Rebels with a Cause:

Does Ideology Make Armed Conflicts Longer and Bloodier?

Online Appendix

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Variables and Data Collection

Overview A1: Ideological Variables in the Rebels and Religion Dataset*

Level/item/question	Types	Examples
Rebel level		
Do rebels have theological (religious ideological) claims?	If yes, type of corresponding faith according to PEW list, i.e., Buddhist, Christian, Folk, Hindu, Muslim, other etc.; Christians	IS in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria (both Sunni Muslim)
Do rebels have other secular ideological claims?	If yes, type of corresponding ideology, i.e., liberal democratic or authoritarian (left-wing/ right-wing/ traditional/ other authoritarian)	Communist FARC and ELN rebels in Colombia, Maoists in India and Nepal
State/government level		
Do states/governments have theological (religious ideological) claims?	If yes, type of faith, see above	Iran (Shia Islam); Saudi-Arabia (Sunni Islam) Vatican City, (Catholic Christian)
Do states/governments have other secular ideological claims?	If yes, type of, see above	E.g., Western liberal democracies, right-wing racist Apartheid South Africa, left-wing authoritarian Communist states in the Soviet bloc
Dyadic level**		
Theological conflict: Do warring factions differ by theological/religious ideological claims?	Types: Rebels with theological claim vs. secular states; secular rebels vs. theocratic state; rebels and states with incompatible theological claims	Islamist IS vs. secular Syrian government; secular Kurd rebels vs. theocratic Iranian state
Secular ideological conflict: Ideological conflict: Do warring factions differ by secular ideological claims?	Types: Rebels with ideological claim vs. unideological state; unideological states vs. ideological state; rebels and states with incompatible ideological claims	Communist vs. liberal democratic rebels during the Cold War; ELN/FARC vs. government in Colombia ANC rebels vs. racist South African government

** The code book includes more detailed information and is available upon request; ** Secular-theological conflicts are a combination of differences of the warring factions (e.g., Jihadists vs Communist government in Afghanistan after 1979).*

Overview A2: Coding Process and Quality Management

In general, our data collection was informed by principles of best practice for data collection (e.g., Davenport & Moore 2014; Salehyan 2015) including important elements such as transparency and reliability. The coding process started by identifying "side B" (rebels) in the UCDP/PRIO data set and then coded the main variables (see overview 1 above) by year and rebel group. In most cases, we assigned one code for several conflict-years for one rebel group, resulting in *static ideological codings*. In some cases, however, the government or the rebels changed their ideological position (or religious affiliation) at some point. For instance, UNITA started out as a Maoist inspired anti-colonial rebel group but then turned democratic at the beginning of the Angolan civil war in 1975.[1] In 1979, Iran changed from a rather secular state to a theocratic Shia Islamist state.

The actual coding was performed by research assistants who received thorough training and were constantly supervised by the project leaders. Given the extensive period under investigation from 1946 to 2017 (originally until 2013 but the following years were subsequently added), we could not use news reports such as LexisNexis as the principal source of information. We decided to opt for a variety of primary and secondary sources, including general information on armed conflicts and actors in the UCDP conflict encyclopedia, the Non-State Actors Data Set (Cunningham et al. 2013), and specific sources on political parties and rebels or militant groups (e.g., Szajkowski, 2003; 2005; "Mapping Militants"). A comprehensive list of sources is detailed in the code book that accompanies the data (available upon request).

As a principle, we avoided quick *judgment on theological and secular ideological claims*. The label "Islamic" or any other reference to religious names or symbols did not automatically lead to counting a group as Islamist. This refers for instance to the *Arab Islamic Front of Azawad* (FIAA) in Mali, and in *Moro Islamic Movement* in the Philippines. Although being a borderline case we did not count the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as an Islamist group either as it included more secular groups and espoused non-religious ideology. While Communists were usually easy to identify, we were similarly cautious with "democratic" rebels. The label "democratic" in the name of a group did not automatically lead to coding it as liberal democratic. The minimal requirement was that actual components of liberal democracy such as free and fair elections as well corresponding liberties were demanded. Several nominally "democratic" rebel groups did not meet this criterion (e.g., the *Allied Democratic Forces*, active in Uganda and the DR Congo, or *Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy* in Liberia until 2003). For governments, we were able to include actual credibility of claims to some extent. As indicated in the main text, we used Polity IV data to determine their democratic or authoritarian character of the regimes. In line with Polity rules, a value of not more than -6 denotes an authoritarian

[1] Interviews with the son of UNITA's founder, Jonas Savimbi, and the UNITA leadership in 2015 in Luanda and Windhoek confirmed that there were liberal democratic claims, especially after independence when the Communist MPLA took over central power in 1975. Leaders however specified, that outsiders may not have "fully understood" the group's ideology. We cannot rule out instrumentalist use of ideology in order to attract outside support.

government and a value of +6 a democratic one.

If coders were unsure, we indicated lower certainty with lower *precision codes* (1 indicating high, 2 lower precision) and commented on the reason thereof. We also engaged in close supervision as well as additional research on "imprecise" cases. Following best practice in data collection (e.g., Salehyan 2015), we cross checked the reliability of our codings on religious rebels and conflicts with similar datasets by Svensson (2007) on inter-religious conflicts, and Basedau, Pfeiffer & Vüllers[2] (2014). These datasets altogether cover 249 out of around 500 conflict dyads. When considering some conceptual deviations between these works and the R&R dataset, we found deviations of around 8 to 14 percent. Deviating cases were investigated further. As our reference sources only cover the period from 1975 to 2010, we conducted extra checks before 1975 and after 2010, particularly in cases with lower precision in the coding (precision code 2). For cross-checking with RELAC (Svensson & Nilsson 2018), that uses other definitions (see main text), please refer to the tables on the overlap below (Tables A9-12).

After provisionally finalizing the data set, *double coding of a random sample* of 10 per cent of the rebel group cases and dyads was performed (religious conflicts and 1946 to 2013 only). Inter-coder reliability proved to be satisfactory overall and stands at over 96 per cent on average. Inter-coder reliability varies across the different variables. Particularly, theological claims by rebels and the state are very reliable (96–100 per cent). Affiliations to religious communities for rebels have 94 per cent reliability, with 90 per cent reliability for the state. The dyadic codings proved to be the most reliable. Reliability stands at 96 per cent for inter-religious conflicts and at 100 per cent for theological conflicts. [3]

Several *caveats* on the dataset are in order. First, despite our efforts, we cannot exclude error. Second, we did not judge whether the ideological claims by rebels were genuine or just instrumental. We took their claims at face value. Our data set captures their rhetoric rather than their actual intention or motive. We do not claim that labeling an armed conflict "religious" or "ideological" means that we assume a causal link between religion or a given secular ideology and violence. As rebels are usually not in power, we cannot assess the authenticity of their demands.[4] The coding does not claim to assess how salient the ideological claims are, unlike, for instance, the RELAC data set by Svensson and Nilsson (2018). However, the coding of specific, abstract, and elaborate ideologies such as Communism, Islamism or Liberal Democracy may indicate a salience on its own. Moreover, higher precision codes may indicate a higher salience indirectly. As noted above, the data set contains little information on the changes in ideological claims within one rebel group over time. Rather, changes in ideological ideas over time are visible in some

[2] Despite one author being identical, the conflicts were coded independently by different research assistants based on different sources.
[3] The double coding and the other additional checks do refer to the religious part of the coding only thus far. A similar process is planned for secular ideologies.
[4] The government and the dyadic level are not discussed in this version of the analysis.

conflicts rather than within rebel groups. For instance, in Chechnya, the Philippines, and Israel, the second and third generation of rebel groups tends to have theological goals.

Data Comparisons

Comparison Table C1. R&R to RELAC Comparison, Part 1

	R&R	RELAC	Joint Total	Overlap	Unique to R&R	Unique to RELAC
Temporal Range	1946-2017	1975-2015				
Unique Conflicts	189	202	274	48.8%	31.7%	19.6%
Unique Dyads	509	445	591	61.6%	28.2%	10.2%
Unique Armed Groups (side_b)	496	416	575	62.9%	28.8%	8.2%

Comparison Table C2. R&R to RELAC Comparison, Part 2

	R&R		**RELAC**	
Armed Group Religious Affiliations	12	Buddhism, Christianity *(Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox),* Folk Religion, Hindu, Islam *(Shia, Sunni),* Judaism, Other	12	Buddhism, Christianity *(Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox),* Animist, Hindu, Islam *(Shia, Sunni),* Sikh, Unclear
Armed Group Secular Claims	5	Communist, Fascist, Liberal/Democratic, Traditional Authoritarian, Other	2	Secularist *(Revolutionary, Separatist)*
Armed Group Theological Claims	7/12 Observed	Christian *(Protestant, Catholic),* Folk Religion, Islam *(Shia, Sunni)*	7	Islamist *(Revolutionary, Separatist, Transnational),* Evangelist/Christian *(Revolutionary, Separatist),* Sikh Separatist
Conflict Types	2	Intrastate, Internationalized	3	Interstate, Intrastate, Internationalized

Comparison Table C3. R&R to RELAC Comparison, Part 3

R&R Variable	% of Unique Cases	RELAC Variable	% of Unique Cases	Pairwise Correlation (Pearson's R) Coefficient
Secular Incompatibility	57.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a
Religious Affiliation Incompatibility	40.1%	Religious Affiliation Incompatibility	29.6%	0.7514 ***
Theological Incompatibility	21.6%	Religious Dimension to Conflict Incompatibility	24.7%	0.7702 ***
		Religion Highly Salient to Conflict Incompatibility	18.4%	0.7670 ***

Descriptive Analysis

Table D1. Frequencies of Ideological and Non-Ideological Rebel Groups, 1946-2017

Type of Armed Conflict	Source	Years Active	%	N of rebel groups (conflict-dyads)	%
All intrastate armed conflicts (in using data)	UCDP	2,576	100	514	100
Religious theological rebels	R&R	532	20.7	92	17.9
Secular ideological rebels	R&R	1,017	39.5	169	32.9
Non-ideological rebels	R&R	1,037	40.3	255	49.6

Note that two rebel groups, with 10 years of armed activity, advanced both religious and secular ideological claims, so aggregate percentages sum to slightly greater than 100%.

Table D2. Duration and Intensity by Rebel Types, Intrastate Armed Conflict, 1946-2017

	Source/Remarks	Active - years / groups	Average duration in years	Average intensity (% years > 1000 brd)	Average intensity (UCDP brd, 1989-2018) best estimate
1. All intrastate armed conflicts	UCDP, Base line	2576 / 514	9.5	1.22 (21.9)	997.59
2. Secular rebels					
All secular ideological rebels	R&R – Communists to Liberal Democrats	1017 / 169	11.2	1.25 (25.5)	931.1
Authoritarian	R&R – Communists to Monarchists	716 / 100	13.1	1.26 (25.6)	574.88
Left-wing authoritarian	R&R – Communists	667 / 83	13.7	1.25 (25.0)	561.33
Right-wing authoritarian	R&R – Fascists, Racists, ultra-nationalists	28 / 9	2.9	1.32 (32.1)	746.67
Traditional authoritarian	R&R – Monarchists	12 / 3	3.1	1.50 (50.0)	139.5
Liberal democratic	R&R	306 / 70	6.7	1.25 (24.8)	1453.67
3. Religious “Theological” rebels					
All “theological” rebels	R&R, – Christian, Muslim, “Folk”	533 / 92	8.6	1.26 (25.9)	1161.32
Christian (Fundamentalist)	R&R – Catholic to “other”	47 / 9	9.9	1.11 (10.6)	310.49
- Catholic	R&R	26 / 4	11.1	1.15 (15.4)	395.41
- Protestant	R&R	15 / 4	8.5	1.07 (6.7)	294.33
- Other Christian	R&R	6 / 1	8.3	1.00 (0.0)	39.5
Muslim (Jihadist)	R&R – Shia to “other”	483 / 83	8.5	1.28 (27.7)	1278.32
- Shia	R&R	32 / 5	6.6	1.03 (3.1)	232.7
- Sunni	R&R	443 / 75	8.7	1.29 (28.9)	1310.89
- Other Muslim	R&R	8 / 3	2.9	1.63 (62.5)	3687.14
Folk religions	R&R	3 / 1	12.7	1.00 (0.0)	150.67
4. Non-ideological rebels	R&R – cases not under 2. or 3.	1037 / 255	8.4	1.16 (16.0)	900.43
Case count			*2,576*	*2,576*	*1,378*

Full Models of Multivariate Analysis

Figure A1. "Risk" of Armed Conflict Termination via Ideological Incompatibilities



Figure A2. "Risk" of Armed Conflict Termination, Secular v. Theological Incompatibilities



Table A2. "Risk" of Armed Conflict Termination – Dyadic, 1950-2017

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Incompatibility			H2: Specific Ideological Incompatibilities		
Hazard Models	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)
Any Ideological	-0.493***	-0.469***	-0.475*			
Incompatibility	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.186)			
Secular Ideological				-0.447***	-0.353**	-0.527**
Incompatibility				(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.192)
Theological				-0.685***	-0.840***	0.158
Incompatibility				(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.861)
Secular & Theological				-0.522**	-0.575**	-0.041
Incompatibility				(0.172)	(0.184)	(0.283)
Religious Affiliation	-0.126	-0.135	-0.360*	-0.104	-0.083	-0.349*
Incompatibility	(0.110)	(0.106)	(0.170)	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.171)
Foreign Military	-0.095	-0.159	-0.203	-0.123	-0.247	-0.339
Intervention	(0.227)	(0.234)	(0.240)	(0.230)	(0.244)	(0.263)
Territorial	-0.052	-0.011	-0.015	-0.076	-0.054	-0.054
Incompatibility	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Intensity	-0.336*	-0.305†	-0.315†	-0.332*	-0.288†	-0.335†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.172)
lnGDP	-0.012	-0.019*	-0.021*	-0.010	-0.017†	-0.019†
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.016	-0.018	-0.018	-0.019	-0.026†	-0.026†
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	-0.002	0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.845***	-0.862***	-0.867***	-0.836***	-0.848***	-0.858***
	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Post-Cold War		0.360**	0.200		0.457***	0.149
		(0.116)	(0.230)		(0.121)	(0.230)
Any Ideological			-0.007			
Incomp*postcw			(0.232)			
Secular Ideological						0.333
Incomp*postcw						(0.238)
Theological						-1.013
Incomp*postcw						(0.885)
Secular & Theological						-0.825*
Incomp*postcw						(0.411)
Religious Affiliation			0.396†			0.511*
Incomp*postcw			(0.214)			(0.218)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1774.744	-1769.951	-1768.176	-1774.084	-1767.187	-1759.838

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A3. "Risk" of Armed Conflict Termination – Monadic, 1950-2017

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Rebel Claim			H2: Specific Ideological Rebel Claims		
Hazard Models	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)
Any Ideological	-0.567***	-0.581***	-0.343*			
Claim	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.174)			
Communist				-0.761***	-0.648***	-0.635***
Rebels				(0.138)	(0.142)	(0.198)
Liberal/Democratic				-0.440**	-0.461**	-0.551*
Rebels				(0.157)	(0.154)	(0.269)
Religiously Affiliated	0.266	0.232	0.411†			
Rebels	(0.174)	(0.173)	(0.224)			
Christian Affiliated				0.405**	0.401**	0.508*
Rebels				(0.142)	(0.139)	(0.218)
Christian				0.215	0.099	0.505
Fundamentalists				(0.343)	(0.332)	(0.886)
Muslim Affiliated				0.077	0.035	0.236
Rebels				(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.209)
Muslim Jihadist				-0.459*	-0.608**	0.469
Rebels				(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.329)
Foreign Military	-0.110	-0.181	-0.172	-0.253	-0.360	-0.348
Intervention	(0.221)	(0.228)	(0.233)	(0.242)	(0.253)	(0.264)
Territorial	-0.327**	-0.277*	-0.243*	-0.283*	-0.221†	-0.225†
Incompatibility	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.118)
Intensity	-0.336*	-0.307†	-0.327*	-0.382*	-0.355*	-0.358*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.177)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.007	-0.015	-0.016	-0.012	-0.019†	-0.017
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.032*	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.027†	-0.029*	-0.031*
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	-0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.838***	-0.861***	-0.867***	-0.836***	-0.850***	-0.849***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.097)
H3: Post-Cold War		0.410***	0.898**		0.422***	0.718**
(postcw)		(0.116)	(0.348)		(0.125)	(0.246)
Any Ideological			-0.382†			
Claim*postcw			(0.211)			
Communist						-0.021
Rebels*postcw						(0.264)
Liberal/Democratic						0.135
Rebels*postcw						(0.324)
Religiously Affiliated			-0.331			
*postcw			(0.353)			
Christian Affiliated						-0.260
*postcw						(0.297)
Christian						-0.619
Fundamental*postcw						(0.860)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.412
*postcw						(0.301)
Muslim Jihadist						-1.436***
*postcw						(0.430)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1771.353	-1765.223	-1762.924	-1763.127	-1757.443	-1751.903

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A2-HR. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination – Dyadic, 1950-2017, Hazard Ratios

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Incompatibility			H2: Specific Ideological Incompatibilities		
Hazard Models	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)
Any Ideological	0.611***	0.625***	0.622*			
Incompatibility	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.116)			
Secular Ideological				0.340***	0.702**	0.590**
Incompatibility				(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.113)
Theological				0.504***	0.432***	1.171
Incompatibility				(0.107)	(0.092)	(1.008)
Secular & Theological				0.593**	0.563**	0.960
Incompatibility				(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.271)
Religious Affiliation	0.881	0.874	0.698*	0.901	0.921	0.705*
Incompatibility	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.119)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.121)
Foreign Military	0.909	0.853	0.816	0.884	0.781	0.712
Intervention	(0.206)	(0.199)	(0.196)	(0.204)	(0.191)	(0.187)
Territorial	0.950	0.989	0.985	0.927	0.947	0.948
Incompatibility	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Intensity	0.715*	0.737†	0.730†	0.718*	0.750†	0.715†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.112)	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.123)
lnGDP	0.988	0.981*	0.979*	0.990	0.983†	0.981†
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	0.984	0.982	0.982	0.981	0.975†	0.974†
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	0.998	1.000	1.000	0.998	0.999	0.999
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	0.430***	0.422***	0.420***	0.433***	0.428***	0.424***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Post-Cold War		1.434**	1.222		1.580***	1.160
		(0.166)	(0.281)		(0.191)	(0.267)
Any Ideological			0.993			
Incomp*postcw			(0.230)			
Secular Ideological						1.396
Incomp*postcw						(0.333)
Theological						0.363
Incomp*postcw						(0.321)
Secular & Theological						0.438*
Incomp*postcw						(0.180)
Religious Affiliation			1.486†			1.667*
Incomp*postcw			(0.318)			(0.363)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1774.744	-1769.951	-1768.176	-1774.084	-1767.187	-1759.838

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A3-HR. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Monadic, 1950-2017, Hazard Ratios

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Rebel Claim			H2: Specific Ideological Rebel Claims		
Hazard Models	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)
Any Ideological	0.567***	0.559***	0.709*			
Claim	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.124)			
Communist				0.467***	0.523***	0.530***
Rebels				(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.105)
Liberal/Democratic				0.644**	0.631**	0.577*
Rebels				(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.155)
Religiously Affiliated	1.304	1.262	1.508†			
Rebels	(0.227)	(0.218)	(0.338)			
Christian Affiliated				1.499**	1.493**	1.662*
Rebels				(0.213)	(0.208)	(0.362)
Christian				1.240	1.104	1.657
Fundamentalists				(0.425)	(0.366)	(1.468)
Muslim Affiliated				1.081	1.035	1.266
Rebels				(0.155)	(0.147)	(0.265)
Muslim Jihadist				0.632*	0.545**	1.599
Rebels				(0.123)	(0.111)	(0.525)
Foreign Military	0.896	0.835	0.842	0.777	0.698	0.706
Intervention	(0.198)	(0.191)	(0.197)	(0.188)	(0.177)	(0.187)
Territorial	0.721**	0.758*	0.784*	0.754*	0.801†	0.799†
Incompatibility	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Intensity	0.714*	0.736†	0.721*	0.682*	0.701*	0.699*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.124)
lnGDP (World Bank	0.993	0.985	0.984	0.989	0.981†	0.983
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	0.969*	0.967*	0.968*	0.973†	0.971*	0.969*
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.997	0.999	1.000	0.997	0.999	0.999
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	0.433***	0.423***	0.420***	0.433***	0.427***	0.428***
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)
H3: Post-Cold War		1.507***	2.455**		1.525***	2.050**
(postcw)		(0.175)	(0.853)		(0.191)	(0.504)
Any Ideological			0.683†			
Claim*postcw			(0.144)			
Communist						0.980
Rebels*postcw						(0.259)
Liberal/Democratic						1.144
Rebels*postcw						(0.370)
Religiously Affiliated			0.718			
*postcw			(0.254)			
Christian Affiliated						0.771
*postcw						(0.229)
Christian						0.539
Fundamental*postcw						(0.463)
Muslim Affiliated						0.662
*postcw						(0.199)
Muslim Jihadist						0.238***
*postcw						(0.102)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1771.353	-1765.223	-1762.924	-1763.127	-1757.443	-1751.903

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A4. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Incompatibility - Dyadic

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7a)	(8a)	(9a)	(10a)	(11a)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Any Ideological	0.663	0.663	0.501	-0.063	-0.062
Incompatibility	(0.431)	(0.431)	(0.579)	(0.111)	(0.135)
Religious Affiliation	0.723*	0.723*	0.561	0.059	0.099
Incompatibility	(0.363)	(0.363)	(0.482)	(0.098)	(0.115)
Foreign Military	2.492**	2.492**	2.510**	0.498†	0.253
Intervention	(0.798)	(0.798)	(0.788)	(0.270)	(0.357)
Territorial	-1.038*	-1.038*	-1.023*	-0.190†	-0.095
Incompatibility	(0.449)	(0.449)	(0.452)	(0.105)	(0.124)
GDP (ln)	-0.059†	-0.059†	-0.060†	-0.002	0.011
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Democracy	-0.036	-0.036	-0.036	0.015	0.035**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.007	0.007	0.006	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.012	-0.081
				(0.084)	(0.093)
Other Crime				0.381***	0.467***
				(0.092)	(0.104)
# of active dyads	0.112	0.112	0.109	-0.009	0.011
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.134)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Post-Cold War		-2.721†	-3.203†		
(postcw)		(1.463)	(1.653)		
Any Ideological			0.369		
Incomp*postcw			(0.620)		
Religious Affiliation			0.289		
Incomp*postcw			(0.686)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.795	-1.795	-1.500	0.439	0.202
	(1.366)	(1.366)	(1.452)	(0.346)	(0.430)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	843	782
Log Likelihood	-836.767	-836.767	-836.456	-5840.628	-4358.363
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5. Determinants of Conflict Intensity – Specific ideological Incompatibilities – Dyadic

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7b)	(8b)	(9b)	(10b)	(11b)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Secular ideological	0.512	0.512	0.249	-0.138	-0.076
Incompatibility	(0.495)	(0.495)	(0.599)	(0.125)	(0.153)
Theological	1.274*	1.274*	1.240	0.014	-0.033
incompatibility	(0.579)	(0.579)	(0.892)	(0.142)	(0.170)
Secular & Theological	0.858	0.858	2.053**	-0.000	-0.061
incompatibility	(0.532)	(0.532)	(0.752)	(0.136)	(0.162)
Religious affiliation	0.669†	0.669†	0.471	0.024	0.094
Incompatibility	(0.368)	(0.368)	(0.481)	(0.103)	(0.124)
Foreign military	2.560**	2.560**	2.590***	0.526†	0.255
Intervention	(0.800)	(0.800)	(0.787)	(0.272)	(0.358)
Territorial	-0.929*	-0.929*	-0.958*	-0.171	-0.089
incompatibility	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.449)	(0.106)	(0.126)
GDP (ln)	-0.059†	-0.059†	-0.054†	-0.002	0.011
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Democracy	-0.031	-0.031	-0.031	0.017	0.036**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.007	0.007	0.007	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.010	-0.080
				(0.084)	(0.093)
Other Crime				0.392***	0.471***
				(0.092)	(0.105)
# of active dyads	0.110	0.110	0.022	-0.023	0.009
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Post-Cold War		-2.951*	-3.678*		
(postcw)		(1.477)	(1.639)		
Secular Ideological			0.827		
Incomp*postcw			(0.697)		
Theological			0.371		
Incomp*postcw			(0.852)		
Secular & Theological			-1.823*		
Incomp*postcw			(0.819)		
Religious Affiliation			0.420		
Incomp*postcw			(0.665)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.626	-1.626	-1.220	0.486	0.207
	(1.410)	(1.410)	(1.472)	(0.350)	(0.434)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	843	782
Log Likelihood	-835.896	-835.896	-829.185	-5839.751	-4358.321
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A6. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Claim - Monadic

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12a)	(13a)	(14a)	(15a)	(16a)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	1.075	1.075	1.016	0.270	0.373
	(0.685)	(0.685)	(0.676)	(0.190)	(0.244)
Any ideological Claim	0.598	0.598	0.931†	-0.243*	-0.415**
	(0.370)	(0.370)	(0.488)	(0.103)	(0.130)
Foreign Military	2.710**	2.710**	2.697***	0.536*	0.276
Intervention	(0.856)	(0.856)	(0.849)	(0.269)	(0.369)
Territorial	-0.546	-0.546	-0.533	-0.221*	-0.187
Incompatibility	(0.429)	(0.429)	(0.426)	(0.105)	(0.126)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.065*	-0.065*	-0.065*	0.001	0.018
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Democracy	-0.023	-0.023	-0.022	0.014	0.035**
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.001	-0.001
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.030	-0.113
(RCD data)				(0.083)	(0.090)
Other Crime				0.397***	0.483***
(RCD data)				(0.091)	(0.102)
# of active dyads	0.098	0.098	0.089	-0.006	0.017
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Post-Cold War		-3.181*	-2.986†		
(postcw)		(1.416)	(1.690)		
Religious Affiliation			0.132		
*postcw			(0.918)		
Ideological Claim			-0.707		
*postcw			(0.663)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.870	-1.870	-1.905	0.257	0.050
	(1.376)	(1.376)	(1.376)	(0.385)	(0.473)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	843	782
Log Likelihood	-837.777	-837.777	-836.731	-5837.549	-4353.634
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7. Determinants of Conflict Intensity – Types of Ideological Claims – Monadic

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12b)	(13b)	(14b)	(15b)	(16b)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	1.028	1.028	0.903	0.215	0.340
	(0.695)	(0.695)	(0.682)	(0.192)	(0.245)
Religious Affiliation	1.956*	1.956*	2.917**	0.118	0.060
& Theological Claim	(0.784)	(0.784)	(0.987)	(0.207)	(0.256)
Secular Ideological	0.323	0.323	0.621	-0.366***	-0.499***
Claim	(0.412)	(0.412)	(0.509)	(0.113)	(0.146)
Foreign Military	2.729**	2.729**	2.715***	0.561*	0.274
Intervention	(0.845)	(0.845)	(0.828)	(0.268)	(0.371)
Territorial	-0.586	-0.586	-0.586	-0.256*	-0.198
Incompatibility	(0.431)	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.105)	(0.126)
GDP (ln)	-0.063*	-0.063*	-0.061†	0.002	0.018
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.025	-0.025	-0.024	0.014	0.036**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.007	0.007	0.007	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.023	-0.100
				(0.083)	(0.089)
Other Crime				0.422***	0.498***
				(0.092)	(0.103)
# of active dyads	0.076	0.076	0.010	-0.027	-0.002
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.122)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Post-Cold War		-3.254*	-3.081†		
(postcw)		(1.423)	(1.688)		
Religious Affiliation			0.224		
*postcw			(0.906)		
Religious Affil &			-1.317		
Theo Claim*postcw			(1.145)		
Secular Ideological			-0.713		
Claim*postcw			(0.749)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.767	-1.767	-1.696	0.313	0.090
	(1.381)	(1.381)	(1.363)	(0.387)	(0.477)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	843	782
Log Likelihood	-837.338	-837.338	-835.006	-5834.480	-4352.745
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Types of Ideological Claim – Monadic

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12c)	(13c)	(14c)	(15c)	(16c)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Christian Affiliated	0.970†	0.970†	1.353*	-0.046	0.001
Rebels	(0.568)	(0.568)	(0.646)	(0.138)	(0.178)
Christian	1.013	1.013	1.736	-0.138	0.047
Fundamentalist Rebels	(0.995)	(0.995)	(1.113)	(0.263)	(0.326)
Muslim Affiliated	0.920	0.920	0.668	-0.081	-0.226
Rebels	(0.564)	(0.564)	(0.590)	(0.138)	(0.171)
Muslim Jihadist Rebels	1.780**	1.780**	2.973***	-0.154	-0.387*
	(0.664)	(0.664)	(0.909)	(0.147)	(0.170)
Communist	0.538	0.538	0.552	-0.511***	-0.627***
Rebels	(0.514)	(0.514)	(0.558)	(0.139)	(0.167)
Liberal/Democratic	-0.279	-0.279	0.434	-0.240	-0.343
Rebels	(0.570)	(0.570)	(0.735)	(0.155)	(0.210)
Foreign Military	2.711**	2.711**	2.859***	0.493†	0.234
Intervention	(0.855)	(0.855)	(0.884)	(0.274)	(0.360)
Territorial	-0.499	-0.499	-0.444	-0.301**	-0.180
Incompatibility	(0.428)	(0.428)	(0.440)	(0.109)	(0.136)
GDP (ln)	-0.064*	-0.064*	-0.067*	0.001	0.011
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.029	-0.029	-0.044	0.023†	0.048***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.007	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.013	-0.101
				(0.084)	(0.091)
Other Crime				0.445***	0.550***
				(0.093)	(0.104)
# of active dyads	0.073	0.073	0.003	-0.026	0.003
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.123)	(0.041)	(0.047)
Post-Cold War		-3.327*	-2.591		
(postcw)		(1.419)	(1.592)		
Christian Affiliated			-1.098		
*postcw			(0.858)		
Christian Fundamentalist			-1.290		
*postcw			(0.861)		
Muslim Affiliated			0.317		
*postcow			(0.836)		
Muslim Jihadist			-1.788†		
*postcw			(1.026)		
Communist			0.231		
Rebels*postcw			(0.878)		
Liberal/Democratic			-1.315†		
Rebels*postcw			(0.684)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.431	-1.431	-1.681	0.660	0.664
	(1.221)	(1.221)	(1.238)	(0.365)	(0.461)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	843	782
Log Likelihood	-836.186	-836.186	-829.436	-5833.011	-4349.252
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Robustness Checks

Table A2-A. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Dyadic, 1950-2010 (NAGs data)

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Incompatibility			H2: Specific Ideological Incompatibilities		
Hazard Models	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)
Any Ideological	-0.420**	-0.385**	-0.314			
Incompatibility	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.210)			
Secular Ideological				-0.372**	-0.258†	-0.361†
Incompatibility				(0.138)	(0.143)	(0.214)
Theological				-0.704*	-0.894**	0.411
Incompatibility				(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.783)
Secular & Theological				-0.448*	-0.488*	0.078
Incompatibility				(0.190)	(0.205)	(0.305)
Religious Affiliation	-0.059	-0.067	-0.302†	-0.043	-0.025	-0.297
Incompatibility	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.180)	(0.136)	(0.133)	(0.181)
Foreign Support for	-0.288*	-0.315**	-0.329**	-0.293*	-0.331**	-0.317*
Rebels (NAGs)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.123)
Territorial	-0.169	-0.132	-0.155	-0.189	-0.162	-0.168
Incompatibility	(0.136)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Intensity	-0.223	-0.196	-0.208	-0.225	-0.194	-0.265
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.176)
lnGDP	-0.021*	-0.027*	-0.028**	-0.019†	-0.025*	-0.025*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.004	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008	-0.018	-0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Democracy-Squared	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.872***	-0.890***	-0.906***	-0.862***	-0.874***	-0.905***
	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.123)
H3: Post-Cold War		0.350**	0.264		0.473***	0.204
(postcw)		(0.130)	(0.264)		(0.138)	(0.265)
Any Ideological			-0.155			
Incomp*postcw			(0.267)			
Secular Ideological						0.231
Incomp*postcw						(0.270)
Theological						-1.366†
Incomp*postcw						(0.816)
Secular & Theological						-0.967*
Incomp*postcw						(0.478)
Religious Affiliation			0.476†			0.612*
Incomp*postcw			(0.244)			(0.255)
Observations	2064	2064	2064	2064	2064	2064
Log pseudolikelihood	-1394.121	-1390.281	-1388.039	-1393.284	-1387.192	-1379.788

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A3-A. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination Monadic, 1950-2010 (NAGs data)

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Rebel Claim			H2: Specific Ideological Rebel Claims		
Hazard Models	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)
Any Ideological	-0.569***	-0.580***	-0.359†			
Claim	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.192)			
Communist				-0.795***	-0.687***	-0.677**
Rebels				(0.159)	(0.167)	(0.209)
Liberal/Democratic				-0.319†	-0.334*	-0.502†
Rebels				(0.173)	(0.169)	(0.274)
Religiously Affiliated	0.303†	0.262	0.580*			
Rebels	(0.184)	(0.178)	(0.234)			
Christian Affiliated				0.519**	0.518***	0.614**
Rebels				(0.159)	(0.157)	(0.233)
Christian				0.562	0.419	0.787
Fundamentalists				(0.515)	(0.511)	(0.796)
Muslim Affiliated				0.229	0.178	0.459*
Rebels				(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.229)
Muslim Jihadist				-0.356	-0.499*	0.604†
Rebels				(0.223)	(0.234)	(0.335)
Foreign Support for	-0.318*	-0.343**	-0.352**	-0.375**	-0.377**	-0.380**
Rebels (NAGs)	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Territorial	-0.440**	-0.394**	-0.373**	-0.386**	-0.321*	-0.347*
Incompatibility	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.142)
Intensity	-0.211	-0.179	-0.204	-0.292	-0.280	-0.289
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.181)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.017	-0.024*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.030**	-0.027*
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.014	-0.018	-0.019	-0.008	-0.013	-0.014
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Democracy-Squared	-0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.853***	-0.876***	-0.892***	-0.877***	-0.892***	-0.903***
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.119)
H3: Post-Cold War		0.397**	1.250***		0.378**	0.751**
(postcw)		(0.130)	(0.336)		(0.142)	(0.270)
Any Ideological			-0.395†			
Claim*postcw			(0.240)			
Communist						-0.076
Rebels*postcw						(0.298)
Liberal/Democratic						0.290
Rebels*postcw						(0.338)
Religiously Affiliated			-0.716*			
*postcw			(0.355)			
Christian Affiliated						-0.297
*postcw						(0.326)
Christian						-0.656
Fundamental*postcw						(0.785)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.644†
*postcw						(0.333)
Muslim Jihadist						-1.623***
*postcw						(0.469)
Observations	2064	2064	2064	2064	2064	2064
Log pseudolikelihood	-1388.848	-1383.913	-1380.407	-1378.417	-1374.577	-1367.611

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A4-A. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Incompatibility – Dyadic, NAGs data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7a)	(8a)	(9a)	(10a)	(11a)
	1950-2010	1950-2010	1950-2010	1989-2010	1989-2010
Religious Affiliation	0.891*	0.891*	0.823†	0.154	0.203
Incompatibility	(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.500)	(0.112)	(0.133)
Any Ideological	0.577	0.577	0.454	-0.094	-0.193
Incompatibility	(0.551)	(0.551)	(0.735)	(0.125)	(0.151)
Foreign Support for	0.498	0.498	0.496	0.076	0.031
Rebels (NAGs data)	(0.336)	(0.336)	(0.340)	(0.087)	(0.097)
Territorial	-0.822†	-0.822†	-0.808†	-0.228†	-0.236
Incompatibility	(0.468)	(0.468)	(0.476)	(0.126)	(0.146)
GDP (ln)	-0.067†	-0.067†	-0.067†	-0.010	0.016
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.035	-0.035	-0.037	0.019	0.042**
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				0.067	-0.026
				(0.095)	(0.105)
Other Crime				0.419***	0.513***
				(0.103)	(0.114)
# of active dyads	0.118	0.118	0.116	-0.013	0.018
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.163)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Post-Cold War		-2.819†	-3.165†		
(postcw)		(1.495)	(1.723)		
Any Ideological			0.120		
Incomp*postcw			(0.771)		
Religious Affiliation			0.300		
Incomp*postcw			(0.701)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000**
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.558	-1.558	-1.357	0.495	0.056
	(1.434)	(1.434)	(1.543)	(0.375)	(0.475)
Observations	2055	2055	2055	689	644
Log Likelihood	-755.992	-755.992	-755.857	-4806.377	-3544.716
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5-A. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Ideological Incompatibilities – Dyadic, NAGs data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7b)	(8b)	(9b)	(10b)	(11b)
	1950-2010	1950-2010	1950-2010	1989-2010	1989-2010
Religious affiliation	0.874*	0.874*	0.745	0.161	0.240†
Incompatibility	(0.402)	(0.402)	(0.505)	(0.120)	(0.146)
Secular ideological	0.498	0.498	0.259	-0.169	-0.200
Incompatibility	(0.627)	(0.627)	(0.769)	(0.141)	(0.174)
Theological	1.238†	1.238†	1.507†	0.106	-0.046
incompatibility	(0.685)	(0.685)	(0.832)	(0.166)	(0.200)
Secular & Theological	0.497	0.497	1.706†	-0.122	-0.261
incompatibility	(0.615)	(0.615)	(0.871)	(0.153)	(0.180)
Foreign Support for	0.527	0.527	0.545	0.082	0.029
Rebels (NAGs data)	(0.337)	(0.337)	(0.342)	(0.087)	(0.097)
Territorial	-0.741	-0.741	-0.782†	-0.221†	-0.226
incompatibility	(0.462)	(0.462)	(0.475)	(0.126)	(0.146)
GDP (ln)	-0.065†	-0.065†	-0.060†	-0.009	0.016
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.031	-0.031	-0.032	0.022†	0.044**
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				0.068	-0.029
				(0.095)	(0.105)
Other Crime				0.442***	0.531***
				(0.104)	(0.115)
# of active dyads	0.138	0.138	0.022	-0.027	0.018
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.050)	(0.056)
Post-Cold War		-3.084*	-3.767*		
(postcw)		(1.523)	(1.738)		
Secular Ideological			0.365		
Incomp*postcw			(0.769)		
Theological			0.820		
Incomp*postcw			(0.777)		
Secular & Theological			0.121		
Incomp*postcw			(0.768)		
Religious Affiliation			-2.156*		
Incomp*postcw			(0.924)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000*
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.520	-1.520	-1.139	0.507	0.023
	(1.489)	(1.489)	(1.581)	(0.381)	(0.480)
Observations	2055	2055	2055	689	644
Log Likelihood	-755.175	-755.175	-747.819	-4804.782	-3544.064
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A6-A. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Claim – Monadic, NAGs Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12a)	(13a)	(14a)	(15a)	(16a)
	1950-2010	1950-2010	1950-2010	1989-2010	1989-2010
Religious Affiliation	0.737	0.737	0.667	0.199	0.259
	(0.646)	(0.646)	(0.640)	(0.200)	(0.255)
Any ideological Claim	0.552	0.552	0.854†	-0.241*	-0.508***
	(0.384)	(0.384)	(0.497)	(0.116)	(0.146)
Foreign Support for	0.504	0.504	0.501	0.054	-0.019
Rebels (NAGs data)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.086)	(0.094)
Territorial	-0.282	-0.282	-0.270	-0.218†	-0.297*
Incompatibility	(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.124)	(0.146)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.074*	-0.074*	-0.073*	-0.005	0.024
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.025	-0.025	-0.027	0.016	0.040**
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				0.050	-0.067
(RCD data)				(0.095)	(0.102)
Other Crime				0.435***	0.536***
(RCD data)				(0.102)	(0.113)
# of active dyads	0.096	0.096	0.089	-0.002	0.034
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Post-Cold War		-3.229*	-2.972†		
(postcw)		(1.402)	(1.628)		
Religious Affiliation			0.141		
*postcw			(0.859)		
Ideological Claim			-0.701		
*postcw			(0.697)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.366	-1.366	-1.406	0.308	-0.058
	(1.432)	(1.432)	(1.433)	(0.414)	(0.517)
Observations	2055	2055	2055	689	644
Log Likelihood	-757.952	-757.952	-757.044	-4805.248	-3541.143
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7-A. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Ideological Claim Types – Monadic, NAGs data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12b)	(13b)	(14b)	(15b)	(16b)
	1950-2010	1950-2010	1950-2010	1989-2010	1989-2010
Religious Affiliation	0.715	0.715	0.591	0.116	0.203
	(0.655)	(0.655)	(0.646)	(0.202)	(0.256)
Religious Affiliation	1.428†	1.428†	2.333*	0.061	-0.126
& Theological Claim	(0.767)	(0.767)	(0.979)	(0.218)	(0.265)
Secular Ideological	0.368	0.368	0.630	-0.394**	-0.598***
Claim	(0.431)	(0.431)	(0.518)	(0.126)	(0.161)
Foreign Support for	0.509	0.509	0.492	0.073	-0.004
Rebels (NAGs data)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.087)	(0.095)
Territorial	-0.327	-0.327	-0.332	-0.292*	-0.326*
Incompatibility	(0.456)	(0.456)	(0.454)	(0.125)	(0.146)
GDP (ln)	-0.073*	-0.073*	-0.071*	-0.003	0.025
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.025	-0.025	-0.026	0.016	0.040**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				0.060	-0.048
				(0.093)	(0.101)
Other Crime				0.476***	0.563***
				(0.103)	(0.114)
# of active dyads	0.081	0.081	0.007	-0.033	0.009
	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.160)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Post-Cold War		-3.282*	-3.040†		
(postcw)		(1.396)	(1.618)		
Religious Affiliation			0.222		
*postcw			(0.847)		
Religious Affil &			-1.294		
Theo Claim*postcw			(1.128)		
Secular Ideological			-0.656		
Claim*postcw			(0.778)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.295	-1.295	-1.206	0.390	-0.016
	(1.446)	(1.446)	(1.431)	(0.416)	(0.520)
Observations	2055	2055	2055	689	644
Log Likelihood	-757.961	-757.961	-755.988	-4801.498	-3540.152
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8-A. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Claim Types – Monadic, NAGs data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12c)	(13c)	(14c)	(15c)	(16c)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Christian Affiliated	1.226*	1.226*	1.428*	0.015	0.004
Rebels	(0.562)	(0.562)	(0.674)	(0.149)	(0.201)
Christian	1.206	1.206	2.019*	-0.015	0.250
Fundamentalist Rebels	(0.976)	(0.976)	(1.020)	(0.273)	(0.347)
Muslim Affiliated	0.518	0.518	0.333	-0.107	-0.290
Rebels	(0.562)	(0.562)	(0.637)	(0.149)	(0.186)
Muslim Jihadist Rebels	1.284†	1.284†	2.331**	-0.125	-0.445*
	(0.675)	(0.675)	(0.894)	(0.158)	(0.186)
Communist	0.301	0.301	0.368	-0.538***	-0.645***
Rebels	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.549)	(0.150)	(0.183)
Liberal/Democratic	-0.452	-0.452	0.239	-0.328†	-0.419†
Rebels	(0.619)	(0.619)	(0.766)	(0.169)	(0.231)
Foreign Support for	0.526†	0.526†	0.535	0.084	0.009
Rebels (NAGs data)	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.334)	(0.089)	(0.099)
Territorial	-0.239	-0.239	-0.227	-0.307*	-0.243
Incompatibility	(0.453)	(0.453)	(0.474)	(0.131)	(0.167)
GDP (ln)	-0.081*	-0.081*	-0.082*	-0.007	0.013
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Democracy	-0.029	-0.029	-0.046	0.024†	0.053***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.000	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				0.062	-0.047
				(0.094)	(0.103)
Other Crime				0.490***	0.589***
				(0.104)	(0.115)
# of active dyads	0.073	0.073	0.003	-0.028	0.014
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Post-Cold War		-3.071*	-2.395		
(postcw)		(1.396)	(1.526)		
Christian Affiliated			-0.708		
*postcw			(0.942)		
Christian Fundamentalist			-1.330		
*postcw			(0.819)		
Muslim Affiliated			0.216		
*postcow			(0.947)		
Muslim Jihadist			-1.680†		
*postcw			(0.994)		
Communist			0.077		
Rebels*postcw			(0.954)		
Liberal/Democratic			-1.544*		
Rebels*postcw			(0.744)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000**
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.126	-1.126	-1.334	0.676	0.472
	(1.327)	(1.327)	(1.375)	(0.395)	(0.515)
Observations	2055	2055	2055	689	644
Log Likelihood	-755.840	-755.840	-750.465	-4799.227	-3536.060
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A2-B. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Dyadic, 1950-2017, ACD2EPR Data

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Incompatibility			H2: Specific Ideological Incompatibilities		
Hazard Models	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)
Any Ideological	-0.538***	-0.509***	-0.600***			
Incompatibility	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.182)			
Secular Ideological				-0.493***	-0.390**	-0.658***
Incompatibility				(0.122)	(0.125)	(0.190)
Theological				-0.743***	-0.897***	0.148
Incompatibility				(0.215)	(0.219)	(0.675)
Secular&Theological				-0.555**	-0.598**	-0.175
Incompatibility				(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.293)
Ethnic Ideological	0.327*	0.296†	0.081	0.325*	0.277†	0.102
Incompatibility	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.259)	(0.163)	(0.162)	(0.260)
Religious Affiliation	-0.082	-0.092	-0.110	-0.060	-0.040	-0.109
Incompatibility	(0.113)	(0.109)	(0.173)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.174)
Ethnic Affiliation	-0.519**	-0.509**	-0.857***	-0.522**	-0.514**	-0.862***
Incompatibility	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.243)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.247)
Foreign Military	-0.069	-0.136	-0.244	-0.096	-0.223	-0.361
Intervention	(0.230)	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.233)	(0.248)	(0.261)
Territorial	-0.043	0.006	0.076	-0.064	-0.022	0.061
Incompatibility	(0.127)	(0.123)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.133)
Intensity	-0.304†	-0.272	-0.258	-0.298†	-0.251	-0.277†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.167)	(0.170)
lnGDP	-0.013	-0.020*	-0.021*	-0.012	-0.018†	-0.019†
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.014	-0.015	-0.016	-0.017	-0.024	-0.025
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Democracy-Squared	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.833***	-0.849***	-0.868***	-0.824***	-0.836***	-0.859***
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Post-Cold War		0.363**	-0.266		0.463***	-0.272
		(0.118)	(0.264)		(0.124)	(0.264)
Any Ideological			0.097			
Incomp*postcw			(0.229)			
Secular Ideological						0.423†
Incomp*postcw						(0.239)
Theological						-0.971
Incomp*postcw						(0.705)
Secular&Theological						-0.721†
Incomp*postcw						(0.442)
Ethnic Ideological			0.276†			0.201
Incomp*postcw			(0.353)			(0.351)
Religious Affiliation			0.055			0.191
Incomp*postcw			(0.221)			(0.229)
Ethnic Affiliation			0.653			0.629†
Incomp*postcw			(0.353)			(0.355)
Observations	2463	2463	2463	2463	2463	2463
Log pseudolikelihood	-1765.038	-1760.168	-1751.672	-1764.328	-1757.271	-1744.346

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A3-B. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Monadic, 1950-2017, ACD2EPR Data

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Rebel Claim			H2: Specific Ideological Rebel Claims		
Hazard Models	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)
Any Ideological	-0.581***	-0.594***	-0.632***			
Claim	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.177)			
Communist				-0.877***	-0.766***	-1.080***
Rebels				(0.154)	(0.158)	(0.213)
Liberal/Democratic				-0.393*	-0.417**	-0.595*
Rebels				(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.281)
Religiously Affiliated	0.340†	0.315†	0.514*			
Rebels	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.222)			
Christian Affiliated				0.442**	0.435**	0.458*
Rebels				(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.210)
Christian				0.382	0.261	0.670
Fundamentalists				(0.336)	(0.325)	(0.689)
Muslim Affiliated				0.105	0.059	0.250
Rebels				(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.206)
Muslim Jihadist				-0.430*	-0.581**	0.399
Rebels				(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.347)
Ethnically Affiliated	-0.293*	-0.298*	-0.325†	-0.301*	-0.268†	-0.373†
Rebels	(0.139)	(0.142)	(0.196)	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.196)
Ethnic Ideological	0.043	0.005	-0.541**	-0.147	-0.164	-0.754***
Rebels	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.194)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.197)
Foreign Military	-0.134	-0.208	-0.316	-0.283	-0.383	-0.485†
Intervention	(0.222)	(0.229)	(0.221)	(0.238)	(0.250)	(0.250)
Territorial	-0.278*	-0.206†	-0.179	-0.122	-0.066	-0.056
Incompatibility	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Intensity	-0.318†	-0.284†	-0.264	-0.342*	-0.315†	-0.282
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.174)	(0.174)	(0.180)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.009	-0.017†	-0.016†	-0.013	-0.020†	-0.013
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.032*	-0.032*	-0.034*	-0.025†	-0.026†	-0.031*
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	-0.003	0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.827***	-0.852***	-0.875***	-0.832***	-0.846***	-0.871***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.097)
H3: Post-Cold War		0.426***	0.296		0.416**	-0.115
(postcw)		(0.119)	(0.395)		(0.127)	(0.337)
Any Ideological			-0.046			
Claim*postcw			(0.216)			
Communist						0.427
Rebels*postcw						(0.280)
Liberal/Democratic						0.268
Rebels*postcw						(0.343)
Religiously Affiliated			-0.400			
*postcw			(0.345)			
Christian Affiliated						-0.129
*postcw						(0.291)
Christian						-0.713
Fundamental*postcw						(0.683)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.337
*postcw						(0.298)
Muslim Jihadist						-1.252**
*postcw						(0.447)
Ethnic Affiliated			0.049			0.142
*postcw			(0.290)			(0.300)
Ethnic Ideological			0.936***			0.972***
*postcw			(0.255)			(0.266)

Observations	2463	2463	2463	2463	2463	2463
Log pseudolikelihood	-1764.362	-1757.829	-1747.374	-1754.581	-1749.101	-1733.899

Table A4-B. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Incompatibility - Dyadic, ACD2EPR Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7a)	(8a)	(9a)	(10a)	(11a)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	0.561	0.561	0.366	0.062	0.124
Incompatibility	(0.365)	(0.365)	(0.504)	(0.101)	(0.118)
Any Ideological	0.644	0.644	0.559	-0.059	-0.072
Incompatibility	(0.435)	(0.435)	(0.602)	(0.113)	(0.141)
Ethnic Affiliation	0.356	0.356	1.228†	-0.244†	-0.299†
Incompatibility	(0.536)	(0.536)	(0.715)	(0.136)	(0.168)
Ethnic Ideological	0.542	0.542	-0.189	0.190	0.234
Incompatibility	(0.545)	(0.545)	(0.727)	(0.151)	(0.190)
Foreign Military	2.497**	2.497**	2.479**	0.524†	0.287
Intervention	(0.798)	(0.798)	(0.800)	(0.272)	(0.360)
Territorial	-1.491**	-1.491**	-1.498**	-0.217	-0.191
Incompatibility	(0.548)	(0.548)	(0.556)	(0.146)	(0.186)
GDP (ln)	-0.062†	-0.062†	-0.054	-0.003	0.011
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.027	-0.027	-0.063	0.012	0.038**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.006	-0.000	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				-0.001	-0.096
				(0.087)	(0.097)
Other Crime				0.396***	0.508***
				(0.096)	(0.109)
# of active dyads	0.110	0.110	0.062	-0.002	0.011
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Post-Cold War		-2.687†	-2.909		
(postcw)		(1.478)	(1.777)		
Religious Affiliation			0.313		
Incomp*postcw			(0.714)		
Any Ideological			0.448		
Incomp*postcw			(0.654)		
Ethnic Affiliation			-2.009*		
Incomp*postcw			(0.976)		
Ethnic Ideological			1.692†		
Incomp*postcw			(0.888)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.951	-1.951	-2.083	0.486	0.251
	(1.389)	(1.389)	(1.537)	(0.351)	(0.438)
Observations	2453	2453	2453	829	768
Log Likelihood	-830.499	-830.499	-824.962	-5747.477	-4274.340
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5-B. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Ideological Incompatibilities - Dyadic, ACD2EPR Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7b)	(8b)	(9b)	(10b)	(11b)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	0.497	0.497	0.264	0.029	0.107
Incompatibility	(0.371)	(0.371)	(0.496)	(0.106)	(0.127)
Secular ideological	0.485	0.485	0.309	-0.136	-0.110
Incompatibility	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.617)	(0.130)	(0.167)
Theological	1.309*	1.309*	1.463	0.001	-0.050
incompatibility	(0.591)	(0.591)	(1.108)	(0.143)	(0.172)
Secular & Theological	0.838	0.838	1.860*	0.002	-0.051
incompatibility	(0.533)	(0.533)	(0.749)	(0.138)	(0.165)
Ethnic Affiliation	0.376	0.376	1.139	-0.236†	-0.294†
Incompatibility	(0.529)	(0.529)	(0.714)	(0.137)	(0.170)
Ethnic Ideological	0.572	0.572	-0.054	0.192	0.235
Incompatibility	(0.546)	(0.546)	(0.746)	(0.151)	(0.191)
Foreign Military	2.565**	2.565**	2.553**	0.553*	0.292
Intervention	(0.799)	(0.799)	(0.796)	(0.274)	(0.362)
Territorial	-1.398**	-1.398**	-1.408*	-0.217	-0.195
Incompatibility	(0.533)	(0.533)	(0.562)	(0.146)	(0.187)
GDP (ln)	-0.062†	-0.062†	-0.050	-0.003	0.011
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.022	-0.022	-0.052	0.016	0.040**
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.000	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				-0.004	-0.096
				(0.087)	(0.097)
Other Crime				0.409***	0.515***
				(0.096)	(0.111)
# of active dyads	0.109	0.109	0.006	-0.015	0.005
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.124)	(0.042)	(0.048)
Post-Cold War		-2.928*	-3.388†		
(postcw)		(1.490)	(1.742)		
Religious Affiliation			0.425		
Incomp*postcw			(0.710)		
Ethnic Affiliation			-1.606†		
Incomp*postcw			(0.960)		
Secular Ideological			0.772		
Incomp*postcw			(0.703)		
Theological			0.376		
Incomp*postcw			(1.008)		
Secular & Theological			-1.426†		
Incomp*postcw			(0.825)		
Ethnic Ideological			1.337		
Incomp*postcw			(0.878)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.783	-1.783	-1.780	0.530	0.266
	(1.432)	(1.432)	(1.539)	(0.354)	(0.441)
Observations	2453	2453	2453	829	768
Log Likelihood	-829.518	-829.518	-819.712	-5746.728	-4274.247
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A6-B. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Claim - Monadic, ACD2EPR Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12a)	(13a)	(14a)	(15a)	(16a)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Rebel Religious	0.832	0.832†	0.888	0.329†	0.466†
Affiliation	(0.705)	(0.705)	(0.693)	(0.195)	(0.252)
Rebel Ethnic Affiliation	0.913†	0.913	1.546†	-0.333*	-0.437*
	(0.546)	(0.546)	(0.811)	(0.143)	(0.178)
Any (non-ethnic)	0.640†	0.640†	1.013*	-0.226*	-0.375**
Ideological Claim	(0.376)	(0.376)	(0.513)	(0.103)	(0.132)
Rebel Ethnic	0.725	0.725	0.468	0.215	0.304†
Ideological Claim	(0.477)	(0.477)	(0.641)	(0.138)	(0.174)
Foreign Military	2.760**	2.760**	2.763**	0.517†	0.280
Intervention	(0.856)	(0.856)	(0.862)	(0.270)	(0.366)
Territorial	-1.229*	-1.229*	-1.242*	-0.248†	-0.277
Incompatibility	(0.533)	(0.533)	(0.540)	(0.148)	(0.189)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.061†	-0.061†	-0.057†	-0.004	0.013
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.014	-0.014	-0.037	0.007	0.031*
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.008	-0.001	0.000
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				-0.025	-0.135
(RCD data)				(0.086)	(0.094)
Other Crime				0.395***	0.486***
(RCD data)				(0.094)	(0.107)
# of active dyads	0.096	0.096	0.066	0.000	0.015
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.125)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Post-Cold War		-3.263*	-2.450		
(postcw)		(1.438)	(2.032)		
Religious Affiliation			0.076		
*postcw			(0.953)		
Ethnic Affiliation			-1.326		
*postcw			(1.209)		
Non-Ethnic Ideological			-0.736		
Claim*postcw			(0.747)		
Ethnic Ideological Claim			0.646		
*postcw			(0.865)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.451	-2.451	-3.043	0.439	0.199
	(1.433)	(1.433)	(1.574)	(0.399)	(0.491)
Observations	2453	2453	2453	829	768
Log Likelihood	-829.295	-829.295	-826.212	-5743.107	-4268.040
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7-B. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Ideological Claim Types - Monadic, ACD2EPR Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12b)	(13b)	(14b)	(15b)	(16b)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	0.808	0.808	0.803	0.274	0.429†
	(0.713)	(0.713)	(0.697)	(0.196)	(0.253)
Religious Affiliation	1.688*	1.688*	2.587**	0.230	0.247
& Theological Claim	(0.806)	(0.806)	(0.992)	(0.214)	(0.270)
Ethnic Affiliation	0.837	0.837	1.401†	-0.406**	-0.523**
	(0.540)	(0.540)	(0.813)	(0.145)	(0.180)
Ethnic Ideological	0.746	0.746	0.499	0.210	0.291†
Claim	(0.477)	(0.477)	(0.645)	(0.137)	(0.172)
Secular Ideological	0.409	0.409	0.750	-0.376**	-0.524***
Claim	(0.419)	(0.419)	(0.540)	(0.115)	(0.150)
Foreign Military	2.770**	2.770**	2.772**	0.560*	0.284
Intervention	(0.848)	(0.848)	(0.845)	(0.269)	(0.373)
Territorial	-1.263*	-1.263*	-1.273*	-0.289†	-0.310†
Incompatibility	(0.536)	(0.536)	(0.545)	(0.148)	(0.188)
GDP (ln)	-0.060†	-0.060†	-0.054	-0.002	0.016
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.015	-0.015	-0.036	0.009	0.035*
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.007	-0.000	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				-0.035	-0.142
				(0.086)	(0.093)
Other Crime				0.427***	0.513***
				(0.095)	(0.107)
# of active dyads	0.079	0.079	0.013	-0.029	-0.017
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Post-Cold War		-3.307*	-2.541		
(postcw)		(1.442)	(2.051)		
Religious Affiliation			0.138		
*postcw			(0.951)		
Religious Affil &			-1.118		
Theo Claim*postcw			(1.211)		
Ethnic Affiliation			-1.230		
*postcw			(1.184)		
Ethnic Ideological Claim			0.598		
*postcw			(0.827)		
Secular Ideological			-0.796		
Claim*postcw			(0.851)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.326	-2.326	-2.786	0.554	0.298
	(1.440)	(1.440)	(1.570)	(0.403)	(0.496)
Observations	2453	2453	2453	829	768
Log Likelihood	-829.151	-829.151	-825.337	-5739.106	-4265.531
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8-B. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Claim Types - Monadic, ACD2EPR Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12c)	(13c)	(14c)	(15c)	(16c)
	1950-2017	1950-2017	1950-2017	1989-2015	1989-2015
Christian Affiliated	0.851	0.851	1.420*	-0.034	-0.058
Rebels	(0.583)	(0.583)	(0.672)	(0.139)	(0.183)
Christian	0.331	0.331	0.977	-0.091	0.083
Fundamentalist Rebels	(0.972)	(0.972)	(1.112)	(0.270)	(0.344)
Muslim Affiliated	0.870	0.870	0.692	-0.062	-0.210
Rebels	(0.574)	(0.574)	(0.602)	(0.139)	(0.174)
Muslim Jihadist Rebels	1.688*	1.688*	2.842**	-0.071	-0.275
	(0.680)	(0.680)	(0.925)	(0.150)	(0.176)
Ethnic Affiliated Rebels	0.979†	0.979†	1.535†	-0.449**	-0.532**
	(0.529)	(0.529)	(0.824)	(0.148)	(0.187)
Ethnic Ideological Rebels	0.943†	0.943†	0.960	0.174	0.168
	(0.504)	(0.504)	(0.626)	(0.142)	(0.191)
Communist	0.851	0.851	0.956	-0.588***	-0.729***
Rebels	(0.540)	(0.540)	(0.595)	(0.147)	(0.174)
Liberal/Democratic	-0.436	-0.436	0.155	-0.172	-0.216
Rebels	(0.575)	(0.575)	(0.743)	(0.158)	(0.220)
Foreign Military	2.790**	2.790**	2.998***	0.484†	0.236
Intervention	(0.857)	(0.857)	(0.892)	(0.275)	(0.364)
Territorial	-1.352*	-1.352*	-1.311*	-0.316*	-0.238
Incompatibility	(0.540)	(0.540)	(0.562)	(0.150)	(0.200)
GDP (ln)	-0.060†	-0.060†	-0.062†	-0.004	0.008
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.023	-0.023	-0.059	0.022†	0.053***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.007	-0.000	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Resource Looting				-0.031	-0.144
				(0.087)	(0.094)
Other Crime				0.463***	0.583***
				(0.096)	(0.109)
# of active dyads	0.079	0.079	0.015	-0.035	-0.022
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.125)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Post-Cold War		-3.434*	-1.746		
(postcw)		(1.434)	(1.870)		
Christian Affiliated			-1.479†		
*postcw			(0.776)		
Christian Fundamentalist			-1.207		
*postcw			(0.836)		
Muslim Affiliated			0.225		
*postcow			(0.847)		
Muslim Jihadist			-1.751†		
*postcw			(1.054)		
Ethnic Affiliated			-1.229		
*postcw			(1.177)		
Ethnic Ideological			0.171		
*postcw			(0.706)		
Communist			0.069		
Rebels*postcw			(0.882)		
Liberal/Democratic			-1.107		
Rebels*postcw			(0.716)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.245	-2.245	-3.101*	1.033**	1.071*
	(1.304)	(1.304)	(1.495)	(0.396)	(0.500)

Observations	2453	2453	2453	829	768
Log Likelihood	-826.805	-826.805	-818.816	-5736.899	-4262.009
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Table A2-C1. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Dyadic - General Incompatibilities, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(2a) 1950-2017	(3a) 1950-2017	(2a-1) 1950-2017	(3a-1) 1950-2017	(2a-2) 1950-2017	(3a-2) 1950-2017
Any Ideological	-0.469***	-0.475*	-0.470***	-0.486†	-0.493***	-0.465***
Incompatibility	(0.111)	(0.186)	(0.111)	(0.251)	(0.111)	(0.134)
Religious Affiliation	-0.135	-0.360*	-0.132	-0.246	-0.127	-0.104
Incompatibility	(0.106)	(0.170)	(0.109)	(0.229)	(0.110)	(0.129)
Foreign Military	-0.159	-0.203	-0.110	-0.132	-0.096	-0.088
Intervention	(0.234)	(0.240)	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.228)	(0.228)
Territorial	-0.011	-0.015	-0.030	-0.027	-0.051	-0.053
Incompatibility	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Intensity	-0.305†	-0.315†	-0.321†	-0.319†	-0.336*	-0.337*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.167)
lnGDP	-0.019*	-0.021*	-0.016	-0.016†	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.862***	-0.867***	-0.855***	-0.855***	-0.845***	-0.845***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.100)
Post-Cold War	0.360**	0.200				
(postcw)	(0.116)	(0.230)				
Any Ideological		-0.007				
Incomp*postcw		(0.232)				
Religious Affiliation		0.396†				
Incomp*postcw		(0.214)				
Post-Iranian			0.193	0.121		
Revolution (iran)			(0.136)	(0.280)		
Any Ideological				0.014		
Incomp*iran				(0.273)		
Religious Affiliation				0.153		
Incomp*iran				(0.258)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					0.004	0.114
					(0.128)	(0.271)
Any Ideological						-0.107
Incomp*p2001						(0.274)
Religious Affiliation						-0.084
Incomp*p2001						(0.243)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1769.951	-1768.176	-1773.626	-1773.425	-1774.743	-1774.584

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A2-C2. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Dyadic - Specific Incompatibilities, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(2b) 1950-2017	(3b) 1950-2017	(2b-1) 1950-2017	(3b-1) 1950-2017	(2b-2) 1950-2017	(3b-2) 1950-2017
Secular Ideological	-0.353**	-0.527**	-0.398***	-0.502*	-0.442***	-0.486***
Incompatibility	(0.121)	(0.192)	(0.120)	(0.255)	(0.120)	(0.140)
Theological	-0.840***	0.158	-0.722***	-0.715***	-0.704**	-0.315
Incompatibility	(0.212)	(0.861)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.223)	(0.360)
Secular & Theological	-0.575**	-0.041	-0.520**	-0.248	-0.524**	-0.350†
Incompatibility	(0.184)	(0.283)	(0.175)	(0.497)	(0.173)	(0.188)
Religious Affiliation	-0.083	-0.349*	-0.100	-0.227	-0.106	-0.092
Incompatibility	(0.110)	(0.171)	(0.112)	(0.228)	(0.113)	(0.130)
Foreign Military	-0.247	-0.339	-0.156	-0.184	-0.131	-0.168
Intervention	(0.244)	(0.263)	(0.233)	(0.238)	(0.234)	(0.245)
Territorial	-0.054	-0.054	-0.058	-0.055	-0.074	-0.059
Incompatibility	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.114)
Intensity	-0.288†	-0.335†	-0.311†	-0.317†	-0.328*	-0.335*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.167)	(0.172)	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.167)	(0.169)
lnGDP	-0.017†	-0.019†	-0.014	-0.014	-0.011	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.026†	-0.026†	-0.023	-0.024	-0.019	-0.022
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Democracy-Squared	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.848***	-0.858***	-0.845***	-0.845***	-0.839***	-0.843***
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Post-Cold War	0.457***	0.149				
(postcw)	(0.121)	(0.230)				
Secular Ideological		0.333				
Incomp*postcw		(0.238)				
Theological		-1.013				
Incomp*postcw		(0.885)				
Secular & Theological		-0.825*				
Incomp*postcw		(0.411)				
Religious Affiliation		0.511*				
Incomp*postcw		(0.218)				
Post-Iranian			0.242†	0.101		
Revolution (iran)			(0.136)	(0.282)		
Secular Ideological				0.140		
Incomp*iran				(0.280)		
Theological				*Collinear*		
Incomp*iran				*Omitted*		
Secular & Theological				-0.334		
Incomp*iran				(0.578)		
Religious Affiliation				0.180		
Incomp*iran				(0.262)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					0.053	0.053
					(0.138)	(0.274)
Secular Ideological						0.264
Incomp*p2001						(0.289)
Theological						-0.606
Incomp*p2001						(0.456)
Secular&Theological						-0.584
Incomp*p2001						(0.472)
Religious Affiliation						0.051
Incomp*p2001						(0.235)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1767.187	-1759.838	-1772.421	-1771.641	-1774.010	-1770.714

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Table A3-C1. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Monadic - General Claims, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(5a) 1950-2017	(6a) 1950-2017	(5a-1) 1950-2017	(6a-1) 1950-2017	(5a-2) 1950-2017	(6a-2) 1950-2017
Religiously Affiliated Rebels	0.232	0.411†	0.258	1.099*	0.266	0.244
	(0.173)	(0.224)	(0.171)	(0.482)	(0.175)	(0.178)
Any Ideological Claim	-0.581***	-0.343*	-0.554***	-0.323	-0.567***	-0.454***
	(0.109)	(0.174)	(0.110)	(0.234)	(0.111)	(0.127)
Foreign Military Intervention	-0.181	-0.172	-0.125	-0.152	-0.108	-0.111
	(0.228)	(0.233)	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.227)
Territorial Incompatibility	-0.277*	-0.243*	-0.294*	-0.277*	-0.328**	-0.309**
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Intensity (UCDP 2-tier)	-0.307†	-0.327*	-0.322†	-0.335*	-0.337*	-0.339*
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.165)
lnGDP (World Bank + Gledistch 1950-60)	-0.015	-0.016	-0.012	-0.015	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy (V-Dem Polyarchy)	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.032*	-0.030*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared (V-Dem Polyarchy)	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.861***	-0.867***	-0.850***	-0.847***	-0.837***	-0.839***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)
H3: Post-Cold War (postcw)	0.410***	0.898**				
	(0.116)	(0.348)				
Religiously Affiliated *postcw		-0.331				
		(0.353)				
Any Ideological Claim*postcw		-0.382†				
		(0.211)				
Post-Iranian Revolution (iran)			0.213	1.330*		
			(0.133)	(0.598)		
Religiously Affiliated *iran				-1.050†		
				(0.594)		
Any Ideological Claim*iran				-0.284		
				(0.252)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-0.010	0.060
					(0.128)	(0.543)
Religiously Affiliated *p2001						0.146
						(0.549)
Any Ideological Claim*p2001						-0.410†
						(0.235)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1765.223	-1762.924	-1769.988	-1766.417	-1771.350	-1769.879

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10

Table A3-C2. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Monadic - Specific Claims, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(5b) 1950-2017	(6b) 1950-2017	(5b-1) 1950-2017	(6b-1) 1950-2017	(5b-2) 1950-2017	(6b-2) 1950-2017
Communist	-0.648***	-0.635**	-0.704***	-0.643*	-0.766***	-0.726***
Rebels	(0.142)	(0.198)	(0.139)	(0.259)	(0.141)	(0.151)
Liberal/Democratic	-0.461**	-0.551*	-0.448**	-0.805*	-0.441**	-0.421*
Rebels	(0.154)	(0.269)	(0.156)	(0.405)	(0.157)	(0.182)
Christian Affiliated	0.401**	0.508*	0.420**	0.753*	0.404**	0.418**
Rebels	(0.139)	(0.218)	(0.139)	(0.301)	(0.142)	(0.160)
Christian Fundamental	0.099	0.505	0.198	0.125	0.218	0.718
Rebel	(0.332)	(0.886)	(0.336)	(0.341)	(0.345)	(0.465)
Muslim Affiliated	0.035	0.236	0.077	0.151	0.080	0.160
Rebels	(0.142)	(0.209)	(0.141)	(0.326)	(0.145)	(0.162)
Muslim Jihadist	-0.608**	0.469	-0.479*	0.689	-0.452*	-0.143
Rebels	(0.203)	(0.329)	(0.195)	(0.469)	(0.200)	(0.226)
Foreign Military	-0.360	-0.348	-0.282	-0.259	-0.249	-0.259
Intervention	(0.253)	(0.264)	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.244)	(0.253)
Territorial	-0.221†	-0.225†	-0.246*	-0.240*	-0.285*	-0.295*
Incompatibility	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.120)
Intensity	-0.355*	-0.358*	-0.372*	-0.381*	-0.383*	-0.383*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.172)	(0.173)
lnGDP	-0.019†	-0.017	-0.016	-0.015	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.029*	-0.031*	-0.029*	-0.028†	-0.027†	-0.030†
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Democracy-Squared	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.850***	-0.849***	-0.846***	-0.845***	-0.835***	-0.839***
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Post-Cold War	0.422***	0.718**				
(postcw)	(0.125)	(0.246)				
Communist		-0.021				
Rebels*postcw		(0.264)				
Liberal/Democratic		0.135				
Rebels*postcw		(0.324)				
Christian Affiliated		-0.260				
*postcw		(0.297)				
Christian		-0.619				
Fundamental*postcw		(0.860)				
Muslim Affiliated		-0.412				
*postcw		(0.301)				
Muslim Jihadist		-1.436***				
*postcw		(0.430)				
Post-Iranian			0.201	0.495		
Revolution (iran)			(0.138)	(0.302)		
Communist				-0.101		
Rebels*iran				(0.301)		
Liberal/Democratic				0.437		
Rebels*iran				(0.435)		
Christian Affiliated				-0.472		
*iran				(0.339)		
Christian				*Collinear*		
Fundamental*iran				*Omitted*		
Muslim Affiliated				-0.111		
*p2001				(0.391)		
Muslim Jihadist				-1.359**		
*p2001				(0.524)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-0.025	0.364

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(5b) 1950-2017	(6b) 1950-2017	(5b-1) 1950-2017	(6b-1) 1950-2017	(5b-2) 1950-2017	(6b-2) 1950-2017
					(0.136)	(0.333)
Communist						-0.211
Rebels*p2001						(0.353)
Liberal/Democratic						-0.176
Rebels*p2001						(0.349)
Christian Affiliated						-0.098
*p2001						(0.356)
Christian						-1.466*
Fundamental*p2001						(0.643)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.412
*p2001						(0.402)
Muslim Jihadist						-0.891†
*p2001						(0.464)
Observations	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480	2480
Log pseudolikelihood	-1757.443	-1751.903	-1762.024	-1757.373	-1763.111	-1758.807

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A4C. Conflict Intensity - Dyadic - General, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11**)**

Random Effects Logits	(8a) 1950-2017	(9a) 1950-2017	(8a-1) 1950-2017	(9a-1) 1950-2017	(8a-2) 1950-2017	(9a-2) 1950-2017
Religious Affiliation Incompatibility	0.723* (0.363)	0.561 (0.482)	0.723* (0.363)	1.596* (0.706)	0.723* (0.363)	0.937* (0.446)
Any Ideological Incompatibility	0.663 (0.431)	0.501 (0.579)	0.663 (0.431)	0.040 (0.817)	0.663 (0.431)	0.603 (0.475)
Foreign Military Intervention	2.492** (0.798)	2.510** (0.788)	2.492** (0.798)	2.733** (0.845)	2.492** (0.798)	2.524** (0.801)
Territorial Incompatibility	-1.038* (0.449)	-1.023* (0.452)	-1.038* (0.449)	-1.072* (0.462)	-1.038* (0.449)	-1.051* (0.457)
GDP (ln)	-0.059 (0.032)	-0.060† (0.033)	-0.059† (0.032)	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.059† (0.032)	-0.057† (0.032)
Democracy	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.044 (0.056)
Democracy-Squared	0.007 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
# of active dyads	0.112 (0.132)	0.109 (0.134)	0.112 (0.132)	0.076 (0.134)	0.112 (0.132)	0.123 (0.132)
Post-Cold War (postcw)	-2.721† (1.463)	-3.203† (1.653)				
Religious Affiliation Incomp*postcw		0.289 (0.686)				
Any Ideological Incomp*postcw		0.369 (0.620)				
Post-Iranian Revolution (iran)			-2.721† (1.463)	-3.209† (1.774)		
Religious Affiliation Incomp*iran				-1.252 (0.835)		
Any Ideological Incomp*iran				0.883 (0.857)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-2.721† (1.463)	-2.914 (1.804)
Religious Affiliation Incomp*p2001						-0.757 (0.802)
Any Ideological Incomp*p2001						0.601 (0.919)
Constant	-1.795 (1.366)	-1.500 (1.452)	-1.795 (1.366)	-1.404 (1.663)	-1.795 (1.366)	-1.861 (1.399)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470
Log Likelihood	-836.767	-836.456	-836.767	-832.155	-836.767	-835.341
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5-C. Conflict Intensity - Dyadic - Specific, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Random Effects Logits	(8b) 1950-2017	(9b) 1950-2017	(8b-1) 1950-2017	(9b-1) 1950-2017	(8b-2) 1950-2017	(9b-2) 1950-2017
Religious affiliation Incompatibility	0.669† (0.368)	0.471 (0.481)	0.669† (0.368)	1.551* (0.705)	0.669† (0.368)	0.804† (0.442)
Secular ideological Incompatibility	0.512 (0.495)	0.249 (0.599)	0.512 (0.495)	-0.071 (0.816)	0.512 (0.495)	0.448 (0.529)
Theological incompatibility	1.274* (0.579)	1.240 (0.892)	1.274* (0.579)	1.461* (0.605)	1.274* (0.579)	0.855 (0.725)
Secular & Theological incompatibility	0.858 (0.532)	2.053** (0.752)	0.858 (0.532)	0.686 (1.483)	0.858 (0.532)	1.246* (0.572)
Foreign military Intervention	2.560** (0.800)	2.590*** (0.787)	2.560** (0.800)	2.813*** (0.852)	2.560** (0.800)	2.597** (0.813)
Territorial incompatibility	-0.929* (0.439)	-0.958* (0.449)	-0.929* (0.439)	-0.972* (0.453)	-0.929* (0.439)	-0.953* (0.448)
GDP (ln)	-0.059† (0.032)	-0.054† (0.032)	-0.059† (0.032)	-0.055 (0.036)	-0.059† (0.032)	-0.056† (0.032)
Democracy	-0.031 (0.055)	-0.031 (0.059)	-0.031 (0.055)	-0.034 (0.057)	-0.031 (0.055)	-0.037 (0.058)
Democracy-Squared	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
# of active dyads	0.110 (0.130)	0.022 (0.123)	0.110 (0.130)	0.075 (0.136)	0.110 (0.130)	0.108 (0.125)
Post-Cold War (postcw)	-2.951* (1.477)	-3.678* (1.639)				
Religious Affiliation Incomp*postcw		0.420 (0.665)				
Secular Ideological Incomp*postcw		0.827 (0.697)				
Theological Incomp*postcw		0.371 (0.852)				
Secular & Theological Incomp*postcw		-1.823* (0.819)				
Post-Iranian Revolution (iran)			-2.951* (1.477)	-3.351† (1.759)		
Religious Affiliation Incomp*iran				-1.262 (0.831)		
Secular Ideological Incomp*iran				0.834 (0.882)		
Theological Incomp*iran				*Collinear Omitted*		
Secular & Theological Incomp*iran				0.435 (1.403)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-2.951* (1.477)	-3.389† (1.839)
Religious Affiliation Incomp*p2001						-0.361 (0.827)
Secular Ideological Incomp*p2001						0.836 (1.061)
Theological Incomp*p2001						1.207 (1.119)
Secular & Theological Incomp*p2001						-0.687 (1.006)
Constant	-1.626 (1.410)	-1.220 (1.472)	-1.626 (1.410)	-1.308 (1.668)	-1.626 (1.410)	-1.671 (1.441)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470
Log Likelihood	-835.896	-829.185	-835.896	-831.312	-835.896	-832.244
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Random Effects Logits	(8b) 1950-2017	(9b) 1950-2017	(8b-1) 1950-2017	(9b-1) 1950-2017	(8b-2) 1950-2017	(9b-2) 1950-2017

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A6-C. Conflict Intensity – Monadic – General, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Random Effects Logits	(13a) 1950-2017	(14a) 1950-2017	(13a-1) 1950-2017	(14a-1) 1950-2017	(13a-2) 1950-2017	(14a-2) 1950-2017
Religious Affiliation	1.075	1.016	1.075	0.745	1.075	***Separation Not Achieved***
	(0.685)	(0.676)	(0.685)	(0.827)	(0.685)	
Any Ideological Claim	0.598	0.931†	0.598	0.349	0.598	
	(0.370)	(0.488)	(0.370)	(0.694)	(0.370)	
Foreign Military Intervention	2.710**	2.697**	2.710**	2.741**	2.710**	
	(0.856)	(0.849)	(0.856)	(0.877)	(0.856)	
Territorial Incompatibility	-0.546	-0.533	-0.546	-0.565	-0.546	
	(0.429)	(0.426)	(0.429)	(0.430)	(0.429)	
lnGDP (World Bank + Gleditsch 1950-60)	-0.065*	-0.065*	-0.065*	-0.064*	-0.065*	
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	
Democracy (V-Dem Polyarchy)	-0.023	-0.022	-0.023	-0.025	-0.023	
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	
Democracy-Squared (V-Dem Polyarchy)	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	
# of active dyads	0.098	0.089	0.098	0.081	0.098	
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.131)	
Post-Cold War (postcw)	-3.181*	-2.986†				
	(1.416)	(1.690)				
Religious Affiliation *postcw		0.132				
		(0.918)				
Ideological Claim *postcw		-0.707				
		(0.663)				
Post-Iranian Revolution (iran)			-3.181*	-3.783*		
			(1.416)	(1.665)		
Religious Affiliation *iran				0.519		
				(0.735)		
Ideological Claim *iran				0.378		
				(0.834)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-3.181*	
					(1.416)	
Religious Affiliation *p2001						
Ideological Claim *p2001						
Constant	-1.870	-1.905	-1.870	-1.509	-1.870	
	(1.376)	(1.376)	(1.376)	(1.432)	(1.376)	
Observations	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470	
Log Likelihood	-837.777	-836.731	-837.777	-837.208	-837.777	
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7-C. Conflict Intensity - Monadic - Types, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Random Effects Logits	(13b) 1950-2017	(14b) 1950-2017	(13b-1) 1950-2017	(14b-1) 1950-2017	(13b-2) 1950-2017	(14b-2) 1950-2017
Secular Ideological Claim	0.323	0.621	0.323	0.191	0.323	0.502
	(0.412)	(0.509)	(0.412)	(0.697)	(0.412)	(0.437)
Religious Affiliation	1.028	0.903	1.028	0.749	1.028	0.904
	(0.695)	(0.682)	(0.695)	(0.827)	(0.695)	(0.701)
Religious Affiliation & Theological Claim	1.956*	2.917**	1.956*	0.476	1.956*	1.889*
	(0.784)	(0.987)	(0.784)	(1.572)	(0.784)	(0.836)
Foreign Military Intervention	2.729**	2.715**	2.729**	2.736**	2.729**	2.733**
	(0.845)	(0.828)	(0.845)	(0.851)	(0.845)	(0.839)
Territorial Incompatibility	-0.586	-0.586	-0.586	-0.592	-0.586	-0.588
	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.431)	(0.431)
lnGDP (World Bank + Gledistch 1950-60)	-0.063*	-0.061†	-0.063*	-0.061†	-0.063*	-0.065*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Democracy (V-Dem Polyarchy)	-0.025	-0.024	-0.025	-0.028	-0.025	-0.013
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Democracy-Squared (V-Dem Polyarchy)	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
# of active dyads	0.076	0.010	0.076	0.052	0.076	0.079
	(0.133)	(0.122)	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.133)	(0.132)
Post-Cold War (postcw)	-3.254*	-3.081†				
	(1.423)	(1.688)				
Religious Affiliation *postcw		0.224				
		(0.906)				
Religious Affil & Theo Claim*postcw		-1.317				
		(1.145)				
Secular Ideological Claim*postcw		-0.713				
		(0.749)				
Post-Iranian Revolution (iran)			-3.254*	-3.798*		
			(1.423)	(1.650)		
Religious Affiliation *iran				0.449		
				(0.741)		
Religious Affil & Theo Claim*iran				1.777		
				(1.599)		
Secular Ideological Claim*iran				0.216		
				(0.875)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-3.254*	-3.270*
					(1.423)	(1.607)
Religious Affiliation *p2001						0.573
						(0.800)
Religious Affil & Theo Claim*p2001						*Collinear Omitted*
Secular Ideological Claim*p2001						-1.255
						(0.949)
Constant	-1.767	-1.696	-1.767	-1.436	-1.767	-1.707
	(1.381)	(1.363)	(1.381)	(1.424)	(1.381)	(1.377)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470	2437
Log Likelihood	-837.338	-835.006	-837.338	-836.635	-837.338	-835.177
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8-C. Conflict Intensity - Monadic - Specific Types, Different Temporal Thresholds (post-Iranian Revolution, post-Cold War, post-9/11)

Random Effects Logits	(13c) 1950-2017	(14c) 1950-2017	(13c-1) 1950-2017	(14c-1) 1950-2017	(13c-2) 1950-2017	(14c-2) 1950-2017
Communist Rebels	0.538 (0.514)	0.552 (0.558)	0.538 (0.514)	0.174 (0.809)	0.538 (0.514)	0.564 (0.543)
Liberal/Democratic Rebels	-0.279 (0.570)	0.434 (0.735)	-0.279 (0.570)	0.456 (0.934)	-0.279 (0.570)	0.064 (0.635)
Christian Affiliated Rebels	0.970† (0.568)	1.353* (0.646)	0.970† (0.568)	0.181 (0.912)	0.970† (0.568)	1.180* (0.590)
Christian Fundamentalist Rebels	1.013 (0.995)	1.736 (1.113)	1.013 (0.995)	1.357 (1.066)	1.013 (0.995)	0.796 (1.057)
Muslim Affiliated Rebels	0.920 (0.564)	0.668 (0.590)	0.920 (0.564)	0.503 (0.793)	0.920 (0.564)	0.954 (0.594)
Muslim Jihadist Rebels	1.780** (0.664)	2.973** (0.909)	1.780** (0.664)	0.003 (1.509)	1.780** (0.664)	2.027** (0.727)
Foreign Military Intervention	2.711** (0.855)	2.859** (0.884)	2.711** (0.855)	2.659*** (0.804)	2.711** (0.855)	2.805** (0.859)
Territorial Incompatibility	-0.499 (0.428)	-0.444 (0.440)	-0.499 (0.428)	-0.588 (0.427)	-0.499 (0.428)	-0.501 (0.435)
GDP (ln)	-0.064* (0.031)	-0.067* (0.032)	-0.064* (0.031)	-0.051† (0.029)	-0.064* (0.031)	-0.066* (0.033)
Democracy	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.044 (0.059)	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.042 (0.056)	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.060)
Democracy-Squared	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
# of active dyads	0.073 (0.133)	0.003 (0.123)	0.073 (0.133)	0.055 (0.138)	0.073 (0.133)	0.094 (0.133)
Post-Cold War (postcw)	-3.327* (1.419)	-2.591 (1.592)				
Communist Rebels*postcw		0.231 (0.878)				
Liberal/Democratic Rebels*postcw		-1.315† (0.684)				
Christian Affiliated *postcw		-1.098 (0.858)				
Christian Fundamentalist *postcw		-1.290 (0.861)				
Muslim Affiliated *postcow		0.317 (0.836)				
Muslim Jihadist *postcw		-1.788† (1.026)				
Post-Iranian Revolution (iran)			-3.327* (1.419)	-4.340** (1.653)		
Communist Rebels*iran				0.616 (1.024)		
Liberal/Democratic Rebels*iran				-0.930 (0.970)		
Christian Affiliated *iran				1.253 (1.146)		
Christian Fundamentalist *iran				*Collinear Omitted*		

Random Effects Logits	(13c) 1950-2017	(14c) 1950-2017	(13c-1) 1950-2017	(14c-1) 1950-2017	(13c-2) 1950-2017	(14c-2) 1950-2017
Muslim Affiliated				0.759		
*iran				(0.977)		
Muslim Jihadist				2.269		
*iran				(1.709)		
Post-2001 (p2001)					-3.327*	-2.204
					(1.419)	(1.583)
Communist						0.131
Rebels*p2001						(1.231)
Liberal/Democratic						-1.616
Rebels*p2001						(1.251)
Christian Affiliated						-1.808
*p2001						(1.368)
Christian Fundamentalist						0.192
*p2001						(1.153)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.509
*p2001						(1.275)
Muslim Jihadist						-1.326
*p2001						(1.011)
Constant	-1.431	-1.681	-1.431	-1.119	-1.431	-1.645
	(1.221)	(1.238)	(1.221)	(1.273)	(1.221)	(1.254)
Observations	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470	2470
Log Likelihood	-836.186	-829.436	-836.186	-831.432	-836.186	-829.391
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A2-D. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Dyadic, 1950-2011, NSA Data

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Incompatibility			H2: Specific Ideological Incompatibilities		
Hazard Models	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)
Any Ideological	-0.373**	-0.349**	-0.271			
Incompatibility	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.194)			
Secular Ideological				-0.352**	-0.255†	-0.339†
Incompatibility				(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.200)
Theological				-0.445†	-0.657*	0.162
Incompatibility				(0.268)	(0.268)	(0.776)
Secular&Theological				-0.425*	-0.496*	0.234
Incompatibility				(0.202)	(0.216)	(0.291)
Religious Affiliation	-0.080	-0.073	-0.348*	-0.069	-0.031	-0.346*
Incompatibility	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.169)	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.169)
Foreign Military	-0.162	-0.251	-0.310	-0.176	-0.330	-0.463
Intervention	(0.263)	(0.278)	(0.287)	(0.266)	(0.292)	(0.325)
Territorial	-0.011	0.037	0.025	-0.019	0.012	0.007
Incompatibility	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.127)
Intensity	-0.337*	-0.309†	-0.322†	-0.335*	-0.296†	-0.354*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.176)
Rebel Strength	0.348***	0.351***	0.371***	0.347***	0.345***	0.369***
(NSA data)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.080)
lnGDP	0.001	-0.005	-0.006	0.002	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.010	-0.016	-0.015	-0.011	-0.022	-0.021
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Democracy-Squared	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.787***	-0.806***	-0.817***	-0.782***	-0.792***	-0.806***
	(0.113)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.110)
Post-Cold War		0.398**	0.297		0.487***	0.243
		(0.123)	(0.229)		(0.131)	(0.231)
Any Ideological			-0.192			
Incomp*postcw			(0.246)			
Secular Ideological						0.167
Incomp*postcw						(0.253)
Theological						-0.901
Incomp*postcw						(0.818)
Secular&Theological						-1.219**
Incomp*postcw						(0.461)
Religious Affiliation			0.560*			0.687**
Incomp*postcw			(0.234)			(0.239)
Observations	2217	2217	2217	2217	2217	2217
Log pseudolikelihood	-1514.878	-1509.633	-1506.242	-1514.749	-1507.915	-1498.122

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A3-D. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Monadic, 1950-2011, NSA Data

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Rebel Claim			H2: Specific Ideological Rebel Claims		
Hazard Models	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)
Any Ideological	-0.503***	-0.525***	-0.261			
Claim	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.184)			
Communist				-0.733***	-0.612***	-0.570**
Rebels				(0.157)	(0.163)	(0.205)
Liberal/Democratic				-0.304†	-0.350*	-0.401
Rebels				(0.172)	(0.169)	(0.272)
Religiously Affiliated	0.246	0.209	0.442*			
Rebels	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.225)			
Christian Affiliated				0.403**	0.418**	0.500*
Rebels				(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.219)
Christian				0.614	0.466	0.495
Fundamentalists				(0.427)	(0.421)	(0.810)
Muslim Affiliated				0.110	0.075	0.265
Rebels				(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.208)
Muslim Jihadist				-0.395†	-0.559*	0.641†
Rebels				(0.221)	(0.232)	(0.337)
Foreign Military	-0.162	-0.249	-0.233	-0.315	-0.446	-0.451
Intervention	(0.252)	(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.284)	(0.305)	(0.323)
Territorial	-0.247†	-0.194	-0.162	-0.230†	-0.157†	-0.177
Incompatibility	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.143)
Intensity	-0.328†	-0.294†	-0.317†	-0.369*	-0.342	-0.344†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.179)
Rebel Strength	0.338***	0.334***	0.344***	0.312***	0.303***	0.307***
(NSA data)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.083)
lnGDP (World Bank	0.004	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.009	-0.007
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.021	-0.027†	-0.026	-0.016	-0.022	-0.022
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Democracy-Squared	-0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.001
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.772***	-0.797***	-0.807***	-0.800***	-0.815***	-0.820***
	(0.111)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.111)
H3: Post-Cold War		0.441***	1.135**		0.442**	0.782**
(postcw)		(0.123)	(0.347)		(0.135)	(0.254)
Any Ideological			-0.470*			
Claim*postcw			(0.225)			
Communist						-0.154
Rebels*postcw						(0.295)
Liberal/Democratic						0.073
Rebels*postcw						(0.323)
Religiously Affiliated			-0.510			
*postcw			(0.358)			
Christian Affiliated						-0.247
*postcw						(0.316)
Christian						-0.220
Fundamental*postcw						(0.773)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.443
*postcw						(0.313)
Muslim Jihadist						-1.688***
*postcw						(0.468)
Observations	2217	2217	2217	2217	2217	2217
Log pseudolikelihood	-1510.711	-1504.281	-1500.875	-1501.787	-1496.270	-1489.575

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A4-D. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Incompatibility - Dyadic, NSA Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7a)	(8a)	(9a)	(10a)	(11a)
	1950-2011	1950-2011	1950-2011	1989-2011	1989-2011
Religious Affiliation	0.457	0.457	0.345	0.107	0.199
Incompatibility	(0.381)	(0.381)	(0.473)	(0.109)	(0.129)
Any Ideological	0.888†	0.888†	0.765	-0.098	-0.146
Incompatibility	(0.455)	(0.455)	(0.593)	(0.118)	(0.145)
Foreign Military	2.279**	2.279**	2.288**	0.576*	0.328
Intervention	(0.786)	(0.786)	(0.775)	(0.287)	(0.380)
Territorial	-0.446	-0.446	-0.439	-0.252*	-0.202
Incompatibility	(0.459)	(0.459)	(0.460)	(0.118)	(0.141)
Rebel Strength	0.980***	0.980***	0.972***	0.128	-0.048
(NSA data)	(0.250)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.079)	(0.095)
GDP (ln)	-0.028	-0.028	-0.029	0.009	0.013
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	0.019	0.038**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				0.044	-0.008
				(0.091)	(0.100)
Other Crime				0.401***	0.511***
				(0.098)	(0.110)
# of active dyads	0.198	0.198	0.193	0.005	0.025
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Post-Cold War		-3.019†	-3.394†		
(postcw)		(1.556)	(1.748)		
Religious Affiliation			0.231		
Incomp*postcw			(0.731)		
Any Ideological			0.287		
Incomp*postcw			(0.644)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000**
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.441	-1.441	-1.219	0.274	0.022
	(1.391)	(1.391)	(1.479)	(0.362)	(0.449)
Observations	2207	2207	2207	732	683
Log Likelihood	-764.857	-764.857	-764.679	-5081.809	-3749.592
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5-E. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Ideological Incompatibilities - Dyadic, NSA Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7b)	(8b)	(9b)	(10b)	(11b)
	1950-2011	1950-2011	1950-2011	1989-2011	1989-2011
Religious Affiliation	0.363	0.363	0.229	0.110	0.246
Incompatibility	(0.386)	(0.386)	(0.475)	(0.116)	(0.141)
Secular ideological	0.689	0.689	0.479	-0.176	-0.136
Incompatibility	(0.512)	(0.512)	(0.606)	(0.134)	(0.167)
Theological	1.685**	1.685**	1.725†	0.104	-0.006
incompatibility	(0.658)	(0.658)	(0.931)	(0.157)	(0.190)
Secular & Theological	1.242*	1.242*	2.561**	-0.127	-0.239
incompatibility	(0.600)	(0.600)	(0.788)	(0.146)	(0.174)
Foreign Military	2.358**	2.358**	2.367**	0.577*	0.317
Intervention	(0.787)	(0.787)	(0.768)	(0.285)	(0.376)
Territorial	-0.310	-0.310	-0.355	-0.238*	-0.190
Incompatibility	(0.447)	(0.447)	(0.458)	(0.118)	(0.141)
Rebel Strength	0.996***	0.996***	1.018***	0.154†	-0.024
(NSA data)	(0.245)	(0.245)	(0.259)	(0.080)	(0.097)
GDP (ln)	-0.027	-0.027	-0.023	0.012	0.015
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.015	-0.015	-0.012	0.023†	0.039**
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				0.045	-0.014
				(0.091)	(0.101)
Other Crime				0.425***	0.524***
				(0.099)	(0.112)
# of active dyads	0.184	0.184	0.075	-0.005	0.030
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.135)	(0.045)	(0.051)
Post-Cold War		-3.339*	-3.831*		
(postcw)		(1.567)	(1.761)		
Religious Affiliation			0.427		
Incomp*postcw			(0.712)		
Secular Ideological			0.767		
Incomp*postcw			(0.714)		
Theological			0.324		
Incomp*postcw			(0.876)		
Secular & Theological			-2.267*		
Incomp*postcw			(0.899)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000**
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.172	-1.172	-0.806	0.260	-0.032
	(1.428)	(1.428)	(1.498)	(0.367)	(0.454)
Observations	2207	2207	2207	732	683
Log Likelihood	-763.564	-763.564	-755.903	-5080.006	-3748.800
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A6-D. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Claim - Monadic, NSA Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12a)	(13a)	(14a)	(15a)	(16a)
	1950-2011	1950-2011	1950-2011	1989-2011	1989-2011
Rebel Religious	1.053	1.053	0.947	0.218	0.261
Affiliation	(0.690)	(0.690)	(0.701)	(0.194)	(0.252)
Any Ideological	0.963*	0.963*	1.320**	-0.241*	-0.450**
Claim	(0.396)	(0.396)	(0.491)	(0.111)	(0.142)
Foreign Military	2.523**	2.523**	2.512**	0.616*	0.365
Intervention	(0.877)	(0.877)	(0.873)	(0.286)	(0.395)
Territorial	0.081	0.081	0.094	-0.251*	-0.248†
Incompatibility	(0.445)	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.116)	(0.141)
Rebel Strength	0.997***	0.997***	1.014***	0.125	-0.028
(NSA data)	(0.245)	(0.245)	(0.244)	(0.079)	(0.094)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.033	-0.033	-0.031	0.012	0.021
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009	0.016	0.036**
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.002	0.002
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				0.032	-0.043
(RCD data)				(0.090)	(0.097)
Other Crime				0.411***	0.526***
(RCD data)				(0.098)	(0.109)
# of active dyads	0.190	0.190	0.182	0.013	0.038
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Post-Cold War		-3.712*	-3.535†		
(postcw)		(1.489)	(1.823)		
Religious Affiliation			0.289		
*postcw			(1.041)		
Any Ideological Claim			-0.856		
*postcw			(0.691)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.456	-1.456	-1.445	0.088	-0.093
	(1.386)	(1.386)	(1.391)	(0.398)	(0.489)
Observations	2207	2207	2207	732	683
Log Likelihood	-764.465	-764.465	-763.064	-5079.943	-3746.590
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7-D. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Ideological Claim Types - Monadic, NSA Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12b)	(13b)	(14b)	(15b)	(16b)
	1950-2011	1950-2011	1950-2011	1989-2011	1989-2011
Religious Affiliation	0.992	0.992	0.826	0.147	0.222
	(0.702)	(0.702)	(0.709)	(0.195)	(0.252)
Religious Affiliation	2.369**	2.369**	3.368**	0.082	-0.073
& Theological Claim	(0.834)	(0.834)	(1.051)	(0.211)	(0.262)
Secular Ideological	0.652	0.652	0.986†	-0.384**	-0.542***
Claim	(0.420)	(0.420)	(0.505)	(0.120)	(0.159)
Foreign Military	2.548**	2.548**	2.532**	0.615*	0.342
Intervention	(0.865)	(0.865)	(0.849)	(0.284)	(0.398)
Territorial	0.031	0.031	0.040	-0.309**	-0.273†
Incompatibility	(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.448)	(0.116)	(0.141)
Rebel Strength	1.006***	1.006***	1.043***	0.144†	-0.001
(NSA data)	(0.243)	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.078)	(0.095)
GDP (ln)	-0.030	-0.030	-0.027	0.015	0.024
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Democracy	-0.009	-0.009	-0.008	0.016	0.036**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				0.043	-0.027
				(0.090)	(0.097)
Other Crime				0.451***	0.546***
				(0.098)	(0.110)
# of active dyads	0.162	0.162	0.087	-0.008	0.019
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.044)	(0.050)
Post-Cold War		-3.782*	-3.576*		
(postcw)		(1.490)	(1.816)		
Religious Affiliation			0.373		
*postcw			(1.027)		
Religious Affil &			-1.403		
Theo Claim*postcw			(1.249)		
Secular Ideological			-0.871		
Claim*postcw			(0.770)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-1.327	-1.327	-1.182	0.138	-0.072
	(1.391)	(1.391)	(1.384)	(0.399)	(0.492)
Observations	2207	2207	2207	732	683
Log Likelihood	-763.968	-763.968	-761.006	-5076.217	-3745.667
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8-D. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Claim Types - Monadic, NSA Data

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12c)	(13c)	(14c)	(15c)	(16c)
	1950-2011	1950-2011	1950-2011	1989-2011	1989-2011
Christian Affiliated	0.841	0.841	1.164†	-0.077	0.061
Rebels	(0.566)	(0.566)	(0.643)	(0.146)	(0.197)
Christian	1.365	1.365	2.170†	-0.098	0.216
Fundamentalist Rebels	(1.046)	(1.046)	(1.198)	(0.268)	(0.339)
Muslim Affiliated	0.753	0.753	0.506	-0.094	-0.263
Rebels	(0.575)	(0.575)	(0.595)	(0.146)	(0.182)
Muslim Jihadist Rebels	2.096**	2.096**	3.456***	-0.149	-0.422*
	(0.720)	(0.720)	(0.953)	(0.153)	(0.180)
Communist	0.854†	0.854†	0.937	-0.530***	-0.654***
Rebels	(0.505)	(0.505)	(0.566)	(0.148)	(0.180)
Liberal/Democratic	0.132	0.132	1.101	-0.303†	-0.433†
Rebels	(0.593)	(0.593)	(0.747)	(0.165)	(0.225)
Foreign Military	2.542**	2.542**	2.723**	0.558†	0.276
Intervention	(0.879)	(0.879)	(0.933)	(0.289)	(0.380)
Territorial	0.093	0.093	0.201	-0.373**	-0.217
Incompatibility	(0.449)	(0.449)	(0.468)	(0.122)	(0.158)
Rebel Strength	0.970***	0.970***	1.126***	0.139†	-0.045
(NSA data)	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.257)	(0.079)	(0.096)
GDP (ln)	-0.033	-0.033	-0.030	0.015	0.012
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Democracy	-0.013	-0.013	-0.032	0.025*	0.048***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Democracy-Squared	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.002	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				0.051	-0.037
				(0.091)	(0.098)
Other Crime				0.477***	0.588***
				(0.099)	(0.110)
# of active dyads	0.157	0.157	0.085	-0.007	0.021
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.133)	(0.044)	(0.050)
Post-Cold War		-3.751*	-3.033†		
(postcw)		(1.479)	(1.651)		
Christian Affiliated			-1.076		
*postcw			(0.859)		
Christian Fundamentalist			-1.318		
*postcw			(0.925)		
Muslim Affiliated			0.462		
*postcow			(0.855)		
Muslim Jihadist			-2.017*		
*postcw			(1.031)		
Communist			0.231		
Rebels*postcw			(0.875)		
Liberal/Democratic			-1.920**		
Rebels*postcw			(0.716)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000**
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.940	-0.940	-1.132	0.428	0.424
	(1.225)	(1.225)	(1.258)	(0.380)	(0.481)
Observations	2207	2207	2207	732	683
Log Likelihood	-763.561	-763.561	-754.675	-5074.430	-3740.508
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A2-E. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Dyadic, 1950-2015, GRP scores

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Incompatibility			H2: Specific Ideological Incompatibilities		
Hazard Models	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)
Any Ideological	-0.452***	-0.427***	-0.439*			
Incompatibility	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.193)			
Secular Ideological				-0.424***	-0.336**	-0.495*
Incompatibility				(0.125)	(0.127)	(0.198)
Theological				-0.571*	-0.746**	0.192
Incompatibility				(0.235)	(0.237)	(0.877)
Secular&Theological				-0.495**	-0.561**	-0.007
Incompatibility				(0.179)	(0.191)	(0.300)
Religious Affiliation	-0.185	-0.197	-0.408*	-0.165	-0.136	-0.392*
Incompatibility	(0.127)	(0.124)	(0.179)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.183)
Foreign Military	-0.065	-0.139	-0.186	-0.079	-0.201	-0.303
Intervention	(0.240)	(0.251)	(0.259)	(0.241)	(0.258)	(0.282)
Territorial	-0.071	-0.033	-0.040	-0.085	-0.068	-0.069
Incompatibility	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.117)
Intensity	-0.323†	-0.286†	-0.296†	-0.321†	-0.273	-0.322†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.175)
State Support for	-0.159†	-0.155†	-0.139	-0.148	-0.121	-0.106
Rebel Religion (GRP)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.100)
lnGDP	-0.012	-0.020†	-0.021*	-0.011	-0.017†	-0.019†
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.019	-0.022	-0.022	-0.021	-0.027†	-0.027
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Democracy-Squared	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.890***	-0.909***	-0.918***	-0.884***	-0.895***	-0.909***
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Post-Cold War		0.364**	0.197		0.447***	0.146
		(0.118)	(0.239)		(0.125)	(0.239)
Any Ideological			0.003			
Incomp*postcw			(0.241)			
Secular Ideological						0.312
Incomp*postcw						(0.251)
Theological						-0.954
Incomp*postcw						(0.905)
Secular&Theological						-0.852*
Incomp*postcw						(0.428)
Religious Affiliation			0.398†			0.517*
Incomp*postcw			(0.222)			(0.226)
Observations	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
Log pseudolikelihood	-1686.029	-1681.282	-1679.589	-1685.786	-1679.445	-1672.452

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A3-E. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination - Monadic, 1950-2015, GRP scores

Cox Proportional	H1: Any Ideological Rebel Claim			H2: Specific Ideological Rebel Claims		
Hazard Models	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(4b)	(5b)	(6b)
Any Ideological	-0.532***	-0.553***	-0.329†			
Claim	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.176)			
Communist				-0.740***	-0.635***	-0.616**
Rebels				(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.198)
Liberal/Democratic				-0.430**	-0.456**	-0.572*
Rebels				(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.273)
Religiously Affiliated	0.342†	0.301†	0.458*			
Rebels	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.234)			
Christian Affiliated				0.421**	0.417**	0.512*
Rebels				(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.223)
Christian				0.528	0.388	0.536
Fundamentalists				(0.432)	(0.427)	(0.871)
Muslim Affiliated				0.080	0.028	0.268
Rebels				(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.212)
Muslim Jihadist				-0.462*	-0.634**	0.417
Rebels				(0.200)	(0.211)	(0.340)
Foreign Military	-0.053	-0.127	-0.121	-0.195	-0.303	-0.312
Intervention	(0.230)	(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.252)	(0.265)	(0.282)
Territorial	-0.363**	-0.317**	-0.283*	-0.307*	-0.245*	-0.251*
Incompatibility	(0.122)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.125)
Intensity	-0.333*	-0.297	-0.315†	-0.380*	-0.349*	-0.349†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.181)
State Support for	-0.136	-0.118	-0.120	-0.037	-0.005	-0.011
Rebel Religion (GRP)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.096)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.008	-0.016	-0.016	-0.012	-0.019†	-0.017
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Democracy	-0.034*	-0.036*	-0.035*	-0.030†	-0.032*	-0.034*
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Democracy-Squared	-0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of active dyads	-0.878***	-0.901***	-0.907***	-0.887***	-0.901***	-0.899***
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.104)
H3: Post-Cold War		0.406***	0.859*		0.429***	0.731**
(postcw)		(0.119)	(0.361)		(0.129)	(0.252)
Any Ideological			-0.366†			
Claim*postcw			(0.216)			
Communist						-0.032
Rebels*postcw						(0.273)
Liberal/Democratic						0.179
Rebels*postcw						(0.325)
Religiously Affiliated			-0.297			
*postcw			(0.368)			
Christian Affiliated						-0.252
*postcw						(0.311)
Christian						-0.341
Fundamental*postcw						(0.838)
Muslim Affiliated						-0.495
*postcw						(0.311)
Muslim Jihadist						-1.413**
*postcw						(0.449)
Observations	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400	2400
Log pseudolikelihood	-1682.750	-1676.905	-1674.956	-1674.267	-1668.586	-1663.333

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.

Table A4-E. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Incompatibility - Dyadic, GRP scores

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7a)	(8a)	(9a)	(10a)	(11a)
	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	1.071**	1.071**	0.811†	0.008	-0.055
Incompatibility	(0.374)	(0.374)	(0.482)	(0.115)	(0.137)
Any Ideological	0.599	0.599	0.293	-0.056	-0.041
Incompatibility	(0.423)	(0.423)	(0.561)	(0.111)	(0.135)
Foreign Military	2.633***	2.633***	2.668***	0.472†	0.191
Intervention	(0.770)	(0.770)	(0.759)	(0.274)	(0.356)
Territorial	-0.915*	-0.915*	-0.872*	-0.193†	-0.096
Incompatibility	(0.438)	(0.438)	(0.437)	(0.106)	(0.125)
State Support for	0.733**	0.733**	0.773**	-0.065	-0.189*
Rebel Religion (GRP)	(0.242)	(0.242)	(0.244)	(0.075)	(0.090)
GDP (ln)	-0.054†	-0.054†	-0.054†	-0.002	0.010
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.040	-0.040	-0.041	0.015	0.034**
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.006	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.017	-0.084
				(0.084)	(0.093)
Other Crime				0.379***	0.464***
				(0.092)	(0.103)
# of active dyads	0.104	0.104	0.098	-0.007	0.018
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Post-Cold War		-2.478†	-3.384*		
(postcw)		(1.363)	(1.512)		
Religious Affiliation			0.504		
Incomp*postcw			(0.687)		
Any Ideological			0.701		
Incomp*postcw			(0.612)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-3.474*	-3.474*	-3.038*	0.610	0.723
	(1.425)	(1.425)	(1.493)	(0.400)	(0.497)
Observations	2391	2391	2391	843	782
Log Likelihood	-815.377	-815.377	-814.368	-5840.255	-4356.179
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A5-E. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Ideological Incompatibilities - Dyadic, GRP scores

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(7b)	(8b)	(9b)	(10b)	(11b)
	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	1.004**	1.004**	0.715	-0.043	-0.084
Incompatibility	(0.381)	(0.381)	(0.485)	(0.121)	(0.147)
Secular ideological	0.457	0.457	0.062	-0.138	-0.069
Incompatibility	(0.495)	(0.495)	(0.587)	(0.125)	(0.153)
Theological	1.002†	1.002†	1.076	0.051	0.078
incompatibility	(0.567)	(0.567)	(0.882)	(0.146)	(0.176)
Secular & Theological	0.911†	0.911†	1.777*	-0.002	-0.071
incompatibility	(0.525)	(0.525)	(0.730)	(0.137)	(0.162)
Foreign Military	2.693***	2.693***	2.730***	0.495†	0.181
Intervention	(0.773)	(0.773)	(0.763)	(0.276)	(0.356)
Territorial	-0.840†	-0.840†	-0.843†	-0.172	-0.076
Incompatibility	(0.433)	(0.433)	(0.440)	(0.107)	(0.126)
State Support for	0.701**	0.701**	0.695**	-0.085	-0.222*
Rebel Religion (GRP)	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.247)	(0.077)	(0.095)
GDP (ln)	-0.055†	-0.055	-0.050	-0.002	0.009
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.036	-0.036	-0.036	0.018	0.037**
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.007	0.007	0.007	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.017	-0.088
				(0.084)	(0.093)
Other Crime				0.392***	0.477***
				(0.092)	(0.104)
# of active dyads	0.085	0.085	0.002	-0.021	0.016
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Post-Cold War		-2.657†	-3.771*		
(postcw)		(1.369)	(1.514)		
Religious Affiliation			0.572		
Incomp*postcw			(0.671)		
Secular Ideological			1.139†		
Incomp*postcw			(0.687)		
Theological			0.422		
Incomp*postcw			(0.859)		
Secular & Theological			-1.246		
Incomp*postcw			(0.831)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-3.206*	-3.206*	-2.571	0.710†	0.810
	(1.487)	(1.487)	(1.536)	(0.406)	(0.507)
Observations	2391	2391	2391	843	782
Log Likelihood	-814.834	-814.834	-808.631	-5839.144	-4355.638
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A6-E. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Any Ideological Claim - Monadic, GRP scores

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12a)	(13a)	(14a)	(15a)	(16a)
	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1989-2015	1989-2015
Rebel Religious	0.944	0.944	0.943	0.294	0.404†
Affiliation	(0.686)	(0.686)	(0.675)	(0.193)	(0.246)
Any Ideological	0.642†	0.642†	0.919†	-0.228*	-0.362**
Claim	(0.366)	(0.366)	(0.478)	(0.104)	(0.133)
Foreign Military	2.846***	2.846***	2.832***	0.490†	0.200
Intervention	(0.830)	(0.830)	(0.826)	(0.274)	(0.364)
Territorial	-0.332	-0.332	-0.326	-0.236*	-0.209†
Incompatibility	(0.429)	(0.429)	(0.428)	(0.107)	(0.127)
State Support for	0.574*	0.574*	0.572*	-0.063	-0.140†
Rebel Religion (GRP)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.065)	(0.077)
lnGDP (World Bank	-0.064*	-0.064*	-0.063*	0.000	0.014
+ Gledistch 1950-60)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.024	-0.024	-0.023	0.015	0.036**
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.001	-0.002
(V-Dem Polyarchy)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.034	-0.105
(RCD data)				(0.083)	(0.090)
Other Crime				0.388***	0.463***
(RCD data)				(0.092)	(0.102)
# of active dyads	0.084	0.084	0.075	-0.005	0.019
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Post-Cold War		-2.856*	-2.542		
(postcw)		(1.333)	(1.653)		
Religious Affiliation			-0.023		
*postcw			(0.960)		
Any Ideological Claim			-0.601		
*postcw			(0.667)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-3.062*	-3.062*	-3.133*	0.417	0.429
	(1.410)	(1.410)	(1.433)	(0.420)	(0.519)
Observations	2391	2391	2391	843	782
Log Likelihood	-817.870	-817.870	-817.120	-5837.072	-4351.999
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A7-E. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Ideological Claim Types - Monadic, GRP scores

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12b)	(13b)	(14b)	(15b)	(16b)
	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1989-2015	1989-2015
Religious Affiliation	0.904	0.904	0.836	0.241	0.373
	(0.696)	(0.696)	(0.683)	(0.194)	(0.246)
Religious Affiliation & Theological Claim	1.886*	1.886*	2.862**	0.161	0.146
	(0.778)	(0.778)	(0.987)	(0.211)	(0.260)
Secular Ideological Claim	0.371	0.371	0.618	-0.355**	-0.451**
	(0.408)	(0.408)	(0.502)	(0.113)	(0.148)
Foreign Military Intervention	2.862***	2.862***	2.851***	0.515†	0.197
	(0.822)	(0.822)	(0.811)	(0.272)	(0.368)
Territorial Incompatibility	-0.377	-0.377	-0.384	-0.277**	-0.229†
	(0.431)	(0.431)	(0.430)	(0.107)	(0.127)
State Support for Rebel Religion (GRP)	0.547*	0.547*	0.554*	-0.072	-0.148†
	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.064)	(0.077)
GDP (ln)	-0.062*	-0.062*	-0.060†	0.001	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.025	-0.025	-0.024	0.014	0.036**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy-Squared	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.027	-0.092
				(0.083)	(0.089)
Other Crime				0.414***	0.479***
				(0.092)	(0.102)
# of active dyads	0.061	0.061	-0.010	-0.026	0.001
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.041)	(0.046)
Post-Cold War (postcw)		-2.929*	-2.636		
		(1.335)	(1.641)		
Religious Affiliation *postcw			0.072		
			(0.942)		
Religious Affil & Theo Claim*postcw			-1.406		
			(1.184)		
Secular Ideological Claim*postcw			-0.590		
			(0.740)		
Battle-Related Deaths (1-year lag)				0.000***	0.000***
				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.895*	-2.895*	-2.875*	0.497	0.490
	(1.408)	(1.408)	(1.422)	(0.422)	(0.523)
Observations	2391	2391	2391	843	782
Log Likelihood	-817.418	-817.418	-815.394	-5833.858	-4350.925
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A8-E. Determinants of Conflict Intensity - Specific Claim Types - Monadic, GRP scores

		RE Logit		RE NBReg	FE NBReg
	(12c)	(13c)	(14c)	(15c)	(16c)
	1950-2015	1950-2015	1950-2015	1989-2015	1989-2015
Christian Affiliated	1.165*	1.165*	1.503*	-0.066	-0.055
Rebels	(0.569)	(0.569)	(0.643)	(0.142)	(0.189)
Christian	1.309	1.309	2.006†	-0.161	-0.005
Fundamentalist Rebels	(1.013)	(1.013)	(1.147)	(0.266)	(0.331)
Muslim Affiliated	0.672	0.672	0.448	-0.079	-0.221
Rebels	(0.559)	(0.559)	(0.592)	(0.138)	(0.170)
Muslim Jihadist Rebels	1.693**	1.693**	2.852**	-0.142	-0.366*
	(0.649)	(0.649)	(0.907)	(0.148)	(0.172)
Communist	0.466	0.466	0.466	-0.491***	-0.572**
Rebels	(0.484)	(0.484)	(0.531)	(0.143)	(0.178)
Liberal/Democratic	-0.282	-0.282	0.334	-0.238	-0.346†
Rebels	(0.569)	(0.569)	(0.723)	(0.156)	(0.210)
Foreign Military	2.785***	2.785***	2.952***	0.479†	0.218
Intervention	(0.819)	(0.819)	(0.850)	(0.276)	(0.361)
Territorial	-0.253	-0.253	-0.219	-0.317**	-0.219
Incompatibility	(0.432)	(0.432)	(0.442)	(0.112)	(0.142)
State Support for	0.611**	0.611**	0.550*	-0.041	-0.080
Rebel Religion (GRP)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.244)	(0.070)	(0.090)
GDP (ln)	-0.067*	-0.067*	-0.070*	0.001	0.011
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Democracy	-0.029	-0.029	-0.044	0.022†	0.046***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Democracy-Squared	0.009	0.009	0.008	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Resource Looting				-0.012	-0.093
				(0.084)	(0.091)
Other Crime				0.440***	0.540***
				(0.093)	(0.104)
# of active dyads	0.056	0.056	-0.020	-0.026	0.005
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.041)	(0.047)
Post-Cold War		-2.855*	-2.205		
(postcw)		(1.321)	(1.522)		
Christian Affiliated			-1.005		
*postcw			(0.904)		
Christian Fundamentalist			-1.248		
*postcw			(0.901)		
Muslim Affiliated			0.388		
*postcow			(0.878)		
Muslim Jihadist			-1.661		
*postcw			(1.073)		
Communist			0.269		
Rebels*postcw			(0.884)		
Liberal/Democratic			-1.151†		
Rebels*postcw			(0.681)		
Battle-Related				0.000***	0.000***
Deaths (1-year lag)				(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-2.778*	-2.778*	-2.845*	0.765†	0.856†
	(1.257)	(1.257)	(1.271)	(0.409)	(0.510)
Observations	2391	2391	2391	843	782
Log Likelihood	-815.851	-815.851	-809.959	-5832.844	-4348.863
Year effects	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included

Standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

Table A2-F. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination, Dyadic, 1950-2017, Cold War Split Samples[1]

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(1a) Full	(2a) Cold War	(3a) Post CW	(1b) Full	(2b) Cold War	(3b) Post CW
	1950-2017	1950-1990	1991-2017	1950-2017	1950-1990	1991-2017
Any Ideological	*-0.493****	*-0.398**	-0.486***			
Incompatibility	*(0.111)*	*(0.183)*	(0.149)			
Secular Ideological				-0.447***	*-0.452**	-0.193
Incompatibility				(0.119)	*(0.188)*	(0.163)
Theological				-0.685***	0.167	-0.807***
Incompatibility				(0.212)	(0.741)	(0.229)
Secular & Theological				*-0.522***	-0.091	*-0.935****
Incompatibility				*(0.172)*	(0.327)	*(0.271)*
Religious Affiliation	-0.126	-0.119	-0.145	-0.104	-0.139	0.008
Incompatibility	(0.110)	(0.161)	(0.147)	(0.113)	(0.164)	(0.154)
Foreign Military	-0.095	-0.004	-0.408	-0.123	0.041	-0.633†
Intervention	(0.227)	(0.340)	(0.310)	(0.230)	(0.341)	(0.338)
Territorial	-0.052	-0.661***	0.427**	-0.076	-0.639***	0.351*
Incompatibility	(0.113)	(0.183)	(0.153)	(0.117)	(0.184)	(0.154)
Intensity	-0.336*	-0.243	-0.488†	-0.332*	-0.266	-0.523†
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.165)	(0.228)	(0.271)	(0.166)	(0.233)	(0.270)
lnGDP	-0.012	-0.021†	-0.014	-0.010	-0.022†	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Democracy	-0.016	-0.014	-0.031†	-0.019	-0.011	-0.046*
	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.019)
Democracy-Squared	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
# of active dyads	*-0.845****	-1.137***	-0.700***	*-0.836****	-1.141***	-0.686***
	(0.099)	(0.196)	(0.112)	*(0.099)*	(0.198)	(0.113)
Observations	2480	1241	1239	2480	1241	1239
Log pseudolikelihood	-1774.744	-696.492	-812.521	-1774.084	-695.684	-805.760

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

[1] Covariates violating proportional hazard assumption italicized

Table A3-F. Risk of Armed Conflict Termination, Monadic, 1950-2017, Cold War Split Samples[1]

Cox Proportional Hazard Models	(4a) Full	(5a) Cold War	(6a) Post CW	(4b) Full	(5b) Cold War	(6b) Post CW
	1950-2017	1950-1990	1991-2017	1950-2017	1950-1990	1991-2017
Any Ideological Claim	*-0.567****	-0.721***	*-0.668****			
	(0.111)	(0.198)	*(0.144)*			
Communist Rebels				*-0.761****	-0.993***	-0.639**
				(0.138)	(0.217)	(0.206)
Liberal/Democratic				*-0.440***	-0.880**	-0.275
Rebels				*(0.157)*	(0.295)	(0.202)
Religiously Affiliated	0.266	0.321	0.091			
Rebels	(0.174)	(0.226)	(0.237)			
Christian Affiliated				0.405**	0.329	0.390*
Rebels				(0.142)	(0.209)	(0.192)
Christian				0.215	0.120	-0.018
Fundamentalists				(0.343)	(0.794)	(0.344)
Muslim Affiliated				0.077	0.172	-0.046
Rebels				(0.143)	(0.203)	(0.214)
Muslim Jihadist				-0.459*	0.206	-0.886***
Rebels				(0.195)	(0.390)	(0.258)
Foreign Military	-0.110	-0.065	-0.397	-0.253	0.102	-0.818*
Intervention	(0.221)	(0.310)	(0.312)	(0.242)	(0.309)	(0.338)
Territorial	-0.327**	-1.100***	0.238	-0.283*	-1.079***	0.299*
Incompatibility	(0.118)	(0.220)	(0.153)	(0.116)	(0.211)	(0.148)
Intensity	-0.336*	-0.201	-0.581*	-0.382*	-0.257	-0.583*
(UCDP 2-tier)	(0.164)	(0.234)	(0.269)	(0.172)	(0.240)	(0.275)
lnGDP	-0.007	-0.019	-0.009	-0.012	-0.016	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Democracy	-0.032*	-0.026	-0.048**	-0.027†	-0.034	-0.039*
	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.017)
Democracy-Squared	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)
# of active dyads	*-0.838****	-1.126***	-0.730***	*-0.836****	-1.115***	-0.706***
	(0.097)	(0.184)	(0.116)	*(0.099)*	(0.182)	(0.116)
Observations	2480	1241	1239	2480	1241	1239
Log pseudolikelihood	-1771.353	-691.213	-807.426	-1763.127	-685.100	-800.520

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered on armed conflict dyads. Stratified by past failures.
**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10*

[1] Covariates violating proportional hazard assumption italicized