Threats at Home and Abroad: Interstate War, Civil War, and Alliance Formation

Online Appendix

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Appendix A: Additional Statistical Analysis

These models control for the presence of an ongoing civil war. Data on ongoing civil conflict is obtained from the Ethnic Power-Relations (EPR) Dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).

Table A1: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A1: Defense Formation	Model A2: Consultation Formation	Model A3: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	4.037**	-0.821	-0.858*
	(0.499)	(0.483)	(0.366)
Small Excluded Group	-0.349	0.474**	
	(0.195)	(0.155)	
Large Excluded Group	0.262*	0.601**	
	(0.125)	(0.131)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.207
			(0.160)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.238
			(0.126)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.537**
			(0.111)
Ongoing Conflict	-0.172	-0.414**	-0.001
	(0.149)	(0.138)	(0.107)
Major Power	1.534**	1.247**	0.738**
	(0.222)	(0.176)	(0.169)
Number of Neighbors	0.052**	0.113**	0.158**
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Existing Defense Pact	0.182	-0.474**	-0.171
	(0.158)	(0.131)	(0.116)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.436**	1.084**	0.219
	(0.164)	(0.136)	(0.119)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.846**	-0.717**	-0.288*
	(0.167)	(0.139)	(0.116)
Constant	-4.518**	-3.320**	-2.867**
	(0.205)	(0.181)	(0.149)
Observations	8,665	8,665	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These models control for GDP per capita. Data on GDP per capita is obtained from the replication files of Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014).

Table A2: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2005

	Model A4: Defense Formation	Model A5: Consultation Formation	Model A6: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	2.930**	-1.206*	-1.290**
	(0.544)	(0.502)	(0.405)
Small Excluded Group	-0.354	0.500**	
	(0.210)	(0.169)	
Large Excluded Group	0.191	0.599**	
	(0.140)	(0.149)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.295
			(0.179)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.292*
			(0.134)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.501**
			(0.126)
GDP Per Capita	-0.191**	0.002	-0.081
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.045)
Major Power	1.759**	1.229**	0.789**
	(0.229)	(0.182)	(0.174)
Number of Neighbors	0.014	0.097**	0.142**
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	0.223	-0.501**	-0.264*
	(0.173)	(0.139)	(0.124)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.718**	1.181**	0.334*
	(0.189)	(0.161)	(0.136)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.757**	-0.451**	-0.098
	(0.190)	(0.163)	(0.133)
Observations	6,988	6,988	6,988

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These models control for oil production per capita. Data on oil production per capita is obtained from the replication files of Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014).

Table A3: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2005

	Model A7: Defense Formation	Model A8: Consultation Formation	Model A9: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	3.465**	-1.076*	-0.867*
	(0.522)	(0.498)	(0.387)
Small Excluded Group	-0.340	0.466**	
	(0.204)	(0.168)	
Large Excluded Group	0.229	0.579**	
	(0.139)	(0.145)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.330
			(0.179)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.246
			(0.134)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.519**
			(0.122)
Oil Production Per Capita	-0.010*	-0.027*	-0.048**
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Major Power	1.560**	1.226**	0.717**
	(0.215)	(0.177)	(0.173)
Number of Neighbors	0.028	0.099**	0.154**
	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	0.264	-0.483**	-0.222
	(0.175)	(0.138)	(0.124)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.576**	1.181**	0.311*
	(0.184)	(0.153)	(0.130)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.755**	-0.405*	-0.078
	(0.191)	(0.158)	(0.130)
Observations	7,058	7,058	7,058

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These models control for log population. Data on population is the same data used to calculate group sizes and was obtained from Luc Girardin from the EPR team (Vogt et al. 2015) on 10/1/20.

Table A4: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A10: Defense Formation	Model A11: Consultation Formation	Model A12: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	3.962**	-0.878	-0.861*
	(0.506)	(0.488)	(0.366)
Small Excluded Group	-0.243	0.539**	
	(0.203)	(0.162)	
Large Excluded Group	0.302*	0.592**	
	(0.126)	(0.132)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.200
			(0.161)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.190
			(0.129)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.537**
			(0.110)
Log Population	-0.095**	-0.061	0.050
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Major Power	1.751**	1.359**	0.662**
	(0.241)	(0.189)	(0.172)
Number of Neighbors	0.068**	0.120**	0.148**
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	0.186	-0.473**	-0.170
	(0.162)	(0.134)	(0.115)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.398*	1.096**	0.218
	(0.168)	(0.139)	(0.119)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.767**	-0.659**	-0.298*
	(0.170)	(0.142)	(0.117)
Constant	-3.827**	-2.908**	-3.267**
	(0.332)	(0.299)	(0.280)
Observations	8,656	8,656	8,656

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These models control for percent mountainous terrain. Data on mountainous terrain is obtained from the replication files of Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014).

Table A5: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2005

	Model A13: Defense Formation	Model A14: Consultation Formation	Model A15: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	3.411**	-0.954*	-1.120**
	(0.506)	(0.481)	(0.378)
Small Excluded Group	-0.296	0.447**	
	(0.206)	(0.168)	
Large Excluded Group	0.347*	0.581**	
	(0.137)	(0.141)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.330
			(0.176)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.291*
			(0.139)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.559**
			(0.122)
Percent Mountainous Terrain	-0.011**	-0.006*	-0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Major Power	1.662**	1.309**	0.792**
	(0.218)	(0.182)	(0.178)
Number of Neighbors	0.027	0.099**	0.149**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	0.110	-0.577**	-0.283*
	(0.171)	(0.139)	(0.125)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.503**	1.098**	0.240
	(0.178)	(0.152)	(0.132)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.775**	-0.497**	-0.138
	(0.182)	(0.150)	(0.127)
Constant	-4.113**	-3.176**	-2.710**
	(0.213)	(0.193)	(0.159)
Observations	7,133	7,133	7,133

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These models control for the number of previous civil conflicts. Data on previous civil conflict is obtained from the EPR Dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).

Table A6: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A16: Defense Formation	Model A17: Consultation Formation	Model A18: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	4.051**	-0.604	-0.787*
	(0.485)	(0.468)	(0.362)
Small Excluded Group	-0.120	0.642**	
	(0.192)	(0.156)	
Large Excluded Group	0.325**	0.667**	
	(0.124)	(0.131)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.233
			(0.160)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.300*
			(0.126)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.568**
			(0.110)
Number Previous Civil Conflicts	-0.333**	-0.322**	-0.060*
	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.026)
Major Power	1.514**	1.266**	0.730**
	(0.211)	(0.169)	(0.167)
Number of Neighbors	0.093**	0.150**	0.167**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Existing Defense Pact	0.292	-0.391**	-0.169
	(0.162)	(0.138)	(0.116)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.220	0.921**	0.181
	(0.172)	(0.143)	(0.121)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.694**	-0.589**	-0.256*
	(0.167)	(0.139)	(0.117)
Constant	-4.578**	-3.467**	-2.900**
	(0.204)	(0.183)	(0.150)
Observations	8,665	8,665	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These models control for democracy. Data on democracy is based on the Polity IV project (Marshall et al. 2012) and obtained from the replication files of Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014). A state is considered a democracy if it has a polity2 score of 6 or higher.

Table A7: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2005

	Model A19: Defense Formation	Model A20: Consultation Formation	Model A21: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	2.791**	-1.128*	-1.213**
	(0.551)	(0.493)	(0.393)
Small Excluded Group	-0.178	0.495**	
	(0.204)	(0.165)	
Large Excluded Group	0.184	0.541**	
	(0.142)	(0.142)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.289
			(0.181)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.318*
			(0.134)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.543**
			(0.126)
Democracy	-0.970**	-0.184	-0.082
	(0.153)	(0.114)	(0.101)
Major Power	2.002**	1.293**	0.769**
	(0.231)	(0.181)	(0.175)
Number of Neighbors	-0.021	0.089**	0.148**
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	-0.114	-0.616**	-0.375**
	(0.169)	(0.136)	(0.124)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.928**	1.154**	0.366**
	(0.175)	(0.149)	(0.131)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.903**	-0.480**	-0.167
	(0.184)	(0.152)	(0.129)
Constant	-3.663**	-3.121**	-2.743**
	(0.244)	(0.206)	(0.177)
Observations	6,932	6,932	6,932

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

For this analysis, alliances that only include defense obligations are considered instances of defense formation, alliances that only include consultation obligations are considered instances of consultation formation, and alliances that only include neutrality or nonaggression obligations are considered instances of neutrality/nonaggression formation.

Table A8: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A22: Defense Formation	Model A23: Consultation Formation	Model A24: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	2.065*	-4.589**	-1.972**
	(0.874)	(0.896)	(0.444)
Small Excluded Group	-0.192	0.949**	
	(0.352)	(0.344)	
Large Excluded Group	0.322	0.741*	
	(0.246)	(0.315)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.334
			(0.216)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.348*
			(0.167)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.594**
			(0.149)
Major Power	1.059*	1.594**	0.338
	(0.417)	(0.314)	(0.222)
Number of Neighbors	0.076*	0.067*	0.173**
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Existing Defense Pact	0.116	-0.269	-0.052
	(0.213)	(0.272)	(0.138)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.212	0.402	-0.230
	(0.227)	(0.265)	(0.142)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.268	0.305	0.064
	(0.278)	(0.313)	(0.146)
Constant	-5.604**	-4.626**	-3.381**
	(0.421)	(0.432)	(0.209)
Observations	8,665	8,665	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These analyses only use country-years where there was at least one politically relevant ethnic group. Data on relevancy is obtained from the EPR Dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).

Table A9: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A25: Defense Formation	Model A26: Consultation Formation	Model A27: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	3.736**	-1.140*	-1.154**
	(0.534)	(0.513)	(0.389)
Small Excluded Group	-0.657**	0.562*	
	(0.231)	(0.249)	
Large Excluded Group	-0.024	0.694**	
	(0.175)	(0.232)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.268
			(0.205)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.216
			(0.181)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.564**
			(0.167)
Major Power	1.603**	1.307**	0.804**
	(0.223)	(0.186)	(0.177)
Number of Neighbors	0.040*	0.111**	0.163**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	0.079	-0.580**	-0.245*
	(0.169)	(0.143)	(0.125)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.530**	1.213**	0.270*
	(0.170)	(0.149)	(0.129)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.652**	-0.562**	-0.131
	(0.172)	(0.148)	(0.123)
Constant	-4.244**	-3.546**	-2.933**
	(0.242)	(0.253)	(0.193)
Observations	6,881	6,881	6,881

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

This model uses a measure of excluded group size that captures the largest excluded group's size relative to the total population.. This measure is obtained from the EPR data (Vogt et al. 2015).

Table A10: Logit Regression of Consultation Pact Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A28: Consultation Formation
External Threat	-0.778
	(0.485)
Small Excluded Group (Relative to Population)	0.537**
	(0.156)
Large Excluded Group (Relative to Population)	0.504**
	(0.128)
Major Power	1.214**
	(0.171)
Number of Neighbors	0.108**
	(0.017)
Existing Defense Pact	-0.462**
	(0.131)
Existing Consultation Pact	1.113**
	(0.138)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.730**
	(0.139)
Constant	-3.341**
	(0.181)
Observations	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These analyses use the mean population size relative to the government population rather than the median to determine whether an excluded group or TEK group is large. We rely on the median in the main analyses due to the distributions of group size being highly skewed.

Table A11: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation, 1946 to 2009

	Model A29: Defense Formation	Model A30: Consultation Formation	Model A31: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	4.141**	-0.702	-0.867*
	(0.499)	(0.483)	(0.366)
Small Excluded Group (Mean)	0.093	0.608**	
	(0.136)	(0.129)	
Large Excluded Group (Mean)	0.183	0.377**	
	(0.136)	(0.144)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.207
			(0.160)
Excluded Group with Small TEK (Mean)			0.294*
			(0.119)
Excluded Group with Large TEK (Mean)			0.527**
			(0.111)
Major Power	1.339**	1.168**	0.685**
	(0.215)	(0.176)	(0.166)
Number of Neighbors	0.052**	0.108**	0.158**
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Existing Defense Pact	0.200	-0.452**	-0.162
	(0.161)	(0.133)	(0.116)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.493**	1.112**	0.214
	(0.162)	(0.138)	(0.119)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.877**	-0.754**	-0.292*
	(0.166)	(0.140)	(0.116)
Constant	-4.583**	-3.351**	-2.863**
	(0.208)	(0.182)	(0.149)
Observations	8,665	8,665	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These analyses use the 40th percentile population size relative to the government population rather than the median to determine whether an excluded group or TEK group is large.

Table A12: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation, 1946 to 2009

	Model A32: Defense Formation	Model A33: Consultation Formation	Model A34: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	4.139**	-0.778	-0.805*
	(0.500)	(0.484)	(0.364)
Small Excluded Group (40th Percentile)	-0.208	0.549**	
	(0.202)	(0.160)	
Large Excluded Group (40th Percentile)	0.191	0.502**	
	(0.122)	(0.127)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.202
			(0.160)
Excluded Group with Small TEK (40th Percentile)			0.266
			(0.136)
Excluded Group with Large TEK (40th Percentile)			0.484**
			(0.106)
Major Power	1.444**	1.210**	0.690**
	(0.214)	(0.171)	(0.166)
Number of Neighbors	0.053**	0.108**	0.156**
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Existing Defense Pact	0.202	-0.462**	-0.171
	(0.159)	(0.131)	(0.116)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.464**	1.112**	0.211
	(0.165)	(0.137)	(0.121)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.868**	-0.731**	-0.293*
	(0.166)	(0.139)	(0.117)
Constant	-4.578**	-3.340**	-2.867**
	(0.207)	(0.181)	(0.150)
Observations	8,665	8,665	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

These analyses use the 60th percentile population size relative to the government population rather than the median to determine whether an excluded group or TEK group is large.

Table A13: Logit Regressions of Alliance Formation, 1946 to 2009

	Model A35: Defense Formation	Model A36: Consultation Formation	Model A37: Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	4.149**	-0.659	-0.849*
	(0.500)	(0.490)	(0.366)
Small Excluded Group (60th Percentile)	0.105	0.640**	
	(0.158)	(0.137)	
Large Excluded Group (60th Percentile)	0.152	0.433**	
	(0.128)	(0.134)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.205
			(0.160)
Excluded Group with Small TEK (60th Percentile)			0.336**
			(0.116)
Excluded Group with Large TEK (60th Percentile)			0.514**
			(0.112)
Major Power	1.334**	1.142**	0.651**
	(0.226)	(0.178)	(0.165)
Number of Neighbors	0.052**	0.106**	0.157**
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Existing Defense Pact	0.206	-0.462**	-0.164
	(0.160)	(0.131)	(0.116)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.490**	1.116**	0.214
	(0.163)	(0.137)	(0.120)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.883**	-0.739**	-0.299**
	(0.165)	(0.139)	(0.116)
Constant	-4.585**	-3.364**	-2.859**
	(0.209)	(0.183)	(0.149)
Observations	8,665	8,665	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

This model uses a measure that identifies country-years with an above average excluded population by summing the population of all excluded groups and dividing it by the total population. The components for this measure were obtained from the EPR dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).

Table A14: Logit Regression of Consultation Pact Formation on Threat, 1946 to 2009

	Model A38: Consultation Formation
External Threat	-0.731
	(0.487)
Sum of Excluded Groups Population Small	0.435**
	(0.140)
Sum of Excluded Groups Population Large	0.578**
	(0.132)
Major Power	1.204**
	(0.171)
Number of Neighbors	0.112**
	(0.018)
Existing Defense Pact	-0.464**
	(0.131)
Existing Consultation Pact	1.112**
	(0.137)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.750**
	(0.141)
Constant	-3.353**
	(0.182)
Observations	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

This model disaggregates excluded groups into their type of exclusion rather than size. Information on the category of exclusion a group faces is obtained from the EPR dataset (Vogt et al. 2015).

Table A15: Logit Regression of Consultation Pact Formation, 1946 to 2009

	Model A39: Consultation Formation
Powerless or Self-Excluded Group	0.435**
	(0.134)
Discriminated Group	0.598**
	(0.135)
External Threat	-0.822
	(0.481)
Major Power	1.200**
	(0.168)
Number of Neighbors	0.105**
	(0.017)
Existing Defense Pact	-0.481**
	(0.132)
Existing Consultation Pact	1.119**
	(0.139)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.726**
	(0.139)
Constant	-3.316**
	(0.180)
Observations	8,665

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

This table presents the results of a multivariate model that jointly estimates our three alliance formation equations and accounts for the correlations in the error terms.

Table A16: Multivariate Probit Regression of Alliance Formation, 1946 to 2009

	Model A40		
	Defense Formation	Consultation Formation	Neutrality/Nonaggression Formation
External Threat	1.256**	-0.583**	-0.490**
	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.173)
Small Excluded Group	-0.087	0.216**	
	(0.080)	(0.070)	
Large Excluded Group	0.159**	0.225**	
	(0.054)	(0.057)	
Excluded Group without TEK			0.181*
			(0.072)
Excluded Group with Small TEK			0.071
			(0.061)
Excluded Group with Large TEK			0.227**
			(0.054)
Major Power	0.638**	0.640**	0.400**
	(0.105)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Number of Neighbors	0.035**	0.054**	0.088**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Existing Defense Pact	0.078	-0.270**	-0.102
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Existing Consultation Pact	0.174*	0.489**	0.090
	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Existing Neutrality or Nonaggression Pact	-0.286**	-0.279**	-0.116*
	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Constant	-2.288**	-1.746**	-1.587**
	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.079)
Error Term Correlations (rho)			
Defense-Consultation		0.734**	
		(0.019)	
Defense-Neutrality/Nonaggression		0.576**	
		(0.024)	
Consultation-Neutrality/Nonaggression		0.699**	
		(0.018)	
Observations		8,665	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < .01$

Appendix A References

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Appendix B: Case Study of Mozambique, 1975-1984

The space restrictions of a research note did not permit us to provide illustrative cases in significant detail. We refer to the case of Mozambique briefly on pages 6 and 7 but here we provide a bit more detail about the Mozambique case as one example of the dynamics we believe occur more generally. Note that Mozambique's civil war is not considered to be primarily an ethnic civil war, but as stated in our manuscript, we believe our argument applies to internal threat more broadly.

Mozambique declared its independence from Portugal in 1975 with a government controlled by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), a socialist independence movement that had led the anti-colonial war against Portugal for more than ten years. FRELIMO faced the challenge of creating a new national identity and consolidating its rule in a difficult international environment. As a "front-line state" in southern Africa, Mozambique's new government faced difficult foreign policy challenges, particularly with respect to the ongoing conflict in neighboring Rhodesia.

Upon independence, FRELIMO leaders had a clear view of their preferred foreign policy. While unabashedly socialist, they were committed to nationalism over ideological conflict and made clear their commitment to nonalignment. The Mozambique constitution even explicitly prohibited the government from granting any foreign military bases in Mozambique territory (Kuhne 1985, 2). While more Maoist than Leninist in approach, and thus oriented a bit more toward China than the U.S.S.R. in its revolutionary days (Henriksen 1978, 443, 447), FRELIMO guarded its foreign policy independence fiercely and worked hard to maintain its distance both from conflict between the U.S.S.R. and U.S. and from the Sino-Soviet split (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 171-2). Isaacman and Isaacman (1983, 183) quote a foreign ministry official stating "If the United States and the Soviet Union want to fight, they can fight in their own house."

In 1977, many international observers were surprised that Mozambique signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with the U.S.S.R. A contemporary report in the *Washington Post* notes "the decision by Machel to identify Mozambique closely with the Soviet Union is certain to come as a surprise to many Western and nonaligned diplomats. The prevailing view in Western diplomatic circles has been that Mozambique is intensely nationalistic, determined to maintain its independence and unlikely to provide naval bases or other facilities to any of the major powers" (Ottaway 1977). While conflict with Rhodesia may have been one reason for seeking additional military support from the Soviet Union, Mozambique and the U.S.S.R diverged in their allegiances among the Rhodesian opposition. Mozambique supported ZANU, which was more closely tied to China, while the U.S.S.R supported ZAPU (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 171).

The treaty specifically notes that the U.S.S.R. will respect Mozambique's policy of nonalignment (Article 5) but commits the two states to "develop cooperation in military matters" (Article 4), consult with the goal of coordinating policy in the event of threats to peace (Article

9), and refrain from participating in any actions against the other party (Article 10).[1] Mozambique proceeded to sign similar agreements with Bulgaria in 1978, the German Democratic Republic in 1979, and Hungary in 1980.

We believe that the potential for internal unrest led Mozambique to form this agreement with the Soviet Union in return for military support, despite the fact that signing the agreement was costly to Mozambique's attempts to maintain neutrality in the Sino-Soviet rivalry and was viewed as a move away from its jealously guarded nonaligned status. We also believe that Mozambique was unwilling to form a stronger agreement in part due to the fact that internal governing legitimacy required being independent of major powers.

While FRELIMO did not have complete control of the country upon independence, it was not clear at the time that there was a clear organized opposition. A military uprising in December of 1975 came from within FRELIMO's own ranks, with longtime fighters demanding increased pay and prestige now that the colonial fight was won (Henriksen 1978, 446). In 1976, however, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) was founded by a small number of citizens who worked in support of Portugal during the war for independence and developed ties with the government of Rhodesia after Mozambique declared independence. Cabrita (2000, 154) reports that there were only 76 members of RENAMO in September, 1977 (six months after the agreement with the Soviet Union was signed), but that number grew to approximately 1000 by the beginning of 1979 due to latent grievances that were apparent before the commitment to the Soviet treaty.

The excitement of independence was short-lived as attention turned to governing in a diverse society with severe economic hardship. While FRELIMO had cooperated with traditional chiefs during the revolutionary struggle, there was now more competition, especially with regard to the movement to reorganize agricultural production. FRELIMO's initial rejection of religion was also a concern of many within Mozambique who had well established traditions. While RENAMO's roots were with those who cooperated with Portugal and Rhodesia, RENAMO gained adherents, particularly among the Shona-Ndau, an excluded group in Mozambique (Hall 1990, 45-46). Hall (1990, 47) reports "The accounts of various witnesses point to many RENAMO soldiers being motivated by specific grievances. These are: resentment at FRELIMO's suppression of traditional chiefly authority and repressive attitude toward religion and religious practitioners…, and rejection of FRELIMO's economic and agrarian policies . . .. Above all, compulsory villagisation, where it has occurred, appears to have caused outrage." As Cederman, Gledistch, and Buhaug (2013) expect, political entrepreneurs were able to appeal to grievances of excluded groups in building their movement, even if forceful conscription was also employed.

Thus, while RENAMO had not yet emerged as a clear rival to FRELIMO in March, 1977, the Mozambique government had already come to understand that there was potential for unrest. The government believed that signing this agreement with Moscow would lead to military support that their Chinese patrons would not provide and that FRELIMO's security situation might well require such aid. At the same time, after a long anti-colonial war,

[1] Agreement on friendship and co-operation, United Nations, New York (vol. 1154, pp. 409), https://treaties.un.org (visited June 6, 2020).

developing legitimacy as a government that was independent of major powers was crucial for FRELIMO. Cabrita (2000, 141) notes that RENAMO leaders frequently used dependence on the Soviets in its criticisms of FRELIMO, referring to the Mozambique government as a "Moscow Stooge." While Mozambique sought military equipment and advisors, they did not seek troops on the ground. In fact, Mozambique always rebuffed requests from the U.S.S.R. for a permanent military base on Bazaruto Island (e.g., Henriksen 1978, 448; Kuhne 185, 2; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, p. 183).

By 1979, a full-fledged civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO was underway. FRELIMO received substantial support from the U.S.S.R. including tanks, artillery, jets, an air defense system, military training, and advisers (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 181). The U.S.S.R. also provided economic aid, including oil sales (CIA, 1985, 15). The German Democratic Republic provided radar and telecommunications systems as well as additional arms (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983, 181). These were crucial for success in the battle against RENAMO.

After the Rhodesian government lost power to Mugabe's ZANU, and Mugabe took charge as the leader of the newly recognized Zimbabwe in 1980, support for RENAMO switched to South Africa. According to Metz (1986), South Africa had two goals in its support of RENAMO. One was to discourage the Mozambique government from supporting its own opposition, the ANC. The other was to disrupt economic ties among front-line states. Metz (1986, 495) writes "In order to reinforce the economic dependence of Zimbabwe and Malawi on South Africa the transportation corridor between Mutare in Zimbabwe and the Mozambican port of Beira became the primary target of guerrilla raids. . . . any action which could disrupt economic links between Zimbabwe and the outside world served South African foreign policy." This was part of South Africa's broader policy of destabilization towards Zimbabwe.

As a land-locked country, Zimbabwe was suffering greatly due to economic sanctions from South Africa; upon independence, almost all of Zimbabwe's trade passed through South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of tons of goods headed for Zimbabwe were being held in South African ports, and transport for vital resources like oil were cut off. As a result, the Zimbabwe economy became heavily reliant on the routes from Mozambique (Chigora 2008, Dzimba 1998, 91). Chigora (2008, 639) reports "For Zimbabwe, Mozambique was central to its survival." In 1981, the governments of Zimbabwe and Mozambique signed a defense pact.[2] The government of Zimbabwe was clearly motivated by an external threat created by South Africa. Zimbabwe feared a South African invasion (Dzimba 1998, 49-50) and wanted to ensure support, but also needed to protect the port of Beira and the corridor from Beira to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe provided military support for Mozambique, and eventually troops from Zimbabwe were fighting in Mozambique territory.[3]

[2] The ATOP project has not located an official copy of this agreement, and we were not able to either, so we can't know for certain what all of the obligations are or the language used to create them. Kalley et al. (1999, 236) describe the agreement this way: "Mozambique and Zimbabwe sign a defence and security agreement under which an attack by South Africa on either country will be taken as an assault on both. The agreement is "all embracing" and allows both countries to deal with internal dissident activity." The last sentence is intriguing. We don't know what obligations the states make to each other with regard to internal dissidents.

[3] Mozambique did not officially request Zimbabwean troops until 1985 (Chigora 2008, 636).

By 1983, however, the economic situation in Mozambique was calamitous. While Soviet economic and military assistance continued, pleas from Mozambique for increased Soviet investment were rebuffed (Kuhne 1985, 4; CIA 1985, 14; Campbell 1987/8, 16). In light of this, the FRELIMO government made the decision to pursue an agreement with South Africa that would commit the two sides to nonaggression and to ending support for one another's rebels. Mozambique had long stood against Apartheid and for the liberation of African people, but the need for both the governments of Mozambique and of South Africa to limit international support for their rebels led the two governments to sign the Accord of Nkomati in 1984.

The Nkomati Accord includes detailed commitments on both sides. The parties promise not to resort to the threat or use of force against one another (Article 2) and not to allow their territories to be used to commit aggression against or threaten the security of their partners (Article 3). In support of the latter goal, the agreement lists eleven specific things that they will eliminate, prohibit, or prevent.

The security environment that the government of Mozambique entered in 1975 was a dangerous one, and yet initially FRELIMO leaders had every intention of pursuing a non-aligned policy and prioritizing national development. In line with our theory, we argue that the fear of internal opposition was one factor that led Mozambique to sign consultation pacts with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. We also believe that the need for legitimacy against potential internal challengers, particularly after a long anti-colonial war, made Mozambique wary of stronger commitments, particularly with major outside powers. Mozambique did, however, sign a defense pact with Zimbabwe in response to the shared external threat posed by South Africa. Once the damaging civil war was underway, Mozambique was motivated to seek a nonaggression pact with a rival state, South Africa, in order to limit the foreign support its RENAMO opposition could receive.

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