018), Payne, Zovatto, Florezand& Zavala (2007); Cheibub (2006), Baldez and Carey (2001) and Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1999) also mention the reversionary state as one of the benchmarks of budgetary powers.

previous year´s budget, or the ad hoc voting of interim partial spending authorization bills)[81]. Those positions are the benchmarks for that component of presidential budgetary power, described in a fuzzy logical variable with values 1 (if reversal is to presidential draft bill[82]); 0,66 (if reversal is to last year´s budget, even if provisionally until a definite budget is approved[83]); 0,33 (if new budget authority will be granted by partial, interim votes); and 0 (if no authority to spend is granted to the president as a result, or if there´s a complete lack of guidance on the matter[84]). Some empirical checking must be held, however, in the circumstances around a formal reversal for last year budget in each country. If such legal hypothesis is found to be acompannied by a strong mandate for the executive to "adapt" the protracted allocations far beyond strict and binding limits[85], that is, if executive can discretionally reshape a material share of those interim expenditure budget authorizations under the guise of "updating" it[86], the condition is to be coded as fuzzy 1, for presidential powers will be much closer to imposing its preferred budget allocation than having to stick with last years´ outcome. Empirical data for that condition are to be found in OECD (2005), and PNUD (2004).

The second kind of budget powers covers how much changes can the legislature impose on the president´s draft bill. On receving the presidential proposal, parliament can face a take-it-or-leave-it vote for its entirety, or face limits on the amendments it can approve (such as not raising expenditures or not changing the overall fiscal balance), or suffer no constraints at all on the amount of change they can effect[87]. This prerrogative strongly conditions which actor has the final say on the

[81] *I group the responses into four categories: the executive budget or highly punitive consequences such as new elections [O], vote on account [3.3], last year's budget [6.7] or no spending [10].* (Wehner, 2010, p. 48)

[82] The other circumstances suggested by Wehner (new elections, fall of the cabinet) have no significance in presidential systems.

[83] Under the assumption that the previous budget, as outdated as it may be, has already been the product of negotiations and is more predictable than the outcome of a new round of bargain under unfavorable circumstances. Field (2022, p. 123) considers the assurance of carrying over the previous year budget, in case the current bill does not pass, one among several strong institutional advantages Spanish governments enjoy in the legislative process.

[84] When legislation is completely silent on the consequences of non-approval, relying entirely on the assumption that the legislature will approve some kind of measure that suffices to grant budget authorization, as clearly happens in the Costa Rican example, the resulting reversionary state – should that event happen – will be so unstable and unpredictable that it cannot be considered to any degree a presidential leeway or power.

[85] Limits that only provide for unavoidable and automatic corrections, such as reducing income projections to updated forecasts (and cutting expenditures accordingly), or eliminating expenditure commitments who have lost their legal standing.

[86] As the Dominican example will show.

[87] *I code the answers in accordance with the five categories of amendment powers analysed in the previous chapter, that is, the legislature may only accept or reject the budget as tabled [O]*

shape of the approved budget. We operationalize it through a fuzzy variable amounting to 1 (if the legislature has only the option of accepting or rejecting presidential budget as tabled); 0,66 (if legislative amendments are limited to reducing proposed expenditures); 0,33 (if funds can be shifted, but subjected in practice to strong macrofiscal constraints such as not raising deficits or total expenditures, or this reallocation is forbidden to certain programmes or kinds of expenditure, or limited to a certain share of the budget); or 0 if there are unfettered amendment powers[88]. Empirical data for that condition are available from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD (2005), PNUD (2004) and Filc & Scartascini (2007), as well as a specific table in Wehner (2010, pp. 89-92) based on his own independent data collection.

The last kind of budget powers to be inducted into our analysis is what Wehner (2010) calls the "executive flexibility during implementation", that is, the possibilities open for the president to unilaterally change budget allocations after these have been approved by the legislature. If such prerogatives are ample, they can can realign the budget´s priorities and aggregate amounts away from those approved by the legislature, strongly jeopardizing congressional grip on the ultimate destination of public resources. Here, we emphasize the unilateral nature of such powers: allocation changes are foreseeable (even unavoidable) in any modern economy, but if they have to be approved by the legislature the balance of power between the branches does not alter fundamentally[89]. That change is distributed along three basic categories of procedural powers in the president´s hands (Wehner, 2010, pp. 31-37):

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it may cut existing items only or has otherwise significantly contained amendment authority [2.5] it may shift funds as long as this does not increase aggregate spending [5] or the deficit [7.5] or it has unfettered powers [10]. (Wehner, 2010,p. 47)

[88] Our coding differs here slightly from Wehner´s since his original rank ordering is defined by the expected effect of amendment powers on aggregate fiscal outcomes. For that matter, it might be posited a difference between deficit-based restrictions (that can be more easily circumvented by the loophole of associating expenditure-raising amendments and legislation creating new revenues that can be more or less "realistic" in terms of their economic feasibility – Alesina & Hausmann & Hommes & Stein, 1999, p. 34; Curristine & Bas, 2007, p. 10; Filc & Scartascini, 2007, p. 176-177) and more stringent expenditure ceilings that force amendments to reshuffle a given amount of total spending (Hausmann & Stein, 1996, p. 261). Our assessment focuses solely on the relative powers to change the budget, and, under this perspective, there´s little difference in deficit- or expenditure-based constraints – taking also into consideration that expenditure ceilings can also be loopholed by means of under-estimated the mandatory share of authorizations, who will have to be paid for anyway during budget execution, in exchange for raising pork-based discretionary ones (Bittencourt, 2019, pp. 145-149 and 196-197).

[89] Although other aspects, such as the final spending biases, can be influenced by the shape of the decision process for budgetary changes in parliament (as proposed by Alesina & Hausmann & Hommes & Stein, 1999). Those deliberation procedures can even alter slightly the relative position of president and legislature (such as requirements for legislative *ex post* approval to unilateral allocations by the Executive), but we don´t find theoretical reasons to state they´ll

- virement powers allow the executive to reallocate resources between the previously defined expenditure items unilaterally; this authority can be explicit in legislation or embedded implicitly in the structure of the budget documents (by means of broadly defined line-item structures which allow strong executive discretion on how to distribute allotments); it can be also allowed for the entire amount of allotments defined in the budget, or under limits for reallocating each allotment individually (either through as intermediate percents of the allotment or through non-negligible nominal ceilings for reshuffling[90]);
- budget "decree" powers that allow presidents to disburse funds beyond authorized spending levels to line items, or on newly created line items; those powers tend to be limited (in OECD countries at least) both in the circumstances they can be used (limited to emergency situations) and in the amount they can add up to (usually a percentage of authorized spending)
- impoundment powers allowing the president to permanently withhold funds from authorized expenditures, refusing in practice to make them (or to carry over their execution to the next fiscal year, delaying them)[91]. This kind of powers has very strong impacts on the aggregate spending policy (Alesina & Hausmann & Hommes & Stein, 1999, p. 259), and fundamentally on the composition of expenditures (since presidents can refuse to materialize pork or

change the overall decisiveness position of the president. In the example of legislative *ex post* validation, Brazilian experience (a constitutional provision named "*créditos extraordinários*") suggests that, if authorization is to be granted *a posteriori*, a significant share of such expenses can be materially incurred in the time between its enactment by the president and the corresponding congressional deliberation.

[90] Reallocations explicitly allowed by congressional authorizations in the approved budget are not considered as a unilateral virement power. So, if that´s the only virement possibility (except for budget decree powers), such as in the Brazilian case, they won´t be considered under that criterion. Another feature, the combination of budget decree and impoundment, does allow for actual virement powers, but it won´t be computed as a specific virement power, given the fact that direct administrative prerogatives for reshuffling (besides the other two combined) must be considered as an additional presidential tool, and having them adds to the resources already available under impoundment and decree allowances.

[91] Theoretically, that might be considered equivalent to a virement power limited to cancelling or suppressing authorizations. So, if any president has virement prerogatives in that way, he´ll be recorded as having no virement and actually having impoundment powers.

other kinds of expenditures decided by congress)[92]. This kind of prerogative is pervasive along the OECD countries, but has been the axis of highly contentious battles for the US Congress during and immediately after the Nixon administration, and the absence of presidential impoundment is now considered one of the strongest levers of power held by that legislature (Wehner, 2010, p. 34-35 and 73; Schick, 2007 pp.120 and 284-289; Oleszek & Oleszek & Rybicki & Heniff Jr, 2016, p. 71 and 83-84; Lee, 2008; Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 9). Recent initiatives to introduce partial impoundment restrictions in Brazil since 2015 have also been remarked as strongly affecting the balance of power between the branches (Mendes, 2022; Mendes & Dias, 2014, Souza, 2019; Chaisty & Cheeseman & Power, 2018).

As we can seee, all the three prerogatives can have very fine-grained features, with subtly different effects on executive-legislative balances of power. That, however, poses the methodological difficulty of how to build up scales commensurate to that granularity. To that effect, we must conform to the still limited theoretical precedents (who themselves influenced the survey structures used for data collection), pointing only to crisp values of existence or not of each of these powers[93]. So, each one of the three powers (virement, decree and impoundment) will be computed as 1 if they exist to any degree (over any material share of the budget), or 0 if they don´t exist at all (or are limited to small adjustments exclusively in response to war, disasters or similar emergencies)[94]. In any case, neither the occasional

[92] Involved here are the presidential discretionary powers to impound, not the mandatory nature of some expenditures (such as servicing debt and paying social security dues). Although a high share of such non-discretionary portions of the budget does affect fiscal policy in countless ways, this will be a constraint imposed on both president and congress in broadly the same fashion, thus not altering the relative bargaining power inherent in the decisiveness condition assessed here.

[93] *The OECD asked (a) whether there is scope for appropriations to be reallocated from one programme to another without parliamentary approval (b) whether the executive may withhold funds that are appropriated, but not available on a legal or entitlement basis, without legislative consent and (c) whether the annual budget includes any central reserve funds to meet unforeseen expenditures. To construct the composite variable, I assign each answer to the above questions a score of 3.3 if it is negative, as a positive answer implies executive flexibility to vire, impound and authorize fresh funds respectively. The sum of the scores for each case can range between zero and ten and constitutes my indicator of executive flexibility during budget execution.* (Wehner, 2010, p. 48-49).

[94] Ceilings on the share of the budget that can be introduced unilaterally via decree are not considered as jeopardizing decree powers. Restrictions on the object of increases by decree are considered as absence of impounding powers only if they encompass anything other than war

requirement of supermajorities for budgetary decisions[95] nor the occasional multi-year nature of some budgetary laws for the whole or part of its expenditure[96] will affect the coding criteria or results.

A few particular cases must be discussed at length. For the sigular pattern of Mexican Congress, a broadly symmetrical bicameralism where the Chamber of Deputies is the only chamber approving expenditures (OECD, 2005, Table "Part 4 Role of the legislature", Question 43; Weldon, 2002, pp. 387 et. seqs.), would that mean budget leverage can be exercised by the president over only one of the legislature´s chambers (that is, over only half of the legislative decision points) ? Formally, the answer could be "yes", if the bargaining between legislators and the executive were limited to those earmarks formally introduced by legislators. However, any part of the budget can potentially be of interest to parliamentarians in their pork-barrelling or policy agendas (regardless of the fact they have formally introduced it on the budget bill or not); so, having virement, decree and impoundment powers, if available, would still be relevant as a bargaining chip for the Mexican president *vis-à-vis* both deputies and senators, which recommends no change in our coding scale. By their turn, amendment and reversionary conditions involve a game played by the president with only one of the two chambers (that is, only one of the players can affect presidential strategies); should that be considered a strengthening of presidential stakes at the game ? In other words, would a Mexican president be stronger than, say, a Brazilian one by having to deal with only one chamber ? That raises a more general question: must there be any difference between other bicameral and unicameral parliaments regarding the impact of presidential budget powers ? Indeed, having to deal with two collectives instead of one suggests that more political capital will have to be spent by the executive; this means that the constituency to negotiate with is more numerous, that is, more individual or group stakeholders come to the table. However, this same feature occurs as the raw number of parliamentarians or groups increase in any one chamber - albeit probably in a lesser degree, since the budget process may be structured to enhance the veto possibilities when legislator

or catastrophic emergencies. Besides, the rather common situation of authorizing virement and expenditure creation during the legislature´s recesses, pending its *ex post* approval (as existing in Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Dominican Republic – Sáez & Montero & López, 2005, pp. 236-237) won´t be coded as the president possessing those powers.

[95] As in the case of Dominican Republic, where some congressional budget votes require a two-thirds majority (Sáez & Montero & López, 2005, p. 234).

[96] Namely, the Uruguayan five-year budget document (Vammalle & Rivadeneira, 2019)

bargaining occurs at two possible veto points instead of one[97]. That is, the downgrading of presidential power involved in budget bargaining becomes not a matter of nature, but of degree (affected both by the sheer size of the chambers and by the budget process´ steps). In that sense, we lack any theoretical benchmarks to associate specific budget decision rules (including unicameral or bicameral decision, which becomes simply one rule more, although much relevant) to more or less presidential influence: literally none of the surveyed studies and repositories even mentions such granular differences, let alone work on it to build a grading scale. So, our coding cannot include such a fine-grained distinction, and the Mexican singularity of unicameral budget authority in an otherwise bicameral simmetry won´t pursue any difference from the other countries´ scale.

Another special appraisal is required by the Brazilian case, where impoundment rules were, in practice, being applied for the whole democratic period considered, but from 2015 onwards a growing portion of earmarks introduced to the budget by legislators began to have mandatory characteristics, severely limiting the executive´s ability to impound them. Interbranch bargaining over those earmarks´ actual disbursement are considered by the literature as absolutely crucial in legislators´ electoral connection, and their absolute and relative amount suffered a steep and continuous increase since then. Those movements deeply bent the balance of power towards legislators´ influence (Faria, 2023; Mendes, 2022; Silva & Avelino & Rodrigues, 2022; Couto & Rodrigues & Rezende Jr., 2022) and accrue a clear distinction regarding the characterization of impoundment powers as a crisp "yes" or "no" avaliability. Since the impact is appraised as very relevant by the abovementioned pioneering studies on the issue, we must downgrade impoundment powers from 2015 onwards to a fuzzy 0,33, reflecting such a strong loss of leverage by presidents.

Finally, the Uruguayan singularity of a five-year budget with annual revisions (Vamalle & Rivadeneira, 2019, pp. 26-27) - instead of an otherwise universal one-year time frame for the budget - will not generate any specific change in the coding parameters, since no evidence was found in the literature in that the political dynamics involved in the budgeting bargains might be affected by this different temporal

[97] Transactional designs differ widely among constitutional realities: some bicameral countries have one single decisional pipeline with simultaneous parallel voting by both chambers (as in Brazil and Colombia); others require sequential discussion and votes by one chamber after another (as in Argentina), including the possibility of *navette*-like reciprocal consideration of amendments between chambers (as in Chile).

horizon. Sure, the fact that the original budget bill is sent in the first six months of the presidential term gives the chief executive more leverage over the chambers to get his preferences through, since he is still in his honeymoon period (Moraes & Chasquetti & Bergara, 2009, p. 234), and he holds the exclusive initiative to the yearly revision bills; however, we find no support whatsoever to consider such advantage influential enough to change the basic conceptual structure of the coding decisions. Indeed, while there is no record of special difficulties for approving presidential bills in the Uruguayan Congress, these streamlined results has been attributed to strong coalition-making achievements instead of any particular institutional feature – besides the fact that all governments since 2005 have opted by fully revisiting the budget decisions during their annual revision bills (Moraes & Chasquetti & Bergara, 2009, pp. 234-235[98]; Zucco, 2013, p. 101; Umansky, 2006, pp. 26-27).

Data can be sourced basically from the OECD Latin American survey (OECD, 2005)[99] and, for the earlier 1980-1992 period, Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1999, p. 260)[100], complemented for cross-checking by PNUD (2004, p. 76),

[98] *Overall, budgets are passed without major contingencies in Parliament within the first year of each government term. For example, achieving legislative majorities to pass budget bills has not been necessarily difficult during the last four governments (under Presidents Lacalle [1990], Sanguinetti [1995], Batlle [2000], and Tabaré Vázquez [2005]). The fact that all presidents have been able to build governmental coalitions since the democratic restoration in 1985 has guaranteed enough political support in Parliament to endorse the presidential or coalitional agenda. Indeed, this political support can be observed in the way budget laws have been passed in plenary sessions during the last 20 years, where the party discipline has been perfect for those within the coalition and the presidential party (Moraes and Morgenstern, 1998; Koolhas, 2002). Since the Lacalle administration (1990–1994), presidents have been able to "impose" that beyond the five-year term budget law, most yearly revision will not modify the spending allocations and the provisions set in the original budget law. This strategy has been followed in order to avoid negotiations every year, with the potential cost of political defeats for presidents after the second or third year of their terms. With only a few exceptions, presidents endorsed yearly revisions with a "single article, no new expenditures" between 1993 and 2002. [..] In 2005, when the Frente Amplio took office, the new administration decided to abandon the rigidities of designing a single budget for the entire period in government, without annual revisions. In this case, the government designed a middle-term fiscal program that was submitted by the minister of finance to the cabinet, which endorsed its contents in a plenary session. This fiscal program set the space or limits within which the left-wing party in office had to elaborate the new budget bill for the entire term in government. Yet the most important change in terms of strategy deals with the fact that the Frente Amplio rejected the "single article, no new expenditures" informally followed by traditional parties. In the current administration, every yearly revision is based on macroeconomic assumptions that build the fiscal programming on which the budget is designed.* (Moraes & Chasquetti & Bergara, 2009, p. 234).

[99] Raw data from the OECD survey tables were contrasted with the interpretation given to them by a dedicated analytical assessment in Curristine and Bas (2007)

[100] Although there´s a version in an academic journal (Alesina & Hausmann & Hommes & Stein, 1999a), the original study published as a working paper contains "[a] much more detailed discussion of our procedures, the questionnaire itself and various country specific issues" (p. 257).

Kim (2015a[101]), Santiso (2005; 2006), Sáez, Montero and López (2005) and Filc and Scartascini (2007); partial data on impoundment powers are also recorded in Fish and Kroenig (2009); data on amendment powers were found partially in Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 155[102]), and Wehner (2010, p. 89-92). Those numerical repositories can also be checked by qualitative descriptions on budget powers and processes according to the following Table 51:

Table 30 - Sources - qualitative description of budget processes

SOURCE	COUNTRY
Blazey et. al. (2020); Rodríguez & Bonvecchi (2004); Abuelafia & Berensztein & Braun & Gresia (2009)	Argentina
Padilla (2019); World Bank (1989, 1999a, 2004, 2011)	Bolivia
Blöndal & Goretti & Kristensen (2003); Stein & Tommasi & Echebarría & Lora & Payne (2007)	Brazil
Montecinos (2003); Hawkesworth & Melchor & Robinson (2012)	Chile
Rentería & Echeverry (2006); Hommes (1996)	Colombia
OECD (2015); Mora & Álvarez (2007); Stein & Tommasi & Echebarría & Lora & Payne (2007)	Costa Rica
OECD (2015); Artana et al (2006); DIGEPRES (2024)	Dominican Republic
Paredes (2019)	El Salvador
World Bank (2007, 2022)	Honduras
CEFP (2009); Cervantes (2013); Diaz & Magaloni (2018); Weldon (2002); OECD (2009)	Mexico
Barahona (2019); World Bank (2013)	Panama
World Bank (1996, 2005, 2006); Molinas & Pérez-Liñán & Hallerberg & Morgan (2009)	Paraguay
Guardia (2002); Margarita & Mancilla & Meza (2019); Santiso & Belgrano (2004), World Bank (1994); Carranza & Chávez & Valderrama (2009)	Peru
Vammalle & Rivadeneira (2019). Moraes & Chasquetti & Bergara (2009)	Uruguay
Millano (2021); Suárez (2019); Bentata (s.d.); Puente & Daza & Rios & Rodríguez (2009), World Bank (1999). Brewer-Carías (1982)	Venezuela

Source: The author

[101] Kim (2019) offers an updated assessment of a wider range of countries, but this paper´s data are presented as weighed indexes who add up several of the features assessed here, making it impossible to extract their direct qualitative assessment under our on coding rules.

[102] Their coding is slightly different (p. 150): Raw values "4 President prepares budget; no amendment pemitted (equivalent to our fuzzy 1); "3 Assembly reduce but not increase amount of budgetary ltems" (our fuzzy 0,66); raw "2 President sets upper limit on total spending, within which assembly may amend" and "1 Assembly may increase expenditures only if it deslgnates new revenues" (our fuzzy 0,33) and "0 Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare or amend budget" (fuzzy 0). Values are supplied for the year 1992, based on the standing constitution for each country that year (for Colombia, values are assigned also for the "pre-1991" period under previous constitution) – if our democratic period begins at a later date, data will be recorded in the first year of that period.

Constitutional texts, and even empirical surveys on budget regulations and practices, are not exempt from changes over time, discrepancies between formal and informal rules and sheer mistakes (Wehner, 2010, p. 89)[103]. Our coding procedure, inspired in Wehner´s own stated procedure, began by aligning the several repositories´ information in a worksheet format and reconciling them as much as possible. Then, the resulting table was checked against direct sources describing budget processes and primary legislation data (when available), whose information prevailed in case of discrepancies. When discrepancies were clearly recorded between the formal legal texts and the reported practice according to the chosen sources, actual practices were considered, since the research goals concern the actual effects of budget power balances on actual economic results[104]. In the few cases where there weren´t empirical data covering earlier periods, or when earlier data shown by repositories contradict well-grounded codings emerging from primary data findings based on legislation enacted in later years[105], and absent any empirical mention to specific changes in the budget rules and regulations that might justify such discrepancies, we chose to roll back the values from later, more widely documented years, based on the general theoretical remark that "the formal budgetary powers of national legislatures are remarkably stable and indicate a strong *status quo* bias" (Wehner, 2010, p. 89). All primary sources and the corresponding coding decisions

[103] *Since not all legislative amendment powers are codified in constitutions (Lienert and Jung 2004), I also consulted parliamentary standing orders, as well as surveys of legislative procedures or budget institutions conducted during or dose to the relevant time period [..]. In quite a few cases, I discovered discrepancies between different data sources. Some of these are due to mistakes. Another reason is that surveys of fiscal institutions based on questionnaires administered to budget officials do not always dearly distinguish between formal rules and actual practice, which may lead to different interpretations and inconsistent responses. Here the focus is on formally codified procedures, which resolves such scoring issues. Where different sources indicated different results, I consulted country experts where possible. Another difficulty arises when countries change their budget institutions during the period under consideration. However, the formal budgetary powers of national legislatures are remarkably stable and indicate a strong* status quo *bias ([..]). The exceptions in this dataset are Argentina, Peru, Poland and New Zealand. Between 1990 and 1998, the first three countries. moved from unrestricted to restricted amendment powers, while New Zealand only modified the form of its restrictions.* (Wehner, 2010, p. 89)

[104] This coding standard differs from the strategy presented by Wehner (see last footnote), for the stated reason related to the research goals, but is found in other assessments where such discrepancies were found (Paraguay being a case in point, as can be seen in World Bank, 2006 and Molinas & Pérez-Liñán & Hallerberg & Morgan, 2009)

[105] This situation emerges fundamentally from the fact that the late 90´s and early 2000´s witnessed a widespread movement of administrative modernization (promoted basically by international financial institutions), one of whose fundamental pillars was the adoption of updated rules and procedures for budget and financial management, replacing outdated legislation and practices.

are described and justified, with quotes from the original sources, in the coresponding supplementary material online.

To close this section, we must briefly justify why some indicators present in the literature were not chosen to reflect budgetary contribution to presidential decisiveness conditions. Strøm (1990) assesses governments´ legislative performance through the degree of changes in budget during its parliamentary deliberation. Although there might be data for Latin America regarding the number of amendments made to the budget and the total proportion of spending involved (OECD, 2005), those statistics may be misleading, since they can´t measure the salience of the changes effected [106] ; moreover, they reflect the end results of both presidential/congressional powers and contingent factors as the president´s majority status or political leverage due to factors such as high popularity. We choose, then, to focus on the "tools" rather than their measured effect.

Even so, some tools are not to be selected. Two of them are discarded by Wehner (2010) himself. First, presidential veto powers on the budget (and their incidence on individual line items or only on the budget as a whole) are depicted as specific to presidential systems (while his focus is on cross-system issues in the whole OECD countries), as well as being controversial in the literature regarding their relevance. For our purposes, however, the main argument against it is that vetoes as a whole are already considered in the computation of legislative powers, which might engender some kind of double-counting in assessing the necessity and sufficiency of conditions. As for the presidential exclusive initiative for tabling the budget, it´s discarded on the grounds of little empirical importance, given the practical unfeasibility of congressional drafting on the budget bill (so, any variance in formal prerogatives would bias the analysis, since there would be no actual variance in any case[107]).

The other relevant indicators kept out of our selection are several organisational legislative features of internal budget processes, associated with the reduction of transaction costs in legislative deliberation over the budget (Wehner, 2010). They involve the time allowed to the legislators to deliberate on the received

[106] For instance, a change in inflation forecasts between tabling and enactment dates may have massive effects on the overall budget (in the amounts of debt servicing or social security payments, mainly) without direct relationship with pork bargaining.

[107] Indeed, the only mention we could find of a possible case of claimed congressional production of a draft bill involves the Brazilian budget for 1950 (Bittencourt, 2019, p. 301), which is scarcely relevant for the analysis of contemporary cases.

budget draft, the involvement of specialized legislative committees in budget deliberations, and the quality of the budget information on the budget provided by the Executive. All those features are indeed relevant (a legislature who is unable to organize its decision procedures is also unable to make use of its formal powers), and there´s roughly some degree of empirical information on them (OECD, 2005[108]). However, we must put them aside, for two main theoretical reasons: within-house budget procedures and practices are legislatures´ exclusive choices, hardly dependent on the Executive for them to be implemented, so they can´t be assigned to an overal institutional balance of power but to strategic, contingent decisions made by each parliamentary majority at each fiscal year (moreover, they can´t be counted on by presidential strategies, since they´re mostly independent from his intervention)[109]. As a consequence to this first reason, such variables are potentially very volatile along time, changeable in very short time spans. That implies the unsuitability of using our main sources of information available (non-recurrent budget surveys), which can cope with stabler institutional variables, for very time-specific organizational data. So, our approach to institutional budgetary powers by the president will not take into account variables relating the internal legislative structures for coping with the budget process.

A.2.4 Decisiveness: presidential powers over informal exchange

Informal institutions are, by definition, very hard to measure. Outright bribery, vote-buying or other illicit activities are even harder. Saiegh (2014, pp. 495-496) has to go back to 18th century Georgian England to provide an actual example of parliamentary vote-buying; Pereira, Power and Raile (2008) describe the existence of the "*mensalão*" bribery scheme in Brazil using the explicit metaphor of "black holes" whose presence can be detected only by the observation of indirect effects on other variables. In their comprehensive volume on informal institutions in Latin America, Helmke and Levitsky (2006, pp. 25-27) present three main strategies for establishing their existence: 1) the "black hole" one, that is "to generate hypotheses about behavioral patterns that are consistent *only* with the existence of a particular informal

[108] The quality of budget documentation is proxied by the available staff dedicated in the legislature to budget research tasks.

[109] Morgenstern & Polga-Hecimovich & Shair-Rosenfield (2013, p. 43) suggest another layer of uncertainty in considering those aspects: "This limit itself could be the topic of investigation. Why do legislatures not vote more resources for themselves ?"

institution, and then test empirically for the existence of those patterns"; 2) focusing directly on actors' expectations and mutual understanding about the informal rules of the game, with ethnography as the most relevant resource, but making use of survey research sometimes; and 3) trying to figure out mechanisms for their enforcement (sanctions triggered by violations of the informal expected behavior), which will tend to be subtle, hidden, and even illegal (ranging from social or cultural disapproval, dismissals, threats of "going public" with illicit deals, up to the naked usage of extrajudicial violence).

Here, the only option available to us is the usage of survey results, since whatever other strategy would require concentrating empirical efforts on this one subcomponent only[110]. Indeed, a pair of questions in the V-Dem questionnaire (Coppedge et. al., 2022a, pp. 151 and 296) probe on the overall engagement of politicians (and specifically legislators) regarding corrupt practices in office, which may offer a first approximation to the demand for such exchanges by MP´s and to the pervasiveness of illicit transactions in the administration (which fixes at least a ceiling for the potential supply of informal exchanges). First, Question 3.5.1.6 asks "Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?[111]", and its responses are already organized into an ordinal scale easily converted in a fuzzy variable, associating fuzzy values 1; 0,66; 0,33; 0,25; and 0, to the following responses: "0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities"; "1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities"; "2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities"; "3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not."; and "4: Never, or hardly ever."[112].

[110] That would be the end result of promoting ethnographic research to cover every Latin American country, or finding out which possible informal exchange of favors might be relevant to each country and designing empirical tests for it.

[111] *Clarification: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.* (Coppedge et al, 2022a, p. 151)

[112] Since assignments were made directly by converting raw ordinal values into fixed fuzzy values, as per theoretical guidance, no calibration figures are necessary for appraising the calibration results.

Question 5.4.4 gauges "To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?[113]", offering a continuous interval[114] from "low" to "high" (0-1). The fuzzy benchmarks here will have to be extracted in calibration from the overall distribution of those values in all the V-Dem sample (that is, assigning fuzzy 0 to the zero as the lowest possible value, the crossover point as the mean value in the sample[115] and fuzzy 1 to the highest corruption score available, that is, numerical 1). Figure 16 below shows the raw values to the indicator, as well as its corresponding calibrated fuzzy values.



Figure 5 - Corruption in the political system indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine

Source: The author, with data from Coppedge et. al (2022a)

Another dimension that must be captured here is patronage power at large, or the capacity for handing out public sector jobs. This prerogative can be traded for support both with individual legislators seeking personal advantage and with parties

[113] *Clarification: In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.*. (Coppedge et al, 2022a, p. 296)

[114] Extracted from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive embezzlement, executive bribes, legislative corruption and judicial corruption (Coppedge et al, 2022a, p. 296).

[115] The extracted mean from the actual values amounts to 0.5848085, while the median was found to be 0.622 (in a scale from 0 to 1). So, there seems to be little numerical difference if the median was chosen as the crossover parameter.

seeking to control chunks of policy influence within the administration (even if cabinet posts have already been allocated). In other words, subcabinet executive nominations aimed at getting reliable and effective agents for parties (as principals on behalf of their policy goals) as well mere personal rewards to allies in the form of a public sector job and perks, are both strong resources for presidents to trade with potential supporters. They do exist in most countries, even if those have evolved from bare spoils systems to more formalistic bureaucratic or more managerialist NPM-style patterns of state management (Peters & Pierre, 2004; De Bonis, 2015); the allocation of appointed slots is flexible enough to support different presidential goals across different agencies (Bersch & Praça & Taylor, 2016). This does not mean, in and of itself, corruption, and must be assessed separately in order to capture the possibility of a country that is well-guarded against corruption may still offer presidents a widespread bargaining chip by looting the administration beyond formal sharing of top-level cabinet posts[116]. To that end, there´s also a proxy in V-DEM´s question 3.9.0.6 (Coppedge et al, 2022a, p. 192) that surveys opinions on the criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration[117] ("*To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?*"[118]), and whose responses are also

[116] That seems to be the case for the Chilean "*cuoteo*" mechanism to distribute subcabinet posts – ones that nevertheless hold some decision-making authority – to coalition members as a means to mutually balance off their powers (Siavelis, 2006; 2018), a strong informal practice within an otherwise highly institutionalized political and government system (notably similar to the Norwegian parliamentarist strategy disclosed by Strøm, 2022). The same role is assigned by Chasquetti (2018, pp. 189-192) to the across-the-aisle bargaining involving the appointment of board members to several Uruguayan autonomous administrative agencies, which must be approved by a supermajority in the Senate. Bäck and Hellström (2022, p. 138) see another policy-oriented, non-corrupt rationale for subcabinet appointments in Sweden: non-cabinet support parties nominate political appointees as advisors in policy ministries (such as finance) to ensure interparty coordination over agreed-upon economic measures and monitor the compliance with support agreements. For non-policy, more patronage-inspired reasons, Anghel (2022) describes subcabinet appointments as a major demand from non-cabinet support parties in exchange for support to dominant parties´ minority cabinets during the first stages of Romanian post-transition democracy. The usage of the appointment criteria to gauge the degree of sheer patronage and its insertion in the logic of a political systems is to be found, for instance, in Lafer´s assessment of the rise of Brazilian developmentalism under the Kubitschek administration in the 1950´s (Lafer, 2002, pp. 71, 77-80 and 107-108).

[117] There´s also the same survey regarding appointments in the armed forces (question 3.9.0.7 - Coppedge et al, 2022a, p. p. 193). We don´t use that information, because none of the theoretical sources referred above points to the military payroll as a relevant arena for such bargains between presidents and legislators.

[118] *Clarification: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.*

ordinally presented ready to convert to a fuzzy variable, associating fuzzy values 1; 0,66; 0,33; 0,25; and 0, to the following responses: 0: "All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit."; 1: "Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit."; 2: "Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit."; 3: "Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit"; and 4: "None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit." [119]. Since assignments were made directly by converting raw ordinal values into fixed fuzzy values, as per theoretical guidance, no calibration figures are necessary for appraising the calibration results.

Since informal powers´ measurement is so notoriously subject to uncertainty, it´s prudent to demand at least the coincidence of supply and potential demand to admit its existence in an empirical instance, at least in the illicit or corrupt features: the resulting logical condition for the two first variables must then be the intersection (logical "AND") from those two indicators (that is, we recognize informal powers when expert surveys see clearly both widespread corrupt transactions in public business and pervasive MP´s practice of tolerance and/or incentives for it). After that, the end result will be the union (logical "OR") between the joint condition on corruption and the specific condition on patronage (owing to the fact that both are alternative sources of presidential leverage that may occur independently).

A.2.5 Decisiveness: reconcilability of party goals

Here, the first operationalization element is the joint existence of electoral competitiveness and oppositional policy influence. The canonical implementation by Strøm (1990) is, for electoral competition (the author calls it "decisiveness of elections"), strongly empirical: a composite of several direct observations regarding

[119] There´s a data gap in both Versions 12 and 13 of V-Dem repository regarding this variable for Peru between 1978 and 2004. Since the values for the subsequent period are uniformly constant, and to prevent the loss of so many country-years caused by only one variable, we chose to impute directly the value uniformly scored for the years 2005-2019 in Peru to the missing years .

each country´s elections during the assessed period[120]. On oppositional influence, it´s also empirical, although indirect: by correlating oppositional capacity with strong parliaments, and proxying parliamentary strength through the organizational development of a full-fledged committee system, such influence is measured by a five-point index based on stable institutional properties of parliamentary committees in the country at hand[121]. Strøm´s choices are, evidently, sensible in a theoretical sense, and coherent to his empirical universe.

However, we can´t go along that path, for reasons of both kinds. In competitiveness, we don´t have repositories or other data sources to one of its subcomponents (the "identifiability of government alternatives"), and the other two have little meaning in presidential systems (the time between elections and government formation, and the cabinet share of electorally successful parties). So, we must proxy such condition with the crudest measurement of electoral competition, the volatility among elections. That should not be a measure of simple alternation in executive power, but a dynamic measure of how much competition there is, not only between two opposing poles, but among parties as a whole, since all of them are potentially affected by this systemic feature[122].

That´s the index of electoral volatility originally brought by Pedersen (1983), quoted, among other Latin American Studies, in Mainwaring and Scully (1995, p. 6) and Mainwaring and Su (2021, p. 278)[123], that is, the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all parties from one election to the next, which measures how parties´ electoral fates alternate from one election to another (thus, how ferocious are the effects of party competition). In our study, since the posited effect of volatility is on

[120] Namely, an impressionistic categorical assessment to the "identifiability of viable government alternatives"; the percent of governments who were formed immediately following a general election; a measure of electoral volatility proper (in legislative seats) between successive elections; and the share of cabinet portfolios occupied by parties that have gained rather than lost seats in the previous elections.

[121] The number of standing committees (considered a precondition to specialization); their having fixed jurisdictions corresponding to ministerial departments (taken as a requisite for more effective oversight); the existence of restrictions to the number of committee assignments to individual MPs (which might restrict government manipulation of committee assignments and raise MPs´ specialization); and the proportional distribution of committee chairmanships among parliamentary parties.

[122] Nor it involves more general assessments of "political competition" as opposed to authoritarian restrictions on political activities, a variable that is offered in the V-Dem repository (Coppedge et. al, 2022a, p. 325), in the Polity V (Pinto & Timmons, 2005, p. 38) or in the Quality of Government one (Teorell et. al. 2018, p. 168), since the case selection criterion (fully democratic instances) uniformizes such condition.

[123] Other possible sources for partial results (in terms of less countries and intermediate periods) might be Sáez (2012, Appendix II); Sáez & Tagina (2013, Anexo II, p. 54); Chuaire, Scartascini et. al. (2014, pp. 14-15); Mainwaring & Zoco (2007) and Mainwaring & Torcal (2006).

parliamentary parties´ interest in political negotiations with the president, the relevant changes are to be found in vote shares for legislative elections (since they reflect "pure" electoral competition between parties, before the filters of electoral system rules).

Data for Latin America are available in some sources that were first considered for sourcing: PNUD (2004, p. 67-68), has volatilities for every country-year from 1990-2002 [124]; Altman and Pérez-Liñan´s (2010) "C" score, or the "weighted difference between the share of the seats of the government and the opposition parties in the lower chamber"[125], might indirectly gauge competition by assessing how closely the government/opposition divide is, and also how fragmented each field has become (given that those electoral outcomes will have emerged from a given interparty competitiveness in the previous elections), for each general (national) election in Latin America from the late 70´s to around 2000. However, a much more comprehensive and finely grained dataset, complete with minutely detailed rules of coding and comments on every particular country feature, is available as supplementary material to Mainwaring and Su (2021)[126]. So, we´ll take the raw data for electoral volatility in lower chamber elections[127] from that repository, using for each country-year the value corresponding the previous election (or to the election that was held in that same year[128]). Those numbers will be relevant only for the cases in the truth table, but for calibration purposes our selection will retrieve raw data volatilities for all democratic country-years, to fully benefit from all available information (after which data will be filtered to our truth table country-years, both

[124] The precise starting year varies according to the country. Payne & Zovatto & Florez & Zavala (2007, Table 6.1, p. 153) use the same data from PNUD (2004) but extend the period from 2002 to 2004, while offering values to the whole period between redemocratization in the 80´s or 90´s up to 2004 for the single or lower houses of parliament.

[125] *The value of C tends to zero whenever the government (or the opposition) controls the whole legislature, and to one if there is balance between government and opposition.* (Altman & Pérez-Liñan, 2010, p. 89)

[126] The precise reference for the supplementary data is Mainwaing and Su (2021a).

[127] It might be useful to have volatility data for all chambers in bicameral parliaments, but using only lower chamber is not meaningless at all, since voters and parties tend to be the same (that is, even if results differ due to separate electoral rules, there are no reasons for assuming that the underlying phenomenon of inter-party competition is different in two simultaneous election).

[128] For the Argentine case, the authors offer two values from 2001 on, one based on district-level competition and another using the seats won by political parties (that is, the end result of post-electoral legislative grouping in the chamber of countless provincial-level *ad hoc* electoral labels, given that "the party system underwent a process of tremendous denationalization" since then – Mainwaring & Su, 2021b, p. 23). Since our intent is to appraise electoral competititveness as perceived by legislative parties (resulting in the incentives for supporting the president at a national level), we pick the latter series for getting the whole amount of raw data (as inputs for calibration).

raw values and their fuzzy conversion). In the case of "foundational" periods, that is, those located from the beginning of the democratic periods to the second election (so as to have two elections to compare), we have no choice but to assign retroactively the value of the second election´s volatility[129].

As for calibration, that´s clearly a continuous variable who allows for a fuzzy condition. The theoretical anchoring points for volatility are clearly, in the extremes, 0 and 100% for non- and full membership respectively (since there may be absolutely no volatility, or a full renewal of parliament in which incumbent parties hold zero shares and new parties grab all the seats[130]). The crossover parameter is a little more tricky: how to set the limit between "volatile" or competitive polities and those who aren´t ? Conceptually, a given system considered as a benchmark may serve as a parameter for comparison: those values above some threshold (e.g. the mean[131]) in such system may be considered "partially in" the volatile polities set. As to which might be the paradigm, two possible options emerge: one is the average level of aggregate volatility found empirically for Western European countries (148 elections) in the period from 1945 to 1985 (7,93%)[132], seen in the literature as a paragon of theoretically expected political stability[133]. The other is strictly Latin American: Mainwaring & Scully (1995, p. 17) see the emergence of an "institutionalized" party system"[134] in the region: their main findings are that such institutionalization faced a clear watershed in the 1980´s, opening the way for more structured politics in the fashion expected by democratic theory from the 1990´s on (albeit, admittedly,

[129] That´s the closest measurement, in time and circumstance, that can be made regarding the political competition during those years (it´s unconceivable, on the other hand, to compare the first election to the last election before authoritarian intervals or any other historical reference).
[130] Those extremes are theoretically possible, but not necessarily found empirically (indeed, there are no 0% or 100% volatilities in our sample).
[131] The Latin American mean is chosen for inter-country comparisons within the region by Payne & Zovatto & Florez & Zavala (2007, pp. 153-155) by Mainwaring and Scully (1995, p. 7), and also by Mainwaring and Su (2021, p. 275).
[132] Volatility measured directly from all elections considered was 7,98% for 1945-1965 and 7,99 for 1966-1985; the mean of countries´ mean volatility was 7,95% for 1945-1965 and 7,81 for 1966-1985 (Bartolini & Mair, 1990, p. 100 and 113). We took the mean for those four variables.
[133] Those same data (quoted from Bartolini and Mair, 1990) are also used by Mainwaring and Scully (1995, p. 7) to qualitatively gauge their own volatility findings. This value is commensurate to other benchmarks quoted from the same authors (pp. 7 and 480): volatility in votes for 303 electoral periods in 13 western European countries from 1885 to 1985 (303 cases) was 8.6 %; between 1970 and 1977, the mean volatility in votes for 13 European democracies was 9.2 % (Pedersen, 1983, p. 39).
[134] "*The major parties are institutionalized, and their share of votes is usually reasonably stable from one election to the next. In terms of electoral volatility, the institutionalized party systems occupy the low six positions on the scale. Parties have at least moderately strong roots in society and modestly strong identities. They are key actors in structuring the electoral process and in determining who governs, and party organizations are not simply expressions of the political desires of charismatic leaders.*" (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995, p. 17)

plagued with shortcomings and heterogeneity). In a way, they posit that the 1990´s saw the closure to one long historical chapter of democratization (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995a). Our choice will be to consider as non-membership threshold in the "competitiveness" set the mean volatility in those "institutionalized" system (i.e., country-years from 1990 on)[135], assuming first that this is the minimal competition expected in more structured circumstances in the region´s reality; using Western Europe as a benchmark for comparing Latin American countries would set an unjustifiable high bar for pondering how those countries relate to each other in term of party competition. This inadequacy is reflected in the following Figures 17 and 18, where we plot each volatility raw value (in a [0,1] scale) against its corresponding fuzzy value, using both the Latin American "institutionalized" and the European parameters as crossover value. In the former (figure on the left), the transition between fuzzy values is roughly similar to the numerical ones, while the latter shows a strong discontinuity immediately below the European threshold of 8 / 9%. There would be no theoretical reason to assume such abrupt collapse as opposed to the gentler slope of actual variances being reflected in a similarly incremental fuzzy scale.



Figure 6 - Volatility indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores, using Latin American post-1990 average as crossover – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine



Figure 7 - Volatility indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores, using Western European historical average as crossover – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine

Source: The author, with data from Bartonlini and Mair (1990) and Mainwaring and Su (2021).

[135] The overall Latin American mean volatility for those authors in legislative elections considered is 24,6%, but that includes all elections at least from the 1940´s – and we must use the actual means calculated from our post-third-wave sample. All quoted studies use Pedersen´s formula, which allows for direct comparison among their raw data and those from Mainwaring and Su we´re taking as data source. As for the usage of mean instead of median, in the considered time frame our actual volatility data yield a 24.46 % mean and a 22.26 % median, resulting in a very small numerical difference (and very similarly shaped scatterplots for both).

Turning our attention now to the difficult issue of operationalizing the "oppositional influence on policy" variable[136], we must also depart from Strøm´s implementation, which is based on measures regarding legislative committees (seen as proxies for strongly deliberative legislatures). The literature on congressional powers in multiparty presidentialism is clear on the variety of legislatures in terms of their roles and relative powers *vis-à-vis* the government (Cox & Morgenstern, 2001; Morgenstern & Nacif, 2002; Montero, 2009) and their multifactor causalities, far beyond one single determinant such as committee structures[137]. Indeed, another measurement, still based on legislative organization and procedures, is Wegmann´s (2022) "policymaking power of opposition players", where several other procedural features are factored, in regarding initiation, debate and veto powers held by the individual MPs and parliamentary groups *vis-à-vis* the executive[138]. Another attempt at using such formal power attributes as proxies to oppositional policy influence – this time in presidential systems – is Araújo, Freitas & Vieira (2018), who take Strøm´s scales together with Montero´s (2009) Index of Institutional Legislative Powers, already mentioned in section A.4.2.2[139].

As theoretically rich as they are, those resources can´t be used for our purposes: first, because some of their components mirror-image our presidential powers indicators (like presidential decree and veto powers, or who holds the agenda-setting privileges in the chambers), risking some kind of double counting given that the data provided are only about the aggregate numbers[140] - besides reflecting the legislature´s aggregate influence power, which is contingent upon the numerical seat balances *vis-*

[136] "*Only rarely does the literature address the specific rights of the opposition that define their potential influence in the legislative arena*." (Wegmann, 2022, p. 2).

[137] Something that might probably affect much less Strøm´s Western European sample or parliamentary governments.

[138] Another compilation of oppositional power, still fully based on a - much smaller - set of procedural rights, is presented by Garritzmann (2017), although his data are available only for 21 advanced parliamentary democracies.

[139] Taking committee´s procedural strength as a proxy for potential oppositional influence is not devoid of criticism, though. Machado (2017) refutes such relationship, pointing out that Strom ignores that majority rules will make any committee, regardless of its procedural dominance, deliberate along the majority-minority fault lines. So, what turns committees into oppositional influence conveyor would be the sheer minoritarian condition on the part of minority governments.

[140] Thus preventing us from isolating some really interesting and innovative components such as the right of individual MPs and other citizens to initiate bills, the possibility of minority reports in committees, or the existence of referenda and who has the legitimacy to call them. Besides, even if her data were found disaggregated, they refer to a very recent period only and do not cover several Latin American countries we must survey (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Paraguay).

à-vis the Executive[141]. Second, because oppositional influence will be in each country-year an end result not only of formal, procedural rights but also of several contingent factors (such as the leverage that the opposition has to harness societal pressures on the government, or its capacity to organize in a coordinated fashion in the policymaking process in parliament). To be sure, all those factors are highly contingent and maybe volatile, apparently not in line with the institutional lens used in this study. However, the underlying political factor is also contingent and variable: presidents´ and parties´ perception of the availability and attractiveness of the bargaining space, which clearly goes beyond formal powers[142].

So, we must search for other assessments of oppositional influence, more fluid albeit less clear-cut or objective. To that end, the closest precedent we find is the assessment registered by expert surveys for European parliamentary democracies, then coded as a categorical variable from 0 to 10 (O'Malley, 2007, 2010) – it represents a qualitative appreciation (so, to a certain extent, unavoidably impressionistic) of this elusive and highly abstract condition of a political system – one that takes into consideration not only the legal levers available to the opposition, but also any other factor that may affect its capacities to use or surpass those levers. Along those lines, there are actually some surveys who deal with the issue on a very broad level: the perception of expert respondents on the openness and depth of elite consultation (which includes, obviously, opposition parties) regarding policy changes, something which more likely than not is correlated to those parties´ influence in policymaking. In V-Dem survey database (Coppedge et. al., 2022a, p. 163-164), Question 3.6.0.4 (variable *v2dlconslt*) asks respondents "When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels (based on the most typical style of policymaking) ?", ranging the answers from 0 (no consultation, the leader or a very small group makes authoritative decisions on their own) to 5 (Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.); Question

[141] As opposed to a presidential majority coalition (where IPIL´s metrics adequately reflect an expectation of more weight or less by the Executive), under a minority government, individual parties would not be able to foresee the effect of their own influence without knowing the end result of the parliamentary equation (that is, if others outside the coalition would join them into an oppositional majority or if they would pursue an uncoordinated course that does not ensure the legislature´s dominance).

[142] One might consider the rather trivial argument that "institutionally very weak legislatures would disincentive parties to seek policy influence outside the government coalition". That, however, does not explain any cross-country differences on the degree of influence involved, besides being found empirically not significant as an independent variable for parties joining or not government coalitions in Latin America (Araújo & Freitas & Vieira, 2018, p. 42).

3.6.0.3 (variable *v2dlcountr*) consults them "When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?", answers set from 0 (Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished) to 5 (Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position. Each of those indicators provide a glimpse at a political behavioral pattern by policymaking bodies who is probably correlated to the oppositional influence on policy[143].

Being ordinal variables, their average is conceptually acceptable and even more likely to be close to a more general view of oppositional influence[144]. The ordinal scale is also a natural candidate for anchoring points in calibrating the fuzzy condition, since 1 means the least characteristic of oppositional influence and 5 the maximum valuation for such situation; the distances between the points of the scale were already construed as an assessment by the experts surveyed of the qualitative degree of membership to the condition involved in the question. So, we can extract our fuzzy condition values straight from the average value: an average of 1 means a fuzzy value of 0; an average of 5 reaches a full 1 in the condition. In the difficult topic of where to set the crossover point, those scales suit our purpose remarkably well: the mid-range point (ordinal value 3) means precisely those situations where there seems to be a break between presence and absence of the desired phenomeon[145]. As input for calibration, all Latin American country-years in our potential sample (that is, from 1977 to 2018) must be included, since the expert opinions regarding the

[143] In BTI Governance project indexes (Beltersmann Stiftung, 2022, p. 44), Question 16.4 assesses "to what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?", which can go from 1 (civil society participation obstructed, their organizations suppressed and their representatives excluded from the policy process) to 10 (political leadership actively enables civil society participation, giving it an important role in deliberating and determining policies). As attractive as it may seem to add to the VDem indexes, that repository covers only the years 2003-2014, and its scale is conceptually divided by four qualitative anchors into three intervals, which would be inconsistent with the deployment of the first two indexes. For those reasons, we refrain from incorporating the BTI values into our assessment.

[144] The averaging solution has the advantage of allowing the composite indicator to be produced from at least one of its individual components, in case data is missing from any of the variables (still representing the best approximation available to us).

[145] Respectively," Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties" and "Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them."). Here, although there might be more than three parametrical thresholds for calibration (the 0-5 scale is precisely that), the variable is an ascending one, and the non-intermediate values have no reason to be restricted or minimized. In other words, there´s no reason to use a "bell-shaped" curve as calibration function (Duşa, 2019, p. 88); so, the "calibrate" object in R receives only the original three parameters.

underlying phenomena considered the whole range of possibilities, including in non-democratic polities; in other words, both variables´ existences are not restricted to institutionally democratic countries, and taking into account only those latter would probably bias calibration (in the sense that the relative difference between the smallest and the biggest raw values under democracy would probably be greater than if both were measured against a scale that weighed in non-democratic tail values). Figure 19 below shows the raw values (in clear steps, since they´re originally averages from a step-like ordinal scale, reduced to a 0-1 range for visualization purposes) and the corresponding calibrated values as a fuzzy variable.



Figure 8 - Oppositional influence indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine

Source: The author, with data from Coppedge et. al (2022a)

As already pointed out, those two dimensions (competitiveness and oppositional influence) are to be present simultaneously for the environment to be considered promising to bargains. So, our logical component to the reconcilability condition will be their multiplication or intersection ("logical AND"), making out a composite variable which we´ll call "electoral policy bargaining potential" for the sake of quick understanding.

The last condition component to operationalize is the particularistic motivation of the party system. Our main theoretical reference (Kellam, 2015a, p. 520) measures it by a residual category in the classification of parties in the left-wing dimension (considered as the primary policy dimension relevant to the policy agenda)

according to expert surveys - that is, particularistic parties those who can´t be assigned any position in such dimension (although they may take positions along other orthogonal dimensions). This method results in "particularistic" mean vote shares in Congress: some of them are probably expected (27,49% for Ecuador, 19% for Brazil, 0,00 % for Uruguay, 1,97% for Chile), but some seem highly problematic *vis-à-vis* the extant knowledge[146]. Theoretically, it´s a coherent view when seen from the point of view of presidents (facing parties interested in dimensions other than the one which is their focus), but we can´t follow this path. First, because such orientation resembles much more an informal institution (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006) than a formal variable that can be captured by party manifestos or even by surveys centered on parties: there´s absolutely no theoretical reason to discard the possibility of any party having particularistic motivations and practices among some of its members and legislators while showing a public profile pointed to pursuing a given left- or right-wing orientation. Second, because we have already made clear that parties can (and often are) divided, non-unitary, and can thus survive balancing their policy *personae* with a particularistic practice to such an extent that this practice affects its bargaining preferences at large.

In other words, although we are dealing with parties´ motives, parties themselves do not offer very precise benchmarks for measuring them[147]. We´ll have to use a more widespread (albeit looser) perspective on the general particularistic view of the political system. Again, there´s strong availability for that in expert surveys: following Chaisty and Power (2018), we find that V-Dem, in particular, offers several different perspectives on that (Coppedge et. al, 2022a, pp. 65, 94-95, 164, 295). Question 3.6.0.6 (variable *v2dlencmps*) asks about the "particularistic" or "public goods" character of social and infrastructural government spending, featuring categorical ordinal responses, all ranging from 0 (the closest to widespread particularism) to 4 (an universalist perspective by parties). The explicit nature of party linkage to constituents (the main contents of their electoral offer to voters and partisans) is the object of Question 3.2.0.7 (variable *v2psprlnks*), whose 0 to 4 scale

[146] Finding 5,7% of particularistic vote in contemporary Argentine Congress conflicts with the strong warnings by Levitsky (2003) regarding the fundamentally clientelistic dynamics of peronism; the 5,80% share of clientelism in the Brazilian legislature between 1946 and 1964 contrasts sharply with the strong emphasis on clientelistic linkages of all major parties by the literature (as surveyed in Bittencourt, 2019)

[147] Nor can we endeavor direct measurement of things like outright bribery in vote-buying, notoriously very hard to gauge empirically (Saiegh, 2014, pp. 495-496, has to fall back to Georgian England in the 18th century as a working example).

evolves from purely clientelistic (individual rewards in goods, cash and/or jobs) to local collective ("pork") goods such as wells, roads or bridges, culminating in a relationship based on a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society. All those indicators are relevant to our measurement[148], since they jointly touch parties´ demand for both "pork" provided through the public budget and for informal exchanges that may leak out of formal public finances (all of which can be of interest to presidents, as already discussed in the "toolbox" section 3.2.1).

Here, too, ordinal scaling in the survey´s responses is conducive to a straight fuzzy interpretation (with the caveat that the extreme membership in our model means the most particularistic case, and that requires the response values be taken inversely[149]). In the second question, the 0-4 range means an expert evaluation of the degree of membership to the "particularistic motivation" set, allowing us to set the 0 and 1 extreme values in those 2 points at the interval, while assigning the crossover point to the mid-range point (ordinal value 2), precisely worded to code those situations where there is seems to be a clear break between presence and absence of the desired phenomeon with little or no inclination to neither[150]. The first question, though, requires a different approach: the first three values (originally 0, 1 and 2) involve distinct particularistic inclinations who are, to our purposes of multiplying demand for bargaining outside cabinet and policy, equivalent: for presidents, legislators willing to trade floor support equally raise his exchange possibilities either when they demand individual clientelistic goods (cash, jobs) provided by informal

[148] There´s also Question 3.1.2.7 which surveys the perception of vote and/or turnout buying in the last national election (variable v2elvotbuy), also ranging from 0 to 4 in categorical ordinal values. It means the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for; does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., "pork barrel" legislation. That´s a meaningful variable to our purposes, since it reflects a pattern of relationship between parties and voters (which cannot but affect accordingly the relationship between parties and the governmental apparatus). Although theoretically relevant, its values in the original V-Dem dataframe are extremely incomplete, lacking in more than half of the selected country-years. Although it might still be possible to use the fuzzy operations disregarding such gaps, some country-years would be affected by a different basket of indicators, which might in itself be a cause for differences (regardless of the actual configuration). For those reasons, we opted that variable out of the equation. There´s also Question 5.4.2, in which a continuous Clientelism Index ("to what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?") is constructed by a Bayesian factor analysis of the three indicators mentioned here.

[149] That is, a 4 in the response means the least particularistic inclination (so, in a fuzzy condition, a 0 value), and so on.

[150] Respectively, "Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public goods program", "Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded".

disbursement practices or when they expect traditional budgetary pork in return. So, we have only three positions of interest: fully clientelistic parties (values 0, 1 and 2), mixed clientelistic and programmatic interests (value 3) and fully programmatic linkages (value 4). So, converting such values in a fuzzy scale requires assigning a fuzzy value 1 to responses coded as 0, a crossover point in value 3, and 0 to an answer in 4[151].

Figures 20 and 21 below show the respective distribution of raw (in a 0-1 scale) and fuzzy values for both indicators. The inverted bearings and stepped line are consistent with the calibration procedure, since the original raw values are coded in such steps and the conversion followed an inverse relationship between both scales, as suggested by theoretical reasons.



Figure 9– Party linkage indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine



Figure 10– Public goods orientation indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine

Source: The author, with data from Coppedge et. al (2022a)

As the questions mean different perspectives to the same phenomenon, the end variable to "particularistic orientation" should be the sum or union (logical "OR") of the three converted fuzzy variables, since all of them signals high potential for particularistic bargains.

Lastly, we must design the final composition of our "reconcilability of party goals" condition. We have already defined two components as fuzzy conditions, one the "electoral policy bargaining potential" and the other called "particularistic orientation". Each of them represents one potential dimension of bargain to be offered

[151] No figures are shown here to appraise the calibration process, since it has been performed by directly assigning fuzzy values according to the ones from an ordinal scale.

by the system to the president for him to rally legislative support. In this sense, one given country may have two positive membership cases (fuzzy value higher than 0,5), when their coexistence multiplies presidential bargaining space by allowing a combination of offers along both dimensions; it may have just one of them, cutting bargaining space by half; or it may have none (both fuzzy values equal or lower than 0,5), precluding expectations around legislators´ demand for such presidential resources. Given this distribution, we might propose the following rules for compounding the ultimate logical condition: if both intermediate conditions have values higher than 0,5, the final fuzzy value will be their sum/union (logical "OR"), with a 0,75 floor to that value (to account for the joint effect of the active possibility of two bargaining dimensions); if only one of the intermediaries exceeds 0,5, the final value will be this higher isolated value, capped at 0,75 (to reflect the existence of only one variable); finally, if no condition exceeds 0,5, the final value will be the multiplication/intersection (logical "AND") of both.

A.2.6 Decisiveness: minimum legislative threshold

Operationalizing this new condition requires choosing its nature (crisp or fuzzy) and the numerical value for the threshold. As for the first issue, we should pick the conservative approach of a crisp variable, valued 1 if the government has more than the threshold in the relevant chambers, or 0 otherwise. In a bicameral congress, such a threshold must be surpassed in both chambers for the condition to be satisfied, otherwise any negative impact on decisiveness will be inflicted on the president anyway. We don´t have theoretical support for any scalar or gradual weighing of seat shares on decisiveness conditions: all the reviewed evaluations point to a sharp distinction between the possibilities above and below such limit, amounting to a clearly Boolean argument.

Moving on to the value, two benchmarks (40% or 45%) are discussed in the literature, and we find no relevant criteria to distinguish them on their intrinsic merit. In section 3.3.1, we found five studies on presidential governments[152] signaling 45% as the relevant numerical threshold, as compared to the mention of 40% by two studying presidentialism (one of them linking that condition to a central location in

[152] Deheza (1998); Albala, Borges and Couto (2023); Mustapic and Bieda (2018); Alemán & Tsebelis (2011); Montero (2009).

the policy space for the minority government)[153], as well as two others in parliamentary settings[154]. In our sample, they´re quite evenly split: minority support between 40 and 45% in any chamber corresponds to 76 cases and between 45% and 50% to 103 (respectively, 42% and 58% of all minority cases above 40%) – the other "hyperminoritarian", below 40%, conditions amount to 99, or 41% of all minoritarian support in any chamber. So, variance in the causal condition would involve 41% against 59% of the cases (for the 40% threshold), or 66% against 34% for the 45% boundary.

In logical terms, conservatism would point to the lower bound: if the actually relevant cleavage effectively lies in 45%, the cases located between them will lead to discarding this condition in the logical minimization, preventing us from drawing an invalid conclusion[155]; if the opposite occurs (real cleavage around 40%, while condition set at 45%), the discarded cases may cause too high consistency and coverage values to the condition only because of that numerical choice, thus distorting the interpretation of such condition as more important than it actually is. Demographically, the number of cases who differentiate by the condition value is more evenly distributed also in the 40% hypothesis. For those reasons, we must choose that lower bound, departing from most studies on presidentialism who mention this figure. Anyway, the data we make publicly available regarding chambers´ and cabinets´composition allow for any replication that might be found applicable using different criteria (using the 45% threshold, or considering only one chamber in a bicameral parliament as sufficing for reaching the condition, for instance).

Therefore, one causal condition to the governance outcomes, related to decisiveness, will be a crisp variable related to "critical minority threshold", assigned 1 when the government coalition holds more than 40% of the seats in each of the relevant chambers, and 0 otherwise. That will encompass the case of bicameral parliaments where one of the chambers features a majoritarian support for the coalition, while in the other the presidential coaliton commands between 40% and 50% of the seats. Cases wil be extracted directly from our database on cabinets, since they already provide the share of support on behalf of presidential coalitions in each

[153] Respectively, Figueiredo, Canello and Vieira (2012) and Negretto (2006a).
[154] Strøm (1990) and Nikolenyi (2022). Others mentioned 33,33% (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh, 2004) or no numerical threshold.
[155] That would mean the loss of one potential explanatory condition, reducing the power of our analysis.

chamber. Data sources for the coalitions´ legislative shares are the ones already mentioned when presenting the empirical findings for cabinet and parliamentary composition (sections A.2.6 and A.2.8 in Appendix 2).

A.2.7 Accountability

As we discussed in conceptual terms in section 3.3.2, a theoretically suitable a working measure of oversight activity would be the volume of the several initiatives performed[156], since the observation of actual tasks developed is a more stringent and objective assessment for the intensity devoted to oversight by parliamentarians.

Section A.2.7 will first present how such a "best case scenario" might be developed in a methodological sense, as well as the empirical barriers which prevent us from relying on this first choice. Then, it´ll conclude by putting forward the alternate path to proxy parliaments´oversight impact by means of expert surveys of oversight effectiveness.

The ideal, objective measurement: volume of police patrol activities

Indeed, measuring activity numbers is how the literature has most frequently evaluated control intensity: how many parliamentary hearings are performed, sometimes proxied by the number of days devoted to that activity in committees and in the floor (Kriner & Schikler, 2016; Mayhew, 1991; Lemos, 2007; Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008; Figueiredo, 2003; Balla & Deering, 2013; Pinto, 2021; Rennó & Lemos & Power, 2018; Parker & Dull, 2009[157]); how many and how diverse are the witnesses heard in such events (Geddes, 2018); the discharge (especially when a clear opinion is not granted, and significant objections or censure are expressed) to whole-of-government accounts presented by the head of the Executive (Bonvecchi, 2010); the issuing of information requests to the government, either written, formal ones (Lemos, 2005b; Lemos, 2007; Rennó & Lemos & Power, 2018; Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008; Figueiredo, 2003; Pinto, 2021; Palanza, 2005; Fuchs & Nolte,

[156] We´re dealing with the tools for an oversight function as circumscribed in section 3.3.2 above. For a list of "oversight tools" who takes all three "legs" of potential legislative control (including those restricted to parliamentary regimes), which of course includes those mentioned here, see Griglio (2020, p. 81).

[157] Parker & Dull (2009) use simultaneously the number of investigations and – to proxy their intensity – the number of days devoted to hearings and the number of pages of the hearings´ published transcripts.

2005; Saez & Montero & Lopez, 2005, p. 154; Araújo, 2017; Chasquetti, 2018, pp. 174-177 and 177-181; Berríos & Gamboa, 2006, pp. 115-116; Braga, 2007[158]) or through verbal questioning in hearings (König & Lin, 2020, p. 9; Sieberer, 2011; Palanza, 2005; Fuchs & Nolte, 2005; Van Rensburg & Vreÿ & Neethling, 2020; Martin & Whitaker, 2019; Saez & Montero & Lopez, 2005, p. 155); the summoning of executive authorities to testify before congressional meetings (Lemos, 2005a; Lemos, 2007; Rennó & Lemos & Power, 2018; Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008; Figueiredo, 2003; Pinto, 2021; Palanza, 2005; Saez & Montero & Lopez, 2005, p. 144; Chasquetti, 2018, pp. 173-174; Mustapic & Bieda, 2028, pp. 221-226, Berríos & Gamboa, 2006, pp. 118-119;); or the deployment of *ad hoc* investigative procedures on specific issues, endowed with institutional and organizational resources to allow effective enquiries (Lemos, 2005b; Lemos, 2007; Rennó & Lemos & Power, 2018; Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008; Figueiredo, 2003; Pinto, 2021; Braga, 2007[159]; Van Rensburg & Vreÿ & Neethling, 2020; Siavelis, 2018; Berríos & Gamboa, 2006; Saez, Montero & Lopez, 2005, p. 147; Mustapic & Bieda, 2028, pp. 226-232[160])[161].

Any assessment of the usage of such tools must first recognize their intrinsic differences in scope and impact. The most comprehensive typology of oversight tools

[158] That paper is limited to assessing the existence of information regarding "information requests" at large (regardless of being processed in written or oral form) in the corresponding parliament´s website in 2006.

[159] That paper is limited to assessing the existence of information regarding commissions´ activities in the corresponding parliament´s website in 2006.

[160] Those authors assess *ad hoc* commissions in tandem with permanent committees in charge of predominantly oversight roles.

[161] Here, and according to the theoretical choice pointed in section 3.3.2, we depart from some studies who measure oversight intensity by those iniciatives who are proposed by parliamentarians, regardless of their approval by the corresponding deliberative bodies or their actual implementation (Lemos, 2005a; Silva, 2021). Other studies assess oversight by the footprint of institutional and organizational resources that might be considered prerequisites for effective control activities, such as the existence of a permanent committee system, whose jurisdiction is arranged around specialized governmental areas, in order to raise members´ expertise and reduce information asymmetry (Meneguin & Inácio, 2014; Montero, 2009, p. 271; Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008; Martin & Vanberg, 2014, p. 444), or the availability of professional and permanent research and investigative staff proficient in relevant issues, either as part of parliament´s organic structure (Meneguin and Inácio, 2014; Nolte, 2003, pp. 58-59; Melo, 2009, p. 42-43), or through independent bodies legally tasked with providing such advisory and informational services to parliament, such as audit offices and courts of accounts (Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008; Lemos, 2007; Figueiredo, 2003). Others, such as Winzen (2012) and Sieberer (2011), involve several institutional power features, albeit explicitly recognizing that such exclusive focus comes from the unfeasibility of getting data on the behavioral aspects of oversight. Those kinds of operationalization will not be considered here, for the reasons already developed in section 3.3.2 (although specific activities involving interaction with the auxiliary bodies can be taken into account, if available).

seems to be the one listed in Pellizzo & Stapenhurst (2008)[162], reflected on Table 52 below:

Table 31 - Parliamentary oversight tools - Pellizzo & Stapenhurst ´s typology

INSTRUMENT	Comment
committee hearings	
hearings in plenary sittings	
commissions of inquiry	
questions	written questions (including information requests)
question time	specific parliamentary sessions where the executive officials (including the prime minister) have to answer and debate personally on the questions presented by MP´s
interpellations	a more formal questioning that may end on a vote[163]
ombudsman	existence of an independent ombudsman office that must convey its findings to parliament
auditors general	existence of an independent audit office that must convey its findings to parliament
committees	existence of a specialized committee system within parliament for its standing committees
public accounts committees	existence of a committee specialized in scrutinizing budget execution and analyzing audit findings

Source: Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008, with comments from the author

A better fit for a theoretical design which explores the combinations of several tools to gauge the actual amount of oversight requires some adjustments and clarifications. First, the mere existence of internal or external institutions (such as ombudsmen or committees) - as important as it is as a necessary condition for oversight effectiveness in terms of information and expertise gathering, and public outreach for receiving grievances or disseminating results (Stapenhurst & Jacobs & Eboutou, 2019, pp. 123-124; Griglio, 2020, p. 101-103) - should not being taken as an oversight action in itself (instead, one should focus on the results of their actions). So, those categories are not relevant to those purposes, except for one very specific

[162] A more recent survey by the same authors (Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2014) updated information relating the availability of tools and added a few other parliaments to the original work, without changing the typology´s core elements.

[163] "*The purpose of questions is to criticise the government, expose abuses and seek redress. Interpellations are similar, but often more formal and extensive, 'designed to provoke comprehensive debate on an issue or a particular case of ministerial neglect'."* (Stapenhurst & Jacobs & Eboutou, 2019, p. 123). Pellizo and Stapenhurst (2014) add that questions, who can usually be submitted by individual parliamentarians, are meant to find facts and information, while interpellations (usually reserved to a parliamentary group or caucus) are destined to address the reasons and motivations underlying the government's course of action. For our purposes, those distinctions do not undermine their being clustered into just one category, neither do the several procedural differences that may occur in actual parliamentary practices for implementing one or other (Griglio, 2020, pp. 118-124).

interaction with the audit office: when congress demands audits and other investigations from those bodies, that´s clearly the materialization of an oversight activity initiated directly by legislators (even if its execution is delegated to the audit office), and probably an impactful one (Van Rensburg & Vreÿ & Neethling, 2020, pp. 3-4). So, this one category should be included in a framework like that. To keep coherence with our legislative accountability conceptualization, the object here is the active and deliberate pursuit of information by legislators, and not their reactive treatment of recurrent, scheduled audit or accounting reports sent *ex officio* by audit offices (such as the ubiquitous end-of-year accounts mentioned in the following paragraph, or the structured flow of reports that audit offices perform on their own initiative and present to permanent oversight committees tasked with deliberating on them[164]). It means no disregarding to the effects of such autonomous surveillance by the audit bodies[165], but simply acknowledging that the independent actions of other institutions in the accountability web fall outside the scope of our study, focused on the chambers´ direct involvement in pursuing oversight.

"Questions" are understood as any formal request for information (if they´re verbally presented but appear registered as such, they must be so considered). On the other hand, the instruments of "question time" and "interpellation", as politically salient as they must be in parliamentary systems (Griglio, 2020, pp. 120-122), have little or no differential effect in presidential systems[166]: the president itself is not subject to personally present and defend his positions in parliament the way a prime minister typically is, and a "vote" after such questioning is no different than any other floor vote (it won´t affect the survival of the cabinet, for instance[167]). Instead, the

[164] Outstanding examples of that last kind of "passive evaluation" of audit office works are the Agentine (Mustapic & Bieda, 2018, pp. 227-228) and Mexican (Gudiño & Reed, 2018) permanent committees specifically assigned to deal with parliament´s relation with each country´s supreme audit office.

[165] Velarde (2018a) points that reports submitted autonomously to Congress by the supreme audit agency are the most proficient means to disclose and review public finance and policies in Mexico.

[166] That´s not to say they do not exist in congressional settings, as Griglio (2020, pp. 116-117) says regarding the US experience, or Sáez, Montero and Lopez (2005, p. 157) on Latin American congresses: our empirical survey will confirm that formal verbal interpellations and questions do take place in Latin American congresses. Our point here is that those questionings are no different from written information requests as far as their political and legal impact are concerned.

[167] Siavelis (2018, p. 114, 141-142) stresses those features as being purposedly introduced by the Chilean authoritarian government in the 1990 constitution to ensure a feebler parliament vis-à-vis the Executive. Some kind of political censure to individual ministers via interpellation does exist in some systems, as in the present Bolivian constitution (Bolivia, 2019, article 158.18), which might end even in the removal of the individual in question, but not in the denial of the

summoning of executive authorities (including ministers) for debates and questioning in the legislative chambers or committees is frequent, and stands for a tool in itself (that would be the – somehow washed-up – presidential equivalent to the question time[168]). So, both "question time" demands and "interpellations" can be added to the general "questions" tally, while a new category must be introduced involving the summoning of executive authorities for questioning[169]. "Commissions of enquiry" are the embodiment of specific investigative procedures performed by congress, so their number must include also those enquiries which, although performed by standing committees, have been recorded by parliament as specific, individual proceedings[170]. In another adjustment, there´s no analytical reason to distinguish committee and plenary hearings, for they both represent the same kind of task. Indeed, every tool should be tallied across all committees, plenaries and other collegiate

president´s power to keep deciding on the cabinet. In the cases where such procedures are reported by Parliaments, they should be added to the number of information requests.

[168] The same goes, as far as we know, for the kind of "question time" formally defined for senior ministers like the *Jefe del Gabinete de Ministros* in Argentinian and Peruvian constitutions (Palanza, 2005). Chasquetti (2018, p. 177) extracts from the Uruguayan case the distinction between *interpelaciones* (a summons where a minister´s political responsibility of a given fact or decision is at stake) and *comisiones generales* (where an executive authority is called to provide information or debate on any given issue, often with the support of government backers in the chamber). For a comprehensive list of the several kinds of in-person questioning available in parliamentary Germany, and their subtle differences, that we group here into only one category, see Fuchs and Nolte (2005). Griglio (2020, pp. 98-99) elaborates on the extension of summoning or subpoena powers by European parliaments to others besides government authorities. Although all those instances might be considered an aggrandizement of parliamentary oversight capabilities, we stick to the summoning of government authorities – counted as a whole, regardless of their procedural or statutory variety - as our variable to be measured, given it´s by far the most common statutory authority in Latin American constitutions and parliamentary rules of procedure (making legislative statistics structured around it), besides representing in itself the strongest pressure power for the interbranch accountability we´re assessing under this conceptualization.

[169] Sometimes those events are formally converted into "invitations" (Lemos, 2005a; Silva, 2021; Rennó & Lemos & Power, 2018) and mustn´t count as such (actually, it´s very likely that they are not listed as such in legislative statistics); in those cases, the activity must still be counted as one more hearing, for that´s what they turned into.

[170] That includes Brazilian Congress´ "*Propostas de Fiscalização e Co*ntrole", for instance (Lemos, 2005a; Silva, 2021; Rennó & Lemos & Power, 2018); Griglio (2020, p. 99) mentions similar "informative missions [..] set up on a temporary basis to gather information, usually following the same procedure that allows a permanent committee to launch an inquiry" held in the French parliament. Although there may be distinctions in the compelling powers *vis-à-vis* formal enquiry committees (for instance, in summoning witnesses and requesting document submissions), the existence of a formal procedure in itself (and the associated legislative powers vested in it, even if not fully developed) raises stakes for the investigation at hand under the dynamics of oversight impacts already shown in section 3.3.2, which justifies their being considered on an equal footing. Moreover, and for the same reasons, all kinds of *ad hoc* enquiries must be considered, regardless of their having just fact-finding aims or some other formal votes or decisions are pursued along or after their performances (a distinction made by Griglio, 2020, p. 99).

organs within parliament, even if they are recorded separately[171]. Finally, it´s necessary to highlight that Pellizzo and Stapenhurst´s slate does not include a very important resource recalled by Bonvecchi (2010) and Saez, Montero and Lopez (2005, p. 149): the passing of judgment of the whole-of-government yearly accounts rendered by the president. That´s an important tool, still to be explored by the literature, but its inclusion would be methodologically tricky: such procedures are typically fixed in number (one account per year), and the oversight intensity is captured in their content (how much, and how grave, are the qualifications and censure points brought to the accounts by congressional judgement). Since our measurement must be based on the amount of activities performed, simply tallying the accounts considered would bring practically no variance to this particular indicator[172].

So, our own categorization of oversight tools might be as presented in Table 53 below.

Table 32 - Parliamentary oversight tools - proposed typology

INSTRUMENT	Comment	Cluster
parliamentary hearings	Either in committees or in plenary sittings, as well as in any collegiate body within parliament	High impact
commissions of inquiry	Including specific, individualized investigative proceedings performed by standing committees and recorded as such	High impact
Questions	all formal information requests and questioning of the executive	Low impact
summons of executive authorities	all mandatory demands for personal attendance of executive authorities for rendering information and debating issues under their jurisdiction	Low impact
audit requests	formal requests to the audit office or equivalent body to independently perform audit or investigative assignments	Low impact

[171] Similarly, every request for public hearing, regardless of its object must be included. The distinction made by Silva (2021) between hearings summoned to discuss specific bills and others devoted to more "conventional" oversight issues (such as investigating malfeasance), although relevant in general, would not be the most suitable for our purposes, since the debating of any issue is an opportunity to exert the kind of influence depicted in section 3.3.2 (even if through the lawmaking process). On the other hand, the frequent gathering of *ad hoc* select committees whose only mission to report on specific bills should not to be considered here, for it´s just another way of organizing parliamentary procedure in the strict lawmaking dimension of legislative activities. For lack of criteria for locating or tallying them, "informal" or "closed doors" by-ways found by some parliaments as an alternative to more procedurally costly hearings *tout court*. (Giglio, 2020, p. 99) cannot even be considered.

[172] The very same argument goes for any regular reporting procedure established on fixed terms and timetables by a country´s regulation (such as periodically mandated presences by the president or given ministers at the chambers´ floor, or the tabling of periodical reports – typically, yearly "state of the nation" reports –by the president or the ministers - Sáez, Montero & Lopez, 2005, p. 149)

Source: Pellizzo & Stapenhurst, 2008, adapted by the author. The meaning of "Cluster" classification will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

For data collection purposes, some criteria are required. As for the information requests, only those formally approved and submitted to the relevant authority must be considered[173]. Those hearings explicitly intended to proactively debate general issues, instead of specific facts or enacted policies[174], shouldn´t be considered as an oversight activity. Hearings performed by commissions of inquiry should not be considered, since their impact is already considered through the separate consideration of such commissions´ effect. Still regarding such inquiries, they ought to be computed as existing in a given year if there´s any evidence of their activity, regardless of having been concluded or not[175]. Temporary commissions whose aim is exclusively to discuss specific bills must not be considered commissions of inquiry, and their hearings should be included in the general tally of public hearings. Moreover, although some theoretical discussion can be found on how the effects of committee and plenary activities differ on oversight dynamics and outcomes (Griglio, 2020, p. 87-88), we find no clear analytical lever to establish different weights or treatments between them based solely on this feature.

To use those categories in building an indicator of congressional oversight, it must be recognized that there are obvious differences between the actual impact of each kind of initiative, and between individual actions within each category. While the latter heterogeneity is entirely contingent, and is hardly feasible to measure in a large comparative survey, the former cleavage is systematic and has already been pointed by the literature (West, 2020, p. 11). Lemos and Power (2013) weighed the oversight tools they captured in the Brazilian Congress according to an ordinal scale

[173] So, information requests tabled by legislators who didn´t get approval or other procedural steps required by law or the standing orders to have the required effects must be disregarded.
[174] Such as "thematic gatherings (*sessões de debates temáticos*)" in Brazilian Federal Senate (article 145, paragraph 7, of the Senate Standing Orders) and the "general summons (*comissão geral*)" in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (article 91 of the Chamber´s Standing Orders).
[175] So, a commission of inquiry who showed any traces of work for two years should be recorded as such in both, regardless of how and when it finished its business. On the other hand, commissions which might formally be considered in existence but had no record of having worked (meetings held, reports published, information requests issued) are to be disregarded. This last criterion will affect particularly the Brazilian tool "*Proposta de fiscalização e controle - PFC*", which may be formally approved as required but, since it´s an internal procedure assigned to a rapporteur´s deliberation, shows little traces of its activities until its final or intermediate reports are voted on. So, the mere approval for opening a PFC procedure will not be counted as an oversight activity, but only other signs of its existence.

trying to reflect "the severity of their consequences"[176]. Investigative commissions have been pointed as strong instruments in terms of their repercussions (Pereira & Melo & Bertholini, 2018, Calcagnotto, 2005, and Figueiredo, 2003, for the Brazilian case; Kriner & Schickler, 2016, for the US Congress[177]); Chernykh, Doyle & Power (2017) find in their expert survey that the surveyed scholars found that the most important attribute (among 32 institutional features) to determine a given parliament´s political power is, precisely, its capacity to conduct independent investigations of the chief executive and the agencies who report to him; Giglio (2020, pp. 91-96) recalls that, without the least dismissal to the relevance of systemic oversight by departmental committees, those tasked only to oversight are likely to have less competition from lawmaking for their time, more procedural resources and expertise[178], less restrictions from jurisdictional boundaries to tackle the issues they must oversee, and more direct connection to public opinion due to higher salience for the issues they specifically cover[179]. Congressional hearings are the main indicator of legislative oversight for the main studies used in shaping our conceptual view in this

[176] Namely, weights were attributed to information requests (1), investigative procedures known as "*Proposta de fiscalização e controle*" (2), summoning of executive authorities (3) and public hearings (4).

[177] Those last authors point historical examples such as the already mentioned "Truman investigative commission" on war procurement (on that particular endeavor, see also Caro, 2003). Some studies on Latin American parliaments point in an opposite direction: Siavelis (2018) deplores that a formalized mechanism of enquiry committees in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies has failed in presenting significant results neither in holding authorities accountable nor in issues recommendations for improving public policies, due to several normative, political and organizational shortcomings; Chasquetti (2018) describes the ups and downs faced by the Uruguayan parliament across the years to establish a set of relevant enforcement and investigatory powers to those committees, ending up in a much decried law passed in 1995 which has induced a growing abandonment of this tool by legislators.

[178] In particular, they can suit their procedures and prerogatives to the issue at hand (such as permanent or temporary oversight committees devoted to scrutinize intelligence and security matters, which require strict confidentiality and secrecy management by the overseers themselves).

[179] "*In this vein, inquiries turn out to be multipurpose tools, impacting executive–legislative relations in many ways. There are at least three ways to frame the oversight potential behind this mechanism. First, inquiries are a powerful oversight tool because they give Parliament the opportunity to exercise real 'vigilance' over a certain issue or policy perceived as a priority by public opinion. The possibility to make a direct assessment on selected items of government is particularly relevant for the opposition, as it gives minorities the opportunity to advocate* in concreto *government responsibility. Second, inquiries give Parliament the power to collect strategic information instrumental to other oversight activities. The third potential is associated with the indirect impact exercised on public opinion. In this vein, the real power behind inquiry committees is not in the internal capacity of Parliament to exercise a direct compelling force on the government. Rather, its strength lies in the external impact on public opinion which leads the executive to give public explanations of its conduct. If inquiries are rarely able to offer something more than a public tribune, some exceptions are offered by those landmark cases that demonstrate how the inquiry activity may lead to major legislative reforms*." (Griglio, 2020, p. 128)

section (Kriner & Schickler, 2016; Mayhew, 1991), and Santos (2005) sees their usage concentrated in "macroissues" regarding matters of State[180]. Although devising a *continuum* of effects might not be methodologically feasible (besides the obvious measurement difficulties, those effects will probably vary from country to country), we must at least attempt to differentiate "high impact" tools from those who have less expected influence on government policy: besides reducing the possibility of measurement errors, the differentiation revolves around the relative position of those two clusters, being less likely to vary across countries. To that end, and based on the precedents above, we must consider consolidating in one composite result the "high-end" tools of parliamentary hearings and commissions of inquiry, and in another the other three (questions[181], summons of executive authorities[182] and audit requests).

Computationally, the characterization of "high intensity" oversight cannot be found but in within-country comparison, since the bare amount of activities (even with the obvious control for the number of legislators in each chamber) is no grounds

[180] While information requests were downgraded as the conduit for "smaller, even minute questions, sometimes of individual scope" (Santos, 2005, p. 117). In the same direction of thought, the low political and transaction costs of information requests and their possible usage as substitutes for "stronger" (and more politically expensive) initiatives, specially by those legislators who support the government, is highlighted by Lemos (2005a) and Rennó, Lemos and Power (2018) for the Brazilian case, while Chasquetti (2018, pp. 174-176) stresses legislators´ district size in Uruguay as the main driver of information requests (those tending to smaller constituencies find it more profitable to act on low-cost individual information requests for position-taking stances into locally oriented issues). Siavelis (2018, p. 114, 140) recalls the Chilean example to raise another possible shortcoming: there, the Executive´s obligation to comply with information requests is deemed fulfilled by simply issuing a formal response, regardless of its substantive contents. That´s not to undermine their usefulness for parliaments´ institutional purposes (they allow for pluralistic representation in the oversight function, bypassing procedural and agenda-setting monopolies by parties and authorities, and can be shared among MPs even if their focus of interest is given by individual perspectives – Griglio, 2020, pp. 84 and 118– besides being available also for the kind of intra-coalitional cross-monitoring that, regardless of not being originated from the opposition, implies parliamentary scrutiny nonetheless - Araújo, 2017), but only to stress the much more limited follow-up consequences of performing such tasks.

[181] Wegmann and Evequoz (2019) find that, for parliaments in Kenya and Zambia, even high-visibility "question time" oral inquiries to government ministers are mostly used to address constituency-based cases, not broad policy concerns (and are exercised with similar frequency by government and opposition MPs), indicating less stringency as a political oversight tool. Silva (2019), uses written inquires as the sole metrics for intra-coalition monitoring in Brazil, exactly because their political cost is so small that variations in how many each party proposes would reflect deliberate differentiation in strategies, instead of inherent limitations or difficulties to access this resource. Nevertheless, oversight tools they are, and relevant: Martin and Whitaker (2019) and Strøm, Muller and Smith (2010, pp. 526-527) make a strong case for the usefulness and versatility of parliamentary questions both to opposition and coalition MPs, the former in Westminster systems, the latter in parliamentary regimes at large (including coalition governments).

[182] Velarde (2018a, pp. 265-266) reports the contempt of Mexican bureaucrats and legislators regarding the surveillance effects by summoning executive authorities, seen by most interviewees as mere theatrics both for government and opposition partisan purposes.

for comparison between two different countries. Indeed, if we are discussing the causal factors for differing effects on policy among specific cabinets, it follows logically that the parameters for assessing how "intense" or "lax" oversight has been in a given country-year are to be found in the historical profile of the same parliament´s oversight along time. For that, the best way would be to measure the normalized value of each subcomponent (the number of each oversight tool exercised in the chamber per legislator[183] at each country/year, subtracted by the average in the whole time series considered for the country in question, and divided by the standard deviation in the same series[184]). Given the potential substitution within each group (the "high" and "low" impact clusters), the value of oversight intensity in each group can be found by averaging the value of the tools it encompasses.

To convert each group into a fuzzy condition, we must then consider how each numerical value might be expected to reflect the actual exercise of control. When the number in the high-impact group is very high (a normalized value greater than 1, that is, at least one standard deviation above average), that means the parliament in question was extremely active in strong instruments of control, which assigns it the value 1. If the high-impact group´s numerical value is still positive (between 0 and 1) and the legislature combines it with extremely high (higher than 1) marks in the low-impact category, oversight activism is slightly smaller, and the condition receives 0,75. If both groups have positive but not top marks (between 0 and 1), the activity is less stringent and the condition equals 0,66. Negative high-impact values and positive (0 to 1) low-impact value still show some activity, but much less so, deserving 0,25 as fuzzy value. The negative values in subcomponents don´t need to mirror-image this scaling of membership: for analytical purposes, anything below average does not characterize strong oversight at all, and whatever combination of negative values accrues a fuzzy 0.

[183] This control is necessary to preempt changes in the measures due exclusively to an increase or decrease in the number of legislators from one year to another, which supposedly is correlated to the possible amount of work developed by their chamber (Fuchs & Nolte, 2005 pointed to that possibility).

[184] One can possibly speculate on the suitability of an average involving decades-long time series, on the basis of possible evolving trends: did technological advances, or societal modernization, or another long-term trend, enhance the overall control activity of parliaments ? We don´t support this reasoning for two reasons. One is that literature has not converged on whether legislative oversight is decreasing in volume and impact (Mayhew, 1991; Rockman, 1984) or growing in importance (Lupia & McCubbins, 1994; Kriner & Schickler, 2016; Pellizzo, 2008; Lemos, 2005b), so there´s no ground for assuming any quantitative trend to the numbers. The other is the simple idea that any upward (or downward) trend in oversight as a whole would mean precisely an increased (or decreased) supply of oversight and its corresponding impact on policy, and as such should be measured and considered in our analysis.

A caveat must be introduced here: regardless of their strengths, within-country comparisons pose a serious risk, for they´ll always yield some above-average results, while they not necessarily mean strong oversight. That´s because a weak parliament in matters of oversight[185] (one who has very little incentive to legislate strong oversight powers for itself, or very little incentive to use those available to it) will anyway show above average numbers in some years, even if that mathematical finding is substantively meaningless. That flaw can´t be corrected by cross-country comparison, as we already discussed; that requires another kind of within-country triangulation to minimize it. The best cross-check available seems some measure of the overall strength for the parliament in question as related to his own country. For that, as discussed already in 3.3.2, the most helpful tool available to check on the overall parliament strength seems to be the assessment of their perception by relevant stakeholders. An extremely low reputation in parliament will probably be the best proxy we can have for a weak capacity for oversight on a given parliament, whose weakness would jeopardize any numerical finding based on its own activity output[186]. Under this strategy, very unbecoming appreciations[187] for the parliament in question on a given year, the fuzzy oversight value to the legislature in question might be given 0 even if numerically they receive a greater value from the analysis of oversight output data.

Another point to be made involves bicameral legislatures: for oversight purposes, they may be considered independent and additive, that is, one chamber reinforces the other´s control or substitutes for it (most notably when majorities belong to different parties or coalitions *vis-à-vis* the executive in each of them)[188]. So, they must be assessed separately, and the final fuzzy value for the country-year in question must be the union (logical "OR") between the value of both (meaning,

[185] As Huneeus, Berríos and Cordero (2006, p. 420-421) claim to be the Chilean case.

[186] Pellizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) use a broadly similar strategy, multiplying their within-parliament capability index by the Polity IV democracy index, arguing that even able oversight organizations will generate smaller impacts under more a restricted political environment in terms of overall parliamentary autonomy or powers. Our conceptual measurement proposal has the same attention to the contextual factors, but intends to be much more activity-based: instead of oversight potential and capabilities, we propose to track actual oversight performed; instead of broadly defined political environment within which parliaments might perform oversight, we suggest assessing how their actual oversight footprint is perceived by expert surveys and/or opinion polls.

[187] That is, of survey results show for the given parliament values in the lower half of the categories available (including the median category, if existed) for answering most of the survey questions considered.

[188] As exemplified by the Italian symmetrical bicameral experience described by Griglio (2020, pp. 134-149)

basically, that the oversight one chamber abstains from doing can be done by the other).

"Boots on the ground", or what can´t be done and why

Now, we must turn to the reality checks of data collection, which will determine the feasibility of any operationalization strategy. We found no other way to gather data on oversight activity than primary data collection, through direct observation of chambers´ yearly reports on their official websites, when available, and direct contact with parliamentary libraries or secretarial offices, via e-mail or post, to request such information whether as a compilation or through copies of the corresponding reports.

Sure, there are some other secondary sources on legislative oversight. However, they can serve as no more than ancillary cross-checking for some inconsistencies occasionally found on the ground. Compilations of formal institutional powers of oversight including Latin American parliaments[189] appear in Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2008), Stapenhurst & Draman & Larson & Staddon (2020), Freudenreich, 2016; Sáez, Montero and López (2005); Sáez (2022); Stapenhurst, Jacobs and Eboutou (2019)[190] – but, as shown above, they say nothing about the actual usage of the available powers. Information on actual oversight activities are much scarcer, and hardly ever of a comparative, cross-country nature: Lemos (2007), Lemos and Power (2013), Calcagnoto (2005), Figueiredo (2003), and Rennó, Lemos and Power (2018) for some instruments in Brazil; Pinto (2021) for some tools in Brazil and Paraguay; Huneeus, Berríos and Cordero (2006), Berríos and Gamboa (2006) [191], and Siavelis (2018) for Chile; Chasquetti (2018) for Uruguay; Palanza (2005), Fuchs and Nolte (2005), and Mustapic and Bieda (2018) for several tools in Argentina; Velarde (2018A) for Mexico; Ponce (2018), regarding Peru; Bonvecchi

[189] Others present data on Western European and other parliamentary democracies: Garritzmann (2017); Wizen (2012); West (2020)

[190] That last paper brings (p. 129) a more comprehensive oversight potential for a few parliaments (Peru, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay) on a given point in time.

[191] Those authors disclose another shortcoming for the direct measurement of oversight tools´deployment, the institutional boundaries submitted to congressional information requests: important Chilean public sector organizations (such as the state-controlled bank and copper mining holding that provides what´s by far the biggest share of the country´s GDP and fiscal revenues) have successfully challenged in court congressional information requests on the grouds that the law (before constitutional changes enacted only in 2005) didn´t give the legislature any oversight prerogatives into those kinds of public entity.

(2010), and Alemán and Tsebelis (2011)[192] for specific instruments and assessments across Latin America. All those sources, however, are strictly complementary, and might at best fill in some gaps or raise some quality issues regarding any kind the primary data collected.

Nevertheless, our primary souces have proven unable to provide the required information, yielding an amount of raw data which could not support the analysis. Existing legislative chambers in our sample of countries have been contacted through their respective websites and e-mail addresses, as well as (when available) the freedom-of-information access pages; in cases where the addressed chamber didn´t answer at all to our requests, the countries´ embassies in Brazil were also contacted in support of our information request.

The main thrust of such effort yielded, however, extremely scarce results. Very few chambers could provide the required data for all of the oversight instruments surveyed (Brazil´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate). Others could provide data only for some of the instruments, although the absent ones did exist in the corresponding constitutions or standing orders (Argentina´s Chamber of Deputies, Chile´s Chamber of Deputies[193], Colombia´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Costa Rica´s National Assembly; El Salvador´s Legislative Assembly). A third group of assemblies replied that the information requested wasn´t available (Argentina´s Senate, Mexico´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate). One last group didn´t even bother to answer the requests for information (Bolivia´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate; Dominican Republic´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate; Honduras´ National Congress, Panama´s National Assembly) [194].

Those regrettable results show that almost all assemblies which are relevant to our empirical study simply can´t provide the required information at all. As for the partial availability of data (that is, some of the instruments were referenced in the chambers´ answers, but others - which did exist in the corresponding constitutions, standing orders and regulations, expressly referenced in our requests - were omitted from the provided information), it also amounts to an unsurmountable shortcoming:

[192] Besides presenting data on formal oversight powers, Alemán and Tsebelis show an overall "effectiveness indicator" for parliaments, as a proxy for the results of their activities.

[193] The Chilean Senate wasn´t surveyed, since the Constitution explicitly bars that chamber from performing oversight duties.

[194] The unicameral parliaments of Guatemala and Nicaragua were also contacted (with partial information on some oversight instruments, by the former, and no reply for the latter), but their information could not be used anyway due to the absence of cabinet data to be matched with. Given the unsuccessful results already discussed, the primary survey was discontinued without any attempt to reach the chambers from Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

given that all five kinds of instruments are part of an integrated model, there´s no way to circumvent the absence of information regarding one or more of them[195] and draw a fuzzy result only from the remaining ones.

In sum, the data collection resources we could mobilize weren´t enough to provide an amount of raw data so as to enable minimal leverage required to consistently run our QCA analysis, which forces us to divert to alternate sources of measurement of legislative oversight. It must be said that, as explained above, we did not find, amid the numerous pieces of research regarding activities in precedents of oversight quoted in this section, any comparative endeavor involving more than a single snapshot in time: that is, they either deal with one single country diachronically (or, at most, a pair of them)[196], or make a cross-section assessment of a list of countries in a given moment of time.

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[195] Again, not the stated absence of the instrument in question (meaning that it does not exist or has not been exercised by parliament), but the absence of any such statement (neither positive nor negative).

[196] In general, Jones (2002, p. 177) describes how comparative studes are severely hindered by data limitations in the study of Latin American legislatures, "where commercial enterprises and private interest groups tracking the national legislature are weak or nonexistent, where the information provided by the national legislature is generally much less complete than that provided by the U.S. Congress, and where personal ties are often crucial to access to data". Blondel (2006, p. 10) deplores that careful analyses of legislatures´ activities during a considerable time frame are only occasionaly performed, and rarely include more than one country. Focusing closer on oversight, Monteiro & Bandeira (2015) found that the opinion of relevant interviewees in legislative oversight affairs indeed points to the tallying of some performed activities (hearings, information exchange with audit institutions, policy evaluation activities) as the most significant indicators of oversight activities by a parliamentary chamber, but there were very little data available on that subject for most parliaments. Pellizzo & Stapenhurst (2012, chapter. 4, section 2, p. 88) found precisely the same barrier to the same causal appraisal:

> *If we were to properly test this causal argument, it would be necessary to test whether changes in oversight capacity (measured in terms of the number of oversight tools available to the legislature) are conducive to changes in the effectiveness of oversight activity. We could then test whether changes in oversight capacity and effectiveness are conducive to changes in democratic quality. To perform this type of analysis, we would need to have diachronic data that are not actually available. In fact, the only data on oversight capacity that have been collected by WBI in collaboration with IPU are synchronic. The data provide a picture of the number of the type of oversight tools available to a certain number of legislatures in 2001 and in 2009, but they do not provide any diachronic information as to how the number of oversight tools available to a legislature has changed over time.*

Even single-country studies on parliamentary oversight disclose data access difficulties:

> *The primary aim of this article was to gather evidence on the use of oversight tools by the South African Parliament over a 20-year period within the post-1994 democratic dispensation in order to determine the broader trajectory of parliamentary defence oversight. [..] The main limitation of this study in terms of data collection revolves around the availability of formal parliamentary documents. Request to officials at Parliament revealed that official parliamentary minutes on committee meetings were not readily available or have been lost, especially for the first two parliaments. As such, committee meeting minutes from the PMG were utilised. However, PMG only commenced with the recording of minutes in January 1998, and limited data were available on committee meetings before this date*. (Van Rensburg & Vreÿ & Neethling, 2020, p. 2)

So, we´re left with the search for a feasible alternative to assess, as precisely as possible, the actual output of parliaments in terms of their proactive oversight activities. In section 3.3.2, we´ve advanced the point that societal perceptions of parliaments are considered as relevant measures of their institutionalization and broader political effect (Palanza & Scartascini & Tommasi, 2016, pp. 15-16). Indeed, there are very suggestive perception measures for the oversight roles of parliaments available. In the V-Dem survey (Coppedge et al, 2022a, pp. 150, 278), expert interviewees present several opinions on how they perceive the effectiveness of their parliaments in oversight: "Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?" (question 3.5.1.7)[197]; "In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?" (question 4.8.32)[198]; and "If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?" (question 3.5.1.4)[199]. Those are the suggested legislature-related components for horizontal accountability indexes proposed by V-Dem experts (Lührmann & Marquardt & Mechkova, 2017, p. 14) and, remarkably, include questions are strictly related to the perception of parliament in a specific proactive oversight role, that is, parliament basically putting into use the "police patrol toolbox" we unsuccessfully tried to measure. That feature tackles the problem (already mentioned in section 3.3.2) of "confounding factors" or "halo effects" arising from questioning interviewees about their trust or their evaluation regarding parliaments in a broader context. From a theoretical point of view, those questions look surprisingly close (albeit more objectively worded) to Schmitter´s conceptual approach to measuring accountability (Schmitter, 2004, pp. 57-59), which builds on a critical assessment of previous

[197] Answers offered in an ordinal scale of "0: No, not at all; 1: Occasionally; 2: Yes, for the most part".
[198] Answers offered in a dichotomous scale of "0: No — never or very rarely; 1: Yes — routinely."
[199] Answers offered in an ordinal scale of "0: Extremely unlikely; 1: Unlikely; 2: As likely as not; 3: Likely; 4: Certain or nearly certain".

attempts to assess quality of democracy through direct observation of its actual accomplishments[200].

It must be acknowledged that expert surveys such as V-Dem[201] may present several possible biases[202]. Besides, since their wording requires one single answer encompassing respondents´ views on "parliament" or "the legislature", this indicator misses the refinement of evaluating independently each of the two chambers in a bicameral system. However, for our purposes, they still seem more adequate than broader public opinion surveys, since the latter are less likely to be informed by the inner workings of Congress, and more likely to be based on particular political context and policy outcomes (Palanza & Scartascini & Tommasi, 2016, p. 15). Oversight issues, being - as they are - instruments of horizontal accountability, require a more detailed, insider focus on administrative and technical detail. Furthermore, our longerterm perspective would be strongly jeopardized if the proxies for congressional effectiveness were strongly affected by country- and time-specific external impulses clearly unrelated to the workings of parliament[203].

An enhanced version including those same indicators is provided by IDEA in their recent Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices), a recollection of indicators intended to measure democratic trends across a broad range of attributes of democracy from 1975 to 2021 (International IDEA, 2022). In the build-up to more comprehensive composite indexes, this repository offers the "Effective parliament"

[200] For another example of using V-Dem survey answers to gauge legislative stances towards the executive branch, see Wiebrecht, 2024.

[201] *Type (C) data requires evaluation about the de facto state of affairs in a particular country at a particular point in time. Country Experts code these data. These experts are generally academics (about 85%) or professionals working media, or public affairs (e.g., senior analysts, editors, judges); about 2/3 are also nationals of and/or residents in a country and have documented knowledge of both that country and a specific substantive area*. (Coppedge, 2022b, p. 11)

[202] Not least a relative shortage of expert respondents for the period 2013-2021, which reduced some country-variables from the targeted five experts to three or less (Coppedge, 2022b, p. 25). Nevertheless, in the IDEA methodological guide (which uses V-Dem responses in countless occasions) there is the caveat that "[i]n practice, this problem tends to be more pronounced for democracies in North America and North and West Europe, where the scores for some indicators and countries have tended to be dragged down towards the global mean for methodological rather than substantial reasons". (Skaaning, 2022, p. 44)

[203] International IDEA authors justify along similar lines their choice of not selecting general public surveys as sources for their composite democracy indexes (Skaaning, 2022, p. 23): "*Finally, representative surveys of the general population were judged less useful for a number of reasons. These include limited coverage in terms of years and countries, the dissimilar standards generally applied by respondents (both within and across countries and time periods), the large differences in terms of nuanced knowledge about the general dynamics and performance of political institutions and the circumstances where citizens might be afraid to express their honest understanding of the lay of the land. Indicators based on surveys of the general public were therefore not used*".

variable (Tufis & Hudson, 2022, pp. 108-115), which compounds the three V-Dem questions presented in this section with two other questions with a broader scope: first, another V-Dem survey question (Coppedge et al, 2022a, pp. 150) regarding the existence of other, extra-parliamentary bodies that might be able to impose checks on executive abuses: "If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?" (question 3.5.1.5) [204]. The last item is a more wide-ranging perception of the whole systemic constraints on the Executive, this time coming from the Polity V expert survey (variable XCONST, Marshall & Gurr, 2020, p. 65 *et. seqs.*), originally intended to map the full extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive[205]. In the process of composing the final "Effective parliament" parameter, the original source scores were recoded to uniform categories based on percentiles into five partial scores with point estimates ranging from 0 (lowest score) to 1 (highest score); those partial scores then received a statistical aggregation treatment based on Item Response Theory, resulting in a final composite index, with point estimates and confidence intervals - that is, a composite index purposedly built as "indices with relative, fine-grained scales with uncertainty estimates but without substantive thresholds" (Skaaning, 2022, p. 30).

That leaves us with the task of choosing whether to use the raw ordinal scales and directly combining them, or to adopt the fully treated product compiled by IDEA. From the point of view of the included indicators, IDEA´s adoption of two with a broader meaning makes the final index less focused on congressional oversight, although they also refer, at least indirectly, to the final outcome of executive

[204] Answers offered in an ordinal scale of "0: Extremely unlikely. 1: Unlikely. 2: Very uncertain. 3: Likely. 4: Certain or nearly certain.".

[205] The underlying concept is avowedly similar to the overall notion of "horizontal accountability" found in the literature on democracy, but including the tail cases of non-democratic governments (which, nevertheless, reckon some institutional constraints by several "accountability groups" in the polity, either being those typically Western legislative and judicial branches of government. or other kinds of countervailing power holders such as the ruling party in a one-party system, a council of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies, and the military, in coup-prone polities). Original response structure is a 7-point scale including 1: Unlimited executive authority; 2: Intermediate category #1; 3: Slight to moderate limitations; 4: Intermediate category #2; 5: Substantial limitations; 6: Intermediate category #3; and 7: Executive parity or subordination (Marshal & Gurr, 2020, pp. 65 *et. seqs*.). Pellizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) use precisely that executive constraints indicator as a proxy of oversight effectiveness/inter-institutional accountability

containment[206] (which is the main rationale for studying congressional oversight). Actually, they refer to the end results of the horizontal accountability web of institutions[207], at the center of whom parliaments are located (see section 3.2.3). So, although the specificity of oversight activities as the respondent´s focus might be reduced, this won´t mean a drift from the overall attention to the accountability effects of interest to our enquiry[208]. Additionally, including data other than from V-Dem (which is the most frequent source to our research) may diversify the respondents base and reduce (at least marginally) the risks of unknown biases arising from V-Dem´s survey design. As far as the methods for integrating partial responses into one aggregated numerical scale, all questions seem to us to compose a "reflective model", where a latent variable (let´s say, for the sake of illustration, that it´s "horizontal accountability" as the composite result of several institutional and historical features) is understood as the common cause of the indicators used to measure it - that is, its indicators are partially interchangeable, and leaving any of them out of the model should not have a major impact on the meaning of the concept of interest (Skaaning, 2022, p. 31). If we attempted to merge the original response scales by simple direct algorithms, such as averaging, or even if we tried to logically pair them through fuzzy arithmetic, the result would be generating precisely this overvaluation of individual indicators *vis-à-vis* the underlying, latent concept measured (while the resulting composite indicator still includes three - out of five - variables that are focused specifically on parliamentary oversight). For all those reasons, we choose the composite IDEA indicator for "Effective parliaments" as our best empirical measurement of stakeholders´ perceptions regarding legislative oversight.

Another feature on behalf of this choice is this indicator´s observed variance: the following Figure 22 plots its raw values along time, each line corresponding to

[206] Although not unrelated to congress at all: as discussed in the notion of horizontal accountability web in section 3.3.2, if other bodies (e.g. comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) can regularly act as checks on the executive, that´s because some legal framework enacted and politically enforced by the legislature allows them to do it. As for "the full extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive", parliaments can´t be ruled out as being a relevant part of them (the more so the stronger are such constraints).

[207] Polity V´s "Executive constraints" variable, as we described above, has this literal concept in its very definition.

[208] Indeed, Polity V´s "Executive constraints" variable was the first choice by Cox & Weingast (2018, p. 288) to measure horizontal accountability in its interaction with economic performance. It´s much broader in its purview than their alternate choice (a subset of budget reversionary state regulations), and was supplemented in that study precisely for encompassing so many dimensions of parliamentary influence ("*Because Polity IV's executive constraints variable was coded partly based on political outcomes, it correlates both with political instability and electoral democracy*").

one country in our sample. It´s clear that expert assessment of parliaments not only varies in each country from year to year, but also vary in absolute numbers between countries. This variance is also what would be expected by the (not many) case studies of Latin American congresses´ oversight of bureaucracies, who bring heterogeneous results as to their performance and impacts (Velarde, 2018, pp. 38-46). So, it may be expected that those numbers reflect actual substantive circumstances of legislative oversight outcomes evolving along a country´s political history, as well as the relative changes in this variable across the region.



Figure 11 - "Effective parliament" indicator – Raw values – Variance over time

Source: The author, with data from International IDEA (2022)
Obs: Each data point is the center of the confidence interval for a given country-year. Zero values usually mean the absence or interruption of parliamentary activities, such as in Chile before 1988 and Bolivia in 1981.

Finally, we´re left with the challenge of converting that continuous variable into fuzzy one, given that the simple 0-1 band in which it´s presented offers no substantive threshold to anchor their relative meanings – that is, calibration. Since it´s meant to be construed as a continuous interval where the relative position corresponds to an assessment of the relative capacities of parliaments within the absolute boundaries of a fully functioning parliament with the best possible oversight effectiveness (1) and no legislative oversight at all (0), the simple roster of values

does not offer any kind of substantive anchors to pivot around in converting to logical conditions.

Those characteristics recommend applying the direct method of calibration (Mello, 2021, pp. 77 *et. seqs.*). Indeed, given the significant variance of the raw data, their concentration in the middle-range band (which recommends an attempt to map finer distinctions) and the wide possibility that surveyed experts have had to code really nuanced evaluations, the automated assignment of continuous fuzzy values that the software provides seems more adequate to our analytical needs.

When implementing calibration, we must take IDEA´s own clustering of its index values into qualitative assessments for the membership scales in the "Effective oversight set"[209], a procedure which closely resembles the logic of QCA calibration:

> Since an interval-level measure provides a potentially infinite number of scores differing from adjacent scores, it is not possible to link each individual score to nuanced verbal assessments capturing the empirical reality in a country. To translate the scores into such assessments, numerical thresholds are needed and useful. Such thresholds help situating a country's specific score within ranges corresponding to meaningful verbal labels. International IDEA has therefore decided to define the scores of 0.4 and 0.7 as thresholds that distinguish levels of performance on attributes. If a country's score exceeds 0.7, its performance is labeled 'high'. Scores below 0.4 correspond to 'low' performance. Scores between 0.4 and 0.7 classify a country's performance as 'mid-range'. These numerical thresholds distinguish few broad categories and are identical across attributes. The advantage of such a distinction is that it creates relatively simple, but still meaningful classifications. (Skaaning, 2022, p. 40)

From those two numerical thresholds, we apply a scale of parameters for fuzzy calibration (Mello, 2021, p. 78), in which indicator values[210] above 0,7 ("high") mean closeness to full membership in the effective legislatures´ set (notionally, a fuzzy value 1 at its highest possible condition), and those below 0,4 mean full non-membership (notionally, fuzzy value 0 for the extreme position). In between, the intermediate membership/non-membership benchmarks (fuzzy 0,66/0,33) are precisely those values 0,4 and 0,7. Using those parameters, we let software routines distribute fuzzy values using those numerical benchmarks simply as parameters for calculation[211]. Since the routine requires the location of a numerical equivalent to a

[209] In the previous section, we had sketched a possible direct calibration into a five-values fuzzy scaling (1, 0,75, 0,66, 0,25 and 0) based on the objective number of oversight tools put in place. However, such specific substantive thresholds are missing here.

[210] All raw values considered are the center of the confidence interval (variable "*C_SD31 Effective parliament - aggregated by IDEA – center*" in the dataset)

[211] *Finally, on the right-hand side of Table 5.2 is the continuous fuzzy set, which is based on the direct method of calibration that is processed with the software. We can see that this calibration approach yields the most fine-grained values and that it introduces further distinctions between*

fuzzy 0,5 value for no clear membership definition (crossover point), we take the median value of all data points for that purpose.

All country-years in Latin America from 1978 to 2018 are to be considered for calibration purposes, in order to use all available information on parliament effectiveness (including the occasional non-existence of parliament outside democratic rule, which is coded as zero in the original raw data). So, we incorporate in the calibration procedure the whole 697 country-years since 1978, regardless of using only 224 of them[212] to appraise the minoritarian country-years available.

The resulting calibrated scores for the whole period are projected into the corresponding raw values as shown in Figure 23 below[213]. The resulting fuzzy values were brought to their corresponding country-years in the truth table (both for simultaneous and lagged assessments). They show a remarkable convergence to a logit-like odds function and an increase in the number of fuzzy values 1, which is to be expected, since the default calibration procedure in the QCA package uses the logistic function, and considers by default "full membership" to be any membership score above 0.95 (Duşa, 2019).



Figure 12 - "Effective parliament" indicator – Raw scores and fuzzy calibrated scores per country-year – Direct continuous calibration through automated software routine

Source: The author, with data from International IDEA (2022)

some of the cases that still received the same values in the five-value fuzzy set. (Mello, 2021, p. 79)

[212] 216 in the case of lagged performance assessment, as shown in section 6.1.

[213] To compose the graphic, raw values were ordered in ascending order and paired with their corresponding fuzzy values for the same country-year.

Lastly, the distributional shape of fuzzy and raw values curves suggests how to handle with an operational problem that arises when the calibration output occasionally yields a 0.5 value (that is, an undefined membership score). Although mathematically possible given the underlying calibration equation adopted by the QCA package, it makes no logical sense in the actual cases where it happens (besides preventing the resulting value from further usage in downstream QCA analysis). Given the relatively abrupt slope shown in the graph immediately above the 0,5 threshold for fuzzy values, it seems reasonable to assume that those cases (with a 0,5 mathematical output for the fuzzy value) might be substantively closer to membership than not. So, we chose to override any 0,5 fuzzy value emerging from the calibration function with a notional 0,51, so as to unequivocally establish their membership condition[214].

A.2.8 Cabinets and legislatures´ composition

This section bring detailed information on the conceptual and data collection issues involved in the assembly of cabinet and legislature datasets used in this studies.

How partisan composition of cabinets is assessed – ministers´ partisanship and portfolio salience

Party membership by ministers is assumed as meaning their representation for the party, regardless of any occasional circumstances of nominations decided by presidents on an individual basis outside party channels (Schleiter, 2020, p. 306)[215].

[214] Avoiding any 0,5 score is a theoretical problem (Ragin, 2008, p. 131) as well as an algorithmic one, and although other procedures have been tried elsewhere (see Fiss, 2011, p. 407), imputing values based on the suggested substantive meaning of the raw data seemed an appropriate strategy.

[215] *The composition of the cabinet is defined by the set of legislative parties that formally hold cabinet posts. The term formally is included because presidents occasionally invite members of other parties to join the cabinet on the basis of "their technical ability, political skill, or public image" (Zelaznik 2001, 132) but without any commitment by their parties (Cheibub 2007, 74–75). The problem with this approach is that agreements between parties in presidential systems are generally not written down or made public. Hence, this study follows Cheibub (2007, 75) and assumes that ministers are representatives of their parties, and departs from this norm only when there is clear evidence against a party's membership in government.* (Freudenreich, 2016, p. 8)

Before classifying the coalitions by size, we need to define what a coalition government is. Following the specialized literature (AMORIM NETO, 2006; FIGUEIREDO et al., 2012; MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, 2012), the criteria utilized in the present study to identify them is the party affiliation of the ministers of the principal ministerial portfolios in each country, taking into account that ministers are not always recruited due to their connections or their congressional influence, and that in some cases they are not recognized by their parties as legitimate representatives of the

There are warnings in the literature on the perils of such direct association between party affiliation and political adherence to parties´ stance towards the government and the coalition, even from those ministers belonging to the president´s party (Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Chaisty & Cheeseman & Power, 2018, ch. 7; similarly, Morgenstern, Negri and Pérez-Liñán, 2008, pp. 163-164 warn that in many Uruguayan and Colombian cases, a presidential "fraction" within his own party is a better indicator of the core legislative support for the chief executive). However, empirical information regarding all those caveats is hardly available, so we must still adhere to party affiliation as the best possible proxy for such legislative support; although some repositories might correct those data points on an *ad hoc* basis, we won´t make any attempt at that. So, any disregard for party affiliation due to other circumstances will be dependent on the data repositories themselves performing such screening.

In applying the above parameters, all ministerial portfolios are being considered for all analytical purposes as similar in their relevance to cabinet membership. Indeed, that´s how the abovementioned precedents see and use them for generalizing concepts from cabinet compositions in a comparative approach. It doesn´t mean an *a priori* refutation of the plausible argument regarding the different weights each ministry can command in coalition negotiations. The point here is that such methodological precision is, at least for presidential systems, something of a frontier field (Camerlo & Martínez-Gallardo, 2022), which is yet to see comparative applications developed – most studies dealing with portfolio differences in political importance are, even now, case studies focusing on only one country (Camerlo & Coutinho, 2022; Manjón, 2022; Cuevas, 2022; Sánchez, 2022; Balmaceda, 2022; Batista, 2017, 2018; Mauerberg & Pereira, 2020; Zucco & Batista & Power, 2019[216]). So, as desirable as it might be to factor in those differential salience issues, we found no way to follow in those pioneer footsteps. Instead, we must still rely on the classical computation of one and the same political weight to each one portfolio.

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same[4]. This aim in mind, I consulted several specialists in some of the countries included in the sample and another three databases on coalition governments to check each observation [5]. Whenever the original data diverged from the information obtained from other databases, the final classification of the specialists was adopted. Next, the number of parties and seats of each coalition were compiled based on the corrected party composition of each cabinet [6]. (Meireles, 2016, pp. 12-13)

[216] The only partial exception, to our knowledge, being Martinez-Gallardo´s (2014) clustering of Latin American ministries between "core" and "non-core" portfolios based only on the duration of their formal existence in each country (assuming that more salient portfolios tend to exist more consistently than those created for more idiosyncratic reasons, such as opportunity or ideology).

The same goes for the very meaning of "party affiliation" for cabinet ministers: as Camerlo and Castaldo (2023)[217] point out, there are multiple degrees of partisanship (and corresponding political effects for office-holding) between a given minister and his or her political party. However, as they themselves reckon, "[e]mpirical operationalizations tend to be restricted to dichotomous categorizations […] the coding of partisanship has focused mostly on formal membership" (p. 1), their recent contribution being an exploratory recoding of a sample of cabinets in only three countries (only one of them in Latin America). That means all possible repositories still present a basically dichotomic coding, which we must unavoidably follow both in conceptualization and in our empirical assessment in a comparative fashion, as desirable as a finer granularity might be for occasionally digging deeper into the cases.

Another feature that can´t be put here in nuanced terms is the role of non-partisan ministers: it is indeed possible that the selection of those players for the cabinet is not exclusively a matter of personal trust, but embeds some strategic choices by the head of the executive instead (being either technocrats whose expertise is required or other outsiders who bring with them the support of specific social groups), as discussed in Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo (2017). However, our analytical equation fully revolves around Executive-Legislative relations, and we see no plausible way of incorporating into the model those indirect impacts of any possible non-partisan recruitment strategy on legislative support.

Sources to cabinet composition

Since our universe regards minority cabinets in Latin American democracies, and requires year-to-year listing of cabinet composition instead of simply tallying cabinet data points as they significantly change composition[218], we must seek data sources accordingly.

A tough task, surprisingly enough: Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo (2017, pp. 21 and 29) point to different datasets covering portfolio allocation (each with a different set of cases, criteria, and structure, making it hard to merge data or compare results), as well as scarce and unreliable data on party affiliation, which leads to loose

[217] A previous version of this point can be found in Camerlo and Coutinho (2019).

[218] Such as in Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter (2015, p. 12): "*Cabinet partisanship is recorded at the time of government appointment and we count a new cabinet each time (a) a government takes office after a presidential election or (b) more than half of the positions in a cabinet change hands.*"

definitions of ministerial partisanship (thus, to the overestimation of party representation in cabinets)[219]. Direct sourcing from case studies literature, narrative historical repositories such as Lexis Nexis, Keesing World Records and newspaper archives, is mentioned by some researchers (Freudenreich, 2016; Albala & Clerici & Olivares, 2023).

However, we could find few primary source repositories for automated data collecting of cabinet composition and duration across Latin America: remarkable among them, our preferred sources for almost all data included were Martínez-Gallardo and Camerlo (2018) and Camerlo and Martínez Gallardo (2023)[220].

As for other primary sources, Octavio Amorim Neto kindly shared with us his fieldwork records from the Venezuelan National Library, describing Venezuelan cabinets from 1979 to 1999 (Amorim Neto, s.d.), which were our preferred source for those country-years[221], as well as unvaluable bibliographical sources on Mexican cabinets (mainly, Torres, 2012).

Secondary data are sometimes an alternative. Among those, the most remarkable are Amorim Neto (2019; 2006, p. 425), which also refers a wide list of primary and secondary sources used for his compilation (the 2019 chapter was our source for Brazilian cabinet data); Nyrup and Bramwell (2020) provide tabulated data in a data repository, as well as several editions of the *Lateinamerika* Jahrbook edited by the Hamburg *Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde*[222].

In greater detail, our actual data sources for listing cabinets in each country-years have been the repositories in the Presidential Cabinets Project for Argentina[223], Chile[224], Colombia[225], Costa Rica[226], Peru[227], Uruguay[228]; Camerlo and Martínez-

[219] Poor documentation of cabinet composition and the absence of systematic coverage of party affiliation is also reported by Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter (2015, p. 12).
[220] A yet-to-be published comprehensive database encompassing most Latin American countries that was still not added to the published Presidential Cabinets Projetct, kindly shared with us by its co-editor Marcelo Camerlo through personal communication.
[221] André Borges and Adrian Albala, authors of other referred pieces of research (Borges & Thurgeon & Albala, 2020; Albala, 2017, 2017a) kindly offered their raw data, but their contents weren´t the same as those in our quest.
[222] Nyrup and Bramwell (2020) also briefly survey the existing repositories on cabinet membership across the world, and served as a check for some of our cabinet tables. Martínez-Gallardo and Camerlo (2018) are also mentioned as the main source for cross-checking Latin American polities in Silva (2022). Meireles (2016) also mentions a repository, but we haven´t been able to actually find it.
[223] Camerlo & Coutinho (2019a)
[224] Avendaño & Davila (2019)
[225] Guinand & Botero (2019)
[226] Naranjo (2019)
[227] Vera & Carreras & Inácio (2019); Nyrup & Bramwell (2020) used for partial data checks.
[228] Chasquetti & Buquet (2019).

Gallardo (2023) for the Dominican Republic, El Salvador[229], Honduras[230], Panama[231]; Nyrup & Bramwell (2020) for Bolivia[232], Mexico[233]; Amorim Neto, 2019 (p. 303-305, Table 16) for Brazil[234]; and Amorim Neto (s.d.) for Venezuela[235]. Some individual cases where the repositories seemed inconsistent in some data points were subjected to extended checks and, in very few of them, corrected accordingly, as recorded in the documentation available at the online replication data.

Consistent data weren´t found for Nicaragua, Guatemala and, for Venezuela (years 1978, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. Accordingly, from the expected 520 country-years of democratic cabinets from 1978 onwards, we´ve been able to cover 469 (90,19%) of them.

How legislatures are assessed in their partisan composition

Parliamentary tenure in presidential systems tend to be much less volatile than cabinet membership, since legislators are elected for a fixed term of office (instead of serving at the president´s pleasure). However, a parliament may present changes in its partisan composition along time, and particularly in election years. To cope with that, for each election year, we chose the legislators´ slate that held office for the largest share of the year – that is, if parliamentary elections are celebrated up to June 30 of a given year, the number of seats will be taken from their outcome (otherwise, the chambers´ composition will correspond to the results of the previous election - that is, will reproduce the previous year distribution). In all the other years, of course, parliamentary seat distribution will correspond to the most up-to-date information, considering that some countries (like Brazil) have year-on-year information on seat shares available[236], while for others only the last electoral outcome can be found. In cases of extreme party fragmentation where too many parties were recorded in

[229] Nyrup & Bramwell (2020) used for partial data checks.
[230] Nyrup & Bramwell (2020) used for partial data checks.
[231] Nyrup & Bramwell (2020) used for partial data checks.
[232] Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo (2023) used as source for the 2017-2018 period, as well as for data checks along the whole time span.
[233] With extensive corrections based on Torres (2012). We thank Octavio Amorim Neto for kindly indicating this book and supplying a copy.
[234] Figueiredo (2007) and IPEA (2022) served as secondary sources for data checking.
[235] Nyrup & Bramwell (2020) used for partial data checks. We are thankful for the kindness of Octavio Amorim Neto in supplying us with his working papers used for primary data collection of Venezuelan cabinets from 1979 to 1999.
[236] Which may stem from party-switching by legislators, changes in the party system and any other contingent factor that might change parliamentary composition between elections.

electoral data, we made sure that parties individually displayed in our tables for legislative composition encompassed at least 90% of each chamber´s number of seats (as well as all those included in the cabinet).

Sources to legislatures´ composition

For parliaments´ composition, as a general remark, most repositories present seat shares as of the election day for the polls considered each country-year (which disregards occasional party switching and party systems changes). Whenever year-on-year data were available from country-specific repositories, we used them. So, yearly composition data were gathered for the following legislatures: the Argentine Senate (HSN-AR, 2024), Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (CD-BR, 2024)[237], Brazilian Senate (SF-BR, 2024) and Uruguay´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate (PARL-UY, 2024).

Post-election legislature compositions were found for the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (Nohlen, 2005b, pp. 101-107; USAL, 2024), the Bolivian Chamber of Deputies (Nohlen, 2005b, pp. 147-148; TSE-BO, 2010; TSE-BO, 2017) and Senate (Nohlen, 2005b, pp. 148-149; TSE-BO, 2010; TSE-BO, 2017); Chilean Chamber of Deputies (SERVEL-CL, 2024) and Senate (USAL, 2024)[238]; Colombian Chamber of Deputies (Nohlen, 2002b, p. 342; Uniandes, 2024) and Senate (Nohlen, 2002b, pp. 345-347; Uniandes, 2024); Costa Rica´s Republic Legislative Assembly (Nohlen, 2005, p. 174; USAL, 2024; TSE-CR, 2014; TSE-CR, 2018); Dominican Republic´s Chamber of Deputies and Senate (for both, USAL, 2024; JCE-DR, 2024); El Salvador´s Republic Assembly (USAL, 2024; TSE-SV, 2015; TSE-SV, 2018); Honduras´ National Congress (Nohlen, 2005, p. 413; USAL, 2024; UE, 2013, p. 37; TSE-HN, 2017, p. 71), the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (USAL, 2024; INE-MX, 2015; IPU, 2018) and Senate (USAL, 2024; INE-MX, 2015a; IPU, 2018a); Panama´s Legislative Assembly (Mann, 2011,p. 349; Nohlen, 2005, pp. 529-530; USAL, 2024; TE-PA, 2024); in Peru, the previously existing (until 1993) Chamber of Deputies and

[237] Except for the years 1985-1986, whose data were unavailable by means of the information requests and were collected in Nohlen (2005b, pp. 225-226).

[238] Except for the periods 2014/2017 and 2018, whose composition data were retrieved from press sources (respectively, https://www.emol.com/especiales/2013/actualidad/nacional/carrera-presidencial/hemiciclo-senadores.asp and https://www.24horas.cl/politica/elecciones2017/asi-quedo-conformado-el-congreso-2018-2567709). Although the electoral data from the same source as for the Chamber of Deputies were available, those involved only the partial renewal of Senate seats at each election.

Senate (for both, USAL, 2024; Nohlen, 2005a, pp. 469), and the present unicameral Congress of the Republic (USAL, 2024; Nohlen, 2005a, pp. 468; CR-PE, 2024; CR-PE, 2024a); Paraguayan Chamber of Deputies (SILPY, 2024; USAL, 2024; Nohlen, 2005a, pp. 433) and Senate (SILPY, 2024; USAL, 2024; Nohlen, 2005a, pp. 434); and finally Venezuela´s Chamber of Deputies (USAL, 2024; Nohlen, 2005a, p. 576-577; CNE-VE, 2024) and Senate (USAL, 2024; Nohlen, 2005a, p. 578; CNE-VE, 2024a).

Some minor corrections have been made on the original data when inconsistencies emerged, based on primary and secondary sources. For a detailed record of every correction made and the specific location of each individual query on the many online national data repositories quoted, see observation worksheets on the replication data.

Dropping individual cases: Argentine parliamentary fractionalization, Colombian constitutional assembly and Chilean first democratic inauguration

Unfortunately, despite a wider availability of systematic data, we also found other shortcomings that jeopardized parts of that full range of country-years.

In the Argentine case, the main sources were Nohlen (2005b) and USAL (2024) for both the lower chamber and for the Senate. The first remarkable feature of the data is the striking proliferation of small regional parties holding one to three seats at Congress, as well as the changes in the very core of major parties who held larger caucuses: in the 1985 parliamentary elections, 13 parties were represented in the Chamber of Deputies, with the main two (PJ and UCR) holding 231 of the 254 seats (Nohlen, 2005b, p. 103), while after the 2009 elections 35 parties were formally assigned seats, and among them the 3 larger ones (since the PJ already had broken into two different caucuses) amounted to only 157 out of 256 mandates. That might already endanger future empirical assignments of policy preferences and pro-government stances, since countless contemporary party data would have to be available. That, however, might reflect a very widespread phenomenon of party system fragmentation and repositioning, as classically reflected in the Brazilian case. However, this empirical explosion seems to be the iceberg tip to a much more disquieting trend unveiled by the literature, that is, a systemic realignment of legislative alliances above and beyond parties. Lucardi (2010, pp. 640-641) points to a very specific loss of meaning of party labels in contemporary Argentine politics:

since 1995, denationalization of the party system means that electoral alliances are decided at provincial level (which brings province-specific meanings to party names and affiliation), and at the legislative arena the proliferation of parliamentary blocs allows for large variation in the individual members´ allegiances towards policy and government support within the same bloc. In a similar way, Rodríguez and Bonvecchi (2004) contrast the strongly cohesive parliamentary parties from 1984 to 1991[239] with overwhelming centripetal forces in the following years - namely, the "double loyalty" legislators owed both towards their national party label as well as towards the provincial party leaders that select legislative candidates, and the harsh cleavages between major leaders´ factions within the major parties (the Peronist infighting involving Carlos Menem against Eduardo Duhalde since 1995 and the spinoffs from UCR led by López Murphy and Elisa Carrió in the early 2000s). To circumvent such a complete redeployment of legislators´ positioning and reach a map of government-opposition cleavages, Lucardi (2010) performs an individual assessment for each parliamentarian, reaching a whole new configuration of "parliamentary parties" in the form of 13 "sectors" whose behavior towards the government (support, opposition or independence) is presumed in a systematic way – and, for most of them, entirely irrespective of formal party affiliation (in effect, both two main traditional parties in parliament, PJ and UCR, are split into subgoups of opposite predictable voting behavior)[240]. Leiras (2006, p. 73) found the Argentine party system "moderately

[239] At least for the two major players (UCR and PJ), who made up almost the Argentine Congress´ entire composition during that period.

[240] "*La variable dependiente es la composición de la Cámara de Diputados durante los períodos 2005-2007 y 2007-2009. Esto implica clasificar a los diputados de acuerdo al sector político al que pertenecen, lo que resulta problemático por varias razones. En primer lugar, el proceso de desnacionalización que el sistema de partidos argentino viene experimentando desde 1995 (Leiras 2006 y 2007; Calvo y Escolar 2005) hace imposible estimar la posición partidaria de los legisladores mirando la etiqueta bajo la cual se presentaron; los rótulos partidarios han perdido buena parte de su valor, y de todas maneras las alianzas electorales se deciden a nivel provincial, por lo que dichos rótulos pueden variar considerablemente de una provincia a otra. En segundo lugar, la Cámara de Diputados está excesivamente atomizada: entre 2005 y 2009 estuvo dividida en alrededor de 30 a 40 bloques, lo que dificulta clasificar a los legisladores de acuerdo al bloque al que pertenecen. Más aun, muchas veces ocurre que legisladores pertenecientes a bloques nominalmente distintos compartan importantes afinidades políticas. Por ejemplo, algunos diputados que han formado un bloque unipersonal votan consistentemente a favor del gobierno, en tanto que otros se encuentran siempre en la oposición; tales bloques deberian ser contados como oficialistas u opositores, no como sectores políticos independientes. Para hacer frente a este problema, el presente artículo agrupa a todos los diputados electos entre 2003 y 2007 bajo 12 rótulos distintos, que comprenden los principales sectores politicos en que estuvo dividida la Camara durante esos años. La pertenencia de cada diputado a alguno de estos sectores ha sido determinada en base a dos criterios. El primero es la actitud de cada diputado hacia los gobiernos de Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) y su esposa Cristina Fernández (2007-2011), es decir, si el diputado en cuestión fue oficialista u opositor. En segundo lugar, se tomó en cuenta*

fragmented and largely nationalized" from 1983 to 1999, but those characteristics broke down in 2001. Since then, UCR votes fell sharply in the metropolitan areas, opening strong niches for third parties with national ambitions, who (although clearly ideologically defined – Calvo & Escolar, 2005, p. 95), cannot tackle the nationalization challenge so as to be electorally competitive for national government. At the same time, splits in several provincial branches of PJ[241] created clusters of opposing factions who competed against each other electorally and in the chambers´ floors. Simultaneously, due to policy ineffectiveness and strong policy switches promoted by national governments headed by the two formerly main national parties, "the labels of established national parties experienced a significant loss of value over the period". That value loss enhanced the payoff of clientelist platforms for provincial leaders in national elections, decreasing even more the ability of parties to convey national policy orientation to members and legislators – that is, policy support is to be negotiated by presidents longitudinally across each main party, directly with provincial leaders[242]. This "provincialization" of parties makes coalition-building much more fragile if attempted trough parties, since not them, but other decision-makers (mostly encroached at provincial authority levels within the parties) are at the negotiating table with the president[243]. Another distorting possibility is that some of the fractional cleavages might be also moved by strong ideological preferences by some fractions, rendering them more prone to across-the-aisle systematic coalitions

la posible identificación del diputado con algun sector o líder politico en particular." (Lucardi, 2010, p. 640)

[241] Mostly presidentially-promoted, as intraparty power grabs by the newly-emerged Kirchner faction.

[242] This "provincialization" seems more a Peronist issue, while the other nationally-oriented parties have yet to overcome the burden of their lack of electoral clout in the provinces outside metropolitan Buenos Aires (over-represented in parliament), which makes them unable to fight for national power: "*Con la caída de la Alianza, la coordinación partidaria en la escala nacional se ha convertido, en el corto plazo, en un problema exclusivamente peronista. El justicialismo es hoy la única organización que tiene motivos para considerar este desafío. El resto del universo partidario está un casillero atrás en el tablero, procurando consolidar o recuperar sus organizaciones distritales*." (Leiras, 2007, p. 176). "*Dada su posición de partido electoralmente dominante pero no hegemonico, el Peronismo se ha beneficiado del surgimiento de terceras fuerzas débiles o volátiles alineadas ideológicamente, las cuales le permiten constituir alianzas institucionales e implementar políticas públicas a las que se opone alguna de sus facciones internas* [..]". (Calvo & Escolar, 2005, p. 195)

[243] "*En el contexto argentino, los partidos provinciales gozan de una gran autonomía y la resolución de los problemas de acción colectiva y coordinación no es sencilla. En consecuencia, la articulación entre lógicas de reproducción de escala provincial y lógicas de coalición de escala nacional adopta, durante el período analizado, la forma de la territorialización de la política electoral. Un sistema político territorializado es perjudicial para la democracia, en particular en lo que concierne a la elaboración de políticas públicas, ya que dificulta la formación de coaliciones nacionales que logren la cooperación de organizaciones que trabajan en provincias con entornos sociales y reglas del juego muy distintos.*" (Tuñón, 2007, p. 246).

with opposing governments that underwrite their main policy stances (something epithomized by the PJ´s strong support of Domingo Cavallo´s *reentré* into the *Alianza* government, nominally elected against his very platform)[244].

That historical development puts an unsurmountable conundrum to our methodological strategy: as already pointed out, we follow the cannonical approach in considering party affiliation as a proxy for coordinated political allegiances in coalition-building (although not dependent on any degree of party discipline, that is, allowing for political interference in such allegiances, specially towards non-cabinet parties). However, what we see in the post-1995 Argentine case are not consistent parties coalescing (suffering occasional *transfuguismo* and rebellions), but fractured parties forming factions *systematically* assuming pro-government and oppositional stances, at least for the two main legislative players up to 2016[245]. Adding to that watertight theoretical ban, there´s an almost unsurmountable empirical barrier: as Mainwaring and Su (2021b, pp. 23-24) describe, since from 2001 on "the Argentine party system underwent a process of tremendous denationalization", electoral data became structured only in district level as far as competing parties are concerned (which forced the authors to develop specific algorithms to "convert" district-dispersed voting distribution into post-electoral legislator groupings in the chamber)

[244] *In the first months of 2001 the Argentine economy, which had been sunk in a recession for two years, dropped further into crisis. The stock market plunged and President Fernando de la Rúa reacted by replacing Economy Minister José Luis Machinea with Ricardo López Murphy, who was seen as "the most orthodox of the economists close to Mr. De la Rúa" (nytimes.com 2001). Despite his credentials, the new minister failed to get political backing for his reform plan and was himself soon replaced by Domingo Cavallo, who had served five years as Economy Minister under President Carlos Menem. Crucially, the new minister not only had the required expertise, but also had powerful backers in the opposition PJ (*Partido Justicialista*), whose votes in congress were essential in granting him extraordinary powers to reform the economy (Lupu 2014).* (Martínez-Gallardo, 2014, p. 8)

[245] That is, for PJ and UCR; the other nationally-oriented "third forces" might be considered reasonably consistent in their behavior (as well as the new national player PRO, entering the national race for good in 2016), but, even so, the multiple scattered provincial electoral labels still lack any possible signaling in terms of policy preferences:

> "*En primer lugar, el Partido Justicialista, dominante pero no hegemónico, se encuentra atravesado por conflictos territoriales, donde distintos ejecutivos peronistas han cultivado candidturas y electorados no peronistas para disciplinar facciones internas o garantizar los votos necesarios en algunos contextos provinciales. En segundo lugar, la desaparición en la ultima eleccion del Radicalismo como partido político efectivo nacional es el resultado paulatino de la transferencia masiva en el interior del país de votos radicales duros hacia dirigentes justicialistas de fuerte impronta regional y del realineamiento del electorado radical volátil en dos nuevas terceras fuerzas de centroderecha y centroizquierda creadas alrededor de figuras políticas con origen partidario en la UCR. En tercer lugar, la regularidad del perfil histórico del electorado antiperonista no radical, el cual ha nutrido a las terceras fuerzas nacionales – con independencia de sus sesgos ideológicos hacia la izquierda o la derecha – a lo largo de los diez últimos anos*." (Calvo & Escolar, 2005, pp. 233-234.

– something that is materially impossible for our purposes given the availability of time and resources.

Under those circumstances, there´s no grounds for associating the major legislative parties with presidential support or opposition from the party affiliation alone – even allowing, as we do, for party indiscipline - since party membership in the chambers can be (and systematically is) split between consistent support and consistent opposition. That makes entirely inconsistent any attempt to characterize a minority or majority government from cabinet and chambers´ party composition alone, as we propose to do in following precedents in the literature[246]. Additionally, the democratic government took office only in December 12, 1983, which takes away any meaning for including that year in our sample. For those reasons, we must drop Argentine country-years for 1983 and from 1996 on, which reduces our sample by an additional 24 cases[247].

The Uruguayan case is not devoid of similar concerns, as Altman (2000) warns about the effects of party fractions ("*sublemas*") on coalition dynamics. The country´s electoral systems allows "competition among fractions without harming the two-party system" (p. 263): fractions control nominations, have their own identifiable ideological position within their party´s ideological range, and show high levels of legislative voting cohesion, while the president belongs to a fraction himself (thus, if fractions are considered, the president may lack a legislative majority even if his party is numerically majoritarian). For all those reasons, his coalition modelling is structured along party fractions, not parties at large. Cross-party coalitions (that is, those who include fractions from different parties) are considered possible, and even likely; although he mentions cases of coalition negotiations where fractions of opposing parties are considered for presidential cabinet sharing (such as pointed above in the Argentine case), even in those instances the deals are described as "focused on parties, rather than fractions, as actors" (p. 274), that is, parties as a whole are the main parameters for support gathering.

So, Altman claims, in theoretical terms, that intraparty factional divisions will strongly influence party behavior, but stops short of alleging that this influence will override party-level negotiations in terms of coalition formation and legislative

[246] To be able to reach such characterization, it would be necessary to reformulate both cabinet and legislature compositions according to other categories able to spot the effective and consistent support or opposition that is empirically observed, as the attempt by Lucardi (2010) exemplifies.

[247] Thus reducing coverage to 445, or 85,57% of the potential 520 cases.

support. Besides, his available empirical coverage of cabinet and chamber composition based on fractions (Altman, 2000, p. 275, Table 4) is limited to one single government (1990-1995)[248].

Other authors recognize the influence of intraparty fractional divisions, but give them less analytical clout. Morgenstern, Negri and Pérez-Liñan (2008, pp. 163-164) accede to measure Uruguayan presidential party size (that is, his "core legislative support") through the seat shares of presidential fraction, but only where such information is available (that is, not further than 1995) – anyway, without equating presidential legislative support as a whole (that is, coalition support) with the size of presidential fractions. Chasquetti (2018, p. 163) claims that this electoral rule that allows for fractions to individually compete within party voting in parliamentary elections has been changed as early as in 1996 - but, as per Magar and Moraes´ (2012, p. 5) caveat, only for the presidential race, while the *sublemas* system stayed in place for House and Senate candidacies. Magar and Moraes (2012, p. 5) also stress that "[i]nter-faction tensions are such that, even when a party has won a majority of seats, the Uruguayan party system has remained squarely on the highly fragmented camp", describing how coalition membership is actively pursued by factions as a way to enhance their leverage in approving the bills they initiate. In their assessment of fraction dynamics, those authors establish different degrees of fraction influence over bill approval according to their being in presidential coalitions or not, but do not posit any systematic position for fractions *vis-à-vis* presidential agendas, whether their parties are in cabinet coalitions or outside them. Empirically, they present legislative fraction data from 1985 to 2005, but without cabinet composition data, and partially differing from Altman´s list of fractions (Magar and Moraes, 2012, p. 6, Table I[249]). Morgenstern (2001) emphasizes the growing uncohesiveness of major parties (and cohesiveness of their fractions) from 1985 to 1994[250], which occurs along several distinct lines mostly according to the electoral cycle (that is, notably, without any systematic bias pro- and against the government in by any fraction of presidential and opposing parties). Concurring with Chasquetti (2011, p. 208), who reckons that

[248] Despite his mention to 116 country-year observations from 1989 to 1999 (p. 264), we could not find any publicly available supporting data covering that wider time frame (which, even so, would be much restricted *vis-à-vis* the whole democratic window in the country).

[249] Besides, their data is shown as "Assembly shares", which does clarify if the seat shares refer to the lower house or to both chambers taken as a whole, and they acknowledge that no data exist for fractions´ ideological or policy preferences.

[250] The partial exception being the Frente Amplio, which during that period was never the presidential party.

"[m]ost studies of discipline in the Uruguayan Congress show that the parties usually vote in a cohesive way" (especially the Frente Amplio), Zucco (2013) also assesses cabinet membership and legislative behavior in terms of fractions (extending from 1985 to 2010 but, again, presenting a fractions list that does not mirror-image the previous studies). His conclusions are that coalition dynamics is managed between presidents and fraction leaders, but

> [..] even after controlling for ideological distance, factions from the same party as the president act more in line with the executive than their ideology and even their cabinet membership would predict. So while Uruguay exhibits "organized factions and disorganized parties" (Morgenstern 2001), parties still have an independent effect, which is likely to have increased after electoral reforms eliminated the possibility of multiple presidential candidates per party (Zucco, 2013, p. 112)[251]

Another batch of studies does acknowledge, in different degreees of emphasis, the existence of fractions and their influence in explaining cabinet appointment strategies and legislative voting behavior, but nevertheless measure and compare governments around party affiliations alone (Chasquetti & Buquet & Cardarello, 2013, and Chasquetti, 2013, both covering all governments spread between 1985 and 2010[252]; González, 1991, 1995, extending a long-term view on the secular democratic history of the country up to the presidential terms following redemocratization). Lanzaro (2013) goes as far as identifying the growht of the Frente Amplio left-wing party in terms of national power with a convergence by the other two main players towards a more unified strategy that puts parties as a whole as the main negotiators at national policy discussions, so that Uruguay would growingly stand up to the characterization as a full-blown "party democracy" ("*democracia de partidos*").

All in all, we find that the similarities with Argentina in terms of party system fragmentation stop short of signalling the need for discarding the Uruguayan case. Besides missing adequate full coverage of fractions as analytical units in coalition negotiations, parties still seem to be relevant as the parameters for that (albeit subject to more noise and uncertainty than under ideal circumstances). Essentially, that´s

[251] The only exception Zucco to this logic is makes is the first Sanguinetti cabinet, in which the few cabinet members outside the presidential party were allegedly "personal nominations", making the government not really a cross-party coalition - which adds to the behavior of the leaders in the main opposition parties, an explicit rejection of joining the government (Zucco, 2013, pp. 107-108).

[252] That study adds an important empirical observation (concurring with Morgenstern, 2001): the left-wing Frente Amplio party, who ruled during three full presidential terms from 2005 on, had its presidents (Vázquez and Mujica) as all-party leaders located over and above its fractions, an admittedly uncommon feature that, nevertheless, affected a significant chunk of our period of interest.

because fractional movements are described in the literature as variable, subject to multiple influences, but in absolutely no case there´s mention to systematic cleavages inconsistent with party lines within parties regarding support or opposition to the president. In other words, presidents may gather support from fractions in opposing parties, and may even lose support from fractions of their own parties; any such condition, however, is contingent to context and circumstances, and does not jeopardize the expectations regarding a (much more) increased likelihood of support from factions within parties included in cabinet coalitions[253]. That could engender, at most, an undercounting of minority cabinets, since parties included in a coalition might not actually deliver votes according to their full legislative seat shares. However, as our previous discussions of party discipline suggests, this potential risk underlies the very assumption of cabinet membership as a measure of party allegiance to presidential positions in the legislature in any polity (having as its upside the possibilities opened for coopting oppositional fractions on behalf of a minoritarian president´s initiatives). That line of reasoning is reinforced by the widespread mention, in the relevant literature, of parties as relevant players in executive-legislative negotiations, and their presence as the measurement units for political power-sharing all but a very recent few of the reviewed studies on the Uruguayan system. Therefore, we do not discard Uruguayan cases from our sample.

For Colombia, the year 1991 had to be dropped due to the specific circumnstances around the Constituent Assembly[254]: this organ was elected specifically to write the new charter in December 12, 1990, but in July 4th, 1991, ordered the dissolution of the formerly elected parliament and assigned an *ad hoc* committee to act as a legislative counterbalance to the presidential administration until December 1st, 1991, inauguration date for the new Congress elected in October 27, 1991[255]. Such duality of powers and fragmentation among legislative sessions make extremely unlikely any stable logic of coalitional support like the ones we study here.

[253] The only exception on the record (the first Sanguinetti government) does not infirm opposing parties´ position *per se*, but, instead, their actual empirical standing as coalition members (given that their affiliates´ nomination is regarded as a personal choice by the president, which did not involve any kind of tacit or explicit agreement with those parties).

[254] Losing another year will bring coverage to 444, or 85,38 % of the potential 520 cases.

[255] Constitution of 1991, provisional articles 1,3,4, 6 and 14. For descriptive and analytical assessments to this processes, see Botero, Losada and Wills-Otero (2016, p. 345); and Calderón (2003).

Another last year dropped must be 1989 in Chile: although democracy indexes mark this time as democratic (maybe because acceptable constitutional rules were already in place), the first democratically elected president and congress took office only in 11/03/1990: it would make no sense studying minority government support with a closed parliament and the former dictator in place during the whole year of 1989.

So, our end count of democratic country-years in Latin America becomes 443 cases, or 85,19 % of the potential 520, according to democracy indexes, from 1978 onwards.

Mandates – occasional condition regarding emergencies

The cases involved in the exceptional circumstances mentioned in section 3.4 are those listed in Table 54 below. The first column shows the mandate (or term segment) – all of them being a one-year tenure under similar causal conditions. The second one ("LAME") is coded 1 if the year in question had a presidential election for that country[256],and 0 otherwise. The third column ("VICE") has value 1 if the president in charge was elected as vice-president in the previous election and is standing in for the elected president in the year considered, and 0 otherwise. The last column ("EMERG") is coded 1 if the incumbent president had not been elected in the presidential slate that won the previous election, and was chosen by whatever procedure to replace both of its members who resigned or were legally dismissed from office[257], or 0 otherwise. There were

Table 33 - Exceptional circumstances regarding one-year mandates – Case list

CASE_NAME	LAME	VICE	EMERG
AR-ALFONSIN-2-1989-1989	1	0	0
BO-MESA-1-2004-2004	0	1	0
BO-SUAZO-2-1985-1985	1	0	0
BO-VELTZE-1-2005-2005	0	0	1
BR-CARDOSO-2-1-2002-2002	1	0	0
BR-LULA-1-2-2006-2006	1	0	0

[256] Here, the discriminating factor is that the election was held in the given year, regardless of the inauguration date for the elected president (which in many cases may happen in the following year).

[257] Since our sample includes only countries who ranked positively in democracy assessments, all such replacements are assumed legal and not breaking any democratic rules for the country considered.

BR-LULA-2-1-2010-2010	1	0	0
BR-TEMER-1-2018-2018	1	1	0
HN-MICHELETTI-1-2009-2009	0	0	1
MX-FOX-2-2006-2006	1	0	0
MX-PENA_NIETO-2-2018-2018	1	0	0
MX-ZEDILLO-2-2000-2000	1	0	0
PA-MOSCOSO-2-2004-2004	1	0	0
PA-TORRIJOS-1-2009-2009	1	0	0
PE-BELAUNDE-2-1985-1985	1	0	0
PE-VIZCARRA-1-2018-2018	0	1	0
PY-WASMOSY-2-1998-1998	1	0	0
UY-BATTLE-2-2004-2004	1	0	0
UY-LACALLE-1-1994-1994	1	0	0
VE-VELAZQUEZ-1-1993-1993	0	0	1
Total amount[258]	15	3	3

Source: The author

Cabinet vs. congress congruence – data availability shortcomings

Section 3.3.3 warns of strong limitations on the availability of data for assessing party ideology across all the time and country ranges to our sample, which materially prevents the consideration of cabinet-congress congruence in our model. Every repository has some methodological limitation preventing them being used to our purposes - given that, contrary to other factual variables such as parliaments´ and cabinets´ composition, ideological or policy position scales cannot simply be collated from several sources across different countries or years.

In fact, some repositories lack party coverage at all: the Database of Political Institutions compiled by the Interamerican Development Bank (Cruz, Keefer & Scartascini, 2021) presents orientation estimations only for the 3 largest government parties and the largest opposition party. The outstanding V-Party database (Lindberg et. al., 2022) covers all the country-years of interest, but without every party represented in the lower chamber (and none that might be referenced to the senates only). Others are restricted to one country: Amorim Neto (2006); Power and Zucco (2012) and Bolognesi, Ribeiro and Codato (2022) offer Brazilian data; Barnes and Jang (2016, p. 307) inform on the Argentine parties. A wider assessment of countries (Albala & Clerici & Olivares, 2023) maps positions in a dicotomous variable (left/center-left vs. right/center-right), uncapable of showing the incremental changes

[258] The gross number of cases ascends to 20, and not 21 as the sum of all three columns might suggest, given that one case (the Temer presidency in Brazil, in 2018) was simultaneously a case of an incumbent who was previously a vice-president and who faced elections during the same year.

suggested by the congruence theoretical specification. Most data sources cover only a limited time horizon, thus forcing an undesired shortening of the available data for analysis, sometimes compounded by a limited number of countries within the region: by far the most quoted data source on party positions in Latin America, Coppedge (1997) doesn´t go beyond 1997; the same goes for the data collected in Deheza (1997) for some South American countries; Baker and Greene (2011) offers data from 1995 to 2008 (besides, we haven´t been able to follow their referenced links to online access to data); Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) use expert surveys conducted in 18 Latin American countries from 2006 to 2007; Wiesehomeier, Singer and Ruth-Lovell (2021) update those same countries but only to surveys in 2018-2019. Colomer (2005a) brings information from Latinobarometer annual surveys performed from 1995 to 2002 in 17 Latin American countries. The several studies based in the landmark PELA repository by the University of Salamanca (Sáez, 2022a), such as Saiegh (2015) – who uses data only from eight countries in the 2010—2011 round of surveys -, Araújo, Freitas and Vieira (2018), or Mello, Santos and Câmara (2020), suffer from the same informational shortcomings that this otherwise outstanding database presents for the specific purpose of estimating party policy positions: its shows data only from 1994 onwards (until 2020); moreover, its only survey respondents are elected parliamentarians for the lower chambers - for our purposes of gauging legislative parties´preferences, that might be an asset, but on the other hand the position of senators does not show up in the results.

A.2.9 Detailing the outlines to the scope condition

Section 5.1 states our scope condition as minority cabinets in Latin American presidential systems (with one country exception *ex ante*, Ecuador) under democratic conditions in the last "third wave" of democratization after 1978:

Latin American presidential systems…..

Presidential systems are automatically the universe of analysis, since there´s no historical record of parliamentary regimes in the region during the time span concerned. Latin America, by its turn, is not the only possible domain for the study of presidential governments: Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power (2018) emphasize that, although most of the literature on presidentialism is heavily reliant on the subcontinent, there´s an emerging reservoir of contemporary experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa and post-Soviet republics[259].

Choosing Latin America, more than just trying to leverage on more experiences available, means trying to align cases that – without ignoring internal diversity - hold strong similarities in significant institutional traits in presidentialism (Foweraker, 1998), as well as in most cultural and socioeconomic variables that might affect government results (Whitehead, 2006; Bethel, 1998; Palanza & Scartascini & Tommasi, 2016; for an overview of the strong association between shared historical trajectories and presidentialism´s features in all Latin America, see Cheibub, 2007, pp. 148-160[260]), besides close resemblances in their socioeconomic environment - that is, "a common history of Iberian colonization and similar insertion in the world economy" (Cheibub, 2006, p. 357). Besides, as already discussed in section 3.1.3, those countries´ insertion in the world economy – consequently, their vulnerability to

[259] Besides other previous cases in Asia, such as South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. An example in research using Latin American cases in tandem with others from outside the region on a quantitative basis, including a brief survey of its precedents, is Albala and Couto (2023).

[260] "*Roy C. Macridis and Richard Cox also argue that if areas are characterized by political as well as non-political uniformities, "the area concept will be of great value, since certain political processes will be compared between units within the area against a common background of similar trait configuration"; they cite Latin America as an example of an area offering the prospect of "fruitful intra-area comparison*." (Lijphart, 1971, p. 688). Crisp and Botero (2004, p. 330) reiterate the logic of such choice: "*Multicountry studies of presidential democracies in Latin America allow us to test the effects of institutional characteristics on legislative politics—institutional characteristics that are constants in single-country studies, notably in studies of the United States, where institutional constants are frequently implicit and assumed*."

many confounding factors in shaping economic outcomes - is much more similar among themselves than across all (or at least most) other groupings[261]. In a way, this choice is an attempt to minimize third variables´ variance, by selecting countries with a more similar background (Peters, 1998[262]); bringing all units of analysis within their Latin American context (that is, as similar as possible among them) is expected to raise unit homogeneity in causally relevant ways (Faletti & Lynch, 2010)[263]. Of course, the ever-standing problem of how to deploy a context-specific understanding of the causal relationships assessed will have to be considered in interpreting the results, although some degree of context dependence is somehow inevitable in studying human affairs (Flyjberg, 2006)

On the other hand, there´s a specific political feature that excludes Ecuador from the assessed universe: the literature points to the so-called "ghost coalitions" made of cabinet posts formally held by non-partisan officials but, in practice, informally controlled by parties[264] (Mejía-Acosta, 2006; Basabe-Serrano & Polga-Hecimovich & Mejía-Acosta, 2017), a pervasive situation at least until the constitutional changes in 2008 (Chaisty & Cheeseman & Power, 2018, cap. 6). That

[261] The difficulties of cross-national comparations based on economic variables are exemplified by the huge number of *ad hoc* controls that Armijo and Gervasoni (2010, p. 156) had to add to their statistical model who tried to estimate so little as the occurrence of very strong GDP falls (larger than 3% or 7%) on a given country-year.

[262] I.e., taking advantage of the fact that Latin American cases are "similar in a large number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other." (Lijphart, 1971, p. 687). In fact, all selected conditions (and the outcome) are, in principle, country-specific.

[263] Considering that virtually all of the explanatory conditions, besides the outcome, are nationwide variables, and as such would be completely pointless in any attempt at the "gold standard" strategy to get homogeneity, that is, to compare subnational units (Lijphart, 1971; Barnes & Jang, 2016; Snyder, 2001). Our strategy, however, still profits from another preferred "alternative way of maximizing comparability [which is] to analyze a single country diachronically" (Lijphart, 1971, p. 688), since several instances of a country´s government along time will be compared to each other. Such strategy has been deployed, for instance, by Bizzarro et. al. (2018, pp. 289-209) for trying their world-encompassing argument firstly on a subsample of East/Southeast Asian countries to provide "ex ante plausibility for making cross-country comparisons given that countries in the same region are likely to share many cultural, geographic, and historical features."

[264] *Although presidential coalition building has helped solve problems of multiparty presidentialism in several Latin American countries, including Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil, Ecuadorian coalitions differ in one important respect: they tend to be hidden from public view. Publicly visible cross-party coalitions are unpopular among Ecuadorian voters, who have become suspicious of the nature of political deals. Thus party leaders view public coalitions as nonviable politically, and negotiations between opposition parties and the government must be clandestine. Here, the absence of roll-call voting mechanisms in the legislature is crucial, for it allows vote-trading while protecting the electoral reputation of coalition partners who vote for unpopular economic reforms. At the same time, threats of ''going public'' with such arrangements provide an especially powerful enforcement mechanism to deter noncompliance.* (Mejía-Acosta, 2006, p. 70).

would heavily distort, during a long period of interest, both the identification of governments as majority and minority (the scope condition itself) and the measurement of some causal conditions such as the forty-percent threshold, all of them depending on the assumption, discussed in section 2.1, that sharing cabinet membership is the best proxy of a stable political alliance between parties (Amorim Neto, 1994, 1998; Chasquetti, 2008)[265].

… in third wave democracies

But we´re not selecting Latin American countries at large, but specifically Latin American democracies during the period in question: that´s not to say legislatures under authoritarian regimes don´t matter (Williamson & Magaloni, 2020; Schuler & Malesky, 2014; Gandhi, 2008), but the whole logic of both decisiveness and accountability factors is borne out of democratic theory, and possibly would be logically irrelevant (or at least much less relevant) within non-democratic polities. To evaluate democratic conditions, we propose as selection criteria, following Chaisty & Cheeseman & Power (2018), a double threshold: simultaneously, the widely regarded "POLITY score" produced by the Polity V Project[266] (Marshall & Gurr, 2020), choosing those countries whose value is no less than 6 for each given year (considered "democracies" according to the dataset categorization)[267], as well as the Freedom House (2022) repository[268] whose cases are specified as 'partly free' (less than 5 on a seven-point scale in which lower numbers indicate higher levels of

[265] In Ecuador, on the contrary, formal coalition membership was used to hide such agreements from the public:

> *When net popularity ratings are negative, the political liabilities of voting with the president exceed the expected benefits of government cooperation. At that point, party coalitions often adopt the form of clandestine alliances or ghost coalitions, where ad hoc agreements or "policy coincidences" take place between the government and parties from diverse affiliations, but any programmatic or long-term commitment is systematically denied (Mejía Acosta, 2004). The absence of voting records in the Ecuadorian Congress facilitated this informal mechanism of coalition formation. The resilience of ghost coalitions as a conventional legislative practice is the more remarkable since presidents and legislators from distinct political parties and tendencies acknowledged their existence from the early 1980s (Burbano de Lara and Rowland García, 1998; Grindle and Thoumi, 1993; Mills, 1984). Often, legislative agreements were disguised under a cloud of heavy criticism against the president with the purpose of projecting an image of political chastity or independence vis-à-vis other parties and potential voters.* (Mejía-Acosta & Araujo & Pérez-Liñán & Saiegh, 2006, p. 36)

[266] The same choice of repository as made by Chaisty and Power (2018), Martínez-Gallardo and Schleiter (2015), Martínez-Gallardo (2014), and Armijo and Gervasoni (2010) to discriminate between democratic and non-democratic countries.

[267] For an overview and short discussion of democracy indexes, see UNDP (2012).

[268] Freedom House scores were also used for selecting the universe where minority government were surveyed in Field and Martin (2022a).

freedom, averaging political rights and civil liberties). Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power (2018) and Bunker (2019) justify this double threshold as more accurate in the sense that it makes case selection sensitive to incremental changes that might be lost if only one of the repositories were used[269]; on the other hand, it prevents using data from 2019 onwards, since the last available data for Polity V ratings is 2018[270].

As becomes clear, those selection criteria don´t imply, in any case, selecting on any given value of both conditions and outcome, which by design circumvents any lack-of-variance arguments (King & Keohane & Verba, 1994). As for the outcome, the explicit examination of its presence (good policy performance) and absence, a standard QCA procedure, allows for its full range of possibilities[271].

[269] *The standard indicators that have been most commonly used to measure and compare levels of liberal democracy include Polity IV's scale of democracy–autocracy (from 1800–2007) and the Freedom House Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties (from 1972 to the present). Although forming the basis for many large-N comparative studies, each has certain strengths and weaknesses.* (Norris, 2012, p. 52)

[270] At this point, only from the standpoint of democracy indexes, we are left with potential 520 democratic Latin American country-years: Argentina, 1983-2018; Bolivia 1983-2018; Brazil 1985-2018; Chile 1989-2018; Colombia 1978-2018; Costa Rica 1978-2018; Dominican Republic 1996-2018; El Salvador 1985-2018; Guatemala 1996-2018; Honduras 1982-1984 and 1989-2018; Mexico 1997-2018; Nicaragua 1990-1992 and 1995-2015; Panama 1990-2018; Paraguay 1992-2018; Peru 1980-1990 and 2001-2018; Uruguay 1985-2018, and Venezuela 1978-2005.

[271] Indeed, the range of cases selected is, by design, population-wide, since it aims to cover the whole set of instances within those historically defined circumnstances (the dropped cases were due exclusively to data availability issues or, in the case of Ecuador, the skewed nature of cabinet membership as a proxy for coalition support in the "*coaliciones fantasma*").

The large-N QCA researcher may again choose to study the whole population of theoretically relevant firms (i.e., the set of cases relevant to a question) or select some subsample. For example, a researcher interested in understanding the causality of performance in a certain industry with many competitors may study all the competitors in the industry. (Greckhamer & Misangyi & Fiss, 2013, p. 58)

A.2.10 Affective polarization overview

Our preliminary appraisal of affective polarization uses the V-DEM results as the best proxy for such measurement (McCoy, 2024 [272]). To gauge affective polarization in the closest meaning for our purposes, we selected the most focused question about the issue within the political system, the "Political polarization" variable[273], specified as :

> Political polarization : V-Dem variable (v2cacamps)
> Question: Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?
> Clarification: Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces
> Responses:
>
> 0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.
>
> 1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.
>
> 2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.
>
> 3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.
>
> 4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.
>
> Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model (Coppedge et. al., 2022a, p. 227)

Table 55 shows the average raw figures for the ordinal values in the V-Dem repository within the countries considered in our sample for the period 1997-2021.

---

[272] *Measures of these different types and levels of polarization are impeded by a dearth of longitudinal comparative data covering Latin America as a region. Studies thus far, including all but one in this volume, are case based. Even the best comparative public opinion surveys do not consistently cover every country in every round and with every question. So, studying the phenomenon and its implications for democracy is complicated, and there is much to be done.*
Expert surveys by V-Dem provide the most comprehensive measures of polarization over time (back to 1900) and around the world (202 countries). It is, of course, a subjective measure, but V-Dem data provide an opening window into identifying larger patterns which can, and should, be examined with other qualitative and quantitative empirical measures, including public opinion surveys, elite opinion surveys, political party system measures, election results, discourse analysis, institutional analysis, and structural analysis. (McCoy, 2014, p. 163)

[273] There´s another "Polarization of Society" variable that measures how differences in opinions on major political issues result in major clashes of views and polarization in the society (McCoy, 2014, p. 163). Albeit undeniably relevant to measure the whole phenomenon, the more limited approach to political polarization is closer to our mechanismic argument in that it focuses strictly on the political sphere, which will be the one where decisionmaking negotiations will take place between the president and congress.

Figure 24 tracks that average measure, and points to a U-shaped trajectory where the first years of the third wave (basically, the late 70´s and the first half of the 80's) were highly polarized, after which polarization plummeted only to raise again steeply from 2015 onwards. It suggests that, overall, the recent surge in affective polarization is not unique, having been preceded by further periods of high polarization; besides, the upsurge happens to a considerable extent within years included in our sample (from 2016 to 2018).

Table 34 – Affective polarization – V-Dem proxy – average among countries in the sample – 1997-2021

YEAR	AVERAGE VALUE	YEAR	AVERAGE VALUE
1977	0,862867	1999	-0,63553
1978	0,889533	2000	-0,62533
1979	0,8004	2001	-0,747
1980	0,793333	2002	-0,67647
1981	0,730333	2003	-0,60367
1982	0,679133	2004	-0,59993
1983	0,598067	2005	-0,58907
1984	0,295067	2006	-0,44673
1985	0,075867	2007	-0,39033
1986	0,068467	2008	-0,45807
1987	0,0812	2009	-0,34347
1988	-0,05513	2010	-0,20607
1989	-0,01427	2011	-0,25733
1990	-0,44607	2012	-0,315
1991	-0,46313	2013	-0,2208
1992	-0,4182	2014	-0,1956
1993	-0,6684	2015	-0,17747
1994	-0,65047	2016	0,029333
1995	-0,57873	2017	0,1142
1996	-0,64667	2018	0,2574
1997	-0,73347	2019	0,440867
1998	-0,72433	2020	0,614267
		2021	0,595533

Source: The author, with data from Coppedge et. al. (2022a)



Figure 13 - Affective polarization – V-Dem proxy – average among countries in the sample – 1997-2021
Source: The author, with data from Coppedge et. al. (2022a)

Certainly, such blunt average measure has several flaws. First, it includes evey kind of regime each year, regardless of its democratic status (so, a significant portion of the fall in polarization in the first leg of the U-shaped graph is probably due to the democratization processes that gradually brought more and more countries out of confrontational dictatorships); second, averaging levels off very important differences between countries. This heterogeneity is shown in Figure 25 below, which displays the individual time series of polarization values for selected countries.



Figure 14 - Affective polarization – V-Dem proxy – individual values for selected countries – 1997-2021

Source: The author, with data from Coppedge et. al. (2022a)
Obs: For visualization purposes, the horizontal axis shows only the landmark years for our analysis (the initial and final years available, 1977-2021, and the two last years of our causal analysis, 2017 for lagged results and 2018 for contemporary results.

Here we can clearly see that different countries have very different stories regarding affective polarization: Mexico follows the *a priori* expectations of relatively low and stable polarization up until 2018, with a breakneck upturn afterwards; Brazil, in turn, shows such pattern but in anticipation, beginning the steep increase in 2013, as well as showing high polarization levels in the first democratic years from 1985 to 1993 (not considering the non-democratic years before, when polarization was recorded as higher than the 2021 value); Colombia shows a very limited increase only in 2020, departing from a considerably high level which started around 2001; finally, while El Salvador did significantly increase polarization from 2019 on, this upsurge reached far below the levels found until 1993 (that is, encompassing a long span since democracy indexes began to signal acceptable levels in 1985). Such heterogeneous trajectories find their origins in country-specific reasons, of course. Yet, they clearly refute the aprioristic idea that "affective polarization began in the late 2010's"; doing that, they support the claim that affective polarization variance may have empirical significance in our sample, both across countries and along time.

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