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A Coding Procedure

In this section we document our procedure for converting the PDB text into data.

A.1 Constructing CORPUS

The PDBs are made available through the CREST archive; hosted online on the CIA website. CREST organizes the documents into two libraries based on the years published. The first library includes PDBs 1961-1969. The second includes PDBs 1969-1977.

Each PDB is assigned its own web-page. Each webpage provides a link to a PDF photocopy of the original document, and associated metadata. The most relevant fields in this metadata were (1) the publication date, (2) the number of PDBs published that day.

Our initial scraping effort extracted one record for every webpage and stored it in an SQL database. That record contained one field for each meta-data item, and one field that contained the PDB.

A.2 Converting the photo-copied text into machine readable text

The PDFs are photocopies of the original PDBs. They are not text readable. Thus, our next step was to convert each PDF picture into readable text.

To do this, we used the professional version of Abby Finereader v14 (Abby) made available to us through the [Removed for review] library. We also took advantage of library staff who specialize in text recognition programming. These library scientists helped us tailor the Abby program to extract an accurate record of text.

The photocopies were sometimes photocopied crooked, and each document had a header and footer with labeling we wanted to remove. To address these issues, we first passed the documents through a python script that re-orientated the documents so the lines were straight, and identified and removed headers and footers from the document. With the documents aligned, we entered each PDF as a separate file into Abby.

By default, Abby treats each page as a single column of text. It then identifies text rows, and convert each horizontal row into a line of text. This creates problems for us because several pages of the PDB are organized into columns. If we want to keep the text in order, we need Abby to recognize column breaks and apply the OCR algorithm to each column individually.

Alone, the column structure is not an issue for us because we are counting words that could appear in any order in the document. However, the PDB often breaks up the last word on a line with a hyphen. If the last word on the line is a country, leader or city name, then we introduce error if we do not keep the columns separate.

We tried a variety of automated approaches to recognizing column partitions. However, all were prone to error. For example, we tried to recognize vertical partitions through estimating white pixilated space. However, the inclusion of redaction codes at odd parts of the document forced the algorithm to place column breaks in strange places.

Abby allows the researcher to manually specify column breaks on pages. Unfortunately, the document formats varied to some degree. For example, some PDBs do not introduce a column structure. Others included two evenly spaced columns. Others still included the paragraph's title in a short, left-hand column; then the main text in a wider column on the right. A handful of entries were formatted as double-space all caps.

In addition, some PDBs included a main report and an Appendix section. These two sections were often formatted differently. In each case, the relevant text in the appendix was formatted as a

single page. We wanted to keep the information in the Appendix for our analysis (we ran a version without the Appendix and found no difference in our analysis).

In the end, we developed 4 templates to manage the different structures. We then visually inspected each document and manually applied the templates. This procedure ensured that the text was read in the correct order.

Abby also auto-identifies pictures and treats them separately to text (even when we apply a template). This was helpful for us because the PDB includes maps and photographs that occasionally have text on them. We explicitly did not want to read the text on maps. The reason was that the maps regularly labeled different countries from an entire region but were there to support one entry on a single country (e.g. a map of Vietnam would have Laos and Cambodia on it. But these other countries were not relevant in the analysis). As a result, we told Abby to skip pictures.

Once we had the documents covered, we applied the OCR algorithm to the document. This turned the PDF into machine readable text.

Next, we searched for errors in the conversion process. A nice feature of Abby is that it identifies characters that the program cannot confidently estimate as a specific character. It allows the user to specify what that letter is. Most of the mis-estimations related to punctuation. For example, Abby would read black marks on the page as a comma. We corrected these where we saw them. However, since our objective was to extract words from the entire document, we did not overly focus on punctuation. We then spot-checked 40 PDBs and looked for errors in character recognition of letters. We found two cases where Abby had mis-estimated letters (one e and one g). With such a low error rate, we moved on.

After making these changes, we extracted the text from the documents as .txt files.

A.3 Regular expression

Our next step was to clean the processed text via regular expression code. Our first task was to record, then clean out the codes for redacted text in the document. Our second task was to identify disconnected words and re-connected them over lines. We then performed a variety of other cleaning procedures including removing white spaces, tabs, and certain punctuation.

We spot checked 100 entries against the original PDB. In many case, the title for an Entry (e.g. Sino-American relations) was not above the relevant entry. But we found no errors that would affect our dictionary guided approach.

A.4 Iterative Dictionary Construction

Our goal was to develop three distinct dictionaries for: countries, capital cities and leaders. We used the ARCHIGOS dataset to determine the list of countries we would focus on, and the list of leaders in charge of those countries on any given day. We used the CIA World Factbook to determine the Capital Cities of all countries in the ARCHIGOS Dataset. When there was a difference between the symbolic (e.g. Jerusalem) and governance capitol (Tel Aviv), we focused on the Governance Capitol.

The PDB is extensively edited before it reaches the president. Further, the CIA standardizes spellings for countries, leaders and capitol cities. This made spelling errors in the documents uncommon. This is not to say we found no spelling errors or variation in spelling. Only that they were relatively rare. This made our job easier, but there were still some significant challenges we faced along the way. The construction of each of the three dictionaries presented their own challenges. We addressed these challenges as they arose.

We started with a construction of the country and capital city dictionaries. Our initial list of spellings came from the CIA World Factbook, ARCHIGOS and the ICEWs dictionary for locations and political actors. One draw back of the ICEWs dictionary included a set of search terms that was too broad (including colloquial names for countries that shared a spelling with common usage words. However, one advantage of ICEWs was that it included a longer list of spellings that covered different parts of speech. For example, ICEWs includes China, Chinese, PRC and other variants of China that all fall within our understanding of country references that do not apply to the leader. Using the different spellings was helpful because we could introduce a long list of terms to search for specifically, rather than use a word stem approach such as "Chin*" that would return too many false positives. Notably, ICEWs includes the country-name conventions "Sino" as a spelling for China, and "Anglo" as a spelling for England. These feature extensively in the PDB near hyphens Thus, we could introduced the root words, and searches that included hyphenated versions such as "Sino-*", ".-Sino" and related terms into our search.

One challenge with cities (and some countries) was that some city names included multiple tokens (e.g. Ho Chi Min City). In some cases, we could deal with this by focusing on a distinctive word in the city name. But in other cases, it was unclear if a single token would return false positives. There were not many double token cities. So we manually searched the PDB to determine how the CIA described those cities. We dealt with this issue by entering a double (or sometimes triple) token into the dictionary. We then pre-processed the text to identify these double-tokens before we tokenized the text.

As a first cut, we token-ized the text at the document level, then ran both country and city dictionaries and analyzed results at the country level. Following We identified cases where (1) countries were never mentioned; (2) countries were mentioned but cities were not; (3) countries or cities were mentioned an unusually large number of times. In each of these cases we manually checked the dictionary's performance and adjusted.

As a second cut, we ran the revised dictionary and analyzed results at the document-country level. We looked for cases where (1) the city was mentioned but the country was not; (2) the city was mentioned more than the country; (3) the document included an unusually small (or large) number of different cities and countries. We then reviewed these cases, revised.

Next we constructed a leader dictionary. Unlike the other two, leaders are not constant over time. Thus, we could not construct a dictionary using country as the unit of analysis. Instead, we developed leader-level dictionary. We started with spellings from Archigos, and the CIA World Factbook.

However, these sources were less effective for leaders than they were for countries. The main reason is that all leaders have more than one name (first and last name at a minimum) and it was unclear what names the CIA used. For example, for certain Asian and Latin American states the CIA referred to leaders by their first name. In addition, transliteration conventions have changed over time, particularly for Arabic names (e.g., Hussein vs. Husayn or Nasser vs. Nasir). As part of another project, we had a person coding large portions of the PDB. We asked that person to identify leader spellings and keep them in a spread sheet. That human coding effort helped considerably.

We then ran diagnostics using the similar techniques as in the country-city case, such as looking for cases of no leader mentions or very few leader mentions relative to country and capital city mentions and updated our leader dictionary as necessary. We discovered two additional challenges. First, there were a handful of cases where two leaders with the same name ruled different countries at the same time (e.g., individuals named Castro led Ecuador and Cuba at the same time). Second, some leaders had common usage names (Park, Price) that came up in many other contexts. Fortunately, the PDB almost always titles each entry with a country name. Thus, there should almost never be a case where there are 0 country mentions and a leader mention.

Using this insight, we focused our leadership count to cases where the country or capital city were also mentioned at some point in the document. In other words, if the country and city count equalled 0, then we assumed the leader count also equalled 0. We then validated that this technique helped alleviate our main concern, and did not affect the counts of other leaders. As part of this process, we identified a handful of additional country and city spellings. We went back and adjusted the dictionary where appropriate. There was one case (leaders named Sanchez over a 2-year period) where the technique counted leaders incorrectly. In this case, we resolved to hand-count these cases.

With our three dictionaries in place, we then entered a validation phase. In the validation phase, we ran the three dictionaries over the tokenized text, extracted counts, and applied the 0 country + city = 0 leader rule. We then randomly chose 20 PDBs and manually counted each country, city and leader mention in the original PDF document. We matched that count to the dictionary count. We repeated this 3 times. In each audit, the dictionary accuracy was over 95%. Thus, we concluded that the dictionary was a comprehensive and reasonable counting procedure.

A.5 Why leaders, countries, and capital cities, but not other terms?

We omit pro-nouns largely for practical reasons. However, we do not think this damages our inferences for three reasons. First, the PDB uses pro-nouns to refer to leaders, cities and countries. It is common, for the PDB to use "they" or "it" as a pronoun for a city (depending on the context). Thus, our omission of pro-nouns for leaders also reduces the count of city and country mentions when they are used as actors. Second, we cannot think of any reason that the use of pro-nouns over names would be correlated with conflict. As we discuss in the manuscript, this is critical for damaging our inferences. Third, our review of the PDB's language patterns finds that the PDB often refers to leaders repeatedly in the same paragraph. Thus, their use of pro-nouns is limited to some degree, allowing for multiple mentions of leaders where appropriate (usually because they are discussing a leader's actions in addition to some other actor's action and they need to refer to the different actors by name to keep the meaning clear).

We also omit lower-level officials for two theoretical reasons. First, it is unclear who the complete list of actors would be. Should we count only foreign ministers? Or should we count all cabinet officials, business people with close ties to the regime, etc.? There is no obvious rule because the relevant alternative actors will vary depending on the political context of a specific country.

Second, we believe that including other officials would artificially deflate the importance of leaders in periods where the CIA judges the leader's choices to be important. The reason is that when the CIA describes the actions that a leader is taking, they also discuss how the leader delegates to other staff, or how the leader overcomes debates with other political actors. In cases like this, the CIA clearly believes that the leader is an important actor (and mentions her by name), but also mentions other actors as well. Ultimately, the way that we count is an empirical question, and we validate our strategy using a survey that we discuss in the manuscript. We explain how we aggregate the measure in the manuscript.

B Organization Chart

Below is the organization chart for the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence, responsible for producing the President's Daily Brief.

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

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C Additional statistical analyses

C.1 Additional analysis for interaction models.

Table 5 reports regression results for our model interacting conflict stages and our measures of political constraints (see Section 3.2). Consistent with our baseline model, we find that political constraints are a robust negative predictor of leadership importance. This implies that on average

leaders of constrained regimes are discussed less than leaders of unconstrained regimes across all periods in our dataset.

To increase our confidence in our estimates we include controls for Weeks's break down of autocratic regimes and a control for history as a rebel leader. Table 6 reports the regression coefficients and Figure 7 plots the marginal affects. There is no change.

Table 5: Interactive Effects of Conflict Events and Institutions

	DV: Leadership Ratio
Crisis Onset	0.0002
	p = 0.996
Crisis ends peacefully	0.062*
	p = 0.020
Onset of Fat. combat	0.187**
	p = 0.00001
Fat. Combat ongoing	0.0004
	p = 0.085
Fat. Combat Ends	0.068
	p = 0.076
Political Constraint	−0.028**
	p = 0.00001
Democracy	0.008**
	p = 0.006
Political Constraint ×	
Crisis Onset	−0.084
	p = 0.464
Crisis ends peacefully	−0.059
	p = 0.607
Onset of Fat. combat	−0.460**
	p = 0.004
Fat. Combat ongoing	−0.0004
	p = 0.631
Fat. Combat Ends	−0.129
	p = 0.404
Observations	106,943
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

C.2 Robustness Checks raised in review

During the review process, the Editors and reviewers raised a number of variables that could plausibly confound our analysis. Here we address each of them with statistical models the extend the model presented in Table 4.[32] In each case, we discuss the issue with reference to our broad

[32]To be clear, we highlight the fact that Editors and Reviewers raised these issues so that readers know we did not cherry-pick our robustness checks. The fact that our results are robust to the concerns of smart, outside readers

Table 6: Interactive Effects of Conflict Events and Institutions + regime, leader controls

	Dependent variable:
	Leadership Ratio
Crisis Onset	0.001
	p = 0.976
Crisis Ends Peacefully	0.057*
	p = 0.034
Onset of Fat. Combat	0.192**
	p = 0.00001
Fat. Combat ongoing	0.0004
	p = 0.093
Fat Combat ends	0.071
	p = 0.063
Political Constraint	−0.036**
	p = 0.000
Democracy	0.002
	p = 0.594
Junta	−0.027**
	p = 0.000
Strongman	−0.045**
	p = 0.000
Machine	−0.029**
	p = 0.000
Boss	−0.003
	p = 0.349
Rebel Leader	0.009**
	p = 0.00000
Political Constraint ×	
Crisis Onset	−0.084
	p = 0.468
Crisis Ends Peacefully	−0.050
	p = 0.664
Onset of Fat. Combat	−0.488**
	p = 0.003
Fat. Combat ongoing	−0.0003
	p = 0.701
Fat Combat ends	−0.126
	p = 0.413
Observations	106,588
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01

Figure 7: Interactive affects with controls



empirical approach. We think presenting the concern and the explaining how approach accounts for it is valuable because our approach is novel. Our confidence in our estimates is based on several interactive defenses to confounding forces. As with any novel approach, readers will likely have a wide variety of concerns and wonder if our approach deals with a specific issue. Thinking through a handful of specific issues in detail will hopefully raise your confidence in our estimates because it will illuminate how approach covers a broad range of issues.

C.2.1 Presidential level biases

One concern was that different presidents wanted to hear more or less about foreign leaders. Our basic approach is robust to this sort of bias if a US president wants to hear more about a foreign leader *all of the time*. The reason is that our estimates capture the difference between reports in peace-time and at each stage of conflict. To bias our results, each president must want to hear more about leaders at a specific stage of conflict but not at any other time. For example, our results are confounded if the CIA knows that Johnson wants to hear a huge amount about foreign leaders at the onset of a crisis, but at no other time. They are not biased if the CIA knows that Johnson wants to hear more about leaders all of the time. To make sure this variant of differential bias did not impact our results, we include presidential fixed effects in column 4 of Table 4. If differential bias is at work, then presidential fixed effects will alter the coefficients and significance of our main explanatory variables. A comparison of model 3 and 4 confirms that they do not. The estimates and error that surrounds them for time until any of our conflict events, and Mid days remains robust. An F-Test rejects the hypothesis also confirms that adding presidential fixed

raises our confidence in them.

effects does not add any explanatory power to the model.

C.2.2 Notable controls that relate to the leader's history

A second issue is that over time the CIA learns about the importance of a foreign leader over time. This could happen because they observe that specific leader on certain foreign policy crises and then realize that they hold an out-sized affect at a specific stage of a crisis. Then in future crises they would report more. It could also happen because they observe a leader day to day and realize that the leader holds a specific skill that makes them especially important, for example, during war.

Our theory expects that this will happen. The reason is that we think the CIA is good at its job on average. Thus, when they realize that a leader has a specific skill that renders them more important at a specific stage of conflict, they will report more on that specific leader at that stage.

However, we predict that case-specific choices to update will not confound our on-average estimates because the CIA should start with the average expectation about how important leaders are before they observe that leader behave in office. Some leaders will be more important than other leaders at a specific stage, and some will be less important than the average. Thus, what the CIA learns will cause them to report on some leaders more at a specific stage and other leaders less at the same stage. These competing affects should net out if the CIA's initial expectation is close to the true level of importance for leaders.

We explore this basic prediction in Table 7. This replicated the models in Table 4 with the added controls that count the number of MIDs a leader was engaged in, the number of MIDs that leader was engaged in against the US, and the leader's time in office. We note that these variables are all significant, suggesting that the CIA adjusts reporting based on what they learn over time. However, our main claim is that the point estimates and levels of confidence for our main explanatory variables will not change. This is what we find.

Table 7: Replicating Table 4 with controls that capture learning over time

	Dependent variable:			
	Leadership Ratio			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Crisis Onset	−0.010	−0.010	−0.018	−0.018
	p = 0.665	p = 0.660	p = 0.415	p = 0.409
Crisis ends peacefully	0.053*	0.053*	0.055*	0.052*
	p = 0.017	p = 0.019	p = 0.015	p = 0.020
Onset of Fat. combat	0.123**	0.122**	0.115**	0.111**
	p = 0.0002	p = 0.0002	p = 0.0004	p = 0.001
Fat. Combat ongoing	0.0002	0.0002	0.0003	0.0002
	p = 0.249	p = 0.217	p = 0.167	p = 0.380
Fat. Combat Ends	0.056	0.055	0.046	0.045
	p = 0.075	p = 0.086	p = 0.151	p = 0.159
Political Constraint		−0.033**	−0.030**	−0.033**
		p = 0.000	p = 0.00000	p = 0.000
Democracy		0.007*	0.007*	0.006*
		p = 0.023	p = 0.023	p = 0.049
Civil War Onset			0.252**	0.251**
			p = 0.00001	p = 0.00001
Fat. Civil War ongoing			0.001	0.001**
			p = 0.098	p = 0.004
Fat. Civil War Ends			0.623**	0.620**
			p = 0.000	p = 0.000
Johnson				0.006**
				p = 0.00002
Kennedy				−0.009**
				p = 0.00001
Nixon				0.002
				p = 0.151
Leader MIDs	−0.002**	−0.002**	−0.002**	−0.002**
	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000
Leader US MIDs	0.009**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000
Time in office	−0.00000**	−0.00000**	−0.00000**	−0.00000*
	p = 0.004	p = 0.001	p = 0.003	p = 0.039
Observations	109,300	106,943	106,943	106,943

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01
Solid line marks the 5 main causal variables.

D Illustrative Case: The Six Day War

At around 8:00 AM on June 5, 1967, Israeli pilots launched waves of attacks on Egyptian airfields, devastating the Egyptian air forces and the tipping simmering Middle East crisis into full-scale conflict. Thus began the Six Day War, a short but intense conflict that saw Israel annex the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. The six days of hostilities, the preceding weeks of crisis, and the description of them in the PDB illustrate our findings illustrate our findings and provide validation of our measure.

The Six Day War presents is particularly useful for two reasons. First, there are clear dates for conflict onset and conflict termination. Thus, we can cleanly compare reporting prior to and during hostilities. Second, the crisis and conflict featured leaders who faced different institutional constraints. King Hussein of Jordan and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt faced limited formal constraints, though they did care for their public standing and were not entirely unencumbered. By contrast, however, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol faced a highly constrained institutional environment. During this period, the Israeli cabinet and individual ministers acted as a strong check on the prime minister's discretion. As a result, the Six Day War allows us to investigate whether CIA reporting, as we suggest above, varies with a leader's institutional prerogative.

The brewing crisis in the Middle East comes on to the CIA's radar in mid-May, with the PDB reporting on possible retaliation by Israel against Syria following a series of Syrian-sponsored terrorist attacks (PDB, 5/11/1967). The focus quickly turns to Egypt when Nasser escalates the crisis in an attempt to deter Israeli action. According to the CIA, Nasser "threw down the gauntlet and announced the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping" on May 22. Nasser ultimately draws Hussein into the crisis, which erupts into conflict on the morning of June 5 when "Israeli planes raided airfields in Cairo and other areas." From May 19 through the termination of the conflict on June 10, the situation in the Middle East was the top item in every PDB delivered to the president.

During the crisis period, May 11 to June 4, there is considerable CIA reporting on the leaders of the most involved states. The CIA frequently reports its understanding of the leaders' actions, goals, strategies, considerations, constraints, and thought processes. Nasser "continues his gigantic gamble" (PDB, 5/20/1967). Hussein felt compelled to join with Egypt, signing a joint defense pact

in Cairo, "leaving his scalp nailed to Nasir's lodge pole" (PDB, 5/31/1967).[33] Eshkol "is being hard pressed by the hawks within and outside his government" (PDB, 6/1/1967). Indeed, on May 25 there is an annex to the PDB devoted to Nasser's behavior and how it "forced the more moderate Arab regimes"—e.g., the Jordanian monarchy—"into a Hobson's choice." (PDB, 5/25/1967)

Table 8: Ratio of Leader-to-Country Mentions in the Six Day War

	Nasser	Hussein	Eshkol
Crisis (May 11 - June 4)	0.72 (32/44)	1.16 (14/12)	0.13 (9/67)
War (June 5 - June 10)	0.25 (6/24)	0.11 (1/9)	0.00 (0/33)
Total	0.55 (38/68)	0.71 (15/21)	0.09 (9/100)

Leaders, as our data suggest, are perceived to be especially important at this particular decision node; leaders are thought to decide whether crises fizzle out or else explode into conflict. By contrast, leaders virtually disappear from CIA analysis and reporting during the primary battles of the Six Day War, when the statistical analysis tells us they are perceived to be relatively less important. As Table 8 shows, the ratio of leader mentions to country mentions during the crisis far outstrips the ratio during the war itself for all three leaders. Indeed, during the crucial first three days of fighting, there is only one leader mention. On June 5 and June 7, there are no leader mentions at all. Instead, there are descriptions of military operations. For example, on June 7:

> At this point, the shooting continues despite the UN ceasefire resolution. Early this morning Israeli planes were hammering Jordanian positions outside Jerusalem ... The Israelis appear to hold substantial portions of the Sinai Peninsula, and Cairo is ordering the Egyptian force at Sharm ash-Shaykh on the Straits of Tiran to withdraw. In fact, there are strong indications that the Egyptians may be withdrawing most, if not all, of their forces from the Sinai. (PDB, 6/7/1967)

Only when the outcome of the war—a decisive Israeli victory and Egyptian humiliation—becomes clear, do leaders re-emerge as a focal point of the PDB. In particular, the CIA reports on June 8 that Nasser has personally "informed" other Arab governments that Egypt will not comply with the UN ceasefire. The CIA also reports that "public realization of the Arab defeat has generated strong feeling against Nasir, and foreign diplomats in Cairo consider the Egyptians are in a state of

[33] Contrary to contemporary convention, the CIA uses the spellings "Nasir" for Nasser and "Husayn" for Hussein.

panic over the military debacle." (PDB, 6/8/1967) The following day, June 9, the PDB states that "[s]igns are growing that Egypt's defeat has badly damaged Nasir's prestige in the Arab world."

The PDB's reporting on the Six Day War and the preceding crisis also illustrate some of the more nuanced findings we present quantitatively above. In particular, the ratio of leader to country mentions is lower for Israel than it is for either Jordan or Egypt, the other two principal crisis actors (Table 8). This, our data suggests, reflects institutional differences. King Hussein of Jordan and President Nasser of Egypt were less constrained than their Israeli counterpart. Israel is not only a democracy, but a parliamentary democracy in which leaders are especially constrained. Cabinet politicking was pervasive in Israel during this period. As the PDB would later note, "chronic infighting" was a feature of Israeli politics in the Eshkol years. (PDB, 1/22/1969)

We see evidence of this in the Six Day War. Though Israel is discussed more than either Egypt or Jordan during both the crisis and the war, Eshkol is mentioned less than his less constrained counterparts. A partial explanation for this is that the PDB was not focused only on Eshkol among Israeli leaders. There are frequent mentions of cabinet deliberations. Most interestingly, the CIA is attentive to the role of Moshe Dayan, a general and war hero from the 1956 Suez conflict who is reported to have joined the Israeli cabinet as defense minister on June 1. (PDB, 6/1/1967) It is not just what Eshkol believes and wants that matters; according to the PDB, other actors in the Israeli system matter, too.

In addition, we see concern for reputation and prestige in the CIA's reporting on Nasser. Though Nasser is an autocrat, his influence rested, in the CIA's view, on his popularity among "the street Arabs of the Middle East," which was important currency in Egypt and in his dealings with foreign leaders. (PDB, 5/25/1967) If leaders feel that their hands are tied by public or elite opinion, then their choices to escalate may be of particular note. As Nasser escalated the crisis, the PDB reports that while the Egyptian leader was "undoubtedly anxious to duck a fight," he had "crawled way on the limb. He has made one of he best publicized troop build-ups in recent years and has told the United Nations Emergency Force to go home. With his prestige on he line, Nasir will find it hard indeed to back down if the crunch comes." (PDB, 5/19/1967)