CODEBOOK

REBEL GROUPS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Jessica A. Stanton

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I. Identifying Variables

countryid country ID

Source: Correlates of War (COW) Country Codes; available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org

government name of government actor

rebels name of rebel group actor

startmo month in which the conflict began

startyr year in which the conflict began

endmo month in which the conflict ended

endyr year in which the conflict ended

post89 conflict began after 1989
0 = conflict began on or before December 31, 1989
1 = conflict began on or after January 1, 1990

Source: start and end dates rely on data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and the Duration Data v1-2006b (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Gates and Strand 2006). These data are supplemented with information from secondary sources where necessary.

Start date indicates the date on which the conflict first accumulated 25 total battle-related deaths. If the *first* battle-related deaths occurred within the 12 months immediately prior to the date on which the conflict reached 25 total battle-related deaths, then the start date indicates the date on which the *first* battle-related deaths occurred.

End date indicates the last date of fighting prior to a period of inactivity. If the last battle-related deaths occurred within the 12 months immediately following, then the end date indicates the date on which the last battle-related deaths occurred.

In some cases, UCDP/PRIO codes conflicts as having several different phases, each with distinct start and end dates. If the rebel group and the government do not change across these phases of conflict, the phases are coded as a single conflict, using the start date from the first phase of conflict and the end date from the last phase of conflict.

II. Variables Measuring Civil War Outcomes

outcome conflict outcome

0 = outcome favoring government
1 = outcome favoring neither side, in which both sides made concessions
2 = outcome favoring rebel group
missing = conflict was ongoing as of 2010

outcome_binary conflict outcome, binary coding

0 = outcome favoring government or neither side
1 = outcome favoring rebel group

Additional Information on Coding of Civil War Outcomes

The following information on coding civil war outcomes is identical to the information in the online appendix. For a discussion of how these data on conflict outcomes compare to other existing data on conflict outcomes, please see the online appendix.

To code conflict outcomes, I begin with the Non-State Actor (NSA) Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009), which distinguish between conflicts that end in government victory, rebel group victory, formal agreement (either ceasefire or peace agreement), fizzle out in periods of low activity, or are ongoing.

termination_NSA conflict outcome, from Non-State Actor (NSA) Data

1 = formal agreement (ceasefire or peace agreement)
2 = government victory
3 = rebel group victory
4 = ended through low activity
5 = ongoing

Source: Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009), derived from *type.of.termination* variable and extended to 2010.

Appendix Table A1 shows how the 103 conflicts in the data set are distributed across these categories of conflict termination.

Appendix Table A1: Conflict Termination, using Non-State Actor Data

Termination Type	Number of Conflicts
Formal agreement (ceasefire or peace agreement)	42
Government victory	4
Rebel group victory	10
Ended through low activity	21
Ongoing	26
Total	103

For the 63 conflicts coded by the NSA data set as ending in formal agreement or periods of low activity, I code whether this conclusion to the conflict favored the government, favored the rebel group, or favored neither side. I do so by comparing the rebel group's primary stated goals at the beginning of the conflict to the political settlement ending the conflict.

This coding scheme produces three categories of conflict outcome: 1) outcomes favorable to the government, which include both government military victories and negotiated settlements favorable to the government; 2) outcomes favorable to the rebel group, which include both rebel group military victories and negotiated settlements favorable to the rebel group; and 3) outcomes involving significant concessions from each side.

Appendix **Table A2: Coding Guidelines for Separatist Conflicts** and **Table A3: Coding Guidelines for Revolutionary Conflicts**, shown below, provide information on the rules used to assign conflicts to each outcome category and examples of conflicts falling into each category.

Guidelines for Coding Conflict Outcomes

0 = outcome favoring government
1 = outcome favoring neither side, in which both sides made concessions
2 = outcome favoring rebel group
missing = conflict was ongoing as of 2010

To categorize conflict outcomes, I begin by identifying the rebel group's stated goals at the start of the conflict. To do so, I rely on the group's stated incompatibility as recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Database, available online at: http://ucdp.uu.se/.

Broadly, I distinguish between separatist conflicts, in which rebel groups seek autonomy or independence for a particular region, and revolutionary conflicts, in which rebel groups seek power in the central government.

Coding Conflict Outcomes – Separatist Conflicts

All of the separatist groups in the data set began by demanding full independence. Thus, for separatist conflicts, I code formal or de facto independence as an outcome favoring the rebel group; regional autonomy within the exiting territorial borders of the state as the intermediate category of conflict outcome; and no regional autonomy as an outcome favoring the government. Appendix Table A2 illustrates the rules for coding separatist conflict outcomes; details on each of the case examples are provided below.

Appendix Table A2:
Coding Guidelines for Separatist Conflicts

Type of Outcome	Outcome Coding
Independence for separatist region	Outcome = 2 *Examples:* Fretilin (East Timor) in Indonesia SPLA (South Sudan) in Sudan
De facto independence for separatist region	Outcome = 2 *Examples:* Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan KDP, PUK (Kurdistan) in Iraq
Autonomy for separatist region	Outcome = 1 *Examples:* GAM (Aceh) in Indonesia Chechen insurgents (Chechnya) in Russia
No autonomy for separatist region	Outcome = 0 *Examples:* ULFA (Assam) in India MFDC (Casamance) in Senegal

Coding Examples – Separatist Conflicts:
The following provides the relevant language from the agreement ending the war, for each of the cases referenced in Table A2:

Independence for separatist region (outcome = 2):

Fretilin (East Timor) in Indonesia:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor, 5 May 1999. The full text of the agreement is available in: United Nations General Assembly, 53rd Session and United Nations Security Council, 54th year, "Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General," 5 May 1999 (A/53/951, S/1999/513). Available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Annex I, Article 6:
If the Secretary-General determines, on the basis of the result of the popular consultation and in accordance with this Agreement, that the proposed constitutional framework for special autonomy is not acceptable to the East Timorese people, the Government of Indonesia shall take the constitutional steps necessary to terminate its links with East Timor thus restoring under Indonesian law the status East Timor held prior to July 1976, and the Governments of Indonesia and Portugal

and the Secretary-General shall agree on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor to the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall, subject to the appropriate legislative mandate, initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence.

Outcome:
The UN facilitated the popular consultation on East Timor's status, with a vote taken on 30 August 1999. The UN estimated that about 95 percent of registered voters participated in the vote, with 78.5 percent voting against the proposal for East Timor to remain within Indonesia under a special autonomy agreement. This rejection of the special autonomy proposal led to the invocation of Annex I, Article 6, paving the way for East Timor's transition to independence. (Source: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm)

SPLA (South Sudan) in Sudan:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, 9 January 2005. The full text of the agreement is available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Part A, 1.3 of Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol, 20 July 2002:
That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, *inter alia*, through a referendum to determine their future status.

Part B, 2.5 of Chapter I: The Machakos Protocol, 20 July 2002:
At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.

Outcome:
In accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, at the end of the six year interim period, the parties held a referendum on the status of South Sudan (in January 2011). In the referendum, 98.83 percent voted in favor of independence for South Sudan. South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011. (Source: United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmis/background.shtml)

De facto independence for separatist region (outcome = 2):

Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
The Bishkek Protocol, 5 May 1994. Full text available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Joint Declaration of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, 2 November 2008. Full text provided in United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 10 November 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United

Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 11 November 2008 (S/2008/702). Available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
The parties to the conflict signed a ceasefire agreement, the Bishkek Protocol, in 1994. This agreement ended the fighting, but did not resolve any of the political issues at stake in the conflict. The parties to the conflict continued to negotiate with one another in the years that followed, but have not reached a formal peace agreement (thus, why this case is considered a case of de facto independence rather than de jure independence). The 2008 Joint Declaration is not a peace treaty, but does indicate that the two sides will continue to work towards a settlement.

Outcome:
When the parties to the conflict signed the ceasefire agreement in 1994, ethnic Armenian forces fighting for independence for Nagorno-Karabakh had succeeded in pushing Azerbaijani forces out of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1994, ethnic Armenian forces have controlled the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as some of the surrounding territory captured during the war. Nagorno-Karabakh has thus functioned as a de facto independent territory since the conclusion of the war; Azerbaijani government structures do not function in the region. (Source: International Crisis Group, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War," Europe Report No. 187, 14 November 2007)

KDP, PUK (Kurdistan) in Iraq
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
No formal agreement ending the war.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal agreement ending the war.

Outcome:
Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein's government in the first Gulf War, the United States established a no-fly zone in the Kurdish region of Iraq. This facilitated the development of a de facto independent state in the Kurdish region of Iraq from 1991 through 2003. According to Minorities at Risk: "their internationally supported autonomous region in the north was largely free of any interference from Saddam Hussein's regime." (Minorities at Risk Database, available online at: www.mar.umd.edu; see also Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

Autonomy for separatist region (outcome = 1):

GAM (Aceh) in Indonesia:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, 15 August 2005. The full text of the agreement is available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:

Article 1 Governing of Aceh

1.1 Law on the Governing of Aceh

1.1.1 A new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be promulgated and will enter into force as soon as possible and not later than 31 March 2006.

1.1.2 The new Law on the Governing of Aceh will be based on the following principles:

a) Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.

b) International agreements entered into by the Government of Indonesia which relate to matters of special interest to Aceh will be entered into in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.

c) Decisions with regard to Aceh by the legislature of the Republic of Indonesia will be taken in consultation with and with the consent of the legislature of Aceh.

d) Administrative measures undertaken by the Government of Indonesia with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration.

Outcome:

The autonomy provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding were implemented in 2006, with the passage of national legislation formalizing the autonomy provisions. This national legislation – the Law on the Governing of Aceh – was passed by the Indonesian Parliament on 11 July 2006 and signed by the President on 1 August 2006. An EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) helped to implement these and other provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding. In accordance with these agreements, Aceh held local elections in December 2006. (Source: EU Council Secretariat, Background: EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia), 15 December 2006. Available online at: eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/index_en.htm).

Chechen insurgents (Chechnya) in Russia (first conflict):

Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:

Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations, 31 August 1996.
Follow-up agreement: Russian-Chechen Agreement, 23 November 1996.
Follow-up agreement: Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian Federation and Chechen Republic Ichkeria, 12 May 1997.
The full text of each of these agreements is available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:

All three agreements refer to the "Russian Federation" and the "Chechen Republic," indicating that that Chechnya remains a republic under the control of Russia. The Russian-Chechen Agreement of 23 November 1996 is most explicit on this point, indicating that this agreement is to establish "principles of relations between the federal center and the Chechen Republic."

Outcome:
Chechnya was permitted to maintain its own parliament and president, but remained within the Russian Federation. In the Russian-Chechen Agreement (23 November 1996) the two sides agreed to "agree actions in the defense sector."
No autonomy for separatist region (outcome = 0):

ULFA (Assam) in India:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Several ceasefire agreements, but no formal peace agreement ending the war.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal peace agreement.

Outcome:
Beginning in 2005 the Indian government and the ULFA participated in several rounds of peace negotiations, but did not reach agreement on a political settlement of the conflict. During negotiations, government counterinsurgency operations against the ULFA continued. Ceasefires halted fighting sporadically during the years that negotiations were ongoing, but no permanent ceasefire was in place at the end of the war. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset marks the end of the conflict in 2010, ending through low activity. The Indian government did not grant any political concessions to the ULFA. (Source: Sanjib Baruah, "Separatist Militants and Contentious Politics in Assam, India: The Limits of Counterinsurgency," *Asian Survey*, vol. 49, no. 6 (2009).)

MFDC (Casamance) in Senegal:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC), 30 December 2004. The full text of the agreement is available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Clause one: The Purpose of the Present Agreement
1. As the law of amnesty is already in force the State engages to provide general security, free circulation of people and goods, in the Casamance as well as in all the rest of the territory, in accordance with the Constitution and to guarantee the exercise of fundamental freedoms in particular freedom of speech and expression in order to favour the political dialogue in the resource-rich region of the Casamance.

2. The MFDC solemnly decides to definitively give up armed combat and the use of violence as a means to conduct the political combat which it wants to conduct.

Outcome:
The peace agreement ending the war between the Senegalese government and the MFDC did not grant any form of political autonomy or independence to the Casamance region. The government pledged to maintain security in the region and to promote "political dialogue" while the MFDC agreed to end its armed challenge to the government. Additional provisions of the agreement dealt with procedures for demobilization and reintegration of MFDC forces, as well as government pledges to facilitate landmine clearance and economic reconstruction in the Casamance region.

Coding Conflict Outcomes – Revolutionary Conflicts

It might seem possible to differentiate among revolutionary conflicts based on their goals – whether they wanted to overthrow the government or simply share power, but in fact, much like separatist conflicts, nearly all revolutionary rebellions in the data set began by demanding the removal of the government in power. Revolutionary groups differ in the types of governments they wish to install in the old government's place – Islamic, socialist, democratic – but all insist that they wish to see a change in the nature of the government.

Thus, for revolutionary conflicts, if the old government was removed from power at the end of the conflict or if the country undertook a major political transition at the national level, I code this as an outcome favoring the rebel group. Many of the conflicts in this category are conflicts in which the rebel group was fighting against a dictatorship, and the conflict ended with a negotiated settlement to launch a major political transition to multiparty democracy. If conflict ended with some degree of rebel group integration into the government, but without a larger political transition at the national level, I code this as the intermediate category of conflict outcome, involving concessions from both sides. Finally, if the conflict ended without any major political concessions to the rebel group and with the rebel group excluded from participation in politics or government, I code this as an outcome favoring the government. Appendix Table A3 illustrates the rules for coding revolutionary conflict outcomes; details on each of the case examples are provided below.

Appendix Table A3:
Coding Guidelines for Revolutionary Conflicts

Type of Outcome	Outcome Coding
Government removed from power or major political transition at the national level (e.g., transition from dictatorship to multiparty democracy)	Outcome = 2 *Examples:* FMLN in El Salvador NPFL in Liberia CPN-M in Nepal
Some degree of integration of rebel group into the government without major political transition (e.g., integration of rebel forces into national military; rebel group transition to legal political party, but without major constitutional changes or guarantee of representation in government)	Outcome = 1 *Examples:* UNITA in Angola CNDP in DR Congo UTO in Tajikistan
No political concessions granted to rebel group; representatives of rebel group not permitted to participate in politics	Outcome = 0 *Examples:* AIS/FIS in Algeria Sendero Luminoso in Peru LRA in Uganda

Coding Examples – Revolutionary Conflicts:

The following provides the relevant language from the agreement ending the war, for each of the cases referenced in Table A3:

Government removed from power or major national political transition (outcome = 2):

FMLN in El Salvador:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Chapultepec Agreement, 16 January 1992. Full text of the agreement is available in United Nations General Assembly, 46th Session, and United Nations Security Council, 47th Year, "Letter dated 27 January 1992 from the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 30 January 1992 (A/46/864, S/23501). Available online at peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Chapter IV: Electoral System
The parties reaffirm their commitment, made in the Mexico Agreements, to promote a comprehensive proposal for reform of the electoral system…
Chapter VI: Political Participation by FMLN
The following agreements have been reached concerning political participation by FMLN, and shall be subject to the implementation timetable contained in this Agreement:
1. Adoption of legislative or other measures needed to guarantee former FMLN combatants the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration, within a framework of full legality, into the civil, political, and institutional life of the country…
5. Cessation of the armed conflict implies the commitment and the right of FMLN to full political participation, without any restrictions other than those deriving from the new institutional and legal framework established by the agreements reached during the negotiations.
6. Legalization of FMLN as a political party, through the adoption of a legislative decree to that end…

Outcome:
The El Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed a series of peace agreements ending the civil war. The Chapultepec Agreement, signed in January 1992, was the final agreement, and laid out detailed provisions for a political, military, and economic reform, including reform and integration of the Salvadoran military and police forces, reform of the judiciary and the electoral system, and full integration of the FMLN into the political system. These reforms constituted a major political transition for El Salvador, consistent with the demands the FMLN had made for political and economic reform in the country.

NPFL in Liberia:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Abuja Agreement to supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as subsequently clarified by the Accra Agreement, August 1995. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 25 August 1995 from the permanent representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 28 August 1995 (S/1995/742). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Akosombo Agreement, 12 September 1994. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 14 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 16 October 1994 (S/1994/1174). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Cotonou Agreement, 25 July 1993. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 6 August 1993 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Benin to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 9 August 1993 (S/26272). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Cotonou Agreement
Section B, Article 14: Structure of Government
1. The Parties observe that Liberia is a unitary State and as such agree to form a single transitional Government, styled THE LIBERIA NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. The authority of the transitional Government shall extend throughout the territorial limits of the Republic of Liberia.

2. The mandate of the transitional Government is to provide essential government services during the transitional period and to also hold and S/26272 English Page 9 supervise general and presidential elections in accordance with the ECOWAS peace plan. The Transitional Legislature Assembly or the Council of State shall have power to enact or cause to be enacted any rule(s), regulation(s) or law, or take any action(s) which may facilitate the holding of free and fair democratic elections.

Outcome:
The peace agreements included provisions for the installment of a transitional government, followed by the holding of legislative and presidential elections. The NPFL engaged in widespread intimidation in the lead up to elections in July 1997. Ultimately, the leader of the NPFL, Charles Taylor, won the presidential election, while his political party, the National Patriotic Party, won a majority of seats in the legislature. Thus, the war ended with a major political transition and the NPFL gaining control over the government of Liberia, as it had demanded throughout the war. (Source: International Crisis Group, "Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability," Africa Report No. 43, 24 April 2002).

CPN-M in Nepal:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), 22 November 2006. Full text available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provisions of Agreement:
Section 3. Political - Economic - Social Transformation and Conflict Management

Both the parties are in agreement to adopt the following policies and programs for political-economic-social transformation and to creatively manage conflict existing in the country:

3.1. To ensure progressive political, economic and social transformation on the basis of the decisions reached at the meeting of senior leaders of seven political parties and the CPN (Maoist) on Nov. 8, 2006 (Addendum-6)

3.2. To form an interim legislature-parliament on the basis of interim constitution, and hold elections to the constituent assembly in a free and fair manner by the month of Jestha, 2064 BS and practically ensure sovereignty inherent in the Nepali people.

3.3. None of the authorities related to the country's rule to remain with the King. To use the properties of late King Birendra, late queen Aishworya and their family for national interest by bringing the properties under the Nepal Government and forming a trust. To nationalize all properties (like palaces situated in different places, forests and reserves, heritages with historical and archeological importance) obtained by King Gyanendra in his capacity as the King. To decide whether or not to retain the monarchy by a simple majority in the first meeting of the constituent assembly.

3.4. To adopt a political system that fully abides by the universally accepted principles of fundamental human rights, multiparty competitive democratic system, sovereignty of the people and supremacy of the people, constitutional balance and control, rule of law, social justice, equality, independent judiciary, periodic elections, monitoring by civil society, complete press freedom, people's right to information, transparency and accountability in the Comprehensive Peace Accord: 21-11-06 4 activities of political parties, people's participation, impartial, competent, and clean bureaucracy.

3.5. To carry out an inclusive, democratic and progressive restructuring of the state by ending the current centralized and unitary form of the state in order to address the problems related to women, Dalit, indigenous people, Janajatis, Madheshi, oppressed, neglected and minority communities and backward regions by ending discrimination based on class, caste, language, gender, culture, religion, and region.

3.6. To gradually implement by deciding through mutual agreement a minimum common program for the economic and social transformation to end all forms of feudalism…

Outcome:
In the peace agreement, the Government of Nepal and the CPN-M agreed to a major political transition for Nepal, including the ending of the monarchy, the holding of elections to a constituent assembly to write a new constitution, and the full incorporation of the rebel group into politics. Along with other Nepali political parties, the CPN-M participated in elections to the constituent assembly in April 2008, and won a majority of seats in the assembly, and then began working with the other political parties to draft a new constitution. The head of the Maoist insurgency was elected prime minister. (Sources: International Crisis Group, "Nepal's Peace Agreement: Making It Work," Asia Report No. 126, 15 December 2006; International Crisis Group, "Nepal's New Political Landscape," Asia Report No. 156, 3 July 2008; International Crisis Group, "Nepal's Peace Process: The Endgame Nears," Asia Briefing No. 131, 13 December 2011).

Integration of rebel group into government without major political transition (outcome = 1):

UNITA in Angola:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Luena Memorandum of Understanding, signed 4 April 2002. Full text of the agreement available in United Nations Security Council, "Identical letters dated 25 April 2002 from the Permanent

Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council," 26 April 2002 (S/2002/483).

Lusaka Protocol, signed 15 November 1994. Full text available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," 22 December 1994 (S/1994/1441).

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Lusaka Protocol:
Annex 6
Agenda Item II.4: National Reconciliation
I. General Principles:
4. National Reconciliation implies:
(c) That, in the pursuit of national interest, UNITA members participate adequately at all levels and in the various institutions of political, administrative and economic activity.

II. Specific Principles:
7. In the context of national reconciliation, all the first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates in the September 1992 legislative elections shall, except in the cases provided for under article 165 (3) of Law 5/92 of 16 April, be installed in their functions in the National Assembly…

III. Modalities:
1. In application of the relevant provisions of Article 4 (c) of the general principles of National Reconciliation above, the concrete modalities of participation by UNITA in the various posts in the Government, State administration and diplomatic missions abroad, as agreed between the Government and UNITA and which appear in a document which is an integral part of the annex of the Lusaka Protocol relating to National Reconciliation, shall be specified in a letter to be written by the Angolan authorities to the leaders of that party.

Outcome:
The Lusaka Protocol (and the follow-up agreements affirming the parties' commitment to the terms of the Lusaka Protocol) provided for the conversion of UNITA into a legal political party, and its incorporation into the national legislature. UNITA was guaranteed four cabinet minister posts as well as a number of other posts in the national government. The Angolan government (led by the MPLA) resisted granting any additional government posts to UNITA and by 2004, only one UNITA member remained in the cabinet. This outcome involved concessions from both sides: UNITA did not secure a complete overthrow of the government or major political transition as it had sought, but was able to secure representation in the government (Source: Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, available online at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu).

CNDP in DR Congo:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the CNDP, Goma, 23 March 2009. Full text available online at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Article 1: Transformation of the CNDP

1.1. The CNDP confirms the irreversible nature of its decision to cease its existence as a politico-military movement. It undertakes to: a) integrate its police force and its armed units into the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively; b) transform into a political party and complete the necessary legal formalities to that end; c) from now on, seek solutions to its concerns strictly through political means and in accordance with the institutional order and laws of the Republic.

1.2. The Government undertakes to respond swiftly to the CNDP's request for recognition as a political party.

1.3. Furthermore, the Parties agree with the principle of the CNDP's participation in DRC politics. The terms will be determined by mutual agreement.

Outcome:
The peace agreement permitted the CNDP to become legal political party, integrated the CNDP into the military and police forces, provided for return of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, allowed for the release of political prisoners, and provided amnesty for participants in the conflict. This settlement involved political concessions from both sides: the CNDP had originally called for the government to step down and for the establishment of a new government. The government offered the CNDP promises of integration into political and military structures, but did not undertake a major political transition. (Sources: "Government of DR Congo (Zaire) – CNDP in UCDP Conflict Database at ucdp.uu.se; International Crisis Group, "Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy," Africa Report No. 150, 11 May 2009).

UTO in Tajikistan:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997. Full text of agreement available in United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 1 July 1997 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 2 July 1997 (A/52/219, S/1997/510). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Annex I to the General Agreement: Protocol on Political Questions, signed in Bishkek on 18 May 1997. Full text of the protocol (which includes the details of the political settlement) available in United Nations Security Council, "Letter dated 20 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," 20 May 1997 (S/1997/385). Full text available at: peacemaker.un.org.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
Annex I:
2: The Central Electoral Commission on Elections and the Holding of a Referendum shall be established for a transitional period with the inclusion in its membership of 25 per cent of the representatives of the United Tajik Opposition and shall conduct the elections and referendum before the beginning of the work of the new professional Parliament and the establishment of the new Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Tajikistan.

3. The reform of the Government shall be carried out by incorporating representatives of the United Tajik Opposition into the structures of the executive branch, including ministries, departments, local government bodies and judicial and law-enforcement bodies on the basis of a quota. The candidates put forward shall be appointed in accordance with a proposal by the United Tajik Opposition following consultations between the President and the Chairman of the Commission on National Reconciliation.

4. The bans and restrictions on activities by the political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition and the mass information media shall be lifted by the authorities of Tajikistan after the completion of the second phase of the implementation of the Protocol on Military Questions. The political parties and movements of the United Tajik Opposition shall function within the framework of the Constitution and the laws in force of the Republic of Tajikistan and in accordance with the norms and guarantees set forth in the general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord in the country.

Outcome:
The peace agreement allowed for the full participation of the UTO in politics in Tajikistan, and guaranteed the UTO representation in the parliament. However, the peace agreement allowed for the Rakhmonov government to remain in power. Therefore, this is a case in which both sides made political concessions: the UTO agreed to a settlement that left the Rakhmonov government in place, while the government agreed to a settlement that permitted UTO participation in politics.

No political concessions granted to rebel group; rebel group not permitted to participate in politics (outcome = 0):

AIS/FIS in Algeria:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
The AIS negotiated a ceasefire agreement with Algerian military forces, effective 21 September 1997. The government formally recognized the ceasefire agreement in 1999 and offered an amnesty to members of the rebel group.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No specific provisions of agreement dealing with political integration.

Outcome:
The AIS/FIS announced a ceasefire on 21 September 1997. The government formally recognized the ceasefire in 1999, leading to formal processes for demobilizing members of the rebel group. The government also offered a general amnesty to former members of the AIS. The ceasefire agreement did not address any of the political issues at stake in the conflict; the FIS was not permitted to participate in politics and AIS forces were not integrated into the military. Apart from the general amnesty, the government did not grant any political concessions to the rebel group. (Sources: John Daniszewski, "Algerian Insurgents Declare a Cease-Fire," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 September 1997; Mohammed M. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," Middle East Journal, vol. 54, no. 4 (2000): pp.572-591.)

Sendero Luminoso in Peru:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict; conflict ends through low activity.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict.

Outcome:
In 1992, the Peruvian government captured the leader of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, as well as a number of senior members of the rebel group. Following the capture of these group leaders, violence declined substantially and eventually fell below the levels used by UCDP/PRIO to identify ongoing armed conflicts. The government did not grant any political concessions to Sendero Luminoso and members of the rebel group are not permitted to participate in politics. (Source: Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Princeton University Press, 2009).

LRA in Uganda:
Ceasefire or Peace Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict; conflict ends through low activity.

Relevant Provision of Agreement:
No formal ceasefire or peace agreement ending the conflict.

Outcome:
Despite a number of attempts at peace negotiations between the Ugandan government and the LRA – including a lengthy period of negotiations from 2006 to 2008 – the two sides did not sign a formal peace agreement. Following the failure to reach agreement in 2008, the Ugandan government launched a renewed military offensive against LRA bases in South Sudan. The offensive pushed the LRA out of South Sudan and into neighboring territory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic. Although scattered LRA forces remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, the LRA has been severely weakened and is no longer active in Uganda. The Ugandan government did not grant any political concessions to the LRA and has not incorporated LRA members into the political system in Uganda. (Source: International Crisis Group, "LRA: A Regional Strategy Beyond Killing Kony," Africa Report No. 157, 28 April 2010).

Sources for coding conflict outcomes:

To identify the details of the political settlement ending the conflict, I relied on the following sources:

University of Notre Dame, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Peace Accords Matrix, available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/. This database provides detailed information on peace agreements and their implementation throughout the world.

United Nations Peacemaker, Peace Agreements Database, created by the UN Department of Political Affairs, available at: peacemaker.un.org. This database provides the text of major peace agreements submitted to the United Nations.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Database, available online at: http://ucdp.uu.se/. This database provides information on conflict termination, including details of negotiations to end the conflict. This source is particularly useful in coding political outcomes for conflicts that ended through low activity or through a ceasefire, and therefore, are not captured in the Peace Accords Matrix database.

International Crisis Group reports, available online at: www.crisisgroup.org. These reports focus on particular conflicts, providing detailed information on conflict mediation, peace negotiations, terms of political settlements, and the implementation of peace agreements.

Multiple secondary sources, detailing the terms of settlement in particular conflicts. Full list available from author.

III. Variables Measuring Civilian Targeting and Restraint toward Civilians

For a detailed discussion of measures of government and rebel group civilian targeting and restraint, see Jessica A. Stanton, *Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law* (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and the associated Codebook describing the data, available online at: jessicastanton.org/book

In measuring civilian targeting and restraint toward civilians, I include as civilian targeting attacks on civilian populations and civilian targets – for example, civilian residential areas, schools, hospitals, camps for internally displaced persons or refugees, as well as civilian infrastructure sites (for more on infrastructure, see the discussion of terrorism below). My definition of civilian populations and civilian targets is similar to the definition used in international humanitarian legal treaties. The war crimes provision of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court outlaws attacks "against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities" (Article 8.2.b.i) or "against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives" (Article 8.2.b.ii).

For the purposes of coding, I consider an individual to be a civilian if s/he is not taking direct part in hostilities and is not a member of an armed opposition group, a member of the government's military or police forces, or a government official. In addition, I do not code attacks on police or government vehicles or buildings as attacks on civilian targets. Although international legal definitions would consider police officers and government officials not actively taking part in hostilities to be civilians, in the context of a civil war, police and government actors often work closely with military forces in carrying out counterinsurgency operations. This can make it difficult to differentiate between the activities of military forces, police forces, and government officials. Using a narrower definition of civilian thus reduces ambiguity in the coding, allowing for a focus on deliberate attacks on civilian targets.

I identify civilian targets based on the primary purpose or use for that target. For example, any vehicle, building, or place that is not affiliated with the government, police, or military is considered a civilian target. In addition, I consider infrastructure targets, such as oil pipelines, sanitation systems, bridges, railway lines, power lines, and electric stations, to be civilian targets. Although one might argue that the civilian infrastructure is crucial not only to the life of the civilian population and the functioning of the economy, but also to the activities of the military forces, the primary purpose of these infrastructure targets is to provide for the day-to-day functioning of the civilian population and the civilian economy. This is also broadly consistent with the provisions of international humanitarian law, which prohibit attacks on objects that would endanger the civilian population. The Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, for example, prohibits attacks on infrastructure targets such as dams or power stations that would endanger the civilian population (Article 15) and prohibits attacks on objects essential to civilian survival, such as crops, drinking water, and irrigation systems (Article 14).

In coding violence against civilians, "I focus on violence that is intentional, in which sources indicate that government or rebel group attacks on civilian populations or civilian targets were deliberate. I do not include incidents of collateral damage, in which civilians are harmed or civilian targets are destroyed during a military engagement with the opponent. To do so would require making judgments about the necessity and proportionality of a military action, as well as whether the actor responsible made adequate attempts to avoid civilian casualties. I am interested in capturing

patterns of behavior – forms of violence that are repeated throughout the conflict…Focusing on patterns of conduct limits the need to make judgements about the legality of particular incidents of violence, and reduces the likelihood of attributing individual criminal acts to the armed group as a whole." (Stanton 2016, 65).

rrestraint rebel group use of restraint toward civilians

0 = rebel group did not exercise restraint toward civilians

1 = rebel group exercised restraint toward civilians

Source: Stanton (2016). A "rebel group is coded as having exercised restraint if it did *not* use any of the following four forms of violence against civilians: massacres, scorched earth campaigns, forced expulsion of a particular ethnic or religious group from territory, or deliberate bombing and shelling of populated civilian targets." (Stanton 2016, 68) See pp. 67-70 in the book for additional information on the concept and measurement of restraint.

gcivtargeting government civilian targeting

0 = government did not target civilians

1 = government targeted civilians

Source: Stanton (2016). Dichotomous variable measuring whether the government used any of the following forms of violence against civilians: massacres, scorched earth campaigns, cleansing of a particular ethnic or religious group, or deliberate bombing and shelling of populated civilian targets.

I define massacres as the killing of five or more civilians at the same place and time, through direct contact of armed forces with civilians – for example, by shooting or beating to death. I code only those groups responsible for more than five massacres as using this form of violence. Scorched earth strategies involve the intentional burning or destruction of villages and/or agricultural land. Cleansing is the forced, permanent removal of civilians from territory. Because belligerents often claim that aerial bombardment or artillery shelling is aimed at military targets, only mistakenly hitting nearby civilians, I focus on sustained bombing or shelling of civilian targets such as residential areas.

gcivtarget_rrestraint interaction term for rebel group restraint and government civilian targeting

g5massacre government massacres of civilians

0 = government did not massacre civilians

1 = government massacred civilians

Source: Stanton (2016). "Massacres are defined as the deliberate killing of a group of five or more civilians at close range in a single incident. Civilians killed by bombs or killed in the crossfire during a battle are not included. Only those groups that were responsible for more than five massacres during the course of the conflict are coded as having used this form of violence." (Stanton 2016, 68)

gmassacre_rrestraint interaction term for rebel group restraint and government massacres

gscorched government use of scorched earth strategies

0 = government did not use scorched earth strategies

1 = government used scorched earth strategies

Source: Stanton (2016). "Scorched earth strategies involve the intentional burning or destruction of villages and/or agricultural land." (Stanton 2016, 68)

gscorched_rrestraint interaction term for rebel group restraint and government scorched earth

gbombing government use of bombing or shelling of civilian targets

0 = government did not bomb or shell civilian targets

1 = government bombed or shelled civilian targets

Source: Stanton (2016), *ghiterrorism* variable. Government bombing "captures cases in which the government engaged in intentional bombing and shelling of populated civilian targets – for example, the bombing of a village at a time when no rebel military forces or military bases were present and when no military engagement with the rebel group was ongoing. Bombing or shelling directed at the rebel group's troops, weapons, or military bases is excluded, even if civilians were killed in the crossfire." (Stanton 2016, 74)

Intentional bombing and shelling includes aerial and naval bombardment as well as artillery shelling. In many cases, governments claim that bombing or shelling of civilian targets is unintentional, insisting that the target of attack was military. For example, governments might assert that rebel forces were stationed near to civilian areas, making it difficult to prevent collateral damage to civilian areas during attacks on rebel group units or bases. To address this issue, I only code a government as having bombed or shelled civilian targets if sources unaffiliated with either the government or the rebel group (media outlets, NGOs, human rights groups, the United Nations) indicate that the government was responsible for attacking civilian targets, and if such behavior on the part of the government was a repeated tactic. See pp. 72-74 in the book for additional discussion.

gbombing_rrestraint interaction term for rebel group restraint and government bombing

gcleansing government use of cleansing

0 = government did not use cleansing

1 = government used cleansing

Source: Stanton (2016). Cleansing captures cases in which a government forcibly expelled civilians from a particular ethnic or religious group from contested territory.

gcleansing_rrestraint interaction term for rebel group restraint and government cleansing

IV. Variables Measuring Diplomatic Actions against Governments

gsanctions economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed on government

0 = no economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed on government

1 = economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed on government

Source: Sanctions data are from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data Set, Version 4.0 (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014). Arms embargoes data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Embargoes Database, available at: www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes.

Measure includes only economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed by Western governments or Western-dominated intergovernmental organizations. The following Western-dominated intergovernmental organizations imposed sanctions in civil wars: the European Economic Community, the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations. The measure does not include trade-related economic sanctions.

UNcondemn UN Security Council condemnation of government violence against civilians

0 = no UN Security Council condemnation of government violence against civilians

1 = UN Security Council condemnation of government violence against civilians

Source: UN Security Council resolutions passed from 1989 to 2010, available at www.un.org.

gsanctions_threat economic sanctions or arms embargoes threatened or imposed on government

0 = no economic sanctions or arms embargoes threatened or imposed on government

1 = economic sanctions or arms embargoes threatened or imposed on government

Source: Sanctions data are from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) Data Set, Version 4.0 (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014). Arms embargoes data are from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Embargoes Database, available at: www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes.

gsanctions_UNcondemn economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed on government and/or UN condemnation of government violence against civilians

0 = no economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed or UN condemnation of government

1 = economic sanctions or arms embargoes imposed and/or UN condemnation of government

V. Variables Measuring Conflict Characteristics

troop ratio of average government troop strength to average rebel group troop strength

logtroop ratio of average government troop strength to average rebel group troop strength, logged

Source: troop data constructed using annual data from *The Military Balance* and the *SIPRI Yearbooks* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) multiple years; The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) multiple years). Annual data are averaged across all years of the conflict.

Government troop estimates include active armed forces, excluding paramilitary forces and police.

rebstrength_NSA alternate measure of rebel group military strength

Source: Non-State Actor Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009), *rebstrength* variable. This measure uses a five-point scale to code the strength of the rebel group relative to the government, ranging from much weaker to much stronger. *Rebstrength_NSA* inverts the scale of the Cunningham et al. measure, to allow for comparison with *troop*.

rintervention foreign military intervention on the rebel group side
0 = no foreign military intervention on rebel group side
1 = foreign military intervention on rebel group side

gintervention foreign military intervention on the government side
0 = no foreign military intervention on government side
1 = foreign military intervention on government side

Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and UCDP/PRIO External Support Dataset (Hogbladh, Pettersson, and Themner 2011). Military intervention variables measure the provision of military troops to aid belligerents during conflict.

bdeath total battle-related deaths for the conflict

logbdeath total battle-related deaths for the conflict, logged

Source: PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, Version 3.0 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset provides three battle-related death estimates for each conflict: low estimate, high estimate, and best estimate. *Bdeath* is coded using best estimate.

duratn duration of the conflict calculated in months, inclusive of the first and last month of the conflict

logduratn duration of the conflict, logged

avdeath battle-related deaths, per year of the conflict

Source: calculated using *bdeath* and *duratn*. For example, if the conflict lasted for 18 months or 2.5 years), avdeath = bdeath/(2.5).

logavdeath battle-related deaths, per year of the conflict, logged

pcgdp per capita GDP

logpcgdp per capita GDP, logged

Source: data are from Gleditsch (2002), variable name "rgdp96pc". Gleditsch uses the Penn World Tables to calculate per capital GDP; all numbers are in 1996 $US. In the Penn World Tables, variable is called "Real GDP Per Capita (Constant Prices: Chain Series)." Per capita GDP is coded for the year prior to the conflict start year. If GDP data are not available for the year prior to the conflict start year, per capita GDP is coded for the conflict start year. For conflicts that began prior to 1989, per capita GDP is coded for the year 1988.

Note: Gleditsch (2002) data cover years through 2000. For conflicts that began in 2002 or later (and would require GDP data for 2001 or later), per capita GDP is coded using data from the year 2000.

separatist type of conflict
0 = rebel group has revolutionary goals
1 = rebel group has separatist goals

Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003), updated to 2010.

multiparty multiparty conflict
0 = conflict is not a multiparty conflict
1 = conflict is a multiparty conflict

Source: coded using information on "incompatibility" (variable name: *incomp*) from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

If multiple rebel groups are fighting against the same government, but they are fighting over different issues (different incompatibilities), then these rebel groups are coded as fighting in separate single-party conflicts. If multiple rebel groups are fighting against the same government and are fighting over the same issues (the same incompatibility), then these rebel groups are coded as fighting in a multiparty conflict. Conflicts are coded as multiparty conflicts even if the rival rebel groups do not engage in fighting that reaches 1,000 battle-related deaths.

rstaid_nonWest rebel group aid (financing, weapons, or troops) from non-Western government, in first year of conflict
0 = rebel group did not receive aid from a non-Western government
1 = rebel group received aid from a non-Western government

Source: UCDP External Support Dataset (Hogbladh, Pettersson, and Themner 2011).

VI. Variables Measuring Government and Rebel Group Characteristics

P5ally target government alliance with any of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council at any point during the civil war

Source: Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set, Version 3.0 (Leeds et al. 2002) and the Correlates of War Formal Alliances data set, Version 4.1 (Gibler 2009).

polity government's polity score in the first year of the conflict

Source: Polity IV Dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2009).

If the conflict began prior to 1989, the polity score from 1989 is used.

If the polity score in the first year of the conflict is not available because the government is in a period of "interregnum" (−77), the polity score is coded as 0, according to the recommendation of the Polity IV data set creators.

The following cases are coded in this way:

Afghanistan (Rabbani government) v. Taliban, 1994-1996
Bosnia v. Croats, 1992-1994
Bosnia v. Serbs, 1992-1995
Congo v. RCD, 1998-2001
Congo v. MLC, 1998-2001
Côte D'Ivoire v. MPCI, MPIGO, MJP, FN, 2002-2004
Somalia v. USC faction led by Aideed, 1991-2002 (**see additional notes on this case below**)
Somalia v. ARS/UIC, 2006-ongoing
Somalia v. Al-Shabaab, 2008-ongoing

If the polity score in the first year of the conflict is not available because the government is in a period of "interruption" (−66), the polity score is coded as 0. The Polity IV data set recommends coding these cases as missing data since an "interruption" is intended to indicate that a foreign power is occupying the country and a new government has not yet been established. The two cases in the data set coded as "interruption" are Afghanistan and Iraq; while both of these countries still had significant foreign presences in the country at the start of their civil wars, in 2003 and 2004, respectively, both countries did have functioning national governments and national police and military forces. Thus, coding for these countries follows the procedure recommended for "interregnum" states, using a polity score of 0.

The following cases are coded in this way:

Afghanistan v. Taliban, 2003-ongoing
Iraq v. Al-Mahdi Army, 2004-2008
Iraq v. Ansar al-Islam, 2004-ongoing
Iraq v. ISI, 2004-ongoing

See additional notes in the Codebook for Stanton (2016) on the polity coding for specific cases.

democracy democratic government
0 = polity < 6
1 = polity ≥ 6

autocracy autocratic government
0 = polity > −6
1 = polity ≤ −6

anocracy anocratic government
0 = polity ≥ 6 OR polity ≤ −6
1 = −6 < polity < 6

WestAlly target government alliance with a Western government at any point during the civil war

Source: Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set, Version 3.0 (Leeds et al. 2002) and the Correlates of War Formal Alliances data set, Version 4.1 (Gibler 2009). Western government includes Australia, New Zealand, the United States, or any European democracy.

Islamic conflict involves differences over Islam
0 = conflict does not involve differences over Islam
1 = conflict involves differences over Islam

Source: information on rebel group political objectives is from the conflict database created by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, as well as from Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism database, available online at www.janes.com.

Conflicts in which the rebel group's stated political objectives involve Islam are coded as *Islamic* = – for example, groups seeking to establish an Islamic government, or groups seeking independence or autonomy for a particular territory, at least in part, because of a desire to establish an Islamic government in the disputed territory. Also coded as *Islamic* = 1 are conflicts in which the rebel group represents an ethnic or national community whose primary religion is Islam and the government represents a community whose primary religion is not Islam.

VII. Additional Variables for Robustness Tests

prorok_adj conflict outcome, using data from Prorok (2016)

Variable is a five-point scale, ranging from −2 to +2, with +2 representing the most favorable outcome for the rebel group.

Source: Prorok (2016). Prorok's original measure is a seven-point scale, ranging from −3 to +3, with +3 representing the most favorable outcome for the combatant and −3 the least favorable outcome for the combatant. Prorok distinguishes between military victories (coding of +3) and conflicts in which the combatant achieved all of its war aims through a negotiated settlement (coding of +2). Similarly, Prorok distinguishes between military defeats (coding of −3) and conflicts ending through settlement, in which the combatant did not achieve any of its war aims (coding of −2). Because I am interested in the political outcome of conflict, and do not differentiate between cases in which rebel groups achieved a favorable outcome through military victory versus through agreement, I collapse Prorok's coding scale to combine values of +3 and +2, and values of −3 and −2.

osv_best_r rebel group one-sided violence, best estimate

osv_best_g government one-sided violence, best estimate

osv_ratio government one-sided violence, as a proportion of total one-sided violence in the conflict

osv_r_plus1 rebel group one-sided violence, plus one (for log transformation)

osv_g_plus1 government one-sided violence, plus one (for log transformation)

logosv_r rebel group one-sided violence, logged

logosv_g government one-sided violence, logged

Source: UCDP One-Sided Violence data set (Eck and Hultman 2007). The UCDP one-sided violence data are annual count data of the number of civilians killed in targeted attacks by the government or rebel group. I use the UCDP best estimates for each year that the conflict was active, summing these to estimate the total number of deaths from government or rebel group one-sided violence for the conflict.

icrq_bq index of government bureaucratic quality

Source: Hendrix (2010).

taxratio total taxes, as a proportion of GDP

Source: Hendrix (2010).

WestMediation attempted or successful mediation by a Western government or intergovernmental organization

0 = Western government or intergovernmental organization was not involved as a mediator

1 = Western government or intergovernmental organization was involved as a mediator

Source: Mediation data collected by Svensson (2007) and the Civil Wars Mediation (CWM) Dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011).

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