Supplementary Appendix:
Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies

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In our article, we acknowledged potential endogeneity between the dependent variable (i,e. Coups) and the main explanatory variables (i.e. Elected legislatures and Purges). The skeptic reader may argue on the one hand that an authoritarian leader that took power through a coup would have incentives to use elite repression (i.e. Purges) to eliminate opposition within the ruling elite. On the other hand, it may be argued that an autocratic leader who came into power via coup would have incentives to eliminate a legislative assembly that may be perceived as an obstacle to efficient governance. In the absence of an efficient instrumental variable and besides the use of lagged explanatory variables (i.e., Elected legislature at time *t-1, t-2,* and *t-3* and Purges at time *t-1, t-2,* and *t-3*), we also test potential reverse causality by regressing our main explanatory variables against coups, controlling for other confounding factors.

Given the nature of the Purges variables (see Figure A1) we have estimated a negative binomial model for Purges in authoritarian regimes. In Model 1 in Table A1, the main independent variable is Coup at time t-1 and controls include GDP pc, Growth of GDP pc, Oil Wealth, Dissent, Elected legislature, and a lagged dependent variable (LDV) (Table A3 describe the sources of all variables). In Model 2, we add four binary variables capturing the type of authoritarian regime (i.e. single party, military, and personalist; monarchic autocracy is the reference category). In Models 1 and 2, coups at time t-1 do not have any significant effect on Purges, suggesting that Coups do not trigger the use of Purges by authoritarian leaders in a systematic way. As seen in Model 2, whereas the presence of Elected legislatures decrease Purges in autocracies, Purges are positively associated with Dissent and Military regimes. Also, the positive and significant coefficient for the LDV indicates that previous repressive behavior helps explain present behavior with regards to repression.

In a similar manner, Table A2 explores whether there is a systematic relationship between Coups at time t-1 and the presence of Elected legislatures in authoritarian regimes. In Model 3, controls include GDP pc, Growth of GDP pc, Oil Wealth, Dissent, Purges, and the lagged dependent variable (LDV). Model 4 incorporates regime variables. As in the case of Purges, we did not find any significant effect of Coups on the presence of Elected legislatures in authoritarian regimes. Taken together, the estimates displayed in Tables A1 and A2 suggest that coups do not influence Purges and Elected Legislatures systematically, mitigating our theoretical concerns on potential reverse causality.

Finally, we explore in a more systematic way the possibility that Purges and Elected Legislatures are substitutes. In Table A1, we find that Elected legislatures are negatively related to Purges in autocracies, indicating that the presence of co-optive institutions decrease leaders' propensity to resort to Purges. Yet, we do not find any evidence that Purges decrease the likelihood to observe the presence of an elected legislative assembly in authoritarian regimes.



Figure 1A: Histogram of Purges

Table A1: Negative binomial estimates of purges

	(1)	(2)
Coup t-1	0.012	-0.148
	(0.427)	(0.415)
Ln GDP pc	-0.269	-0.214
	(0.185)	(0.188)
Growth GDP pc	0.818	0.915
	(0.685)	(0.699)
Oil wealth	-0.063	-0.067
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Dissent	0.549***	0.533***
	(0.110)	(0.106)
Elected legislature	-0.548**	-0.558***
	(0.249)	(0.200)
LDV	0.770***	0.659***
	(0.197)	(0.167)
Single-party		0.719
		(0.486)
Military		0.984*
		(0.584)
Personalist		0.063
		(0.579)
Constant	1.512	0.583
	(1.391)	(1.638)
N	1587	1587
Log pseudolikelihood	-706.896	-699.677

Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.10; ** p<.05; ***p<.01

Table A2: Probit estimates of elected legislatures

	(3)	(4)
Coup t-1	0.221	0.158
	(0.351)	(0.345)
Ln GDP pc	-0.035	0.072
	(0.068)	(0.063)
Growth GDP pc	0.290	0.270
	(0.325)	(0.320)
Oil wealth	-0.008	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.021)
Dissent	-0.165**	-0.179**
	(0.075)	(0.078)
Purges	-0.032	-0.038
	(0.063)	(0.067)
LDV	3.119***	3.030***
	(0.166)	(0.170)
Single-party		0.708***
		(0.197)
Military		0.578**
		(0.237)
Personalist		0.468*
		(0.246)
Constant	-0.705	-1.822***
	(0.559)	(0.659)
N	1594	1594
pseudo R-sq	0.671	0.680

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
* p<.10; ** p<.05; ***p<.01

Table A3. Description of variables

Variable	Definition	Source
Coup	Any event where the threat or use of force is used and the military or government insiders are involved.	Goemans et al (2009)
Purges	"Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition"	Arthur Banks CNTS
Elected legislatures	This is a binary variable coded 1 if the legislature is "elected" and 0 if the legislature is "appointed" or "closed."	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Ln GDP pc	Gross domestic product per capita, logged	Gleditsch (2002)
Growth GDP pc	This is the annual growth of GDP per capita.	Gleditsch (2002)
Dissent	This is the sum the annual number of general strikes, anti-government demonstrations, and riots. General strikes are defined as any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority. Antigovernment demonstrations account for any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. Riots refer to any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.	Arthur Banks CNTS
Single-party regimes	Presence of a single-party regime	Geddes et al. (2014)
Military regime	Presence of military regime	Geddes et al. (2014)
Personalist regime	Presence of personalist regime	Geddes et al. (2014)
Monarchic regime	Presence of monarchic regime	Geddes et al. (2014)

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