Appendix A for 'Breaking Down Pillars of Support for Democratic Backsliding'

Additional Tables and Figures

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Table 1: Full Set of Democratic Backsliding Spells

Country	Starting Year	Ending Year	Outcome
Albania	2017	2018	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Bolivia	2019	2021	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Bulgaria	2008	2021	democracy protected
Burkina Faso	2010	2015	democracy protected
Colombia	2001	2006	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Comoros	1999	2001	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Fiji	2000	2002	democracy protected
Fiji	2006	2015	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Georgia	2008	2010	democracy protected
Guinea-Bissau	2002	2005	democracy protected
Guinea-Bissau	2012	2015	democracy protected
Hungary	2010	2020	authoritarian regime
India	2014	2023	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Lesotho	2014	2018	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Malawi	1999	1999	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Mali	2012	2013	democracy protected
Moldova	2002	2002	democracy protected
Mongolia	2008	2009	democracy protected
Nicaragua	2007	2011	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Nicaragua	2012	2016	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Nicaragua	2017	2018	authoritarian regime
North Macedonia	1999	2002	democracy protected
Paraguay	2012	2013	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Serbia	2014	2023	democracy preserved but deteriorated
South Korea	2008	2012	democracy preserved but deteriorated
South Korea	2013	2017	democracy protected
Sri Lanka	2006	2015	democracy protected
Sri Lanka	2019	2022	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Türkiye	2011	2016	authoritarian regime
Ukraine	1998	2005	democracy protected
Venezuela	1992	1992	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Venezuela	1999	2000	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Venezuela	2001	2013	democracy preserved but deteriorated
Venezuela	2014	2019	authoritarian regime
Zambia	2012	2021	democracy protected

Additional Descriptive Tables and Figures

Table 2 includes summary statistics on all the variables included in our regression model of the impact of civil resistance on the protection of democracy. Our measures of civil resistance and the protection of democracy come from our own data collection and are described in the main text.

Four of our five control variables came from V-Dem. Our measure of presidentialism is the Presidentialism Index (v2xnp_pres) from V-Dem, which is constructed through a Bayesian factor analysis of ten indicators of legislative and judicial restraints on the executive. See pages 300-301 of the V-Dem codebook for more information. Our measure of media freedom is the Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index from V-Dem (v2x_freexp_altinf), which is constructed using a Bayesian factor analysis of eight indicators of media freedom. Our measure of polarization is the "Political Polarization" (v2cacamps) variable from V-Dem, which is a single indicator in which multiple country experts answered the question "Is society polarized into antagonisic political camps?" on a 5-point ordinal scale and their answers were combined into a single indicator using V-Dem's Bayesian item response theory measurement model (See page 232 of the V-Dem codebook). Our measure of democracy at the beginning of a backsliding spell was the V-Dem Polyarchy score (v2x_polyarchy), which we describe in the main text. All V-Dem indicators are given at the country-year level, while some of our backsliding spells continue for multiple years. Thus, to generate our spell-level indicators we averaged the V-Dem indicators over all the years included in our spells. We drew our measure of recessions from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. We first took the World Bank's measure of GDP per capita (NY.GDP.PCAP.CD), and then calculated whether there was a drop in GDP per capita in any year included in our backsliding spells. If such a drop occurred we coded the variable as a 1, otherwise as a 0.

Table 3 shows the frequencies of pillar-tactic combinations in our tactic-level data. As noted in the main text, we observed tactics by civic and faith actors much more frequently than tactics by business or security forces/veterans, and observed physical and verbal protest more frequently than other tactic categories.

Figure 1 reports success rates across pillar-tactic combinations. Note that empty columns with 0% over them indicates that we did observe that pillar-tactic combination, but that none of those tactics were successful, while fully empty columns indicate that we did not observe any instances of that pillar-tactic combination.

Table 2: Summary Statistics on Spell-Level Data

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Civil Resistance	0.5714286	0.5020964	0.0000000	1.000000
Democracy Protected	0.4000000	0.4970501	0.0000000	1.000000
Media Freedom	0.6559174	0.1534907	0.3086000	0.903000
Polarization	0.4260426	1.1135913	-1.5420000	2.707667
Presidentialism	0.4251024	0.2579505	0.1281667	0.964500
Recession	0.7714286	0.4260430	0.0000000	1.000000
Starting Democracy Level	0.5182286	0.1398352	0.2850000	0.808000

Table 3: Tactic/Pillar Combination Frequencies

Tactic	Civic Groups	Faith Communities	Veterans and Sec. Forces	Business
Outreach	9	13	1	0
Institutional Action	13	4	0	1
Material Support	0	3	0	2
Verbal Protest	29	30	2	2
Physical Protest	85	15	2	3
Nonviolent Intervention	25	3	4	1
Non-Cooperation	30	2	9	5



Figure 1: Tactic Success Rates Across Pillars

Regression Tables

Table 4 reports full regression results from two models of pillar alignment at the end of a backsliding spell, interacting outreach strategies with pillar alignment at the beginning of the spell and controlling for pillar. In both cases the dependent variable is our five-level Likert scale of pillar alignment, ranging from "completely support regime" to "completely support democracy." In the linear model, this is simply transformed to a 1-5 numeric scale. In the ordered logit model this is transformed to a factor variable ordered from "completely support regime" to "completely support democracy." Note that in the ordered logit there are separate intercepts for the first four levels of the dependent variable. Table 5 contains regression output from the

logistic regression modeling the impact of noncooperation tactics interacted with pillar on tactic-level success. Note that the business pillar was used as the baseline pillar category.

Table 4: Outreach and Pillar Alignment Models

	Linear	Ordered Logit
Outreach	2.99***	10.51**
	(0.66)	(3.69)
Beginning Alignment	0.86***	3.16***
	(0.13)	(0.85)
Outreach*Beginning Alignment	−0.80***	−2.82**
	(0.18)	(0.98)
Civic Groups	0.32	0.43
	(0.31)	(0.80)
Faith Communities	0.13	−0.18
	(0.31)	(0.84)
Vets/Security Forces	−0.19	−0.49
	(0.32)	(1.05)
Intercepts		
Constant	0.44	
	(0.26)	
Completely Support Regime		4.42***
		(0.96)
Mostly Support Regime		7.07***
		(1.13)
Neutral or Mixed		10.89***
		(1.66)
Mostly Support Democracy		13.56***
		(1.83)
R^2	0.70	
Adj. R^2	0.68	
Num. obs.	80	80
AIC		164.74
BIC		188.56
Log Likelihood		−72.37
Deviance		144.74

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Clustered SEs in parentheses.

Table 5: Noncooperation Success Across Pillars

	Model 1
Non-Cooperation	4.97^{***}
	(1.11)
Civic Groups	1.87^{*}
	(0.78)
Faith Communities	0.09
	(1.43)
Veterans and Sec. Forces	-2.80^{**}
	(1.04)
Polyarchy	-4.75
	(4.27)
Democratic Mobilization	1.40^{***}
	(0.41)
Non-Cooperation*Civic	-2.90^{*}
	(1.23)
Non-Cooperation*Faith	-19.54^{***}
	(1.92)
Non-Cooperation*Vets	3.55
	(4.39)
Intercept	25.91^{***}
	(5.66)
Country FE	Yes
Year FE	Yes
AIC	281.78
BIC	477.28
Log Likelihood	-86.89
Deviance	173.78
Num. obs.	276

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$.
Business pillar used as baseline.
Clustered SEs in parentheses.