Appendix Full Model Results for

Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma

by Anne Meng and Jack Paine

B.2: Alternative Samples

DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN								
Panel A. Smaller sample (lower threshold for democracy)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0436***	-0.0423***	-0.0539***	-0.0500***				
	(0.00899)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)	(0.0120)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0406***	-0.0398***	-0.0477***	-0.0372**
					(0.00970)	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0144)
Civil war winner					-0.0489***	-0.0476***	-0.0639***	-0.0701***
					(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0135)	(0.0139)
ln(population)			0.00735	0.0185***			0.00700	0.0201***
			(0.00464)	(0.00509)			(0.00465)	(0.00548)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0208	-0.0192			-0.0165	-0.00953
			(0.0241)	(0.0233)			(0.0260)	(0.0260)
Religious frac.			0.0234	0.00821			0.0255	0.00922
			(0.0184)	(0.0196)			(0.0185)	(0.0197)
British colony			-0.00564	-0.00455			-0.00678	-0.00656
			(0.0121)	(0.0128)			(0.0121)	(0.0126)
French colony			0.00989	0.00463			0.00871	0.00117
			(0.00986)	(0.0111)			(0.0101)	(0.0115)
Portuguese colony			0.00111	-0.00829			-0.00417	-0.0212
			(0.0176)	(0.0195)			(0.0178)	(0.0207)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.000244		-0.0144***		0.000147		-0.0174***
		(0.00523)		(0.00532)		(0.00527)		(0.00650)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0558		-0.0491		-0.0548		-0.0430
		(0.0374)		(0.0381)		(0.0375)		(0.0384)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000217		0.000295		-0.000224		0.000409
		(0.000677)		(0.000717)		(0.000678)		(0.000744)
Country-years	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203	2,203
R-squared	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046	0.011	0.041	0.043	0.046
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 is identical to Table 2 except here we alter the sample. In Panel A, the sample is smaller than our core sample. We continue to exclude all democracies, but use a less stringent standard for coding a country as democratic. Specifically, we use Geddes et al.'s (2014) coding of democracy, which unlike our core measure does not require rotation in office. In Panel B, we expand the sample from our core sample. We include *all* post-independence years, including democracies, transitional regimes, and warlord regimes (all of which are excluded from the core sample). $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.2: Alternative Samples

DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN								
Panel B. Larger sample (all post-independence years)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0464***	-0.0418***	-0.0517***	-0.0481***				
	(0.00861)	(0.00958)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0430***	-0.0408***	-0.0484***	-0.0354**
					(0.00913)	(0.0113)	(0.0127)	(0.0138)
Civil war winner					-0.0509***	-0.0434***	-0.0557***	-0.0641***
					(0.0106)	(0.0117)	(0.0124)	(0.0139)
ln(population)			0.00716	0.0217***			0.00689	0.0227***
			(0.00427)	(0.00528)			(0.00438)	(0.00556)
Ethnic frac.			0.00328	0.00342			0.00575	0.0124
			(0.0240)	(0.0223)			(0.0264)	(0.0253)
Religious frac.			0.0110	-0.00797			0.0115	-0.00791
			(0.0200)	(0.0206)			(0.0199)	(0.0209)
British colony			-0.00924	-0.00561			-0.00987	-0.00733
			(0.0145)	(0.0133)			(0.0146)	(0.0134)
French colony			0.00587	-0.000384			0.00505	-0.00394
			(0.0111)	(0.0112)			(0.0117)	(0.0121)
Portuguese colony			0.00305	-0.00765			0.000281	-0.0196
			(0.0214)	(0.0231)			(0.0222)	(0.0256)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.000539		-0.0180***		-0.000603		-0.0207***
		(0.00528)		(0.00561)		(0.00541)		(0.00700)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0562*		-0.0490		-0.0559*		-0.0446
		(0.0312)		(0.0315)		(0.0309)		(0.0313)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000168		0.000381		-0.000170		0.000466
		(0.000721)		(0.000702)		(0.000722)		(0.000723)
Country-years	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614	2,636	2,614
R-squared	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049	0.016	0.044	0.045	0.049
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.2 is identical to Table 2 except here we alter the sample. In Panel A, the sample is smaller than our core sample. We continue to exclude all democracies, but use a less stringent standard for coding a country as democratic. Specifically, we use Geddes et al.'s (2014) coding of democracy, which unlike our core measure does not require rotation in office. In Panel B, we expand the sample from our core sample. We include *all* post-independence years, including democracies, transitional regimes, and warlord regimes (all of which are excluded from the core sample). $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.3: Sample without Revolutionary Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Lachapelle et al. (2020)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no LLWC cases)	-0.0486***	-0.0479***	-0.0599***	-0.0562***
	(0.00924)	(0.0108)	(0.0111)	(0.0107)
ln(population)			0.00892*	0.0224***
			(0.00487)	(0.00544)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0100	-0.00915
			(0.0264)	(0.0253)
Religious frac.			0.0150	-0.000644
			(0.0205)	(0.0209)
British colony			-0.00425	-0.000800
			(0.0136)	(0.0136)
French colony			0.00671	0.000527
			(0.0113)	(0.0120)
Portuguese colony			-0.00212	-0.00896
			(0.0209)	(0.0226)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00217		-0.0170**
		(0.00542)		(0.00659)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0918**		-0.0840**
		(0.0387)		(0.0400)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000300		0.000488
		(0.000763)		(0.000773)
Country-years	2,180	2,180	2,180	2,180
R-squared	0.011	0.043	0.043	0.048
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.3 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 1 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.3: Sample without Revolutionary Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel B. Colgan and Weeks (2015)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no CW cases)	-0.0519***	-0.0512***	-0.0604***	-0.0549***
	(0.00859)	(0.0106)	(0.0113)	(0.0114)
ln(population)			0.00915*	0.0215***
			(0.00459)	(0.00510)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00544	-0.00178
			(0.0279)	(0.0277)
Religious frac.			0.0127	-0.00291
			(0.0203)	(0.0211)
British colony			-0.00494	-0.00195
			(0.0149)	(0.0146)
French colony			0.00563	-0.00117
			(0.0110)	(0.0118)
Portuguese colony			-0.00821	-0.0186
			(0.0113)	(0.0140)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00266		-0.0158**
		(0.00541)		(0.00654)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0925**		-0.0854**
		(0.0389)		(0.0402)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000283		0.000368
		(0.000794)		(0.000748)
Country-years	2,219	2,219	2,219	2,219
R-squared	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.050
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.3 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 1 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.3: Sample without Revolutionary Regimes

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel C. Roessler and Verhoeven (2016)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (no RV cases)	-0.0453***	-0.0427***	-0.0523***	-0.0475***
	(0.0102)	(0.0121)	(0.0139)	(0.0137)
ln(population)			0.00926*	0.0229***
			(0.00479)	(0.00598)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00471	-0.00277
			(0.0284)	(0.0275)
Religious frac.			0.0152	-0.000720
			(0.0203)	(0.0213)
British colony			-0.00449	-0.00331
			(0.0153)	(0.0150)
French colony			0.00424	-0.00362
			(0.0121)	(0.0128)
Portuguese colony			-0.00389	-0.0119
			(0.0199)	(0.0219)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00353		-0.0169**
		(0.00567)		(0.00758)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0998**		-0.0907**
		(0.0414)		(0.0430)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000419		0.000401
		(0.000847)		(0.000812)
Country-years	2,035	2,035	2,035	2,035
R-squared	0.009	0.044	0.044	0.049
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.3 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we alter the sample by dropping all observations from regimes that we code as REBEL REGIME=1 and that an existing dataset codes as revolutionary. Panel A drops six rebel regimes that Lachapelle et al. (2020) code as revolutionary. Panel B drops five rebel regimes that Colgan and Weks (2015) code as revolutionary. Panel C drops twelve rebel regimes that Roessler and Verhoeven (2016) code as violent liberation regimes. Table 1 denotes which regimes are dropped in each panel. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.4: Robustness Checks for Table 2

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN							
	Panel A. Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.399***	-1.430***	-1.551***	-1.477***				
	(0.356)	(0.391)	(0.378)	(0.376)				
Col. liberation					-1.318***	-1.380***	-1.413***	-1.213**
					(0.438)	(0.486)	(0.486)	(0.530)
Civil war winner					-1.542***	-1.525***	-1.770***	-1.834***
					(0.519)	(0.512)	(0.506)	(0.491)
ln(population)			0.143*	0.441***			0.137	0.447***
			(0.0848)	(0.130)			(0.0865)	(0.135)
Ethnic frac.			-0.110	-0.121			-0.0623	-0.0182
			(0.545)	(0.532)			(0.568)	(0.578)
Religious frac.			0.233	-0.135			0.252	-0.118
			(0.365)	(0.413)			(0.366)	(0.410)
British colony			-0.0458	0.102			-0.0642	0.0671
			(0.242)	(0.228)			(0.242)	(0.227)
French colony			0.173	0.140			0.153	0.0921
			(0.212)	(0.225)			(0.216)	(0.235)
Portuguese colony			-0.108	-0.162			-0.177	-0.317
			(0.532)	(0.564)			(0.526)	(0.582)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0419		-0.346**		0.0412		-0.368**
		(0.0929)		(0.152)		(0.0937)		(0.169)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-1.598***		-1.410**		-1.591***		-1.344**
		(0.591)		(0.625)		(0.592)		(0.634)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00450		0.00956		-0.00458		0.00952
		(0.0160)		(0.0147)		(0.0160)		(0.0147)
Country-years	2,352	2,172	2,172	2,172	2,352	2,172	2,172	2,172
Pseudo R2	0.0372	0.0873	0.0874	0.0981	0.0373	0.0874	0.0877	0.0987
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.4 is identical to Table 2 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4 and 6–8. The missing values are from years in which no regime breakdown occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.4: Robustness Checks for Table 2

DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN								
Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0695***	-0.0622***	-0.0703***	-0.0636***				
	(0.0139)	(0.0153)	(0.0186)	(0.0189)				
Col. liberation					-0.0668***	-0.0619***	-0.0728***	-0.0598**
					(0.0151)	(0.0170)	(0.0209)	(0.0231)
Civil war winner					-0.0738***	-0.0630***	-0.0664***	-0.0686***
					(0.0140)	(0.0166)	(0.0222)	(0.0209)
ln(population)			-0.000870	0.00951			-0.000883	0.0104
			(0.00623)	(0.00610)			(0.00623)	(0.00755)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0372	-0.0332			-0.0397	-0.0291
			(0.0316)	(0.0319)			(0.0340)	(0.0374)
Religious frac.			0.0555	0.0336			0.0545	0.0332
			(0.0392)	(0.0427)			(0.0391)	(0.0431)
British colony			0.0424***	0.0448***			0.0436***	0.0434***
			(0.0138)	(0.0147)			(0.0133)	(0.0148)
French colony			0.0328*	0.0277			0.0332*	0.0266
			(0.0173)	(0.0187)			(0.0175)	(0.0197)
Portuguese colony			-0.000105	-0.00765			0.00267	-0.0125
			(0.0150)	(0.0170)			(0.0165)	(0.0218)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00406		-0.0135*		-0.00409		-0.0147*
		(0.00688)		(0.00735)		(0.00695)		(0.00873)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.115		-0.117		-0.115		-0.115
		(0.0826)		(0.0854)		(0.0823)		(0.0844)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000676		2.90e-05		-0.000678		8.12e-05
		(0.000765)		(0.000914)		(0.000764)		(0.000968)
Country-years	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.029	0.085	0.088	0.093	0.029	0.085	0.088	0.093
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.4 is identical to Table 2 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4 and 6–8. The missing values are from years in which no regime breakdown occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions

	Panel A. 2SLS. DV: REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0940**	-0.0805**		
(IV=land suitability)	(0.0356)	(0.0310)		
Col. liberation regime			-0.0961**	-0.0806**
(IV=land suitability)			(0.0375)	(0.0316)
Civil war winner			-0.0647***	-0.0782***
			(0.0127)	(0.0149)
British colony		0.0132		0.0134
		(0.0194)		(0.0186)
French colony		0.0206		0.0206
		(0.0187)		(0.0185)
Portuguese colony		0.0325		0.0328
		(0.0223)		(0.0247)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		0.00164**		0.00163**
		(0.000707)		(0.000747)
Precolonial state		0.0194		0.0192
		(0.0151)		(0.0154)
Rugged terrain		-0.00922*		-0.00918
		(0.00542)		(0.00557)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.008	0.044	0.009	0.044
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents 2SLS estimates with standard errors clustered by country. Equation B.1 (see appendix) is the first stage in Columns 1 and 2, Equation B.2 (see appendix) is the first stage in Columns 3 and 4, and Equation 1 (see article) is the second stage in all columns. The sample differs from that in Table 2 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions

	Panel B. First stage. DV: COL. LIBERATION REGIME			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	0.0615***	0.0833***	0.0581***	0.0838***
	(0.0168)	(0.0190)	(0.0171)	(0.0187)
Civil war winner			-0.191**	-0.0835*
			(0.0782)	(0.0417)
British colony		-0.164		-0.0520
		(0.117)		(0.132)
French colony		0.0732		0.135
		(0.123)		(0.139)
Portuguese colony		0.455***		0.580***
		(0.152)		(0.171)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		-0.00322		-0.00774*
		(0.00482)		(0.00421)
Precolonial state		0.0163		-0.0768
		(0.0967)		(0.0783)
Rugged terrain		-0.0495		-0.0382
		(0.0373)		(0.0352)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.203	0.359	0.262	0.522
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES
F-test for IV	13.3	19.2	11.5	20.1

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents 2SLS estimates with standard errors clustered by country. Equation B.1 (see appendix) is the first stage in Columns 1 and 2, Equation B.2 (see appendix) is the first stage in Columns 3 and 4, and Equation 1 (see article) is the second stage in all columns. The sample differs from that in Table 2 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.5: Instrumental Variable Regressions

	Panel C. Reduced form. DV: REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(% area suitable for Eu. agri.)	-0.00575***	-0.00713***	-0.00557***	-0.00716***
	(0.00171)	(0.00171)	(0.00178)	(0.00173)
Civil war winner			-0.0447***	-0.0622***
			(0.00716)	(0.0109)
British colony		0.0304**		0.0227
		(0.0118)		(0.0143)
French colony		0.0167		0.0125
		(0.0126)		(0.0147)
Portuguese colony		0.0179		0.00947
		(0.0224)		(0.0240)
ln(pop dens. in 1800)		0.00204***		0.00235***
		(0.000593)		(0.000633)
Precolonial state		0.0152		0.0215
		(0.0121)		(0.0131)
Rugged terrain		-0.00236		-0.00313
		(0.00618)		(0.00626)
Country-years	2,055	2,055	2,055	2,055
R-squared	0.013	0.020	0.016	0.025
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	NO	YES

Notes: Panel A of Table B.5 presents 2SLS estimates with standard errors clustered by country. Equation B.1 (see appendix) is the first stage in Columns 1 and 2, Equation B.2 (see appendix) is the first stage in Columns 3 and 4, and Equation 1 (see article) is the second stage in all columns. The sample differs from that in Table 2 because island countries (except Madagascar) and countries that did not gain independence from a European country (Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia) are missing data on the climate instrument. Panel B presents the first-stage estimates and Panel C presents the reduced-form estimates. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.7: Robustness Checks for Table 3

DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS								
Panel A. Logit models								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-1.269***	-1.103**	-1.452***	-1.350***				
	(0.432)	(0.451)	(0.477)	(0.486)				
Col. liberation regime					-1.053**	-0.955*	-1.351**	-1.155**
					(0.460)	(0.488)	(0.535)	(0.588)
Civil war winner					-1.952**	-1.640*	-1.771*	-1.865*
					(0.965)	(0.994)	(0.962)	(0.968)
ln(population)			0.171*	0.424***			0.165*	0.427***
			(0.0976)	(0.142)			(0.1000)	(0.144)
Ethnic frac.			-0.668	-0.708			-0.625	-0.615
			(0.583)	(0.559)			(0.607)	(0.606)
Religious frac.			0.149	-0.147			0.169	-0.131
			(0.482)	(0.522)			(0.482)	(0.512)
British colony			0.0248	0.121			0.00752	0.0890
			(0.291)	(0.296)			(0.288)	(0.292)
French colony			0.345	0.316			0.323	0.271
			(0.233)	(0.240)			(0.235)	(0.246)
Portuguese colony			0.423	0.343			0.359	0.207
			(0.822)	(0.865)			(0.813)	(0.873)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0245		-0.266*		0.0229		-0.284*
		(0.102)		(0.147)		(0.104)		(0.164)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-1.861**		-1.793*		-1.830**		-1.727*
		(0.902)		(0.948)		(0.898)		(0.959)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.0153		-0.00506		-0.0161		-0.00560
		(0.0175)		(0.0162)		(0.0175)		(0.0160)
Country-years	2,352	1,804	1,804	1,804	2,352	1,804	1,804	1,804
Pseudo R2	0.0441	0.0827	0.0815	0.0923	0.0452	0.0833	0.0817	0.0928
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.7 follows the same structure as Table B.4; the present table is identical to Table 3 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{*}p < 0.1$.

B.7: Robustness Checks for Table 3

	DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS							
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0358***	-0.0288***	-0.0374***	-0.0348***				
	(0.0106)	(0.0101)	(0.0120)	(0.0126)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0332***	-0.0278**	-0.0444***	-0.0403**
					(0.0114)	(0.0109)	(0.0135)	(0.0151)
Civil war winner					-0.0409***	-0.0309**	-0.0272*	-0.0281*
					(0.0111)	(0.0124)	(0.0158)	(0.0155)
ln(population)			-0.00246	0.00369			-0.00231	0.00236
			(0.00458)	(0.00496)			(0.00459)	(0.00535)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0492**	-0.0497**			-0.0563**	-0.0556**
			(0.0237)	(0.0243)			(0.0249)	(0.0265)
Religious frac.			0.0378	0.0217			0.0342	0.0220
			(0.0255)	(0.0293)			(0.0257)	(0.0290)
British colony			0.0372***	0.0379***			0.0405***	0.0398***
			(0.0114)	(0.0125)			(0.0115)	(0.0126)
French colony			0.0248*	0.0225			0.0259*	0.0242*
			(0.0131)	(0.0139)			(0.0132)	(0.0140)
Portuguese colony			0.0115	0.0118			0.0203	0.0194
			(0.0127)	(0.0149)			(0.0145)	(0.0171)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00288		-0.00593		-0.00301		-0.00402
		(0.00443)		(0.00525)		(0.00457)		(0.00563)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0606		-0.0644		-0.0601		-0.0668
		(0.0466)		(0.0470)		(0.0464)		(0.0466)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000862		-0.000665		-0.000868		-0.000745
		(0.000643)		(0.000796)		(0.000643)		(0.000801)
Country-years	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333	1,333
R-squared	0.019	0.077	0.081	0.084	0.019	0.077	0.081	0.085
Time controls?	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.7 follows the same structure as Table B.4; the present table is identical to Table 3 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. The addition of year fixed effects causes the decrease in sample size in Columns 2–4. The missing values are from years in which no successful coups occurred, causing the logit model to drop every observation for those years. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B9: Robustness Checks for Table 4

DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME								
	Panel A. Logit models							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	1.305***	1.091***	0.915***	0.910***				
	(0.254)	(0.263)	(0.273)	(0.294)				
Col. liberation regime					1.325***	1.227***	1.203***	1.304***
					(0.313)	(0.299)	(0.283)	(0.356)
Civil war winner					1.267***	0.842**	0.476	0.372
					(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.367)	(0.369)
ln(population)			0.155	0.142			0.138	0.204
			(0.125)	(0.171)			(0.124)	(0.175)
Ethnic frac.			0.882	0.879			1.114	1.220
			(0.776)	(0.776)			(0.791)	(0.778)
Religious frac.			0.211	0.225			0.285	0.200
			(0.668)	(0.617)			(0.676)	(0.630)
British colony			-0.721	-0.782*			-0.810*	-0.879**
			(0.448)	(0.430)			(0.449)	(0.422)
French colony			-0.203	-0.171			-0.282	-0.306
			(0.440)	(0.429)			(0.444)	(0.421)
Portuguese colony			0.783	0.801			0.575	0.455
			(0.654)	(0.647)			(0.752)	(0.778)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0561		0.0493		0.0472		-0.0590
		(0.108)		(0.181)		(0.111)		(0.198)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.563		0.755*		0.609		0.926**
		(0.416)		(0.421)		(0.426)		(0.424)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00648		-0.0140		-0.00718		-0.0108
		(0.0125)		(0.0123)		(0.0126)		(0.0118)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
Pseudo R2	0.0540	0.0955	0.124	0.127	0.0540	0.0966	0.128	0.131
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.9 follows the same structure as Tables B.4 and B.7; the present table is identical to Table 4 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

B9: Robustness Checks for Table 4

	DV: DEFENSE MINISTER SAME							
	Panel B. Sample: coercive-origins regimes only							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.315***	0.252***	0.206***	0.206***				
	(0.0574)	(0.0599)	(0.0608)	(0.0646)				
Col. liberation regime					0.320***	0.280***	0.259***	0.278***
					(0.0707)	(0.0657)	(0.0631)	(0.0761)
Civil war winner					0.306***	0.200**	0.122	0.0994
					(0.0812)	(0.0826)	(0.0841)	(0.0848)
ln(population)			0.0287	0.0274			0.0254	0.0395
			(0.0254)	(0.0347)			(0.0251)	(0.0347)
Ethnic frac.			0.187	0.190			0.227	0.249
			(0.153)	(0.152)			(0.155)	(0.151)
Religious frac.			0.0461	0.0470			0.0600	0.0431
			(0.139)	(0.126)			(0.140)	(0.129)
British colony			-0.147	-0.159*			-0.164*	-0.177**
			(0.0902)	(0.0857)			(0.0907)	(0.0843)
French colony			-0.0443	-0.0375			-0.0587	-0.0625
			(0.0921)	(0.0884)			(0.0926)	(0.0862)
Portuguese colony			0.151	0.157			0.104	0.0813
			(0.125)	(0.123)			(0.143)	(0.150)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0119		0.00849		0.0101		-0.0119
		(0.0231)		(0.0365)		(0.0236)		(0.0392)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.121		0.156*		0.130		0.188**
		(0.0888)		(0.0849)		(0.0909)		(0.0861)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00140		-0.00300		-0.00154		-0.00244
		(0.00270)		(0.00254)		(0.00273)		(0.00245)
Country-years	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
R-squared	0.074	0.124	0.158	0.161	0.074	0.125	0.161	0.165
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table B.9 follows the same structure as Tables B.4 and B.7; the present table is identical to Table 4 except for the following changes in each panel. In Panel A, we change the link function from linear to logit. In Panel B, we limit the sample to regimes that gained power via force (i.e., rebel regimes and coup regimes), thus dropping all civilian regimes. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C1: Controlling the Countryside

Panel A. DV: V-Dem Civil society participation index								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0227	-0.0602	-0.0585	-0.0502				
	(0.0544)	(0.0528)	(0.0511)	(0.0492)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0217	-0.0624	-0.0998	-0.0733
					(0.0653)	(0.0683)	(0.0787)	(0.0782)
Civil war winner					0.106*	-0.0560	0.00878	-0.0154
					(0.0607)	(0.0620)	(0.0549)	(0.0525)
ln(population)			0.0113	0.0378			0.0142	0.0343
			(0.0203)	(0.0275)			(0.0219)	(0.0252)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0343	-0.0242			-0.0612	-0.0405
			(0.0764)	(0.0651)			(0.0850)	(0.0798)
Religious frac.			0.0772	0.0412			0.0641	0.0410
			(0.0775)	(0.0775)			(0.0799)	(0.0776)
British colony			0.236***	0.231***			0.248***	0.236***
			(0.0586)	(0.0626)			(0.0626)	(0.0661)
French colony			0.150***	0.147***			0.161***	0.155***
			(0.0531)	(0.0475)			(0.0579)	(0.0540)
Portuguese colony			0.212**	0.197**			0.250**	0.221*
			(0.102)	(0.0915)			(0.113)	(0.112)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0105		-0.0260		0.0107		-0.0197
		(0.0235)		(0.0223)		(0.0242)		(0.0207)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.154**		0.141***		0.153**		0.131**
		(0.0692)		(0.0498)		(0.0695)		(0.0498)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00516*		-0.00240		-0.00515*		-0.00257
		(0.00289)		(0.00248)		(0.00290)		(0.00237)
Country-years	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351	2,351
R-squared	0.002	0.343	0.456	0.481	0.016	0.343	0.464	0.483
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.1 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable or how we disaggregate rebel regimes. In Panel A, the DV is V-Dem's Civil society participation index. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. In Panel B, the DV is Adjusted BTI stateness. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate greater stateness. For reasons stated above, we use a cross-section of countries in 2006 in Panel B. In Panel C, the DV is the same as in Table 2. Rebel regimes are disaggregated depending on whether a civil war occurs within five years of the rebel group coming to power. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

C1: Controlling the Countryside

Panel B. DV: Adjusted BTI stateness								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.380	0.430	0.302	0.451				
	(0.619)	(0.579)	(0.618)	(0.488)				
Col. liberation regime					1.285**	1.217*	0.930	0.429
					(0.595)	(0.621)	(0.714)	(0.583)
Civil war winner					-0.654	-0.448	-0.449	0.476
					(0.712)	(0.663)	(0.686)	(0.701)
ln(population)			-0.253	-0.721**			-0.194	-0.730**
			(0.232)	(0.278)			(0.215)	(0.320)
Ethnic frac.			-1.916*	-1.727*			-1.572	-1.740
			(1.072)	(0.882)			(1.052)	(1.027)
Religious frac.			-1.928	-1.030			-1.551	-1.025
			(1.540)	(1.438)			(1.667)	(1.488)
British colony			0.853	0.598			0.437	0.606
			(0.964)	(0.736)			(0.990)	(0.738)
French colony			-0.452	0.352			-0.667	0.366
			(0.684)	(0.664)			(0.589)	(0.791)
Portuguese colony			1.136	2.070			0.115	2.112
			(0.804)	(1.399)			(0.975)	(1.722)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.674**		1.091***		0.520*		1.102**
		(0.262)		(0.359)		(0.262)		(0.467)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		1.870**		1.637		1.921*		1.621
		(0.850)		(1.558)		(1.068)		(1.612)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.0949**		-0.111***		-0.0884***		-0.112**
		(0.0352)		(0.0399)		(0.0303)		(0.0454)
Countries	31	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
R-squared	0.013	0.252	0.290	0.578	0.172	0.359	0.347	0.578
Year	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006

Notes: Table C.1 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable or how we disaggregate rebel regimes. In Panel A, the DV is V-Dem's Civil society participation index. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. In Panel B, the DV is Adjusted BTI stateness. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate greater stateness. For reasons stated above, we use a cross-section of countries in 2006 in Panel B. In Panel C, the DV is the same as in Table 2. Rebel regimes are disaggregated depending on whether a civil war occurs within five years of the rebel group coming to power. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

C1: Controlling the Countryside

	Panel C. Counterrevolutions.			
	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel (counterrev.)	-0.0481***	-0.0466***	-0.0600***	-0.0600***
	(0.0113)	(0.0130)	(0.0151)	(0.0164)
Rebel (none)	-0.0482***	-0.0490***	-0.0551***	-0.0460***
	(0.00955)	(0.0114)	(0.0120)	(0.0123)
ln(population)			0.00885**	0.0216***
			(0.00434)	(0.00523)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00870	-0.00474
			(0.0257)	(0.0253)
Religious frac.			0.0115	-0.00444
			(0.0195)	(0.0210)
British colony			-0.00243	0.000645
			(0.0132)	(0.0129)
French colony			0.00876	0.00235
			(0.0103)	(0.0109)
Portuguese colony			-0.000460	-0.00844
			(0.0163)	(0.0169)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00208		-0.0162**
		(0.00519)		(0.00622)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0887**		-0.0813**
		(0.0364)		(0.0376)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000199		0.000537
		(0.000727)		(0.000741)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.1 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable or how we disaggregate rebel regimes. In Panel A, the DV is V-Dem's Civil society participation index. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate a stronger and more autonomous civil society. In Panel B, the DV is Adjusted BTI stateness. Higher values for the coefficient estimates indicate greater stateness. For reasons stated above, we use a cross-section of countries in 2006 in Panel B. In Panel C, the DV is the same as in Table 2. Rebel regimes are disaggregated depending on whether a civil war occurs within five years of the rebel group coming to power. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

C.3: Other Party Explanations

Panel A. DV: Party control of military								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.565	0.706	0.364	0.381				
	(0.405)	(0.422)	(0.359)	(0.348)				
Col. liberation regime					0.907*	1.082**	0.686	0.730
					(0.526)	(0.500)	(0.476)	(0.485)
Civil war winner					-0.224	-0.222	-0.0936	-0.109
					(0.328)	(0.340)	(0.418)	(0.429)
ln(population)			0.0415	-0.0270			0.0252	0.0150
			(0.130)	(0.147)			(0.127)	(0.138)
Ethnic frac.			-0.421	-0.483			-0.146	-0.165
			(0.514)	(0.538)			(0.534)	(0.588)
Religious frac.			0.614	0.711			0.732	0.733
			(0.482)	(0.549)			(0.509)	(0.551)
British colony			0.645	0.568			0.597	0.517
			(0.384)	(0.377)			(0.375)	(0.371)
French colony			0.164	0.258			0.100	0.161
			(0.257)	(0.272)			(0.264)	(0.302)
Portuguese colony			2.105***	2.248***			1.755**	1.819**
			(0.647)	(0.589)			(0.715)	(0.685)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0137		0.139		-0.0199		0.0586
		(0.129)		(0.140)		(0.128)		(0.151)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.105		-0.0919		0.299		0.0706
		(0.231)		(0.243)		(0.229)		(0.275)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.0251		-0.0260*		-0.0283*		-0.0239
		(0.0156)		(0.0151)		(0.0148)		(0.0152)
Country-years	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744	1,744
R-squared	0.034	0.081	0.225	0.242	0.072	0.126	0.237	0.254
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.3 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is Geddes et al.'s ordinal variable for party control over the military. In Panel B, the DV indicates the presence of a commissar system. In Panel C, the DV is the total number of counterbalancing units. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.3: Other Party Explanations

	Panel B. DV: Commissar system							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0601	0.0800	0.0343	0.0373				
	(0.0663)	(0.0748)	(0.0322)	(0.0333)				
Col. liberation regime					0.110	0.122	0.0565	0.0646
					(0.0960)	(0.107)	(0.0478)	(0.0556)
Civil war winner					-0.0336*	0.000474	-0.00190	-0.00362
					(0.0191)	(0.0157)	(0.0230)	(0.0264)
ln(population)			0.0219*	0.0206			0.0204	0.0247
			(0.0128)	(0.0156)			(0.0125)	(0.0175)
Ethnic frac.			0.0195	0.0163			0.0339	0.0354
			(0.0400)	(0.0391)			(0.0376)	(0.0371)
Religious frac.			0.0179	0.0198			0.0249	0.0200
			(0.0422)	(0.0395)			(0.0455)	(0.0398)
British colony			0.0564	0.0505			0.0502	0.0445
			(0.0418)	(0.0405)			(0.0423)	(0.0411)
French colony			0.0196	0.0242			0.0135	0.0150
			(0.0215)	(0.0264)			(0.0208)	(0.0280)
Portuguese colony			0.298**	0.305**			0.278**	0.276**
			(0.139)	(0.139)			(0.133)	(0.130)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0110		0.00633		0.00823		-0.00112
		(0.0153)		(0.0135)		(0.0162)		(0.0179)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0443*		-0.0577*		-0.0301		-0.0459
		(0.0227)		(0.0294)		(0.0210)		(0.0288)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00229		-0.00205		-0.00249		-0.00185
		(0.00242)		(0.00198)		(0.00238)		(0.00203)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.064	0.183	0.189	0.038	0.079	0.186	0.193
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.3 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is Geddes et al.'s ordinal variable for party control over the military. In Panel B, the DV indicates the presence of a commissar system. In Panel C, the DV is the total number of counterbalancing units. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.3: Other Party Explanations

	Panel C. DV: Paramilitaries							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.487	0.249	0.0286	0.0370				
	(0.293)	(0.371)	(0.437)	(0.433)				
Col. liberation regime					0.561*	0.196	-0.0758	-0.231
					(0.278)	(0.395)	(0.534)	(0.492)
Civil war winner					0.322	0.354	0.138	0.320
					(0.641)	(0.680)	(0.563)	(0.557)
ln(population)			0.167	0.114			0.182	0.119
			(0.130)	(0.216)			(0.144)	(0.214)
Ethnic frac.			0.802	0.839			0.734	0.657
			(0.515)	(0.507)			(0.535)	(0.480)
Religious frac.			-0.633	-0.484			-0.677	-0.520
			(0.769)	(0.902)			(0.776)	(0.884)
British colony			-0.00587	0.0174			0.0204	0.0789
			(0.405)	(0.455)			(0.416)	(0.459)
French colony			0.915**	0.882**			0.958*	0.994**
			(0.416)	(0.388)			(0.468)	(0.422)
Portuguese colony			0.557	0.486			0.666	0.769*
			(0.372)	(0.330)			(0.501)	(0.441)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.0290		-0.0142		-0.0302		0.0132
		(0.0940)		(0.165)		(0.0952)		(0.163)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.362		-0.0631		-0.379		-0.133
		(0.352)		(0.246)		(0.365)		(0.236)
ln(oil & gas income)		0.0350**		0.0187		0.0369**		0.0212
		(0.0128)		(0.0212)		(0.0151)		(0.0220)
Country-years	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220	1,220
R-squared	0.031	0.128	0.274	0.284	0.034	0.129	0.274	0.290
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.3 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is Geddes et al.'s ordinal variable for party control over the military. In Panel B, the DV indicates the presence of a commissar system. In Panel C, the DV is the total number of counterbalancing units. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.4: Civilian Power Sharing

Panel A. DV: VP/PM SAME								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0746	-0.0584	-0.0266	-0.0384				
	(0.0800)	(0.0721)	(0.0779)	(0.0754)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0555	-0.0545	-0.0464	-0.102
					(0.0977)	(0.0936)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Civil war winner					0.133	-0.0635	-0.00564	0.0249
					(0.101)	(0.111)	(0.0940)	(0.0950)
ln(population)			-0.0541	-0.0916			-0.0541	-0.103*
			(0.0354)	(0.0586)			(0.0355)	(0.0540)
Ethnic frac.			0.347**	0.335**			0.340**	0.307**
			(0.140)	(0.128)			(0.151)	(0.139)
Religious frac.			-0.146	-0.134			-0.143	-0.120
			(0.157)	(0.140)			(0.158)	(0.140)
British colony			0.146	0.123			0.148	0.125
			(0.102)	(0.106)			(0.103)	(0.105)
French colony			-0.124	-0.119			-0.123	-0.114
			(0.0911)	(0.0873)			(0.0917)	(0.0883)
Portuguese colony			0.0105	0.0325			0.0236	0.0806
			(0.150)	(0.146)			(0.173)	(0.167)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0105		0.0546		0.0104		0.0711
		(0.0305)		(0.0508)		(0.0310)		(0.0469)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.281*		0.213		0.282*		0.189
		(0.160)		(0.153)		(0.158)		(0.147)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00265		-0.00177		-0.00265		-0.00222
		(0.00520)		(0.00457)		(0.00521)		(0.00440)
Country-years	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,882	1,701	1,701	1,701
R-squared	0.003	0.080	0.127	0.133	0.006	0.080	0.127	0.135
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.4 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is the stable appointment of a VP/PM. In Panel B, the DV is the appointment of a VP/PM. These follow the differences between the Minister of Defense variables in Tables 4 and B.8, respectively. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.4: Civilian Power Sharing

	Panel B. DV: VP/PM APPOINT							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	0.0354	-0.165**	-0.143	-0.146*				
	(0.0891)	(0.0688)	(0.0883)	(0.0799)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0421	-0.202*	-0.220	-0.244*
					(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.154)	(0.142)
Civil war winner					0.137	-0.115	-0.0577	-0.0460
					(0.0907)	(0.0742)	(0.0822)	(0.0851)
ln(population)			-0.0611*	-0.0630			-0.0608*	-0.0810
			(0.0326)	(0.0640)			(0.0322)	(0.0578)
Ethnic frac.			0.385***	0.388***			0.357**	0.346**
			(0.134)	(0.126)			(0.152)	(0.137)
Religious frac.			-0.150	-0.146			-0.137	-0.123
			(0.158)	(0.150)			(0.160)	(0.147)
British colony			0.154	0.150			0.164	0.154
			(0.107)	(0.115)			(0.110)	(0.114)
French colony			-0.139	-0.138			-0.135	-0.130
			(0.101)	(0.0984)			(0.102)	(0.0992)
Portuguese colony			0.00102	0.00326			0.0526	0.0774
			(0.124)	(0.111)			(0.154)	(0.140)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00361		0.00378		-0.00212		0.0293
		(0.0278)		(0.0617)		(0.0280)		(0.0566)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.157		0.107		0.147		0.0719
		(0.0997)		(0.0960)		(0.0981)		(0.0892)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.00294		-0.000710		-0.00291		-0.00141
		(0.00503)		(0.00499)		(0.00498)		(0.00475)
Country-years	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,742
R-squared	0.001	0.199	0.265	0.266	0.007	0.201	0.269	0.271
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.4 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. In Panel A, the DV is the stable appointment of a VP/PM. In Panel B, the DV is the appointment of a VP/PM. These follow the differences between the Minister of Defense variables in Tables 4 and B.8, respectively. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.5: Ethnic Power Sharing

Panel A. DV: ETHNIC REPRESENTATION								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.00442	-0.0599	0.0416	0.0218				
	(0.0978)	(0.101)	(0.0997)	(0.0954)				
Col. liberation regime					0.00306	-0.0530	0.119	0.0702
					(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.118)	(0.123)
Civil war winner					-0.0184	-0.0728	-0.0847	-0.0507
					(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.118)
ln(population)			-0.0211	-0.0826*			-0.0266	-0.0753
			(0.0338)	(0.0459)			(0.0324)	(0.0489)
Ethnic frac.			0.282	0.265			0.332	0.299
			(0.242)	(0.244)			(0.248)	(0.252)
Religious frac.			0.0788	0.161			0.103	0.162
			(0.182)	(0.171)			(0.179)	(0.170)
British colony			0.0284	0.0159			0.00652	0.00531
			(0.125)	(0.118)			(0.125)	(0.121)
French colony			0.0862	0.107			0.0650	0.0906
			(0.124)	(0.119)			(0.124)	(0.123)
Portuguese colony			-0.142	-0.0982			-0.212	-0.148
			(0.190)	(0.199)			(0.195)	(0.214)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0235		0.0741*		0.0230		0.0609
		(0.0313)		(0.0398)		(0.0322)		(0.0461)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		0.125		0.147*		0.127		0.168**
		(0.0786)		(0.0761)		(0.0794)		(0.0737)
ln(oil & gas income)		0.00204		-0.000753		0.00201		-0.000393
		(0.00516)		(0.00527)		(0.00514)		(0.00525)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.000	0.027	0.066	0.093	0.000	0.027	0.078	0.097
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.5 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. Data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). In Panel A, the dependent variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government (i.e., "junior partner" or higher in the EPR scheme). In Panel B, the dependent variable is ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group has a status of either "monopoly" or "dominant," hence shutting out members of any other ethnic group from influential cabinet positions. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.5: Ethnic Power Sharing

Panel B. DV: ETHNOCRACY								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0384	-0.0185	-0.129	-0.125				
	(0.134)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.104)				
Col. liberation regime					0.0667	0.0412	-0.0493	-0.0194
					(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Civil war winner					-0.235*	-0.131	-0.258**	-0.284**
					(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.121)
ln(population)			0.102***	0.124**			0.0962**	0.139**
			(0.0370)	(0.0501)			(0.0376)	(0.0530)
Ethnic frac.			-0.130	-0.125			-0.0785	-0.0504
			(0.217)	(0.216)			(0.235)	(0.233)
Religious frac.			-0.448*	-0.478**			-0.423*	-0.477**
			(0.223)	(0.215)			(0.218)	(0.213)
British colony			-0.273*	-0.249			-0.296*	-0.272*
			(0.159)	(0.158)			(0.159)	(0.158)
French colony			-0.234	-0.255			-0.256	-0.291*
			(0.157)	(0.160)			(0.156)	(0.156)
Portuguese colony			-0.0734	-0.0990			-0.145	-0.209
			(0.254)	(0.252)			(0.243)	(0.240)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.0356		-0.0393		0.0316		-0.0682
		(0.0441)		(0.0513)		(0.0439)		(0.0575)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.288**		-0.258**		-0.268*		-0.212*
		(0.133)		(0.113)		(0.134)		(0.112)
ln(oil & gas income)		0.00459		0.00610		0.00431		0.00688
		(0.00645)		(0.00551)		(0.00633)		(0.00559)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.001	0.077	0.190	0.201	0.022	0.083	0.198	0.211
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.5 presents the same sequence of specifications as the main tables, except we change the dependent variable. Data on the ethnic makeup of cabinets is from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR; Vogt et al. 2015). In Panel A, the dependent variable is ETHNIC REPRESENTATION, the percentage of the country's population with some membership in cabinet or other high-ranking positions in the central government (i.e., "junior partner" or higher in the EPR scheme). In Panel B, the dependent variable is ETHNOCRACY, an indicator for whether a single ethnic group has a status of either "monopoly" or "dominant," hence shutting out members of any other ethnic group from influential cabinet positions. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}\ p < 0.05,^{*}\ p < 0.1$.

C.7: Controlling for Ethnic Power Sharing

Panel A. DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0484***	-0.0484***	-0.0561***	-0.0521***				
	(0.00901)	(0.0109)	(0.0116)	(0.0118)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0453***	-0.0468***	-0.0486***	-0.0382**
					(0.00939)	(0.0119)	(0.0136)	(0.0153)
Civil war winner					-0.0540***	-0.0517***	-0.0686***	-0.0738***
					(0.0111)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)	(0.0130)
Ethnic representation	-0.0199	-0.0194	-0.0229	-0.0180	-0.0198	-0.0193	-0.0236*	-0.0187
	(0.0146)	(0.0141)	(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0145)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)
ln(population)			0.00820*	0.0192***			0.00772*	0.0210***
			(0.00418)	(0.00504)			(0.00421)	(0.00534)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00339	-0.00322			0.00189	0.00701
			(0.0273)	(0.0261)			(0.0297)	(0.0297)
Religious frac.			0.0130	-0.00165			0.0153	-0.00102
			(0.0187)	(0.0205)			(0.0187)	(0.0207)
British colony			-0.00190	0.00108			-0.00373	-0.00171
			(0.0129)	(0.0131)			(0.0130)	(0.0131)
French colony			0.0103	0.00457			0.00863	0.000342
			(0.00945)	(0.0104)			(0.00979)	(0.0112)
Portuguese colony			-0.00526	-0.0130			-0.0119	-0.0272
			(0.0165)	(0.0179)			(0.0173)	(0.0207)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00237		-0.0140**		0.00229		-0.0174**
		(0.00512)		(0.00600)		(0.00521)		(0.00737)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0863**		-0.0804**		-0.0857**		-0.0739*
		(0.0362)		(0.0376)		(0.0362)		(0.0380)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000174		0.000439		-0.000178		0.000555
		(0.000677)		(0.000717)		(0.000678)		(0.000735)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.044	0.048	0.014	0.043	0.044	0.048
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.7 replicates the main analyses while adding an additional control for ETHNIC REPRESENTATION. Panel A reruns the regression from Table 2; Panel B reruns the regression from Table 3, and Panel C reruns the regression from Table 5. $^{***}p < 0.01$,** $p < 0.05$,* $p < 0.1$.

C.7: Controlling for Ethnic Power Sharing

Panel B. DV: SUCCESSFUL COUPS								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rebel regime	-0.0290***	-0.0226***	-0.0300***	-0.0274***				
	(0.00713)	(0.00719)	(0.00810)	(0.00807)				
Col. liberation regime					-0.0264***	-0.0224**	-0.0297***	-0.0235*
					(0.00822)	(0.00897)	(0.0106)	(0.0121)
Civil war winner					-0.0339***	-0.0229***	-0.0305***	-0.0333***
					(0.00757)	(0.00752)	(0.00830)	(0.00908)
Ethnic representation	-0.0193	-0.0194	-0.0210*	-0.0181	-0.0194	-0.0194	-0.0211	-0.0184
	(0.0126)	(0.0129)	(0.0125)	(0.0126)	(0.0126)	(0.0129)	(0.0127)	(0.0127)
ln(population)			0.00444	0.0103***			0.00442	0.0109**
			(0.00304)	(0.00381)			(0.00305)	(0.00425)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0130	-0.0142			-0.0128	-0.0113
			(0.0202)	(0.0191)			(0.0217)	(0.0217)
Religious frac.			0.0116	0.00349			0.0117	0.00360
			(0.0161)	(0.0177)			(0.0164)	(0.0177)
British colony			-0.00238	-0.00264			-0.00246	-0.00349
			(0.0105)	(0.0111)			(0.0107)	(0.0113)
French colony			0.00871	0.00648			0.00865	0.00522
			(0.00786)	(0.00814)			(0.00802)	(0.00871)
Portuguese colony			0.00203	-0.000881			0.00178	-0.00497
			(0.0207)	(0.0210)			(0.0219)	(0.0237)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00102		-0.00614		0.00100		-0.00718
		(0.00386)		(0.00432)		(0.00399)		(0.00551)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0497*		-0.0466		-0.0496		-0.0449
		(0.0296)		(0.0306)		(0.0298)		(0.0310)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000479		-0.000304		-0.000480		-0.000275
		(0.000465)		(0.000529)		(0.000464)		(0.000532)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.012	0.039	0.039	0.041	0.013	0.039	0.039	0.041
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.7 replicates the main analyses while adding an additional control for ETHNIC REPRESENTATION. Panel A reruns the regression from Table 2; Panel B reruns the regression from Table 3, and Panel C reruns the regression from Table 5. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.7: Controlling for Ethnic Power Sharing

	Panel C. Sample: Rebel regimes.			
	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MoD same (average)	-0.0578*	-0.0703**	-0.0984*	-0.0920
	(0.0294)	(0.0292)	(0.0482)	(0.0558)
Ethnic representation	-0.0248*	-0.0266	-0.0245	-0.0201
	(0.0138)	(0.0216)	(0.0169)	(0.0241)
ln(population)			-0.00933	-0.00602
			(0.00682)	(0.00749)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0203	-0.0171
			(0.0439)	(0.0476)
Religious frac.			0.00435	-0.00479
			(0.0536)	(0.0712)
British colony			-0.0105	-0.00679
			(0.0217)	(0.0267)
French colony			-0.0150	-0.0170
			(0.0150)	(0.0190)
Portuguese colony			0.00180	-0.00376
			(0.0218)	(0.0277)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.00699		-0.00582
		(0.00637)		(0.0122)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0512		-0.0459
		(0.0443)		(0.0485)
ln(oil & gas income)		-5.02e-05		0.000333
		(0.000752)		(0.00106)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.029	0.122	0.123	0.125
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Notes: Table C.7 replicates the main analyses while adding an additional control for ETHNIC REPRESENTATION. Panel A reruns the regression from Table 2; Panel B reruns the regression from Table 3, and Panel C reruns the regression from Table 5. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.8: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel A. Mode of victory for rebel regimes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (outright victory)	-0.0462***	-0.0452***	-0.0558***	-0.0532***
	(0.00966)	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0123)
Rebel regime (settlement)	-0.0563***	-0.0592***	-0.0632***	-0.0515***
	(0.0117)	(0.0131)	(0.0147)	(0.0152)
ln(population)			0.00859*	0.0206***
			(0.00442)	(0.00511)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0101	-0.00787
			(0.0249)	(0.0243)
Religious frac.			0.0124	-0.00455
			(0.0201)	(0.0218)
British colony			-0.00203	0.000997
			(0.0133)	(0.0131)
French colony			0.00848	0.00307
			(0.0107)	(0.0111)
Portuguese colony			-0.00278	-0.0106
			(0.0153)	(0.0168)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00230		-0.0152**
		(0.00517)		(0.00610)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0888**		-0.0827**
		(0.0364)		(0.0377)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000267		0.000472
		(0.000747)		(0.000738)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.013	0.042	0.043	0.047
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Table C.8 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we either disaggregate the rebel regime variable in various ways, or include alternative control variables. See above for a description of each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**} p < 0.05,^{*} p < 0.1$.

C.8: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel B. General civil war termination			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel victory	-0.0412***	-0.0412***	-0.0499***	-0.0465***
	(0.0107)	(0.0125)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Government victory	0.0372	0.0305	0.0241	0.0183
	(0.0317)	(0.0305)	(0.0358)	(0.0353)
Settlement	-0.0514***	-0.0497***	-0.0567***	-0.0527***
	(0.00952)	(0.0114)	(0.0149)	(0.0155)
ln(population)			0.00740	0.0193***
			(0.00450)	(0.00517)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00494	-0.00419
			(0.0249)	(0.0245)
Religious frac.			0.00909	-0.00558
			(0.0214)	(0.0226)
British colony			0.00393	0.00564
			(0.0143)	(0.0145)
French colony			0.0125	0.00597
			(0.0115)	(0.0124)
Portuguese colony			0.000778	-0.00871
			(0.0149)	(0.0171)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00138		-0.0147**
		(0.00508)		(0.00584)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0869**		-0.0822**
		(0.0366)		(0.0376)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000278		0.000382
		(0.000726)		(0.000702)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.043	0.047
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Table C.8 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we either disaggregate the rebel regime variable in various ways, or include alternative control variables. See above for a description of each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.8: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel C. Origins in Cold War vs. Post			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime (Cold War)	-0.0391***	-0.0387***	-0.0410**	-0.0382**
	(0.0104)	(0.0126)	(0.0171)	(0.0182)
Rebel regime (Post-Cold War)	-0.0604***	-0.0629***	-0.0784***	-0.0715***
	(0.00967)	(0.0120)	(0.0145)	(0.0147)
ln(population)			0.00695	0.0188***
			(0.00487)	(0.00513)
Ethnic frac.			-0.00147	-0.000644
			(0.0259)	(0.0255)
Religious frac.			0.0198	0.00352
			(0.0210)	(0.0216)
British colony			-0.0103	-0.00644
			(0.0152)	(0.0150)
French colony			0.00159	-0.00327
			(0.0121)	(0.0125)
Portuguese colony			-0.0196	-0.0267
			(0.0196)	(0.0217)
ln(GDP p.c.)		0.00199		-0.0149**
		(0.00516)		(0.00592)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0869**		-0.0797**
		(0.0364)		(0.0381)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000238		0.000408
		(0.000714)		(0.000724)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.014	0.043	0.043	0.047
Year FE?	NO	YES	YES	YES

Table C.8 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we either disaggregate the rebel regime variable in various ways, or include alternative control variables. See above for a description of each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.

C.8: Alternative Civil War Factors

	DV: AUTHORITARIAN REGIME BREAKDOWN			
	Panel D. Additional conflict covariates			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rebel regime	-0.0641***	-0.0620***	-0.0673***	-0.0627***
	(0.0143)	(0.0158)	(0.0161)	(0.0162)
Cold War FE	-0.0167	-0.0180	-0.0180	-0.0211
	(0.0140)	(0.0139)	(0.0142)	(0.0144)
ln(Refugees)	-0.000763	-0.000725	-0.00149	-0.00179
	(0.00107)	(0.00104)	(0.00120)	(0.00119)
Ongoing civil war	0.0565***	0.0558***	0.0563**	0.0517**
	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0219)	(0.0218)
Foreign-imposed democracy	-0.0127	-0.0119	-0.0201	-0.0171
	(0.0201)	(0.0194)	(0.0226)	(0.0219)
ln(population)			0.00531	0.0171**
			(0.00551)	(0.00659)
Ethnic frac.			-0.0147	-0.0111
			(0.0267)	(0.0258)
Religious frac.			0.0245	0.00936
			(0.0212)	(0.0225)
British colony			0.00584	0.00770
			(0.0146)	(0.0151)
French colony			0.0122	0.00576
			(0.0115)	(0.0126)
Portuguese colony			-0.00744	-0.0168
			(0.0187)	(0.0202)
ln(GDP p.c.)		-0.000224		-0.0143**
		(0.00544)		(0.00638)
ln(GDP p.c.) growth		-0.0847**		-0.0811**
		(0.0361)		(0.0373)
ln(oil & gas income)		-0.000160		0.000446
		(0.000773)		(0.000832)
Country-years	2,352	2,352	2,352	2,352
R-squared	0.021	0.023	0.023	0.027
Year FE?	NO	NO	NO	NO

Table C.8 is identical to Columns 1–4 of Table 2 except here we either disaggregate the rebel regime variable in various ways, or include alternative control variables. See above for a description of each specification. $^{***}p < 0.01,^{**}p < 0.05,^{*}p < 0.1$.