Distributional consequences shape public support for the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Evidence from four European countries

—SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION—

July 12, 2024

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A CBAM Support: Main Results

We present the main results of our information treatments in Figure 2, Panel A. In the main text, we aggregate experimental treatment conditions across the three different framing conditions (control frame; climate leadership frame; free trade frame). Here, we first show the main results in tabular format; second, we demonstrate the absence of framing effects; third, we show that results remain unchanged when including control variables.

A.1 Regression Table

Table A1: Main regression results for CBAM support

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
(Intercept)	3.294	3.277	3.180	3.380
	[3.210, 3.378]	[3.193, 3.361]	[3.086, 3.274]	[3.275, 3.484]
Treatment: Jobs	-0.023	0.024	0.076	-0.066
	[-0.143, 0.096]	[-0.096, 0.144]	[-0.057, 0.208]	[-0.209, 0.078]
Treatment: Prices	-0.233	-0.348	-0.191	-0.247
	[-0.353, -0.114]	[-0.467, -0.230]	[-0.323, -0.060]	[-0.392, -0.102]
Treatment: Both	-0.195	-0.133	-0.045	-0.200
	[-0.313, -0.076]	[-0.252, -0.014]	[-0.176, 0.087]	[-0.344, -0.055]
Num.Obs.	2981	2200	2095	1728

A.2 Absence of Framing Effects

Figure A1 shows that differences across point estimates for each set of information treatments are small across different policy frames.

Indeed, when testing for differences in means between the different policy frames and against the respective control frame for our three main material information vignettes, we do not find any statistically significant differences. Table A2 shows p-values from difference-in-means tests for all relevant combinations of policy frames by country. None of these tests indicates the presence of framing effects. The only two instances of statistically significant means by policy frame is for the control group in Hungary, where means between the control frame and the trade policy frame ($p = 0.023$) and the means between the trade and climate frame are statistically different ($p = 0.011$). Two significant tests out of a total of 48 tests overall is, however, well within expectations, so we do not find any evidence for effects of policy frames in addition to the treatment effects of material information treatments.

FIGURE A1: Treatment effects on the support for a carbon border tax in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK.



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on public support for the EU carbon border tax (CBAM) in Germany (grey), Hungary (yellow), Switzerland (blue), and the UK (green) together with 95% confidence intervals. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

A.3 Model Specifications with Control Variables

The results presented in the main text above in Figure 2, Panel A show coefficient estimates from models that regress CBAM policy support on a set of indicator variables for treatment conditions without any other control variables. Figures A2-A5 show that coefficients from these main models are almost identical in more fully specified models.

For each country, we show point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for four different models. The first model is the main model from above for reference. The next model in the second row adds a set of individual-level socio-economic control variables, including a respondent's gender (male/female); age (younger than 25 yrs, 25-34, 35-44, and so on); education levels (3 categories); income (3 categories); and dummy variables for whether the respondent is retired (0/1) and unemployed (0/1). The third model adds political control variables, namely, a respondent's political interest (4 categories), their concern about climate change (4 categories) , and left-right self-placement (left, center, right). The final model also includes region fixed effects, where regions correspond roughly to the first regional administrative unit below the country as a whole.

Point estimates across all model specifications are remarkably robust no matter whether control variables are included or not.

TABLE A2: Test statistic p-values for difference-in-means tests for policy frames

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
Treatment: Jobs				
Control frame vs trade frame	0.94	0.46	0.25	0.52
Treatment vs climate frame	0.46	0.87	0.42	0.88
Trade frame vs climate frame	0.50	0.62	0.09	0.49
Treatment: Prices				
Control vs trade frame	0.42	0.83	0.24	0.12
Treatment vs climate frame	0.50	0.12	0.79	0.86
Trade frame vs climate frame	0.90	0.12	0.21	0.23
Treatment: Both				
Control vs trade frame	0.67	0.81	0.94	0.46
Treatment vs climate frame	0.83	0.23	0.64	0.38
Trade frame vs climate frame	0.83	0.21	0.64	0.90

Note: Table shows p-values from difference-in-means tests for each group of treatment conditions and for all combinations of policy frame conditions. For each set of treatments, the different rows indicate which different policy frames are compared. Point estimates for none of the comparisons are statistically different at $\alpha < 0.05$.

FIGURE A2: Treatment effects on the support for a carbon border tax in Germany



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on public support for the EU carbon border tax (CBAM) in Germany together with 95% confidence intervals and for different model specifications. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" ($=1$) to "strongly support" ($=5$). Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table A3: Regression results for CBAM support with control variables (Germany)

	Main	+ w/ soc.econ controls	+ w/ pol. controls	+ w/ region FE
(Intercept)	3.294	3.383	2.496	2.531
	[3.210, 3.378]	[3.166, 3.599]	[2.176, 2.816]	[2.194, 2.869]
Treatment: Jobs	-0.023	-0.021	-0.034	-0.036
	[-0.143, 0.096]	[-0.149, 0.107]	[-0.151, 0.083]	[-0.153, 0.081]
Treatment: Prices	-0.233	-0.253	-0.288	-0.293
	[-0.353, -0.114]	[-0.380, -0.126]	[-0.405, -0.172]	[-0.409, -0.177]
Treatment: Both	-0.195	-0.197	-0.227	-0.226
	[-0.313, -0.076]	[-0.324, -0.071]	[-0.342, -0.111]	[-0.342, -0.111]
Female		-0.029	-0.084	-0.083
		[-0.121, 0.063]	[-0.170, 0.002]	[-0.169, 0.003]
25-34 years old		-0.157	-0.207	-0.229
		[-0.368, 0.054]	[-0.400, -0.013]	[-0.424, -0.035]
35-44 years old		-0.280	-0.295	-0.318
		[-0.491, -0.069]	[-0.488, -0.102]	[-0.513, -0.123]
45-54 years old		-0.177	-0.218	-0.248
		[-0.381, 0.027]	[-0.405, -0.031]	[-0.437, -0.059]
55-64 years old		-0.166	-0.223	-0.240
		[-0.372, 0.040]	[-0.412, -0.033]	[-0.430, -0.049]
65 years and older		-0.064	-0.167	-0.194
		[-0.297, 0.168]	[-0.381, 0.047]	[-0.409, 0.021]
Vocational qualification		0.070	0.067	0.067
		[-0.055, 0.195]	[-0.048, 0.181]	[-0.048, 0.183]
University degree		0.150	0.159	0.167
		[0.000, 0.299]	[0.022, 0.295]	[0.030, 0.304]
Median income		-0.020	-0.062	-0.063
		[-0.139, 0.098]	[-0.171, 0.046]	[-0.172, 0.046]
High income		0.076	0.060	0.052
		[-0.041, 0.193]	[-0.048, 0.167]	[-0.056, 0.160]
Very high income		0.201	0.136	0.117
		[0.020, 0.381]	[-0.030, 0.303]	[-0.050, 0.284]
Unemployed		0.143	0.171	0.162
		[-0.026, 0.311]	[0.014, 0.327]	[0.005, 0.318]
Retired		-0.111	-0.138	-0.141
		[-0.263, 0.042]	[-0.277, 0.001]	[-0.280, -0.001]
Low political interest			-0.014	-0.014
			[-0.239, 0.211]	[-0.238, 0.211]
Medium political interest			0.057	0.057
			[-0.148, 0.263]	[-0.148, 0.262]
High political interest			0.087	0.091
			[-0.125, 0.300]	[-0.122, 0.303]
Low climate concern			0.470	0.474
			[0.256, 0.684]	[0.260, 0.688]
Medium climate concern			1.095	1.071
			[0.905, 1.285]	[0.881, 1.261]
High climate concern			1.565	1.536
			[1.369, 1.761]	[1.340, 1.733]
Central ideology			-0.249	-0.247
			[-0.346, -0.152]	[-0.345, -0.150]
Right ideology			-0.286	-0.287
			[-0.410, -0.162]	[-0.412, -0.163]
Num.Obs.	2981	2639	2614	2614

FIGURE A3: Treatment effects on the support for a carbon border tax in Hungary



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on public support for the EU carbon border tax (CBAM) in Hungary together with 95% confidence intervals and for different model specifications. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" ($=1$) to "strongly support" ($=5$). Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table A4: Regression results for CBAM support with control variables (Hungary)

	Main	+ w/ soc.econ controls	+ w/ pol. controls	+ w/ region FE
(Intercept)	3.277	3.228	2.464	2.426
	[3.193, 3.361]	[2.958, 3.498]	[2.120, 2.808]	[2.079, 2.773]
Treatment: Jobs	0.024	0.031	-0.015	-0.014
	[-0.096, 0.144]	[-0.094, 0.156]	[-0.133, 0.102]	[-0.132, 0.103]
Treatment: Prices	-0.348	-0.351	-0.338	-0.337
	[-0.467, -0.230]	[-0.474, -0.228]	[-0.454, -0.223]	[-0.453, -0.222]
Treatment: Both	-0.133	-0.163	-0.163	-0.166
	[-0.252, -0.014]	[-0.286, -0.040]	[-0.279, -0.047]	[-0.282, -0.050]
Female		-0.107	-0.118	-0.115
		[-0.198, -0.016]	[-0.205, -0.031]	[-0.202, -0.028]
25-34 years old		0.029	0.084	0.082
		[-0.164, 0.223]	[-0.098, 0.266]	[-0.099, 0.264]
35-44 years old		-0.228	-0.112	-0.106
		[-0.416, -0.041]	[-0.288, 0.064]	[-0.283, 0.071]
45-54 years old		-0.079	0.002	0.006
		[-0.266, 0.108]	[-0.173, 0.178]	[-0.169, 0.182]
55-64 years old		0.006	-0.031	-0.027
		[-0.196, 0.209]	[-0.220, 0.158]	[-0.216, 0.162]
65 years and older		0.189	0.060	0.051
		[-0.054, 0.432]	[-0.168, 0.287]	[-0.177, 0.278]
Vocational qualification		0.029	0.019	0.010
		[-0.199, 0.258]	[-0.197, 0.234]	[-0.206, 0.226]
University degree		0.218	0.136	0.124
		[-0.027, 0.463]	[-0.095, 0.367]	[-0.107, 0.356]
Median income		0.138	0.093	0.091
		[0.020, 0.256]	[-0.017, 0.204]	[-0.020, 0.201]
High income		0.149	0.152	0.143
		[0.040, 0.259]	[0.049, 0.255]	[0.040, 0.247]
Very high income		0.356	0.363	0.343
		[0.154, 0.558]	[0.174, 0.551]	[0.153, 0.532]
Unemployed		-0.073	0.032	0.042
		[-0.231, 0.084]	[-0.116, 0.181]	[-0.106, 0.191]
Retired		-0.105	-0.076	-0.068
		[-0.279, 0.069]	[-0.239, 0.087]	[-0.231, 0.095]
Low political interest			0.163	0.173
			[0.004, 0.322]	[0.014, 0.332]
Medium political interest			0.303	0.309
			[0.142, 0.464]	[0.148, 0.470]
High political interest			0.371	0.375
			[0.191, 0.552]	[0.195, 0.555]
Low climate concern			0.563	0.564
			[0.358, 0.769]	[0.358, 0.769]
Medium climate concern			0.886	0.892
			[0.682, 1.089]	[0.688, 1.095]
High climate concern			1.075	1.082
			[0.862, 1.287]	[0.870, 1.295]
Central ideology			-0.259	-0.248
			[-0.367, -0.152]	[-0.356, -0.140]
Right ideology			-0.470	-0.460
			[-0.578, -0.362]	[-0.568, -0.352]
Num.Obs.	2200	1992	1976	1976

FIGURE A4: Treatment effects on the support for a carbon border tax in Switzerland



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on public support for the EU carbon border tax (CBAM) in Switzerland together with 95% confidence intervals and for different model specifications. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" ($=1$) to "strongly support" ($=5$). Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table A5: Regression results for CBAM support with control variables (Switzerland)

	Main	+ w/ soc.econ controls	+ w/ pol. controls	+ w/ region FE
(Intercept)	3.180	3.087	1.823	1.752
	[3.086, 3.274]	[2.857, 3.316]	[1.510, 2.136]	[1.431, 2.073]
Treatment: Jobs	0.076	0.054	0.048	0.049
	[-0.057, 0.208]	[-0.079, 0.187]	[-0.069, 0.166]	[-0.069, 0.167]
Treatment: Prices	-0.191	-0.202	-0.193	-0.198
	[-0.323, -0.060]	[-0.335, -0.069]	[-0.312, -0.075]	[-0.316, -0.079]
Treatment: Both	-0.045	-0.067	-0.059	-0.061
	[-0.176, 0.087]	[-0.199, 0.066]	[-0.176, 0.059]	[-0.179, 0.057]
Female		0.116	0.009	0.014
		[0.020, 0.212]	[-0.079, 0.097]	[-0.074, 0.102]
25-34 years old		-0.150	-0.049	-0.051
		[-0.351, 0.050]	[-0.227, 0.129]	[-0.230, 0.127]
35-44 years old		-0.172	-0.016	-0.026
		[-0.372, 0.029]	[-0.194, 0.162]	[-0.204, 0.153]
45-54 years old		-0.134	-0.074	-0.080
		[-0.330, 0.063]	[-0.249, 0.101]	[-0.255, 0.095]
55-64 years old		-0.201	-0.111	-0.113
		[-0.403, 0.000]	[-0.291, 0.069]	[-0.293, 0.066]
65 years and older		-0.261	-0.205	-0.207
		[-0.513, -0.009]	[-0.429, 0.019]	[-0.431, 0.018]
Vocational qualification		0.115	0.100	0.101
		[-0.037, 0.267]	[-0.037, 0.236]	[-0.036, 0.237]
University degree		0.325	0.222	0.222
		[0.165, 0.485]	[0.076, 0.368]	[0.076, 0.367]
Median income		0.081	0.096	0.102
		[-0.071, 0.233]	[-0.038, 0.231]	[-0.032, 0.237]
High income		-0.048	-0.045	-0.047
		[-0.238, 0.142]	[-0.213, 0.123]	[-0.214, 0.121]
Very high income		-0.130	-0.030	-0.034
		[-0.253, -0.007]	[-0.140, 0.080]	[-0.144, 0.077]
Unemployed		0.049	0.015	0.013
		[-0.129, 0.226]	[-0.143, 0.173]	[-0.145, 0.171]
Retired		0.215	0.163	0.156
		[0.024, 0.405]	[-0.006, 0.331]	[-0.012, 0.325]
Low political interest			0.085	0.092
			[-0.091, 0.261]	[-0.085, 0.269]
Medium political interest			0.146	0.150
			[-0.023, 0.315]	[-0.020, 0.320]
High political interest			0.243	0.255
			[0.050, 0.435]	[0.061, 0.450]
Low climate concern			0.896	0.906
			[0.678, 1.113]	[0.689, 1.123]
Medium climate concern			1.384	1.391
			[1.189, 1.580]	[1.196, 1.587]
High climate concern			1.807	1.814
			[1.604, 2.010]	[1.611, 2.017]
Central ideology			-0.269	-0.270
			[-0.374, -0.164]	[-0.375, -0.164]
Right ideology			-0.473	-0.474
			[-0.589, -0.357]	[-0.590, -0.357]
Num.Obs.	2095	2048	2020	2020

FIGURE A5: Treatment effects on the support for a carbon border tax in the UK



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on public support for the EU carbon border tax (CBAM) in the UK together with 95% confidence intervals and for different model specifications. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" ($=1$) to "strongly support" ($=5$). Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table A6: Regression results for CBAM support with control variables (UK)

	Main	+ w/ soc.econ controls	+ w/ pol. controls	+ w/ region FE
(Intercept)	3.380	3.325	2.598	2.771
	[3.275, 3.484]	[3.073, 3.576]	[2.285, 2.911]	[2.441, 3.102]
Treatment: Jobs	-0.066	-0.071	-0.045	-0.044
	[-0.209, 0.078]	[-0.211, 0.070]	[-0.168, 0.078]	[-0.167, 0.079]
Treatment: Prices	-0.247	-0.251	-0.193	-0.187
	[-0.392, -0.102]	[-0.393, -0.110]	[-0.317, -0.068]	[-0.311, -0.063]
Treatment: Both	-0.200	-0.196	-0.136	-0.145
	[-0.344, -0.055]	[-0.337, -0.054]	[-0.260, -0.013]	[-0.268, -0.021]
Female		0.082	-0.020	-0.008
		[-0.019, 0.183]	[-0.111, 0.070]	[-0.099, 0.082]
25-34 years old		0.050	-0.052	-0.044
		[-0.177, 0.277]	[-0.251, 0.148]	[-0.243, 0.154]
35-44 years old		-0.185	-0.222	-0.168
		[-0.412, 0.043]	[-0.423, -0.021]	[-0.369, 0.034]
45-54 years old		-0.285	-0.258	-0.211
		[-0.504, -0.065]	[-0.451, -0.065]	[-0.406, -0.017]
55-64 years old		-0.228	-0.229	-0.183
		[-0.456, 0.000]	[-0.430, -0.028]	[-0.385, 0.019]
65 years and older		-0.359	-0.282	-0.223
		[-0.626, -0.093]	[-0.516, -0.048]	[-0.458, 0.011]
Vocational qualification		0.032	0.032	0.044
		[-0.123, 0.187]	[-0.104, 0.168]	[-0.092, 0.180]
University degree		0.298	0.090	0.086
		[0.133, 0.464]	[-0.059, 0.238]	[-0.063, 0.234]
Median income		0.212	0.126	0.115
		[0.086, 0.339]	[0.015, 0.237]	[0.004, 0.226]
High income		0.087	0.076	0.040
		[-0.060, 0.234]	[-0.053, 0.204]	[-0.090, 0.169]
Unemployed		-0.015	-0.034	-0.028
		[-0.182, 0.152]	[-0.181, 0.112]	[-0.174, 0.118]
Retired		0.059	0.017	0.018
		[-0.120, 0.238]	[-0.139, 0.174]	[-0.139, 0.174]
Low political interest			-0.058	-0.053
			[-0.241, 0.125]	[-0.236, 0.129]
Medium political interest			-0.099	-0.101
			[-0.271, 0.072]	[-0.272, 0.071]
High political interest			-0.095	-0.103
			[-0.284, 0.094]	[-0.292, 0.086]
Low climate concern			0.663	0.658
			[0.464, 0.863]	[0.459, 0.857]
Medium climate concern			1.226	1.207
			[1.048, 1.403]	[1.030, 1.385]
High climate concern			1.668	1.646
			[1.485, 1.852]	[1.462, 1.830]
Central ideology			-0.402	-0.398
			[-0.511, -0.293]	[-0.507, -0.289]
Right ideology			-0.386	-0.401
			[-0.507, -0.264]	[-0.523, -0.279]
Num.Obs.	1728	1717	1703	1703

B Personal, Regional, and Country-Wide Effects of CBAM: Full Results

In this section, we show the effects of our information treatments about the material consequences from the CBAM policy for an additional outcome measure. While we study CBAM support and the "climate versus trade" trade-off in the main text, we consider how respondents assess the effects of the CBAM policy for them individually (Figure B1), for the region they live in (Figure B2), and their country as a whole (Figure B3).

While the general patterns of average treatment effects mirror those of the ones we found for the CBAM support outcome measure, respondents' assessments of the effects of the CBAM policy become increasingly positive when comparing personal effects against effects for the region and the country as a whole. Except for Switzerland, we do not find a treatment effect of the jobs treatment when asking survey participants about the effects of the CBAM policy on respondents individually. However, we do detect statistically significant positive effects (for Germany, Hungary, and Switzerland) when assessing effects of the CBAM policy for the country as a whole. This suggests that in evaluating carbon border tax policies, respondents can distinguish between effects on their own lives (for which the job treatment does not show positive effects) and for their region or their country as a whole.

FIGURE B1: Treatment effects on perceived impacts from CBAM policy at the personal level in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK.



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on perceived effects of the CBAM policy at the personal level in Germany (grey), Hungary (yellow), Switzerland (blue), and the UK (green) together with 95% confidence intervals. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "very negatively impacts by CBAM" $(=1)$ to "very positive impacted by CBAM" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table B1: Regression results for CBAM effect on person

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
(Intercept)	2.799	2.943	2.910	3.117
	[2.718, 2.880]	[2.863, 3.022]	[2.819, 3.001]	[3.019, 3.215]
Treatment: Jobs	-0.025	-0.038	0.151	-0.029
	[-0.139, 0.090]	[-0.152, 0.075]	[0.022, 0.280]	[-0.164, 0.106]
Treatment: Prices	-0.208	-0.276	-0.226	-0.157
	[-0.322, -0.094]	[-0.388, -0.164]	[-0.354, -0.098]	[-0.292, -0.022]
Treatment: Both	-0.138	-0.170	-0.053	-0.087
	[-0.252, -0.024]	[-0.282, -0.058]	[-0.182, 0.075]	[-0.224, 0.049]
Num.Obs.	2930	2143	2071	1619

FIGURE B2: Treatment effects on perceived impacts from CBAM policy at the regional level in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK.



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on perceived effects of the CBAM policy at the regional level in Germany (grey), Hungary (yellow), Switzerland (blue), and the UK (green) together with 95% confidence intervals. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "very negatively impacts by CBAM" $(=1)$ to "very positive impacted by CBAM" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table B2: Regression results for CBAM effect on region

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
(Intercept)	3.043	2.964	3.012	3.151
	[2.958, 3.128]	[2.881, 3.047]	[2.917, 3.107]	[3.044, 3.258]
Treatment: Jobs	0.124	0.100	0.222	0.047
	[0.004, 0.244]	[-0.020, 0.219]	[0.088, 0.356]	[-0.101, 0.195]
Treatment: Prices	-0.217	-0.242	-0.110	-0.139
	[-0.337, -0.097]	[-0.359, -0.124]	[-0.243, 0.023]	[-0.287, 0.009]
Treatment: Both	-0.124	-0.098	0.083	-0.036
	[-0.244, -0.004]	[-0.215, 0.020]	[-0.049, 0.216]	[-0.187, 0.114]
Num.Obs.	2923	2101	2055	1614

FIGURE B3: Treatment effects on perceived impacts from CBAM policy at the country (as a whole) level in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK.



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on perceived effects of the CBAM policy at the country (as a whole) level in Germany (grey), Hungary (yellow), Switzerland (blue), and the UK (green) together with 95% confidence intervals. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "very negatively impacts by CBAM" $(=1)$ to "very positive impacted by CBAM" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

Table B3: Regression results for CBAM effect on country as a whole

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
(Intercept)	3.111	2.991	3.100	3.140
	[3.021, 3.202]	[2.905, 3.076]	[3.000, 3.201]	[3.026, 3.255]
Treatment: Jobs	0.183	0.165	0.229	0.083
	[0.055, 0.311]	[0.041, 0.288]	[0.087, 0.371]	[-0.076, 0.242]
Treatment: Prices	-0.211	-0.268	-0.207	-0.147
	[-0.339, -0.083]	[-0.389, -0.147]	[-0.349, -0.066]	[-0.305, 0.011]
Treatment: Both	-0.066	-0.024	0.044	-0.043
	[-0.194, 0.061]	[-0.146, 0.097]	[-0.097, 0.185]	[-0.204, 0.117]
Num.Obs.	2920	2108	2070	1632

C Analysis of Order Effects

Our compound treatments combine information about price and employment effects from the CBAM policy. We randomized the order in which this information Was shown to mitigate order effects by design.

For our two main outcome measures—support for CBAM policy ($p = 0.052$ from t-test and $p = 0.107$ from χ^2 test) and respondents' assessment of the trade-off between climate protection and free trade ($p = 0.635$ from t-test and $p = 0.666$ from χ^2 test)—we do not find strong evidence for ordering effects in the pooled data.

Once we disaggregate data by frame condition and country, some tests show significant differences across groups at conventional levels, but rarely consistently across both tests. While differences in group means may exist according to t-test results, the entire distribution of the outcome measure may not be different across the two groups. Tables C1 and C2 below report p-values from both t-tests and χ^2 tests for both outcome measures.

Notwithstanding the climate frame condition in the UK, which shows statistically significant differences (which may be due to chance because of repeated tests), concerns about order effects can be largely ruled out. We are confident about this assessment not least because we randomized the order of compound treatment texts, while retaining meaningfully large sample sizes (between at least 60-130 respondents) in each of the ordered conditions in our compound treatments.

TABLE C1: CBAM support: Test statistic p-values for order effects

	Control frame		Trade frame		Climate frame	
	t-test	χ^2 test	t-test	χ^2 test	t-test	χ^2 test
Germany	0.90	0.51	0.72	0.66	0.39	0.50
Hungary	0.86	0.39	0.03	0.25	0.09	0.07
Switzerland	0.67	0.03	0.02	0.22	0.28	0.11
UK	0.22	0.39	0.04	0.17	0.00	0.01

Note: Table shows p-values from t-tests and χ^2 tests across ordered groups in compound treatments by country and frame condition.

TABLE C2: Climate-trade trade-off: Test statistic p-values for order effects

	Control frame		Trade frame		Climate frame	
	t-test	χ^2 test	t-test	χ^2 test	t-test	χ^2 test
Germany	0.69	0.82	0.54	0.83	0.08	0.32
Hungary	0.50	0.63	0.01	0.07	0.65	0.50
Switzerland	0.09	0.22	0.16	0.56	0.94	0.16
United Kingdom	0.35	0.56	0.46	0.26	0.48	0.89

Note: Table shows p-values from t-tests and χ^2 tests across ordered groups in compound treatments by country and frame condition.

D CBAM Support: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The models in the main text present average treatment effects of the information treatments on respondents' support of the CBAM policy. Here, we probe whether these effects operate differently based on subgroups in our data. We examine heterogeneous treatment effects for: income, education, public/private sector employment, retirement status, employment status, concern for climate change, political left/right ideology, urban/rural populations, and regional differences. For all variables that have more than two levels, we split respondents into two groups at the median separately for country. We report results in Figures D1-D9 below, where horizontal lines indicate 83.4% confidence intervals to visually assess statistical differences in group means.

Heterogeneous treatment effects, to the extent that they exist, are limited to a few countries and some conditions. Indeed, we only find statistically significant differences in group means for education in Switzerland and the UK (but only for the compound treatment conditions), for public/private sector employment in Switzerland (for jobs and compound treatment conditions), for retired respondents in Germany (only in the compound treatment condition), and between politically left and politically right respondents in Germany (again only in the compound treatment condition). For all other tests, no significant differences are detected and given the number of comparisons the above identified differences may be the result of mere chance.

FIGURE D1: Heterogeneous treatment effects for low and high income groups



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for low and high income groups for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between low and high income groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D2: Heterogeneous treatment effects for low and high education groups



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for low and high education groups for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between low and high education groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D3: Heterogeneous treatment effects for public/private sector respondents



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for public and private sector respondents for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between public and private sector groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" ($=1$) to "strongly support" ($=5$). Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D4: Heterogeneous treatment effects for working age and retired respondents



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for working age and retired respondents for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between working age and retired respondents groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D5: Heterogeneous treatment effects for working and unemployed respondents



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for working and unemployed respondents for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between working and unemployed respondents groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D6: Heterogeneous treatment effects for low and high climate concern



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for respondents with low and high climate concern for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between low and high climate concern groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D7: Heterogeneous treatment effects for left/right political ideology



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for respondents with left/right political ideology for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between politically left and politically right groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D8: Heterogeneous treatment effects for rural/urban respondents



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for rural and urban respondents for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between rural and urban groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" ($=1$) to "strongly support" ($=5$). Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

FIGURE D9: Heterogeneous treatment effects for regions with heavy manufacturing base



Note: The plot shows heterogeneous treatment effects for rural and urban respondents for all four countries and different information treatments. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between rural and urban groups. Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "strongly oppose" $(=1)$ to "strongly support" $(=5)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

E Trade-off between Climate Protection and Trade Promotion: Full Results

The main text above in Figure 3 presents main results for our trade-off outcome measure for the climate leadership and free trade frames. In the following sections we present these results in tabular format, provide information about the descriptive distribution of the trade-off measure; we show the full results when not aggregating data over information vignettes by policy frame; and we discuss the extent to which respondents' support/opposition to the CBAM policy shapes their responses to our trade-off outcome question.

E.1 Regression Table

Table E1: Regression results for 'climate protection versus trade promotion' trade-off

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
(Intercept)	0.385	0.423	0.297	0.458
	[0.345, 0.425]	[0.374, 0.472]	[0.260, 0.335]	[0.410, 0.505]
Free trade frame	-0.064	-0.038	0.046	0.034
	[-0.120, -0.008]	[-0.119, 0.044]	[-0.021, 0.112]	[-0.045, 0.113]
Climate frame	-0.045	0.049	0.029	0.082
	[-0.102, 0.011]	[-0.036, 0.133]	[-0.037, 0.095]	[0.001, 0.162]
Num.Obs.	1642	812	1155	894

E.2 Distribution of Outcome Measure

Figure E1 shows the distribution of how respondents prioritize "climate protection" over "trade promotion" across our four countries. Data come from the control group that did neither receive an informational treatment about the material consequences from the CBAM policy nor any policy frame. For the vast majority of respondents, climate protection and trade promotion are equally important.

E.3 Absence of Framing Effects

In the main text, we discuss framing effects for the trade-off outcome measure. Figure E2 below demonstrates that there is little evidence for framing effects when disaggregating estimates by experimental conditions. Indeed, most point estimates are estimated tightly around zero.

As with our CBAM support measure before, we show that no statistically significant framing effects exist. Table E2 summarizes p-values from tests of all possible combinations of potential effects of policy frames. Except for two tests, none of the results are statistically significant at the conventional $\alpha = 0.05$ level. We do not find any evidence that different policy frames of the CBAM policy would condition main effects.

FIGURE E1: Importance of climate protection and trade promotion in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK for carbon border tax.



Note: The plot shows respondents' priorities for climate protection and trade promotion in Germany (grey), Hungary (yellow), Switzerland (blue), and the UK (green). Results are shown on a $1-5$ scale, ranging from "climate protection is more important" ($=1$) to "trade promotion is more important" ($=5$). Data is based on responses from control group. Sample size: $n = 261$ (Germany); $n = 301$ (Hungary); $n = 273$ (Switzerland); $n = 231$ (UK)

TABLE E2: Test statistic p-values for difference-in-means tests for policy frames

	Germany	Hungary	Switzerland	UK
Treatment: Jobs				
Control frame vs trade frame	0.01	0.19	0.90	0.32
Treatment vs climate frame	0.58	0.41	0.65	0.20
Trade frame vs climate frame	0.06	0.07	0.78	0.79
Treatment: Prices				
Control vs trade frame	0.90	0.46	0.56	0.91
Treatment vs climate frame	0.46	0.44	0.91	0.11
Trade frame vs climate frame	0.54	0.95	0.68	0.20
Treatment: Both				
Control vs trade frame	0.22	0.36	0.16	0.62
Treatment vs climate frame	0.26	0.03	0.51	0.86
Trade frame vs climate frame	0.93	0.30	0.54	0.78

Note: Table shows p-values from difference-in-means tests for each group of treatment conditions and for all combinations of policy frame conditions. For each set of treatments, the different rows indicate which different policy frames are compared. Point estimates for two comparisons are statistically different.

FIGURE E2: Treatment effects on the trade-off between "climate protection" and "trade promotion" in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK.



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for different information treatments on how respondents prioritize "climate protection" and "trade promotion." Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown for Germany (grey), Hungary (yellow), Switzerland (blue), and the UK (green). The outcome is measured on a $0/1$ scale, indicating that "climate protection is more important" $(= 0)$ or that "trade promotion is more important" $(= 1)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

E.4 Results for Trade-off Outcome as a Function of CBAM Support

Since we do not randomize the order in which we measure outcomes, but measure CBAM support always before measuring the trade-off outcome, CBAM responses may condition respondents' answers to the trade-off question. In Figure E3 below we show that this is not the case: for each country and each experimental condition, we show that the mean response to the trade-off question is statistically not distinguishable for respondents who support the CBAM policy and those who do not. This offers some tentative reassurance that support for/opposition to CBAM does not shape who respondents answer the "climate protection versus trade promotion" trade-off question.

FIGURE E3: Treatment effects on the trade-off between "climate protection" and "trade promotion" in Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and the UK.



Note: The plot shows treatment effects for how respondents prioritize "climate protection" and "trade promotion" as a function of their CBAM support. The error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals and allow visual inspection of statistically significant differences between CBAM opposing and CBAM supporting respondent groups. The outcome is measured on a $0/1$ scale, indicating that "climate protection is more important" $(= 0)$ or that "trade promotion is more important" $(= 1)$. Dashed reference line indicates the normalized control group mean.

F CBAM Support and Vote Intention

Figure 4 in the main text presents data from our surveys that demonstrate a positive relationship between CBAM support and political party support.

For this, we classified party vote intention data into four main party groups similar to Abou-Chadi (2016); Carter et al. (2018). Table F1 shows the classification into green, mainstream left, mainstream right, and populist right parties for Germany and Hungary. In the Hungarian national election of April 2022, multiple parties of the opposition decided to unite to counter the ruling party of Victor Orban, Fidesz. This coalition included party groups from Green parties (e.g., Párbeszéd), the mainstream left (e.g., DK) and the mainstream right (Jobbik). This coalition (DK-Jobbik-Momentum-MSZP-LMP-Párbeszéd) was one choice on the ballot and hence also one choice in our survey question on vote intention. Although this coalition clearly does not belong to one party group, we classified it under the mainstream right party group.

Party Group	Germany	Hungary
Green	Alliance90/The Greens	
Main left	SPD	
Main right	CDU/CSU	DK-Jobbik-Momentum-
	FDP	MSZP-LMP-Párbeszéd
		(Opposition Coalition)
Populist right	AfD	Fidesz-MPSZ

TABLE F1: Classification of parties to party groups for Germany and Hungary

G Survey Questionnaire

The full survey questionnaire is attached at the end of this appendix. It shows all survey questions and their sequencing, including treatment frames and outcome measures. The surveys in Germany, Hungary, and Switzerland were identical in all main components except for country-specific questions, for example, about regions in which respondents live.

The information about employment effects and price effects of the CBAM policy that we use in the treatment frames is primarily based on the sectoral analysis in Marcu, Mehling, and Cosbey (2021). Specifically, we gauge the number of jobs potentially affected in the key industrial sectors of metal/steel manufacturing (Germany and Hungary), cement and chemicals (Switzerland), and power generation (UK) from national labor market statistics. We focus on these particular sectors because they are regulated under the CBAM and have greater importance for each of the selected countries. For the treatment frames on price increases, we do not quantify the exact size of how much prices are likely to rise as a result of CBAM. Instead, we simply inform survey participants that prices for products, such as cars, electronics, and household appliances might increase after the introduction of a CBAM.

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Marcu, Andrei, Michael Mehling, and Aaron Cosbey. 2021. "Carbon Border Adjustments in the EU: Sectoral Deep Dive." ERCST Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition report. Available at https://ercst.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/20210317-CBAM-II_Report-I-Sectors.pdf.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS BORDER TAXES

UK Questionnaire

LEGEND:

Relevant Experiment and Treatment Info is marked in yellow,

PROGRAMMING INFORMATION GENERAL

DATE OF BIRTH

1. What is your date of birth?

Select a year: Select a month:

GENDER

2. Are you…?

◉ Male

○ Female

REGION STATE CITY

3. Where do you live? Please note: This question may be considered personal. We would like to remind you that your participation is strictly voluntary and that your responses are used for research purposes only. The answers that you provide will be presented in aggregate form and none of them will be linked back to you in any way. All data will be collected and processed in adherence to the Market Research Society's Code of Conduct and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

[PN: IF PREFER NOT TO ANSWER IS SELECTED, ASK UKREGION1]

UKREGION1

[PN: ONLY SHOWN TO RESPONDENT IF THEY SELECTED "PREFER NOT TO ANSWER" AT REGION STATE CITY, OTHERWISE THIS IS A HIDDEN RECODED QUESTION]

Where do you live?

[Hidden]. Hidden Question: Government Office Region

◉ North East

○ North West

○ Yorkshire and the Humber

○ West Midlands

○ East Midlands

- O East of England
- O South West
- O South East
- O Greater London
- O Wales
- O Scotland
- O Northern Ireland

EDUCATION

4. What is your highest level of education attained (Select only one)?

- ◉ Primary school
- O Secondary school(under 15 years old)
- O General National Vocational Qualification Foundation (Level 1) or Intermediate Level(Level 2) (GNVQ, GSVQ) / GCSE/ SCE standard (Level 1)
- O 5 NVQ3 (Level 3)/ SCE Higher Grade (Level 2)/ Scottish Certificate of Sixth Year Studies / General National Vocational Qualification Advanced Level (Level 3) / GCE Advanced Level (GCE A/AS) (Level 3)
- O NVQ4 (Level 4+) / Higher National Certificate (HNC) (Level 4+) / Higher National Diploma (HND) (Level 4+) / Diploma in HE (including nurses training) / Bachelor's degree (BA, BSc, BEd, Beng, MB, BDS, BV, etc.) (Level 4+)
- O NVQ5 (Level 4+) / Master's degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) (Level 4+) / Post-graduate diplomas and certificates / Doctorate (Ph.D.) (Level 4+)

GENERAL ISSUES

SHOW ALL:

Please read the following information carefully. If you would like to take part in the survey, please click the "I have read the consent form and agree to participate in this survey" button.

This survey is being carried out by a team of researchers at the University of Lucerne in Switzerland. It will be used exclusively to increase scientific knowledge on public opinion. It has no commercial purpose and has not been commissioned by the government. Participation does not involve any risks we are aware of. The information you provide us with will not be stored or used to collect personal data.

AGREEMENT

I have read the consent form and agree to participate in this survey

☑Yes, I agree

□ No. I don't agree

RESPONDENT MUST TICK THE BOX IN ORDER TO CONTINUE WITH THE SURVEY

PAGE BREAK

SHOW IF [AGREEMENT] BOX IS TICKED

Dear participant,
Welcome to our survey. We really appreciate your participation. Please note that the quality of our study depends heavily on you reading each question carefully and giving us your honest personal opinion. There are no right or wrong answers. Completing the survey shouldn't take longer than 8 minutes.

PAGE BREAK

PUBLIC

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

5. What is your current occupation?

◉ Public sector (civil servant or public sector employee)

O Private sector (private sector employee)

O Private sector (self-employed)

O Not employed (homemaker, unemployed)

O Student

O Retired

No answer

HOUSE

6. What kind of house do you live in or what kind of building is your apartment in?

◉ Detached house

O Farmhouse

O Semi-detached or terraced house

O Apartment building with up to 4 apartments

O Apartment building with more than 4 apartments

O Other

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

PROPERTY

7. Do you (or someone in your household) rent the apartment or house in which you live, or do you (or someone in your household) own it

O Rent/Lease

O Own

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

[Landlord]

7a. Are you, or anyone in your immediate family, a landlord/landlady? That is you are the owner of a property which is rented or leased to an individual or business.

◉ Yes

O No

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

HOUSEHOLD

8. How many people live in your household (including you)?

◉ I live alone

O Two people

O 3-6 people

O More than 6 people

No answer

CHILDREN

9. How many people in your household are children under the age of 18?

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

CAR

10. How many motorized vehicles (cars, motorcycles, etc.) does your household own (including motorized machines such as tractors)?

◉ 0

O 1

O 2

O 3

O More than 3

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

CAR 2

11. How often do you drive your car in a typical week?

◉ Every day

O 4-6 times a week

O 1-3 times a week

O Less than once a week

O Never

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

COMMUTE

12. How do you usually get to work?

◉ I work from home

O On foot

O By bike, e-bike or e-scooter

O Public transport

O By car or other motorised vehicle e.g. motorbike

O Eco-friendly vehicle (electric, biogas, hydrogen)

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

POLITICAL INTEREST

13. How interested are you in politics in general?

◉ Very interested

O Quite interested

O Not very interested

O Not interested at all

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

DEMOCRACY

14. In general, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the UK?

◉ Very satisfied

O Quite satisfied

O Quite dissatisfied

O Very dissatisfied

No answer

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

EU

15. In your opinion is the fact that the UK is no longer a member of the EU

◉ A good thing

O A bad thing

O Neither good nor bad

Don’t know

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

CLIMATE

15. How concerned are you about climate change?

◉ Very concerned

O Quite concerned

O Not very concerned

O Not concerned at all

Don’t know

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

LEFTRIGHT

16. Sometimes in politics we talk about *left* and *right* Where would you place yourself on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is left and 10 is right

◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
LEFT									RIGHT

PAGE BREAK

CONJOINT EXPERIMENT

RULES: ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEE THREE CONJOINT TABLES:

THE ORDER OF VARIABLES SHOULD BE RANDOMIZED FOR THE FIRST TABLE. THE ORDER OF THE VARIABLES SHOULD STAY THE SAME FOR THE OTHER TWO TABLES.

ONE OPTION FOR EACH VARIABLE SHOULD BE RANDOMLY SELECTED FROM EACH CELL FOR POLICY 1 IN EACH TABLE. ONE OPTION FOR EACH VARIABLE SHOULD BE RANDOMLY SELECTED FROM EACH CELL FOR POLICY 2 IN EACH TABLE. POLICY1 AND POLICY2 CANNOT BE THE SAME ON ALL VARIABLES IN ANY GIVEN TABLE.

IDENTICAL TABLES (WITH ANY ORDER OF POLICIES) ARE NOT ALLOWED

SHOW ALL

[Intro] The buildings sector accounts for 24.2% of CO_2 emissions from energy use in the United Kingdom. In order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within this sector, the government is proposing policies that help citizens to make the building stock more energy efficient and less dependent on fossil fuels. This can involve subsidising home energy efficiency measures and requiring minimum levels of energy efficiency in houses. These measures can be targeted toward different forms of housing (rental vs. owner-occupied), different groups within society, and would need to be funded by the government.

Below, we provide you with two different policy proposals. Their features differ, and you will be asked to tell us whether you support or oppose these proposals.

Please read carefully. Some sets of features and proposals may look similar but could still differ in one or more important aspects. You will be asked to compare the two proposals and tell us which one you think the UK government should adopt. Please first decide which of the two policy proposals you would prefer to be implemented and then – in a second step – please rate how much you support each policy proposal.

RANDOMISE OPTIONS FOR [Policy1] AND [Policy2] FOR EACH VARIABLE
IDENTCAL POLICIES (IDENTICAL OPTIONS FOR ALL VARIABLES) ARE NOT ALLOWED
RANDOMISE VARIABLES (EXCEPT HEADING)
NEW PAGE SHOW ALL

REPEAT CONJOINT 1 AND Q17, Q18, Q19 IN THE LOOP 3 TIMES FOR EACH RESPONDENT

RANDOMISE OPTIONS FOR [Policy1] AND [Policy2] FOR EACH VARIABLE
IDENTICAL POLICIES (IDENTICAL OPTIONS FOR ALL VARIABLES) ARE NOT ALLOWED

SHOW Q17, INTRO, Q18, Q19 ON THE SAME PAGE AS THE TABLE, BELOW TABLE
ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWES

FORCED POLICY

17. Which of the two policy proposals would you prefer?

◉ Policy proposal A

○ Policy proposal B

ASK ALL in UK, SINGLE ANSWER

How much do you support or oppose each of the above-mentioned policy proposals?

	Strongly Oppose	Slightly Oppose	Neither support nor oppose	Slightly Support	Strongly Support
Q18: Policy A	◉	○	○	○	○
Q19 Policy B	◉	○	○	○	○

PARTY BELIEFS

SHOW ALL

We will now show you two possible statements that political parties in Britain could make about taxes.

“Climate change is one of the most pressing political issues. In order to achieve the goals of the Paris climate agreement, the UK should introduce an ambitious CO2 tax.”

SINGLE ANSWER, IMPLEMENT AS GRID QUESTION, RANDOMIZE

20. Please indicate how much you think each party or their representatives would support this statement.

	Not support at all	Oppose to some extent	Support to some extent	Strongly support	The party would have no clear position on the issue
Conservative Party	◉	○	○	○	○

Labour Party	◉	○	○	○	○
Scottish National Party	◉	○	○	○	○
Liberal Democrats	◉	○	○	○	○
Reform UK	◉	○	○	○	○
Conservative Party	◉	○	○	○	○
Plaid Cymru	◉	○	○	○	○
Green Party	◉	○	○	○	○
Democratic Unionist Party	◉	○	○	○	○
Sinn Féin	◉	○	○	○	○

SHOW ALL in UK

“Public debt is one of the most pressing political problems. To balance the national budget, VAT should be increased.”

PLEASE KEEP THE ARGUMENT ON THE TOP OF THE PAGE WHEN SHOWING QUESTION Q21.

21. Please indicate how much you think each party or their representatives would support this statement.

KEEP THE LIST OF PARTIES IN THE SAME ORDER AS IN Q20

SINGLE ANSWER, IMPLEMENT AS GRID QUESTION

PAGE BREAK

EXPOSURE

ASK ALL, IMPLEMENT AS PROGRESSIVE GRID QUESTION

22. Please indicate which of the following statements apply to you.

	True	False

There are one or more wind turbines in my local area	◉	○
I see one or more wind turbines every day	◉	○
There are solar panels in my local area	◉	○
There is someone in my circle of friends/acquaintances who has solar panels	◉	○
I have solar panels on the roof/balcony	◉	○

CONNECTION

23. How closely connected do you feel to the UK?

◉ Closely connected

○ Connected

○ Not very connected

○ Not connected at all

Don’t know

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

NATIONALITY

24. Are you British?

◉ Yes

○ No

○ Not very connected

○ Not connected at all

Don’t know

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER

TRUST PEOPLE

25. Do you usually assume that most people can be trusted, or do you think that you can't be too careful? Please answer with a number between 1 and 5, where 1 means you can't be too careful and 5 means most people can be trusted.

◉	○	○	○	○
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
YOU CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL				MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER. IMPLEMENT AS PROGRESSIVE GRID QUESTION, RANDOMIZE.

TRUST INSTITUTIONS

26. How much trust do you personally have in the following institutions?

◉ UK Government

○ News media

○ European Union

○ UK Parliament

◉	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
NO TRUST AT ALL									ABSOLUTE TRUST

EXPERIMENT 2; CARBON BORDER TAX

ALLOCATING RESPONDENTS TO TREATMENT (TR1 – TR12):

STEP 1: RANDOMLY ALLOCATE ALL RESPONDENTS USING LEAST FULL BASIS FROM UK INTO TWO GROUPS: "GROUP 1" AND "GROUP 2"

STEP 2: TAKE RESPONDENTS FROM GROUP 1 AND RANDOMLY ALLOCATE USING LEAST FULL BASIS INTO 4 GROUPS: "TR1", "TR2", "TR3", "TR4".

STEP 3: IF "TR4", RANDOMLY SPLIT INTO TWO FURTHER GROUPS CALLED "TR4A" AND "TR4B" USING LEAST FULL BASIS

STEP 4: IF "GROUP 2", RANDOMLY ALLOCATE RESPONDENTS USING LEAST FULL BASIS INTO "TR5", "TR6", "TR7", "TR8", "TR9", "TR10", "TR11", "TR12"

STEP 5: IF "TR8", RANDOMLY SPLIT INTO TWO FURTHER GROUPS CALLED "TR8A" AND "TR8B" USING LEAST FULL BASIS

STEP 6: IF "TR12", RANDOMLY SPLIT INTO TWO FURTHER GROUPS CALLED "TR12A" AND "TR12B" USING LEAST FULL BASIS.

FINAL BASE SIZES SHOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

	NAME	BASE SIZE	REAL NUMBER
Group 1 1/2	TR1	1/8 OF TOTAL	312
	TR2	1/8 OF TOTAL	312
	TR3	1/8 OF TOTAL	312
	TR4A	1/16 OF TOTAL	157
	TR4B	1/16 OF TOTAL	157
Group 2 1/2	TR5	1/16 OF TOTAL	157
	TR6	1/16 OF TOTAL	157
	TR7	1/16 OF TOTAL	156
	TR8A	1/32 OF TOTAL	78
	TR8B	1/32 OF TOTAL	78
	TR9	1/16 OF TOTAL	156
	TR10	1/16 OF TOTAL	156
	TR11	1/16 OF TOTAL	156
	TR12A	1/32 OF TOTAL	78
	TR12B	1/32 OF TOTAL	78

SHOW TEXT FOR EACH SPECIFIC GROUP ON THE SAME PAGE AS STATED BELOW:

GROUP NAME	TEXT CODE
TR1	[GRENZSTEUER_INFO]
TR2	[GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [TREAT_JOBS]
TR3	[GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [TREAT_PRICES]
TR4A	[GRENZSTEUER_INFO] +[TREAT_BORDER_PRO]
TR4B	[GRENZSTEUER_INFO] +[TREAT_BORDER_AGAINST]
TR5	[FRAME_TRADE_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_TRADE_2]
TR6	[FRAME_TRADE_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_TRADE_2] + [TREAT_JOBS]
TR7	[FRAME_TRADE_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_TRADE_2] + [TREAT_PRICES]
TR8A	[FRAME_TRADE_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_TRADE_2] +[TREAT_BORDER_PRO]
TR8B	[FRAME_TRADE_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_TRADE_2] + [TREAT_BORDER_AGAINST]
TR9	[FRAME_KLIMA_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_KLIMA_2]
TR10	[FRAME_KLIMA_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_KLIMA_2] + [TREAT_JOBS]
TR11	[FRAME_KLIMA_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_KLIMA_2] + [TREAT_PRICES]
TR12A	[FRAME_KLIMA_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_KLIMA_2] +[TREAT_BORDER_PRO]
TR12B	[FRAME_KLIMA_1] + [GRENZSTEUER_INFO] + [FRAME_KLIMA_2] + [TREAT_BORDER_AGAINST]

TREATMENT Group TR1 – TR12

SHOW ALL

Please read the text below:

SHOW IF GROUP = TR5, TR6, TR7, TR8A, TR8B

[FRAME_TRADE_1] The UK is an open economy. In 2021, exports totalled almost £550bn, contributing to roughly one third of the UK's economic output. Free trade of goods and services and access to global markets are essential for the UK economy.

SHOW IF GROUP = TR9, T10, T11, T12A, TR12B

[FRAME_KLIMA_1] The United Kingdom passed legislation in June 2019 to reduce the UK's carbon emissions to "net zero" by 2050. This goal demonstrates the UK's commitment to sustainable climate policy and emphasises the importance of global climate protection and achieving the Paris Agreement.

SHOW ALL

[GRENZSTEUER_INFO] The European Union (EU) has been pricing companies' carbon emissions since 2005. The UK participated in this emissions trading policy until it left the EU and is considering its policy options around carbon pricing.

Since companies outside Europe generally face less stringent climate regulation, they can produce goods more cheaply and import them back to European and UK markets. To mitigate this and incentivise firms to keep production sites in Europe, the European Commission has proposed legislation for the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), i.e. an EU carbon border tax. This carbon border tax would mean that goods from countries with lax climate policy would have to pay a penalty when imported into the EU's market.

UK products would most likely face a carbon tax when importing into EU markets, unless the UK government decides to align its policy with the EU's emissions trading policy.

SHOW IF GROUP = **TR5, TR6, TR7, TR8A, TR8B**

[FRAME TRADE_2] Some experts are sceptical of the introduction of an EU carbon border tax. Several countries (including China) believe such a carbon border tax is incompatible with international trade law and free trade. They are considering filing a complaint with the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

SHOW IF GROUP = **TR9, T10, T11, T12A, TR12B**

[FRAME_KLIMA_2] The UK Government's commitment to align its carbon pricing policy with the EU's proposed carbon border tax would emphasise UK leadership in international climate policy by supporting a globally more coordinated climate policy that is consistent with the Paris Agreement.

SHOW IF GROUP = TR2, TR6, TR10

[TREAT_JOBS] A carbon border tax would be important for carbon-intensive sectors. Aligning a potential UK carbon border tax with the EU's carbon border tax would help UK sectors to remain competitive in international markets despite increasingly ambitious UK climate policy. This policy would be critical for securing UK jobs in sectors such as power generation and manufacturing, which currently employ around 3 million people.

SHOW IF GROUP = TR3, TR7, TR11

[TREAT_PRICES] An aligned carbon border tax between the UK and the EU would increase prices of imported goods into the UK that come from foreign producers with less stringent carbon regulation. A UK carbon border tax would hence leave consumers with higher costs for some types of consumer goods. Prices of cars, consumer electronics, and household appliances, such as washing machines or fridges, would likely increase as a result.

SHOW IF GROUP = TR4A, TR8A, TR12A

[TREAT_BORDER_PRO] A carbon border tax would be important for carbon-intensive sectors in the UK. Aligning a potential UK carbon border tax with the EU's carbon border tax would help UK sectors to remain competitive in international markets despite increasingly ambitious UK climate policy. This policy would be critical for securing UK jobs in sectors such as power generation and manufacturing, which currently employ around 3 million people.

However, an aligned carbon border tax between the EU and the UK would also increase prices of imported goods into the UK that come from foreign producers with less stringent carbon regulation. A UK carbon border tax would hence leave UK consumers with higher costs for some types of consumer goods. Prices of cars, consumer electronics, and household appliances, such as washing machines or fridges, would likely increase as a result.

SHOW IF GROUP = TR4B, TR8B, TR12B

[TREAT_BORDER_AGAINST] An aligned carbon border tax between the EU and the UK would increase prices of imported goods into the UK that come from foreign producers with less stringent carbon regulation. A UK carbon border tax would hence leave UK consumers with higher costs for some types of consumer goods. Prices of cars, consumer electronics, and household appliances, such as washing machines or fridges, would likely increase as a result.

However, a carbon border tax would be important for carbon-intensive sectors in the UK. Aligning a potential UK carbon border tax with the EU's carbon border tax would help UK sectors to remain competitive in international markets despite increasingly ambitious UK climate policy. This policy would be critical for securing UK jobs in sectors such as power generation and manufacturing, which currently employ around 3 million people.

COMPREHENSION

ASK ALL. SINGLE ANSWER

27. Which regulation were you asked about on the previous page?

◉ Nuclear Treaty

○ EU Carbon Border tax

○ EU Expansion

EU CARBON BORDER TAX

ASK ALL. SINGLE ANSWER

28. Would you support or oppose the UK's participation within an EU-wide carbon border tax?

◉ Strongly support

O Support

O Neither support nor oppose

O Oppose

O Strongly oppose

Don't know

29. In your opinion, what kind of impacts will an EU Carbon Border tax (CBAM) have:

	Very positive	Quite positive	Neither positive nor negative	Quite negative	Don't know
For you personally	◉	O	O	O	O
for [PIPE IN ANSWER FROM UKREGION01)	◉	O	O	O	O
For the UK	◉	O	O	O	O

TRADEOFF

30. Which UK Government policies are more important for you- promoting climate protection, or promoting international trade and globalization?

◉	O	O	O	O
1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
CLIMATE PROTECTION MORE IMPORTANT EVEN IF RESULTS IN LESS TRADE		BOTH ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT		TRADE MORE IMPORTANT EVEN IF IT RESULTS IN LESS CLIMATE PROTECTION

VOTE

ASK ALL. SINGLE ANSWER

31. Did you vote in the last UK General Election (2019)?

◉ Yes

O No

O Prefer not to say

ASK IN UK IF Q26 = 1 “Yes”. SINGLE ANSWER

PARTY VOTE

32. Which of these political parties did you vote for in the 2019 General Election?

◉ Conservative Party

O Labour Party

O Scottish National Party

O Liberal Democrats

O Change UK

O Plaid Cymru

O Green Party

O Democratic Unionist Party

O Sinn Féin

Don’t know

ASK ALL IN UK, SINGLE ANSWER

ELECTION NOW

33. If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?

◉ Conservative Party

O Labour Party

O Scottish National Party

O Liberal Democrats

O Change UK

O Plaid Cymru

O Green Party

O Democratic Unionist Party

O Sinn Féin

Don’t know

ASK ALL IN UK, SINGLE ANSWER

REFERENDUM EU

34. In 2016, the UK held a referendum to decide whether to remain in the EU. Could you please let us know how you voted (This survey is totally anonymous and your response will not be shared with any third parties)?

◉ Leave

O Remain

O I did not vote

O Not eligible

ASK IF Q19_new = 9995 “Not eligible to vote”. SINGLE ANSWER

.

34a. If another Brexit referendum were to be held today, how would you vote?

◉ Definitely support

O Probably support

O Undecided

O Probably oppose

O Definitely oppose

CLIMATE CHANGE

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER.

35. Please think about global warming. What do you think is the main cause of climate change?

◉ Greenhouse gases

O Plastic waste

O The extinction of wild animals

O There is no climate change

Don’t know

INCOME

ASK ALL, SINGLE ANSWER.

The next question may be considered personal, but it is not mandatory to answer. If you do, we assure you that your responses will be kept strictly confidential and used for research purposes only.

36. What is the COMBINED TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME (pre-tax) earned by all members of your household? Please include all your income sources : salaries, scholarships, pension and Social Security benefits, dividends from shares, income from rental properties, child support and alimony etc.

◉ Under £5,000

O £5,000 - £9,999

- O £10,000 - £14,999
- O £15,000 - £19,999
- O £20,000 - £24,999
- O £25,000 - £34,999
- O £35,000 - £44,999
- O £45,000 - £54,999
- O £55,000 - £99,999
- O £100,000 or more
- O Prefer not to answer

SHOW ALL

Thank you for your participation!

END OF SURVEY