"Birds of a Feather, Do Sanctioned States Flock Together?" Supplemental Files - Online Appendix

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Table A1: Summary Statistics for the Sanctions Busting Analyses' Variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Trade-Based Sanctions Busting	128,393	0.02	0.14	0	1
Sanctioned Third Party	128,393	0.12	0.32	0	1
Third-Party Economic Size	122,452	16.42	2.15	9.53	22.65
Third-Party Commercial Openness	116,700	0.46	1.68	0.00	31.66
Third-Party Commercial Dependence	91,899	0.01	0.03	0	4.73
Only a U.S.-Third Party DP	128,393	0.26	0.44	0	1
Third Party DPs with Both	128,393	0.03	0.18	0	1
Only a Target-Third Party DP	128,393	0.02	0.15	0	1
Only Target Democratic	113,194	0.08	0.27	0	1
Both Democracies	113,194	0.04	0.20	0	1
Only the Third Party Democratic	113,194	0.30	0.46	0	1
Target-Third Party Distance	128,393	8.13	1.47	0	9.42
Target-Third Party Shared Border	128,393	0.03	0.16	0	1
Target Economic Size	123,182	17.30	1.69	12.23	22.65
Harsh U.S. Sanctions	128,393	0.13	0.34	0	1
Duration of U.S. Sanctions	128,393	10.49	11.45	0	56
Time Since Busting	128,393	8.50	9.51	0	56

Table A2: Correlation Matrix for the Sanctions Busting Analyses' Variables

	1.	*2.*	*3.*	*4.*	*5.*	*6.*	*7.*	*8.*	*9.*	*10.*	*11.*	*12.*	*13.*	*14.*	*15.*	*16.*	*17.*
1. Trade-Based Sanctions Busting	1																
2. Sanctioned Third Party	0.00	1															
3. Third-Party Economic Size	0.22	0.10	1														
4. Third-Party Commercial Openness	-0.01	-0.07	-0.10	1													
5. Third-Party Commercial Dependence	0.09	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	1												
6. Only a U.S.-Third Party DP	0.10	-0.08	0.29	0.11	-0.06	1											
7. Third Party DPs with Both	0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.05	-0.13	1										
8. Only a Target-Third Party DP	0.04	0.07	-0.02	0.00	0.10	-0.12	-0.04	1									
9. Only Target Democratic	-0.04	0.03	-0.15	-0.03	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.05	1								
10. Both Democracies	0.03	-0.07	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.10	-0.04	-0.07	1							
11. Only the Third Party Democratic	0.08	-0.20	0.31	0.10	-0.04	0.43	0.00	-0.12	-0.22	-0.17	1						
12. Target-Third Party Distance	-0.15	-0.07	-0.02	0.02	-0.23	0.17	-0.20	-0.28	0.02	0.02	0.08	1					
13. Target-Third Party Shared Border	0.13	0.07	0.03	-0.03	0.22	-0.08	0.13	0.21	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07	-0.90	1				
14. Target Economic Size	-0.02	0.03	0.07	0.00	0.17	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.05	1			
15. Harsh U.S. Sanctions	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.10	-0.06	0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.06	1		
16. Duration of U.S. Sanctions	0.00	0.00	0.11	-0.01	-0.04	0.00	-0.09	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.03	0.05	-0.13	1	
17. Time Since Busting	-0.12	0.02	0.07	0.00	-0.05	0.01	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.07	-0.05	0.06	-0.12	0.89	1

Table A3: Analyzing the Determinants of Extensive Trade-Based Sanctions Busting Using a Constrained Model

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Sanctioned Third Party	-0.819***	-0.818***	-0.818***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Third-Party Economic Size	0.863***	0.863***	0.863***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Target Economic Size	-0.098***	-0.098***	-0.098***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Target-Third Party Distance	-0.721***	-0.720***	-0.720***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Target-Third Party Shared Border	-3.586***	-3.583***	-3.583***
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.29)
Time Since Busting	-0.896***	-0.895***	-0.895***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Time Since Busting^2	0.048***	0.047***	0.047***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Since Busting^3	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-10.396***	-10.390***	-10.390***
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.46)
Probability > χ^2	89615	89615	89615
Observations	0.453		

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.

Table A4: Analyzing the Determinants of Extensive Trade-Based Sanctions Busting Without the Top-5 Leading Sanctions Busters

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Sanctioned Third Party	-0.247***	-0.245***	-0.245**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Third-Party Economic Size	0.666***	0.665***	0.665***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Third-Party Commercial Openness	0.089***	0.091***	0.091***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Third-Party Commercial Dependence	4.052***	4.028***	4.029***
	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.41)
Only a U.S.-Third Party DP	0.341***	0.341***	0.341***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Third Party DPs with Both	0.660***	0.661***	0.661***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Only a Target-Third Party DP	0.558***	0.558***	0.558***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Only Target Democratic	-0.019	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Both Democracies	-0.018	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Only the Third Party Democratic	-0.298***	-0.297***	-0.297***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Target-Third Party Distance	-0.894***	-0.893***	-0.893***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Target-Third Party Shared Border	-5.048***	-5.042***	-5.042***
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.39)
Target Economic Size	-0.204***	-0.204***	-0.204***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Harsh U.S. Sanctions	-0.042	-0.040	-0.040
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Duration of U.S. Sanctions	0.084***	0.083***	0.083***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Since Busting	-0.799***	-0.796***	-0.796***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Time Since Busting^2	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Since Busting^3	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-4.619***	-4.606***	-4.606***
	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.66)
Probability > χ^2	79791	79791	79791
Observations	0.447		

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.

Table A5: Analyzing the Determinants of Extensive Trade-Based Sanctions Busting in First 3 Years (Models 1-2) vs. After 3 Years (Models 3-4)

	Model 1 Relogit	**Model 2 Firth**	**Model 3 Relogit**	**Model 4 Firth**
Sanctioned Third Party	-0.301**	-0.301**	-0.556***	-0.556***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Third-Party Economic Size	0.791***	0.791***	0.588***	0.588***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Third-Party Commercial Openness	0.050***	0.050**	0.090***	0.090***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Third-Party Commercial Dependence	3.893***	3.892***	5.151***	5.151***
	(0.56)	(0.48)	(1.21)	(1.04)
Only a U.S.-Third Party DP	1.110***	1.110***	0.365***	0.365***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Third Party DPs with Both	1.125***	1.125***	0.002	0.002
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Only a Target-Third Party DP	0.849***	0.849***	0.310	0.310*
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Only Target Democratic	0.280	0.280	-0.330	-0.330
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.30)
Both Democracies	0.574***	0.574***	0.398**	0.398**
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Only the Third Party Democratic	0.122	0.122	-0.334***	-0.334***
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Target-Third Party Distance	-0.739***	-0.739***	-0.353***	-0.353***
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Target-Third Party Shared Border	-3.706***	-3.706***	-1.667***	-1.667***
	(0.75)	(0.49)	(0.45)	(0.38)
Target Economic Size	-0.219***	-0.219***	-0.113***	-0.113***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Harsh U.S. Sanctions	-0.325**	-0.325***	-0.043	-0.043
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Time Since Busting	-1.970***	-1.970***	-1.032***	-1.032***
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Time Since Busting^2	0.578	0.578	0.051***	0.051***
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Since Busting^3	-0.055	-0.055	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-8.126***	-8.126***	-6.564***	-6.564***
	(0.97)	(0.77)	(0.78)	(0.72)
Observations	30608	30608	52535	52535

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.

Table A6: Analyzing the Determinants of Extensive Trade-Based Sanctions Busting with Only Severe Sanctions Episodes

	Model 1 Logit	**Model 2 Relogit**	**Model 3 Firth**
Sanctioned Third Party	-0.408***	-0.406***	-0.406***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Third-Party Economic Size	0.742***	0.741***	0.741***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Third-Party Commercial Openness	0.063***	0.065***	0.065***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Third-Party Commercial Dependence	4.217***	4.188***	4.189***
	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.42)
Only a U.S.-Third Party DP	0.842***	0.841***	0.841***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Third Party DPs with Both	0.776***	0.777***	0.777***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Only a Target-Third Party DP	0.800***	0.801***	0.801***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Only Target Democratic	-0.098	-0.090	-0.090
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Both Democracies	0.384***	0.385***	0.385***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Only the Third Party Democratic	-0.077	-0.077	-0.077
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Target-Third Party Distance	-0.638***	-0.638***	-0.638***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Target-Third Party Shared Border	-3.203***	-3.198***	-3.198***
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.31)
Target Economic Size	-0.157***	-0.157***	-0.157***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Harsh U.S. Sanctions - Target	0.007	0.008	0.008
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Harsh U.S. Sanctions - Third-Party	-0.026	-0.011	-0.011
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Time Since Busting	0.066***	0.066***	0.066***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time Since Busting^2	-0.884***	-0.882***	-0.882***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Time Since Busting^3	0.043***	0.043***	0.043***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	30608	30608	52535

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.

Table A7: Summary Statistics for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Analyses' Variables

	Obs.	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
NCAs Signed	153,146	0.01	0.11	0	1
Only Supplier Sanctioned	157,640	0.17	0.38	0	1
Only the Recipient Sanctioned	157,640	0.08	0.27	0	1
Both Sanctioned	157,640	0.02	0.14	0	1
Alliance	157,640	0.05	0.22	0	1
Conflict	153,460	0.00	0.06	0	1
Shared Enemy	157,640	0.04	0.20	0	1
Superpower Enemy	157,640	0.10	0.30	0	1
Nuclear Weapons	157,640	0.03	0.16	0	1
Supplier's GDP	149,141	4.36E+08	6.54E+08	917896	4.84E+09
Recipient's GDP	148,538	7.96E+07	2.69E+08	57628.3	4.84E+09
Distance	157,640	4510.49	2635.78	0	12347.00
Exports	146,178	225.54	1385.10	0	112031.00
Export Pressure	149,141	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.16
No NCA Years	153,146	17.80	13.20	0	51

Table A8: Summary Statistics for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Analyses' Variables - Directed Dyads Never Sanctioned by U.S.

	Obs.	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
NCAs Signed	49,380	0.02	0.12	0	1
Only Supplier Sanctioned	51,224	0	0	0	0
Only the Recipient Sanctioned	51,224	0	0	0	0
Both Sanctioned	51,224	0	0	0	0
Alliance	51,224	0.08	0.27	0	1
Conflict	49,585	0.00	0.02	0	1
Shared Enemy	51,224	0.03	0.16	0	1
Superpower Enemy	51,224	0.04	0.21	0	1
Nuclear Weapons	51,224	0.00	0.05	0	1
Supplier's GDP	47,850	4.84E+08	6.07E+08	8823612	3.29E+09
Recipient's GDP	47,532	6.75E+07	2.30E+08	57628.3	3.29E+09
Distance	51,224	4083.29	2649.01	0	12347
Exports	45,946	402.54	1999.82	0	112031
Export Pressure	47,850	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.16
No NCA Years	49,380	14.85	11.86	0	51

Table A9: Summary Statistics for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Analyses' Variables - Directed Dyads Sanctioned by the U.S.

	Obs.	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*
NCAs Signed	103,766	0.01	0.10	0	1
Only Supplier Sanctioned	106,416	0.25	0.44	0	1
Only the Recipient Sanctioned	106,416	0.12	0.32	0	1
Both Sanctioned	106,416	0.03	0.17	0	1
Alliance	106,416	0.04	0.20	0	1
Conflict	103,875	0.01	0.07	0	1
Shared Enemy	106,416	0.05	0.22	0	1
Superpower Enemy	106,416	0.12	0.33	0	1
Nuclear Weapons	106,416	0.04	0.19	0	1
Supplier's GDP	101,291	4.14E+08	6.75E+08	917896	4.84E+09
Recipient's GDP	101,006	8.53E+07	2.86E+08	57628.3	4.84E+09
Distance	106,416	4716.12	2604.54	0	12192
Exports	100,232	144.41	971.48	0	57632
Export Pressure	101,291	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.16
No NCA Years	103,766	19.20	13.56	0	51

Table A10: Correlation Matrix for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Analyses' Variables

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
1. NCAs Signed	1														
2. Only Supplier Sanctioned	-0.02	1													
3. Only the Recipient Sanctioned	0.00	-0.14	1												
4. Both Sanctioned	0.00	-0.07	-0.04	1											
5. Alliance	0.11	-0.07	-0.04	0.00	1										
6. Conflict	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.01	-0.01	1									
7. Shared Enemy	0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.09	0.08	0.07	1								
8. Superpower Enemy	0.07	-0.05	0.25	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.31	1							
9. Nuclear Weapons	0.01	-0.05	0.27	0.14	-0.02	0.02	0.11	0.25	1						
10. Supplier's GDP	0.03	0.08	0.04	0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.07	0.01	1					
11. Recipient's GDP	0.13	0.00	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.14	0.21	0.05	0.09	1				
12. Distance	-0.08	0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.27	-0.07	-0.16	-0.05	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	1			
13. Exports	0.11	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.24	-0.01	0.16	0.04	-0.01	0.15	0.33	-0.16	1		
14. Export Pressure	0.02	-0.20	0.09	-0.08	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.06	-0.11	0.09	1	
15. No NCA Years	-0.07	0.08	0.18	0.11	-0.09	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.06	0.26	0.07	0.10	-0.05	0.17	1

Table A11: Analysis of the Determinants of Civil Nuclear Cooperation Using a Constrained Model

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Only Supplier Sanctioned	-0.526***	-0.523***	-0.523***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Only the Recipient Sanctioned	-0.691***	-0.687***	-0.687***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Both Sanctioned	-0.765***	-0.752***	-0.752***
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.19)
Conflict	-1.207**	-1.086**	-1.093**
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.49)
Nuclear Weapons	1.017***	1.022***	1.022***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Supplier's GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Recipient's GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Distance	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
No NCA Years	-0.188***	-0.188***	-0.188***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
No NCA Years^2	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
No NCA Years^3	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.682***	-2.682***	-2.682***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Pseudo-R^2	148069	148069	148069
Observations	0.131		

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.

Table A12: Analysis of the Determinants of Civil Nuclear Cooperation with U.S. Observations Included

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Only Supplier Sanctioned	-0.301***	-0.299***	-0.299***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Only the Recipient Sanctioned	-0.479***	-0.477***	-0.477***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Both Sanctioned	-0.532***	-0.519***	-0.519***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Alliance	1.167***	1.167***	1.167***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Conflict	-1.756***	-1.634***	-1.641***
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.48)
Shared Enemy	0.336***	0.336***	0.336***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Superpower Enemy	1.013***	1.013***	1.013***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Nuclear Weapons	0.447***	0.450***	0.450***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Supplier's GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Recipient's GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Distance	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Exports	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Export Pressure	4.623***	4.631***	4.631***
	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.73)
No NCA Years	-0.183***	-0.183***	-0.183***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
No NCA Years^2	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
No NCA Years^3	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.293***	-3.293***	-3.293***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Pseudo-R^2	0.202		
Observations	153895	153895	153895

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.

Table A13: Cross Tab of NCAs by Dyads Never Sanctioned by the U.S. Compared to Directed Dyads that Experienced U.S. Sanctions

	Directed Dyads Never Sanctioned by U.S.	Directed Dyads Sanctioned by the U.S.	
All NCAs	0	1	Total
0	52,943	106,017	158,960
	(97.67%)	(98.82%)	(98.43%)
1	1,261	1,271	2,532
	(2.33%)	(1.18%)	(1.57%)
Total	54,204	107,288	161,492
	(100.00%)	(100.00%)	(100.00 %)

Table A14: Analysis of the Determinants of Civil Nuclear Cooperation in Directed Dyads with a Party Sanctioned by the U.S. from 1950-2000

Variables	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Neither Sanctioned				0.377***	0.375***	0.375***
				(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Only Supplier Sanctioned	-0.377***	-0.375***	-0.375***			
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)			
Only the Recipient Sanctioned	-0.703***	-0.700***	-0.700***	-0.326**	-0.325**	-0.325**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Both Sanctioned	-0.850***	-0.837***	-0.837***	-0.472**	-0.462**	-0.462**
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)
Alliance	1.093***	1.094***	1.094***	1.093***	1.094***	1.094***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Conflict	-0.964*	-0.842	-0.850*	-0.964*	-0.842	-0.849*
	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.49)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.49)
Shared Enemy	0.076	0.078	0.078	0.076	0.078	0.078
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Superpower Enemy	0.785***	0.786***	0.786***	0.785***	0.786***	0.786***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Nuclear Weapons	0.758***	0.763***	0.763***	0.758***	0.763***	0.763***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Supplier's GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Recipient's GDP	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Distance	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Exports	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Export Pressure	4.930***	4.954***	4.954***	4.930***	4.954***	4.954***

	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.21)	(1.14)	(1.14)	(1.21)
No NCA Years	-0.164***	-0.164***	-0.164***	-0.164***	-0.164***	-0.164***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
No NCA Years^2	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
No NCA Years^3	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-3.463***	-3.462***	-3.462***	-3.841***	-3.837***	-3.837***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Pseudo-R^2	100,114	100,114	100,114	100,114	100,114	100,114
Observations	0.153			0.153		

Notes: *, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels using two-tailed tests.