ONLINE APPENDIX

Additional Material

Table A1. Democratically Committed IGOs 1
Figure A1. Breakdown of Backsliding by Country-Years 2
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics 3
Table A3. Do IO Features Deter Backsliding? 4

Robustness Checks – Replicating Table 1

Changing the dependent variable

Table A4. Subsequent Suspension Years Coded 0 5
Table A5. Suspension Threats Included 6

Changing the estimation

Table A6. Jackknife Estimates 7
Table A7. Rare Events Logit, Controlling for Probability of Backsliding 8
Table A8. Logit, Controlling for Probability of Backsliding 9

Changing the sample

Table A9. Restricting the Sample to Model 7 Sample 10
Table A10. Restricting the Sample to Backsliding IGO-Country-Years, Rare Event Logit 11
Table A11. Restricting the Sample to Backsliding IGO-Country-Years, Logit 12
Table A12. Restricting the Sample to Backsliding Type: Elections 13
Table A13. Restricting the Sample to Backsliding Type: Democracy 14
Table A14. Restricting the Sample to Backsliding Type: Coups 15
Table A15. Restricting the Sample to the Post Cold War period 16

Changing the controls

Table A16. Adding Further Control Variables 17
Table A17. Adding Issue Area Control Variables 18
Table A18. Replacing the Alliance measure with COW data 19
Table A19. Replacing Backsliding Election measure with V-Dem data 20
Table A20. Replacing Backsliding Human Rights measure with Fariss/Schnakenberg ... 21
Table A21. Descriptive Statistics for added controls 22

Details on Original Data Collection

Democratically committed IGOs (sample restriction) 23
IGO Membership Suspension (dependent variable) 24
IGO Suspension Voting Rule (independent variable) 25
IGO Suspension Clause (control variable) 27

Appendix Table A1: Democratically Committed IGOs

IGO Acronym	IGO name	Commitment Year
ILO	Intl Labour Org	1919
IADefB	Inter-American Defense Board	1942
UN	United Nations	1945
UNESCO	UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Org	1945
WEU	Western European Union	1948
OAS	Organization of American States	1948
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Org	1949
INCAP	Institit Nutrition for Cent Am and Pan	1949
COE	Council of Europe	1949
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community	1951
ICCS	Intl Comm on Civil Status	1952
INTERPOL	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1956
BENELUX	Benelux Community	1958
SEAMEO	Southeast Asian Minist. of Educ. Org.	1968
WTOURO	World Tourism Org.	1970
ComSec	Commonwealth	1971
OIC	Org. Islamic Conference	1974
AP	Andean Parliament	1979
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	1983
EU	European Union	1988
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	1989
Andean	Andean Pact	1989
CEI	Central European Initiative	1989
OSCE	OSCE	1990
GEF	Global Environ. Fund	1991
SICA	Central American Integration System	1991
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	1991
SADC	SADC	1992
ACP	ACP Group	1992
FDIPLAC	Fund 4 Devel. of Indigen Peoples of LA/Carib	1992
CEFTA	Central Europe FTA	1992
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Council	1992
COMESA	Comm Market for East/South Africa	1993
OESAS	Observatorie economique statistique sub-saharan Afr.	1993
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	1994
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Union	1994
ACS	Association of Caribbean States	1994
ECOWAS	ECOWAS	1995
CPSC	Comm Portugese Speaking Countries	1996
MERCOSUR	Mercosur	1998
ICC	International Criminal Court	1998
RIOgroup	Rio Group	1999
ACPEU	ACP/EU Joint Assembly	2000
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons	2000
PIF	Pacific Island Forum	2000
AU	African Union	2000
PAP	Pan-African Parliament	2000
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	2001
EACS	Sec. for the Commission for East Afr. Coop.	2001
SACU	Southern African CU	2002
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia	2002
SEGIB	Ibero-American General Secretariat	2003
ACCT	OI de la Francophonie	2005
CEPGL	Economic Community of Great Lakes States	2006
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	2007

Note: The number of organizations shown here is slightly higher than in our analysis as it accounts for several organizations that are follow-on entities.

Appendix Figure A1. Breakdown of Backsliding by Country-Year, 1980-2010



Appendix Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Suspension	0.001	0.027	0	1	41171
Allied with regional power	0.424	0.494	0	1	41211
Oil and gas income per capita	-1.246	6.999	-9.210	11.147	40852
GDP	23.926	2.237	18.425	30.247	39000
IGO size	110.269	64.313	3	189	41211
Hard IGO voting rule	0.145	0.352	0	1	32504
IGO clause on suspension	0.367	0.482	0	1	41211
Post Cold War	0.779	0.415	0	1	41211
More democratic IGO	7.330	2.287	-3.488	10	40606
Backsliding	0.114	0.318	0	1	41220
GDP growth	3.539	6.493	-51.031	149.973	39277
GDP per capita	7.844	1.612	3.913	11.674	38979
Democracy	2.799	6.910	-10	10	40591
Age of democracy	1.896	1.446	0	4.394	41188
Effective number of parties	0.800	0.386	0	2.67	41188
Political system	1.261	0.916	0	2	40807

Appendix Table A3: Do IO Features Deter Backsliding?

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.319						-0.679
	(0.181)*						(0.465)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.044					-0.030
		(0.008)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.141				-0.027
			(0.023)***				(0.058)
IGO size				0.075			0.063
				(0.036)**			(0.036)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)**			(0.000)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.637		-0.722
					(0.376)*		(0.303)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.480	0.073
						(0.349)	(0.225)
Post Cold War	0.432	0.449	0.385	0.367	0.673	0.502	0.023
	(0.273)	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.384)	(0.387)*	(0.288)*	(0.603)
More democratic IGO	0.122	0.192	0.195	0.095	0.118	0.109	0.202
	(0.044)***	(0.044)***	(0.047)***	(0.046)**	(0.054)**	(0.046)**	(0.056)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.004
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)	(0.002)***	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)*	(0.001)*	(0.001)*	(0.001)*	(0.001)	(0.001)*	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.176	-0.176	-0.176	-0.176	-0.174	-0.176	-0.174
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.011)***	(0.009)***	(0.011)***
Democracy	-0.061	-0.061	-0.061	-0.061	-0.060	-0.061	-0.060
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.030
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.008)***	(0.006)***	(0.008)***
Effective number of parties	0.103	0.104	0.103	0.103	0.110	0.103	0.110
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***
Political system	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.100	0.103	0.100
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.012)***	(0.011)***	(0.012)***
IGO clause on suspension	-0.015	-0.014	-0.015	-0.015	0.225	-0.014	0.224
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.124)*	(0.024)	(0.124)*
IGO history of suspension	0.031	0.042	0.033	0.035	0.116	0.032	0.115
	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.232)	(0.107)	(0.226)
IGO democratic commitment strength	-0.025	-0.024	-0.025	-0.024	-0.167	-0.025	-0.170
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.155)	(0.040)	(0.154)
More democratic IGO	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.038	0.025	0.038
	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.010)***	(0.005)***	(0.010)***
IGO memberships (logged)	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.182	0.128	0.182
	(0.029)***	(0.029)***	(0.029)***	(0.029)***	(0.081)**	(0.029)***	(0.081)**
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38054	38054	38054	38054	37076	38054	37076
AIC	23694.32	23684.03	23689.48	23655.11	19796.90	23686.51	19756.53
BIC	23873.80	23863.51	23868.97	23843.14	19975.83	23865.99	19986.59
Rho	0.217	-0.092	0.139	0.127	-0.298	0.184	-0.427
Pr(rho=0)	0.604	0.805	0.734	0.755	0.555	0.665	0.197

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A4: Replicating Table 1 with Subsequent Suspension Years Coded Zero

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.321						-0.684
	(0.179)*						(0.473)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.043					-0.029
		(0.009)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.141				-0.036
			(0.026)***				(0.055)
IGO size				0.075			0.063
				(0.036)**			(0.038)*
IGO size × IGO size				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)**			(0.000)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.685		-0.754
					(0.343)**		(0.293)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.472	0.129
						(0.344)	(0.214)
Post Cold War	0.413	0.449	0.368	0.363	0.716	0.483	0.079
	(0.290)	(0.300)	(0.295)	(0.395)	(0.387)*	(0.308)	(0.598)
More democratic IGO	0.110	0.186	0.185	0.080	0.106	0.095	0.210
	(0.030)***	(0.038)***	(0.037)***	(0.043)*	(0.046)**	(0.032)***	(0.058)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)**	(0.002)***	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.168	-0.169	-0.168	-0.168	-0.159	-0.168	-0.159
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.054	-0.057	-0.054
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.054	0.048	0.054
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.136	0.118	0.137
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***
Political system	0.112	0.111	0.112	0.112	0.110	0.112	0.111
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38082	38082	38082	38082	37100	38082	37100
AIC	23763.69	23753.78	23758.75	23723.38	20014.00	23755.97	19973.44
BIC	23900.45	23890.54	23895.51	23868.69	20150.34	23892.73	20160.92
Rho	0.283	-0.039	0.197	0.220	-0.119	0.269	-0.365
Pr(rho=0)	0.326	0.880	0.491	0.494	0.573	0.333	0.072

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A5: Replicating Table 1 with Suspension Threats Included

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.258						-0.501
	(0.148)*						(0.331)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.042					-0.031
		(0.009)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.127				0.004
			(0.041)***				(0.077)
IGO size				0.092			0.078
				(0.033)***			(0.045)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)***			(0.001)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.751		-0.791
					(0.341)**		(0.290)***
IGO clause on suspension						0.462	0.188
						(0.346)	(0.183)
Post Cold War	0.462	0.495	0.418	0.449	0.769	0.520	0.333
	(0.259)*	(0.267)*	(0.259)	(0.350)	(0.340)**	(0.280)*	(0.435)
More democratic IGO	0.103	0.183	0.175	0.074	0.125	0.088	0.219
	(0.032)***	(0.034)***	(0.032)***	(0.039)*	(0.053)**	(0.035)**	(0.060)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)**	(0.002)***	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.168	-0.169	-0.168	-0.168	-0.159	-0.168	-0.159
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.054	-0.057	-0.054
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.053	0.048	0.053
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.136	0.118	0.136
	(0.016)***	(0.015)***	(0.016)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***
Political system	0.111	0.111	0.111	0.112	0.110	0.112	0.111
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38082	38082	38082	38082	37100	38082	37100
AIC	23792.11	23781.16	23787.23	23742.51	20028.42	23783.07	19984.44
BIC	23928.87	23917.92	23923.99	23887.82	20164.76	23919.83	20171.91
Rho	0.329	0.017	0.254	0.273	-0.060	0.320	-0.316
Pr(rho=0)	0.239	0.947	0.356	0.387	0.792	0.237	0.137

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A6: Replicating Table 1 with Jackknife Estimation

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.316						-0.698
	(0.264)						(0.473)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.043					-0.030
		(0.015)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.139				-0.032
			(0.048)***				(0.057)
IGO size				0.074			0.063
				(0.019)***			(0.037)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)***			(0.000)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.689		-0.729
					(3.193)		(0.294)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.478	0.155
						(0.174)***	(0.222)
Post Cold War	0.425	0.455	0.381	0.366	0.719	0.496	0.055
	(0.341)	(0.338)	(0.341)	(0.417)	(3.027)	(0.351)	(0.613)
More democratic IGO	0.114	0.189	0.187	0.084	0.108	0.099	0.212
	(0.047)**	(0.054)***	(0.065)***	(0.057)	(0.056)*	(0.048)**	(0.055)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.168	-0.169	-0.168	-0.168	-0.159	-0.168	-0.159
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.054	-0.057	-0.054
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.048	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.054	0.049	0.054
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.138	0.121	0.138
	(0.026)***	(0.026)***	(0.026)***	(0.026)***	(0.028)***	(0.026)***	(0.018)***
Political system	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.110	0.112	0.110
	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.015)***	(0.014)***	(0.016)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38074	38074	38074	38074	37096	38074	37096
AIC	23731.55	23721.60	23726.84	23692.38	19998.56	23723.65	19957.77
BIC	23868.31	23858.36	23863.59	23837.68	20134.90	23860.40	20145.24
Rho	0.258	-0.062	0.176	0.200	-0.133	0.247	-0.390
Pr(rho=0)	0.343	0.825	0.523	0.519	0.685	0.368	0.054

Note: Heckman probit models with jackknife standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A7: Rare Events Logit, Controlling for Probability of Backsliding

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(36)	(37)	(38)	(39)	(40)	(41)	(42)
Allied with regional power	-1.015						-0.946
	(0.423)**						(0.776)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.096					-0.051
		(0.021)***					(0.026)**
GDP			-0.386				-0.221
			(0.069)***				(0.116)*
IGO size				0.162			0.111
				(0.074)**			(0.073)
IGO size squared				-0.002			-0.001
				(0.001)**			(0.001)
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.845		-1.326
					(0.860)		(0.627)**
IGO clause on suspension						1.069	0.051
						(0.904)	(0.551)
Post Cold War	1.375	1.465	1.214	0.993	1.926	1.629	0.195
	(0.763)*	(0.788)*	(0.747)	(0.816)	(1.254)	(0.808)**	(0.913)
More democratic IGO	0.274	0.387	0.498	0.147	0.153	0.206	0.411
	(0.112)**	(0.121)***	(0.142)***	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.120)*	(0.176)**
Probability of political backsliding	5.127	7.929	5.629	6.204	6.246	6.047	7.679
	(1.141)***	(1.262)***	(1.094)***	(1.097)***	(1.313)***	(1.126)***	(1.349)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38014	38014	38014	38014	30131	38014	30131
AIC	456.241	450.728	451.016	410.667	347.408	452.625	299.345
BIC	524.606	519.094	519.381	487.579	413.914	520.990	415.732
LL	-220.120	-217.364	-217.508	-196.334	-165.704	-218.312	-135.673

Note: Rare event logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A8: Logit, Controlling for Probability of Backsliding

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(43)	(44)	(45)	(46)	(47)	(48)	(49)
Allied with regional power	-1.080						-1.104
	(0.423)**						(0.776)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.098					-0.053
		(0.021)***					(0.026)**
GDP			-0.392				-0.230
			(0.069)***				(0.116)**
IGO size				0.186			0.158
				(0.074)**			(0.073)**
IGO size squared				-0.002			-0.002
				(0.001)***			(0.001)**
Hard IGO voting rule					-1.070		-1.335
					(0.861)		(0.627)**
IGO clause on suspension						1.087	0.228
						(0.904)	(0.551)
Post Cold War	1.630	1.721	1.467	1.296	2.431	1.879	0.669
	(0.764)**	(0.788)**	(0.747)**	(0.817)	(1.255)*	(0.809)**	(0.913)
More democratic IGO	0.277	0.393	0.504	0.150	0.157	0.210	0.403
	(0.113)**	(0.121)***	(0.142)***	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.120)*	(0.176)**
Probability of political backsliding	5.090	7.904	5.569	6.253	6.206	6.002	7.895
	(1.142)***	(1.263)***	(1.095)***	(1.097)***	(1.313)***	(1.126)***	(1.350)***
Observations	38014	38014	38014	38014	30131	38014	30131
AIC	456.24	450.73	451.02	410.67	347.41	452.62	299.35
BIC	524.61	519.09	519.38	487.58	413.91	520.99	415.73

Note: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A9: Restricting the Sample to Model 7 Sample

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(50)	(51)	(52)	(53)	(54)	(55)	(56)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.303						-0.698
	(0.269)						(0.473)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.037					-0.030
		(0.007)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.122				-0.032
			(0.028)***				(0.057)
IGO size				0.093			0.063
				(0.038)**			(0.037)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)***			(0.000)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.689		-0.729
					(0.344)**		(0.294)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.733	0.155
						(0.319)**	(0.222)
Post Cold War	0.549	0.547	0.497	0.282	0.719	0.719	0.055
	(0.398)	(0.360)	(0.368)	(0.546)	(0.388)*	(0.399)*	(0.613)
More democratic IGO	0.109	0.168	0.171	0.019	0.108	0.100	0.212
	(0.044)**	(0.041)***	(0.045)***	(0.062)	(0.046)**	(0.046)**	(0.055)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.159	-0.160	-0.159	-0.159	-0.159	-0.159	-0.159
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054	-0.054
	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.138	0.138	0.138	0.138	0.138	0.138	0.138
	(0.018)***	(0.018)***	(0.018)***	(0.018)***	(0.018)***	(0.018)***	(0.018)***
Political system	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.110
	(0.016)***	(0.016)***	(0.016)***	(0.016)***	(0.016)***	(0.016)***	(0.016)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	37096	37096	37096	37096	37096	37096	37096
AIC	20003.12	19996.65	20000.68	19965.99	19998.56	19989.72	19957.77
BIC	20139.46	20132.99	20137.02	20110.85	20134.90	20126.06	20145.24
Rho	-0.093	-0.350	-0.157	-0.228	-0.133	-0.124	-0.390
Pr(rho=0)	0.673	0.116	0.492	0.291	0.534	0.568	0.054

Note: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A10: Restricting the Sample to Backsliding IGO-Country-Years, Rare Events Logit

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(57)	(58)	(59)	(60)	(61)	(62)	(63)
Allied with regional power	-0.770						-1.365
	(0.536)						(1.258)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.112					-0.059
		(0.025)***					(0.028)**
GDP			-0.390				-0.069
			(0.083)***				(0.117)
IGO size				0.154			0.095
				(0.088)*			(0.091)
IGO size squared				-0.002			-0.001
				(0.001)*			(0.001)
Hard IGO voting rule					-1.366		-1.692
					(1.047)		(0.874)*
IGO clause on suspension						1.251	0.212
						(0.937)	(0.570)
Post Cold War	0.907	1.030	0.697	0.481	1.654	1.223	-0.507
	(0.909)	(0.898)	(0.870)	(1.099)	(1.328)	(0.933)	(1.577)
More democratic IGO	0.405	0.478	0.586	0.291	0.234	0.333	0.361
	(0.166)**	(0.171)***	(0.207)***	(0.206)	(0.137)*	(0.163)**	(0.148)**
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	4590	4555	4323	4590	3523	4590	3323
AIC	287.707	276.969	280.725	247.744	227.460	280.550	186.479
BIC	332.728	321.937	325.327	299.197	270.629	325.572	265.891
LL	-136.853	-131.484	-133.362	-115.872	-106.730	-133.275	-80.240

Note: Rare Event Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A11: Restricting the Sample to Backsliding IGO-Country-Years, Logit

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(64)	(65)	(66)	(67)	(68)	(69)	(70)
Allied with regional power	-0.908						-1.706
	(0.537)*						(1.263)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.116					-0.063
		(0.025)***					(0.028)**
GDP			-0.398				-0.088
			(0.083)***				(0.117)
IGO size				0.180			0.156
				(0.088)**			(0.091)*
IGO size squared				-0.002			-0.002
				(0.001)**			(0.001)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-1.841		-1.922
					(1.049)*		(0.877)**
IGO clause on suspension						1.286	0.422
						(0.938)	(0.572)
Post Cold War	1.166	1.277	0.952	0.785	2.171	1.476	-0.084
	(0.910)	(0.900)	(0.871)	(1.101)	(1.330)	(0.934)	(1.584)
More democratic IGO	0.409	0.484	0.594	0.291	0.236	0.338	0.355
	(0.167)**	(0.171)***	(0.208)***	(0.206)	(0.138)*	(0.163)**	(0.149)**
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	4590	4555	4323	4590	3523	4590	3323
AIC	287.71	276.97	280.72	247.74	227.46	280.55	186.48
BIC	332.73	321.94	325.33	299.20	270.63	325.57	265.89
LL	-136.853	-131.484	-133.362	-115.872	-106.730	-133.275	-80.240

Note: Logit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A12: Determinants of IGO Suspensions for Political Backsliding, 1980-2010

Elections only

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design		
	(71)	(72)	(73)	(74)	(75)	(76)
Stage 2: Suspension						
Allied with regional power	-3.417					
	(0.183)***					
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.025				
		(0.005)***				
GDP			-0.067			
			(0.026)**			
IGO size				0.066		
				(0.029)**		
IGO size squared				-0.001		
				(0.000)***		
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.202	
					(0.323)	
IGO clause on suspension						0.506
						(0.336)
Post Cold War	3.361	3.767	3.455	3.736	3.585	3.359
	(0.224)***	(0.321)***	(0.221)***	(0.266)***	(0.239)***	(0.246)***
More democratic IGO	0.042	0.087	0.063	-0.009	0.066	0.023
	(0.073)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.082)
Stage 1: Political Backsliding – Elections						
Oil and gas income per capita	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***
GDP growth	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
GDP per capita	-0.156	-0.156	-0.156	-0.156	-0.148	-0.156
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***
Democracy	-0.071	-0.071	-0.071	-0.071	-0.066	-0.071
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***
Age of democracy	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.088	0.082
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.015)***	(0.006)***
Effective number of parties	0.088	0.089	0.088	0.088	0.099	0.088
	(0.022)***	(0.022)***	(0.022)***	(0.022)***	(0.023)***	(0.022)***
Political system	0.124	0.123	0.124	0.124	0.126	0.124
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.020)***	(0.015)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38034	38034	38034	38034	37294	38034
AIC	19150.57	19151.80	19152.75	19141.04	16139.96	19149.28
BIC	19312.95	19314.18	19315.12	19311.97	16293.44	19311.66
Rho	0.149	-0.125	0.059	0.006	-0.011	0.057
Pr(rho=0)	0.187	0.160	0.599	0.957	0.931	0.619

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A13: Determinants of IGO Suspensions for Political Backsliding, 1980-2010

Democracy only

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design		
	(77)	(78)	(79)	(80)	(81)	(82)
Stage 2: Suspension						
Allied with regional power	-0.721					
	(0.228)***					
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.035				
		(0.015)**				
GDP			-0.092			
			(0.047)*			
IGO size				0.054		
				(0.029)*		
IGO size squared				-0.001		
				(0.000)*		
Hard IGO voting rule					-4.576	
					(1.709)***	
IGO clause on suspension						0.373
						(0.302)
Post Cold War	0.277	0.173	0.176	0.022	0.419	0.170
	(0.236)	(0.217)	(0.264)	(0.272)	(0.361)	(0.276)
More democratic IGO	0.233	0.195	0.203	0.141	0.091	0.160
	(0.044)***	(0.050)***	(0.067)***	(0.065)**	(0.044)**	(0.059)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding – Democracy						
Oil and gas income per capita	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.008	0.010
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
GDP growth	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-0.017	-0.019
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***
GDP per capita	-0.241	-0.243	-0.241	-0.242	-0.223	-0.241
	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.013)***	(0.008)***
Democracy	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.038	0.040
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Age of democracy	-0.046	-0.047	-0.048	-0.047	-0.039	-0.048
	(0.016)***	(0.014)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)**	(0.015)***
Effective number of parties	0.151	0.146	0.146	0.148	0.177	0.148
	(0.051)***	(0.050)***	(0.051)***	(0.049)***	(0.058)***	(0.050)***
Political system	0.038	0.035	0.037	0.035	0.046	0.036
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.016)***	(0.011)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38093	38093	38093	38093	37947	38093
AIC	6341.25	6341.22	6345.91	6326.98	5217.46	6343.95
BIC	6478.02	6477.99	6482.67	6472.29	5354.16	6480.72
Rho	-0.822	-0.852	-0.729	-0.851	-0.807	-0.757
Pr(rho=0)	0.009	0.000	0.016	0.002	0.029	0.009

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A14: Determinants of IGO Suspensions for Political Backsliding, 1980-2010

Coups only

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design		
	(83)	(84)	(85)	(86)	(87)	(88)
Stage 2: Suspension						
Allied with regional power	-0.094					
	(0.401)					
Oil and gas income per capita		0.001				
		(0.027)				
GDP			0.032			
			(0.057)			
IGO size				0.226		
				(0.089)**		
IGO size squared				-0.003		
				(0.001)**		
Hard IGO voting rule					-5.182	
					(1.337)***	
IGO clause on suspension						0.585
						(0.533)
Post Cold War	1.284	1.314	1.289	1.659	1.417	1.341
	(0.333)***	(0.370)***	(0.338)***	(0.669)**	(0.351)***	(0.387)***
More democratic IGO	0.375	0.376	0.365	0.573	0.258	0.394
	(0.134)***	(0.132)***	(0.141)***	(0.263)**	(0.080)***	(0.140)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding – Coups						
Oil and gas income per capita	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
GDP growth	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
GDP per capita	-0.280	-0.280	-0.280	-0.279	-0.265	-0.279
	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.012)***	(0.014)***	(0.012)***
Democracy	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.017	-0.015
	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Age of democracy	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.024	0.007
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Effective number of parties	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.067	0.107	0.067
	(0.040)*	(0.040)*	(0.040)*	(0.040)*	(0.055)*	(0.040)*
Political system	-0.066	-0.066	-0.066	-0.066	-0.063	-0.066
	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.020)***	(0.014)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38047	38047	38047	38047	37933	38047
AIC	4394.88	4394.91	4394.83	4368.66	3481.67	4391.69
BIC	4531.63	4531.65	4531.58	4513.95	3618.37	4528.43
Rho	-0.258	-0.261	-0.330	0.154	-0.501	-0.128
Pr(rho=0)	0.509	0.352	0.402	0.878	0.396	0.725

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A15: Restricting the Sample to the Post Cold War period

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(89)	(90)	(91)	(92)	(93)	(94)	(95)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.184						-0.280
	(0.197)						(0.441)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.044					-0.028
		(0.008)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.136				-0.081
			(0.022)***				(0.058)
IGO size				0.080			0.066
				(0.036)**			(0.039)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)**			(0.001)*
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.650		-0.684
					(0.346)*		(0.294)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.513	0.108
						(0.338)	(0.237)
More democratic IGO	0.083	0.172	0.163	0.046	0.082	0.077	0.189
	(0.031)***	(0.043)***	(0.040)***	(0.051)	(0.047)*	(0.039)**	(0.062)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.004
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)*	(0.002)***	(0.003)*
GDP growth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.156	-0.157	-0.156	-0.156	-0.148	-0.156	-0.149
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.012)***	(0.011)***	(0.012)***
Democracy	-0.063	-0.063	-0.063	-0.063	-0.059	-0.063	-0.059
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.057	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.062	0.057	0.062
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.063	0.064	0.063	0.063	0.077	0.063	0.078
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)***
Political system	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.102	0.105	0.102
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.017)***	(0.011)***	(0.017)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	31096	31096	31096	31096	30366	31096	30366
AIC	19060.50	19049.56	19055.75	19024.18	16229.76	19050.87	16192.01
BIC	19210.70	19199.77	19205.96	19182.73	16379.54	19201.07	16391.71
Rho	0.138	-0.170	0.058	0.072	-0.181	0.122	-0.475
Pr(rho=0)	0.576	0.444	0.815	0.803	0.332	0.613	0.038

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A16: Adding further controls

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(96)	(97)	(98)	(99)	(100)	(101)	(102)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.401						-0.404
	(0.333)						(0.310)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.037					-0.022
		(0.012)***					(0.010)**
GDP			-0.145				-0.006
			(0.037)***				(0.041)
IGO size				-0.001			0.004
				(0.017)			(0.015)
IGO size squared				-0.000			-0.000
				(0.000)			(0.000)
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.246		-0.588
					(0.140)*		(0.165)***
IGO clause on suspension						-0.112	-0.473
						(0.216)	(0.231)**
Post Cold War	0.359	0.363	0.333	0.360	0.527	0.353	0.383
	(0.218)*	(0.197)*	(0.245)	(0.228)	(0.300)*	(0.225)	(0.293)
More democratic IGO	0.268	0.295	0.323	0.217	0.203	0.225	0.303
	(0.042)***	(0.044)***	(0.049)***	(0.034)***	(0.045)***	(0.032)***	(0.039)***
Regional IGO	0.893	0.628	0.818	0.670	0.686	0.883	0.675
	(0.192)***	(0.131)***	(0.170)***	(0.153)***	(0.188)***	(0.201)***	(0.222)***
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.896	0.738	0.886	0.771	0.566	0.884	0.476
	(0.440)**	(0.313)**	(0.383)**	(0.377)**	(0.282)**	(0.415)**	(0.302)
IGO history of suspension	0.827	0.764	0.900	0.888	0.490	0.862	0.500
	(0.289)***	(0.244)***	(0.302)***	(0.324)***	(0.189)***	(0.303)***	(0.234)**
Economic sanction	0.447	0.285	0.398	0.453	0.177	0.442	0.181
	(0.204)**	(0.165)*	(0.197)**	(0.211)**	(0.145)	(0.208)**	(0.155)
Political backsliding degree	0.125	0.111	0.119	0.123	0.092	0.121	0.083
	(0.028)***	(0.020)***	(0.024)***	(0.025)***	(0.020)***	(0.024)***	(0.018)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)**	(0.002)***	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.169	-0.170	-0.169	-0.169	-0.160	-0.169	-0.160
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.054	-0.057	-0.054
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.054	0.050	0.054
	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.136	0.121	0.138
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***	(0.015)***	(0.017)***
Political system	0.110	0.109	0.110	0.110	0.109	0.110	0.110
	(0.010)***	(0.011)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38074	38074	38074	38074	37096	38074	37096
AIC	23628.50	23621.95	23625.94	23631.27	19923.63	23630.59	19925.60
BIC	23808.00	23801.44	23805.43	23819.31	20102.58	23810.09	20155.68
Rho	-0.602	-0.772	-0.622	-0.636	-0.828	-0.621	-0.870
Pr(rho=0)	0.022	0.000	0.011	0.023	0.000	0.017	0.000

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A17: Adding IGO issue area controls

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(103)	(104)	(105)	(106)	(107)	(108)	(109)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.354						-1.132
	(0.188)*						(0.703)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.039					-0.017
		(0.008)***					(0.012)
GDP			-0.135				-0.073
			(0.025)***				(0.060)
IGO size				0.139			0.368
				(0.045)***			(0.096)***
IGO size squared				-0.002			-0.005
				(0.001)***			(0.001)***
Hard IGO voting rule					-1.127		-2.780
					(0.308)***		(0.674)***
IGO clause on suspension						0.441	-2.058
						(0.392)	(0.614)***
Post Cold War	0.352	0.410	0.322	0.129	0.812	0.451	-2.549
	(0.315)	(0.334)	(0.319)	(0.451)	(0.471)*	(0.286)	(1.318)*
More democratic IGO	0.132	0.187	0.196	0.153	0.120	0.113	0.441
	(0.033)***	(0.042)***	(0.038)***	(0.059)***	(0.045)***	(0.035)***	(0.056)***
IGO Issue Area Security	0.322	0.343	0.327	-0.095	0.755	0.431	-0.272
	(0.359)	(0.359)	(0.365)	(0.305)	(0.374)**	(0.386)	(0.384)
IGO Issue Area Economics	0.503	0.433	0.474	1.065	0.198	0.403	3.145
	(0.284)*	(0.279)	(0.282)*	(0.335)***	(0.314)	(0.296)	(0.688)***
IGO Issue Area Other	-0.302	-0.275	-0.299	-0.394	-0.650	-0.201	-1.906
	(0.346)	(0.347)	(0.346)	(0.299)	(0.355)*	(0.339)	(0.517)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)**	(0.002)***	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.168	-0.169	-0.168	-0.168	-0.159	-0.168	-0.159
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.054	-0.057	-0.054
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.048	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.054	0.049	0.053
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.138	0.121	0.137
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)***
Political system	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.110	0.112	0.110
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38074	38074	38074	38074	37096	38074	37096
AIC	23722.61	23715.66	23719.16	23674.22	19983.69	23717.87	19934.91
BIC	23885.01	23878.06	23881.56	23845.16	20145.59	23880.27	20147.94
Rho	0.296	0.024	0.223	0.127	-0.040	0.301	-0.001
Pr(rho=0)	0.246	0.921	0.383	0.678	0.836	0.213	0.997

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
The excluded baseline category is IGO Issue Area Politics.
$^{+}$ $p < 0.11$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A18: Replacing Alliance measure

		Geopolitics		Institutional Design			Combined
	(110)	(111)	(112)	(113)	(114)	(115)	(116)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power (COW data)	-3.111						1.191
	(0.319)***						(2.147)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.043					-0.023
		(0.009)***					(0.012)**
GDP			-0.139				-0.070
			(0.025)***				(0.051)
IGO size				0.074			0.058
				(0.036)**			(0.032)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)**			(0.000)**
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.689		-0.732
					(0.344)**		(0.291)**
IGO clause on suspension						0.478	0.139
						(0.345)	(0.225)
Post Cold War	3.587	0.455	0.381	0.366	0.719	0.496	-0.772
	(0.265)***	(0.287)	(0.285)	(0.386)	(0.388)*	(0.298)*	(1.894)
More democratic IGO	0.095	0.189	0.187	0.084	0.108	0.099	0.181
	(0.033)***	(0.039)***	(0.037)***	(0.044)*	(0.046)**	(0.032)***	(0.064)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)**	(0.002)***	(0.003)**
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita	-0.168	-0.169	-0.168	-0.168	-0.159	-0.168	-0.159
	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.010)***
Democracy	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.054	-0.057	-0.054
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.054	0.049	0.054
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.138	0.121	0.138
	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)***	(0.015)***	(0.018)***
Political system	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.112	0.110	0.112	0.110
	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***	(0.010)***	(0.016)***
Observations	38074	38074	38074	38074	37096	38074	37096
AIC	23733.60	23721.60	23726.84	23692.38	19998.56	23723.65	19961.18
BIC	23870.36	23858.36	23863.59	23837.68	20134.90	23860.40	20148.65
Rho	0.228	-0.062	0.176	0.200	-0.133	0.247	-0.361
Pr(rho=0)	0.437	0.811	0.543	0.539	0.534	0.379	0.096

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A19: Replacing Backsliding Election measure with V-Dem data

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(117)	(118)	(119)	(120)	(121)	(122)	(123)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.283						-0.945
	(0.183)						(0.649)
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.063					-0.070
		(0.014)***					(0.020)***
GDP			-0.137				0.024
			(0.032)***				(0.068)
IGO size				0.070			0.062
				(0.035)**			(0.033)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)**			(0.000)**
Hard IGO voting rule					-3.921		-4.855
					(0.303)***		(0.373)***
IGO clause on suspension						0.452	0.020
						(0.356)	(0.258)
Post Cold War	0.440	0.527	0.401	0.391	0.800	0.522	0.085
	(0.288)	(0.307)*	(0.276)	(0.392)	(0.398)**	(0.296)*	(0.800)
More democratic IGO	0.108	0.223	0.177	0.072	0.090	0.093	0.272
	(0.031)***	(0.042)***	(0.035)***	(0.053)	(0.051)*	(0.030)***	(0.057)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.014	0.012
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
GDP growth	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
GDP per capita	-0.190	-0.191	-0.190	-0.190	-0.179	-0.190	-0.179
	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***	(0.014)***
Democracy	-0.068	-0.068	-0.068	-0.068	-0.064	-0.068	-0.064
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	0.087	0.088	0.087	0.087	0.090	0.087	0.090
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***	(0.006)***	(0.012)***
Effective number of parties	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.098	0.083	0.099
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.015)***	(0.011)***	(0.015)***
Political system	0.092	0.091	0.092	0.092	0.091	0.092	0.092
	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.011)***	(0.019)***	(0.011)***	(0.019)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38079	38079	38079	38079	37246	38079	37246
AIC	20464.34	20447.89	20460.07	20429.62	17087.54	20457.57	17048.53
BIC	20601.10	20584.65	20596.83	20574.93	17223.94	20594.32	17236.08
Rho	0.473	-0.007	0.367	0.469	0.196	0.452	-0.165
Pr(rho=0)	0.075	0.978	0.162	0.077	0.323	0.052	0.546

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A20: Replacing Backsliding Human Rights measure with Schnakenberg/Fariss measure

	Geopolitics			Institutional Design			Combined
	(124)	(125)	(126)	(127)	(128)	(129)	(130)
Stage 2: Suspension							
Allied with regional power	-0.634						-2.337
	(0.125)***						(0.557)***
Oil and gas income per capita		-0.015					-0.007
		(0.004)***					(0.005)
GDP			-0.070				0.000
			(0.018)***				(0.023)
IGO size				0.052			0.043
				(0.023)**			(0.024)*
IGO size squared				-0.001			-0.001
				(0.000)**			(0.000)
Hard IGO voting rule					-0.321		-0.251
					(0.206)		(0.144)*
IGO clause on suspension						0.276	0.077
						(0.227)	(0.099)
Post Cold War	0.245	0.276	0.285	0.133	0.357	0.308	-0.271
	(0.217)	(0.189)	(0.214)	(0.233)	(0.210)*	(0.195)	(0.172)
More democratic IGO	0.112	0.097	0.116	0.076	0.074	0.082	0.088
	(0.023)***	(0.021)***	(0.023)***	(0.031)**	(0.022)***	(0.020)***	(0.027)***
Stage 1: Political Backsliding							
Oil and gas income per capita	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)*	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
GDP growth	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
GDP per capita	-0.098	-0.099	-0.098	-0.099	-0.093	-0.098	-0.094
	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.009)***	(0.006)***	(0.009)***
Democracy	-0.021	-0.021	-0.021	-0.021	-0.018	-0.021	-0.018
	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Age of democracy	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.016	-0.018	-0.016
	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.014)	(0.007)***	(0.013)
Effective number of parties	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.116	0.099	0.116
	(0.017)***	(0.017)***	(0.017)***	(0.017)***	(0.019)***	(0.017)***	(0.019)***
Political system	0.080	0.079	0.080	0.079	0.072	0.079	0.072
	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.017)***	(0.007)***	(0.017)***
Cubic polynomial of time	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	38056	38056	38056	38056	35986	38056	35986
AIC	41200.95	41206.96	41207.43	41170.02	35525.10	41204.22	35487.17
BIC	41337.70	41343.71	41344.17	41315.31	35660.96	41340.97	35673.97
Rho	-0.501	-0.662	-0.540	-0.735	-0.831	-0.640	-0.933
Pr(rho=0)	0.081	0.013	0.086	0.001	0.003	0.015	0.000

Note: Heckman probit models with robust standard errors clustered on IGO in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A21: Summary Statistics for Added Controls

Variable	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Suspension, subsequent years coded 0	0.001	0.027	0	1	41211
IGO Issue Area Security	0.257	0.437	0	1	41211
IGO Issue Area Politics	0.403	0.491	0	1	41211
IGO Issue Area Economics	0.497	0.500	0	1	41220
IGO Issue Area Other	0.855	0.352	0	1	41220
Regional IGO	0.166	0.372	0	1	41211
IGO democratic commitment strength	0.278	0.448	0	1	41211
IGO history of suspension	0.076	0.264	0	1	41211
Economic sanction	0.076	0.265	0	1	41211
Political backsliding degree	-0.130	1.574	-16	15	40527
Allied with regional power (COW data)	0.791	0.407	0	1	41211
Elections not (really) free or fair	2.811	1.330	0	4	11541
Latent Human Rights Score	0.025	0.151	-0.876	0.87	41188

Details on Original Data Collection

Democratically Committed IGOs (sample restriction)

In the interest of theoretical clarity and inferential validity, we restrict the initial universe of 308 IGOs (from the Correlates of War IO dataset) to only include "democratically committed" IGOs. This allows us to compare similar and relevant IGOs by focusing our analysis on those organizations that have agreed in writing to uphold domestic political standards. We consider an IGO democratically committed if its Charter makes any reference to one or more of these three concepts/phrases: democracy, human rights, rule of law.

To establish this set of IGOs, we searched the text of the Charters or treaties establishing each of the 308 active IGOs in the Correlates of War dataset to find phrases including "democracy," "human rights," and/or "rule of law." [1] [2] We also searched the text of *revised* charters and treaties to determine if these terms were added at a later point in time after the initial creation of the IGO. We recorded whether these phrases exist in the constitutive documents, the earliest year that they were recorded, whether it was part of the original document or the updated treaty, and the actual text including the phrase (for later reference). Appendix Table 1 lists the set of democratically committed IGOs.

[1] This search also included words with a similar root such as "democratic" (when it did not refer to a country like the Democratic Republic of Congo).

[2] For example, the United Nations (UN) retains a norm of electoral rights in its Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Even primarily economic organizations in less democratic regions – such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) – pay lip-service to democratic standards in their charters.

IGO Membership Suspension (dependent variable)

We collected an original dataset of all IGO suspensions in the set of active IGOs in the Correlates of War from 1946-2015. The COW data contain 529 IGOs in that time period, but we only evaluate active IGOs which we define as having a website or internet presence. This set of 308 active IGOs provides the basis for our sample. (In other words, the original dataset includes suspensions for IGOs that are not "democratically committed," but those data are not utilized for this paper).

Importantly, we code actual suspensions and not suspension votes in the interest of data quality.[3] Our dataset includes information that is uniform across all IGOs: actual suspensions, which are announced publicly either through the IGO's website (e.g. press releases), through the news media, or available through inquiries to the IGO (e.g. by email).

For each IGO in our universe of 308 cases, we used the Factiva database to search historical newspaper accounts that included both an IGO name and the word "suspen*". We used both the full IGO name as well as its acronym as search terms in the Factiva database. Our search produced many extraneous accounts, especially when the term "suspend" or "suspension" was not used to refer to membership privileges but instead to refer to other topics like "suspension of the meeting", "suspend activities", "suspend the indictment", "suspense", "suspends uranium enrichment" etc. We did not include these instances in our dataset. After reading the relevant portion of over 50,000 articles, we documented each unique occurrence of an IGO membership suspension (because as one would expect, a single suspension often resulted in hundreds of articles from different newspapers on the same instance.)

We supplemented the Factiva research by scraping each IGO's website for mentions of

[3]Failed votes are less publicized, so that data would be inconsistent. Documenting the full set of votes is almost impossible because votes are internal and often secret procedures; some IGO suspension votes are made public, but others are not. If we solely relied on voting information, our data collection effort would be inconsistent, missing information where votes were secret. This would pose a serious challenge to inferential validity.

suspensions that occasionally added new records to the dataset. Most IGOs record membership information on their website including details on how the membership has fluctuated over time; sometimes this information could be found in an organizational history section for the IGO. Last, a team of research assistants reached out individually via email to each IGO to obtain any supplemental or clarification information. In sum, we documented the IGO, the country suspended, the start and end date (if applicable) of the suspension, the specific rights that had been removed (when the information was available), any reinstatement facts, detailed information about the suspension including source documents, and the reason for suspension. We use information about the reason for suspension to focus our attention on suspensions due to political backsliding and to ensure logical consistency. Suspensions for political backsliding make up more than half of the sample.

We code an IGO-member state-year as 1 in suspension onset years, and 0 otherwise. For example, the Commonwealth-Nigeria-1995 observation is coded "1" whereas all other years for Commonwealth-Nigeria contain "0s" (as that was the only instance of Nigeria being suspended from the Commonwealth).

IGO Suspension Voting Rule (independent variable)

We code IGO suspension voting rule to capture the way in which IGO member states decide suspensions. We code this information from the IGO's charter or treaty in the text surrounding information about suspension. The variable IGO suspension voting rule captures easy versus difficult voting rules. This variable is coded as follows:

- 0 (easy) for a suspension voting rule of simple majority (50%) or qualified majority (67%, 70% of 75% of members).
- 1 (difficult) for a suspension voting rule of consensus minus 1.

In cases where the voting rule was bi-layer (e.g. 3/4 of the member countries and 2/3 of

the governors), we listed the most restrictive vote (e.g. 3/4). Examples of each category are listed below:

- The League of Arab States specifies a **consensus minus one** voting rule for suspension in Article 18 of its Charter. It states "The Council of the League may consider any State that is not fulfilling the obligations resulting from this Pact as excluded from the League, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of all the States except the State referred to." See: `http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028015a44b`

- The Organization of American States specifies a **two-thirds majority** voting rule for suspension in Chapter 3, Article 9 of its 1967 amended treaty. It states: "The decision to suspend shall be adopted at a special session of the General Assembly by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Member States." See: `http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_a-41_Charter_of_the_organization_of_american_States.htm`

- The European Investment Bank specifies a **qualified majority** voting rule for suspension in Article 26 of its treaty. It states "the granting of loans or guarantees to that Member State or its nationals may be suspended by a decision of the Board of Governors, acting by a qualified majority." See: `http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/statute/eib_statute_2013_en.pdf`

- The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States specifies a **majority** voting rule for suspension in Article 30, Chapter 4 of its treaty. It states "If a Protocol Member State does not or is unable to comply with a recommendation made in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article and the Council of Ministers finds, by majority vote, that an obligation under this Protocol has not been fulfilled, the Economic Affairs Council may, by majority vote, authorise any Protocol Member State to suspend as regards the Protocol Member State which has not complied with the recommendations the application of such obligations under this Protocol as the Economic Affairs Council by majority vote

considers appropriate." See: http://www.oecs.org/publications/doc_download/506-revised-treaty-of-basseterre-establishing-the-oecs-economic-union

No voting rule or ambiguous[4] voting rules for suspension were specified in about half of the observations, so that models including this variable are based on a much smaller sample. We attempted to alleviate missing values in this variable by searching for documentation of suspension procedures and voting rules in IGO Rules of Procedure (in addition to their Charters), without much success.[5] We therefore chose the best and most consistent source for data, the Charter/ Treaty. To remedy remaining missing values, we sourced data from Blake and Lockwood Payton (2015). They code three voting rule categories: majority and weighted (we include this as 0) and unanimity (we include this as 1).

IGO Suspension Clause (control variable)

We code IGO suspension clause as 1 if there is any mention of the word "suspen" as it relates to membership, and 0 otherwise, using a text analysis of the charter. (As noted above, IGO charters that use the word "suspend" or "suspension" as it relates to other topical areas are not included.)

Many times we had to use OCR (Optical Character Recognition) to first translate the charter's image to text before performing the find/ search function. In addition to searching on the word "suspen," we tried to look at clauses before and after any Withdrawal articles to ensure we included such terms as "no vote" or "deprived of membership" to account for IGOs that might reference the concept of suspension with a different actual word.

[4]Ambiguous voting rules are cases where voting is described as "unclear, special vote, automatic, or triggered by another organization."

[5]Extensive research showed that Rules of Procedure documents (1) vary greatly from IGO to IGO, sometimes not existing at all (or titled by a different name, thus making it impossible to create a systematic accounting of these documents), and (2) often exist at a sub-IGO level (for each committee rather than the whole IGO, our level of analysis.)