MovLab: Labor Movements in Latin America

Codebook

Fondecyt Project 1200190

Version 1.0
Last update: 24.1.25

INTRODUCTION *3*

The database 3

CODEBOOK *5*

0. Country and Year Characterization 5

A. Organizational Variables 6

B. Structural Power or Sectoral Strength of Unionism 8

C. Resources and Activities 11

D. Internal Organization 12

E. Services for Members 13

F. Demands 14

G. Tactics 17

H. Repression 18

I. Links with Institutional Politics 20

J. Links with Social Organizations 23

K. External Variables 25

REFERENCES *34*

ANNEXES *35*

Annex 1. Organizations by Country Considered in the Demand Variables 35

Annex 2. Comments on the Coding of Variable G1 37

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the codebook for MovLab (Labor Movements in Latin America), a research project funded by Fondecyt Regular 1200190 (*Victims of Neoliberalism or Workers' Aristocracy? Explaining Variations in Latin American Labor Movements from the Washington Consensus to Bolsonaro*). This project was funded by the Chilean National Agency for Research and Development (ANID) (ANID/CONICYT/FONDECYT Regular 1200190). For the next version, a license through Creative Commons is planned.

Suggested Citation: Please use the following citation when referring to this document:

> Somma, Nicolás M., Rodrigo M. Medel, Rodolfo Disi, Matías Bargsted, Julia Cavieres, Fernando Candia, Andrés González, Cristóbal Karle, Sebastián Osorio, Rocío Sáez, and Nicolás Selamé. (2025). *MovLab: Labor Movements in Latin America*.

Funding: We acknowledge the financial support of the Chilean National Agency for Research and Development (ANID) (ANID/FONDECYT Regular 1200190). We also appreciate the support of ANID through the Center for the Study of Conflict and Social Cohesion (COES) (ANID/FONDAP/15130009).

Inquiries: For inquiries, please contact Nicolás Somma (principal investigator of the project) at nsomma@uc.cl. We also encourage reporting any issues or errors in the database or the codebook to this email, as well as submitting well-founded suggestions for modifying values or categories in any variable, country, and/or year.

The database

The main empirical product of MovLab is a database on labor movements in 17 Latin American countries between 1990 and 2020. The database records the characteristics and evolution over time of movements defending workers' rights in each of these countries.[1] Additionally, the database includes information on the social, political, and economic characteristics of the respective countries that could help explain variations in labor movements.

As a second empirical product, MovLab produced a more limited database with some basic characteristics of the main labor organizations in each country during the studied period.

[1] They are **Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela**. We excluded the Caribbean countries, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana to make the research more feasible and because their trajectories likely differ too much from those of the selected countries.

Finally, another byproduct of MovLab is a series of 17 national reports on labor movements in each country. These reports were used to build both databases, allowing for deeper analysis, interpretation, and complementary insights to statistical analyses.

To construct the main database, we took as a reference the pioneering work of William Gamson (1975) in his book *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Gamson randomly selected 53 movements from 467 he identified in the United States between 1800 and 1945. He then coded a set of variables for each selected movement by reviewing historical research on them. More recent studies on social movements using a similar methodology, which we also used as references, include Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), McCarthy and Wolfson (1996), Cress and Snow (2000), and Diani (2015).

Instead of using a random selection as Gamson did, MovLab studies the main labor organizations in each country. Databases of this kind allow for systematic comparisons of different organizations and movements across various geographical units (countries, in this case) over time, expanding knowledge on social movements. The MovLab database contains information on the organizational strength, links with institutional politics, and centrality within civil society of labor organizations. Its structure consists of 527 rows, derived from combining 17 countries over 31 years (1990-2020). Thus, each row represents a country-year combination (e.g., "Argentina 1990").

Since there are no specific variables on labor organizations in the region, the first stage of the project focused on producing systematic and comparable qualitative information on a set of relevant topics and dimensions in the 17 selected countries. In the second stage, these narratives were analyzed, coded, and quantified based on a set of previously defined variables, resulting in a database that can be analyzed using conventional statistical procedures. In this way, MovLab contributes to a long (though still emerging) tradition in the social sciences of coding qualitative narratives and transforming them into databases.[2]

[2] In addition to the previously cited works on social movements that draw inspiration from this methodology (**Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996; Cress and Snow 2000; Diani 2015**), the first major project in this tradition is **G. Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas** (see, e.g., **Murdock 1967**). **Hodson (1999)** provides an overview of this methodology. Currently, a notable example is the **Seshat project**, a large-scale historical initiative led by **Peter Turchin** (**https://seshatdatabank.info/**).

CODEBOOK

0. Country and Year Characterization

id: Numeric variable that uniquely identifies each country-year with a number (from 1 to 527).

pais: Text variable indicating the corresponding country.

pais_num: Numeric variable indicating the corresponding country:

1. Argentina
2. Bolivia
3. Brazil
4. Chile
5. Colombia
6. Costa Rica
7. Ecuador
8. El Salvador
9. Guatemala
10. Honduras
11. Mexico
12. Nicaragua
13. Panama
14. Paraguay
15. Peru
16. Uruguay
17. Venezuela

anio: Numeric variable indicating the corresponding year (1990 to 2020).

Presidente: Text variable indicating the president in office for the given country-year.

numero_mandato: Numeric variable indicating the president's term number.

A. Organizational Variables

A1_afsin: Union Membership

Percentage of union membership at the national level. This data comes from national reports, supplemented by ILO data[3]. One country (Ecuador) has no data for this variable. Many years lack information in different countries.

A2_poasoc: Organizational Power

Refers to the elements inherent to collective organization, such as the number of members, the structure of union confederations, participation levels, and other aspects. Organizational power is derived from the organization's ability to develop strategies that mobilize its members. This is a general inference based on the full reading of the report.

1. No organizational power
2. Low organizational power
3. Medium organizational power
4. High organizational power

A2_obs: Observations on A2_poasoc Coding

Contains explanations or notes regarding the coding of **A2_poasoc**. Most variables in the dataset have an additional variable with the original variable code (e.g., "J1") followed by "_obs." These variables store qualitative information relevant to understanding the coding of the original variable. They usually provide brief explanations of why the value changed compared to the previous year, with references to the corresponding country report and/or page numbers. Additional contextual information may also be included.

A3_cohsin: Union Cohesion

Indicates how unified the labor movement is within one or multiple union confederations.

1. **Atomized**: The union movement is highly fragmented, with more than five confederations or the absence of significant supra-organizations (either because they

[3] The data from the **International Labour Organization (ILO)** comes from the following link: https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/union-membership/. The **ILO** defines this variable as follows:

"The trade union density rate is the share of employees who are union members, expressed as a percentage. Trade union membership excludes union members who are not in paid employment (self-employed, unemployed, retired, etc.)."

do not exist or lack representativeness). Relations between confederations are conflictual, and ties with grassroots organizations are weak.
2. **Moderate fragmentation**: No single confederation dominates. There are between three and five major supra-union organizations, each representing significant sectors of the national labor movement. Relations between confederations are often characterized by division and conflict, with occasional cooperation.
3. **Bipolarity**: No single confederation dominates, but rather two major supra-union organizations, each representing significant sectors of the national labor movement. Relations between them are typically marked by ideological divisions.
4. **Predominant confederation**: Although two or three relatively important confederations exist, one tends to dominate and gathers the most relevant sectors of the national labor movement. Membership in the dominant confederation is highly imbalanced, strong in some branches and/or regions but weak in others, which often justifies the existence of alternative supra-organizations.
5. **Single confederation**: The entire national labor movement is organized under a single union confederation, with others being either nonexistent or highly marginal. This confederation is vibrant, with high membership and strong ties to its grassroots base.

A4_capmov: Mobilization Capacity

Measures the ability of union confederations or supra-union organizations to mobilize their members.

1. **None**: The union movement is incapable of calling general strikes or mobilizing nationwide for political and/or social objectives.
2. **Low**: Confederations have attempted coordinated mobilizations but have been unable to generalize strikes or exert significant pressure. Their strike capacity exists but is weak.
3. **Medium**: Confederations can organize general strikes or significant mobilizations, but without full or majority support from their base.
4. **High**: Major union confederations have demonstrated the ability to mobilize most of their members through general or regional strikes.

A5_nacsin: Nationalization of Unionism

Evaluates how representative union confederations are at the national level.

1. **Not nationalized**: No national union confederations exist; instead, there are federations or supra-organizations with only territorial reach, or there is no centralized national organization.
2. **Moderately nationalized**: Major union confederations are present across most of the country. However, there are also regional or autonomous supra-organizations, or vast areas where confederations do not operate, creating an organizational gap.
3. **Nationalized**: Major union confederations are present throughout the entire country, with no significant regional or subnational confederations.

A6_exporg: Supra-Union Organizational Experience

Measures the level of experience of the main supra-union organizations.

1. **Little experience**: Either no national union confederations exist, or they were created very recently, meaning the labor movement lacks substantial historical experience in contentious processes.
2. **Recent experience**: Major union confederations were founded in the late 20th or early 21st century. Due to dictatorships or other circumstances, there was little or no continuity with historical supra-organizations.
3. **Extensive experience**: Major confederations have a significant history of union struggle, with key organizations being heirs to confederations established in the mid-20th century.

B. Structural Power or Sectoral Strength of Unionism[4]

[4] The objective is to assess the existence and use of structural power in each country. To achieve this, the construction of the variable will consist of two indicators:

1. Identification of economic sectors that can be defined as "strategic sectors" due to their importance in national economies.
2. Presence of "strategic power", meaning the ability of unions to carry out significant sectoral strikes in these sectors.

While the first indicator aligns with the conventional definition of structural power in the literature, the second represents a complementary innovation. This addition is justified by the various challenges posed by the concept of strategic sectors when it lacks a concrete correlation with the actual deployment of labor movements. In other words, strategic sectors provide an objective basis that facilitates and enhances the exercise of union power, but a labor movement capable of leveraging this power does not always exist.

The coding process involves the following steps:

1. Distinguish between different sectors of the economy. This will be done using the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic Activities, Rev. 2, as it is the simplest, allows for greater comparability, and is commonly used for classifying union activity by industry in Latin American countries. The sectors identified will be:
    1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing
    2. Mining and Quarrying
    3. Manufacturing
    4. Electricity, Gas, and Water
    5. Construction
    6. Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants, and Hotels
    7. Transport, Storage, and Communication
    8. Financial, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services
    9. Community, Social, and Personal Services
    10. Public Sector *(This category is additionally included due to its significant role in Latin America.)*

Note: Variables **B1_secest1, B3_secest2, and B5_secest3** distinguish **1, 2, or up to 3** strategic economic sectors for each country based on national reports.

B1_secest1: Strategic Sector 1 (Primary Strategic Economic Sector)

1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing
2. Mining and Quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Electricity, Gas, and Water
5. Construction
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants, and Hotels
7. Transport, Storage, and Communication
8. Financial, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services
9. Community, Social, and Personal Services
10. Public Sector

B2_poestruc1: Structural Power 1 (Union Mobilization Capacity in Strategic Sector 1)

1. No disruptive activity recorded.
2. Engages in disruptive activities without majority support from the sector's unions.
3. Engages in disruptive activities with majority support from the sector's unions.[5]

B3_secest2: Strategic Sector 2 (Secondary Strategic Economic Sector)

(Same sector options as B1_secest1)

B4_poestruc2: Structural Power 2 (Union Mobilization Capacity in Strategic Sector 2)

1. No disruptive activity recorded.
2. Engages in disruptive activities without majority support from the sector's unions.
3. Engages in disruptive activities with majority support from the sector's unions.

2. Identify 1, 2, or up to 3 "strategic" economic sectors in each country.
3. Determine the mobilization capacity of the identified "strategic" sectors by analyzing union participation in disruptive actions.
4. Construct a "general strategic power" variable based on these indicators to assess, at the national level, the extent to which unions leverage their strategic power.
5. Additionally, evaluate the disruptive capacity of the public sector.
6. Finally, in some cases, national reports identified economic sectors with strong labor movements that do not necessarily belong to strategic sectors.

[5] Note that this refers to the percentage of workers **in the sector** who are union members, not the total number of workers in the sector.

B5_secest3: Strategic Sector 3 (Tertiary Strategic Economic Sector)

(Same sector options as B1_secest1)

B6_poestruc3: Structural Power 3 (Union Mobilization Capacity in Strategic Sector 3)

1. No disruptive activity recorded.
2. Engages in disruptive activities without majority support from the sector's unions.
3. Engages in disruptive activities with majority support from the sector's unions.

B7_poestrat1: Primary Strategic Power (Main Sector Where Unionism Holds Its Strongest Power)

(Same sector options as B1_secest1)
99. No data

B8_grapo1: Degree of Union Power in Sector 1

1. No disruptive activity recorded.
2. Engages in disruptive activities without majority support from the sector's unions.
3. Engages in disruptive activities with majority support from the sector's unions.
4. No data

B9_poestrat2: Secondary Strategic Power (Second Most Important Sector for Union Power)

(Same sector options as B1_secest1)
99. No data

B10_grapo2: Degree of Union Power in Sector 2

1. No disruptive activity recorded.
2. Engages in disruptive activities without majority support from the sector's unions.
3. Engages in disruptive activities with majority support from the sector's unions.
4. No information

B11_secpub: Public Sector – Degree of Union Power in the Public Sector

1. No disruptive activity recorded.
2. Engages in disruptive activities without majority support from the sector's unions.
3. Engages in disruptive activities with majority support from the sector's unions.

B12_poestruc_gen: General Structural Power – Degree of Overlap Between Strategic Sectors and Strategic Power

1. Strategic sectors do not align with sectors holding strategic power.

2. Only one strategic sector exhibits structural power.
3. Two or more strategic sectors exhibit structural power.
4. No information.

C. Resources and Activities[6]

C1_acciones: Do unions or labor organizations hold shares in companies?

1. Yes, several
2. Yes, but few/occasionally
3. No

C2_pensiones: Do unions or labor organizations manage workers' pension funds?

1. Yes, several
2. Yes, but few/occasionally
3. No

C3_inmuebles: Do unions or labor organizations own real estate and physical infrastructure (buildings, land, offices)?

1. Yes, widespread, abundant, in multiple locations
2. Yes, but few/restricted to capital cities
3. No

C4_fondos: Do unions or labor organizations have access to national and international funds?

1. Yes, national and international
2. Yes, only national
3. Yes, only international
4. No

[6] The **C, D, and E** codes help to understand the **organizational strength** of labor movements: specifically, whether they have **abundant and generous material resources** or not; whether they are **internally organized based on bureaucratic criteria and internal democracy** or not; and whether they **offer their members or affiliates a generous range of services, benefits, and facilities** or not.

Material resources—**money, properties, media outlets, control over production processes, etc.**—are a key component of any social movement, particularly labor movements, which must compete with powerful actors such as **states or business associations**.

C5_medios: Do unions or labor organizations have their own media outlets (such as newspapers, magazines, or websites)?

1. Yes, diverse, active, and/or abundant
2. Yes, but limited/not very active
3. No

C6_cooperat: Do unions or labor organizations manage factories or cooperatives, or do they control any sector of the economy?

1. Yes, frequent cooperative/productive activity and/or in multiple sectors
2. Yes, cooperative/productive activity exists but is sporadic
3. No

C7_otros: Do unions or labor organizations possess other relevant resources, such as think tanks?

(In the observations variable **C7_obs**, the specific type of resource is detailed.)

0. No other relevant resources identified
1. Yes, other relevant resources identified (see **C7_obs**)

D. Internal Organization[7]

D1_estatutos: Do unions or labor organizations have written statutes for their internal functioning?

1. Yes, generally widespread
2. Yes, but not widespread
3. No
4. No data

D2_cuotas: Do members systematically pay dues?

1. Yes, generally widespread
2. Yes, in some cases
3. No
4. No data

[7] These variables provide information on how labor organizations are internally structured, their functioning, and their usual practices.

D3_particip: Are there assemblies and/or meetings with worker participation (not just leaders)?

1. Yes, generally widespread
2. Yes, in some cases
3. No
4. No data

E. Services for Members

E1_servbas: Do labor organizations provide basic services (water, electricity) to their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E2_tierras: Do labor organizations distribute land to their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E3_alimentos: Do labor organizations distribute food to their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E4_viviendas: Do labor organizations build housing for their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E5_creditos: Do labor organizations provide loans to their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E6_capacit: Do labor organizations provide job training and/or education for their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)

3. No

E7_salud: Do labor organizations provide healthcare services for their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E8_jardines: Do labor organizations offer childcare services for their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E9_recreacion: Do labor organizations provide recreational services for their members?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E10_empleo: Do labor organizations offer employment in companies managed by the movement?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E11_cultura: Do labor organizations provide cultural services such as libraries, artistic or literary groups?

1. Yes (widespread/common/generalized)
2. Yes (limited/sporadic/occasional)
3. No

E12_otros: Other services provided by labor organizations (see E12_obs for details).

1. No additional services identified.
2. Yes, additional services identified.

F. Demands

The variables **F1_dem1, F2_dem2, F3_dem3, and F4_dem4** record the four main demands (if applicable) of labor organizations throughout the study period, without establishing differences over time by country. They are not ordered by relevance.

F1_dem1: Country Demand 1 (time-invariant)

1. Measures against unemployment (macroeconomic measures, unemployment insurance, hiring policies)
2. Minimum wage adjustment / Wage increases / Wage adjustments
3. Unionization conditions (collective bargaining rights, right to protest, unionization incentives, membership promotion, union freedom, union protections)
4. Labor norms and conditions (physical and/or psychological integrity safeguards, working hours regulation, worker recognition and incentives, equipment, worker evaluation conditions, contract compliance)
5. Employment protection (opposition to outsourcing and/or subcontracting, changes in labor code/legislation, anti-labor flexibility measures)
6. Gender norms in the workplace (gender pay equality, gender violence protocols)
7. Affirmative action norms (participation quotas for social minorities)
8. Worker participation in business management
9. Combatting informality
10. Economic-union benefits or reparations (pension debts, payment of historical debts, bonuses, non-expropriation of land)
11. Internal anti-neoliberalism (public sector defense, progressive fiscal policies, opposition to privatization initiatives, opposition to neoliberal reforms)
12. External anti-neoliberalism (anti-foreign capital, imperialism, opposition to economic openness and/or interdependence such as Free Trade Agreements)
13. Internal pro-neoliberalism
14. Systemic demands (economic system reforms, pension system changes, political reforms, participation in political representation and/or negotiation bodies, environmental policies)
15. Agrarian reform and environmental or agricultural demands
16. No data

F2_dem2: Country Demand 2 (time-invariant)
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F3_dem3: Country Demand 3 (time-invariant)
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F4_dem4: Country Demand 4 (time-invariant)
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F5_anual: Did demands vary significantly between 1990-2020 at the national level?

1. No, they remained relatively constant
2. Yes, they varied
3. Yes, they varied, but it is not possible to distinguish how
4. No data

F6_org: Differences between organizations in demands
Identifies whether, within a country, union organizations' demands varied over the entire period.

1. No, they remained relatively constant
2. Yes, they varied
3. Yes, they varied, but it is not possible to distinguish how
4. No data

F7_demp1 and F8_demp2: Measure the two main national demands (if applicable) and their variation over time.

F7_demp1: Primary national demand (time-variant)
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F8_demp2: Secondary national demand (time-variant)
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F9_o1_1: Organization 1 - Demand 1[8]
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F10_o1_2: Organization 1 - Demand 2
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F11_o2_1: Organization 2 - Demand 1
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F12_o2_2: Organization 2 - Demand 2
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F13_o3_1: Organization 3 - Demand 1
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F14_o3_2: Organization 3 - Demand 2
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F15_o4_1: Organization 4 - Demand 1
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F16_o4_2: Organization 4 - Demand 2
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F17_o5_1: Organization 5 - Demand 1
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

F18_o5_2: Organization 5 - Demand 2
Response categories identical to F1_dem1

[8] See Annex 1 for the list of organizations considered for each country.

G. Tactics[9]

G1: Presence of significant labor protest events in the country that year[10]

0. Year without significant protest events
1. Year with significant protest events

G2_1: Most relevant tactic at the national level

1. Participation in state negotiation instances (corporatism, lobbying)
2. Collaboration and coordination with specific political forces
3. Call for plebiscites and/or referendums
4. Legal claims
5. Participation in public debate (think tanks, public policy proposals, NGOs)
6. March, demonstration, gathering (assembly of people protesting in a public space)
7. Petition, collection of signatures and/or funds
8. Assembly, discussion, or open debate among participants
9. Boycott
10. Strike or work stoppage
11. Occupation or takeover of buildings, estates, or public spaces
12. Roadblocks, barricades, or takeovers of roads, streets, highways, ports, bridges, or access points
13. Hunger strike
14. Destruction of private and/or public property (arson, looting)
15. No data

G2_2: Second most relevant tactic at the national level
Response categories identical to G2_1

G3_huelgas: Presence of labor strikes

1. Frequently used
2. Rare
3. Nonexistent
4. No data

G4_lobby: Presence of lobbying

1. Frequently used
2. Rare

[9] The conceptualization of tactics initially used the lists of tactics from various studies on protest events as a reference framework, such as *Dynamics of Collective Action* (https://web.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/) and the *Observatorio de Conflictos* of COES (https://coes.cl/observatorio-de-conflictos/). These were adapted to the case of Latin American labor movements based on national reports.
[10] See Annex 2 for the list of comments on the coding of this variable.

3. Nonexistent
4. No data

G5_marchas: Presence of marches

1. Frequently used
2. Rare
3. Nonexistent
4. No data

G6_cortesruta: Presence of roadblocks

1. Frequently used
2. Rare
3. Nonexistent
4. No data

G7_tomas: Presence of land occupations

1. Frequently used
2. Rare
3. Nonexistent
4. No data

G8_hhambre: Presence of hunger strikes

1. Frequently used
2. Rare
3. Nonexistent
4. No data

H. Repression

H1_actgob: Government attitude towards labor activism
To what extent does the legal framework regulating forms of protest and collective action in the labor sector enable or restrict labor activism?

1. Criminalizing
2. Obstructive
3. Permissive

H2_represion: Police repression of strikes or labor protests
Level of physical repression by the police against forms of protest and collective action in the labor sector, regardless of whether they fall within or outside the legal framework.

1. Low: Very few cases of police repression are recorded, and no cases of excessive violence are reported.
2. Medium: Cases of violent repression are moderate. They do not occur recurrently across different forms of protest (both legal and illegal), and no cases of excessive violence are reported.
3. High: Most protests (both legal and illegal) are repressed with moderate levels of violence, or repression is not systematic but includes episodes of excessive violence.
4. Very high: Most protests (both legal and illegal) are repressed with high levels of violence.

H3_persecucion: Persecution of labor leaders or mobilized workers

1. No
2. Yes, occasionally
3. Yes, extensively
4. No data

H4_det_pal: Presence of arrests, beatings, or interrogations of union leaders or mobilized workers

1. No
2. Yes, occasionally
3. Yes, extensively
4. No information

H5_asesinatos: Presence of assassinations of union leaders or mobilized workers

1. No
2. Yes
3. No information

H6_espionaje: Presence of espionage against union organizations

1. No
2. Yes, occasionally
3. Yes, extensively

H7_enfrentamientos: Presence of violent clashes between mobilized workers and the police

1. No
2. Yes, occasionally
3. Yes, extensively
4. No data

I. Links with Institutional Politics

I1_ppder: Links between labor organizations and right-wing political parties

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively

I2_ppcen: Links between labor organizations and centrist or catch-all political parties

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively

I3_ppizq: Links between labor organizations and left-wing political parties

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively

I4_ppact: Political parties participate in labor movement activities (assemblies, marches, etc.)

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively
4. No data

I5_adspp: Party affiliation: Level of political party involvement in union leadership

1. Low: Autonomy claims prevail, displacing political parties from the main union structures in the country.
2. Medium: Several union leaders are members of political parties; however, there are significant autonomy claims within the union space.
3. High: The vast majority of union leaders are affiliated with political parties.

I6_apoyopp: Support from labor organizations in elections and other forms of articulation with political parties

1. No reported cases of labor organizations supporting party candidates or showing any other type of support in political or social spaces.
2. Yes, occasionally, labor organizations have supported candidates in specific elections.
3. Yes, extensively, significant labor organizations provide support to political parties and maintain stable ties over time (not only limited to elections).

I7_ppdem: Political parties with links to labor movements adopt their demands in party programs

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively
4. No data

I8_ppmlab: Presence of relevant political parties (>5% of votes) that emerged from labor movements

1. No
2. Yes

I9_clipp: Presence of clientelism between unions and political parties

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively

I10_clegales: Presence of legal changes in labor matters

0. No regulatory changes in labor matters
1. Regulatory: Legal changes that increase state involvement in labor relations by providing more funds and resources to monitor compliance with labor rights laws.
1. Mixed: Government plans include policies that increase regulation in some areas while decreasing it in others.
2. Deregulatory: Legal changes that reduce state involvement in labor relations. This model emerged in the 1990s during the implementation of neoliberal reforms.
3. No information

I11_relasim: Presence of asymmetric relations (favoritism) between the government and labor organizations

1. Low/None: No favoritism observed.
2. Medium: Moderate favoritism is observed, which, while acknowledged by actors in this political space, does not generate significant conflicts within the labor movement.
3. High: Significant favoritism is observed, producing major tensions within the labor movement.

I12_relep: Relationship between the government and labor organizations in the public sphere (recognition and legitimacy)

1. Low: The government tends to treat union organizations dismissively.
2. Medium: The government has an ambivalent relationship, recognizing unions in some instances while disregarding them in others.

3. High: The government acknowledges and validates the role of the country's main union federations, invites them to dialogue spaces, and publicly recognizes their relevance.

I13_afgob: Affinity between labor organizations and the government

Level of influence or political affinity in the labor movement's disposition towards the government.

1. Low/No affinity or influence
2. Medium: A moderate degree of openness is observed among labor organizations in their relations with the government.
3. High: There is explicit affinity and influence between the main labor movement forces and the government.

I14_cligob: Presence of clientelism between unions and the government

1. Not reported
2. Yes, occasionally or unconfirmed
3. Yes, extensively

I15_carep: Presence of union leaders or former union leaders in elected positions

1. No
2. Yes
3. No information

I16_cargob: Presence of union leaders or former union leaders in government positions

1. No
2. Yes
3. No information

I17_participacion: Level of union participation in public policy spaces

1. Low: Union organizations rarely participate in tripartite spaces, working groups, or commissions proposed by the government.
2. Medium: Union organizations participate in tripartite spaces, working groups, and commissions that do not function effectively over time.
3. High: Union organizations frequently participate in tripartite spaces, working groups, and commissions that function effectively over time.
4. No data

I18_sinpar: Presence of parallel unions promoted or supported by governments

1. No
2. Yes

I19_respuesta: Government responsiveness to union demands (openness to dialogue)

1. Low: The government is unwilling to engage in dialogue regarding labor organization demands, imposing its original positions with little or no modifications.
2. Medium: There are instances where the government shows openness to reconsider labor organization demands, adjusting its measures to reach agreements.
3. High: The government generally shows openness to reconsider labor organization demands, adjusting its measures to reach agreements.

J. Links with Social Organizations[11]

J1_pocol: Collective power with civil society in general

Level of collective power between the labor movement/organization and civil society actors. This variable provides a general assessment of links with different groups, detailed in the following variables.
0. Nonexistent/irrelevant

1. Very low: Actors are in antagonistic positions when advancing interests.
2. Low: No connections exist, and actors do not interact to advance interests.
3. Medium: Connections exist, but during the same period, some are cooperative while others are antagonistic.
4. High: Connections exist but tend to be weak, informal, sporadic, and/or unused with some civil society actors.
5. Very high: Actors have strong, formal, permanent connections actively used to advance interests.
6. No data

J2_indigenas:: Links between the labor movement and Indigenous and/or Afro-descendant organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

[11] The first step in the coding process is to disaggregate civil society in each country into its relevant actors or sectors. The identification of these sectors is based on the literature on social movements in Latin America—considering social mobilization as a decisive criterion for recognizing a sector/actor as relevant—and on the civil society actors that establish connections with political parties.

The second step in generating the variables is to identify the different types of links that may exist between the country's labor movement and civil society.

J3_estudiantes:: Links between the labor movement and student organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J4_campesinos: Links between the labor movement and peasant organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J5_ong: Links between the labor movement and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J6_fem: Links between the labor movement and women's or feminist organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J7_msexgen: Links between the labor movement and LGBTQ+ organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J8_ambientalistas: Links between the labor movement and environmental organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J9_pensionados: Links between the labor movement and pensioners' and/or social security beneficiaries' organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J10_iglesia: Links between the labor movement and churches
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J11_pobladores: Links between the labor movement and neighborhood organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J12_empresarios: Links between the labor movement and business organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J13_crimeorg: Links between the labor movement and organized crime organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J14_guerrillas: Links between the labor movement and guerrilla organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J15_paramilitares: Links between the labor movement and paramilitary organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J16_ddhh: Links between the labor movement and human rights and/or detainee organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J17_militares: Links between the labor movement and the military
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J18_consumidores: Links between the labor movement and consumer advocacy organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

J19_migrantes: Links between the labor movement and migrant organizations
Same response categories as J1_pocol

K. External Variables

The variables in this section come from various secondary sources (unlike the previous ones, which are derived from national reports). They were collected to study the national social, economic, and political contexts in which labor organizations operate. For each variable, the source, description, and data gaps (countries and periods) are presented. For more details, it is recommended to consult the original sources.

K1_pibpc: GDP per capita (US$ at current prices)

1. **Source:** World Bank
   Link
2. **Variable:** GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by the mid-year population. GDP is the sum of the gross value added by all resident producers in the economy, plus any product taxes, minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without deducting depreciation of manufactured goods or depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data in US$ at current prices. **Source:** World Bank national accounts data and OECD national accounts data files.
3. **Data gaps:** Venezuela (2015-2020)

K2_ginipre: Gini Index (pre-tax and transfer)

1. **Source:** SWIID Link
2. **Variable:** *gini_mkt*: "Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household market (pre-tax, pre-transfer) income, using Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard." The range of values is from 0 to 100, where 0 represents perfect equality, and 100 represents perfect inequality.
3. **Data gaps:**
   - Bolivia (1990, 1991)
   - Chile (2018, 2019)
   - Ecuador (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993)
   - El Salvador (1990)
   - Guatemala (2015-2020)
   - Honduras (2020)

- Mexico (2019)
- Nicaragua (1990, 1991, 1992, 2015-2020)
- Panama (2020)

K3_ginipost: Gini Index (post-tax and transfer)

1. **Source:** SWIID Link
2. **Variable:** *gini_disp*: "Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income, using Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard." The range of values is from 0 to 100, where 0 represents perfect equality, and 100 represents perfect inequality.
3. **Data gaps:**
   - Bolivia (1990, 1991)
   - Chile (2018, 2019)
   - Ecuador (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993)
   - El Salvador (1990)
   - Guatemala (2015-2020)
   - Honduras (2020)
   - Mexico (2019)
   - Nicaragua (1990, 1991, 1992, 2015-2020)
   - Panama (2020)

K4_inflacion: Inflation

1. **Source:** World Bank Link
2. **Variable:** Inflation: Consumer prices (annual percentage change).
3. **Data gaps:**
   - Argentina (1990-2020)
   - Nicaragua (1990-1999)
   - Venezuela (1990-2008 and 2017-2020)

K5_idh: Human Development Index (HDI)

1. **Source:** UNDP Link
2. **Variable:** The Human Development Index is a composite measure of average achievement in three key dimensions of human development:
   - A long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth)
   - Knowledge (expected and mean years of schooling)
   - A decent standard of living (Gross National Income per capita)
     The index ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating higher human development.

3. **Data gaps:** None

K6_state_leg: State Legitimacy

1. **Source:** Fragile State Index: Link
2. **Variable:**
   "The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The indicator examines the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, assessing the effects where confidence is absent, such as mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Although the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (e.g., flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions, and in cases where democratic elections are absent, the degree to which the government is representative of its population. The indicator accounts for government openness, specifically the transparency, accountability, and political representation of ruling elites, or conversely, levels of corruption, profiteering, and exclusion or persecution of opposition groups. Additionally, the indicator assesses a state's ability to perform basic functions that infer public confidence, such as tax collection."
   - **Scale:** 0 to 10, where lower scores indicate higher state legitimacy.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries from 1990 to 2006.

K7_libdem: Liberal Democracy Index

1. **Source:** V-Dem: Link
2. **Variable:** *v2x_libdem*: *"Combines information on voting rights, the freedom and fairness of elections, freedoms of association and expression, civil liberties, and executive constraints."*
   - **Scale:** 0 to 1, where 0 represents low liberal democracy and 1 represents high liberal democracy.
3. **Data gaps:** None.

K8_partdem: Participatory Democracy Index

1. **Source:** V-Dem: Link
2. **Variable:** *v2x_partipdem*: *"Measures the degree of citizen participation in their own government through local democratic institutions, civil society organizations, direct democracy, and concepts measured in the electoral democracy index."*
   - **Scale:** 0 to 1.
3. **Data gaps:** None.

K9_voiceacc: Voice and Accountability

1. **Source:** Worldwide Governance Indicators: Link
2. **Variable:**
   "Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of the press."
   - **Governance Score:** -2.5 to +2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries between 1990 and 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001.

K10_goveff: Government Effectiveness

1. **Source:** Worldwide Governance Indicators: Link
2. **Variable:**
   "Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies."
   - **Governance Score:** -2.5 to +2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries between 1990 and 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001.

K11_ruleoflaw: Rule of Law

1. **Source:** Worldwide Governance Indicators: Link
2. **Variable:**
   "Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence."
   - **Governance Score:** -2.5 to +2.5, where higher values correspond to better governance.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries between 1990 and 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001.

K12_pol_bid: Political Polarization (BID)

1. **Source:** DPI2020 Database of Political Institutions: Link
2. **Variable:** *POLARIZ*: *"Measures the maximum difference between the chief executive's party's value (EXECRLC) and the values of the three largest government parties and the largest opposition party."*

- **Scale:** 0 (no difference) to 2 (maximum observed difference, e.g., left-wing executive and right-wing opposition; see original source for details).

3. **Data gaps:**
   - Chile (2018 - 2020)
   - Colombia (2003 – 2018, 2020)
   - Ecuador (1997, 2003 – 2006)
   - Guatemala (1992 – 1995)
   - Nicaragua (1993, 1994)
   - Panama (1995 – 1999, 2015 – 2019)
   - Venezuela (1994 – 2000, 2016 – 2020)

K13_pospol_gob: Government Political Orientation

1. **Source:** DPI2020 Database of Political Institutions
2. **Variable:** *EXECRLC*: Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No information (0); No executive (NA).
   - *"Party orientation with respect to economic policy, coded based on the description of the party in the sources."*
   - **Right:** Conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing parties.
   - **Left:** Communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing parties.
   - **Center:** Centrist parties or those best described as centrist.
3. **Data gaps:**
   - Chile (2014 – 2020)
   - Colombia (2003 – 2018)
   - Ecuador (1997)
   - Nicaragua (1991 – 1996, 2002 – 2006)
   - Panama (1995 – 1999, 2005 – 2020)
   - Venezuela (1994 – 2020)

K14_desempleo: Unemployment

1. **Source:** World Bank (1991-2021) Link
2. **Variable:**
   "Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and unemployment differ by country."
3. **Data gaps:** All countries in 1990.

K15_informalidad: Labor Informality

1. **Source:** Constructed from a combination of ILO and World Bank data. The dataset includes 153 records from the ILO, supplemented with 46 additional records from the World Bank. These databases were merged after confirming that they tended to be identical or had minimal differences.
    - **ILO:** Link
    - **World Bank:** Link
2. **Variable:**
    - **ILO:** "Proportion of informal employment in total employment by sex and sector (%). This indicator conveys the share of informal employment in total employment. Employment comprises all persons of working age who, during a specified brief period, were either in paid employment (whether at work or with a job but not at work) or in self-employment (whether at work or with an enterprise but not at work). Informal employment comprises persons who in their main or secondary jobs were (a) own-account workers, employers, and members of producers' cooperatives employed in their own informal sector enterprises; (b) own-account workers engaged in the production of goods exclusively for own final use by their household (e.g., subsistence farming); (c) contributing family workers, regardless of whether they work in formal or informal sector enterprises; or (d) employees holding informal jobs, whether employed by formal sector enterprises, informal sector enterprises, or as paid domestic workers by households. Data disaggregated by economic activity are provided according to the latest version of the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) available for that year. Data may have been regrouped from national classifications, which may not be strictly compatible with ISIC."
    - **World Bank:** *Infemp_p*: "Informal employment (% of total employment; International Labour Organization; harmonized series)."
3. **Data gaps:** Data gaps exist for all countries from 1990 to approximately 2004-2010. After this period, most data is available, with the following exceptions:
    - Venezuela only has data for 2017.
    - Nicaragua only has data for 2012.

K16_mc_vo to K25_nr_vn: Trust in Unions

Disaggregated into response categories, each of which is a separate variable (described below). The response probability (0 to 1) is presented for each category (e.g., "0.15" means that 15% of responses fall into that category).

1. **Source:** Latinobarómetro
2. **Variable:** The wording of the question about trust in unions changed after 2018, so both versions are presented:

- **Original variable:** *"Please look at this card and tell me, for each group, institution, or person on the list, how much trust do you have in them?"* (Unions, 1995, 1996, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015)
  - **Response categories:**
    1. A lot of trust (K16_mc_vo)
    2. Some trust (K17_ac_vo)
    3. Little trust (K18_pc_vo)
    4. No trust (K19_nc_vo)
  - **Data gaps:** 1990–1994, 1997–2002, 2012–2014, 2016–2020. No data for 1995 in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
- **New variable:** *"Please look at this card and tell me, for each group, institution, or person on the list, how much trust do you have in them to improve our quality of life?"* (Unions, 2018, 2020)
  - **Response categories:**
    1. A lot (K20_m_vn)
    2. Some (K21_a_vn)
    3. Little (K22_p_vn)
    4. None (K23_n_vn)
    5. Don't know (K24_ns_vn)
    6. No response (K25_nr_vn)
  - **Data gaps:** No data available for all countries between 1990–2017 and 2019.

K26_vlaw: Violations in Law

1. **Source:** Labour Rights Indicators: Link
2. **Variable:** "Violations in law: refer to national legislation that is not in conformity with FACB rights as defined by the ILO, as well as to actions taken on the basis of such legislation." The data corresponds to the number of legal violations.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries (1990–1999, 2001–2004, 2006–2008, 2010, 2011, 2018–2020).

K27_vprac: Violations in Practice

1. **Source:** Labour Rights Indicators: Link
2. **Variable:** "Violations in practice: refer to acts committed in violation of existing national legislation that conforms to FACB rights as defined by the ILO." The data corresponds to the number of practical violations.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries (1990–1999, 2011–2004, 2006–2008, 2010, 2011, 2018–2020).

K28_labfree: Labor Freedom

1. **Source:** Heritage Foundation: Link
2. **Variable:** "Labor Freedom: A quantitative measure considering various aspects of a country's labor market legal and regulatory framework, including regulations on minimum wages, associational rights, laws inhibiting layoffs, severance requirements, and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked. It also includes the labor force participation rate and labor productivity as indicators of employment opportunities. The following sub-factors are equally weighted: Minimum wage, associational rights, paid annual leave, notice period for redundancy dismissal, severance pay, labor productivity, labor force participation rate, restrictions on overtime work, and legal redundancy dismissal permissions."
    - **Scale:** 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest labor freedom and 100 the highest.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries (1990–2004).

K29_priv_sp: Privatization Index (Social Policy)

1. **Source:** Social Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean Dataset
2. **Variable:** *pin*: "Privatization Index, from Table A5." Derived from Morley et al. (1999). "All values theoretically range from 0 to 1. Coverage spans 1970–1995." No explanation is provided on how this data is extended for later years.
3. **Data gaps:** No data for Nicaragua and Panama. Gaps for other countries between 2001–2020.

K30_priv_lora: Privatization Index (Lora)

1. **Source:** Lora, E. (2012). *Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It*, IDB Working Paper Series 346.
2. **Variable:** "Measures total or partial private sector participation in infrastructure projects (energy, telecommunications, transport, water). The index is constructed from the accumulated value of privatizations (net of nationalizations) as a percentage of GDP."
    - **Scale:** 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more privatization.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries (2010–2020); no data for Panama.

K31_ecfree: Economic Freedom Index

1. **Source:** Heritage Foundation: Link

2. **Variable:** Measures economic freedom based on 12 factors, grouped into four pillars: Rule of Law, Government Size, Regulatory Efficiency, and Open Markets.
    - **Scale:** 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate greater economic freedom.
3. **Data gaps:** All countries (1990–1994).

REFERENCES

Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2011). *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. Columbia University Press.

Cress, D. M., & Snow, D. A. (2000). The outcomes of homeless mobilization: The influence of organization, disruption, political mediation, and framing. *American Journal of Sociology*, *105*(4), 1063-1104.

Diani, M. (2015). *The cement of civil society*. Cambridge University Press.

Gamson, W. A. (1975). *The strategy of social protest*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.

Hodson, R. (1999). *Analyzing documentary accounts* (No. 128). Sage.

McCarthy, J. D., & Wolfson, M. (1996). Resource mobilization by local social movement organizations: Agency, strategy, and organization in the movement against drinking and driving. *American Sociological Review*, 1070-1088.

Murdock, G. P. (1967). Ethnographic atlas: a summary. *Ethnology*, *6*(2), 109-236.

ANNEXES

Annex 1. Organizations by Country Considered in the Demand Variables

Below are the comments on the coding of the demand variables (**F9_o1_1 to F18_o5_2**).*

Country - Labor Organizations - Demand Coding Commentary

Country	Org.1	Org.2	Org.3	Org.4	Org.5	Demand Coding Commentary
Argentina	CTA	CGT	CTEP	Piqueteros		The coding of the main demands in the country (**F7_demp1** and **F7_demp2**) was based on the demands of the **CGT** and **CTA**, as stated in the first section of the report, given that these are the associations with the highest number of affiliates. **CGT** has **2.1 million members**; **CTA** has **1.4 million**.
Bolivia	COB	FSTMB	CSUTCB	Coordinator of the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba	CTEUB	The coding of country-level demands for the first two organizations was based on the demands of **coca growers** and the **COB**, as they are the main pressure groups. According to the report (pg. 30), these are the primary national organizations, and their demands are explicitly stated. Blank spaces indicate missing information in the report.
Brazil	CUT	FS	MST	CONTAG	UGT	The disaggregated demand data by organization does not mention the **MST**; it is assumed that its demands are those specified in the third paragraph on **page 30**. Since no variations are specified, it is assumed that these demands remain constant over time.
Chile	CONFUSAM	ANEF	Teachers' Association	FTC	CUT	
Colombia	CUT	CGT	CTC	FECODE	FENSUAGRO	
Costa Rica	CMTC	CTRN	ANEP	SITRAP	Workers' Front of the Costa Rican Electricity Institute	Only one of the organizations mentioned in the **demands section** is one of the **main organizations**, making it impossible to differentiate demands by organization. It is assumed that they are **temporally invariable**, based on what is stated in the first paragraph of **page 28**.
Ecuador	Labor Parliament	FETRAPEC	UNE	FUT	CUT	
El Salvador	CSTS	CNTS	STISS	SIMETRISS	ANDES 21	Review **Demand 1** for **Organization 2 (CNTS)**. The coding follows what Roberto Gómez states on **page 19 (or page 4 in the shortened version)**, but it is necessary to verify when "currently" applies.
Guatemala	CUSG	UNSITRAGUA	CTC	UASP	UGT	In the section on **organizational differences**, there are no clear ways to distinguish demands. This is mainly because none of the **major organizations** are mentioned (except for **UASP**, which is only **marginally mentioned on page 22**).
Honduras	CTH	CGT	CUTH			Differences can be distinguished if **national-level demands** are assumed to align with those of the **central unions**, particularly **CTH** and **CGT**.
Mexico	Congress of Labor	CTM	UNT	FSTSE	FESEBS	The demands by organization were coded based on the **first part of the demands section**, which specifies the demands of **four organizations (CTM, CROM, and CROC)**: maintaining their **institutional position within unionism** (**pg. 28**). However, since **CROM** and **CROC** are not considered **major organizations** due to their size, and since **page 28** suggests that **CTM is part of the Congress of Labor** (but these are distinct entities), only the **Congress of Labor** is coded. No further differences or organization-specific demands were found in the **demands section**.

Nicaragua	CGTI	CST	ATC	CUS	FETSALUD	Only **one organization's demands were identified**: **CGTI**.
Panama	CONATO	CONUSI	CTRP	FENASEP	CS	Only **CONATO, CONUSI, and CTRP** are mentioned in a way that allows their **demands to be disaggregated** over time.
Paraguay	CUT	CCT	CUT-A	CNT	CPT	The **last paragraph** on **temporal differences in demands (pg. 33)** is too vague to track significant **changes over time**. Regarding **differences between organizations**, the same problem as in **Uruguay** arises.
Peru	CGTP	CTP	CUT	SUTEP	FNTMMSP	For **Organization 4 (SUTEP)**, verify how long **"early 1990s"** extends, as stated in the **report on page 23**.
Uruguay	PIT-CNT	CSGU	ASU	SUPU	SUNCA	The **differences between organizations** are **more ideological than demand-related**, as implied in the **last paragraph of the section on page 42**. Therefore, **organizational differences are coded as category 3**.
Venezuela	CTV	UNT (or UNETE)	CSBT			The **tendency to differentiate and develop** the demands of **CTV** and **UNT** makes it difficult to establish **national-level demands** for Venezuelan organizations. The **country-level demands** were coded based on **CTV** from the **1990s to 2001**, as it was the **only confederation with clearly stated demands**. From **2002 onwards**, **UNT** is considered the **source for the second national-level demand**, while the **primary country-level demand (F7_demp1)** is coded based on **CTV**. Regarding **Organization 1's demands**, it is necessary to check **when the shift mentioned in the second paragraph of page 32 ("Subsequently, it was accepted...") occurred**. In general, greater fluidity in demand changes should be incorporated, and a clearer distinction of each organization's primary demand is needed. It is unclear what Organization 1 has demanded from 2005 to the present.

Annex 2. Comments on the Coding of Variable G1

Below are the comments on the coding of variable G1 (Presence of significant labor protest events in the country).

Country	Tactics Coding Commentary
Argentina	For the years of the main campaigns, the report mentions the Macri period as one with a high number of protests, though it does not specify exact years. Thus, the entire Macri period (2015-2019) is coded as 1.
Bolivia	For the years of the main campaigns, the entire period from 1990 to 1999 is coded as 1, given that coca growers led major media-driven campaigns during this time, according to the report (pg. 30). The 1998 campaign seems to be just one example. Additionally, the "last two years" mentioned (pg. 32) are interpreted as 2019 and 2020.
Brazil	For the years of the main campaigns, the year 2001 is coded as 1 for both the Marcha das Margaridas and the March Against the Blackout.
Chile	Similar to Brazil, in some years there is more than one major protest in the country. The variables on the presence or absence of a given tactic were inferred based on the mobilization table in the report.
Costa Rica	The coding of the two main tactics was based on the table presented in the report.
Ecuador	No explicit campaigns are mentioned, unlike the reports from Argentina to Costa Rica. The two main tactics were coded based on Sánchez's graph on page 7 of the summarized version.
El Salvador	The first conflict is coded as occurring between 1992 and 1995, since the report states that it took place in the early and mid-1990s (pg. 5 of the fragment), though it appears to have happened after the 1992 peace agreements. In 1992, there is overlap between ANDES 21's actions and the wave of privatizations (1990 and 1991 would correspond only to the latter). In 2003, protests against the Free Trade Agreement (TLC) and hospital privatization also overlap. Regarding the main tactic, the report states that strikes are not the primary tactic, but footnote 36 mentions that, among other actions, work stoppages are a key tactic. Since both options are included in the database, further clarification is needed.
Guatemala	In the main protests section, the peace agreements (1987-1996) are mentioned. The year 2003 includes both the campaigns against that year's labor reform and the teachers' strike.
Honduras	Difficulty coding the main tactic: While unions use it, federations are prohibited from doing so.
Mexico	Consider whether to expand the negotiation code to include private actors in addition to the state. Strike and lobbying tactics were coded as scarce, as they are only used by major confederations.
Nicaragua	The document should be reviewed to identify campaigns. The report does not explicitly highlight main tactics but strikes appear to be the dominant one.

Paraguay	"Social dialogue instances" were coded under the second tactic as participation in public debate (an alternative option could be participation in state negotiations). There are doubts about the prominence of different tactics.
Uruguay	The main campaigns were coded based on both the list and table presented in the report.
Venezuela	The report does not identify a central tactic with temporal consistency for organizations, so this variable is left blank.