Online Appendix: 'Environmental Impacts and Public Opinion about International Trade. Experimental Evidence from Six OECD Countries'

A1 Additional Information on Samples

Dimension	Level	Population	Sample
Age	18-24	13%	13%
	25-34	18%	18%
	35-44	17%	17%
	45-54	18%	18%
	55-65	35%	34%
Gender	Female	52%	52%
	Male	48%	48%
Region	Northeast	18%	18%
	Midwest	21%	21%
	South	37%	37%
	West	23%	24%
Education	No college	42%	42%
	Some college	29%	29%
	College and more	29%	29%

Groups may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Source: https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps.html.

Table A1: **Sample information for the US**

Dimension	Level	Population	Sample
Age	18-24	12%	12%
	25-34	17%	17%
	35-44	17%	18%
	45-54	21%	22%
	55-65	34%	32%
Gender	Female	51%	51%
	Male	49%	49%
Region	Alberta	11%	11%
	British Columbia	13%	13%
	Manitoba	3%	3%
	New Brunswick	2%	2%
	Newfoundland and Labrador	2%	2%
	Nova Scotia	3%	3%
	Ontario	38%	38%
	Prince Edward Island	0.4%	0.3%
	Quebec	24%	24%
	Saskatchewan	3%	3%
Education	No college	43%	43%
	Some college	35%	35%
	College and more	22%	22%

Groups may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Source: https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E.

Table A2: **Sample information for Canada**

Dimension	Level	Population	Sample
Age	18-24	15%	11%
	25-34	22%	23%
	35-44	22%	23%
	45-54	22%	22%
	55-65	20%	21%
Gender	Female	50%	49%
	Male	50%	51%
Region	New South Wales	32%	318%
	Victoria	25%	25 %
	Queensland	20%	21%
	South Australia	7%	8%
	Western Australia	11%	11%
	Tasmania	2%	2%
	Northern Territory	1%	1%
	Australian Capital Territory	2%	2%
Education	Year 12 and below	42%	44%
	Certificate	23%	22%
	Advanced diploma or diploma	10%	10%
	Bachelor degree and above	26 %	24%

Groups may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Source: https://www.abs.gov.au/census.

Table A3: **Sample information for Australia**

Dimension	Level	Population	Sample
Age	18-24	14%	11%
	25-34	20%	20%
	35-44	22%	22%
	45-54	22%	23%
	55-65	23%	23%
Gender	Female	50%	50%
	Male	50%	50%
Region	Region Parisienne	20%	20%
	Nord-Ouest	23%	23%
	Nord-Est	23%	22%
	Sud-Ouest	11%	11%
	Sud-Est	24%	24%
Education	Low	27%	22%
	Medium	44%	47%
	High	30 %	32%

Groups may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Source: Eurostat 2013.

Table A4: **Sample information for France**

Dimension	Level	Population	Sample
Age	18-24	12%	12%
	25-34	19%	19%
	35-44	20%	21%
	45-54	26%	26%
	55-65	22%	22%
Gender	Female	49%	49%
	Male	51%	51%
Region	Nielsen I	16%	16%
	Nielsen II	22%	21%
	Nielsen IIIa	14%	14%
	Nielsen IIIb	13%	13%
	Nielsen IV	16%	16%
	Nielsen V(a&b)	5%	5%
	Nielsen VI	8%	8%
	Nielsen VII	8%	8%
Education	Low	17%	17%
	Medium	57%	58%
	High	25%	25%

Groups may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Source: Eurostat 2013.

Table A5: **Sample information for Germany**

Dimension	Level	Population	Sample
Age	18-24	13%	14%
	25-34	21%	22%
	35-44	22%	23%
	45-54	24%	24%
	55-65	20%	18%
Gender	Female	50%	52%
	Male	50%	48%
Region	Région lémanique	19%	19%
	Espace Mittelland	22%	23%
	Nordwestschweiz	14%	14%
	Zürich	18%	19%
	Ostschweiz	14%	14%
	Zentralschweiz	10%	10%
	Ticino	4%	1%
Education	Low	15%	16%
	Medium	50%	48%
	High	35%	35%

Groups may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Source: Eurostat 2013.

Table A6: **Sample information for Switzerland**

A2 Treatment conditions

All treatments are introduced by the following two passages:

Please read the following information.

There has been some discussion about the relationship between international trade and protection of the environment.

A2.1 Treatment 1 – T1

There is a lot of evidence that, overall, the effects of international trade on environmental protection both in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades are positive.

International trade creates wealth that can be used for better environmental protection in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] as well as in the countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades. International trade also promotes the development and spread of environmentally friendly technologies whose use reduces pollution and waste both in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and its trade partner countries.

In brief, international trade supports environmental protection efforts and improves environmental conditions both in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades.

Please take a look at the following illustration.



A2.2 Treatment 2 – T2

There is a lot of evidence that, overall, the effects of international trade on environmental protection both in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades are negative.

The production and consumption of goods that are traded internationally, such as machines, steel, cement, paper, chemicals, food, metals, cars, or electronic devices damage the environment. Increased economic competition through international trade also puts pressure on policymakers to lower environmental standards both in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and in countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades, so as to maintain the competitiveness of exporting firms.

In brief, international trade undermines environmental protection efforts and worsens environmental conditions both in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades.

Please take a look at the following illustration.



A2.3 Treatment 3 – T3

There is a lot of evidence that, overall, the effects of international trade on environmental protection in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] are positive, but that the effects on environmental protection in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades are negative.

On the one hand, international trade creates wealth that can be used for better environmental protection in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY]. International trade also promotes the development and spread of environmentally friendly technologies whose use reduces pollution and waste in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY].

On the other hand, the production of goods such as machines, steel, cement, paper, chemicals, food, metals, cars, or electronic devices, which are exported from other countries to [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY], damages the environment in those other countries. Increased economic competition through international trade also puts pressure on policymakers in those countries to lower their environmental standards, so as to maintain the competitiveness of exporting firms.

In brief, international trade supports environmental protection efforts and improves environmental conditions in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY]. But it undermines environmental protection efforts and worsens environmental conditions in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades.

Please take a look at the following illustration.



A3 Treatment 4 – T4

There is a lot of evidence that, overall, the effects of international trade on environmental protection in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] are negative, but that the effects on environmental protection in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades are positive.

On the one hand, the production of goods such as machines, steel, cement, paper, chemicals, food, metals, cars, or electronic devices, which are exported from [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] to other countries, damages the environment in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY]. Increased economic competition through international trade also puts pressure on policymakers in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] to lower environmental standards, so as to maintain the competitiveness of exporting firms.

On the other hand, in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades, international trade creates wealth that can be used for better environmental protection. International trade also promotes the development and spread of environmentally friendly technologies whose use reduces pollution and waste in those countries.

In brief, international trade undermines environmental protection efforts and worsens environmental conditions in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY], but supports environmental protection efforts and improves environmental conditions in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades.

Please take a look at the following illustration.



A4 Balance tests

	Age	Gender	Political Ideology
(Intercept)	41.90***	0.00	4.03***
	(0.35)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Helps both (T1)	1.56**	0.05	0.04
	(0.49)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Hurts both (T2)	1.23*	0.06	−0.01
	(0.49)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Hurts abroad (T3)	1.49**	0.08	0.01
	(0.49)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Hurts home (T4)	0.48	−0.01	−0.05
	(0.49)	(0.07)	(0.06)
R^2	0.00		0.00
Adj. R^2	0.00		-0.00
Num. obs.	7543	7543	6186
RMSE	13.58		1.53
AIC		10462.56	
BIC		10497.20	
Log Likelihood		-5226.28	
Deviance		10452.56	

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A7: **Balance table: Age, Gender, Political Ideology**

	Income	Employment	Education	Financial Situation
(Intercept)	5.83***	0.58***	0.38***	3.14***
	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Helps both (T1)	−0.06	−0.03	−0.10	0.00
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.06	−0.07	−0.04	0.02
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Hurts abroad (T3)	−0.11	−0.00	−0.06	−0.01
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Hurts home (T4)	−0.02	0.06	−0.13	0.03
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
R^2	0.00			0.00
Adj. R^2	-0.00			-0.00
Num. obs.	6526	7543	7517	7385
RMSE	3.81			1.09
AIC		9882.24	10250.00	
BIC		9916.89	10284.63	
Log Likelihood		-4936.12	-5120.00	
Deviance		9872.24	10240.00	

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A8: **Balance table: Income, Employment, Education and Financial Situation**

	Environmental Concern	Climate Scepticism	Trade Knowledge	Nationalism
(Intercept)	−1.01***	1.11***	2.10***	3.89***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Helps both (T1)	−0.05	0.08	0.01	−0.02
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Hurts both (T2)	0.05	0.12	0.03	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Hurts abroad (T3)	−0.13	−0.13	0.05	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Hurts home (T4)	0.03	−0.04	0.04	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.05)
AIC	8698.47	8095.76		
BIC	8733.12	8130.20		
Log Likelihood	-4344.24	-4042.88		
Deviance	8688.47	8085.76		
Num. obs.	7543	7233	7543	7217
R^2			0.00	0.00
Adj. R^2			0.00	0.00
RMSE			0.79	1.30

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A9: **Balance table: Environmental Concern, Climate Scepticism, Trade Knowledge, Nationalism**

A5 Manipulation check

	Baseline
(Intercept)	3.29***
	(0.05)
Helps both (T1)	0.68***
	(0.05)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.36***
	(0.05)
Hurts abroad (T3)	0.05
	(0.05)
Hurts home (T4)	−0.03
	(0.05)
Germany	0.17**
	(0.05)
USA	0.64***
	(0.06)
Canada	0.51***
	(0.06)
Switzerland	0.13*
	(0.05)
Australia	0.42***
	(0.06)
R^2	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.09
Num. obs.	6798
RMSE	1.30

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A10: **Manipulation Check**

A6 Regression tables

	Oppose	Have not thought about it	Dont know
Intercept	-0.40^{**}	0.15	-0.60^{**}
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.19)
Helps both (T1)	0.13	0.19^{*}	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.04	0.12	-0.39^{**}
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.06	0.20^{*}	-0.24
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Hurts home (T4)	0.11	0.30^{**}	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Age	-0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.24^{***}	0.98^{***}	0.25
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)
USA	0.19	0.33^{***}	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Canada	0.63^{***}	0.82^{***}	0.59^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Switzerland	1.05^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Australia	0.33^{**}	0.76^{***}	0.38^{*}
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
AIC	18988.54	18988.54	18988.54
BIC	19217.18	19217.18	19217.18
Log Likelihood	-9461.27	-9461.27	-9461.27
Deviance	18922.54	18922.54	18922.54
Num. obs.	7543	7543	7543

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A11: **Experimental results – Trade restrictions: Economic**

	Trade Perception: (Egotropic)	Trade Perception: (Sociotropic)	Trade Restriction: (Environment)
Intercept	4.01^{***}	4.10^{***}	4.23^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Helps both (T1)	0.23^{***}	0.33^{***}	-0.13^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.23^{***}	-0.27^{***}	0.11^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.02	-0.03	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hurts home (T4)	-0.18^{***}	-0.22^{***}	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.35^{***}	0.59^{***}	-0.73^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
USA	0.43^{***}	0.39^{***}	-0.31^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Canada	0.54^{***}	0.64^{***}	-0.52^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Switzerland	0.34^{***}	0.42^{***}	-0.58^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Australia	0.38^{***}	0.40^{***}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.05	0.04
Num. obs.	6747	6951	6923
RMSE	1.23	1.29	1.26

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A12: **Experimental result**

A6.1 Heterogeneous treatment effects

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	4.15^{***}	4.27^{***}	3.96^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Helps both (T1)	0.23^{**}	0.34^{***}	-0.13
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.29^{***}	-0.44^{***}	0.26^{**}
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.08	-0.10	0.21^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Hurts home (T4)	-0.25^{**}	-0.32^{***}	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Nationalism	-0.23^{**}	-0.30^{***}	0.49^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.00	0.00	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.36^{***}	0.60^{***}	-0.74^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
USA	0.43^{***}	0.38^{***}	-0.31^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Canada	0.55^{***}	0.64^{***}	-0.52^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Switzerland	0.35^{***}	0.42^{***}	-0.59^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Australia	0.39^{***}	0.41^{***}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
T1 x Nationalism	-0.01	-0.02	0.03
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T2 x Nationalism	0.08	0.25^{*}	-0.21^{*}
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
T3 x Nationalism	0.09	0.10	-0.19
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
T4 x Nationalism	0.11	0.16	-0.00
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.05	0.07
Num. obs.	6580	6777	6804
RMSE	1.22	1.28	1.25

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A13: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Nationalism**

	Oppose	Have not thought	Dont know
Intercept	0.11	0.48^{**}	-0.51^{*}
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.26)
Helps both (T1)	0.11	0.04	−0.09
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.26)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.14	0.07	-0.60^{*}
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.29)
Hurts abroad (T3)	−0.34	0.16	−0.54
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.28)
Hurts home (T4)	0.55^{**}	0.72^{***}	0.36
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.28)
Nationalism	-0.97^{***}	-0.70^{***}	-0.74^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Age	0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.28^{***}	1.02^{***}	0.32
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.19)
USA	0.18	0.30^{**}	−0.07
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Canada	0.67^{***}	0.82^{***}	0.61^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Switzerland	1.10^{***}	0.57^{***}	0.26
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Australia	0.37^{**}	0.78^{***}	0.30
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.17)
T1 x Nationalism	−0.00	0.20	−0.12
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.33)
T2 x Nationalism	0.14	0.03	0.21
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.35)
T3 x Nationalism	0.43	0.06	0.39
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.34)
T4 x Nationalism	-0.50^{*}	-0.49^{*}	−0.62
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.34)
AIC	17728.81	17728.81	17728.81
BIC	18059.25	18059.25	18059.25
Log Likelihood	-8816.41	-8816.41	-8816.41
Deviance	17632.81	17632.81	17632.81
Num. obs.	7217	7217	7217

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A14: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Nationalism**

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	3.97***	4.06***	4.12***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Helps both (T1)	0.21***	0.31***	−0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.15**	−0.20***	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hurts abroad (T3)	0.01	−0.02	0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hurts home (T4)	−0.15**	−0.21***	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Environmental Concern	0.12	0.11	0.29***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.35***	0.59***	−0.74***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
USA	0.43***	0.39***	−0.31***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Canada	0.54***	0.63***	−0.54***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Switzerland	0.34***	0.42***	−0.60***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Australia	0.39***	0.40***	−0.30***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
T1 x Environmental Concern	0.09	0.07	−0.16
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
T2 x Environmental Concern	−0.30**	−0.27*	−0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
T3 x Environmental Concern	−0.14	−0.05	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
T4 x Environmental Concern	−0.10	−0.07	−0.11
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	6747	6951	6923
RMSE	1.22	1.29	1.26

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A15: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Environmental Concern**

	Oppose	Have not thought	Dont know
Intercept	-0.47^{**}	0.14	-0.54^{**}
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Helps both (T1)	0.19	0.24^{*}	-0.05
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.02	0.15	-0.39^{*}
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.01	0.27^{*}	-0.29
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Hurts home (T4)	0.08	0.30^{**}	-0.29
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Environmental Concern	0.23	0.05	-0.23
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)
Age	-0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.24^{***}	0.98^{***}	0.25
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)
USA	0.19	0.33^{***}	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Canada	0.62^{***}	0.83^{***}	0.58^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Switzerland	1.04^{***}	0.52^{***}	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Australia	0.33^{**}	0.77^{***}	0.38^{*}
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
T1 x Environmental Concern	-0.20	-0.17	-0.13
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.34)
T2 x Environmental Concern	-0.10	-0.15	0.02
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.35)
T3 x Environmental Concern	-0.20	-0.26	0.20
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.34)
T4 x Environmental Concern	0.11	0.00	0.77^{*}
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.32)
AIC	18995.12	18995.12	18995.12
BIC	19327.68	19327.68	19327.68
Log Likelihood	-9449.56	-9449.56	-9449.56
Deviance	18899.12	18899.12	18899.12
Num. obs.	7543	7543	7543

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A16: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Environmental Concern**

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	4.15^{***}	4.26^{***}	4.14^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Helps both (T1)	0.17^{*}	0.21^{**}	-0.11
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.20^{**}	-0.21^{**}	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.04	-0.04	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Hurts home (T4)	-0.16^{*}	-0.17^{*}	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Gender	-0.23^{***}	-0.25^{***}	0.13
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.00^{*}	-0.00	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.35^{***}	0.59^{***}	-0.73^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
USA	0.43^{***}	0.39^{***}	-0.31^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Canada	0.54^{***}	0.64^{***}	-0.52^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Switzerland	0.35^{***}	0.43^{***}	-0.58^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Australia	0.38^{***}	0.40^{***}	-0.29^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
T1 x Gender	0.14	0.24^{*}	-0.04
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T2 x Gender	-0.03	-0.11	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T3 x Gender	0.05	0.03	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T4 x Gender	-0.03	-0.11	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.06	0.05
Num. obs.	6747	6951	6923
RMSE	1.22	1.28	1.26

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A17: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Gender**

	Oppose	Have not thought	Dont know
Intercept	−0.20	−0.22	−0.86***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)
Helps both (T1)	0.19	0.26	−0.00
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.06	0.12	−0.02
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Hurts abroad (T3)	−0.07	0.20	−0.35
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Hurts home (T4)	0.05	0.23	−0.19
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Gender	−0.33*	0.52***	0.41*
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)
Age	−0.00	−0.01***	−0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.24***	0.98***	0.26
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)
USA	0.19	0.31**	0.00
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Canada	0.63***	0.82***	0.59***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Switzerland	1.06***	0.49***	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.17)
Australia	0.33**	0.77***	0.38*
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
T1 x Gender	−0.11	−0.14	−0.17
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.29)
T2 x Gender	0.06	−0.04	−0.75*
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.30)
T3 x Gender	0.02	−0.01	0.17
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.29)
T4 x Gender	0.13	0.14	0.22
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.29)
AIC	18793.98	18793.98	18793.98
BIC	19126.54	19126.54	19126.54
Log Likelihood	-9348.99	-9348.99	-9348.99
Deviance	18697.98	18697.98	18697.98
Num. obs.	7543	7543	7543

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A18: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Gender**

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	3.91***	4.00***	4.38***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Helps both (T1)	0.32*	0.49***	−0.22
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.46**	−0.44**	0.17
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Hurts abroad (T3)	−0.04	0.00	−0.01
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Hurts home (T4)	−0.29*	−0.51***	0.10
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Left-Right	0.04	0.04	−0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.33***	0.60***	−0.71***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
USA	0.42***	0.38***	−0.26***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Canada	0.53***	0.63***	−0.53***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Switzerland	0.30***	0.40***	−0.56***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Australia	0.40***	0.46***	−0.28***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
T1 x Left-Right	−0.03	−0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
T2 x Left-Right	0.06	0.04	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
T3 x Left-Right	−0.00	−0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
T4 x Left-Right	0.03	0.07*	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.05	0.04
Num. obs.	5741	5881	5859
RMSE	1.21	1.28	1.27

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A19: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Left-Right**

	Oppose	Have not thought	Dont know
Intercept	0.30	0.62^{*}	-0.51
	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.40)
Helps both (T1)	-0.09	0.07	-0.51
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.51)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.30	0.11	-0.84
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.53)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.45	0.09	-0.07
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.50)
Hurts home (T4)	0.22	0.30	0.43
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.49)
Left-Right	-0.16^{***}	-0.14^{**}	-0.18^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Age	-0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.01^{**}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.13^{***}	0.91^{***}	0.22
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.21)
USA	0.13	0.19	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.20)
Canada	0.56^{***}	0.62^{***}	0.59^{**}
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.19)
Switzerland	0.97^{***}	0.46^{***}	0.21
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.20)
Australia	0.34^{**}	0.67^{***}	0.22
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.20)
T1 x Left-Right	0.06	0.04	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)
T2 x Left-Right	0.06	0.01	0.15
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)
T3 x Left-Right	0.09	0.04	-0.00
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)
T4 x Left-Right	-0.03	0.02	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)
AIC	15199.33	15199.33	15199.33
BIC	15522.37	15522.37	15522.37
Log Likelihood	-7551.66	-7551.66	-7551.66
Deviance	15103.33	15103.33	15103.33
Num. obs.	6186	6186	6186

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A20: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Left-Right**

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	3.92^{***}	3.98^{***}	4.29^{***}
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Helps both (T1)	0.17	0.34^{***}	-0.22^{*}
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.33^{***}	-0.27^{**}	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.16	-0.05	0.16
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Hurts home (T4)	-0.23^{*}	-0.23^{*}	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Income	0.03^{**}	0.04^{***}	-0.02^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.34^{***}	0.60^{***}	-0.70^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
USA	0.34^{***}	0.29^{***}	-0.23^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Canada	0.43^{***}	0.52^{***}	-0.41^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Switzerland	0.23^{***}	0.32^{***}	-0.48^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Australia	0.21^{***}	0.25^{***}	-0.16^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
T1 x Income	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
T2 x Income	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
T3 x Income	0.02	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
T4 x Income	0.01	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.05
Num. obs.	5913	6086	6045
RMSE	1.23	1.29	1.27

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A21: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Income**

	Oppose	Have not thought	Dont know
Intercept	-0.55^{**}	0.09	-0.16
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.26)
Helps both (T1)	0.21	0.34	-0.39
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.29)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.11	-0.10	-1.07^{***}
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.02	0.23	-0.98^{***}
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.29)
Hurts home (T4)	0.22	0.67^{***}	-0.40
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.29)
Income	0.04^{*}	-0.02	-0.13^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age	-0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.17^{***}	0.98^{***}	0.21
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.19)
USA	0.05	0.43^{***}	0.08
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Canada	0.48^{***}	0.92^{***}	0.72^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Switzerland	0.92^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.08
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Australia	0.08	0.88^{***}	0.49^{**}
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.18)
T1 x Income	-0.00	-0.02	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
T2 x Income	0.01	0.04	0.11^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
T3 x Income	-0.00	-0.01	0.14^{**}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
T4 x Income	-0.01	-0.05	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
AIC	16212.45	16212.45	16212.45
BIC	16538.06	16538.06	16538.06
Log Likelihood	-8058.23	-8058.23	-8058.23
Deviance	16116.45	16116.45	16116.45
Num. obs.	6526	6526	6526

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A22: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Income**

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	3.76***	3.79***	4.44***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Helps both (T1)	0.37***	0.42***	−0.19**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Hurts both (T2)	−0.13*	−0.17**	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Hurts abroad (T3)	0.10	0.09	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Hurts home (T4)	−0.08	−0.11	−0.10
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Education	0.34***	0.39***	−0.27***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Age	−0.00	0.00	−0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.40***	0.65***	−0.78***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
USA	0.39***	0.34***	−0.28***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Canada	0.52***	0.60***	−0.49***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Switzerland	0.43***	0.54***	−0.67***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Australia	0.52***	0.59***	−0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
T1 x Education	−0.23**	−0.16	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T2 x Education	−0.17*	−0.17*	0.18*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T3 x Education	−0.21**	−0.21**	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
T4 x Education	−0.17*	−0.19*	0.14
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.05
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.05	0.05
Num. obs.	6728	6933	6899
RMSE	1.22	1.29	1.26

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A23: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Education**

	Oppose	Have not thought	Dont know
Intercept	-0.97^{***}	0.21	-0.67^{**}
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.26)
Helps both (T1)	0.11	0.10	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Hurts both (T2)	0.00	0.03	−0.39
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.24)
Hurts abroad (T3)	0.03	0.15	−0.23
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.23)
Hurts home (T4)	0.26	0.27	−0.03
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.23)
Education	0.63^{***}	−0.10	0.08
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Age	−0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.38^{***}	0.98^{***}	0.23
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)
USA	0.09	0.33^{***}	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Canada	0.54^{***}	0.81^{***}	0.59^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Switzerland	1.34^{***}	0.50^{***}	0.10
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Australia	0.77^{***}	0.75^{***}	0.39^{*}
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.19)
T1 x Education	0.07	0.17	−0.27
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.29)
T2 x Education	−0.07	0.14	−0.01
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.30)
T3 x Education	−0.14	0.10	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.30)
T4 x Education	−0.23	0.05	−0.06
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.29)
AIC	18873.73	18873.73	18873.73
BIC	19206.12	19206.12	19206.12
Log Likelihood	-9388.86	-9388.86	-9388.86
Deviance	18777.73	18777.73	18777.73
Num. obs.	7517	7517	7517

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A24: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects – Education**

A6.2 Additional Evidence by Country



Figure A1: **Treatment effects on *Trade Restrictions: economic* by country.** *Notes:* 1) Ranges represent 95% confidence intervals; dots represent unstandardised coefficients from a multinomial logistic regression. 3) The solid grey vertical line represents marks 1, ergo a null-effect.

A7 Treatment 5

Our empirical setup also included a fifth treatment condition. This treatment repeated the information of treatment 3 (hurt abroad) and additionally emphasised that the environmental consequences abroad are stronger.

Treatment 5 Wording

There is a lot of evidence that, overall, the effects of international trade on environmental protection in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] are positive, but that the effects on environmental protection in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades are negative.

On the one hand, international trade creates wealth that can be used for better environmental protection in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY]. International trade also promotes the development and spread of environmentally friendly technologies whose use reduces pollution and waste in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY].

On the other hand, increasingly tough environmental protection standards in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] have pushed highly polluting industrial production out of [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] and into other countries that have weaker environmental protection standards. Such goods include for example machines, steel, cement, paper, chemicals, food, metals, cars, or electronic devices. These goods are then exported from other countries to [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY]. As a result, the environment in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] has become cleaner while consumers in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] are still able to buy all the goods they want. But environmental conditions in countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades have become worse, because the environmental damage from producing many goods that people in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] consume now takes place in other countries.

In brief, international trade supports environmental protection efforts and helps improve environmental conditions in [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY]. But it does so at the expense of environmental protection efforts in other countries with whom [INSERT RESPONDENT'S COUNTRY] trades.

Please take a look at the following illustration.



Results

By and large, we do not observe any systematic changes in the results of T3 when combining Treatment 3 and Treatment 5. Only the coefficient for T3 and the response *Don't know* in Table A26 now reaches statistical significance. However, this is entirely a function of the smaller standard errors. The point estimate remains essentially the same.

	Trade perception Egotropic	Trade perception Sociotropic	Trade restrictions Environment
Intercept	4.02^{***}	4.10^{***}	4.23^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Helps both (T1)	0.23^{***}	0.33^{***}	-0.13^{**}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.23^{***}	-0.27^{***}	0.11^{*}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.02	-0.05	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Hurts home (T4)	-0.18^{***}	-0.22^{***}	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	0.36^{***}	0.59^{***}	-0.73^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
USA	0.44^{***}	0.40^{***}	-0.31^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Canada	0.53^{***}	0.62^{***}	-0.51^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Switzerland	0.36^{***}	0.43^{***}	-0.55^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Australia	0.42^{***}	0.43^{***}	-0.32^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	8113	8350	8317
RMSE	1.22	1.29	1.25

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A25: **Experimental result: Treatment 3 and 5 combined**

	Oppose	Have not thought about it	Dont know
Intercept	-0.40^{**}	0.16	-0.55^{**}
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Helps both (T1)	0.13	0.20^{*}	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Hurts both (T2)	-0.04	0.12	-0.39^{**}
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Hurts abroad (T3)	-0.06	0.20^{*}	-0.26^{*}
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Hurts home (T4)	0.11	0.30^{**}	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Age	-0.00	-0.01^{***}	-0.02^{***}
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Germany	1.30^{***}	1.04^{***}	0.26
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)
USA	0.17	0.32^{***}	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Canada	0.65^{***}	0.87^{***}	0.55^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Switzerland	1.03^{***}	0.51^{***}	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)
Australia	0.32^{**}	0.72^{***}	0.31^{*}
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)
AIC	22714.47	22714.47	22714.47
BIC	22949.12	22949.12	22949.12
Log Likelihood	-11324.24	-11324.24	-11324.24
Deviance	22648.47	22648.47	22648.47
Num. obs.	9052	9052	9052

$^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A26: **Experimental result: Treatment 3 and 5 combined**