## Supplemental Appendices

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**Appendix 1: Question Wording, Descriptive Data for All Variables, and Correlations of Dependent Variables**

*Question Wording for Democratic Status Quo and Control Variables*

The text for the vertical and horizontal accountability support measures are in the text; here I describe the questions used to generate the other variables in the analyses. The numbers in parentheses represent the values used in the analysis as I recoded them.

*Democracy is the Best System:* "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?" Answered with a card, coded such that (0) Strongly Disagree (6) Strongly Agree.

*Opposition to a coup:* "Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances:

- When there is high unemployment?
- When there is a lot of crime?
- When there is a lot of corruption?

(0) A military take-over of the state would be justified or (1) A military take-over of the state would not be justified"

*Voted for the winning candidate/abstained*: Both these dummy variables are coded from two questions in the survey. Respondents were first asked "Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]" If they answered "no" they are counted as having abstained. If they answered yes, they were asked a follow up closed-list question "Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot), (XX) names and parties , (77) Other, (88) DK, (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)". From this I manually coded whether they cast a valid vote or not (blank votes count as abstaining) and categorized the vote as a vote for the incumbent president or not.

*National Economy is Getting Better*: "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (2) Better, (1) Same, (0) Worse"

*Personal Finances are Getting Better*: "Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (2) Better, (1) Same, (0) Worse" (emphasis in original)

*Feels Safe in Neighborhood*: "Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (3) Very safe, (2) Somewhat safe, (1) Somewhat unsafe, (0) Very unsafe."

*Avoided Being a Crime Victim*: "Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) No, (0) Yes"

*Corruption is Uncommon*: "Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: (0) Very common, (1) Common, (2) Uncommon, or (3) Very uncommon?"

*Avoided paying a bribe*: "In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? (1) No (0) Yes."

*Interpersonal Trust*: "And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are (3) very trustworthy, (2) somewhat trustworthy, (1) not very trustworthy or (0) untrustworthy...?

*Education*: Coded from the question

**ED**. How many years of schooling have you completed?
_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

| | **$1^0$** | **$2^0$** | **$3^0$** | **$4^0$** | **$5^0$** | **$6^0$** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| None | 0 | | | | | |
| Primary | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Secondary | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| University | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18+ |
| Post-secondary, not university | 13 | 14 | 15 | | | |

*Wealth:* As described in the text, this variable is an income quintile measure coded from a factor analysis that looks at which of the following household goods the respondent reported owning: phone (landline or cellular), tv, refrigerator, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, washing machine, a computer, a motorcycle, and the number of cars they own.

*Female*: Coded by the interviewer (0) male or (1) female

*Ethnicity*: a series of dummy variables from the question "Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? [If respondent says Afro-country, mark (4) Black] (1) White, (2) Mestizo, (3) Indigenous, (4) Black, (5) Mulatto, (7) Other" with an additional category of "Moreno" in Venezuela. I generated a dummy variable for each of these categories.

*Age*: respondents were asked the year that they were born and, form that, their age is calculated. I generated dummy variables for each decade (26-35, 36-45, etc. until 66+).

*Lives in a rural area*: Coded by Lapop staff based on the municipality the respondent lives in. (0) Urban (1) Rural.

*Descriptive Variables*

**Table A1: Descriptive Variables**

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democracy is the Best System of Government | 4.21 | 1.73 | 0 | 6 |
| Oppose a Coup | 1.96 | 1.16 | 0 | 3 |
| Tolerance of Civil Liberties | 22.84 | 9.87 | 4 | 40 |
| Protect Free Speech | 32.95 | 9.97 | 0 | 45 |
| President Not Limit Opposition Parties | 3.65 | 1.94 | 0 | 6 |
| President Should Not Close the Legislature | 0.80 | 0.40 | 0 | 1 |
| President Should Not Close the Court | 0.75 | 0.43 | 0 | 1 |
| President Should Not Bypass the Legislature | 3.75 | 1.96 | 0 | 6 |
| President Should Not Bypass the Court | 3.90 | 1.89 | 0 | 6 |
| Voted for the Winning Presidential Candidate | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0 | 1 |
| Abstained Last Election | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0 | 1 |
| National Economy Has Improved in the Last Year | 0.80 | 0.72 | 0 | 2 |
| Personal Finances Have Improved in the Last Year | 0.93 | 0.70 | 0 | 2 |
| Neighborhood Has Grown More Secure in Last Year | 1.71 | 0.93 | 0 | 3 |
| Was Not a Crime Victim in the Last Year | 0.81 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Corruption Not Widespread in the Government | 0.79 | 0.84 | 0 | 3 |
| Not Asked for a Bribe in the Last Year | 0.94 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 |
| Interpersonal Trust | 1.77 | 0.91 | 0 | 3 |
| Education | 9.13 | 4.56 | 0 | 18 |
| Income Quintiles | 1.94 | 1.42 | 0 | 4 |
| Female | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| 26-35 Years | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0 | 1 |
| 36-45 Years | 0.20 | 0.40 | 0 | 1 |
| 46-55 Years | 0.15 | 0.35 | 0 | 1 |
| 55-65 Years | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| 66 Years or More | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 |
| Mestizo | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0 | 1 |
| Indigenous | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 |
| Black | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0 | 1 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mulato | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 |
| Moreno | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0 | 1 |
| Other Race | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0 | 1 |
| Lives in a Rural Area | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Guatemala | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| El Salvador | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Honduras | 0.05 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 |
| Nicaragua | 0.05 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 |
| Costa Rica | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Panama | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Colombia | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Ecuador | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 |
| Bolivia | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0 | 1 |
| Peru | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Paraguay | 0.04 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| Chile | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 |
| Uruguay | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| Brazil | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0 | 1 |
| Venezuela | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| Argentina | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 |
| Dominican Republic | 0.05 | 0.22 | 0 | 1 |
| V-Dem Polyarchy Measure | 0.70 | 0.14 | 0.5 | 0.9 |
| Polarization (Centered) | 0.00 | 0.82 | -1 | 2 |
| Ln(Months Incumbent Has Been in Power) | 2.97 | 1.35 | 0 | 5.1 |

*Correlations of Dependent Variables*

**Table A2: Correlations of Dependent Variables with Each Other**

| | Democracy the Best System | Oppose Coup | Tolerance of Civil Liberties | Protect Free Speech | President Not Close Legislature | President Not Close Court | President Not Bypass Legislature | President Not Bypass Court |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oppose Coup | 0.136 | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tolerance of Civil Liberties | 0.191 | 0.069 | | | | | | |
| Protect Free Speech | 0.097 | 0.126 | 0.107 | | | | | |
| President Not Limit Opposition Parties | 0.080 | 0.113 | 0.144 | N/A | | | | |
| President Not Close the Legislature | 0.056 | 0.216 | 0.044 | 0.067 | 0.107 | | | |
| President Not Close the Court | 0.067 | 0.196 | 0.052 | 0.091 | 0.122 | 0.633 | | |
| President Not Bypass the Legislature | 0.083 | 0.113 | 0.145 | N/A | 0.487 | 0.238 | 0.183 | |
| President Not Bypass the Court | 0.097 | 0.100 | 0.148 | N/A | 0.454 | 0.196 | 0.181 | 0.685 |

## Appendix 2: Hierarchical Models of Democratic Support

The individual-level models in Tables 1-2 in the paper use country-fixed effects to control for unmeasured differences across countries. As a robustness check, I have also estimated the models as hierarchical models to control for additional clustering in the standard errors. Tables A3-A4 estimate the models a cross-nested hierarchical models, embedding survey years inside of countries and years. To facilitate estimation (Stata's hierarchical ordered logit command often struggles to identify starting points for ordered models), I have estimated these models treating the dependent variables as linear. Because our theoretical interest in this paper is in Table A4, in Table A5 I also estimate the model of whether the president should be able restrict the opposition as a three-level ordered logit model to ensure that the choice to use a linear specification are not changing the results. The results across all the tables are broadly consistent with those in the paper, with winners, those who perceive the economy is strong, those who think corruption is rare, and crime avoiders supporting the democratic status quo while also supporting steps to limit speech and restrict the opposition. This is further evidence that the results are not a function of the model specification.

**Table A3: Hierarchical Support for the Democratic Status Quo**

| | Democracy is the Best System | | Oppose a Coup | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| Voted for the Winner | 0.054*** | 0.066*** | 0.111*** | 0.122*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | 0.147*** | | 0.066*** | |
| | (0.008) | | (0.006) | |
| Personal Finances re Getting Better | | 0.116*** | | 0.010 |
| | | (0.008) | | (0.006) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.068*** | | 0.056*** | |
| | (0.007) | | (0.005) | |
| Has Not Been a Crime Victim | | -0.008 | | 0.123*** |
| | | (0.014) | | (0.010) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.063*** | | 0.007 | |
| | (0.007) | | (0.005) | |
| Has Not Been Asked for a Bribe | | 0.093*** | | 0.075*** |
| | | (0.024) | | (0.018) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.115*** | 0.134*** | 0.045*** | 0.059*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.028*** | 0.028*** | 0.019*** | 0.020*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Household Wealth | 0.024*** | 0.024*** | 0.014*** | 0.016*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.161*** | -0.161*** | 0.040*** | 0.048*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.011) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | -0.036** | -0.046*** | -0.029*** | -0.038*** |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.039* | 0.043** | 0.101*** | 0.094*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.159*** | 0.168*** | 0.203*** | 0.191*** |
| | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.242*** | 0.252*** | 0.270*** | 0.251*** |
| | (0.020) | (0.019) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.317*** | 0.335*** | 0.345*** | 0.333*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Age 66+ | 0.394*** | 0.420 | 0.365*** | 0.350*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Mestizo | 0.012 | 0.019 | 0.012 | 0.010 |
| | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Indigenous | -0.032 | -0.040 | -0.018 | 0.005 |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.021) | (0.020) |
| Black | 0.067* | 0.066* | -0.058* | -0.055* |
| | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Mulato | 0.043 | 0.046 | -0.027 | -0.031 |
| | (0.036) | (0.035) | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| Moreno | -0.033 | -0.033 | 0.020 | 0.027 |
| | (0.054) | (0.052) | (0.040) | (0.039) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.046 | -0.062 | -0.124*** | -0.137*** |
| | (0.050) | (0.049) | (0.037) | (0.036) |
| Rural | 0.006 | 0.014 | 0.019 | 0.027** |
| | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Constant | 3.447*** | 3.396 | 1.322*** | 1.274*** |
| | (0.096) | (0.099) | (0.059) | (0.063) |
| Random-Effects | | | | |
| Country | 0.132 | 0.136 | 0.047 | 0.048 |
| | (0.044) | (0.046) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Year | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| Survey-Year | 2.764 | 2.780 | 1.243 | 1.245 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.007) | (0.006) |
| Number of obs | 86,978 | 90,138 | 71,634 | 74,157 |
| $\chi^2$ | 2492.87*** | 2219.41*** | 1759.54*** | 1645.00*** |
| Cross-Classified Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | |

**Table A4: Hierarchical Model of Protection of Civil Liberties**

| | Tolerance Civil Rights | | Protect Free Speech | | President Should Not Limit the Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] |
| Voted for the Winner | -1.131*** | -1.133*** | -1.568*** | -1.638*** | -0.413*** | -0.453*** |
| | (0.081) | (0.080) | (0.191) | (0.187) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.371*** | | -0.498*** | | -0.198*** | |
| | (0.048) | | (0.115) | | (0.011) | |
| Personal Finances Improving | | -0.318*** | | -0.554*** | | -0.159*** |
| | | (0.048) | | (0.110) | | (0.011) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.019 | | 0.121 | | 0.018* | |
| | (0.038) | | (0.085) | | (0.009) | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | -0.355*** | | -0.793*** | | -0.084*** |
| | | (0.083) | | (0.197) | | (0.018) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.356*** | | -0.816*** | | -0.132*** | |
| | (0.040) | | (0.093) | | (0.009) | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | -0.457*** | | 0.297 | | -0.060 |
| | | (0.140) | | (0.332) | | (0.032) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.379*** | 0.409*** | 0.033 | 0.055 | 0.027** | 0.033*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.037) | (0.088) | (0.083) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Education | 0.215*** | 0.216*** | 0.254*** | 0.255*** | 0.052*** | 0.052*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Household Wealth | 0.128*** | 0.142*** | 0.201*** | 0.229*** | 0.053*** | 0.055*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Female | -0.954*** | -0.929*** | -0.973*** | -0.954*** | -0.026 | -0.026 |
| | (0.066) | (0.065) | (0.154) | (0.151) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.820*** | -0.794*** | -1.008*** | -1.103*** | -0.194*** | -0.219*** |
| | (0.091) | (0.090) | (0.210) | (0.206) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.283** | -0.278** | 0.144 | 0.335 | 0.072*** | 0.068*** |
| | (0.096) | (0.095) | (0.218) | (0.214) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.259* | -0.216* | 0.225 | 0.399 | 0.201*** | 0.193*** |
| | (0.103) | (0.101) | (0.234) | (0.230) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.187 | -0.154 | 0.327 | 0.446 | 0.275*** | 0.263*** |
| | (0.114) | (0.112) | (0.265) | (0.260) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.249 | -0.174 | 0.505 | 0.580 | 0.327*** | 0.324*** |
| | (0.132) | (0.130) | (0.320) | (0.313) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Age 66+ | -0.574*** | -0.508*** | 0.300 | 0.324 | 0.346*** | 0.326*** |
| | (0.154) | (0.150) | (0.363) | (0.354) | (0.034) | (0.033) |
| Mestizo | 0.152 | 0.161 | 1.117*** | 1.157*** | 0.022 | 0.027 |
| | (0.085) | (0.083) | (0.186) | (0.184) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Indigenous | 0.004 | 0.103 | 0.064 | -0.034 | -0.063 | -0.048 |
| | (0.165) | (0.161) | (0.377) | (0.362) | (0.037) | (0.036) |
| Black | 0.343 | 0.399* | 1.117** | 0.946* | -0.069 | -0.083 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.180) | (0.177) | (0.422) | (0.419) | (0.040) | (0.039) |
| Mulato | 0.430* | 0.398* | -0.187 | -0.161 | -0.024 | -0.025 |
| | (0.207) | (0.204) | (0.495) | (0.492) | (0.046) | (0.045) |
| Moreno | -1.110*** | -0.915*** | | | 0.047 | 0.059 |
| | (0.321) | (0.310) | | | (0.068) | (0.066) |
| Other Ethnic | 0.480 | 0.482 | -0.252 | -0.406 | -0.005 | 0.001 |
| | (0.288) | (0.284) | (0.645) | (0.639) | (0.064) | (0.063) |
| Rural | -0.302*** | -0.287*** | -1.162*** | -1.097*** | 0.011 | 0.016 |
| | (0.080) | (0.079) | (0.189) | (0.185) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Constant | 22.238*** | 22.540*** | 31.660*** | 31.564*** | 3.330*** | 3.382*** |
| | (0.615) | (0.642) | (0.727) | (0.766) | (0.090) | (0.094) |
| Random-Effects | | | | | | |
| Country | 4.194 | 4.253 | 4.816 | 4.362 | 0.074 | 0.074 |
| | (1.412) | (1.431) | (1.926) | (1.745) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Year | 0.456 | 0.510 | | | 0.007 | 0.007 |
| | (0.345) | (0.384) | | | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Survey-Year | 90.945 | 91.389 | 89.241 | 90.337 | 3.555 | 3.580 |
| | (0.442) | (0.437) | (1.018) | (1.006) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Number of obs | 84,551 | 87,378 | 15,390 | 16,155 | 66,759 | 68,732 |
| $\chi^2$ | 1949.18*** | 1920.3*** | 683.52*** | 643.99*** | 2796.37*** | 2437.59*** |
| Cross-Classified Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | |

**Table A5: Hierarchical Ordered Logit of Whether "the President Should Not Limit the Opposition"**

| | [11] | (SE) | [12] | (SE) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.400*** | (0.017) | -0.432*** | (0.017) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.182*** | (0.010) | | |
| Personal Finances Improving | | | -0.144*** | (0.010) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.013 | (0.008) | | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | | -0.081*** | (0.017) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.125*** | (0.008) | | |
| Not Asked to Pay a Bribe | | | -0.071* | (0.030) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.026** | (0.008) | 0.031*** | (0.008) |
| Education | 0.050*** | (0.002) | 0.050*** | (0.002) |
| Household Wealth | 0.049*** | (0.005) | 0.051*** | (0.005) |
| Female | -0.031* | (0.014) | -0.030* | (0.014) |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.210*** | (0.019) | -0.230*** | (0.019) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.074*** | (0.020) | 0.071*** | (0.020) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.202*** | (0.021) | 0.196*** | (0.021) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.279*** | (0.024) | 0.270*** | (0.024) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age 56-65 | 0.335*** | (0.028) | 0.336*** | (0.027) |
| Age 66+ | 0.358*** | (0.032) | 0.341*** | (0.032) |
| Mestizo | 0.025 | (0.018) | 0.030 | (0.018) |
| Indigenous | -0.035 | (0.034) | -0.020 | (0.033) |
| Black | -0.056 | (0.038) | -0.066 | (0.037) |
| Mulato | 0.042 | (0.046) | 0.040 | (0.045) |
| Moreno | 0.058 | (0.067) | 0.069 | (0.064) |
| Other Ethnic | 0.035 | (0.060) | 0.053 | (0.059) |
| Rural | 0.018 | (0.017) | 0.023 | (0.016) |
| Cut 1 | -2.215 | (0.079) | -2.258 | (0.084) |
| Cut 2 | -1.479 | (0.079) | -1.526 | (0.083) |
| Cut 3 | -0.629 | (0.079) | -0.683 | (0.083) |
| Cut 4 | 0.155 | (0.079) | 0.097 | (0.083) |
| Cut 5 | 0.784 | (0.079) | 0.723 | (0.083) |
| Cut 6 | 1.357 | (0.079) | 1.294 | (0.083) |
| Variance Component | | | | |
| Country-Year | 0.055 | (0.030) | 0.053 | (0.030) |
| Country | 0.09 | (0.022) | 0.093 | (0.023) |
| Number of Observations | 66,759 | | 68,732 | |
| Three-Level Hierarchical Ordered Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | |

**Table A6: Hierarchical Model of Attitudes About Horizontal Accountability**

| | President Should Not Close the Congress | | President Should Not Close the Court | | President Should Not Bypass the Congress | | President Should Not Bypass the Court | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [11] | [12] | [13] | [14] | [15] | [16] | [17] | [18] |
| Voted for the Winner | -0.019*** | -0.018*** | -0.024*** | -0.023*** | -0.460*** | -0.494*** | -0.410*** | -0.441*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.022) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.004* | | -0.004 | | -0.177*** | | -0.147*** | |
| | (0.002) | | (0.003) | | (0.013) | | (0.013) | |
| Personal Finances Improving | | -0.003 | | -0.003 | | -0.104*** | | -0.087*** |
| | | (0.002) | | (0.003) | | (0.013) | | (0.013) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.007*** | | 0.013*** | | 0.021 | | 0.008 | |
| | (0.002) | | (0.002) | | (0.011) | | (0.010) | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | 0.022*** | | 0.020*** | | -0.037 | | -0.038 |
| | | (0.003) | | (0.005) | | (0.023) | | (0.022) |
| No Corruption in Government | 0.005*** | | -0.001 | | -0.063*** | | -0.056*** | |
| | (0.002) | | (0.003) | | (0.011) | | (0.011) | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | 0.061*** | | 0.041*** | | 0.059 | | -0.006 |
| | | (0.006) | | (0.009) | | (0.039) | | (0.038) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.010*** | 0.009*** | 0.008** | 0.010*** | 0.022* | 0.029** | 0.048*** | 0.045*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Education | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002** | 0.002*** | 0.039*** | 0.039*** | 0.040*** | 0.040*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Household Wealth | 0.002 | 0.002* | 0.008*** | 0.008*** | 0.026*** | 0.026*** | 0.039*** | 0.037*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Female | 0.022*** | 0.020*** | 0.019*** | 0.019*** | 0.010 | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.035* |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.016*** | -0.016*** | -0.017** | -0.018** | -0.267*** | -0.288*** | -0.266*** | -0.281*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.011** | -0.010* | -0.011 | -0.012* | 0.001 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.013 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.019*** | -0.017*** | -0.025*** | -0.025*** | 0.083** | 0.094*** | 0.050 | 0.065* |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.015*** | -0.015*** | -0.010 | -0.012 | 0.180*** | 0.178*** | 0.153*** | 0.163*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.014** | -0.014** | -0.023** | -0.024** | 0.258*** | 0.268*** | 0.228*** | 0.252*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.035) |
| Age 66+ | -0.006 | -0.007 | 0.002 | 0.006 | 0.246*** | 0.238*** | 0.208*** | 0.218*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.043) | (0.043) | (0.042) | (0.041) |
| Mestizo | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.011* | 0.013* | 0.038 | 0.047* | 0.040 | 0.048* |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Indigenous | -0.018** | -0.016* | -0.009 | -0.004 | -0.016 | -0.002 | 0.024 | 0.034 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.044) | (0.044) |
| Black | -0.010 | -0.009 | -0.015 | -0.015 | -0.012 | -0.019 | -0.031 | -0.017 |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.050) | (0.050) | (0.049) | (0.048) |
| Mulato | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.010 | -0.009 | -0.058 | -0.054 | 0.043 | 0.042 |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.065) | (0.064) | (0.063) | (0.062) |
| Moreno | -0.016 | -0.019 | -0.028 | -0.024 | 0.106 | 0.105 | 0.124 | 0.125 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.088) | (0.084) | (0.085) | (0.082) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.049*** | -0.047*** | -0.048* | -0.046* | -0.164* | -0.195* | -0.136 | -0.148* |
| | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.078) | (0.077) | (0.075) | (0.075) |
| Rural | 0.021*** | 0.021*** | 0.009 | 0.013* | 0.120*** | 0.131*** | 0.038 | 0.038 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.021) |
| Constant | 0.766*** | 0.706*** | 0.722*** | 0.680*** | 3.609*** | 3.521*** | 3.662*** | 3.640*** |
| | (0.040) | (0.041) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.148) | (0.149) | (0.131) | (0.133) |
| Random-Effects | | | | | | | | |
| Country | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.145 | 0.141 | 0.123 | 0.121 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.050) | (0.048) | (0.042) | (0.041) |
| Year | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.022 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.015 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.017) | (0.016) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Survey-Year | 0.149<br>(0.001) | 0.147<br>(0.001) | 0.173<br>(0.001) | 0.171<br>(0.001) | 3.655<br>(0.025) | 3.682<br>(0.025) | 3.410<br>(0.023) | 3.430<br>(0.023) |
| Number of obs<br>$\chi^2$ | 83,277<br>306.99*** | 86,159<br>458.62*** | 37,817<br>198.62*** | 38,436<br>210.48*** | 43,707<br>1199.01*** | 44,685<br>1031.92*** | 43,415<br>1173.43*** | 44,338<br>1046.92*** |
| Cross-Classified Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses;<br>* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | | | |

## Appendix 3: Results of Models with Full Controls

In the paper I have excluded the control variables and country dummies to conserve space. The full results from the models in Tables 1-3 are in Table A7, Table A8, and Table A9 below.

### Table A7: Support for the Democratic Status Quo

| | Democracy is the Best System | | Oppose a Coup | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| Voted for the Winner | 0.045 | 0.055 | 0.184*** | 0.203*** |
| | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.049) | (0.059) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | 0.148*** | | 0.108*** | |
| | (0.018) | | (0.021) | |
| Personal Finances are Getting Better | | 0.114*** | | 0.016 |
| | | (0.017) | | (0.023) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.073*** | | 0.096*** | |
| | (0.010) | | (0.014) | |
| Not a Crime Victim in Last 12 Months | | -0.021 | | 0.199*** |
| | | (0.020) | | (0.026) |
| No Corruption in Government | 0.074*** | | 0.018 | |
| | (0.020) | | (0.016) | |
| Not Targeted for a Bribe in Last Year | | 0.065 | | 0.124*** |
| | | (0.039) | | (0.028) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.126*** | 0.147*** | 0.075*** | 0.100*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.018) | (0.014) |
| Education | 0.033*** | 0.032*** | 0.034*** | 0.035*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.007) |
| Household Wealth | 0.026*** | 0.027** | 0.021* | 0.023 |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.017) |
| Female | -0.044*** | -0.054*** | -0.042* | -0.058** |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.021) |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.167*** | -0.169*** | 0.070** | 0.083* |
| | (0.032) | (0.041) | (0.031) | (0.041) |
| Female | -0.044** | -0.054*** | -0.042* | -0.058*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.051* | 0.055* | 0.168*** | 0.156*** |
| | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.208*** | 0.217*** | 0.345*** | 0.326*** |
| | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.309*** | 0.320*** | 0.476*** | 0.442*** |
| | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.046) | (0.047) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.386*** | 0.407*** | 0.611*** | 0.590*** |
| | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.052) | (0.054) |
| Age 66+ | 0.495*** | 0.525*** | 0.657*** | 0.634*** |
| | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.059) | (0.059) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mestizo | 0.002 | 0.011 | 0.022 | 0.020 |
| | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| Indigenous | -0.016 | -0.027 | -0.036 | 0.002 |
| | (0.040) | (0.041) | (0.046) | (0.046) |
| Black | 0.071 | 0.068 | -0.098* | -0.093* |
| | (0.069) | (0.067) | (0.048) | (0.047) |
| Mulata | 0.036 | 0.039 | -0.046 | -0.049 |
| | (0.069) | (0.069) | (0.047) | (0.045) |
| Moreno | -0.014 | -0.029 | 0.017 | 0.033 |
| | (0.072) | (0.083) | (0.077) | (0.048) |
| Other | -0.088 | -0.099 | -0.183** | -0.200** |
| | (0.052) | (0.053) | (0.066) | (0.070) |
| Rural | -0.004 | 0.007 | 0.042 | 0.057 |
| | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.035) | (0.035) |
| Guatemala | -0.175 | -0.199 | 0.340** | 0.340** |
| | (0.126) | (0.139) | (0.129) | (0.128) |
| El Salvador | -0.126 | -0.164* | 0.128 | 0.092 |
| | (0.076) | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.073) |
| Honduras | -0.403** | -0.380** | 0.292 | 0.285 |
| | (0.155) | (0.147) | (0.206) | (0.212) |
| Nicaragua | 0.196 | 0.195 | 0.428*** | 0.420*** |
| | (0.211) | (0.207) | (0.092) | (0.092) |
| Costa Rica | 0.717*** | 0.714*** | 0.882*** | 0.877*** |
| | (0.123) | (0.132) | (0.077) | (0.078) |
| Panama | -0.028 | -0.005 | 1.399*** | 1.409*** |
| | (0.292) | (0.302) | (0.187) | (0.193) |
| Colombia | 0.113 | 0.145* | 0.360** | 0.368** |
| | (0.061) | (0.058) | (0.123) | (0.125) |
| Ecuador | -0.246*** | -0.246*** | 0.113 | 0.126 |
| | (0.045) | (0.048) | (0.115) | (0.129) |
| Bolivia | -0.171 | -0.174 | 0.389*** | 0.395*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.128) | (0.102) | (0.096) |
| Peru | -0.421*** | -0.432*** | -0.230** | -0.215** |
| | (0.079) | (0.068) | (0.080) | (0.081) |
| Paraguay | -0.158 | -0.171 | 0.127 | 0.163 |
| | (0.122) | (0.124) | (0.185) | (0.177) |
| Chile | 0.189* | 0.184* | 0.937*** | 0.947*** |
| | (0.077) | (0.075) | (0.175) | (0.175) |
| Uruguay | 1.111*** | 1.135*** | 0.826*** | 0.885*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.074) | (0.085) | (0.082) |
| Brazil | 0.135* | 0.175* | 0.633*** | 0.675*** |
| | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.104) | (0.099) |
| Venezuela | 0.877*** | 0.883*** | 0.763*** | 0.830*** |
| | (0.131) | (0.130) | (0.160) | (0.139) |
| Argentina | 1.079*** | 1.065*** | 1.102*** | 1.076*** |
| | (0.158) | (0.150) | (0.295) | (0.281) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dominican Republic | 0.309* | 0.326* | 0.513*** | 0.510*** |
| | (0.148) | (0.157) | (0.107) | (0.110) |
| Cut 1 | -2.196 | -2.161 | -0.205 | -0.126 |
| | (0.101) | (0.106) | (0.102) | (0.130) |
| Cut 2 | -1.528 | -1.501 | 1.030 | 1.102 |
| | (0.085) | (0.073) | (0.109) | (0.145) |
| Cut 3 | -0.684 | -0.661 | 1.615 | 1.681 |
| | (0.075) | (0.073) | (0.112) | (0.142) |
| Cut 4 | 0.182 | 0.202 | | |
| | (0.074) | (0.081) | | |
| Cut 5 | 0.971 | 0.986 | | |
| | (0.073) | (0.081) | | |
| Cut 6 | 1.757 | 1.766 | | |
| | (0.077) | (0.099) | | |
| Model Type | Ordered Logit | | Ordered Logit | |
| Number of Observations | 86,978 | 90,138 | 71,634 | 74,157 |
| Number of Country Years | 67 | 67 | 57 | 57 |
| Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | |

**Table A8: Protection of Civil Liberties**

| | Tolerance Civil Rights | | Protect Free Speech | | President Should Not Limit the Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] |
| Voted for the Winner | -1.077*** | -1.074** | -1.567*** | -1.639*** | -0.416*** | -0.453*** |
| | (0.213) | (0.309) | (0.191) | (0.188) | (0.035) | (0.048) |
| National Economy is | -0.370*** | | -0.509*** | | -0.189*** | |
| Getting Better | (0.107) | | (0.115) | | (0.024) | |
| Personal Finances are | | -0.326* | | -0.558*** | | -0.151*** |
| Getting Better | | (0.126) | | (0.110) | | (0.023) |
| Feels Secure in | -0.025 | | 0.122 | | 0.015 | |
| Neighborhood | (0.071) | | (0.085) | | (0.013) | |
| Not a Crime Victim in | | -0.347** | | -0.786*** | | -0.090*** |
| Last 12 Months | | (0.096) | | (0.197) | | (0.019) |
| No Corruption in | -0.396*** | | -0.819*** | | -0.130*** | |
| Government | (0.090) | | (0.093) | | (0.023) | |
| Not Targeted for a | | -0.530* | | 0.294 | | -0.071 |
| Bribe in Last Year | | (0.217) | | (0.332) | | (0.061) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.370*** | 0.387*** | 0.032 | 0.053 | 0.033* | 0.039** |
| | (0.054) | (0.068) | (0.088) | (0.083) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Education | 0.210*** | 0.211*** | 0.254*** | 0.256*** | 0.051*** | 0.050*** |
| | (0.020) | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Household Wealth | 0.132** | 0.148** | 0.202*** | 0.230*** | 0.048*** | 0.050*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.044) | (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.008) | (0.011) |
| | -0.776*** | -0.742** | -1.003*** | -1.099*** | -0.208*** | -0.231*** |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abstained Last Election | (0.187) | (0.251) | (0.210) | (0.206) | (0.036) | (0.044) |
| Female | -0.956*** | -0.927*** | -0.974*** | -0.955*** | -0.029 | -0.028* |
| | (0.105) | (0.101) | (0.154) | (0.151) | (0.015) | (0.014) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.306** | -0.300** | 0.144 | 0.335 | 0.074** | 0.071** |
| | (0.112) | (0.112) | (0.218) | (0.215) | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.287 | -0.243 | 0.225 | 0.400 | 0.201*** | 0.195*** |
| | (0.158) | (0.158) | (0.234) | (0.230) | (0.028) | (0.029) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.246 | -0.216 | 0.322 | 0.442 | 0.287*** | 0.278*** |
| | (0.180) | (0.174) | (0.265) | (0.261) | (0.039) | (0.040) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.324 | -0.250 | 0.499 | 0.574 | 0.341*** | 0.341*** |
| | (0.201) | (0.207) | (0.320) | (0.314) | (0.041) | (0.039) |
| Age 66+ | -0.689** | -0.634** | 0.290 | 0.316 | 0.368*** | 0.352*** |
| | (0.215) | (0.228) | (0.364) | (0.354) | (0.051) | (0.053) |
| Mestizo | 0.154 | 0.162 | 1.136*** | 1.175*** | 0.021 | 0.024 |
| | (0.162) | (0.165) | (0.187) | (0.184) | (0.034) | (0.034) |
| Indigenous | -0.003 | 0.089 | 0.095 | -0.005 | -0.035 | -0.020 |
| | (0.295) | (0.293) | (0.378) | (0.363) | (0.063) | (0.069) |
| Black | 0.269 | 0.314 | 1.130** | 0.958* | -0.051 | -0.062 |
| | (0.251) | (0.242) | (0.422) | (0.419) | (0.053) | (0.052) |
| Mulata | 0.282 | 0.226 | -0.184 | -0.161 | 0.011 | 0.013 |
| | (0.267) | (0.256) | (0.495) | (0.492) | (0.087) | (0.076) |
| Moreno | -1.555 | -1.359 | | | 0.047 | 0.058 |
| | (1.003) | (1.032) | | | (0.051) | (0.031) |
| Other | 0.545 | 0.543 | -0.229 | -0.382 | -0.007 | 0.005 |
| | (0.545) | (0.529) | (0.645) | (0.639) | (0.101) | (0.098) |
| Rural | -0.287* | -0.282* | -1.152*** | -1.089*** | 0.015 | 0.020 |
| | (0.138) | (0.135) | (0.190) | (0.185) | (0.030) | (0.030) |
| Guatemala | -0.700 | -0.724 | -0.307 | -0.011 | 0.083 | 0.092 |
| | (0.843) | (0.825) | (0.435) | (0.414) | (0.120) | (0.108) |
| El Salvador | -0.320 | -0.393 | -2.037*** | -2.130*** | -0.146 | -0.183 |
| | (1.154) | (1.167) | (0.411) | (0.403) | (0.148) | (0.153) |
| Honduras | -2.202* | -2.202* | 0.291 | 0.530 | 0.181 | 0.184 |
| | (1.052) | (1.052) | (0.400) | (0.390) | (0.135) | (0.139) |
| Nicaragua | 1.588 | 1.599 | 1.722*** | 2.075*** | 0.377*** | 0.371*** |
| | (0.965) | (0.863) | (0.388) | (0.377) | (0.088) | (0.081) |
| Costa Rica | 3.128* | 3.181** | -1.150** | -0.926* | 0.456* | 0.441* |
| | (1.171) | (1.160) | (0.400) | (0.394) | (0.177) | (0.180) |
| Panama | -0.286 | -0.277 | -3.286*** | -3.038*** | 0.304 | 0.309 |
| | (0.702) | (0.636) | (0.395) | (0.388) | (0.242) | (0.245) |
| Colombia | -0.112 | -0.124 | -2.387*** | -2.310*** | -0.087 | -0.096 |
| | (0.706) | (0.629) | (0.399) | (0.391) | (0.132) | (0.143) |
| Ecuador | -1.770* | -1.752* | | | -0.274* | -0.312** |
| | (0.808) | (0.742) | | | (0.123) | (0.117) |
| Bolivia | -2.285** | -2.307** | | | -0.064 | -0.088 |
| | (0.798) | (0.757) | | | (0.107) | (0.102) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peru | -1.652 | -1.799 | -0.431 | -0.453 | -0.104 | -0.137 |
| | (1.101) | (1.112) | (0.403) | (0.394) | (0.117) | (0.104) |
| Paraguay | 0.791 | 0.791 | | | 0.105 | 0.103 |
| | (1.363) | (1.346) | | | (0.321) | (0.329) |
| Chile | 0.660 | 0.493 | 2.065*** | 1.691*** | -0.038 | -0.080 |
| | (0.923) | (0.867) | (0.403) | (0.397) | (0.163) | (0.167) |
| Uruguay | 3.683*** | 3.592*** | 5.389*** | 5.018*** | 0.523*** | 0.433* |
| | (0.922) | (0.894) | (0.441) | (0.430) | (0.163) | (0.171) |
| Brazil | 2.737*** | 2.625*** | | | 0.289** | 0.242** |
| | (0.707) | (0.638) | | | (0.096) | (0.089) |
| Venezuela | 3.288** | 3.264** | 0.581 | 0.690 | 0.517*** | 0.450*** |
| | (1.208) | (1.143) | (0.405) | (0.396) | (0.098) | (0.095) |
| Argentina | 4.301*** | 4.370*** | | | 0.803*** | 0.799*** |
| | (1.032) | (1.056) | | | (0.146) | (0.148) |
| Dominican Republic | 1.197 | 1.172 | 2.392*** | 2.383*** | -0.167 | -0.163 |
| | (0.963) | (0.913) | (0.418) | (0.409) | (0.160) | (0.162) |
| Constant | 21.669 | 21.989 | 31.438 | 31.282 | | |
| | (0.786) | (0.573) | (0.493) | (0.560) | | |
| Cut 1 | | | | | -2.035 | -2.105 |
| | | | | | (0.148) | (0.147) |
| Cut 2 | | | | | -1.302 | -1.376 |
| | | | | | (0.135) | (0.122) |
| Cut 3 | | | | | -0.459 | -0.540 |
| | | | | | (0.124) | (0.112) |
| Cut 4 | | | | | 0.317 | 0.232 |
| | | | | | (0.120) | (0.108) |
| Cut 5 | | | | | 0.939 | 0.850 |
| | | | | | (0.119) | (0.117) |
| Cut 6 | | | | | 1.505 | 1.415 |
| | | | | | (0.120) | (0.131) |
| Model Type | OLS | | OLS | | Ordered Logit | |
| N Observations | 84,551 | 87,378 | 15,390 | 16,155 | 66,759 | 68,732 |
| N Country Years | 67 | 67 | 13 | 13 | 53 | 53 |
| Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses<br>* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | |

**Table A9: Support for Checks and Balances**

| | President Not Close the Congress | | President Not Close the Court | | President Not Bypass the Congress | | President Not Bypass the Court | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [11] | [12] | [13] | [14] | [15] | [16] | [17] | [18] |
| Voted for the Winner | -0.141* | -0.134* | -0.138* | -0.132* | -0.435*** | -0.464*** | -0.410*** | -0.439*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.058) | (0.053) | (0.054) | (0.050) | (0.049) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.003 | | -0.027 | | 0.019 | | -0.134*** | |
| | (0.040) | | (0.037) | | (0.013) | | (0.030) | |
| Personal Finances Getting Better | | 0.005 | | -0.018 | | -0.087*** | | -0.076*** |
| | | (0.026) | | (0.036) | | (0.026) | | (0.023) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.067*** | | 0.076** | | -0.066** | | 0.010 | |
| | (0.013) | | (0.024) | | (0.025) | | (0.014) | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | 0.113*** | | 0.112** | | -0.054 | | -0.053* |
| | | (0.031) | | (0.036) | | (0.031) | | (0.026) |
| No Corruption in Government | 0.061* | | -0.002 | | 0.028 | | -0.064** | |
| | (0.028) | | (0.025) | | (0.017) | | (0.025) | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | 0.380*** | | 0.215*** | | 0.029 | | -0.046 |
| | | (0.045) | | (0.053) | | (0.053) | | (0.063) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.068*** | 0.076*** | 0.045* | 0.056** | 0.040*** | 0.036* | 0.050*** | 0.050*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.006) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Education | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.013* | 0.022* | 0.039*** | 0.042*** | 0.041*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Household Wealth | 0.006 | 0.007 | 0.044*** | 0.046*** | -0.001 | 0.023* | 0.035*** | 0.033*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.023) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Abstained | -0.123** | -0.121** | -0.101* | -0.109** | -0.158*** | -0.297*** | -0.284*** | -0.297*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.046) | (0.040) | (0.032) | (0.051) | (0.052) | (0.051) |
| Female | 0.148*** | 0.137*** | 0.110*** | 0.114*** | -0.280*** | 0.003 | 0.012 | 0.019 |
| | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.050) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.061 | -0.055 | -0.062 | -0.074* | 0.011 | 0.016 | 0.008 | 0.020 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.040) | (0.034) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.023) | (0.022) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.104** | -0.097* | -0.143** | -0.147** | 0.097*** | 0.107*** | 0.070* | 0.083** |
| | (0.039) | (0.038) | (0.050) | (0.047) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.031) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.048 | -0.054 | -0.059 | -0.071 | 0.213*** | 0.211*** | 0.196*** | 0.204*** |
| | (0.052) | (0.053) | (0.066) | (0.063) | (0.049) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.047) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.030 | -0.036 | -0.131 | -0.136* | 0.278*** | 0.293*** | 0.257*** | 0.285*** |
| | (0.053) | (0.050) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.039) | (0.037) | (0.053) | (0.051) |
| Age 66+ | 0.047 | 0.037 | 0.020 | 0.043 | 0.269*** | 0.265*** | 0.236*** | 0.250*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.094) | (0.094) | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.055) |
| Mestizo | 0.051 | 0.051 | 0.064 | 0.077 | 0.045 | 0.052 | 0.039 | 0.045 |
| | (0.038) | (0.039) | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.038) | (0.037) |
| Indigenous | -0.106 | -0.092 | -0.045 | -0.016 | 0.006 | 0.019 | 0.033 | 0.041 |
| | (0.090) | (0.092) | (0.103) | (0.104) | (0.090) | (0.096) | (0.098) | (0.101) |
| Black | -0.010 | -0.005 | -0.088 | -0.087 | 0.020 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 0.012 |
| | (0.059) | (0.067) | (0.080) | (0.084) | (0.072) | (0.067) | (0.073) | (0.071) |
| Mulato | 0.072 | 0.079 | -0.058 | -0.049 | -0.012 | -0.009 | 0.081 | 0.078 |
| | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.086) | (0.080) | (0.101) | (0.100) | (0.089) | (0.090) |
| Moreno | 0.228 | 0.232 | -0.159 | -0.119 | 0.106 | 0.104 | 0.104* | 0.114 |
| | (0.183) | (0.179) | (0.101) | (0.103) | (0.111) | (0.106) | (0.042) | (0.072) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.231 | -0.222 | -0.271 | -0.260 | -0.107 | -0.136 | -0.087 | -0.103 |
| | (0.150) | (0.143) | (0.172) | (0.174) | (0.153) | (0.148) | (0.189) | (0.183) |
| Rural | 0.135** | 0.147*** | 0.050 | 0.076 | 0.112*** | 0.124*** | 0.038 | 0.041 |
| | (0.043) | (0.042) | (0.053) | (0.052) | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.032) |
| Guatemala | 0.037 | 0.012 | 0.189 | 0.163 | 0.238 | 0.250 | 0.236 | 0.232 |
| | (0.246) | (0.262) | (0.145) | (0.147) | (0.253) | (0.250) | (0.276) | (0.268) |
| El Salvador | -0.110 | -0.127 | -0.166 | -0.166 | 0.056 | 0.038 | 0.050 | 0.034 |
| | (0.219) | (0.224) | (0.153) | (0.156) | (0.136) | (0.149) | (0.110) | (0.126) |
| Honduras | 0.436* | 0.425* | 0.459* | 0.479** | 0.296 | 0.293 | 0.141 | 0.153 |
| | (0.190) | (0.198) | (0.180) | (0.171) | (0.160) | (0.159) | (0.167) | (0.165) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nicaragua | 0.183 | 0.165 | 0.114 | 0.133 | 0.866*** | 0.885*** | 0.861*** | 0.887*** |
| | (0.250) | (0.262) | (0.237) | (0.246) | (0.212) | (0.215) | (0.164) | (0.163) |
| Costa Rica | 0.132 | 0.115 | 0.246 | 0.274 | 1.013** | 0.988** | 0.992*** | 0.981*** |
| | (0.190) | (0.190) | (0.154) | (0.160) | (0.335) | (0.333) | (0.298) | (0.285) |
| Panama | 0.330 | 0.295 | 0.028 | 0.035 | 0.003 | -0.016 | -0.057 | -0.067 |
| | (0.383) | (0.383) | (0.192) | (0.191) | (0.156) | (0.151) | (0.147) | (0.147) |
| Colombia | -0.277 | -0.282 | -0.218 | -0.199 | 0.075 | 0.044 | 0.045 | 0.017 |
| | (0.330) | (0.334) | (0.190) | (0.194) | (0.185) | (0.201) | (0.136) | (0.150) |
| Ecuador | -1.455** | -1.444** | -1.421*** | -1.397*** | -0.172 | -0.212 | -0.115 | -0.146 |
| | (0.516) | (0.522) | (0.156) | (0.157) | (0.292) | (0.295) | (0.220) | (0.220) |
| Bolivia | -0.156 | -0.087 | -0.121 | -0.051 | 0.211 | 0.195 | 0.077 | 0.082 |
| | (0.227) | (0.230) | (0.145) | (0.144) | (0.123) | (0.119) | (0.113) | (0.097) |
| Peru | -0.948** | -0.939** | -0.847*** | -0.861*** | -0.026 | -0.030 | -0.118* | -0.141 |
| | (0.333) | (0.357) | (0.191) | (0.192) | (0.107) | (0.111) | (0.066) | (0.071) |
| Paraguay | -0.411* | -0.414* | 0.068 | 0.102 | 0.604 | 0.596 | 0.522 | 0.527 |
| | (0.201) | (0.210) | (0.141) | (0.143) | (0.400) | (0.417) | (0.380) | (0.386) |
| Chile | 0.583* | 0.587* | 0.610** | 0.606** | 0.184 | 0.132 | 0.130 | 0.087 |
| | (0.248) | (0.256) | (0.200) | (0.203) | (0.293) | (0.284) | (0.277) | (0.269) |
| Uruguay | 0.462* | 0.465* | 0.438** | 0.462** | 0.859*** | 0.758*** | 0.807*** | 0.733*** |
| | (0.210) | (0.210) | (0.169) | (0.161) | (0.227) | (0.220) | (0.198) | (0.200) |
| Brazil | 0.247 | 0.247 | 0.580*** | 0.613*** | 0.445*** | 0.377** | 0.337** | 0.277** |
| | (0.186) | (0.185) | (0.143) | (0.141) | (0.136) | (0.131) | (0.109) | (0.105) |
| Venezuela | 0.426 | 0.454 | 0.282 | 0.330 | 1.016*** | 0.935*** | 0.880*** | 0.815*** |
| | (0.289) | (0.288) | (0.176) | (0.177) | (0.151) | (0.152) | (0.094) | (0.100) |
| Argentina | 0.679** | 0.680** | 0.362* | 0.395** | 1.215*** | 1.193*** | 1.134*** | 1.109*** |
| | (0.223) | (0.230) | (0.143) | (0.145) | (0.134) | (0.130) | (0.082) | (0.079) |
| Dominican Republic | 0.114 | 0.105 | 0.284 | 0.316* | 0.235* | 0.233* | 0.182* | 0.190* |
| | (0.177) | (0.177) | (0.146) | (0.142) | (0.108) | (0.110) | (0.071) | (0.075) |
| Constant | 1.108*** | 0.812*** | 0.943*** | 0.709*** | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.182) | (0.180) | (0.186) | (0.179) | | | | |
| Cut 1 | | | | | -1.935 | -1.889 | -2.185 | -2.205 |
| | | | | | (0.166) | (0.162) | (0.137) | (0.127) |
| Cut 2 | | | | | -1.180 | -1.140 | -1.398 | -1.430 |
| | | | | | (0.158) | (0.157) | (0.124) | (0.116) |
| Cut 3 | | | | | -0.424 | -0.386 | -0.582 | -0.615 |
| | | | | | (0.151) | (0.153) | (0.118) | (0.114) |
| Cut 4 | | | | | 0.281 | 0.312 | 0.168 | 0.129 |
| | | | | | (0.148) | (0.154) | (0.115) | (0.117) |
| Cut 5 | | | | | 0.881 | 0.907 | 0.808 | 0.764 |
| | | | | | (0.147) | (0.159) | (0.112) | (0.121) |
| Cut 6 | | | | | 1.501 | 1.523 | 1.434 | 1.388 |
| | | | | | (0.154) | (0.168) | (0.120) | (0.131) |
| Model Type | Binary Logit | | Binary Logit | | Ordered Logit | | Ordered Logit | |
| N Observations | 83,277 | 86,159 | 86,159 | 38,436 | 43,707 | 44,685 | 43,415 | 44,338 |
| N Countries | 67 | 67 | 32 | 32 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | | | |

**Appendix 4: Models without Attitudinal Controls**

While the models are relatively parsimonious, one could still worry about whether the results are driven by the selection of control variables. Thus in Table A8 and A9 I estimate the models from Table 2 with two different specifications. In the first, I include the country dummies but none of the demographic variables or the interpersonal trust variable. In the second I add the demographics but not the individual-level social capital measure. Table A8 contains the sociotropic performance measures while Table A9 contains the egotropic ones. The results show that the coefficients shift a little bit with the choice of controls but, with the exception of the egotropic economic measure in model 7, all variables that are significant in the results presented in Table 2 in the paper are significant at conventional levels. Then the bribe avoider variable in Model 11 is significant and negative without the demographic controls but becomes insignificant once added. Thus, for the most part, the results are not a function of the model specification.

**Table A10: Sociotropic Performance Variables and Belief in Vertical Accountability**

| | Tolerance Civil Rights | | Protect Free Speech | | President Should Not Limit the Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics |
| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| Voted for the Winner | -1.245*** | -1.085*** | -1.898*** | -1.601*** | -0.454*** | -0.416*** |
| | (0.222) | (0.213) | (0.191) | (0.190) | (0.037) | (0.035) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.216* | -0.355** | -0.287* | -0.503*** | -0.173*** | -0.188*** |
| | (0.108) | (0.107) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.070 | 0.073 | 0.080 | 0.131 | 0.022 | 0.024* |
| | (0.066) | (0.071) | (0.080) | (0.080) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.509*** | -0.404*** | -1.089*** | -0.829*** | -0.155*** | -0.130*** |
| | (0.086) | (0.089) | (0.092) | (0.093) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Education | | 0.213*** | | 0.253*** | | 0.051*** |
| | | (0.021) | | (0.021) | | (0.005) |
| Household Wealth | | 0.143*** | | 0.215*** | | 0.048*** |
| | | (0.042) | | (0.059) | | (0.008) |
| Female | | -0.978*** | | -0.969*** | | -0.030* |
| | | (0.106) | | (0.153) | | (0.015) |
| Abstained | -0.852*** | -0.809*** | -1.398*** | -1.048*** | -0.311*** | -0.210*** |
| | (0.198) | (0.187) | (0.202) | (0.209) | (0.039) | (0.036) |
| Age 26-35 | | -0.300* | | 0.136 | | 0.076** |
| | | (0.116) | | (0.217) | | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | | -0.265 | | 0.235 | | 0.202*** |
| | | (0.159) | | (0.232) | | (0.028) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age 46-55 | | -0.197 | | 0.277 | | 0.288*** |
| | | (0.181) | | (0.263) | | (0.039) |
| Age 56-65 | | -0.289 | | 0.445 | | 0.342*** |
| | | (0.198) | | (0.318) | | (0.042) |
| Age 66+ | | -0.611 | | 0.377 | | 0.381*** |
| | | (0.218) | | (0.360) | | (0.053) |
| Mestizo | | 0.131 | | 1.143*** | | 0.021 |
| | | (0.161) | | (0.186) | | (0.034) |
| Indigenous | | -0.041 | | 0.088 | | -0.035 |
| | | (0.291) | | (0.375) | | (0.064) |
| Black | | 0.245 | | 1.168** | | -0.042 |
| | | (0.250) | | (0.419) | | (0.053) |
| Mulato | | 0.260 | | -0.109 | | 0.017 |
| | | (0.259) | | (0.490) | | (0.089) |
| Moreno | | -1.492 | | | | 0.060 |
| | | (1.005) | | 0.000 | | (0.055) |
| Other Ethnic | | 0.462 | | -0.365 | | -0.003 |
| | | (0.540) | | (0.639) | | (0.100) |
| Rural | | -0.247 | | -1.145*** | | 0.020 |
| | | (0.138) | | (0.188) | | (0.030) |
| Constant | 23.628*** | 22.120*** | 34.672*** | 31.507*** | | |
| | (0.701) | (0.797) | (0.349) | (0.480) | | |
| Cut 1 | | | | | -2.816 | -2.064 |
| | | | | | (0.127) | (0.148) |
| Cut 2 | | | | | -2.094 | -1.331 |
| | | | | | (0.112) | (0.135) |
| Cut 3 | | | | | -1.263 | -0.489 |
| | | | | | (0.100) | (0.124) |
| Cut 4 | | | | | -0.495 | 0.287 |
| | | | | | (0.099) | (0.120) |
| Cut 5 | | | | | 0.114 | 0.907 |
| | | | | | (0.101) | (0.118) |
| Cut 6 | | | | | 0.669 | 1.472 |
| | | | | | (0.104) | (0.119) |
| N | 90,165 | 85,780 | 15,927 | 15,588 | 70,039 | 67,746 |
| Country Dummies Deleted from the Table, Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | |

**Table A11: Egotropic Performance Variables and Belief in Vertical Accountability**

| | Tolerance Civil Rights | Protect Free Speech | President Should Not Limit the Opposition |
|---|---|---|---|

| | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -1.236*** | -1.080*** | -1.853*** | -1.668*** | -0.492*** | -0.454*** |
| | (0.222) | (0.217) | (0.176) | (0.186) | (0.039) | (0.036) |
| Personal Finances are Getting Better | -0.115 | -0.298** | -0.297** | -0.558*** | -0.126*** | -0.147*** |
| | (0.083) | (0.090) | (0.101) | (0.109) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Not a Crime Victim in Last Year | -0.695*** | -0.290** | -1.342*** | -0.770*** | -0.131*** | -0.088*** |
| | (0.115) | (0.105) | (0.183) | (0.195) | (0.024) | (0.022) |
| Not Asked a Bribe in Last Year | -0.870*** | -0.502** | -0.324 | 0.256 | -0.141** | -0.063 |
| | (0.182) | (0.173) | (0.303) | (0.329) | (0.050) | (0.047) |
| Education | | 0.216*** | | 0.252*** | | 0.051*** |
| | | (0.020) | | (0.021) | | (0.005) |
| Household Wealth | | 0.160*** | | 0.241*** | | 0.050*** |
| | | (0.039) | | (0.059) | | (0.009) |
| Female | | -0.966*** | | -0.955*** | | -0.031* |
| | | (0.103) | | (0.150) | | (0.014) |
| Abstained | -0.872*** | -0.774*** | -1.578*** | -1.173*** | -0.334*** | -0.234*** |
| | (0.198) | (0.189) | (0.187) | (0.205) | (0.039) | (0.037) |
| Age 26-35 | | -0.288* | | 0.303 | | 0.073** |
| | | (0.114) | | (0.213) | | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | | -0.213 | | 0.389 | | 0.197*** |
| | | (0.159) | | (0.228) | | (0.029) |
| Age 46-55 | | -0.167 | | 0.395 | | 0.282*** |
| | | (0.175) | | (0.259) | | (0.040) |
| Age 56-65 | | -0.208 | | 0.506 | | 0.343*** |
| | | (0.205) | | (0.311) | | (0.040) |
| Age 66+ | | -0.531* | | 0.374 | | 0.371*** |
| | | (0.231) | | (0.350) | | (0.055) |
| Mestizo | | 0.148 | | 1.180*** | | 0.023 |
| | | (0.165) | | (0.183) | | (0.034) |
| Indigenous | | 0.064 | | -0.014 | | -0.019 |
| | | (0.289) | | (0.361) | | (0.070) |
| Black | | 0.312 | | 0.994* | | -0.054 |
| | | (0.241) | | (0.416) | | (0.052) |
| Mulato | | 0.206 | | -0.076 | | 0.019 |
| | | (0.247) | | (0.487) | | (0.079) |
| Moreno | | -1.297 | | | | 0.074* |
| | | (1.044) | | | | (0.038) |
| Other Ethnic | | 0.412 | | -0.532 | | -0.002 |
| | | (0.526) | | (0.633) | | (0.095) |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rural | | -0.211<br>(0.135) | | -1.080***<br>(0.183) | | 0.030<br>(0.030) |
| Constant | 24.638***<br>(0.664) | 22.512***<br>(0.743) | 35.334***<br>(0.414) | 31.472***<br>(0.547) | | |
| Cut 1 | | | | | -2.974<br>(0.113) | -2.149<br>(0.132) |
| Cut 2 | | | | | -2.258<br>(0.101) | -1.421<br>(0.121) |
| Cut 3 | | | | | -1.435<br>(0.093) | -0.586<br>(0.112) |
| Cut 4 | | | | | -0.673<br>(0.095) | 0.184<br>(0.109) |
| Cut 5 | | | | | -0.067<br>(0.102) | 0.800<br>(0.111) |
| Cut 6 | | | | | 0.488<br>(0.110) | 1.364<br>(0.115) |
| N | 95,373 | 88,741 | 18,696 | 16,381 | 72,344 | 69,835 |
| Country Dummies Deleted from the Table, Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | |

**Table A12: Sociotropic Performance Variables and Belief in Horizontal Accountability**

| | President Should Not Close the Congress | | President Should Not Close the Court | | President Should Not Bypass the Congress | | President Should Not Bypass the Court | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics |
| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| Voted for the Winner | -0.153** | -0.139* | -0.152* | -0.138* | -0.468*** | -0.436*** | -0.444*** | -0.408*** |
| | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.053) | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.049) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | 0.001 | 0.003 | -0.006 | -0.019 | -0.149*** | -0.157*** | -0.122*** | -0.132*** |
| | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.037) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.093*** | 0.088*** | 0.090*** | 0.087*** | 0.031* | 0.028* | 0.022 | 0.023 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.015) |
| No Corruption in Government | 0.063* | 0.060* | -0.013 | -0.005 | -0.087*** | -0.066** | -0.086*** | -0.064** |
| | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Education | | 0.009* | | 0.011 | | 0.040*** | | 0.042*** |
| | | (0.004) | | (0.006) | | (0.006) | | (0.006) |
| Household Wealth | | 0.007 | | 0.047*** | | 0.024* | | 0.036*** |
| | | (0.010) | | (0.011) | | (0.011) | | (0.010) |
| Female | | 0.145*** | | 0.107*** | | 0.000 | | 0.009 |
| | | (0.028) | | (0.024) | | (0.023) | | (0.025) |
| Abstained | -0.126** | -0.126** | -0.093 | -0.102* | -0.353*** | -0.282*** | -0.354*** | -0.285*** |
| | (0.045) | (0.041) | (0.049) | (0.046) | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.054) | (0.052) |
| Age 26-35 | | -0.056 | | -0.046 | | 0.015 | | 0.014 |
| | | (0.037) | | (0.039) | | (0.025) | | (0.022) |
| Age 36-45 | | -0.095* | | -0.135** | | 0.101*** | | 0.079* |
| | | (0.038) | | (0.049) | | (0.030) | | (0.032) |
| Age 46-55 | | -0.042 | | -0.063 | | 0.219*** | | 0.205*** |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (0.051) | | (0.064) | | (0.049) | | (0.049) |
| Age 56-65 | | -0.016 | | -0.113 | | 0.282*** | | 0.264*** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.070) | | (0.040) | | (0.055) |
| Age 66+ | | 0.068 | | 0.032 | | 0.286*** | | 0.251*** |
| | | (0.058) | | (0.093) | | (0.058) | | (0.055) |
| Mestizo | | 0.048 | | 0.064 | | 0.046 | | 0.040 |
| | | (0.039) | | (0.052) | | (0.043) | | (0.039) |
| Indigenous | | -0.114 | | -0.039 | | 0.004 | | 0.030 |
| | | (0.090) | | (0.102) | | (0.089) | | (0.097) |
| Black | | -0.011 | | -0.086 | | 0.030 | | 0.006 |
| | | (0.058) | | (0.078) | | (0.071) | | (0.071) |
| Mulato | | 0.060 | | -0.049 | | -0.006 | | 0.090 |
| | | (0.070) | | (0.085) | | (0.100) | | (0.088) |
| Moreno | | 0.222 | | -0.139 | | 0.108 | | 0.117 |
| | | (0.178) | | (0.099) | | (0.111) | | (0.041) |
| Other Ethnic | | -0.232 | | -0.286 | | -0.117 | | -0.089 |
| | | (0.145) | | (0.170) | | (0.153) | | (0.186) |
| Rural | | 0.144*** | | 0.052 | | 0.111*** | | 0.045 |
| | | (0.043) | | (0.052) | | (0.034) | | (0.033) |
| Constant | 1.343 | 1.170 | 1.182 | 0.980 | | | | |
| | (0.177) | (0.181) | (0.142) | (0.188) | | | | |
| Cut 1 | | | | | -2.552 | -1.959 | -2.848 | -2.228 |
| | | | | | (0.151) | (0.165) | (0.123) | (0.138) |
| Cut 2 | | | | | -1.798 | -1.204 | -2.068 | -1.442 |
| | | | | | (0.139) | (0.157) | (0.100) | (0.124) |
| Cut 3 | | | | | -1.048 | -0.451 | -1.258 | -0.627 |
| | | | | | (0.127) | (0.150) | (0.089) | (0.118) |
| Cut 4 | | | | | -0.346 | 0.255 | -0.513 | 0.123 |
| | | | | | (0.125) | (0.147) | (0.087) | (0.116) |
| Cut 5 | | | | | 0.247 | 0.853 | 0.120 | 0.761 |
| | | | | | (0.126) | (0.147) | (0.088) | (0.112) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cut 6 | | | | | 0.861 | 1.473 | 0.738 | 1.386 |
| | | | | | (0.131) | (0.153) | (0.095) | (0.119) |
| N | 87,051 | 84,457 | 39,397 | 38,287 | 45,663 | 44,332 | 45,351 | 44,030 |
| Country Dummies Deleted from the Table, Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | | | |

**Table A13: Egotropic Performance Variables and Belief in Horizontal Accountability**

| | President Should Not Close the Congress | | President Should Not Close the Court | | President Should Not Bypass the Congress | | President Should Not Bypass the Court | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics | Country Dummies but No Demographics or Trust | Country Dummies and Demographics |
| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| Voted for the Winner | -0.145* | -0.132* | -0.143* | -0.132* | -0.494*** | -0.464*** | -0.471*** | -0.437*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.061) | (0.056) | (0.057) | (0.055) | (0.054) | (0.050) | (0.048) |
| Personal Finances are Getting Better | 0.019 | 0.010 | 0.003 | -0.011 | -0.077** | -0.084*** | -0.059* | -0.072** |
| | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.035) | (0.034) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Not a Crime Victim | 0.139*** | 0.123*** | 0.105** | 0.123*** | -0.077* | -0.055 | -0.085** | -0.053* |
| | (0.033) | (0.031) | (0.040) | (0.036) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.026) |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | 0.404*** | 0.390*** | 0.214*** | 0.222*** | -0.007 | 0.038 | -0.090 | -0.037 |
| | (0.043) | (0.044) | (0.055) | (0.055) | (0.059) | (0.053) | (0.066) | (0.063) |
| Education | | 0.009* | | 0.013* | | 0.039*** | | 0.042*** |
| | | (0.004) | | (0.006) | | (0.006) | | (0.006) |
| Household Wealth | | 0.008 | | 0.048*** | | 0.024* | | 0.034*** |
| | | (0.010) | | (0.011) | | (0.011) | | (0.010) |
| Female | | 0.131*** | | 0.109*** | | 0.002 | | 0.014 |
| | | (0.028) | | (0.026) | | (0.021) | | (0.023) |
| Abstained | -0.124** | -0.127*** | -0.091* | -0.112** | -0.371*** | -0.298*** | -0.371*** | -0.299*** |
| | (0.042) | (0.040) | (0.044) | (0.041) | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.053) | (0.051) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age 26-35 | | -0.052 | | -0.058 | | 0.020 | | 0.025 |
| | | (0.037) | | (0.033) | | (0.023) | | (0.021) |
| Age 36-45 | | -0.089* | | -0.138** | | 0.112*** | | 0.093** |
| | | (0.038) | | (0.047) | | (0.029) | | (0.031) |
| Age 46-55 | | -0.048 | | -0.071 | | 0.219*** | | 0.214*** |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.062) | | (0.048) | | (0.047) |
| Age 56-65 | | -0.024 | | -0.116 | | 0.297*** | | 0.293*** |
| | | (0.049) | | (0.069) | | (0.038) | | (0.052) |
| Age 66+ | | 0.056 | | 0.061 | | 0.290*** | | 0.269*** |
| | | (0.057) | | (0.093) | | (0.057) | | (0.056) |
| Mestizo | | 0.048 | | 0.078 | | 0.052 | | 0.045 |
| | | (0.039) | | (0.052) | | (0.042) | | (0.037) |
| Indigenous | | -0.099 | | -0.008 | | 0.018 | | 0.039 |
| | | (0.092) | | (0.103) | | (0.096) | | (0.101) |
| Black | | -0.006 | | -0.087 | | 0.021 | | 0.014 |
| | | (0.065) | | (0.082) | | (0.068) | | (0.070) |
| Mulato | | 0.067 | | -0.042 | | 0.002 | | 0.090 |
| | | (0.071) | | (0.079) | | (0.098) | | (0.089) |
| Moreno | | 0.231 | | -0.100 | | 0.107 | | 0.130 |
| | | (0.176) | | (0.099) | | (0.101) | | (0.068) |
| Other Ethnic | | -0.234 | | -0.275 | | -0.146 | | -0.105 |
| | | (0.137) | | (0.175) | | (0.146) | | (0.177) |
| Rural | | 0.163*** | | 0.083 | | 0.127*** | | 0.051 |
| | | (0.042) | | (0.050) | | (0.033) | | (0.033) |
| Constant | 1.056 | 0.904 | 1.015 | 0.762 | | | | |
| | (0.174) | (0.177) | (0.152) | (0.177) | | | | |
| Cut 1 | | | | | -2.580 | -1.935 | -2.945 | -2.262 |
| | | | | | (0.156) | (0.158) | (0.123) | (0.125) |
| Cut 2 | | | | | -1.834 | -1.186 | -2.178 | -1.490 |
| | | | | | (0.148) | (0.153) | (0.105) | (0.114) |
| Cut 3 | | | | | -1.085 | -0.435 | -1.370 | -0.677 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | (0.141) | (0.149) | (0.100) | (0.112) |
| Cut 4 | | | | | -0.390 | 0.264 | -0.630 | 0.067 |
| | | | | | (0.144) | (0.151) | (0.107) | (0.116) |
| Cut 5 | | | | | 0.198 | 0.857 | -0.002 | 0.701 |
| | | | | | (0.150) | (0.156) | (0.115) | (0.120) |
| Cut 6 | | | | | 0.807 | 1.473 | 0.614 | 1.324 |
| | | | | | (0.157) | (0.164) | (0.123) | (0.129) |
| N | 91,311 | 87,483 | 40,903 | 38,943 | 46,787 | 45,368 | 46,416 | 45,015 |
| Country Dummies Deleted from the Table, Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Year Clustering in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | | | | | |

## Appendix 5: Measuring Performance by Using Regional Average Perceptions

The models in the paper focus on individual-level measures of government performance. Yet a classic critique of these measures is that they are endogenous to levels of government support (Kramer 1983) and thus while we might find the expected correlations in Table 2, those results might be spurious and not actually provide evidence that citizens are looking to government performance (although those results would be further evidence that attitudes about vertical accountability are just another form of self-dealing). In the models below I thus follow the methodology of Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colugna (2013) and instrument for the individual-level perception by using instead the average perception of the economy (either the national economy or personal finances), the number of non-crime victims, and the average perception of government corruption (the performance variables that had the strongest effects in the individual-level variables) in the survey region within the country. I expect, if the delegation argument advanced in the paper is correct, that all of them will have a negative association with support for vertical accountability. Because these regional averages are nested within survey years, I estimate hierarchical models that cross-nest countries and years and then embed regions within them. Because we cannot control for country-specific factors, I do not model the free speech battery that was only asked in 2006.

The results in Table A14 are not quite as consistent with the delegation story as are the individual-level perception measures. The correlation between the average sociotropic perception and tolerance of civil rights is negative but not quite statistically significant at the $p<0.05$ level we have used in this paper ($p=0.079$). Yet the egotropic perceptions measure has the expected significant negative correlation and both economic variables have a negative correlation with a belief that the president should not limit the opposition. Then the crime and corruption perception measures also do not have a significant correlation with the tolerance of civil rights measure, although both have the negative and significant correlation with the question about the president not being able to limit the opposition. Yet while the results in Table A14 show that the evidence for the performance-delegation link is not as robust in this alternative specification, I believe it is noteworthy, however, that none of these variables has a significant positive correlation with these vertical accountability measures. Thus, inasmuch as performance measured this way has a correlation with attitudes about delegation on average, that correlation is consistent with the delegation model.

**Table A14: Aggregate Perceptions of Performance at the Regional Level and Support for Protection of Civil Liberties**

| | Tolerance Civil Rights | | President Should Not Limit the Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [A] | [B] | [C] | [D] |
| Voted for the Winner | -1.199*** | -1.199*** | -0.455*** | -0.457*** |
| | (0.079) | (0.079) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Average Opinion of National Economy | -0.393 | | -0.452*** | |
| | (0.224) | | (0.054) | |
| Average Opinion of Personal Finances | | -0.649* | | -0.590*** |
| | | (0.314) | | (0.074) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Percentage of Crime Avoiders | -1.359 | -1.354 | -0.992*** | -1.012*** |
| | (0.880) | (0.879) | (0.200) | (0.201) |
| Average Opinion of No Corruption | 0.433 | 0.386 | -0.874*** | -0.922*** |
| | (0.272) | (0.265) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.391*** | 0.391*** | 0.024** | 0.024** |
| | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Education | 0.213*** | 0.213*** | 0.049*** | 0.050*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Household Wealth | 0.133*** | 0.133*** | 0.047*** | 0.047*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Female | -0.933*** | -0.933*** | -0.023 | -0.024 |
| | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Abstained | -0.837*** | -0.838*** | -0.223*** | -0.222*** |
| | (0.089) | (0.089) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.226* | -0.227* | 0.086*** | 0.085*** |
| | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.180 | -0.180 | 0.214*** | 0.214*** |
| | (0.099) | (0.099) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.117 | -0.117 | 0.286*** | 0.285*** |
| | (0.110) | (0.110) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.161 | -0.161 | 0.338*** | 0.338*** |
| | (0.128) | (0.128) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Age 66+ | -0.459** | -0.458** | 0.346*** | 0.346*** |
| | (0.147) | (0.147) | (0.033) | (0.033) |
| Mestizo | 0.210* | 0.210* | 0.040* | 0.040* |
| | (0.083) | (0.083) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| Indigenous | 0.261 | 0.262 | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| | (0.161) | (0.161) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Black | 0.308 | 0.310 | -0.046 | -0.045 |
| | (0.177) | (0.177) | (0.039) | (0.039) |
| Mulato | 0.419* | 0.429* | -0.004 | 0.006 |
| | (0.202) | (0.202) | (0.045) | (0.045) |
| Moreno | -0.821** | -0.810** | 0.037 | 0.039 |
| | (0.305) | (0.305) | (0.065) | (0.065) |
| Other Ethnic | 0.437 | 0.440 | -0.024 | -0.026 |
| | (0.280) | (0.280) | (0.062) | (0.062) |
| Rural | -0.151 | -0.150 | -0.015 | -0.015 |
| | (0.089) | (0.089) | (0.020) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 22.415*** | 22.732*** | 5.023*** | 5.264*** |
| | (0.984) | (1.010) | (0.195) | (0.201) |
| Random-effects | | | | |
| Country | 3.968 | 4.009 | 0.091 | 0.087 |
| | (1.448) | (1.461) | (0.035) | (0.034) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | 0.576 | 0.572 | 0.013 | 0.015 |
| | (0.433) | (0.430) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Region | 1.731 | 1.718 | 0.053 | 0.055 |
| | (0.289) | (0.287) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Individual-Level | 90.159 | 90.158 | 3.528 | 3.528 |
| | (0.426) | (0.426) | (0.019) | (0.019) |
| N | 89,590 | 89,590 | 70,749 | 70,749 |
| Cross-Nested Hierarchical Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | |

**Table A15: Aggregate Perceptions of Performance at the Regional Level and Support for Not Bypassing Other Institutions**

| | President Should Not Close the Legislature | | President Should Not Close the Court | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [A] | [B] | [C] | [D] |
| Voted for the Winner | -0.496*** | -0.497*** | -0.437*** | -0.439*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Average Opinion of National Economy | -0.477*** | | -0.436*** | |
| | (0.072) | | (0.069) | |
| Average Opinion of Personal Finances | | -0.420*** | | -0.360*** |
| | | (0.094) | | (0.091) |
| Percentage of Crime Avoiders | -0.385 | -0.412 | -0.161 | -0.183 |
| | (0.281) | (0.282) | (0.266) | (0.267) |
| Average Opinion of No Corruption | -0.683*** | -0.711*** | -0.691*** | -0.719*** |
| | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.088) | (0.088) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.021* | 0.022* | 0.041*** | 0.041*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Education | 0.038*** | 0.038*** | 0.040*** | 0.040*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Household Wealth | 0.019** | 0.019** | 0.035*** | 0.035*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Female | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.039* | 0.039* |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Abstained | -0.285*** | -0.282*** | -0.281*** | -0.278*** |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.019*** | 0.019*** | 0.021** | 0.021** |
| | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.105*** | 0.106*** | 0.074*** | 0.074*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.180*** | 0.180*** | 0.155*** | 0.155*** |
| | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.030) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.279*** | 0.279*** | 0.260*** | 0.260*** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.034) | (0.034) |
| Age 66+ | 0.246*** | 0.246*** | 0.214*** | 0.214*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.040) |
| Mestizo | 0.045* | 0.046* | 0.047* | 0.048* |
| | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Indigenous | 0.019 | 0.017 | 0.055 | 0.053 |
| | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.044) | (0.044) |
| Black | 0.015 | 0.010 | -0.004 | -0.008 |
| | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| Mulato | -0.043 | -0.044 | 0.048 | 0.047 |
| | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.061) | (0.061) |
| Moreno | 0.076 | 0.080 | 0.111 | 0.115 |
| | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.079) | (0.079) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.264*** | -0.273*** | -0.210** | -0.219** |
| | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.074) | (0.074) |
| Rural | 0.091*** | 0.089*** | 0.011 | 0.010 |
| | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Constant | 4.723*** | 4.778*** | 4.571*** | 4.598*** |
| | (0.279) | (0.287) | (0.261) | (0.268) |
| Random-effects | | | | |
| Country | 0.133 | 0.122 | 0.118 | 0.106 |
| | (0.051) | (0.047) | (0.045) | (0.041) |
| Year | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.021 |
| | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.023) | (0.022) |
| Region | 0.067 | 0.070 | 0.051 | 0.053 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Individual-Level | 3.619 | 3.621 | 3.381 | 3.383 |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| N | 46,318 | 46,318 | 45,928 | 45,928 |
| Cross-Nested Hierarchical Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | |

## Appendix 6: Testing for Whether the Effect is Larger in Countries Where there has Been Evidence of Democratic Decay

While the breakdown of democracy is a general concern across the hemisphere, the most visible examples of this phenomenon have occurred in Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and, to a lesser extent, Bolivia. Thus we might expect the gap between winners and losers to be especially large in those countries. In Tables A16 and A17, I estimate cross-nested ordered models wherein I interact a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for these four countries with the variables for winner and abstainers. The dummy variable thus tests if losers in these countries are different from losers in other countries while the interaction terms test if the difference between winners/abstainers and losers is different in those countries. For the variable on protecting free speech, the dummy variable only includes Venezuela because the democratic decays had not started in the other three cases in 2006 when the surveys were conducted.

Starting with the models on vertical accountability in Table A16, all three dependent variables provide evidence that there is a significant interaction term between being in a democratic decay case and the winner loser gap. For the measures on tolerating civil rights and not limiting the opposition, that gap occurs not because losers in those cases are particularly vigilant (the dummy variable is not significant, which implies that losers are no more positive towards vertical accountability than are those in other countries) but because winners in those cases are even less supportive of vertical accountability than are winners elsewhere. For the protect free speech question, the majority of the increased gap in Venezuela is because losers in Venezuela are particularly committed to free speech while the winners are slightly less supportive of them than other winners are, although not significantly so.

A similar pattern emerges for the horizontal accountability measures in Table A17. The negative interactions terms between winning and the four cases dummy variable show that the winner-loser gap is larger in those countries than in the rest of the sample and the insignificant dummy variable for the 4 main extreme cases shows that this gap is driven by the winners being more negative. More interestingly, the insignificant winners variable for the two autogolpe questions in Table A17 suggests that these 4 cases are driving the overall winner-loser gap we see in Table 3.

But in general we see the cases where democracy has been most threatened by the executive that it is in those cases where questions of opposition rights and checks and balances have in fact been politicized.

**Table A16: Support for Vertical Accountability in Cases Where It Has Been Threatened**

| | Tolerance Civil Rights | Protect Free Speech | President Should Not Limit the Opposition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.930*** | -1.175*** | -0.346*** |
| | (0.096) | (0.196) | (0.021) |
| Four Extreme Cases | -0.219 | | 0.056 |
| | (1.157) | | (0.155) |
| Four Cases*Winner | -0.708*** | | -0.228*** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.176) | | (0.039) |
| Venezuela | | 5.145* | |
| | | (2.363) | |
| Venezuela*Winner | | -6.564*** | |
| | | (0.778) | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.700*** | -0.827*** | -0.193*** |
| | (0.106) | (0.216) | (0.024) |
| Four Cases*Winner | -0.443* | | 0.003 |
| | (0.198) | | (0.044) |
| Venezuela*Abstained | | -4.367*** | |
| | | (0.874) | |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.363*** | -0.407*** | -0.194*** |
| | (0.048) | (0.115) | (0.011) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.018 | 0.138 | 0.017* |
| | (0.038) | (0.084) | (0.009) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.354*** | -0.807*** | -0.132*** |
| | (0.040) | (0.093) | (0.009) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.378*** | 0.031 | 0.027** |
| | (0.039) | (0.088) | (0.009) |
| Education | 0.215*** | 0.250*** | 0.051*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.002) |
| Household Wealth | 0.127*** | 0.202*** | 0.053*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.060) | (0.006) |
| Female | -0.953*** | -0.976*** | -0.026 |
| | (0.066) | (0.153) | (0.015) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.285** | 0.140 | 0.071*** |
| | (0.096) | (0.217) | (0.021) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.260* | 0.242 | 0.199*** |
| | (0.103) | (0.234) | (0.023) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.185 | 0.334 | 0.273*** |
| | (0.114) | (0.264) | (0.025) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.250 | 0.500 | 0.324*** |
| | (0.132) | (0.319) | (0.029) |
| Age 66+ | -0.573*** | 0.287 | 0.344*** |
| | (0.154) | (0.363) | (0.034) |
| Mestizo | 0.151 | 1.158*** | 0.022 |
| | (0.085) | (0.186) | (0.019) |
| Indigenous | 0.020 | 0.079 | -0.055 |
| | (0.165) | (0.376) | (0.037) |
| Black | 0.345 | 1.230** | -0.069 |
| | (0.180) | (0.421) | (0.040) |
| Mulato | 0.433* | -0.106 | -0.024 |
| | (0.207) | (0.494) | (0.046) |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moreno | -1.115*** | | 0.056 |
| | (0.321) | | (0.068) |
| Other Ethnic | 0.473 | -0.469 | -0.007 |
| | (0.288) | (0.644) | (0.064) |
| Rural | -0.298*** | -1.176*** | 0.013 |
| | (0.080) | (0.189) | (0.018) |
| Constant | 22.265*** | 31.340*** | 3.314*** |
| | (0.663) | (0.745) | (0.096) |
| Random Effects | | | |
| Country | 4.106 | 4.734 | 0.072 |
| | (1.382) | (1.893) | (0.024) |
| Year | 0.452 | | 0.007 |
| | (0.343) | | (0.006) |
| Level 1 | 90.928 | 88.827 | 3.552 |
| | (0.442) | (1.013) | (0.019) |
| Number Respondents | 84551 | 15930 | 66759 |
| Cross-Classified Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | |

**Table A17: Support for Horizontal Accountability in Cases Where It Has Been Threatened**

| | President Not Close the Legislature | President Not Close the Court | President Not Bypass the Legislature | President Not Bypass the Court |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | 0.003 | -0.001 | -0.349*** | -0.318*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.028) | (0.027) |
| Four Extreme Cases | -0.020 | -0.043 | 0.266 | 0.249 |
| | (0.050) | (0.051) | (0.217) | (0.200) |
| Four Cases*Winner | -0.079*** | -0.080*** | -0.365*** | -0.305*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.012) | (0.050) | (0.048) |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.008* | -0.008 | -0.248*** | -0.243*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.031) | (0.030) |
| Four Cases*Abstained | -0.028*** | -0.033** | -0.059 | -0.076 |
| | (0.008) | (0.013) | (0.056) | (0.054) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.003 | -0.004 | -0.172*** | -0.142*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.013) | (0.013) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.007*** | 0.013*** | 0.020 | 0.007 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| No Corruption in Government | 0.005*** | -0.001 | -0.064*** | -0.057*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.009*** | 0.008** | 0.021* | 0.047*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| Education | 0.000 | 0.002*** | 0.039*** | 0.040*** |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| Household Wealth | 0.002 | 0.008*** | 0.026*** | 0.038*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| Female | 0.021*** | 0.019*** | 0.010 | 0.028 |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.011** | -0.011 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.027) | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.019*** | -0.025*** | 0.080** | 0.048 |
| | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.028) | (0.027) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.015*** | -0.010 | 0.177*** | 0.152*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.007) | (0.032) | (0.031) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.015** | -0.024** | 0.255*** | 0.226*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.009) | (0.037) | (0.036) |
| Age 66+ | -0.006 | 0.002 | 0.240*** | 0.204*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.043) | (0.042) |
| Mestizo | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.037 | 0.039 |
| | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Indigenous | -0.016* | -0.007 | -0.006 | 0.032 |
| | (0.007) | (0.010) | (0.046) | (0.044) |
| Black | -0.010 | -0.015 | -0.012 | -0.031 |
| | (0.007) | (0.012) | (0.050) | (0.049) |
| Mulato | -0.001 | -0.010 | -0.060 | 0.041 |
| | (0.008) | (0.015) | (0.065) | (0.063) |
| Moreno | -0.017 | -0.027 | 0.116 | 0.131 |
| | (0.013) | (0.025) | (0.088) | (0.085) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.049*** | -0.049* | -0.171* | -0.141 |
| | (0.012) | (0.021) | (0.078) | (0.075) |
| Rural | 0.021*** | 0.010 | 0.124*** | 0.042* |
| | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Constant | 0.769*** | 0.730*** | 3.542*** | 3.599*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.027) | (0.155) | (0.138) |
| Random Effects | | | | |
| Country | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.141 | 0.120 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.048) | (0.041) |
| Year | 0.004 | 0.000 | 0.022 | 0.016 |
| | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.024) | (0.017) |
| Level 1 | 0.149 | 0.172 | 3.649 | 3.406 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| N Respondents | 83,277 | 37,817 | 43,707 | 43,415 |
| Cross-Classified Hierarchical Linear Model, Standard Errors in Parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 | | | | |

## Appendix 7: Testing for How the Delegation Model Differs by Context

In the paper, I discuss how the winner-loser gap and the performance variables should have their effect differ depending upon the stakes and also the time that the president has been in office. To illustrate these arguments, I provide figures graphing the contextual coefficients from hierarchical models interacting the individual-level variables with the contextual ones. I provide the full results of those models below. To simplify the presentation, I do not provide all the control variables, the results for the interaction between abstainers and contextual variables, or descriptive statistics for the models but I can provide that information of needed (please just email me). I also simplify the presentation by only presenting a significance test of $p<0.05$.

I start by presenting the results for the vertical accountability measures in Tables A18-A21.

The first hypothesis was that the winner-loser gap would increase with the stakes of the contest. As described in the paper, I test whether this gap grows with polarization and shrinks with the quality of democracy. The models in Tables A18-A20 include different arrays of the performance variables (sociotropic/egotropic, interacted with time or not) and all of the interaction terms between winning and polyarcy are positive and significant and all of the interaction terms between polarization and winning are negative and significant at conventional levels as expected. These gaps occur both because winners become especially negative to free speech as the stakes rise (Table A15) or because losers become especially protective of them (Tables A14 and A16).

The second contextual hypothesis considered the role of time in clarifying the effect of performance. The strongest evidence for this hypothesis is with regards to the national economy-all 12 models with the interaction between time in office and sociotropic economic perceptions are negative and significant as expected. In some cases we even see that it is a crisis at the VERY start of the president's term that buys support for restricting vertical accountability (e.g. Table A18 models 2, 3, 8, and 9 or A19 models 2, 3) whereas in other cases the economy has no effect or a small negative effect at the beginning of the term but, in every case there is strong evidence that the effect of the economy becomes increasingly negative as the president's time in office increases. The evidence for the personal finance measure is slightly less consistent-it has the expected negative interaction term in all models in Table A18, has a negative effect in table A19 but one that is driven in part by Venezuela (Venezuela is excluded from the polarization models and the size of the egotropic and sociotropic coefficients both shrink when it is dropped), and then the interaction terms in Table A20 are negative as expected but with p values that are between 0.10 and 0.05. Thus the evidence that time affects the role of personal finances is suggestive but not robust.

As mentioned in the paper, the evidence that corruption perceptions have their effect deepen over time is less consistent than it is for the economic perceptions: the interaction term is negative and significant in both models in Table A20, one of the two models in Table A18, and

**Table A18: Tolerance for Opposition Rights by Context and Performance Outcomes Over Time**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] | [11] | [12] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -4.033* | -3.814* | -3.785* | -4.069* | -3.983* | -3.979* | -1.105* | -1.092* | -1.091* | -1.090* | -1.081* | -1.081* |
| | (0.415) | (0.416) | (0.416) | (0.406) | (0.406) | (0.406) | (0.083) | (0.083) | (0.083) | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.082) |
| Winner*Polyarchy | 4.062* | 3.793* | 3.752* | 4.113* | 4.013* | 4.007* | | | | | | |
| | (0.572) | (0.573) | (0.574) | (0.561) | (0.561) | (0.561) | | | | | | |
| Winner*Polarization | | | | | | | -0.298* | -0.300* | -0.300* | -0.247* | -0.250* | -0.250* |
| | | | | | | | (0.101) | (0.101) | (0.101) | (0.100) | (0.100) | (0.100) |
| Polyarchy | -9.329* | -9.782* | -9.770* | -7.934* | -8.248* | -8.240* | | | | | | |
| | (1.035) | (1.043) | (1.043) | (1.014) | (1.021) | (1.021) | | | | | | |
| Polarization | | | | | | | | -0.460* | -0.461* | -0.413* | -0.405* | -0.405* |
| | | | | | | | | (0.113) | (0.113) | (0.110) | (0.111) | (0.111) |
| National Economy is Improving | -0.374* | 0.419* | 0.407* | | | | -0.313* | 0.265* | 0.265* | | | |
| | (0.048) | (0.124) | (0.124) | | | | (0.049) | (0.126) | (0.127) | | | |
| Ln(Months President in Office) | | 0.175* | 0.234* | | 0.100* | 0.317* | | 0.162* | 0.163* | | 0.096 | 0.225 |
| | | (0.048) | (0.068) | | (0.050) | (0.120) | | (0.049) | (0.071) | | (0.051) | (0.126) |
| Ln(Months)*National Economy | | -0.256* | -0.252* | | | | | -0.193* | -0.192* | | | |
| | | (0.037) | (0.037) | | | | | (0.039) | (0.039) | | | |
| Personal Finances are Improving | | | | -0.314* | 0.168 | 0.167 | | | | -0.285* | 0.073 | 0.073 |
| | | | | (0.048) | (0.122) | (0.122) | | | | (0.049) | (0.124) | (0.124) |
| Ln(Months)*Personal Finances | | | | | -0.157* | -0.157* | | | | | -0.121* | -0.120* |
| | | | | | (0.037) | (0.037) | | | | | (0.038) | (0.038) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.020 | 0.020 | 0.052 | | | | 0.029 | 0.028 | 0.005 | | | |
| | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.091) | | | | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.093) | | | |
| Ln(Months)*Secure | | | -0.011 | | | | | | 0.008 | | | |
| | | | (0.027) | | | | | | (0.029) | | | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | | | -0.353* | -0.350* | -0.304 | | | | -0.325* | -0.324* | -0.338 |
| | | | | (0.083) | (0.083) | (0.203) | | | | (0.086) | (0.086) | (0.208) |
| Ln(Months)*Not a Crime Victim | | | | | | -0.015 | | | | | | 0.005 |
| | | | | | | (0.062) | | | | | | (0.066) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.367* | -0.361* | -0.183 | | | | -0.317* | -0.312* | -0.261* | | | |
| | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.100) | | | | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.102) | | | |
| Ln(Months)*No Corruption | | | -0.059* | | | | | | -0.017 | | | |
| | | | (0.030) | | | | | | (0.032) | | | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | | | -0.467* | -0.464* | 0.203 | | | | -0.368* | -0.365* | 0.053 |
| | | | | (0.140) | (0.140) | (0.363) | | | | (0.143) | (0.143) | (0.370) |
| Ln(Months)*Not Asked Bribe | | | | | | -0.217* | | | | | | -0.141 |
| | | | | | | (0.109) | | | | | | (0.115) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

**Table A19: Support for Free Speech by Context and Performance Outcomes Over Time**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] | [11] | [12] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -8.849* | -8.286* | -8.307* | -8.916* | -8.735* | -8.751* | -1.252* | -1.225* | -1.222* | -1.296* | -1.287* | -1.284* |
| | (1.007) | (1.011) | (1.012) | (0.991) | (0.992) | (0.992) | (0.197) | (0.198) | (0.198) | (0.194) | (0.194) | (0.194) |
| Winner*Polyarchy | 10.148* | 9.445* | 9.480* | 10.163* | 9.953* | 9.979* | | | | | | |
| | (1.377) | (1.381) | (1.382) | (1.358) | (1.358) | (1.359) | | | | | | |
| Winner*Polarization | | | | | | | -0.744* | -0.735* | -0.738* | -0.746* | -0.748* | -0.746* |
| | | | | | | | (0.230) | (0.230) | (0.230) | (0.229) | (0.229) | (0.229) |
| Polyarchy | 0.297 | 5.944 | 5.895 | -0.469 | 4.520 | 4.518 | | | | | | |
| | (3.979) | (4.426) | (4.430) | (3.849) | (4.318) | (4.318) | | | | | | |
| Polarization | | | | | | | 0.327 | 0.196 | 0.204 | 0.311 | 0.209 | 0.207 |
| | | | | | | | (0.766) | (0.801) | (0.802) | (0.737) | (0.768) | (0.768) |
| National Economy is Improving | -0.452* | 0.770* | 0.738* | | | | -0.235* | 0.454 | 0.440 | | | |
| | (0.115) | (0.250) | (0.251) | | | | (0.121) | (0.257) | (0.258) | | | |
| Ln(Months President in Office) | | 1.179* | 1.243* | | 1.023* | 0.822* | | 0.371 | 0.369 | | 0.284 | 0.182 |
| | | (0.430) | (0.439) | | (0.421) | (0.461) | | (0.493) | (0.502) | | (0.473) | (0.518) |
| Ln(Months)*National Economy | | -0.432* | -0.422* | | | | | -0.262* | -0.258* | | | |
| | | (0.078) | (0.079) | | | | | (0.086) | (0.087) | | | |
| Personal Finances are Improving | | | | -0.522* | 0.182 | 0.183 | | | | -0.339* | -0.085 | -0.085 |
| | | | | (0.110) | (0.232) | (0.232) | | | | (0.115) | (0.238) | (0.238) |
| Ln(Months)*Personal Finances | | | | | -0.254* | -0.255* | | | | | -0.098 | -0.098 |
| | | | | | (0.074) | (0.074) | | | | | (0.080) | (0.080) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.129 | 0.123 | 0.353* | | | | 0.192* | 0.188* | 0.275 | | | |
| | (0.085) | (0.084) | (0.170) | | | | (0.088) | (0.088) | (0.174) | | | |
| Ln(Months)*Secure | | | -0.084 | | | | | | -0.033 | | | |
| | | | (0.054) | | | | | | (0.059) | | | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | | | -0.780* | -0.769* | -0.900* | | | | -0.871* | -0.868* | -0.717 |
| | | | | (0.197) | (0.196) | (0.391) | | | | (0.206) | (0.206) | (0.400) |
| Ln(Months)*Not a Crime Victim | | | | | | 0.049 | | | | | | -0.061 |
| | | | | | | (0.127) | | | | | | (0.139) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.815* | -0.804* | -1.016* | | | | -0.807* | -0.801* | -0.985* | | | |
| | (0.093) | (0.093) | (0.198) | | | | (0.096) | (0.096) | (0.202) | | | |
| Ln(Months)*No Corruption | | | 0.076 | | | | | | 0.070 | | | |
| | | | (0.064) | | | | | | (0.068) | | | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | | | 0.281 | 0.291 | -0.201 | | | | 0.250 | 0.256 | -0.148 |
| | | | | (0.331) | (0.331) | (0.624) | | | | (0.354) | (0.354) | (0.634) |
| Ln(Months)*Not Asked Bribe | | | | | | 0.179 | | | | | | 0.163 |
| | | | | | | (0.193) | | | | | | (0.213) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

**Table A20: President Should Not Limit the Opposition by Context and Performance Outcomes Over Time**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] | [11] | [12] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.719* | -0.686* | -0.678* | -0.767* | -0.757* | -0.757* | -0.419* | -0.418* | -0.417* | -0.455* | -0.455* | -0.455* |
| | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.088) | (0.088) | (0.088) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Winner*Polyarchy | 0.435* | 0.392* | 0.381* | 0.446* | 0.434* | 0.434* | | | | | | |
| | (0.125) | (0.125) | (0.125) | (0.122) | (0.122) | (0.122) | | | | | | |
| Winner*Polarization | | | | | | | -0.135* | -0.136* | -0.136* | -0.139* | -0.139* | -0.139* |
| | | | | | | | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Polyarchy | 0.382 | 0.381 | 0.390 | 0.494* | 0.505* | 0.504* | | | | | | |
| | (0.248) | (0.249) | (0.249) | (0.246) | (0.247) | (0.247) | | | | | | |
| Polarization | | | | | | | 0.134* | 0.134* | 0.132* | 0.147* | 0.147* | 0.147* |
| | | | | | | | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| National Economy is | -0.197* | -0.067* | -0.072* | | | | -0.188* | -0.072* | -0.075* | | | |
| Improving | (0.011) | (0.029) | (0.029) | | | | (0.011) | (0.030) | (0.030) | | | |
| Ln(Months President in | | 0.050* | 0.069* | | 0.025* | 0.022 | | 0.044* | 0.051* | | 0.020 | 0.012 |
| Office) | | (0.011) | (0.016) | | (0.012) | (0.030) | | (0.012) | (0.017) | | (0.012) | (0.031) |
| Ln(Months)*National | | -0.040* | -0.039* | | | | | -0.037* | -0.036* | | | |
| Economy | | (0.009) | (0.009) | | | | | (0.009) | (0.009) | | | |
| Personal Finances are | | | | -0.158* | -0.107* | -0.106* | | | | -0.153* | -0.106* | -0.106* |
| Improving | | | | (0.011) | (0.029) | (0.029) | | | | (0.011) | (0.030) | (0.030) |
| Ln(Months)*Personal | | | | | -0.016 | -0.016 | | | | | -0.015 | -0.015 |
| Finances | | | | | (0.009) | (0.009) | | | | | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.018* | 0.018* | 0.019 | | | | 0.021* | 0.021* | 0.007 | | | |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.022) | | | | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.022) | | | |
| Ln(Months)*Secure | | | 0.000 | | | | | | 0.004 | | | |
| | | | (0.006) | | | | | | (0.007) | | | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | | | -0.084* | -0.084* | -0.106* | | | | -0.082* | -0.082* | -0.117* |
| | | | | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.048) | | | | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.049) |
| Ln(Months)*Not a Crime | | | | | | 0.007 | | | | | | 0.011 |
| Victim | | | | | | (0.014) | | | | | | (0.015) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.131* | -0.131* | -0.056* | | | | -0.125* | -0.125* | -0.066* | | | |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.023) | | | | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.024) | | | |
| Ln(Months)*No Corruption | | | -0.024* | | | | | | -0.020* | | | |
| | | | (0.007) | | | | | | (0.007) | | | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | | | -0.060 | -0.060 | -0.052 | | | | -0.059 | -0.059 | -0.056 |
| | | | | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.094) | | | | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.096) |
| Ln(Months)*Not Asked Bribe | | | | | | -0.002 | | | | | | -0.001 |
| | | | | | | (0.027) | | | | | | (0.029) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

neither model in Table A20. And then there is even less evidence that avoiding crime has a differential effect over time.[1]

Finally, we see in Table A21 below that the winner-loser gap also tends to increase over time, with this gap generally growing because the winner is becoming more negative in support for vertical accountability, although for the case of opposition rights it is the losers who become more supportive for them over time.

**Table A21: Winning and Support for Vertical Accountability Over Time**

| | Tolerance for Opposition Rights | | Support for Free Speech | | President Should Not Limit the Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winner | -0.666* | (0.197) | 0.130* | (0.383) | -0.326* | (0.047) |
| Ln(Months) | 0.035 | (0.052) | 0.503 | (0.426) | 0.025* | (0.012) |
| Ln(Months)*Winner | -0.154* | (0.061) | -0.658* | (0.128) | -0.028* | (0.014) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Performance Variables, Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * $p<0.05$ (two-tailed)

Tables A22-A24 focus on how the context affects citizen attitudes about whether the president should be able to bypass the legislature and court. I focus on these two outcomes because those are the ones for which the performance items most strongly conformed to the delegation model. We see a similar pattern to those described above, with the gap between winners and losers growing with polarization and shrinking with improved democracy. The effect of the economy and corruption perceptions also varies over time, with their effect sometimes even being slightly positive at the very start of the president's term and then becoming increasingly negative. The results in Table A24 show that the winner-loser gap also increases over time. The effect of crime is not significantly affected by the time the president has been in office.

Finally, while I did not include the questions about attitudes about self-coups in Figure 1 or Figure 2, in Table A25 I model the winner-loser gap by context and we see that the gap deepens with a lack of democracy, with polarization, and with time. Thus this aspect of the delegation model matches expectations.

The occasional null results for the crime interaction term suggests that the results are more supportive for the hypothesis that willingness/opposition to delegation is affected by the stakes of that choice than it is by the time the president has been in office, but even that latter hypothesis is strongly supported for the economic and winning-losing variables and, with one exception, the corruption perceptions variable.

[1] The egotropic measure of avoiding corruption experiences is generally not significant on average or in interaction with time. When contextual variables are added, the feels secure measure does occasionally become statistically significant)

## Table A22: President Should Not Bypass the Legislature by Context and Performance Outcomes Over Time

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] | [11] | [12] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -1.002* | -0.942* | -0.928* | -0.434* | -0.432* | -0.432* | -1.031* | -0.997* | -0.996* | -0.465* | -0.464* | -0.464* |
| | (0.119) | (0.120) | (0.120) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Winner*Polyarchy | 0.767* | 0.689* | 0.670* | | | | 0.761* | 0.716* | 0.715* | | | |
| | (0.165) | (0.166) | (0.166) | | | | (0.163) | (0.163) | (0.163) | | | |
| Winner*Polarization | | | | -0.207* | -0.206* | -0.205* | | | | -0.204* | -0.204* | -0.204* |
| | | | | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) | | | | (0.029) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Polyarchy | 0.695 | 0.668 | 0.713 | | | | 0.677 | 0.683 | 0.678 | | | |
| | (0.342) | (0.344) | (0.344) | | | | (0.338) | (0.341) | (0.341) | | | |
| Polarization | | | | 0.415* | 0.380* | 0.378* | | | | 0.405* | 0.383* | 0.383* |
| | | | | (0.053) | (0.054) | (0.054) | | | | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.053) |
| National Economy is | -0.177* | 0.038 | 0.028 | -0.168* | 0.021 | 0.015 | | | | | | |
| Improving | (0.013) | (0.033) | (0.034) | (0.014) | (0.034) | (0.034) | | | | | | |
| Ln(Months President in | | 0.087* | 0.132* | | 0.078* | 0.106* | | 0.076* | 0.110* | | 0.068* | 0.096* |
| Office) | | (0.013) | (0.019) | | (0.014) | (0.020) | | (0.014) | (0.037) | | (0.014) | (0.039) |
| Ln(Months)*National | | -0.070* | -0.067* | | -0.064* | -0.062* | | | | | | |
| Economy | | (0.010) | (0.010) | | (0.011) | (0.011) | | | | | | |
| Personal Finances are | | | | | | | -0.104* | 0.055 | 0.055 | -0.098* | 0.046 | 0.046 |
| Improving | | | | | | | (0.013) | (0.033) | (0.033) | (0.014) | (0.034) | (0.034) |
| Ln(Months)*Personal | | | | | | | | -0.053* | -0.053* | | -0.049* | -0.049* |
| Finances | | | | | | | | (0.010) | (0.010) | | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.021* | 0.021* | 0.069* | 0.024* | 0.023* | 0.051 | | | | | | |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.025) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.026) | | | | | | |
| Ln(Months)*Secure | | | -0.016 | | | -0.009 | | | | | | |
| | | | (0.008) | | | (0.008) | | | | | | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | | | | | | 0.023 | -0.036 | -0.058 | -0.048* | -0.047* | -0.050 |
| | | | | | | | (0.114) | (0.023) | (0.056) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.057) |
| Ln(Months)*Not a Crime | | | | | | | | | 0.008 | | | 0.001 |
| Victim | | | | | | | | | (0.017) | | | (0.018) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.062* | -0.063* | 0.012 | -0.055* | -0.055* | -0.004 | | | | | | |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.027) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.028) | | | | | | |
| Ln(Months)*No Corruption | | | -0.025* | | | -0.017* | | | | | | |
| | | | (0.008) | | | (0.009) | | | | | | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | | | | | | 0.039 | 0.058 | 0.189 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.155 |
| | | | | | | | (0.139) | (0.039) | (0.111) | (0.040) | (0.040) | (0.114) |
| Ln(Months)*Not Asked Bribe | | | | | | | | | -0.043 | | | -0.030 |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.034) | | | (0.036) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

## Table A23: President Should Not Bypass the Court by Context and Performance Outcomes Over Time

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] | [9] | [10] | [11] | [12] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.833* | -0.772* | -0.758* | -0.394* | -0.393* | -0.393* | -0.883* | -0.848* | -0.847* | -0.421* | -0.420* | -0.420* |
| | (0.116) | (0.116) | (0.116) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Winner*Polyarchy | 0.599* | 0.519* | 0.500* | | | | 0.626* | 0.579* | 0.578* | | | |
| | (0.160) | (0.160) | (0.161) | | | | (0.158) | (0.158) | (0.158) | | | |
| Winner*Polarization | | | | -0.204* | -0.203* | -0.202* | | | | -0.200* | -0.200* | -0.200* |
| | | | | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) | | | | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Polyarchy | 1.056* | 1.065* | 1.111* | | | | 1.026* | 1.068* | 1.062* | | | |
| | (0.331) | (0.333) | (0.334) | | | | (0.328) | (0.331) | (0.331) | | | |
| Polarization | | | | 0.522* | 0.486* | 0.483* | | | | 0.508* | 0.486* | 0.485* |
| | | | | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) | | | | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.052) |
| National Economy is | -0.146* | 0.067* | 0.057 | -0.137* | 0.043 | 0.037 | | | | | | |
| Improving | (0.013) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.013) | (0.033) | (0.033) | | | | | | |
| Ln(Months President in | | 0.096* | 0.140* | | 0.082* | 0.112* | | 0.084* | 0.124* | | 0.069* | 0.103* |
| Office) | | (0.013) | (0.019) | | (0.013) | (0.020) | | (0.013) | (0.036) | | (0.014) | (0.038) |
| Ln(Months)*National | | -0.070* | -0.066* | | -0.061* | -0.058* | | | | | | |
| Economy | | (0.010) | (0.010) | | (0.010) | (0.010) | | | | | | |
| Personal Finances are | | | | | | | -0.087* | 0.071* | 0.071* | -0.077* | 0.051 | 0.051 |
| Improving | | | | | | | (0.013) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.013) | (0.033) | (0.033) |
| Ln(Months)*Personal | | | | | | | | -0.052* | -0.052* | | -0.044* | -0.044* |
| Finances | | | | | | | | (0.010) | (0.010) | | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.047 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.033 | | | | | | |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.024) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.025) | | | | | | |
| Ln(Months)*Secure | | | -0.013 | | | -0.008 | | | | | | |
| | | | (0.007) | | | (0.008) | | | | | | |
| Not a Crime Victim | | | | | | | -0.037 | -0.036 | -0.061 | -0.049* | -0.048* | -0.053 |
| | | | | | | | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.054) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.055) |
| Ln(Months)*Not a Crime | | | | | | | | | 0.009 | | | 0.002 |
| Victim | | | | | | | | | (0.017) | | | (0.018) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.055* | -0.055* | 0.034 | -0.047* | -0.047* | 0.017 | | | | | | |
| | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.027) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.027) | | | | | | |
| Ln(Months)*No Corruption | | | -0.030* | | | -0.022* | | | | | | |
| | | | (0.008) | | | (0.008) | | | | | | |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | | | | | | | -0.006 | -0.006 | 0.144 | -0.001 | -0.001 | 0.109 |
| | | | | | | | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.108) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.111) |
| Ln(Months)*Not Asked Bribe | | | | | | | | | -0.049 | | | -0.037 |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.033) | | | (0.035) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

**Table A24: Winner-Loser Gap and Support for Bypassing Institutions Over Time**

| | President Not Bypass Legislature | | President Not Bypass Court | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Winner | -0.357* | 0.056 | -0.328* | 0.053 |
| Ln(Months) | 0.039* | 0.015 | 0.048* | 0.015 |
| Ln(Months)*Winner | -0.036* | 0.018 | -0.040* | 0.017 |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Performance Variables, Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

**Table A25: Support for Closing Institutions and the Winner Loser-Gap by Context and Over Time**

| | President Should Not Close the Legislature | | | President Should Not Close the Court | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| Winner | -0.140* | -0.019* | 0.008 | 0.028* | -0.149* | -0.021* |
| | (0.017) | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.013) | (0.030) | (0.005) |
| Polyarchy | -0.526* | | | 0.013 | | |
| | (0.042) | | | (0.004) | | |
| Polyarchy*Winner | 0.168* | | | -0.019 | | |
| | (0.023) | | | (0.004) | | |
| Polarization (Centered) | | 0.010* | | | -0.513* | |
| | | (0.005) | | | (0.104) | |
| Polarization*Winner | | -0.026* | | | 0.174* | |
| | | (0.004) | | | (0.041) | |
| Ln(Months President in Office) | | | 0.016* | | | -0.116* |
| | | | (0.002) | | | (0.022) |
| Ln(Months)*Winner | | | -0.010* | | | -0.034* |
| | | | (0.002) | | | (0.007) |

Cross-Nested Hierarchical Models with Standard Errors in Parentheses. Performance Variables, Demographic and Attitudinal Controls Excluded for Space. * p<0.05 (two-tailed)

## Appendix 8: Alternative Indicators of Government Support

In the paper, I focus on the winner-loser gap that Anderson and so many others have focused on (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005). But there are many other ways that we could conceptualize and operationalize feeling represented by the incumbent. Here I focus on 4 others to provide a robustness check on the analysis in the paper.

An additional indicator scholars have used to track whether respondents feel represented by the incumbent (e.g. Cho and Bratton 2006) is *self-identifying with the ruling party*. Partisanship combines long-term affective self-identification with a party with short-term evaluations of how the parties are doing in office, although scholars disagree about the relative importance of these two factors (Fiorina 1981, Bartels 2002, Green et al. 2004). While levels of party-identification in Latin America tend to be lower and less stable than are those in the United States due to the generally younger and less well-institutionalized party systems in Latin America, the demographic and psychological correlates of partisanship in Latin America are generally the same as are those that have been identified in the literature on partisanship in the United States (Lupu 2013, 2015). In the AmericasBarometer survey, respondents are asked two questions about their partisanship. They are first asked whether they currently sympathize with a political party and then, if they answer yes, they are asked to identify the political party they sympathize with off a list of the parties in the country. Just as with previous vote choice, I code respondents into three groups: those who identify with the president's party, those who identify with a different party, and those who do not have a partisanship. The focus is on the difference between those who identify with the president's party and those who identify with another party while we have fewer a priori expectations about how self-described independents will behave; independents may have attitudes about democratic institutions that lie between those who actively identify with the president and those who actively identify with a rival party or these respondents may have negative democratic attitudes that are the base reason they are alienated from political parties. Our expectations are clearer regarding those who identify with the president's party: they will be more likely to express support for democratic institutions but be less likely to stand up for protections of civil liberties or checks and balances.

Like the inner-loser indicator, the partisan indicator focuses on the respondent's association with the political party of the incumbent. Yet not all people who voted for the president or who identify with the incumbent party are equally likely to agree with the president's approach to governing while individuals who did not support or identify with the ruling party may also differ in the depths of their disagreement with its approach. Thus various studies (Kim, 2009; Curini et al 2011; Singh et al 2011, Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011) argue that satisfaction with democratic arrangements should increase with ideological *proximity to the government*. In the case of Latin America, it becomes more difficult to talk about ideologies as some countries have party systems that are not structured around issues even at the elite level (Kitschelt et al 2010) and individual-level answers to survey questions about where respondents would place themselves on the left-right scale often do not reflect issue concerns as much as they do partisan self-identification with how the term is used by elites in their country (Zechmeister and Corral 2013, Zechmeister 2015). Yet even if "left-right" represents an self-identification instead of issue-based ideology, we might expect that individuals who place themselves on the same location on the scale as where the president is commonly described to be will be more likely to support the democratic status quo

while not opposing steps that would restrict challenges to the president than are individuals whose self-described position is different from that of the president.

One challenge in measuring left-right congruence between the incumbent and the respondent is estimating the incumbent's placement on the left-right scale. In an ideal world, we would have data where respondents are asked about how the president should be scored (Golder and Stramski 2010) that would ensure that placements of the executive and the voter are based on a common scale. Yet these data do not exist except for a handful of Latin American countries. Thus we follow Powell (2009) and others and measure the incumbent's position using expert surveys. In particular, we use Wiesehomeier and Benoit's expert survey to estimate the left-right position of each president. The survey was conducted between 2006 and 2007 and asks experts on party competition in the 18 countries studied here to place the major parties in each country as well as the sitting president on the left-right scale. From this survey, I generated a measure of the president's ideology, using the average placement of the president in the cases where the president at the time of the AmericasBarometer survey was the same president covered in the Wiesehomeier and Benoit expert survey and using the average position of the ruling party when the president was different from the one at the time of the expert survey.[2]

I measure respondent self-placement using answers to the question:

> On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

I then compare respondents' self-placements with my estimated presidents' positions by calculating a measure of left-right proximity, measured as for respondent *i* in country-year *j*

$$Proximity_{ij}=10-|LRRespondent_{ij}-LRPresident_{j}|$$

High values designate individuals who have very similar left-right placements as the president. While we cannot know if this measure is on a common scale between respondents and elites, measurement error in this variable should weaken the correspondence between it and attitudes to the regime in a way that should make it less likely that the analysis identifies significant associations.[3] Just over 19 percent of respondents who answered the left-right question placed themselves within 1 unit of the president on the 10-point scale.

[2] One challenge was that the Wiesehomeier and Benoit expert survey uses a 1-20 scale while the left-right self-placement question in the AmericasBarometer is asked along a 1-10 scale. I thus rescaled the left-right scores from the expert survey by the following transformation $LRPres_{rescaled}=(LRPres_{original}-1)*9/19+1$.

[3] One additional challenge with this measure, of course, is that we cannot estimate it for the 21 percent of respondents who did not place themselves on the left-right scale. In the analyses looking at left-right proximity, these individuals are excluded and in some country-years that number is substantial. There are no valid responses for the left-right question in Paraguay for 2006. Then in Ecuador and Costa Rica more than 31 percent of respondents did not answer the left-right question while in Guatemala and Paraguay (excluding 2006) more than 25 percent of respondents did not answer the question. There is no good way to get around this issue that I can think of because left-right position

The last two measures of government support that I use are contemporaneous measure of *approval of the incumbent president*. Even if individuals did not vote for the president, identify with the ruling party, or see themselves in similar terms on the left-right scale, they might come to approve of the job the president is doing (and, of course, individuals who have supported the president and the ruling party in the past may stop doing so). Thus government approval might also be associated with feelings of representation and a desire for the status quo to be preserved. One way to measure government approval is using the question

> Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President[NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT]? (4) Very good (3) Good (2) Neither good nor bad (fair) (1) Bad (0) Very bad

where high scores represent positive evaluations. In an average country only 7 percent of respondents said that the president was doing a very good job but another 28 percent of respondents said the president was doing a good job while the share of respondents who said the president was doing a bad or very bad job totaled less than 21 percent. Again, there is substantial variation across countries, with the highest average scores going to presidents in Brazil (2010), Colombia (2008 and 2010), Ecuador (2010), and Uruguay (2010) while the least popular presidents were in Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua 92006), and Paraguay (2008). The latter three presidents saw their party lose control of the executive in the next election.

An alternative measure tracks how the government is doing in achieving certain policy outcomes. Specifically respondents were asked:

- To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?
- To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?
- To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?
- To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?

Answers to each question range from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). Answers to the 4 questions are highly correlated (the weakest bivariate correlation is r=0.645 and the Chronbach's alpha for the four questions= 0.897) and so I created an additive scale of approval of the government's policy efforts. This variable is strongly correlated with the basic measure of government approval at the individual (r=0.552) and country-year level (r=0.817). Whether this is because these policy areas are the driving factors that explain government support or answers to these questions reflect respondent's underlying feelings about the incumbent is impossible to tell, but the important factor is that both of them measure current evaluations of how the government is doing and, if these performance issues have spillover effects for democracy more broadly, should both be correlated with support for the democratic status quo.

These five indicators of connections to and evaluations of the incumbent government are correlated with each other, but that correlation is far from perfect at either the individual or

cannot be easily imputed from issue positions in Latin America. That is one reason why I like to rely on multiple measures so that we can ensure that the patterns are not specific to any one subsample.

country-year level (Table A26).[4] The correlation between left-right proximity and the other indicators of incumbent support is particularly weak, which is further evidence that left and right do not anchor political attitudes in the hemisphere. But even reported voter choices, partisanship, and contemporaneous measures of approval imperfectly overlap and presidents can have strong support on one measure without necessarily having strong support on another. Thus I look at all five measures in the analyses that follow to provide a wide view of the concept of "government support". For simplicity's sake, I use the sociotropic performance measures in the results that follow.

**Table A26: Correlations of Measures of Government Support**

| | Voted for the Winner Last Time | Identifies with the President's Party | Proximity to the President on the Left-Right Scale | Approves of the Current Government |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identifies with the President's Party | 0.650[5] | | | |
| Proximity to the President on the Left-Right Scale | 0.150 | 0.136 | | |
| Approves of the Current Government | 0.297 | 0.283 | 0.132 | |
| Approves of Policy Outcomes Under the Government | 0.245 | 0.255 | 0.096 | 0.552 |

Tables A27-A29 look at these various measures correlate with the dependent variables in Table 2. For simplicity, each table includes one of the dependent variables. While left-right proximity has no significant correlation with tolerance towards civil liberties, all the other measures of government support are negative and significant at conventional levels, confirming that not only are winners less supportive of vertical accountability than are losers but so are government partisans, (with the exception of one model) those who are close to the president in left-right terms, those who approve of the president, and those who approve of outcomes under the president's watch. Taken together, these results confirm that questions of vertical accountability are strongly affected by how the respondent relates to and views the incumbent to whom the power to restrict those checks is being given.

The results looking at horizontal accountability in Table A30-A33 show that the questions about autogolpes are again less consistent with the delegation argument. While the results regarding performance are comparable to those in the text (feeling insecure makes people more accepting

[4] All correlations are pairwise correlations to maximize the number of observations in each cell. I report the pearson's r for the individual-level variables' correlations despite most of these variables being ordinal for simplicity sake.
[5] Tetrachoric rho between two dichotomous variables

of closing down other branches and the economy has no correlation), several of the government support measures have no significant correlation with these attitudes, especially contemporaneous government approval. None of the measures have a significant positive correlation and 5 of the 10 are in the expected negative direction, but these provide further evidence that the self coup variable has less of a strong connection to short-term considerations. Yet the question about bypassing the other branches is consistently related negatively to government support (all 10 variables are negative and significant at conventional levels), to views of the economy, and to (non)corruption perceptions. Thus we continue to see that bypassing the legislature or the courts is seen as a simple delegation problem while closing the other branches of government is not.

**Table A27: Allow Regime Critics to Exercise Civil Rights**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -1.077*** | | | | |
| | (0.213) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.776*** | | | | |
| | (0.187) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -1.417*** | | | |
| | | (0.350) | | | |
| Independent | | -1.336*** | | | |
| | | (0.254) | | | |
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.074 | | |
| | | | (0.067) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -0.869*** | |
| | | | | (0.110) | |
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | -0.054** |
| | | | | | (0.020) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.370*** | -0.455*** | -0.443*** | -0.119 | -0.359*** |
| | (0.107) | (0.104) | (0.102) | (0.090) | (0.097) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | -0.025 | -0.015 | 0.035 | 0.061 | 0.025 |
| | (0.071) | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.069) | (0.072) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.396*** | -0.365*** | -0.385*** | -0.299*** | -0.329*** |
| | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.100) | (0.088) | (0.091) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.370*** | 0.380*** | 0.377*** | 0.424*** | 0.396*** |
| | (0.054) | (0.056) | (0.062) | (0.053) | (0.055) |
| Education | 0.210*** | 0.205*** | 0.223*** | 0.208*** | 0.206*** |
| | (0.020) | (0.020) | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.020) |
| Household Wealth | 0.132** | 0.158*** | 0.150*** | 0.134*** | 0.150*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.039) | (0.040) |
| Female | -0.956*** | -0.870*** | -0.949*** | -0.887*** | -0.884*** |
| | (0.105) | (0.102) | (0.104) | (0.099) | (0.099) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.306** | -0.212° | -0.216° | -0.195° | -0.195° |
| | (0.112) | (0.112) | (0.126) | (0.111) | (0.112) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age 36-45 | -0.287° | -0.228 | -0.107 | -0.163 | -0.182 |
| | (0.158) | (0.160) | (0.162) | (0.154) | (0.156) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.246 | -0.178 | -0.081 | -0.120 | -0.110 |
| | (0.180) | (0.183) | (0.192) | (0.177) | (0.183) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.324 | -0.347° | -0.248 | -0.204 | -0.266 |
| | (0.201) | (0.203) | (0.233) | (0.202) | (0.210) |
| Age 66+ | -0.689** | -0.730*** | -0.489* | -0.524* | -0.588** |
| | (0.215) | (0.220) | (0.224) | (0.220) | (0.216) |
| Mestizo | 0.154 | 0.205 | 0.129 | 0.209 | 0.187 |
| | (0.162) | (0.170) | (0.178) | (0.160) | (0.163) |
| Indigenous | -0.003 | 0.043 | -0.036 | 0.076 | 0.063 |
| | (0.295) | (0.311) | (0.316) | (0.279) | (0.298) |
| Black | 0.269 | 0.277 | 0.082 | 0.295 | 0.337 |
| | (0.251) | (0.268) | (0.298) | (0.253) | (0.274) |
| Mulato | 0.282 | 0.274 | 0.235 | 0.313 | 0.311 |
| | (0.267) | (0.258) | (0.261) | (0.256) | (0.252) |
| Moreno | -1.555 | -1.448 | -1.464 | -1.504 | -1.573 |
| | (1.003) | (0.970) | (0.935) | (1.016) | (0.978) |
| Other Ethnic | 0.545 | 0.433 | 0.069 | 0.474 | 0.340 |
| | (0.545) | (0.526) | (0.505) | (0.517) | (0.545) |
| Rural | -0.287* | -0.387** | -0.316* | -0.331* | -0.335* |
| | (0.138) | (0.142) | (0.142) | (0.135) | (0.137) |
| Constant | 21.669 | 22.077 | 21.273 | 22.418 | 21.583 |
| | (0.786) | (0.754) | (0.887) | (0.780) | (0.789) |
| N Respondents | 84551 | 86612 | 76665 | 91605 | 89110 |
| N Country-Years | 67 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 68 |
| OLS Regression with Standard Errors Adjusted for Country-Years in Parentheses<br>° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | | |

**Table A28: Disapprove of Attempts to Restrict Free Speech**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -1.567*** | | | | |
| | (0.191) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -1.003*** | | | | |
| | (0.210) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -1.051*** | | | |
| | | (0.258) | | | |
| Independent | | -0.924*** | | | |
| | | (0.203) | | | |
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.311*** | | |
| | | | (0.041) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -1.143*** | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (0.087) | |
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | -0.353*** (0.013) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.509*** (0.115) | -0.573*** (0.116) | -0.474*** (0.116) | -0.161 (0.114) | 0.095 (0.112) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.122 (0.085) | 0.048 (0.085) | 0.108 (0.087) | 0.184* (0.081) | 0.274*** (0.082) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.819*** (0.093) | -0.836*** (0.093) | -0.771*** (0.095) | -0.709*** (0.090) | -0.505*** (0.090) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.032 (0.088) | 0.093 (0.088) | 0.083 (0.090) | 0.114 (0.084) | 0.169* (0.085) |
| Education | 0.254*** (0.022) | 0.270*** (0.021) | 0.292*** (0.022) | 0.264*** (0.020) | 0.249*** (0.020) |
| Household Wealth | 0.202*** (0.060) | 0.193*** (0.060) | 0.263*** (0.061) | 0.219*** (0.057) | 0.213*** (0.057) |
| Female | -0.974*** (0.154) | -1.002 (0.154) | -1.231*** (0.157) | -0.988*** (0.147) | -0.971*** (0.147) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.144 (0.218) | 0.313 (0.216) | 0.319 (0.219) | 0.279 (0.206) | 0.222 (0.205) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.225 (0.234) | 0.312 (0.228) | 0.514* (0.231) | 0.335 (0.218) | 0.215 (0.218) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.322 (0.265) | 0.447° (0.258) | 0.436° (0.264) | 0.351 (0.247) | 0.419° (0.247) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.499 (0.320) | 0.419 (0.312) | 0.585° (0.322) | 0.602* (0.299) | 0.444 (0.298) |
| Age 66+ | 0.290 (0.364) | 0.295 (0.355) | 0.663° (0.365) | 0.607° (0.341) | 0.472 (0.344) |
| Mestizo | 1.136*** (0.187) | 1.103*** (0.189) | 1.165*** (0.190) | 1.084*** (0.179) | 1.086*** (0.179) |
| Indigenous | 0.095 (0.378) | 0.057 (0.378) | 0.213 (0.392) | 0.171 (0.364) | 0.087 (0.362) |
| Black | 1.130** (0.422) | 1.286** (0.440) | 1.138** (0.434) | 1.225** (0.406) | 1.105** (0.405) |
| Mulato | -0.184 (0.495) | -0.125 (0.475) | -0.207 (0.504) | -0.161 (0.469) | -0.154 (0.472) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.229 (0.645) | 0.216 (0.609) | 0.000 (0.668) | 0.209 (0.605) | 0.346 (0.604) |
| Rural | -1.152*** (0.190) | -1.165*** (0.189) | -0.908*** (0.196) | -1.077*** (0.182) | -1.025*** (0.182) |
| Constant | 31.438 (0.493) | 31.034 (0.484) | 31.921 (0.541) | 32.183 (0.464) | 34.306 (0.468) |
| N Respondents | 15390 | 15220 | 14503 | 16587 | 16089 |
| N Country-Years | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 |

OLS Regression with Standard Errors in Parentheses
° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed)

**Table A29: Support for Opposition Party Rights**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.416*** | | | | |
| | (0.035) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.208*** | | | | |
| | (0.036) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -0.454*** | | | |
| | | (0.069) | | | |
| Independent | | -0.186*** | | | |
| | | (0.053) | | | |
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.044** | | |
| | | | (0.014) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -0.358*** | |
| | | | | (0.024) | |
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | -0.082*** |
| | | | | | (0.005) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.189*** | -0.197*** | -0.223*** | -0.088*** | -0.050** |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.026) | (0.016) | (0.019) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.015 | 0.035** | 0.043*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.130*** | -0.133*** | -0.139*** | -0.114*** | -0.076*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.020) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.033* | 0.034** | 0.029* | 0.051*** | 0.064*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Education | 0.051*** | 0.053*** | 0.057*** | 0.052*** | 0.049*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Household Wealth | 0.048*** | 0.045*** | 0.057*** | 0.042*** | 0.040*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Female | -0.029 | -0.029* | -0.052*** | -0.024 | -0.027 |
| | (0.015) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.074** | 0.070** | 0.075** | 0.080*** | 0.071*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.026) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.201*** | 0.201*** | 0.196*** | 0.203*** | 0.197*** |
| | (0.028) | (0.025) | (0.029) | (0.024) | (0.025) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.287*** | 0.276*** | 0.283*** | 0.281*** | 0.288*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.035) | (0.040) | (0.035) | (0.035) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.341*** | 0.337*** | 0.341*** | 0.344*** | 0.340*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.039) | (0.040) |
| Age 66+ | 0.368*** | 0.361*** | 0.394*** | 0.379*** | 0.377*** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.051) | (0.045) | (0.053) | (0.045) | (0.046) |
| Mestizo | 0.021 | 0.017 | 0.039 | 0.034 | 0.019 |
| | (0.034) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.032) |
| Indigenous | -0.035 | -0.047 | -0.034 | -0.026 | -0.020 |
| | (0.063) | (0.063) | (0.071) | (0.060) | (0.056) |
| Black | -0.051 | -0.037 | -0.033 | -0.027 | -0.047 |
| | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.057) | (0.051) | (0.047) |
| Mulato | 0.011 | -0.003 | 0.017 | 0.020 | -0.015 |
| | (0.087) | (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.081) | (0.078) |
| Moreno | 0.047 | 0.039 | 0.020 | 0.033 | 0.007 |
| | (0.051) | (0.017) | (0.037) | (0.035) | (0.016) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.007 | -0.053 | -0.073 | -0.003 | 0.012 |
| | (0.101) | (0.098) | (0.080) | (0.088) | (0.095) |
| Rural | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.018 | 0.021 | 0.048 |
| | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.033) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Cut 1 | -2.035 | -2.035 | -2.084 | -2.534 | -3.004 |
| | (0.148) | (0.145) | (0.177) | (0.166) | (0.177) |
| Cut 2 | -1.302 | -1.294 | -1.340 | -1.789 | -2.245 |
| | (0.135) | (0.131) | (0.165) | (0.150) | (0.161) |
| Cut 3 | -0.459 | -0.446 | -0.484 | -0.931 | -1.357 |
| | (0.124) | (0.120) | (0.153) | (0.136) | (0.147) |
| Cut 4 | 0.317 | 0.333 | 0.300 | -0.140 | -0.538 |
| | (0.120) | (0.117) | (0.145) | (0.129) | (0.135) |
| Cut 5 | 0.939 | 0.958 | 0.926 | 0.496 | 0.116 |
| | (0.119) | (0.116) | (0.140) | (0.124) | (0.126) |
| Cut 6 | 1.505 | 1.532 | 1.491 | 1.079 | 0.711 |
| | (0.120) | (0.117) | (0.139) | (0.121) | (0.121) |
| N Respondents | 66759 | 71523 | 60712 | 72559 | 70710 |
| N Country-Years | 53 | 54 | 53 | 54 | 54 |
| Ordered Logit with Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | | |

**Table A30: President Not Close the Congress**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.141* | | | | |
| | (0.059) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.123** | | | | |
| | (0.041) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -0.133 | | | |
| | | (0.070) | | | |
| Independent | | 0.011 | | | |
| | | (0.037) | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.029* | | |
| | | | (0.012) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -0.026 | |
| | | | | (0.058) | |
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | 0.003 |
| | | | | | (0.009) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.003 | -0.040 | -0.032 | -0.010 | -0.029 |
| | (0.040) | (0.025) | (0.039) | (0.024) | (0.026) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.067*** | 0.069*** | 0.066*** | 0.069*** | 0.065*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| No Corruption in Government | 0.061* | 0.030 | 0.036 | 0.053* | 0.045* |
| | (0.028) | (0.018) | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.068*** | 0.071*** | 0.083*** | 0.071*** | 0.070*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.015) |
| Education | 0.008 | 0.014*** | 0.011* | 0.011* | 0.012** |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Household Wealth | 0.006 | 0.004 | 0.010 | 0.004 | 0.007 |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Female | 0.148*** | 0.153*** | 0.144*** | 0.144*** | 0.142*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.026) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.061 | -0.032 | -0.031 | -0.058 | -0.056 |
| | (0.037) | (0.033) | (0.038) | (0.035) | (0.036) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.104** | -0.059 | -0.093* | -0.093* | -0.093* |
| | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.038) | (0.038) |
| Age 46-55 | -0.048 | -0.009 | -0.021 | -0.037 | -0.034 |
| | (0.052) | (0.046) | (0.051) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.030 | 0.018 | -0.017 | -0.016 | -0.015 |
| | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.056) | (0.052) | (0.051) |
| Age 66+ | 0.047 | 0.093 | 0.085 | 0.082 | 0.070 |
| | (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.064) | (0.057) | (0.056) |
| Mestizo | 0.051 | 0.052 | 0.059 | 0.046 | 0.052 |
| | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.036) |
| Indigenous | -0.106 | -0.106 | -0.087 | -0.106 | -0.094 |
| | (0.090) | (0.088) | (0.092) | (0.083) | (0.091) |
| Black | -0.010 | -0.018 | 0.006 | -0.013 | -0.001 |
| | (0.059) | (0.060) | (0.064) | (0.055) | (0.056) |
| Mulato | 0.072 | 0.072 | 0.077 | 0.070 | 0.075 |
| | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.074) | (0.071) | (0.072) |
| Moreno | 0.228 | 0.182 | 0.223 | 0.187 | 0.203 |
| | (0.183) | (0.225) | (0.202) | (0.194) | (0.198) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.231 | -0.243 | -0.215 | -0.228 | -0.203 |
| | (0.150) | (0.151) | (0.136) | (0.156) | (0.148) |
| Rural | 0.135** | 0.179*** | 0.130*** | 0.145*** | 0.135** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.043) | (0.031) | (0.039) | (0.043) | (0.046) |
| Constant | 1.108 | 0.998 | 1.189 | 1.083 | 1.000 |
| | (0.182) | (0.160) | (0.186) | (0.198) | (0.202) |
| N Respondents | 83277 | 85337 | 75536 | 90180 | 87544 |
| N Country-Years | 67 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 68 |
| Binary Logit Regression with Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | | |

**Table A31: President Should Not Close the Court**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.138* | | | | |
| | (0.061) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.101* | | | | |
| | (0.046) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -0.215** | | | |
| | | (0.078) | | | |
| Independent | | -0.092* | | | |
| | | (0.043) | | | |
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.013 | | |
| | | | (0.013) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -0.087 | |
| | | | | (0.053) | |
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | -0.016* |
| | | | | | (0.007) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.027 | -0.051 | -0.054 | -0.014 | -0.010 |
| | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.040) | (0.029) | (0.027) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.076*** | 0.092*** | 0.083*** | 0.087*** | 0.081*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.002 | -0.017 | -0.013 | 0.002 | 0.013 |
| | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.045* | 0.043 | 0.055* | 0.055** | 0.057** |
| | (0.022) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.021) | (0.022) |
| Education | 0.011 | 0.017** | 0.015* | 0.014* | 0.014* |
| | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Household Wealth | 0.044*** | 0.043*** | 0.044*** | 0.043*** | 0.044*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.012) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) |
| Female | 0.110*** | 0.107*** | 0.080*** | 0.093*** | 0.090*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.030) | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.025) |
| Age 26-35 | -0.062 | -0.040 | -0.062 | -0.064 | -0.065 |
| | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.049) | (0.041) | (0.042) |
| Age 36-45 | -0.143** | -0.085 | -0.117 | -0.124* | -0.121* |
| | (0.050) | (0.055) | (0.060) | (0.053) | (0.054) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age 46-55 | -0.059 | -0.009 | -0.025 | -0.045 | -0.044 |
| | (0.066) | (0.067) | (0.066) | (0.059) | (0.061) |
| Age 56-65 | -0.131 | -0.096 | -0.100 | -0.098 | -0.115 |
| | (0.068) | (0.073) | (0.075) | (0.066) | (0.066) |
| Age 66+ | 0.020 | 0.055 | 0.074 | 0.041 | 0.033 |
| | (0.094) | (0.100) | (0.103) | (0.095) | (0.101) |
| Mestizo | 0.064 | 0.108 | 0.095 | 0.095 | 0.087 |
| | (0.051) | (0.055) | (0.049) | (0.050) | (0.051) |
| Indigenous | -0.045 | 0.000 | 0.003 | -0.015 | -0.021 |
| | (0.103) | (0.110) | (0.110) | (0.093) | (0.098) |
| Black | -0.088 | -0.053 | -0.100 | -0.079 | -0.064 |
| | (0.080) | (0.081) | (0.086) | (0.076) | (0.068) |
| Mulato | -0.058 | -0.040 | -0.052 | -0.041 | -0.069 |
| | (0.086) | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.088) | (0.087) |
| Moreno | -0.159 | -0.176 | -0.144 | -0.141 | -0.154 |
| | (0.101) | (0.072) | (0.094) | (0.087) | (0.098) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.271 | -0.207 | -0.266 | -0.230 | -0.244 |
| | (0.172) | (0.152) | (0.148) | (0.151) | (0.156) |
| Rural | 0.050 | 0.074 | 0.057 | 0.045 | 0.047 |
| | (0.053) | (0.054) | (0.051) | (0.053) | (0.053) |
| Constant | 37817 | 36,860 | 35018 | 40880 | 39663 |
| | 32 | 30 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| N Respondents | -0.138 | | | | |
| N Country-Years | (0.061) | | | | |
| Binary Logit Regression with Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | | |

**Table A32: President Should Not Bypass the Legislature**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.435*** | | | | |
| | (0.053) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.280*** | | | | |
| | (0.050) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -0.501*** | | | |
| | | (0.073) | | | |
| Independent | | -0.255*** | | | |
| | | (0.053) | | | |
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.053*** | | |
| | | | (0.013) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -0.330*** | |
| | | | | (0.032) | |
| | | | | | -0.069*** |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | (0.007) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.158*** | -0.167*** | -0.194*** | -0.067** | -0.051* |
| | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.034) | (0.025) | (0.026) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.019 | 0.019 | 0.016 | 0.038*** | 0.042*** |
| | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.014) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.066** | -0.071** | -0.076** | -0.056** | -0.029 |
| | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.019) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.028 | 0.032* | 0.025 | 0.049*** | 0.061*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.015) |
| Education | 0.040*** | 0.043*** | 0.047*** | 0.042*** | 0.040*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Household Wealth | 0.022* | 0.024* | 0.031** | 0.018** | 0.018* |
| | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.009) |
| Female | -0.001 | 0.000 | -0.036 | 0.001 | -0.006 |
| | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.020) | (0.018) | (0.019) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.011 | 0.020 | 0.012 | 0.022 | 0.014 |
| | (0.026) | (0.024) | (0.031) | (0.025) | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.097*** | 0.112*** | 0.115*** | 0.114*** | 0.104*** |
| | (0.030) | (0.024) | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.027) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.213*** | 0.197*** | 0.231*** | 0.210*** | 0.199*** |
| | (0.049) | (0.043) | (0.053) | (0.044) | (0.046) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.278*** | 0.284*** | 0.284*** | 0.294*** | 0.278*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.037) | (0.046) | (0.037) | (0.040) |
| Age 66+ | 0.269*** | 0.292*** | 0.324*** | 0.300*** | 0.309*** |
| | (0.055) | (0.048) | (0.060) | (0.047) | (0.049) |
| Mestizo | 0.045 | 0.047 | 0.064 | 0.056 | 0.033 |
| | (0.042) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.038) | (0.041) |
| Indigenous | 0.006 | -0.003 | -0.027 | -0.007 | -0.018 |
| | (0.090) | (0.082) | (0.092) | (0.075) | (0.074) |
| Black | 0.020 | 0.030 | -0.008 | 0.033 | 0.014 |
| | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.080) | (0.065) | (0.066) |
| Mulato | -0.012 | -0.038 | -0.020 | -0.011 | -0.064 |
| | (0.101) | (0.090) | (0.111) | (0.082) | (0.081) |
| Moreno | 0.106 | 0.046 | 0.078 | 0.070 | 0.034 |
| | (0.111) | (0.112) | (0.121) | (0.116) | (0.116) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.107 | -0.110 | -0.139 | -0.107 | -0.096 |
| | (0.153) | (0.139) | (0.121) | (0.129) | (0.133) |
| Rural | 0.112*** | 0.104*** | 0.101*** | 0.125*** | 0.130*** |
| | (0.033) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.029) | (0.031) |
| Cut 1 | -1.935 | -1.927 | -2.050 | -2.332 | -2.691 |
| | (0.166) | (0.142) | (0.179) | (0.185) | (0.234) |
| Cut 2 | -1.180 | -1.162 | -1.269 | -1.563 | -1.912 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.158) | (0.133) | (0.174) | (0.172) | (0.222) |
| Cut 3 | -0.424 | -0.403 | -0.494 | -0.796 | -1.123 |
| | (0.151) | (0.127) | (0.166) | (0.164) | (0.214) |
| Cut 4 | 0.281 | 0.309 | 0.236 | -0.071 | -0.379 |
| | (0.148) | (0.126) | (0.161) | (0.159) | (0.203) |
| Cut 5 | 0.881 | 0.917 | 0.845 | 0.544 | 0.249 |
| | (0.147) | (0.126) | (0.160) | (0.155) | (0.194) |
| Cut 6 | 1.501 | 1.552 | 1.479 | 1.188 | 0.900 |
| | (0.154) | (0.134) | (0.164) | (0.155) | (0.192) |
| N Respondents | 43707 | 49329 | 41081 | 49836 | 48554 |
| N Country-Years | 35 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 36 |
| Ordered Logit with Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | | |

**Table A33: President Should Not Bypass the Court**

| | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.410*** | | | | |
| | (0.050) | | | | |
| Abstained Last Election | -0.284*** | | | | |
| | (0.052) | | | | |
| Government Partisan | | -0.479*** | | | |
| | | (0.065) | | | |
| Independent | | -0.272*** | | | |
| | | (0.054) | | | |
| Close to President on Left-Right Scale | | | -0.053*** | | |
| | | | (0.011) | | |
| Government Approval | | | | -0.294*** | |
| | | | | (0.028) | |
| Government Policy Performance | | | | | -0.068*** |
| | | | | | (0.006) |
| National Economy is Getting Better | -0.134*** | -0.140*** | -0.168*** | -0.054* | -0.023 |
| | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.023) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.010 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.026 | 0.035* |
| | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.064* | -0.072** | -0.072** | -0.056* | -0.032 |
| | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.019) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.050*** | 0.050*** | 0.044*** | 0.064*** | 0.075*** |
| | (0.015) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Education | 0.042*** | 0.045*** | 0.051*** | 0.044*** | 0.042*** |
| | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Household Wealth | 0.035*** | 0.035*** | 0.044*** | 0.031*** | 0.028** |
| | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.009) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 0.012 | 0.010 | -0.028 | 0.011 | -0.002 |
| | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.021) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.008 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.012 |
| | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.023) | (0.026) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.070* | 0.077** | 0.082* | 0.076** | 0.075* |
| | (0.032) | (0.028) | (0.035) | (0.026) | (0.032) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.196*** | 0.179*** | 0.201*** | 0.191*** | 0.181*** |
| | (0.048) | (0.044) | (0.053) | (0.046) | (0.050) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.257*** | 0.260*** | 0.260*** | 0.266*** | 0.262*** |
| | (0.053) | (0.050) | (0.063) | (0.048) | (0.055) |
| Age 66+ | 0.236*** | 0.246*** | 0.292*** | 0.254*** | 0.268*** |
| | (0.054) | (0.045) | (0.060) | (0.044) | (0.055) |
| Mestizo | 0.039 | 0.035 | 0.049 | 0.050 | 0.025 |
| | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.038) | (0.032) | (0.037) |
| Indigenous | 0.033 | 0.022 | 0.009 | 0.025 | 0.006 |
| | (0.098) | (0.090) | (0.095) | (0.083) | (0.079) |
| Black | 0.002 | 0.006 | -0.038 | 0.010 | -0.020 |
| | (0.073) | (0.073) | (0.078) | (0.064) | (0.068) |
| Mulato | 0.081 | 0.056 | 0.078 | 0.092 | 0.057 |
| | (0.089) | (0.082) | (0.092) | (0.074) | (0.074) |
| Moreno | 0.104 | 0.047 | 0.058 | 0.074 | 0.022 |
| | (0.042) | (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.052) | (0.051) |
| Other Ethnic | -0.087 | -0.108 | -0.112 | -0.077 | -0.060 |
| | (0.189) | (0.170) | (0.161) | (0.165) | (0.172) |
| Rural | 0.038 | 0.040 | 0.040 | 0.055 | 0.063 |
| | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.038) | (0.031) | (0.033) |
| Cut 1 | -2.185 | -2.229 | -2.298 | -2.541 | -2.949 |
| | (0.137) | (0.129) | (0.169) | (0.165) | (0.217) |
| Cut 2 | -1.398 | -1.427 | -1.476 | -1.737 | -2.132 |
| | (0.124) | (0.115) | (0.156) | (0.146) | (0.200) |
| Cut 3 | -0.582 | -0.600 | -0.642 | -0.906 | -1.281 |
| | (0.118) | (0.109) | (0.150) | (0.138) | (0.193) |
| Cut 4 | 0.168 | 0.155 | 0.118 | -0.145 | -0.501 |
| | (0.115) | (0.104) | (0.143) | (0.131) | (0.183) |
| Cut 5 | 0.808 | 0.804 | 0.766 | 0.511 | 0.168 |
| | (0.112) | (0.101) | (0.140) | (0.124) | (0.170) |
| Cut 6 | 1.434 | 1.441 | 1.405 | 1.154 | 0.820 |
| | (0.120) | (0.107) | (0.144) | (0.121) | (0.165) |
| N Respondents | 43,415 | 49,006 | 40,877 | 49,514 | 48,315 |
| N Country-Years | 35 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 36 |
| Ordered Logit with Standard Errors in Parentheses<br>° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed) | | | | | |

## Appendix 9: Support for Civil Liberties by Question

One potential weakness of the indicators of support for vertical accountability is that many of them ask specifically about "regime opponents", "the president", "the government" or "the opposition". Thus we might worry that these cues help explain the politicization we see in the paper. But we can also look in more detail at some of the questions I analyzed in the paper that I labeled "*tolerance for civil liberties*" and that were included in the 2006 wave of the survey because these may be less problematic in this regards. The questions are as follows (for convenience I have numbered them):

1. "To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting public protests?"
2. "To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting the meetings of any group that criticizes the nationality's political system?"
3. "To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored television programs?"
4. "To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored books in public school libraries?"
5. "To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored any of the media that criticized it?"

As we look at these questions, we can differentiate them by how narrowly they are focused on opposition actors compared to civil rights more broadly. I would argue that questions 3 and 4 are NOT about targeting opposition actors/critics of the government in the way that the reviewer is concerned about but are about general censorship of television and libraries. Question 1 also does not mention opposition actors, but we might assume that mentioning protests implies they are targeting anti-government actors. Then Questions 2 and 5 are more directly about the government targeting critics, although they are about meetings and the media, not necessarily opposition voters directly. Now, there are limits to this exercise-the questions were asked consecutively and so we might expect there to be the possibility of response set. But inasmuch as the questions capture slightly different dynamics we break the index down by question we can ensure that the dynamics are not being driven by questions that are specifically about government-opposition relations.

We see in Tables A34 and A35 that the estimated direction and significance of the variables, with the exception of the interpersonal trust and income quintile variables, are generally consistent across models. We cannot directly compare the coefficients from ordered logit model, but the predicted difference in the probability that an election winner gave one of the three highest responses compared to an election loser (all else at their mean) was -0.043, -0.039, -0.059, -0.044, and -0.048 respectively. Similarly, the predicted differences in the probability of giving one of the top 3 scores between those who think the economy is getting better and those who think it is getting worse are -0.039, -0.041, -0.048, -0.028, and -0.035 respectively and so, again, they are fairly consistent across models. This suggests to me that the results are not being driven by the target of the suppression being the opposition but instead reflects a more general dynamic about how citizens view presidential actions that restrict external checks on his authority by enhancing vertical accountability.

**Table A34: Support for Free Speech (2006) by Question, Sociotropic Performance Indicators**

| | Do Not Ban Protests | Do Not Ban Opposition Meetings | Do Not Censure TV | Do Not Censure Libraries | Do Not Censure Critical Media |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.147*** | -0.162*** | -0.238*** | -0.204*** | -0.200*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.035) | (0.037) | (0.032) |
| National Economy is Better | -0.082*** | -0.084*** | -0.096*** | -0.063** | -0.076*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.019) |
| Feels Secure in Neighborhood | 0.001 | 0.009 | -0.039* | 0.017 | -0.017 |
| | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| No Corruption in Government | -0.082*** | -0.088*** | -0.101*** | -0.184*** | -0.166*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.016) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.036* | -0.004 | 0.006 | 0.000 | 0.059*** |
| | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.015) |
| Education | 0.033*** | 0.039*** | 0.033*** | 0.038*** | 0.046*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |
| Household Wealth | 0.021* | 0.032** | 0.011 | 0.035** | 0.017 |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.012) | (0.010) |
| Female | -0.157*** | -0.145*** | -0.140*** | -0.143*** | -0.107*** |
| | (0.026) | (0.029) | (0.028) | (0.030) | (0.026) |
| Abstained | -0.079* | -0.109** | -0.195*** | -0.142*** | -0.129*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.039) | (0.038) | (0.041) | (0.035) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.087* | 0.067 | -0.053 | -0.007 | -0.017 |
| | (0.036) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.042) | (0.037) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.111** | 0.166*** | -0.059 | -0.035 | 0.045 |
| | (0.039) | (0.044) | (0.042) | (0.045) | (0.039) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.189*** | 0.221*** | -0.027 | -0.047 | 0.098* |
| | (0.044) | (0.049) | (0.048) | (0.051) | (0.045) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.216*** | 0.271*** | 0.004 | -0.092 | -0.005 |
| | (0.053) | (0.060) | (0.057) | (0.061) | (0.053) |
| Age 66+ | 0.217*** | 0.227*** | -0.044 | -0.143 | 0.049 |
| | (0.062) | (0.068) | (0.067) | (0.070) | (0.062) |
| Mestizo | 0.143*** | 0.204*** | 0.122*** | 0.219*** | 0.195*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.033) | (0.036) | (0.032) |
| Indigenous | 0.034 | 0.043 | -0.024 | 0.203** | 0.040 |
| | (0.064) | (0.068) | (0.066) | (0.069) | (0.064) |
| Black | 0.270** | 0.242** | 0.071 | 0.306*** | 0.095 |
| | (0.070) | (0.080) | (0.077) | (0.084) | (0.071) |
| Mulato | -0.044 | -0.202* | 0.147 | 0.156 | -0.034 |
| | (0.078) | (0.094) | (0.093) | (0.099) | (0.081) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Other Ethnic | 0.024 | -0.118 | 0.040 | 0.122 | -0.007 |
| | (0.117) | (0.121) | (0.122) | (0.129) | (0.124) |
| Rural | -0.115*** | -0.136*** | -0.122*** | -0.174*** | -0.173*** |
| | (0.030) | (0.035) | (0.033) | (0.036) | (0.030) |
| /cut1 | -2.008 | -2.493 | -2.953 | -3.233 | -3.272 |
| | (0.088) | (0.098) | (0.095) | (0.103) | (0.094) |
| /cut2 | -1.693 | -2.083 | -2.597 | -2.826 | -2.921 |
| | (0.087) | (0.095) | (0.094) | (0.100) | (0.093) |
| /cut3 | -1.237 | -1.562 | -2.095 | -2.386 | -2.440 |
| | (0.086) | (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.099) | (0.091) |
| /cut4 | -0.879 | -1.135 | -1.731 | -2.028 | -2.050 |
| | (0.086) | (0.093) | (0.092) | (0.098) | (0.090) |
| /cut5 | -0.445 | -0.667 | -1.301 | -1.602 | -1.597 |
| | (0.086) | (0.092) | (0.091) | (0.097) | (0.089) |
| /cut6 | 0.129 | -0.081 | -0.718 | -1.073 | -1.039 |
| | (0.086) | (0.092) | (0.091) | (0.096) | (0.089) |
| /cut7 | 0.479 | 0.325 | -0.350 | -0.723 | -0.655 |
| | (0.086) | (0.092) | (0.090) | (0.096) | (0.088) |
| /cut8 | 0.868 | 0.791 | 0.075 | -0.303 | -0.245 |
| | (0.086) | (0.092) | (0.090) | (0.096) | (0.088) |
| /cut9 | 1.316 | 1.293 | 0.533 | 0.191 | 0.275 |
| | (0.086) | (0.092) | (0.090) | (0.096) | (0.088) |
| N | 19,509 | 15,824 | 17,004 | 15,771 | 20,742 |
| $\chi^2$ | 625.79*** | 869.96*** | 1327.75*** | 1387.68*** | 1677.45*** |

**Table A35: Support for Free Speech (2006) by Question, Egotropic Performance Indicators**

| | Do Not Ban Protests | Do Not Ban Opposition Meetings | Do Not Censure TV | Do Not Censure Libraries | Do Not Censure Critical Media |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Voted for the Winner | -0.172*** | -0.160*** | -0.247*** | -0.207*** | -0.220*** |
| | (0.031) | (0.035) | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.031) |
| Personal Finances Improving | -0.065*** | -0.077*** | -0.105*** | -0.078*** | -0.040* |
| | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.020) | (0.021) | (0.018) |
| Not a Crime Victim | -0.086** | -0.096** | -0.105** | -0.156*** | -0.223*** |
| | (0.033) | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.034) |
| Not Asked for a Bribe | 0.037 | -0.043 | -0.069 | 0.016 | -0.079 |
| | (0.052) | (0.063) | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.053) |
| Interpersonal Trust | 0.035* | -0.005 | -0.003 | 0.001 | 0.052*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.014) |
| Education | 0.033*** | 0.039*** | 0.032*** | 0.039*** | 0.045*** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Household Wealth | 0.022* | 0.032** | 0.016 | 0.040*** | 0.019 |
| | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.010) |
| Abstained | -0.095** | -0.122*** | -0.206*** | -0.158*** | -0.157*** |
| | (0.034) | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.040) | (0.034) |
| Abstained | -0.151*** | -0.138*** | -0.123*** | -0.143*** | -0.094*** |
| | (0.025) | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.025) |
| Age 26-35 | 0.123*** | 0.090* | -0.023 | 0.027 | 0.007 |
| | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.038) | (0.041) | (0.036) |
| Age 36-45 | 0.147*** | 0.182*** | -0.023 | 0.001 | 0.066 |
| | (0.038) | (0.043) | (0.041) | (0.044) | (0.038) |
| Age 46-55 | 0.210*** | 0.228*** | -0.008 | -0.001 | 0.125** |
| | (0.043) | (0.048) | (0.047) | (0.050) | (0.044) |
| Age 56-65 | 0.225*** | 0.277*** | 0.034 | -0.035 | 0.032 |
| | (0.052) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.059) | (0.052) |
| Age 66+ | 0.223*** | 0.240*** | -0.040 | -0.115 | 0.063 |
| | (0.060) | (0.065) | (0.064) | (0.067) | (0.060) |
| Mestizo | 0.149*** | 0.202*** | 0.125*** | 0.222*** | 0.204*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.034) | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.031) |
| Indigenous | 0.028 | 0.045 | -0.046 | 0.142* | 0.026 |
| | (0.061) | (0.065) | (0.063) | (0.066) | (0.061) |
| Black | 0.238*** | 0.185* | 0.053 | 0.286*** | 0.068 |
| | (0.068) | (0.079) | (0.076) | (0.082) | (0.069) |
| Mulato | -0.030 | -0.229* | 0.187* | 0.122 | -0.046 |
| | (0.077) | (0.093) | (0.092) | (0.098) | (0.080) |
| Other Ethnic | 0.010 | -0.133 | 0.021 | 0.110 | -0.022 |
| | (0.114) | (0.118) | (0.120) | (0.127) | (0.122) |
| Rural | -0.100*** | -0.128*** | -0.128*** | -0.164*** | -0.167*** |
| | (0.029) | (0.034) | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.029) |
| /cut1 | -1.970 | -2.555 | -2.948 | -3.178 | -3.330 |
| | (0.097) | (0.110) | (0.106) | (0.115) | (0.103) |
| /cut2 | -1.658 | -2.141 | -2.595 | -2.788 | -2.981 |
| | (0.096) | (0.108) | (0.105) | (0.113) | (0.101) |
| /cut3 | -1.188 | -1.611 | -2.089 | -2.343 | -2.491 |
| | (0.095) | (0.106) | (0.104) | (0.111) | (0.099) |
| /cut4 | -0.836 | -1.189 | -1.728 | -1.991 | -2.099 |
| | (0.095) | (0.106) | (0.103) | (0.111) | (0.099) |
| /cut5 | -0.407 | -0.725 | -1.300 | -1.566 | -1.650 |
| | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.103) | (0.110) | (0.098) |
| /cut6 | 0.171 | -0.131 | -0.712 | -1.034 | -1.090 |
| | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.103) | (0.110) | (0.098) |
| /cut7 | 0.519 | 0.273 | -0.342 | -0.686 | -0.709 |
| | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.102) | (0.109) | (0.097) |
| /cut8 | 0.908 | 0.739 | 0.082 | -0.272 | -0.300 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.102) | (0.109) | (0.097) |
| /cut9 | 1.354 | 1.240 | 0.543 | 0.221 | 0.219 |
| | (0.095) | (0.105) | (0.102) | (0.109) | (0.097) |
| N | 20,459 | 16,673 | 17,935 | 16,662 | 21,754 |
| $\chi^2$ | 619.85*** | 884.81*** | 1333.93*** | 1346.59*** | 1642.74*** |