Online Appendix

Altering Capabilities or Imposing Costs? Intervention Strategy and Civil War Outcomes

Contents

1 Selection **2**

1.1 Heckman Approach . . . 2

1.2 Matching . . . 5

2 Coding of Direct Interventions **14**

List of Tables

1 Modeling the Onset of Military Interventions . . . 4

2 Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Indirect Rebel Interventions . . . 6

3 Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Indirect Government Interventions . . . 7

4 Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Conventional Rebel Interventions . . . 7

5 Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Conventional Government Interventions . . . 8

6 Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Unconventional Rebel Interventions . . . 8

7 Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Unconventional Government Interventions . . . 9

8 Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Unconventional Rebel Interventions . . . 10

9 Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Unconventional Government Interventions . . . 11

10 Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Conventional Rebel Interventions . . . 12

11 Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Conventional Government Interventions . . . 12

12 Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Indirect Rebel Interventions . . . 13

13 Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Indirect Government Interventions . . . 13

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 14

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 15

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 16

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 17

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 18

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 19

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 20

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 21

14 Direct Interventions in Civil Wars . . . 22

1 Selection

1.1 Heckman Approach

As noted in the body of the paper, one potential statistical concern with evaluating the effects of military interventions on civil war outcomes is the possibility that interventions are not randomly assigned. The most straightforward approach to modeling selection is a two-stage modeling strategy in which the first stage models the selection process, in this case the occurrence of a military intervention, and the second stage applies the fitted values of the first stage as a predictor of the ultimate outcome of interest. This standard approach is not directly applicable in this context, as the outcome of the selection equation in this instance is not dichotomous, but rather multinomial since there are in fact 6 different types of military interventions that may occur. Nevertheless, it may be possible to use a series of two-stage selection model, each modeling the effect of one type of intervention at a time.

However, in order to properly model a selection process using this framework, it is necessary to satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, at least one variable in the selection equation must be correlated with the occurrence of a military intervention, but exogenous from the outcome equation, i.e. the outcome of the civil war (Achen, 1986). Such variables are notoriously difficult to identify in practice; however the below results focus on three variables that theoretically meet the exclusion restriction. The first such measure is the average similarity in UN General Assembly votes between the government of a civil war state, and the United States, Britain and France (Gartzke and Jo, 2002). I also include the squared value of this term. The logic for this variable is that states with very similar voting records to three NATO members of the P5 may be more likely to receive supportive interventions from these great powers, as well as interventions in support of the rebels from rivals of the NATO members, for example the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The same logic applies in reverse, with states with very different voting records from the P5 NATO members more likely to experience interventions from those states in support of the rebels. Moreover, similarity in voting scores with great powers are likely uncorrelated with the outcome of a civil war, thus theoretically meeting the exclusion restriction.

The next potential variable I consider is the number of contiguous neighbors a state has, as the more neighbors a state currently experiencing a civil war has, the more likely it is that at least one of them will intervene in the ongoing conflict.[1] Moreover, the number of neighbors a state has is unlikely to be corre-

[1] Data on neighbors come from Gent (2008).

lated with the outcome of a civil war through any mechanism beyond increasing the likelihood of military interventions.

The final potential variable I consider to meet the exclusion restriction is the annual percent change in US GDP per capita. This measure is designed to capture economic conditions in the United States, because the US is a frequent third-party intervenor in civil wars, and it may be much more inclined to intervene abroad when the US economy is growing, and much more reluctant to intervene abroad when the US economy is contracting. This measure also theoretically meets the exclusion restriction because US economic growth may impact the likelihood of observing a military intervention in a civil war, but should have no independent effect on the outcome of a civil war.

Table 1 presents the results of 6 logit models predicting the occurrence of a military intervention. That is, the dependent variable in each of the models corresponds to a distinct type of military intervention, and is coded 1 in conflict-months when that type of intervention occurs, and 0 otherwise. These models contain the 3 variables described above, as well as several additional controls that may correlate with the occurrence of third-party interventions. As Table 1 indicates, the three variables that theoretically meet the exclusion restriction do not fare well in practice, as they are at best weakly correlated with military interventions. UNGA voting similarity between the government of a civil war state and the US, Britain and France is a statistically insignificant predictor of all military intervention types except coercive interventions in support of the government. Similarly, economic growth in the US is only a significant predictor for interventions providing indirect support for rebel groups. Finally, the number of neighboring states a civil war state has fares slightly better, as it is statistically significant at the $p = 0.05$ level for two types of interventions and significant at the $p = 0.10$ level for a third. However, this variable still fails to reach statistical significance in half of the models. As a result, none of these variables are useful for meeting the exclusion restriction necessarily to appropriately estimate a selection model as they are not significantly correlated with the outcome of the selection stage of such a model.

Table 1: Modeling the Onset of Military Interventions

	Direct-Conventional Government	Direct-Conventional Rebel	Direct-Coercive Government	Direct-Coercive Rebel	Indirect Government	Indirect Rebel
UNGA Voting	6.401	2.510	-8.408**	5.995	3.240	2.397
Similarity	(7.03)	(3.58)	(2.74)	(5.32)	(3.02)	(2.76)
UNGA Voting	-4.697	-1.693	8.004**	-3.695	-1.719	-1.393
Similarity Squared	(5.85)	(3.06)	(2.47)	(4.17)	(2.56)	(2.27)
Neighbors	0.141	0.225*	0.801†	0.117	0.065	0.164*
	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.42)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
%Δ US GDP	11.551	13.417	51.857	31.139	-27.047	-80.213**
per capita	(41.76)	(25.09)	(86.11)	(59.44)	(24.86)	(26.51)
Relative Rebel	0.388**	-0.021	1.247***	0.071	0.357***	0.222*
Capabilities	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Intensity	0.053**	-0.006	0.046	0.038	0.043†	0.049*
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Mountains	-0.551***	-0.426*	-0.130	-0.367	-0.244*	-0.272†
	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.809†	-0.128	-5.105*	-0.182	-0.564†	-0.882*
	(0.43)	(0.49)	(2.46)	(0.62)	(0.31)	(0.40)
Democracy	-0.079	-0.010	-0.916†	-0.042	-0.009	0.005
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.52)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-5.777**	-5.698***	-11.478***	-7.220***	-3.427***	-3.953***
	(1.99)	(1.26)	(2.80)	(1.78)	(0.94)	(0.89)

Coefficient estimates are reported with robust standard errors, clustered by conflict, in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

1.2 Matching

Given the above difficulty with meeting the exclusion restriction necessary for a 2 stage selection model to be valid, I instead employ matching to correct for the nonrandom assignment of different intervention types as suggested by Ho et al. (2007, 2011). However, the time-varying nature of the data set used for the analysis in the main text poses an initial challenge to a matching strategy as it introduces the possibility of including post-treatment bias. In other words, because the unit of analysis is the conflict-month, it is possible that if an intervention is experienced in month 1, it may increase the likelihood of observing an opposing intervention in month 2 which may impact the outcome of the conflict. However, controlling for the second intervention biases the estimated causal effect of the initial intervention. To avoid this potential concern, I follow the strategy developed by Gilligan and Sergenti (2007, 105) to assess the effect of UN peacekeeping operations employed during civil wars. This approach involves three basic steps. First, I transform the data by taking "snapshots" in conflict-months in which an intervention occurs, such that all of the potentially time-varying covariates are fixed at the their observed values when the intervention occurs, thus avoiding the possibility of post-treatment bias. Then, using this covariate profile, the dependent variable is now the time from when the interventions occurs until one of the three possible outcomes of the war occurs. Conflict-months prior to an intervention remain in the sample as control cases. Second, I include an additional covariate capturing the duration that the civil war has endured up to the time that an intervention occurs, to account for the potential differences in timing of when an intervention occurs. Finally, with this data structure and measure of when an intervention occurs, it is then possible to match observations that experience an intervention (treatment) with observations that do not experience an intervention (controls) based on both the observations' covariate profiles, *and* the duration of the war up to the time of an intervention. In practice, this approach yields the appropriate counterfactual: how would the duration and outcome of the civil war be different if an intervention had not occurred?

Matching procedures are designed for situations in which there is a single, dichotomous treatment effect. When there is more than one possible treatment effect of interest to researchers, Ho et al. (2011) advise re-matching the data for *each* treatment of interest. Thus, I employ the above matching procedure for each of the 6 possible intervention types described in the paper to ensure an appropriate balance in the matched samples.[2]

[2] As a dichotomous treatment effect is required for matching, I remove the decay effect for each intervention when generating the matched samples, but maintain it for each of the other types of interventions to match on the timing of prior interventions of different types.

Table 2: Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Indirect Rebel Interventions

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Means Treated	Means Control	Means Treated	Means Control
Indirect Govt.	0.332	0.082	0.332	0.236
Direct-Conventional Rebel	0.170	0.004	0.170	0.060
Direct-Conventional Govt.	0.108	0.015	0.108	0.085
Direct-Unconventional Rebel	0.062	0.011	0.062	0.101
Direct-Unconventional Govt.	0.030	0.006	0.030	0.030
Opposing	0.755	0.034	0.755	0.578
Relative Rebel Cap.	-1.249	-2.506	-1.249	-1.642
Intensity	3.475	1.127	3.475	3.364
Mountains	2.357	2.863	2.357	2.363
Ethnic Conflict	0.460	0.650	0.460	0.644
Cold War	0.798	0.534	0.798	0.755
Democracy	-2.672	-0.280	-2.672	-2.586
Time of Observation	40.093	112.797	40.093	34.781
Number of Conflict Dyads	1.480	1.477	1.480	1.449

To ensure appropriate balance between observations that experience (treated) and do not experience (control) an intervention, I match on all of the variables included in the models in the main text. That is, I match on the prior intervention history of a state up to an intervention of a particular type is experienced, as well as all of the other potential confounders identified in the main text, and the duration of the conflict up to the time the intervention is observed. Tables 2-7 report the means of each variable for observations that experience the corresponding type of intervention, and those that do not for the full sample, and then for the matched sample. The ultimate goal of the matching procedure is to try to match observations such that the means of the treated and control groups are roughly similar. For each of the intervention types I employ nearest neighbor matching, and match each treated observation with two control observations (a 2:1 ratio).[3]

[3] As suggested by Ho et al. (2011), I employed several different matching procedures in addition to nearest neighbor, however nearest neighbor seemed to provide the best post-matching balance. The one exception to this is matching on direct-conventional interventions in support of the government, for which optimal matching provided a superior balance to nearest neighbor.

Table 3: Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Indirect Government Interventions

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Means Treated	Means Control	Means Treated	Means Control
Indirect Rebel	0.253	0.036	0.253	0.110
Direct-Conventional Rebel	0.067	0.030	0.067	0.025
Direct-Conventional Govt.	0.139	0.009	0.139	0.061
Direct-Unconventional Rebel	0.049	0.013	0.049	0.033
Direct-Unconventional Govt.	0.066	0.000	0.066	0.003
Opposing	0.578	0.036	0.578	0.265
Relative Rebel Cap.	-0.987	-2.779	-0.987	-1.112
Intensity	3.592	1.168	3.592	3.275
Mountains	2.359	2.819	2.359	2.481
Ethnic Conflict	0.410	0.812	0.410	0.399
Cold War	0.831	0.487	0.831	0.785
Democracy	-3.140	-1.130	-3.140	-4.240
Time of Observation	35.855	87.993	35.855	42.808
Number of Conflict Dyads	1.407	1.259	1.407	1.319

Table 4: Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Conventional Rebel Interventions

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Means Treated	Means Control	Means Treated	Means Control
Indirect Rebel	0.277	0.053	0.277	0.255
Indirect Govt.	0.186	0.102	0.186	0.213
Direct-Conventional Govt.	0.128	0.018	0.128	0.135
Direct-Unconventional Rebel	0.094	0.017	0.094	0.105
Direct-Unconventional Govt.	0.062	0.011	0.062	0.077
Opposing	0.575	0.092	0.575	0.563
Relative Rebel Cap.	-2.375	-2.408	-2.375	-2.323
Intensity	2.404	1.411	2.404	2.756
Mountains	2.334	2.822	2.334	2.364
Ethnic Conflict	0.699	0.650	0.699	0.688
Cold War	0.505	0.544	0.505	0.527
Democracy	-3.194	-0.877	-3.194	-3.263
Time of Observation	52.666	111.110	52.666	43.321
Number of Conflict Dyads	1.237	1.471	1.237	1.242

Table 5: Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Conventional Government Interventions

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Means Treated	Means Control	Means Treated	Means Control
Indirect Rebel	0.286	0.058	0.286	0.203
Indirect Govt.	0.406	0.089	0.406	0.359
Direct-Conventional Rebel	0.253	0.025	0.253	0.226
Direct-Unconventional Rebel	0.113	0.015	0.113	0.091
Direct-Unconventional Govt.	0.178	0.005	0.178	0.076
Opposing	0.847	0.078	0.847	0.794
Relative Rebel Cap.	-0.676	-2.491	-0.676	-0.696
Intensity	3.630	1.447	3.630	3.462
Mountains	1.757	2.845	1.757	1.911
Ethnic Conflict	0.430	0.690	0.430	0.449
Cold War	0.873	0.525	0.873	0.722
Democracy	-4.759	-0.722	-4.759	-4.291
Time of Observation	49.590	107.898	49.590	41.789
Number of Conflict Dyads	1.519	1.391	1.519	1.380

Table 6: Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Unconventional Rebel Interventions

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Means Treated	Means Control	Means Treated	Means Control
Indirect Govt.	0.306	0.110	0.306	0.334
Indirect Rebel	0.264	0.062	0.264	0.273
Direct-Conventional Rebel	0.165	0.022	0.165	0.190
Direct-Conventional Govt.	0.140	0.026	0.140	0.119
Direct-Unconventional Govt.	0.143	0.013	0.143	0.135
Opposing	0.743	0.096	0.743	0.727
Relative Rebel Cap.	-1.428	-2.351	-1.428	-1.432
Intensity	2.212	1.240	2.212	2.194
Mountains	2.074	2.868	2.074	2.196
Ethnic Conflict	0.680	0.624	0.680	0.720
Cold War	0.820	0.557	0.820	0.820
Democracy	-2.640	-0.662	-2.640	-2.580
Time of Observation	36.396	108.385	36.396	36.244
Number of Conflict Dyads	1.180	1.470	1.180	1.140

Table 7: Balance Statistics for Matched Data on Direct-Unconventional Government Interventions

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Means Treated	Means Control	Means Treated	Means Control
Indirect Govt.	0.478	0.102	0.478	0.569
Indirect Rebel	0.209	0.064	0.209	0.228
Direct-Conventional Rebel	0.138	0.033	0.138	0.143
Direct-Conventional Govt.	0.348	0.025	0.348	0.197
Direct-Unconventional Rebel	0.221	0.018	0.221	0.071
Opposing	0.860	0.110	0.860	0.569
Relative Rebel Cap.	-0.139	-2.477	-0.139	-0.396
Intensity	4.799	1.497	4.799	5.487
Mountains	2.001	2.780	2.001	2.045
Ethnic Conflict	0.036	0.670	0.036	0.098
Democracy	-7.464	-0.840	-7.464	-6.429
Time of Observation	34.386	109.159	34.386	35.230
Number of Conflict Dyads	2.768	1.393	2.768	2.223

Table 8: Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Unconventional Rebel Interventions

	Unmatched Data			Matched Data		
	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement
Direct-Unconventional Rebel	0.103	0.105	-1.889	-0.457	-0.008	0.188
	(1.641)	(1.176)	(1.266)	(0.594)	(0.564)	(0.631)
Direct-Unconventional Rebel X Ln(time)	-	-	-	-	-	-

Coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

Upon generating a matched sample for each intervention type, the final step is to perform an appropriate analysis, in this instance a competing risks model, as the outcome of interest is the time until three possible outcomes are observed (Ho et al., 2011). Thus, I estimate six competing risks models, one for dichotomous intervention variable, employing a distinct matched sample.[4] In estimating these models, I include all of the control variables, but omit their coefficients from the tables below "because they are substantively meaningless since we have matched on those variables" (Gilligan and Sergenti, 2007, 108, fn18). The results of these models are presented in Tables 8-13. The first 3 columns reproduce the coefficient estimates and standard errors from a model estimated on the full sample (reproduced from Table 2 in the main text). The next 3 columns present the effect of the specified intervention on the three outcomes of interest in the matched sample.

Several conclusions emerge from an examination of these results. First, the results with respect to direct-unconventional interventions are robust to the matching analysis. Both the unmatched and matched analyses indicate that direct-unconventional interventions in support of either the rebels or the government do not significantly impact the outcome of a war (Tables 8-9).

Second, the results with respect to direct-conventional interventions are similarly robust to the matching analysis. Direct-conventional interventions in support of the rebels increase the likelihood of a rebel victory, especially when the occur early in a war, and this effect diminishes over time (Table 10. Similarly, the model estimated on the matched sample reaffirms that such interventions increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement, especially when they occur early in war, as again, this effect declines the longer the war endures. The magnitude of this effect is larger in the matched sample than the unmatched sample, indicating that the unmatched sample may have underestimated this effect.

[4] I test and correct for violations of the proportional hazards assumption using time interactions where appropriate.

Table 9: Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Unconventional Government Interventions

	Unmatched Data			Matched Data		
	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement
Direct-Unconventional Govt.	0.246	-0.759	-	0.172	0.834	-0.647
	(0.952)	(2.068)		(0.988)	(0.518)	(0.561)
Direct-Unconventional Govt. X Ln(time)	-	-	-	-	-	-

Coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

Similarly, the matching analysis yields the same inference with respect to direct-conventional interventions in support of the government (Table 11). Consistent with the analysis on the full sample, the matching analysis indicates that such interventions increase the odds of a negotiated settlement, though this effect diminishes over time. Similarly, such interventions are found to decrease the likelihood of a government victory when they occur early in a civil war, but over time their efficacy increases, and eventually they increase the risk of a government victory, consistent with the full sample results. The fact that the effect of direct-conventional interventions in support of the government maintain their counterintuitive effect even after employing the matching procedure suggests two possible implications. First, it is possible that there is still an unobserved selection effect at work. Matching is a potentially useful tool for accounting for sample selection; however, it is a limited tool in that it can only account for selection on *observable* indicators. To the extent that selection occurs based on unobservable factors, the matching routine is subject to the same potential bias that the initial analysis is potentially prone to. Second, and perhaps more interesting, is the possibility that this counterintuitive effects is not the result of sample selection at all, but rather the product of an interesting sort of feedback in civil wars in which the direct involvement of an outside power in support of the government early in a conflict may trigger a greater backlash against the regime on the part of the population by making it appear as though the regime is being protected and sponsored by a foreign power. Such a perception may boost the ability of the rebels to increase their support from the population, with the result being that when such interventions occur early in a civil war they are in fact counterproductive—making a government victory less likely by increasing the local base of support for the rebels.

Finally, the matching results with respect to indirect interventions indicate some differences from the results of the analysis when using the full sample. Table 12 presents the results of the effect of indirect interventions in support of the rebels. As can be seen, there are some differences in the estimated effects of

Table 10: Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Conventional Rebel Interventions

	Unmatched Data			Matched Data		
	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement
Direct-Conventional Rebel	0.671	6.476***	0.503	0.164	33.19***	0.060
	(1.058)	(1.461)	(0.775)	(0.464)	(5.438)	(0.348)
Direct-Conventional Rebel X Ln(time)	-	-1.337**	-	-	-7.93***	-
		(0.496)			(1.363)	

Coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

Table 11: Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Direct-Conventional Government Interventions

	Unmatched Data			Matched Data		
	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement
Direct-Conventional Govt.	-22.349*	1.552	7.462*	-17.93**	-0.285	20.06***
	(9.310)	(1.207)	(3.200)	(6.881)	(0.506)	(4.734)
Direct-Conventional Govt. X Ln(time)	5.401***	-	-4.489**	4.093**	-	-4.034***
	(1.870)		(1.589)	(1.572)		(0.936)

Coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

such interventions between the full and matched samples. In both samples, indirect support for the rebels is found to increase the likelihood of rebel victories, though in the matched sample this effect is found to decline over time, similar to the effect of direct-conventional support for rebels. Taken together, these results provide further support for the claim that there is a "critical window" early in a civil war in which support for rebels can increase the odds of victory, and that over time such support becomes less effective as the government marshals its own resources. Similarly, in both samples indirect support for rebels increase the likelihood of a negotiated outcome to the conflict, but in the matched sample, this effect is found not to vary over time. That is, the matched results indicate that regardless of when indirect support for rebels is provided, it increases the likelihood of a negotiated outcome to the conflict.

In contrast, the results with respect to indirect support for the government vary quite a bit between the full and matched samples. Whereas in the full sample, such interventions are found to have no effect on the outcome of a war, in the matched sample indirect support for the government is found to increase the likelihood of both a government victory and a negotiated settlement. However, in both cases, this effect is strongest when support is provided to the government early in the war, as the effect of such interventions declines over time.

Table 12: Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Indirect Rebel Interventions

	Unmatched Data			Matched Data		
	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement
Indirect Rebel	-0.463	1.645*	7.428**	-0.155	3.307*	0.416*
	(0.578)	(0.783)	(2.400)	(0.284)	(1.386)	(0.203)
Indirect Rebel X Ln(time)	-	-	-1.615*	-	-0.897**	-
			(0.629)		(0.307)	

Coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

Table 13: Competing Risks Models for Matched & Unmatched Data on Indirect Government Interventions

	Unmatched Data			Matched Data		
	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement	Government Victory	Rebel Victory	Negotiated Settlement
Indirect Govt.	0.468	0.979	0.019	3.130***	0.245	2.141*
	(0.423)	(0.769)	(0.905)	(0.745)	(0.219)	(0.887)
Indirect Govt. X Ln(time)	-	-	-	-0.561***	-	-0.398*
				(0.167)		(0.180)

Coefficient estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.
† significant at the .1 level, * .05 level, ** .01 level, *** .001 level.

These results indicate an interesting form of bias in the unmatched results. Failing to control for non-random assignment indicates that indirect support for the government in a civil war has no impact on the durations or outcome of the conflict. However, once this nonrandom assignment is accounted for, the results indicate that indirect support for the government increases the likelihood of both a government victory and a negotiated settlement, though in both cases this effect is strongest early in a conflict and declines over time. One interpretation of this result is that third parties are more likely to provide indirect support to governments in more difficult civil wars, such that failing to account for this nonrandom assignment masks the true impact of indirect support for governments. Such a strategic dynamic suggests that third parties, when contemplating intervention in more difficult cases, may be inclined to support the government, while simultaneously avoiding bearing the higher costs associated with direct forms of intervention.

2 Coding of Direct Interventions

Table 14 presents a list of all direct interventions in the dataset, and provides information on the coding of such interventions as conventional or unconventional as well as the date of a particular intervention, the country in which it occurred, the target of the intervention and the identity of the intervenor. As Table 14 makes clear, intervener strategy can, and often does, vary over the course of a war. The dataset is structured in a time-varying fashion, with the unit of analysis in the study being the conflict-month, and Regan (2002) records multiple interventions on the part of an intervener to the extent that the conduct of an intervener is sufficiently "convention-breaking" from its prior involvement in the state. I code each intervention that Regan (2002) records, which means that as the behavior and strategy of an intervener varies over time, it is treated as a new intervention by Regan (2002), and as such I code it separately from the prior intervention.

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
1186	Haiti	2004-2004	United States	2	2004	Direct-Conventional	Government
817	Guatemala	1954-1954	United States	6	1954	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
910	El Salvador	1979-1991	Honduras	6	1982	Direct-Conventional	Government
910	El Salvador	1979-1991	Honduras	11	1984	Direct-Conventional	Government
910	El Salvador	1979-1991	Honduras	2	1985	Direct-Conventional	Government
910	El Salvador	1979-1991	Honduras	5	1987	Direct-Conventional	Government
928	Nicaragua	1982-1990	United States	9	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
928	Nicaragua	1982-1990	United States	9	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
928	Nicaragua	1982-1990	United States	2	1984	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
928	Nicaragua	1982-1990	Honduras	4	1985	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
928	Nicaragua	1982-1990	Honduras	9	1985	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
936	Colombia	1984-2007	United States	8	1989	Direct-Conventional	Government
822	Hungary	1956-1956	USSR	10	1956	Direct-Unconventional	Government
822	Hungary	1956-1956	USSR	10	1956	Direct-Unconventional	Government
822	Hungary	1956-1956	USSR	11	1956	Direct-Unconventional	Government
600	Serbia	1998-1999	UN	10	1998	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
600	Serbia	1998-1999	UN	3	1999	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
781	Greece	1944-1949	United Kingdom	12	1944	Direct-Conventional	Government
781	Greece	1944-1949	United Kingdom	12	1944	Direct-Conventional	Government
781	Greece	1944-1949	Albania	9	1947	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
781	Greece	1944-1949	Yugoslavia	9	1947	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
781	Greece	1944-1949	Bulgaria	9	1947	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
857	Cyprus	1963-1964	Turkey	8	1964	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
956	Georgia	1990-1992	Russia	6	1992	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
956	Georgia	1990-1992	Russia	6	1992	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
992	Georgia	1992-1994	Russia	10	1992	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
992	Georgia	1992-1994	Russia	2	1993	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
992	Georgia	1992-1994	Russia	3	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
992	Georgia	1992-1994	Russia	9	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
992	Georgia	1992-1994	Russia	9	1993	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
962	Azerbaijan	1991-1999	Armenia	12	1991	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
962	Azerbaijan	1991-1999	Armenia	3	1992	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
962	Azerbaijan	1991-1999	Armenia	2	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
962	Azerbaijan	1991-1999	Armenia	3	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
962	Azerbaijan	1991-1999	Armenia	6	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
962	Azerbaijan	1991-1999	Armenia	6	1994	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
893	Mauritania	1975-1979	France	5	1978	Direct-Conventional	Government
1222	Central African Republic	2001-2002	Chad	10	2002	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
1222	Central African Republic	2001-2002	Rwanda	5	2001	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
1222	Central African Republic	2001-2002	Libya	5	2001	Direct-Conventional	Government
1222	Central African Republic	2001-2002	Libya	11	2001	Direct-Conventional	Government
1222	Central African Republic	2001-2002	Libya	11	2002	Direct-Conventional	Government
1222	Central African Republic	2001-2002	Libya	10	2002	Direct-Conventional	Government
903	Chad	1978-1982	France	4	1978	Direct-Conventional	Government
903	Chad	1978-1982	France	5	1978	Direct-Conventional	Government
934	Chad	1983-1988	France	1	1986	Direct-Conventional	Government
934	Chad	1983-1988	Libya	8	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
934	Chad	1983-1988	Libya	8	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
934	Chad	1983-1988	Libya	1	1987	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
934	Chad	1983-1988	Libya	8	1987	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
934	Chad	1983-1988	Libya	9	1987	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
615	Congo Brazzaville	1997-1997	Angola	10	1997	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	8	1960	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	12	1960	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	9	1961	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	12	1961	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	12	1961	Direct-Conventional	Government

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	12	1961	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	9	1962	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	12	1962	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	1	1963	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	1	1963	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	1	1963	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	UN	1	1963	Direct-Conventional	Government
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	Belgium	7	1960	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
838	Congo Kinshasa	1960-1965	Belgium	7	1960	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
881	Uganda	1971-1972	Tanzania	8	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
881	Uganda	1971-1972	Tanzania	8	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
881	Uganda	1971-1972	Tanzania	10	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
881	Uganda	1971-1972	Tanzania	10	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
881	Uganda	1971-1972	Tanzania	9	1972	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
995	Uganda	1978-1979	Libya	3	1979	Direct-Unconventional	Government
995	Uganda	1978-1979	Libya	3	1979	Direct-Conventional	Government
931	Somalia	1982-1991	Ethiopia	7	1982	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
931	Somalia	1982-1991	Ethiopia	7	1982	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
931	Somalia	1982-1991	Ethiopia	2	1987	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
931	Somalia	1982-1991	Ethiopia	2	1987	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
840	Ethiopia	1963-1964	Somalia	1	1964	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
840	Ethiopia	1963-1964	Somalia	3	1964	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
840	Ethiopia	1963-1964	Somalia	3	1964	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
898	Ethiopia	1977-1986	Cuba	9	1977	Direct-Conventional	Government
898	Ethiopia	1977-1986	Cuba	3	1978	Direct-Conventional	Government
898	Ethiopia	1977-1986	Somalia	6	1977	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	12	1975	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	2	1976	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	6	1976	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	11	1976	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	3	1987	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	11	1987	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	Cuba	6	1988	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	USSR	11	1987	Direct-Conventional	Government
897	Angola	1975-1991	South Africa	12	1975	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
897	Angola	1975-1991	South Africa	4	1977	Direct-Conventional	Rebels

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
897	Angola	1975-1991	South Africa	5	1980	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
897	Angola	1975-1991	South Africa	12	1983	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
897	Angola	1975-1991	South Africa	11	1987	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
897	Angola	1975-1991	South Africa	6	1988	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
913	Mozambique	1979-1993	South Africa	1	1981	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
913	Mozambique	1979-1993	South Africa	5	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Mozambique	4	1976	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Mozambique	5	1976	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Mozambique	6	1976	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Mozambique	5	1977	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Mozambique	9	1977	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Mozambique	3	1979	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Zambia	6	1977	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Zambia	10	1977	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
889	Zimbabwe	1972-1979	Zambia	3	1979	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
920	Zimbabwe	1980-1988	South Africa	8	1982	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
937	Sudan	1983-2007	Libya	3	1984	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United States	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United States	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United States	11	1994	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United States	9	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United States	12	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United States	12	1998	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United Kingdom	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United Kingdom	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United Kingdom	9	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United Kingdom	12	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	United Kingdom	12	1998	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Iran	6	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Iran	2	1986	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Iran	4	1992	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Iran	5	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	5	1983	Direct-Conventional	Government
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	8	1986	Direct-Conventional	Government
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	3	1987	Direct-Conventional	Government
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	6	1996	Direct-Conventional	Government

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	12	1996	Direct-Conventional	Government
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	5	1997	Direct-Conventional	Government
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	9	1997	Direct-Conventional	Government
941	Iraq	1980-1999	Turkey	12	1997	Direct-Conventional	Government
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United States	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United States	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United States	11	1994	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United States	9	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United States	12	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United States	12	1998	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United Kingdom	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United Kingdom	1	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United Kingdom	9	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United Kingdom	12	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
971	Iraq	1991-1999	United Kingdom	12	1998	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
826	Lebanon	1958-1958	United Kingdom	5	1958	Direct-Conventional	Government
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Egypt	11	1962	Direct-Unconventional	Government
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Egypt	9	1964	Direct-Unconventional	Government
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Egypt	2	1966	Direct-Unconventional	Government
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Egypt	5	1967	Direct-Unconventional	Government
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Syria	2	1968	Direct-Conventional	Government
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Saudi Arabia	10	1962	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
847	Yemen North	1962-1970	Yemen South	2	1968	Direct-Conventional	Government
870	Oman	1970-1975	United Kingdom	7	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
870	Oman	1970-1975	United Kingdom	3	1974	Direct-Unconventional	Government
870	Oman	1970-1975	Iran	10	1975	Direct-Conventional	Government
870	Oman	1970-1975	Jordan	7	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
870	Oman	1970-1975	Yemen South	5	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
870	Oman	1970-1975	Yemen South	7	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
870	Oman	1970-1975	Yemen South	11	1973	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	2	1980	Direct-Conventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	6	1980	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	7	1980	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	8	1980	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	9	1980	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	10	1980	Direct-Unconventional	Government

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	12	1981	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	9	1982	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	7	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	10	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	4	1984	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	6	1984	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	4	1985	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	6	1985	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	7	1985	Direct-Unconventional	Government
901	Afghanistan	1978-1992	USSR	12	1987	Direct-Unconventional	Government
784	China	1946-1950	Taiwan	12	1949	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
784	China	1946-1950	Taiwan	3	1950	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
942	India	1984-1999	Afghanistan	6	1994	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	2	1990	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	8	1991	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	9	1993	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	1	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	1	1996	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	3	1996	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	5	1998	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	7	1998	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	5	1999	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	6	1999	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	6	1999	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
994	India	1989-2007	Pakistan	8	1999	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	4	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	5	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	7	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	8	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	10	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	11	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	11	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
880	Pakistan	1971-1971	India	11	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
890	Pakistan	1973-1977	Afghanistan	8	1975	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
930	Sri Lanka	1981-2001	India	9	1987	Direct-Conventional	Government
861	Thailand	1965-1985	Malaysia	5	1970	Direct-Conventional	Government

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
861	Thailand	1965-1985	Malaysia	2	1985	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	4	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	10	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	12	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	3	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	6	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	9	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	12	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	3	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	6	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	9	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	12	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	12	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	12	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	3	1973	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	6	1973	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	United States	8	1973	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	6	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	8	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	11	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	2	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	6	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	10	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	12	1971	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	2	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	8	1972	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	9	1972	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam North	8	1973	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	3	1970	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	4	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	6	1970	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	8	1970	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	10	1970	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	11	1970	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	1	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	3	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	5	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	9	1971	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	10	1971	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	1	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	2	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	3	1972	Direct-Unconventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	3	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	7	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	12	1972	Direct-Conventional	Government
871	Cambodia	1970-1975	Vietnam South	4	1973	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	6	1980	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	1	1981	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	2	1982	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	4	1983	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	4	1983	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	3	1984	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Thailand	2	1985	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	12	1978	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	12	1978	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	1	1979	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	1	1979	Direct-Unconventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	1	1979	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	3	1979	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	6	1980	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	7	1980	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	2	1982	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	1	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	3	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	3	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	4	1983	Direct-Unconventional	Rebels
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	12	1983	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	3	1984	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	12	1984	Direct-Unconventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	1	1985	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	2	1985	Direct-Conventional	Government
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	3	1985	Direct-Conventional	Government

Continued on next page

Table 14: Direct Interventions in Civil Wars

Conflict ID	*Country*	*Years of Conflict*	*Intervenor*	*Month of Intervention*	*Year of Intervention*	*Strategy*	*Target*
908	Cambodia	1978-1991	Vietnam	4	1985	Direct-Conventional	Government
841	Laos	1959-1962	Vietnam North	9	1959	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
841	Laos	1959-1962	Vietnam North	1	1961	Direct-Conventional	Rebels
850	Laos	1963-1973	United States	6	1963	Direct-Unconventional	Government
835	Vietnam South	1960-1965	United States	2	1962	Direct-Conventional	Government
835	Vietnam South	1960-1965	United States	3	1962	Direct-Conventional	Government
835	Vietnam South	1960-1965	United States	1	1964	Direct-Conventional	Government
835	Vietnam South	1960-1965	United States	8	1964	Direct-Unconventional	Government
835	Vietnam South	1960-1965	United States	1	1965	Direct-Unconventional	Government
835	Vietnam South	1960-1965	United States	2	1965	Direct-Unconventional	Government

References

Achen, Christopher H. 1986. *The Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments*. Berkely: University of California Press.

Gartzke, Erik and Dong-Joon Jo. 2002. "The Affinity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting Positions in the UNGA." *http://erikgartzke.com/datasets.html* .

Gent, Stephen E. 2008. "Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts." *International Studies Quarterly* 52:713–735.

Gilligan, Michael J. and Ernest J. Sergenti. 2007. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2):89–122.

Ho, Daniel, Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Elizabeth Stuart. 2007. "Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference." *Political Analysis* 15(3):199–236.

Ho, Daniel, Kosuke Imai, Gary King and Elizabeth Stuart. 2011. "Matchit: Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference." *Journal of Statistical Software* 42(8).

Regan, Patrick M. 2002. "Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1):55–73.