Supplemental Appendix

In Strongman We Trust: The Political Legacy of the New Village Movement in South Korea

Appendix A: Additional background information on elections

Appendix B: Descriptive statistics, tables showing full results, and robustness checks

Appendix C: Description and additional analyses of survey data for mechanism analysis

Appendix D: Sample raw data showing the NVM leaders and assigned local officials

Appendix A: Authoritarian and Democratic Elections in Korea

This research analyzes both the elections under Park's authoritarian regime and after democratization in Korea. After Park Chung-hee came to power in 1961 in a military coup, he had himself elected a civilian president in the 1963 election. He was successful re-elected in 1967, and again in 1971 after changing the constitution to allow for a third term. In October 1972, facing rising discontent about his repeatedly extended tenure, Park launched an auto-coup called *Yushin*, which abolished both the presidential term limit and direct elections for the presidency, which was restored in 1987 after democratization. He also gave himself the authority to appoint one-third of National Assembly members. During Park's first two terms (1963–1971), the Polity score remained at 3, indicating a moderate hybrid regime. It plummeted to -9 in 1972 with the auto-coup and remained at -8 until Park's death in 1979.

Our study relies on the legislative elections under Park's regime, held in 1973 and 1978. The two elections were the only direct elections conducted under the multi-member district system to fill in the two-thirds of legislative seats not appointed by Park, and the incumbent party won the most seats in each. However, the opposition parties also obtained a large share of popular votes in both elections. The 1973 election was held before the launch of the nationwide cash transfer under the NVM and thus serves as a reference point in our analyses. The 1978 election marked the first in which Park's party lost the plurality of the total vote. Approximately one year after the election, Park Chung-hee was assassinated by the director of the Korean National Intelligence Agency, a longtime subordinate, Kim Jae-gyu. After another coup by Chun Doo-hwan and his 7-year dictatorship, South Korea was democratized in 1987, since which democracy has gradually consolidated.

In 1998, the first year political power transferred to the opposition party, and 20 years following Park Chung-hee's death, his elder daughter Park Geun-hye entered politics, winning a legislative by-election in her hometown. From that point, the younger Park played a vital role in the major conservative party, eventually being elected president in 2012. Her presidential election campaign largely appealed to her father's legacy, and supporters often brought photographs of Park Chung-hee and his wife to campaigns and shouted their names. Several key figures from her father's administration also joined her camp. At the same time, Park Guen-hye's ambiguous stance on her father's repressive political decisions served as heated topics of debate during the electoral campaign.

Appendix B

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max .
Outcome variable					
Δ Incumbent share 1978 - 1973	1,339	-0.042	0.205	-0.750	0.642
Δ Incumbent - Oppositions 1978-1973	1,339	-.084	.404	-1.481	1.265
Park share in 2012	1,388	0.544	0.278	0.063	0.917
Park - Oppositions share in 2012	1,388	0.089	0.557	-0.874	0.834
Incumbent share (1973)	1,370	0.396	0.185	0.048	0.915
Explanatory variable					
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1974)	1,370	0.341	0.162	0	1.422
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1975)	1,370	0.326	0.157	0	1.001
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1976)	1,370	0.156	0.173	0	0.845
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1977)	1,370	0.481	0.184	0	1.380
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1978)	1,370	0.493	0.185	0	1.832
NVM subsidy per population (log) (1977)	1,459	0.276	0.118	0	0.865
Number of beneficiary villages per voter (1977)	1,370	0.0004	0.0002	0	0.002
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1974-1978)	1,370	1.170	0.257	0.159	2.342
NVM subsidy per population (log) (1974-1978)	1,454	0.755	0.205	0	1.761
Number of beneficiary villages per voter (1974-1978)	1,339	0.002	0.001	0.0002	0.008
Controls 1					
Area in 1970	1,459	0.066	0.047	0.007	0.472
Eup in 1970	1,460	0.084	0.278	0	1
Controls 2					
Female pop share (1966)	1,452	0.494	0.015	0	0.549
Share of pop aged 15+ (1966)	1,452	0.547	0.020	0.489	1
Illiterate pop share (1966)	1,453	0.423	0.086	0.224	1.116
Pop change in 1966-1970	1,452	-0.065	0.134	-0.889	3.350
Long-term variables					
Incumbent share (2007)	1,393	0.415	0.247	0.017	0.918
Night-time luminosity (log)	1,459	3.105	0.635	1.172	4.159
ΔShare of HH with mechanic cultivator (1970-80)	1,445	0.102	0.065	-0.014	0.392
Share of HH with mechanic cultivator (2010)	1,391	0.212	0.130	0	0.528
Share of full-time farming HH (2010)	1,391	0.263	0.152	0	0.663
ΔAgricultural pop (log) (1970-80)	1,442	-0.296	0.171	-2.778	1.490
Share of pop aged 55+ (2010)	1,393	0.470	0.157	0.054	0.749
Terrain elevation (median)	1,460	0.162	0.158	0	0.938
Terrain slope (median)	1,460	4.336	2.920	0.01	15.568

Table B2: Cash Transfer and Authoritarian Election (NVM Year: 1977)

Dependent Variable: Δ Incumbent vote share 1978 - 1973				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.081**	0.030*	0.033*	0.033*
(1977)	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Area in 1970			0.114	0.077
			(0.080)	(0.080)
Eup in 1970			0.005	0.008
			(0.008)	(0.008)
Female pop share in 1966				-0.948*
				(0.422)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966				-0.428
				(0.286)
Illiterate pop share in 1966				-0.010
				(0.068)
Pop change 1966-1970				0.012
				(0.014)
Constant	-0.081**	-0.056**	-0.066**	0.645*
	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.261)
Observations	1339	1339	1339	1337
No. of counties	129	129	129	129
County FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.838	0.838	0.839

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B3: Cash Transfer and Authoritarian Election (NVM Year: 1974-1978)

Dependent Variable: Δ Incumbent vote share 1978 - 1973					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
NVM year:	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.017	-0.020	0.007	0.033*	0.005
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Area in 1970	0.074	0.060	0.067	0.077	0.069
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Eup in 1970	0.004	-0.000	0.002	0.008	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female pop share in 1966	-0.930*	-0.996*	-0.962*	-0.948*	-0.961*
	(0.423)	(0.418)	(0.421)	(0.422)	(0.418)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.444	-0.428	-0.453	-0.428	-0.451
	(0.285)	(0.290)	(0.283)	(0.286)	(0.286)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	-0.012	-0.013	-0.016	-0.010	-0.013
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Pop change 1966-1970	0.006	-0.000	0.003	0.012	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Constant	0.655*	0.693**	0.683*	0.645*	0.679**
	(0.262)	(0.260)	(0.262)	(0.261)	(0.259)
Observations	1337	1337	1337	1337	1337
No. of counties	129	129	129	129	129
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.838	0.838	0.838	0.839	0.838

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4: Robustness Checks for Authoritarian Election

Dependent Variable:	Δ Incumbent share 1978 - 1973		Δ Incumbent - Oppositions 1978 - 1973
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of beneficiary villages per voter (1977)	24.854† (13.893)		
NVM subsidy per population (log) (1977)		0.069** (0.025)	
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1977)			0.063† (0.033)
Area in 1970	0.077	0.087	0.119
	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.154)
Eup in 1970	0.006	0.011	0.016
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)
Female pop share in 1966	-0.952*	-0.924*	-1.846*
	(0.421)	(0.426)	(0.828)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.428	-0.425	-0.908
	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.552)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	-0.011	-0.009	-0.028
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.135)
Pop change 1966-1970	0.010	0.011	0.025
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.027)
Constant	0.652*	0.626*	1.301*
	(0.261)	(0.262)	(0.514)
Observations	1337	1337	1337
No. of counties	129	129	129
County FE	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.838	0.839	0.841

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Non-Random Cash Transfer and Challenges in Estimation

It is worth discussing the potential non-randomness of the 1970s cash transfers and how it affects our estimation. First, we investigate whether the government favored villages that had supported the incumbent party strongly in the previous election in 1973 when it began distributing cash beginning in 1974. In Table A5, the results show that townships where the incumbent party got more votes did indeed receive more generous cash subsidies in the following years. This non-random pattern of subsidy distribution suggests that the "change" in vote share between 1973 and 1978, rather than the "level" of support in 1978 is more appropriate as a dependent variable. The pattern also implies that it might be difficult to capture any additional positive effects of cash transfers on electoral support for the ruling party in 1978 because those townships with large subsidies had already likely been strong supporters of the ruling party in 1973.

Table B5: The Allocation of Rural Development Cash Transfer

Dependent Variable: *NVM subsidy per voter (log)* (1974-1978)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Incumbent vote share in 1973	0.183**	0.501**	0.345**	0.321**	0.184
	(0.037)	(0.113)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.284)
Incumbent vote share in 1973^2					0.158
					(0.312)
Area in 1970			-0.424*	-0.572**	-0.569**
			(0.200)	(0.209)	(0.209)
Eup in 1970			-0.408**	-0.335**	-0.334**
			(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Female pop share in 1966				-2.842*	-2.844*
				(1.238)	(1.245)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966				0.026	0.029
				(0.849)	(0.849)
Illiterate pop share in 1966				-0.060	-0.062
				(0.133)	(0.133)
Pop change 1966-1970				-0.507**	-0.507**
				(0.095)	(0.095)
Constant	1.097**	0.972**	1.096**	2.495**	2.518**
	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.803)	(0.807)
Observations	1370	1370	1370	1368	1368
No. of counties	131	131	131	131	131
County FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.118	0.315	0.367	0.367

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B6: Cash Transfer and Democratic Election

Dependent Variable: Park's vote share in 2012				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	-0.052†	0.026**	0.015*	0.012*
(1974-1978)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Area in 1970			0.000	0.000*
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Eup in 1970			-0.016*	-0.018*
			(0.006)	(0.005)
Female pop share in 1966			0.457	0.373
			(0.334)	(0.306)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966			-0.398*	-0.506**
			(0.166)	(0.131)
Illiterate pop share in 1966			0.058*	0.024
			(0.025)	(0.022)
Pop change 1966-1970			-0.014	-0.010
			(0.021)	(0.014)
Lee's vote share				0.680**
				(0.063)
Constant	0.595**	0.504**	0.480*	0.320†
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.185)	(0.173)
Observations	1302	1302	1300	1300
No. of counties	131	131	131	131
County FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.977	0.977	0.984

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B7: Regionalism and the Election Outcomes

Dependent Variable:	Δ Incumbent share 1978 - 1973			Park's share in 2012		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	Honam	Youngnam	All	Honam	Youngnam
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.033*	0.057†	0.025			
(1977)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.026)			
NVM subsidy per voter (log)				0.012*	0.006	0.013†
(1974-1978)				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Area in 1970	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Eup in 1970	0.008	-0.004	0.004	-0.018**	-0.003	-0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Female pop share in 1966	-0.948*	-0.475	-2.338**	0.373	-0.210	0.183
	(0.422)	(0.952)	(0.740)	(0.306)	(0.194)	(0.528)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.428	-0.008	-1.307*	-0.506**	-0.181	-0.444*
	(0.286)	(0.435)	(0.549)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.220)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	-0.010	0.078	-0.068	0.024	-0.001	0.038
	(0.068)	(0.096)	(0.130)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Pop change 1966-1970	0.012	-0.102	-0.053	-0.010	0.007	-0.037†
	(0.014)	(0.107)	(0.071)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Lee's vote share				0.680**	0.823**	0.644**
				(0.063)	(0.170)	(0.076)
Constant	0.645*	0.138	1.820**	0.320†	0.249**	0.476
	(0.261)	(0.614)	(0.440)	(0.173)	(0.091)	(0.332)
Observations	1337	362	429	1300	373	419
No. of counties	129	33	40	131	35	40
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.839	0.871	0.847	0.984	0.738	0.879

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B8: Cash Transfer and Democratic Election: Mixed Effects Model

Dependent Variable: Park's vote share in 2012		
	(1)	(2)
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.017**	0.012*
(1974-1978)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Area in 1970	0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Eup in 1970	-0.015**	-0.017**
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Female pop share in 1966	0.401+	0.320+
	(0.220)	(0.186)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.397**	-0.523**
	(0.120)	(0.103)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	0.071**	0.029
	(0.024)	(0.020)
Pop change 1966-1970	-0.022*	-0.015+
	(0.011)	(0.009)
Lee's vote share		0.655**
		(0.029)
Constant	0.506**	0.374**
	(0.151)	(0.116)
Random-Effects Parameters		
Province Level:		
Var (Constant	0.057	.015
	(0.027)	(0.007)
County Level:		
Var (Constant)	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Var (Residual)	0.002	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1300	1300
Log-likelihood	2102.135	2314.716
*chi*2	74.19	625.00

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B9: Instrumental Variable Analysis

Dependent Variable:	(1) Park's vote share (2012)	(2) Lee's vote share (2007)
2nd Stage		
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1974-1978)	0.056** (0.022)	-0.015 (0.028)
Area in 1970	0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Eup in 1970	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.010)
Female pop share in 1966	0.501 (0.319)	0.089 (0.238)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.504** (0.120)	0.156 (0.126)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	0.027 (0.021)	0.047* (0.021)
Pop change 1966-1970	0.012 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.019)
Lee's vote share	0.675** (0.060)	
Constant	0.144 (0.193)	0.436** (0.148)
Observations	1300	1305
No. of counties	131	131
County FE	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.983	0.980
1st Stage		
Terrain Elevation	0.335* (0.143)	0.330* (0.141)
Terrain Slope	0.017** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)
Area in 1970	-0.002** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.000)
Eup in 1970	-0.301** (0.027)	-0.300** (0.027)
Female pop share in 1966	-2.237† (1.332)	-2.238† (1.324)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	0.187 (0.887)	0.226 (0.895)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	0.001 (0.141)	0.015 (.143)
Pop change 1966-1970	-0.505** (0.081)	-0.505** (0.082)
Lee's vote share	0.161 (0.194)	
Constant	2.076* (0.853)	2.141* (0.848)
Observations	1300	1305
No. of counties	131	131
County FE	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.382	0.382
$F(9, 1160)$	31.30	
$F(8, 1166)$		34.39

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B10: Robustness Checks for Democratic Elections

Dependent Variable:	Park's vote share		Park - Oppositions
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Number of beneficiary villages per voter	4.865**		
(1974-1978)	(1.468)		
NVM subsidy per population (log))		0.016*	
(1974-1978)		(0.007)	
NVM subsidy per voter (log)			0.024*
(1974-1978)			(0.012)
Area in 1970	0.000*	0.000**	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Eup in 1970	-0.020**	-0.018**	-0.037**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)
Female pop share in 1966	0.417	0.352	0.746
	(0.309)	(0.284)	(0.613)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.518**	-0.516**	-1.012**
	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.262)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	0.020	0.025	0.048
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.043)
Pop change 1966-1970	-0.010	-0.013	-0.019
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.028)
Lee's vote share	0.681**	0.662**	1.361**
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.126)
Constant	0.314+	0.348*	-0.359
	(0.176)	(0.165)	(0.345)
Observations	1269	1382	1300
No. of counties	129	138	131
County FE	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.984	0.984	0.984

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B11: Mechanism Analysis: Economic Development (Night-time Luminosity)

Dependent variable: night-time luminosity (log)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	1992	1996	2001	2006	2011
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	-0.433**	-0.439**	-0.401**	-0.429**	-0.415**
(1974-1978)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.059)
Area in 1970	-4.800**	-4.920**	-4.430**	-4.965**	-5.096**
	(0.539)	(0.574)	(0.549)	(0.596)	(0.638)
Eup in 1970	0.277**	0.336**	0.327**	0.374**	0.346**
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Female pop share in 1966	0.020	-0.251	-0.793	-1.177	-1.531
	(2.554)	(2.284)	(1.989)	(2.337)	(2.377)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	5.611**	4.699**	5.270**	6.317**	5.609**
	(1.651)	(1.457)	(1.396)	(1.608)	(1.559)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	-0.622†	-0.351	-0.360	-0.438	-0.346
	(0.327)	(0.273)	(0.272)	(0.297)	(0.297)
Pop change 1966-1970	0.169	0.059	0.063	0.061	0.015
	(0.191)	(0.156)	(0.147)	(0.158)	(0.140)
Constant	0.286	1.295	1.225	0.829	1.577
	(1.646)	(1.307)	(1.168)	(1.331)	(1.319)
Observations	1368	1368	1368	1368	1368
No. of counties	131	131	131	131	131
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.763	0.760	0.771	0.740	0.751

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B12: Mechanism Analysis: Demographic Changes (1970-2010)

Dependent variable:	(1) ΔShare of households w/ mechanical cultivator (1970-80)	(2) Share of households w/ mechanical cultivator (2010)	(3) Share of full-time farming households (2010)	(4) ΔAgricultural population (log, 1970-80)	(5) Share of population age 55 + (2010)
NVM subsidy per voter (log) (1974-1978)	0.015*	0.072**	0.085**	0.080*	0.115**
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.016)
Area in 1970	-0.146**	-0.165	0.117	0.069	0.294*
	(0.046)	(0.103)	(0.121)	(0.143)	(0.122)
Eup in 1970	-0.047**	-0.120**	-0.141**	0.073**	-0.138**
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.026)	(0.014)
Female pop share in 1966	-0.207	1.650**	1.408**	1.836*	1.880**
	(0.376)	(0.461)	(0.535)	(0.784)	(0.586)
Share of pop aged 15+ in 1966	-0.524*	-1.757**	-2.146**	1.322**	-1.654**
	(0.205)	(0.308)	(0.329)	(0.500)	(0.365)
Illiterate pop share in 1966	-0.060†	-0.111†	-0.237**	0.091	-0.016
	(0.031)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.062)
Pop change 1966-1970	-0.043	-0.014	-0.012	-0.056	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Constant	0.510*	0.338	0.745*	-2.074**	0.309
	(0.203)	(0.264)	(0.310)	(0.467)	(0.332)
Observations	1360	1303	1303	1357	1305
No. of counties	131	131	131	131	131
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.575	0.598	0.624	0.265	0.600

Notes. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the county level when the county fixed effects are used. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix C: Public Opinion Surveys

The original **2019 Residential Satisfaction Survey** was conducted between October 31 and November 28, 2019, among 2,344 adults aged 18-99 residing in rural areas and 719 in urban areas. The original **2020 Residential Satisfaction Survey** was conducted between August 31 and October 26, 2020, among 2,219 adults aged 18-99 residing in rural areas and 793 in urban areas. Both online surveys and face-to-face interviews were used with a village-level quota sampling. After merging the original survey data with the NVM cash transfer dataset, the final number of respondents used in the analysis is 1,760 in 2019 and 2,076 in 2020, respectively. This reduction in sample size is due to the exclusion of urban areas, including some rural areas newly developed after the 1970s, which were not eligible for the NVM program.

The dependent variables are taken from the questions relevant to social capital. The "local life satisfaction" is a subjective satisfaction with life in the residential village. The "sense of belonging" is a subjective feeling of belonging to the residential village. The "social interaction" is measured by whether the respondent maintains a good relationship with neighbors. All questions require an answer on an eleven-point scale (0 to 10) where a higher number indicates a more positive response. We include demographic features as the control variables such as a yearly household income in five scales (1 as less than 10 million won, 2 as from 10 to 19 million won, 3 as from 20 to 29 million won, 4 as 30 to 39 million, and 5 as more than 40 million Korean Won), the length of residence, marital status (1 married, 0 otherwise), age, gender (1 for male, 0 otherwise), educational attainment (1 for less than primary school, 2 for middle school, 3 for high school, 4 for university graduates, and 6 for graduates) and occupation (1 for farmer and 0 for otherwise).

The original **Rural Village Survey (2020)** was conducted between September 21 and October 13, 2020, among 2,151 adults residing in rural areas. No observations were dropped during the merging process because the survey exclusively targeted rural areas and did not include any urban respondents. The dependent variable taken from this survey is the frequency of participation in community activities. The variable is coded from the questions asking how often the survey respondent takes part in eight types of community activities including social gathering, town-wide cleanup, maintenance of the commons, communal sharing of labor, communal business projects, village-level associations (for example, senior citizens' association), town hall meeting, and club activities for hobby. The options for each question are from 1 (not participate at all) to 5 (participate almost all). We sum the participation frequencies for all eight activities by each respondent. The control variables are the length of residence, age, and gender.

The original **Survey of Korean Identity (2015)** by the East Asia Institute surveyed 2,427 nationally representative respondents to investigate the political and social perceptions of the South Korean population. Following the exclusion of urban residents during the merging process, who were not eligible for NVM cash transfers, the final analytic sample was reduced to 1,006. Survey of Korean Identity (2015) is the only survey we have found that directly asks questions related to the respondent's evaluation of previous political leaders and their contributions. We employ questions asking how much Park Chung-hee contributed to Korea's economic and political development. The response options are four Likert scales from 1 (very negative) to 4 (very

positive). The control variables we used are a monthly household income (by a unit of 1 million won, from 1 as less than 1 million won to 11 as more than 10 million), age, gender (1 for male, 0 otherwise), educational attainment (1 for less than primary school, 2 for middle school, 3 for high school, 4 for university graduates, and 6 for graduates).

Table C1: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Data

Variable	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max .
Residential Satisfaction Survey by KREI					
Local life satisfaction	3,836	6.107	2.284	0	10
Sense of belonging	2,076	5.939	2.185	0	10
Social interaction	2,076	6.224	2.188	0	10
Happiness	3,836	6.093	2.185	0	10
Prospect on village future	3,836	5.854	2.309	0	10
Household income	3,836	3.484	1.427	1	5
Length of residence	3,836	21.389	21.183	0	94
Married	3,836	0.746	0.435	0	1
Age	3,836	49.720	15.954	19	99
Male	3,836	0.504	0.500	0	1
Education	3,836	3.419	0.911	1	5
Farmers	3,836	0.353	0.478	0	1
Rural Village Survey by KREI					
Community activity participation (sum)	2,151	11.396	8.111	0	40
Social gathering	2,151	2.815	1.755	0	5
Town-wide Cleanup	2,151	2.070	1.938	0	5
Maintenance of the commons	2,151	0.632	1.416	0	5
Labor sharing	2,151	0.494	1.263	0	5
Communal business	2,151	0.341	1.125	0	5
Village association	2,151	2.689	1.845	0	5
Town-hall meeting	2,151	2.015	1.949	0	5
Club activity	2,151	0.339	1.061	0	5
Relationship with neighbors	2,151	7.887	1.578	0	10
Willingness to move out	2,151	0.974	0.161	0	1
Length of residence	2,151	44.488	25.853	1	97
Male	2,151	0.444	0.497	0	1
Age	2,151	68.174	12.719	30	98
Survey of Korean Identity by EAI					
Park's contribution to economic development	1,006	3.480	0.679	1	4
Park's contribution to political development	1,006	2.977	0.834	1	4
Social activities	1,006	2.022	0.886	1	5.545
Political ideology	1,005	5.299	1.740	0	10
Policy attitude	990	5.484	1.821	1	9
Household income	1,005	3.942	2.020	1	11
Education	1,003	3.263	0.886	1	5
Male	1,006	0.496	0.500	0	1
Age	1,006	45.903	15.285	19	83

Table C2: Mechanism Analysis: Social Capital and Affinity to Former Leader

Survey	Residential Satisfaction Survey			Rural Village Survey	Survey of Korean Identity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Var	Local Life Satisfaction	Sense of belonging	Social interactions	Community activity participation	Park's contribution to economic development	Park's contribution to political development
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.154	-0.031	-0.199	-0.533	0.348*	0.327†
	(0.173)	(0.239)	(0.232)	(1.830)	(0.165)	(0.167)
Household Income	0.191**	0.040	0.079		0.030	0.015
	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.053)		(0.021)	(0.025)
Length of Residence	0.006*	0.010**	0.013**	0.072**		
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.011)		
Married	0.779**	0.911**	0.823**			
	(0.150)	(0.171)	(0.173)			
Age	0.009†	0.016*	0.018**	-0.101**	0.011**	0.010**
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Male	0.038	0.049	0.059	0.949*	0.096	-0.001
	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.392)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Education	0.001	-0.070	-0.069		-0.015	-0.063
	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.073)		(0.056)	(0.056)
Farmers	0.384**	0.510**	0.487**			
	(0.115)	(0.156)	(0.150)			
Constant	3.906**	3.937**	4.178**	15.833**	2.524**	2.342**
	(0.405)	(0.527)	(0.481)	(2.344)	(0.383)	(0.329)
Observations	3836	2076	2076	1858	360	360
No. of counties	131	127	127	27	23	23
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.268	0.243	0.158	0.224	0.229
Survey Year	2019 & 2020	2020	2020	2020	2015	2015

Notes. The survey questions to measure dependent variables are as follows: "do you agree that I am satisfied with my local residence"? for Model (1), "how much do you think you belong to your village?" for Model (2), "how much do you think you have a good relationship with your neighbors?" for Model (3). Community activity participation for Model (4) are the average response to a series of 8 questions on community activity participation. Each 8 questions are in Table A15. Models (5) and (6) use a question that "do you think how much Park Chung-hee government contribute to political/economic development?", respectively. Model (1) includes year fixed effects as the residential satisfaction survey covers 2019 and 2020. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table C3: Mechanism Analysis: Additional Analysis of 8 Types of Community Activities (Rural Village Survey)

	(1) Social gathering	(2) Town-wide cleanup	(3) Maintenance of the commons	(4) Labor sharing	(5) Communal business	(6) Village association	(7) Town hall meeting	(8) Club activities
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.047	-0.164	-0.330	-0.506	-0.111	-0.091	0.722	-0.101
	(0.200)	(0.455)	(0.555)	(0.558)	(0.158)	(0.288)	(0.539)	(0.133)
Male	0.106	0.232**	0.513**	0.048	0.027	-0.319*	0.337**	0.004
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.115)	(0.094)	(0.045)
Age	-0.008	-0.024**	-0.023**	-0.015**	-0.015**	0.007	-0.017**	-0.007†
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Length of Residence	0.012**	0.007**	0.011**	0.006**	0.005*	0.015**	0.014**	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Constant	2.872**	3.589**	1.873*	1.803*	1.257**	1.909**	1.646*	0.884**
	(0.381)	(0.557)	(0.711)	(0.719)	(0.277)	(0.441)	(0.664)	(0.207)
Observations	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858	1858
No. of counties	27	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.159	0.227	0.206	0.151	0.133	0.112	0.166	0.120

Notes. The survey question is as follows: "how often do you participate in the following social activities in your village? (1) social gathering, (2) town-wide cleanup, (3) maintenance of the commons, (4) labor sharing, (5) communal business, (6) village association, (7) town hall meeting, and (8) club activities". Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table C4: Mechanism Analysis: Additional Analysis of Social Capital and Political Attitudes

Survey Title	Residential Satisfaction Survey		Rural Village Survey		Survey of Korean Identity		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dependent Var	Happiness	Prospect on village future	Relationship with Neighbors	Willingness to move out	Social activities	Political ideology	Policy attitude
NVM subsidy per voter (log)	0.142	-0.242	0.956†	-0.004	-0.169	-0.130	-0.696
	(0.154)	(0.182)	(0.496)	(0.036)	(0.229)	(0.657)	(0.463)
Household Income	0.238**	0.164**			0.103**	-0.018	0.009
	(0.039)	(0.040)			(0.028)	(0.059)	(0.039)
Length of Residence	0.006*	-0.001	0.005*	0.001*			
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.000)			
Married	0.913**	0.822**					
	(0.134)	(0.140)					
Age	0.003	-0.003	-0.009	0.002**	0.012**	0.028*	0.023†
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Male	-0.119†	-0.072	0.127	-0.005	0.267***	-0.082	0.462**
	(0.065)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.007)	(0.074)	(0.164)	(0.217)
Education	0.031	0.162**			0.125†	-0.182	-0.113
	(0.073)	(0.061)			(0.061)	(0.153)	(0.194)
Farmers	0.304**	0.241*					
	(0.102)	(0.104)					
Constant	3.981**	4.546**	7.131**	0.804**	0.826*	4.777**	5.372**
	(0.394)	(0.356)	(0.754)	(0.057)	(0.384)	(1.151)	(1.195)
Observations	3836	3836	1858	1858	360	360	349
No. of counties	131	131	27	27	23	23	23
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.108	0.118	0.022	0.062	0.274	0.114	0.278
Survey Year	2019 & 2020	2019 & 2020	2020	2020	2015	2015	2015

Notes. The survey questions to measure dependent variables are as follows: do you agree that "I am happy now"? for Model (1), "how much do you think your village will develop in the future" for Model (2), "I have good relationship with neighbors" for Model (3), "do you have a plan to move out of your village?" for Model (4). Social activities for Model (5) are the average response to a series of questions on social activities: "how often do you participate in the following eleven kinds of social activities: village communities, religious groups, civil groups, alumni associations and etc." Political ideology in Model (6) is a self-reported political ideology from very liberal (coded as 0) to very conservative (coded as 10). Policy attitude in Model (7) is the sum of the responses to policy-relevant questions such as foreign policy priority (US vs China), abolition of the National Security Act, humanitarian aid for North Korea, economic policy priority between welfare and growth, privatization, governmental regulations, freedom of assembly and association, death penalty, and law and order. Models (1) and (2) include the year fixed effect as the residential satisfaction survey covers 2019 and 2020. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table C5: Mechanism Analysis: Evaluation of Former Presidents' Contribution to Political and Economic Development

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
	Rhee Syngman contribution to		Chun Doo-hwan contribution to		Roh Tae-woo contribution to		Kim Young-sam contribution to		Kim Dae-jung contribution to		Roh Moo-hyun contribution to		Lee Myung-bak contribution to	
	politics	economy	politics	economy	politics	economy	politics	economy	politics	economy	politics	economy	politics	economy
NVM subsidy	0.003	-0.073	0.370	0.308	0.222	0.236	0.017	0.089	-0.048	0.102	-0.249	-0.376	0.047	0.242
per voter (log)	(0.208)	(0.283)	(0.338)	(0.304)	(0.255)	(0.449)	(0.305)	(0.453)	(0.292)	(0.381)	(0.233)	(0.338)	(0.359)	(0.437)
Male	-0.099	-0.164*	-0.011	0.074	-0.093	-0.100	0.004	-0.090	-0.117	-0.125*	0.027	0.035	-0.043	-0.137†
	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.085)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.059)	(0.079)
Age	0.006*	0.005	0.005	0.004	-0.001	0.003	0.001	-0.003	-0.004	0.000	-0.005	-0.004	0.006*	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Education	0.041	0.075	-0.075	-0.006	-0.036	0.117*	0.024	0.041	0.026	0.066	0.016	0.051	0.013	0.030
	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.061)
Household	-0.021	-0.033	0.038	0.021	-0.011	-0.015	-0.019	-0.042*	-0.019	-0.030	-0.032	-0.042*	-0.024	-0.031
Income	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Constant	2.236**	2.174**	1.813**	2.076**	2.256**	1.675**	2.302**	2.343**	3.037**	2.469**	3.346**	3.170**	1.864**	1.872**
	(0.375)	(0.442)	(0.396)	(0.365)	(0.326)	(0.458)	(0.358)	(0.528)	(0.397)	(0.482)	(0.429)	(0.408)	(0.454)	(0.504)
Observations	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360	360
No. of counties	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.185	0.121	0.192	0.248	0.145	0.204	0.132	0.169	0.072	0.122	0.062	0.112	0.224	0.235

Notes. The survey question is as follows: "do you think how much the following government contribute to political/economic development?" Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are in parenthesis. † $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix D

Figure D1: The NVM Leaders and Assigned Local Officials