Domestic Interests, Democracy, and Foreign Policy Change

Supplementary Appendix

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

In this appendix, you will find descriptive statistics for all of our analyses, organized by issue area. For each issue area we present a) descriptives for the DV, b) crosstabs of SOLS changes and Regime type, c) descriptives for the control variables, d) crosstabs of Other leader transitions and Regime type, and e) crosstabs of SOLS change and Irregular leader transition.

Abrogation of Military Alliances

TABLE A1: Termination of Alliance in Violation of Terms, Alliances

Violate = 0	16,433 (99.6%)
Violate = 1	73 (0.44%)

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A2: SOLS Change and Regime Type, Alliances

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	7,873 96.2%	309 3.78%	8,181 100%
Contdem=1	6,637 79.7%	1,687 20.3%	8,324 100%
Total	14,510 87.9%	1,996 12.1%	16,506 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A3: Control Variables, Alliances

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Regime Transition (A)	0.019	0.138	0	1
Δ Military Capabilities (A)	0.140	0.347	0	1
Threat Decrease (A)	0.058	0.233	0	1
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)	0.187	0.390	0	1
End of Cold War	0.041	0.199	0	1
Asymmetric Alliance	0.244	0.430	0	1
Non-military Cooperation	0.788	0.409	0	1

Treaty	0.882	0.323	0	1
Peacetime Cooperation	0.372	0.677	0	2
Δ Military Capabilities (B)	0.140	0.347	0	1
Threat Increase (B)	0.118	0.322	0	1
SOLS Change (B)	0.123	0.328	0	1

Note: Control 2 model sample.

TABLE A4: Other Leader Transition and Regime Type, Alliances

	Other Leader Transitions=0	Other Leader Transition=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	7,559 92.4%	623 7.61%	8,182 100%
Contdem=1	7,666 92.1%	658 7.9%	8,324 100%
Total	15,225 92.2%	1,281 7.8%	16,505 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A5: SOLS Change and Irregular Leader Transition, Alliances

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Irregular=0	14,458 88.3%	1,912 11.7%	16,370 100%
Irregular=1	52 38.2%	84 61.8%	136 100%
Total	14,510 87.9%	1,996 12.1%	16,506 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

Change in UNGA Ideal Points

TABLE A6: UNGA vote change, UNGA

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Log of UNGA Vote Change	-2.35	1.25	-11.04	0.81

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A7: SOLS Change and Regime Type, UNGA

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	4,708 93.5%	327 6.5%	5,035 100%
Contdem=1	3,209 87.2%	470 12.8%	3,679 100%
Total	7,917 90.9%	797 9.1%	8,714 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A8: Control Variables, UNGA

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Regime Transition	0.021	0.143	0	1
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally	0.224	0.417	0	1
End of Cold War	0.073	0.260	0	1
Δ Military Capabilities	0.125	0.331	0	1
Economic Turmoil	0.126	0.332	0	1
Wealth	8.265	1.204	4.889	13.357

Note: Control 1 model sample.

TABLE A9: Other Leader Transition and Regime Type, UNGA

	Other Leader Transitions=0	Other Leader Transition=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	4,718 93.7%	317 6.3%	5,035 100%
Contdem=1	3,363 91.4%	316 8.6%	3,679 100%
Total	8,081 92.7%	633 7.3%	8,714 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A10: SOLS Change and Irregular Leader Transition, UNGA

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Irregular=0	7,392 92.5%	604 7.5%	7,996 100%
Irregular=1	69 31.8%	148 68.2%	217 100%
Total	7,461 90.8%	752 9.2%	8,213 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

Sender Termination of Economic Sanctions

TABLE A11: Sender Capitulation, Sanctions

Capitulate = 0	27,307 (98.9%)
Capitulate = 1	301 (1.1%)

Note: Basic model sample, U.S. included.

TABLE A12: SOLS Change and Regime Type, Sanctions

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	3,836 99.0%	39 1.00%	3,875 100%
Contdem=1	22,882 96.4%	851 3.6%	23,733 100%
Total	26,718 96.8%	890 3.2%	27,608 100%

Note: Basic model sample, U.S. included.

TABLE A13: Control Variables, Sanctions

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Regime Transition (A)	0.003	0.054	0	1
Δ Military Capabilities (A)	0.034	0.181	0	1
Economic Turmoil (A)	0.028	0.166	0	1
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)	0.885	0.319	0	1
End of Cold War	0.057	0.231	0	1
Δ Military Capabilities (B)	0.107	0.308	0	1
Regime Transition (B)	0.022	0.147	0	1
SOLS Change (B)	0.030	0.171	0	1
Sender-to-Target GDP Ratio	0.829	0.267	0.001	1.000
Sender Costs	0.042	0.201	0	1
High Politics	0.346	0.476	0	1
Sender Commitment	0.281	0.449	0	1

Note: Control 2 model sample, U.S. included.

TABLE A14: Other Leader Transition and Regime Type, Sanctions

	Other Leader Transitions=0	Other Leader Transition=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	3,764 97.1%	111 2.9%	3,875 100%
Contdem=1	23,354 98.4%	379 1.6%	23,733 100%
Total	27,118 98.2%	490 1.8%	27,608 100%

Note: Basic model sample, U.S. included.

TABLE A15: SOLS Change and Irregular Leader Transition, Sanctions

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Irregular=0	26,710 96.8%	876 3.2%	27,586 100%
Irregular=1	8 36.4%	14 63.6%	22 100%
Total	26,718 96.8%	890 3.2%	27,608 100%

Note: Basic model sample, U.S. included.

Change in Dyadic Import Patterns

TABLE A16: Change in Import Patterns, Trade

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Change in Import Patterns	0.91	1.78	0	16.12

TABLE A17: SOLS Change and Regime Type, Trade

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	197,981 91.4%	18,531 8.6%	216,512 100%
Contdem=1	154,071 83.3%	30,909 16.7%	184,980 100%
Total	352,052 87.7%	49,440 12.3%	401,492 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A18: Control Variables, Trade

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Regime Transition (A)	0.023	0.149	0	1
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)	0.321	0.467	0	1
Domestic Conflict (A)	0.070	0.255	0	1
Interstate Conflict (A-B)	0.001	0.030	0	1
End of Cold War	0.119	0.324	0	1
Economic Turmoil	0.122	0.327	0	1

Joint GATT/WTO Membership	0.438	0.496	0	1
Joint PTA Membership	0.173	0.378	0	1
SOLS Change (B)	0.114	0.318	0	1
Regime Transition (B)	0.021	0.144	0	1
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)	0.333	0.471	0	1
Domestic Conflict (B)	0.078	0.269	0	1
GDP (A)	22.507	2.077	16.575	28.245
GDP (B)	22.637	2.036	16.132	28.245

Note: Control 2 model sample.

TABLE A19: Other Leader Transition and Regime Type, Trade

	Other Leader Transitions=0	Other Leader Transition=1	*Total*
Contdem=0	200,205 92.5%	16,307 7.5%	216,512 100%
Contdem=1	159,667 86.3%	25,313 13.7%	184,980 100%
Total	359,872 89.6%	41,620 10.4%	401,492 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

TABLE A20: SOLS Change and Irregular Leader Transition, Trade

	SOLS change=0	SOLS change=1	*Total*
Irregular=0	347,034 90.0%	38,429 10%	385,463 100%
Irregular=1	5,018 31.3%	11,011 68.7%	16,029 100%
Total	352,052 87.7%	49,440 12.3%	401,492 100%

Note: Basic model sample.

Appendix B: Supplementary Analysis to Main Results

In this appendix, you will find supplementary analyses mentioned in Section 4.1, organized by issue area. For each issue area, we show 1) full results tables for main analyses that were not displayed in the manuscript for space reasons, 2) results from the robustness check that drops cases of regime transitions, and 3) results from any issue area-specific robustness checks.

Abrogation of Military Alliances

Table B1A: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Alliance Termination: Basic Model, SOLS change

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	0.09% (0.04% - 0.18%)	0.33% (0.15% - 0.60%)	3.96 (1.78-7.33)
Democracy	0.11% (0.05% - 0.22%)	0.25% (0.08% - 0.55%)	2.50 (0.64-6.14)
Nondemocracy	0.63% (0.47% - 0.82%)	2.95% (1.41% - 5.53%)	4.80 (2.20-9.30)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	6.45 (2.69-13.39)	15.19 (3.98-41.63)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Basic models, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B1B: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Alliance Termination: Basic Model, Contdem

	Democracy	Nondemocracy	Relative Risk (ContDem)
All States	0.09% (0.04 - 0.18%)	0.64% (0.50% - 0.83%)	8.27 (3.68-16.43)

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Basic models, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B2A: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Alliance Termination: Control 1 Model, SOLS change

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	0.11% (0.05% - 0.22%)	0.33% (0.14% - 0.68%)	3.56 (1.28-7.97)
Democracy	0.14% (0.06% - 0.29%)	0.22% (0.07% - 0.60%)	1.90 (0.39-6.16)
Nondemocracy	0.78% (0.55% - 1.11%)	4.11% (1.29% - 10.10%)	5.42 (1.74-13.24)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	6.39 (2.67-13.54)	24.50 (3.95-88.89)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 1 models, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B2B: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Alliance Termination: Control 1 Model, Contdem

	Democracy	Nondemocracy	Relative Risk (ContDem)
All States	0.11% (0.04% - 0.22%)	0.80% (0.56% - 1.11%)	9.00 (3.44-19.89)

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 1 models, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B3: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Alliance Termination: Control 2 Model, Contdem

	Democracy	Nondemocracy	Relative Risk (ContDem)
All States	0.03% (0.01% - 0.07%)	0.20% (0.12% - 0.32%)	7.29 (2.65-14.65)

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 2 models, 95% CI in parentheses. Note that the equivalent for tables B1A and B2A for the Control 2 model is Table 3 displayed in the manuscript.

Table B4: Difference in First Differences of Alliance Termination: Control 2 Model

First Difference of SOLS Change in Democracies	First Difference of SOLS Change in Nondemocracies	Difference in First Differences
0.03% (-0.03% - 0.14%)	0.92% (0.15% - 2.53%)	0.90% (0.12%-2.48%)
First Difference of Nondemocracy when No SOLS Change	First Difference of Nondemocracy when SOLS Change	
0.15% (0.07%-0.26%)	1.05% (0.27%.-2.65%)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 2 models, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B5: Military Alliance Termination, Regime Transitions Dropped, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	1.504**	1.194*	1.289**
	(0.420)	(0.512)	(0.488)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-2.169**	-2.127**	-1.957**
	(0.416)	(0.465)	(0.440)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		0.956**	0.609*
		(0.265)	(0.282)
Threat Decrease (A)		-0.868	-1.113
		(0.728)	(0.745)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.695+	-0.285
		(0.396)	(0.406)
End of Cold War		-0.511	-0.522
		(0.711)	(0.827)
Asymmetric Alliance			0.727**
			(0.276)
Non-military Cooperation			-1.079**
			(0.312)
Treaty			0.117
			(0.415)
Peacetime Cooperation			0.447**
			(0.167)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			1.613**
			(0.303)
Threat Increase (B)			0.203
			(0.389)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.485
			(0.529)
Constant	-4.515**	-4.569**	-5.179**
	(0.227)	(0.329)	(0.538)
Observations	16,193	12,640	12,219
Alliance Phases	435	414	397
Log lik.	-421.0	-379.6	-314.0
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the alliance phase in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B6: Military Alliance Termination, Regime Transitions Dropped, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	1.887**	1.708**	1.847**
	(0.426)	(0.582)	(0.538)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-1.801**	-1.761**	-1.535**
	(0.402)	(0.420)	(0.409)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-1.116	-1.338	-1.441+
	(0.753)	(0.900)	(0.840)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		0.973**	0.632*
		(0.267)	(0.283)
Threat Decrease (A)		-0.874	-1.102
		(0.729)	(0.748)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.683+	-0.322
		(0.396)	(0.407)
End of Cold War		-0.741	-0.745
		(0.797)	(0.899)
Asymmetric Alliance			0.763**
			(0.283)
Non-military Cooperation			-1.076**
			(0.316)
Treaty			0.182
			(0.408)
Peacetime Cooperation			0.442**
			(0.168)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			1.598**
			(0.302)
Threat Increase (B)			0.224
			(0.389)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.482
			(0.523)
Constant	-4.557**	-4.608**	-5.295**
	(0.232)	(0.332)	(0.539)
Observations	16,193	12,640	12,219
Alliance Phases	435	414	397
Log lik.	-419.9	-378.3	-312.6
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the alliance phase in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Change in UNGA Ideal Points:

Table B7: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, Regime Transitions Dropped, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.115*	0.130*
	(0.057)	(0.058)
Continuing Democracy	-0.512**	-0.295**
	(0.057)	(0.065)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.269**
		(0.064)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.105*
		(0.050)
Economic Turmoil		-0.083
		(0.053)
Wealth		-0.363**
		(0.056)
End of Cold War		0.004
		(0.061)
Constant	-2.138**	0.726
	(0.025)	(0.466)
Observations	8,532	7,215
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.037
Country FE	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table B8: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, Regime Transitions Dropped, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.316**	0.292**
	(0.094)	(0.097)
Continuing Democracy	-0.488**	-0.275**
	(0.058)	(0.066)
SOLS Change X Continuing Democracy	-0.302**	-0.256*
	(0.113)	(0.120)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.268**
		(0.065)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.104*
		(0.050)
Economic Turmoil		-0.084
		(0.053)
Wealth		-0.360**
		(0.056)
End of Cold War		0.004
		(0.060)
Constant	-2.148**	0.700
	(0.025)	(0.465)
Observations	8,532	7,215
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.038
Country FE	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table B9: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, No FE and Two-Way FE, Pooled Models

	No FE		Two-Way FE	
	Basic	Control 1	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.098^{+}	0.105^{+}	0.113*	0.128*
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Continuing Democracy	-0.431**	-0.304**	-0.188**	-0.161**
	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.057)
Regime Transition		-0.117		0.008
		(0.115)		(0.111)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.305**		0.115
		(0.044)		(0.071)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.124*		0.078
		(0.049)		(0.047)
Economic Turmoil		-0.044		-0.018
		(0.051)		(0.049)
Wealth		-0.105**		-0.123**
		(0.020)		(0.045)
End of Cold War		0.034		
		(0.057)		
Constant	-2.175**	-1.420**	-1.267**	-0.719^{+}
	(0.025)	(0.158)	(0.145)	(0.380)
Observations	8,714	7,369	8,714	7,369
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.041	0.094	0.091
Country FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table B10: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, No FE and Two-Way FE, Interaction Models

	No FE		Two-Way FE	
	Basic	Control 1	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.239**	0.261**	0.219**	0.247**
	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.083)	(0.093)
Continuing Democracy	-0.409**	-0.285**	-0.167**	-0.145*
	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.058)
SOLS Change X Continuing Democracy	-0.246*	-0.265*	-0.184+	-0.201+
	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.101)	(0.115)
Regime Transition		-0.204+		-0.057
		(0.122)		(0.120)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.302**		0.114
		(0.045)		(0.071)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.123*		0.078
		(0.049)		(0.047)
Economic Turmoil		-0.045		-0.019
		(0.051)		(0.049)
Wealth		-0.103**		-0.122**
		(0.020)		(0.044)
End of Cold War		0.033		
		(0.057)		
Constant	-2.184**	-1.443**	-1.269**	-0.729+
	(0.024)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.377)
Observations	8,714	7,369	8,714	7,369
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.041	0.095	0.091
Country FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Sender Termination of Economic Sanctions

Table B11: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Sender Termination of Sanctions: Basic Model, USA Excluded

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	1.40% (0.00% - 13.14%)	3.02% (0.00% - 36.21%)	3.94 (1.67-8.16)
Democracy	1.84% (0.00% - 22.66%)	2.92% (0.00% - 37.73%)	2.71 (0.87-6.93)
Nondemocracy	1.92% (0.00% - 25.34%)	6.32% (0.00% - 69.49%)	8.98 (2.19-23.84)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	1.16 (0.79-1.66)	4.87 (0.82-14.59)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Basic models, excluding US cases, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B12: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Sender Termination of Sanctions: Control 1 Model, USA Excluded

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	1.65% (0.00% - 18.53%)	3.54% (0.00% - 48.25%)	3.94 (1.35-8.48)
Democracy	1.62% (0.00% - 17.54%)	2.50% (0.00% - 26.05%)	2.41 (0.69-6.53)
Nondemocracy	1.72% (0.00% - 17.71%)	7.75% (0.00% - 79.11%)	14.80 (2.95-42.95)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	1.22 (0.77-1.83)	9.42 (1.30-32.22)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 1 models, excluding US cases, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B13: Difference in First Differences of Sender Termination of Sanctions: Control 2 Model, USA Excluded

First Difference of SOLS Change in Democracies	First Difference of SOLS Change in Nondemocracies	Difference in First Differences
0.83% (-0.19% - 3.63%)	6.52% (1.24% - 18.94%)	5.69% (0.45%-17.67%)
First Difference of Nondemocracy when No SOLS Change	First Difference of Nondemocracy when SOLS Change	
-0.06% (-0.41%-0.24%)	5.63% (0.38%-17.52%)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 2 interaction models, excluding US cases, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B14: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Sender Termination of Sanctions: Basic Model, USA Included

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	0.69% (0.57% - 0.82%)	0.80% (0.37% - 1.49%)	1.16 (0.56-2.11)
Democracy	0.70% (0.58% - 0.83%)	0.44% (0.16% - 1.02%)	0.63 (0.23-1.42)
Nondemocracy	1.09% (0.80% - 1.43%)	8.41% (2.60% - 18.01%)	7.89 (2.40-17.64)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	1.57 (1.10-2.09)	23.60 (5.20-67.68)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Basic models, including US cases, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B15: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Sender Termination of Sanctions: Control 1 Model, USA Included

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	0.66% (0.55% - 0.80%)	0.70% (0.34% - 1.30%)	1.05 (0.53-1.90)
Democracy	0.67% (0.55% - 0.81%)	0.40% (0.14% - 0.88%)	0.58 (0.22-1.27)
Nondemocracy	1.03% (0.73% - 1.43%)	10.62% (2.86% - 26.89%)	10.38 (2.85-26.12)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	1.54 (1.06-2.14)	33.16 (6.22-109.79)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 1 models, including US cases, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B16: Predicted Probabilities and Relative Risks of Sender Termination of Sanctions: Control 2 Model, USA Included

	No SOLS Change	SOLS Change	Relative Risk (SOLS Change)
All States	0.32% (0.02% - 1.46%)	0.40% (0.03% - 1.83%)	1.33 (0.59-2.52)
Democracy	0.34% (0.03% - 1.56%)	0.22% (0.01% - 1.00%)	0.69 (0.25-1.56)
Nondemocracy	0.31% (0.02% - 1.44%)	4.67% (0.25% - 23.65%)	16.84 (3.80-48.28)
Relative Risk (Contdem)	0.95 (0.58-1.45)	28.03 (4.40-93.46)	

Note: Estimates based on simulations using the Control 2 models, including US cases, 95% CI in parentheses

Table B17: Sender Termination of Economic Sanctions, Regime Transitions Dropped, Pooled Models

	Sample Incl. United States			Sample Excl. United States		
	Basic	Control 1	Control 2	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.109	0.079	0.283	1.479**	1.547**	1.528**
	(0.333)	(0.341)	(0.350)	(0.404)	(0.423)	(0.426)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.503**	-0.460*	0.043	-0.187	-0.215	0.086
	(0.157)	(0.189)	(0.238)	(0.188)	(0.227)	(0.267)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		-0.380	-0.474		-0.561	-0.824*
		(0.324)	(0.334)		(0.362)	(0.335)
Economic Turmoil (A)		0.542+	0.264		0.452	0.303
		(0.289)	(0.302)		(0.288)	(0.313)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.426*	-0.082		-0.073	-0.297
		(0.183)	(0.246)		(0.226)	(0.300)
End of Cold War		-0.576+	-0.426		-0.610	-0.649
		(0.307)	(0.344)		(0.445)	(0.472)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			-0.393			0.339
			(0.265)			(0.357)
Regime Transition (B)			0.161			0.901+
			(0.390)			(0.471)
SOLS Change (B)			0.247			-0.006
			(0.334)			(0.585)
Sender-to-Target GDP Ratio			-0.767**			-0.776*
			(0.289)			(0.334)
Sender Costs			0.248			0.369
			(0.331)			(0.379)
High Politics			0.474**			0.806**
			(0.147)			(0.269)
Sender Commitment			-0.582**			-0.248
			(0.167)			(0.287)
Constant	-3.186**	-2.786**	-2.692**	-2.841**	-2.689**	-2.748**
	(0.161)	(0.260)	(0.284)	(0.195)	(0.307)	(0.329)
Observations	27,478	26,678	23,189	9,152	8,769	7,645
Sanctions Cases	888	853	736	351	336	295
Log lik.	-1545.6	-1487.7	-1234.9	-627.3	-595.6	-523.9
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the sanctions in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B18: Sender Termination of Economic Sanctions, Regime Transitions Dropped, Interaction Models

	Sample Incl. United States			Sample Excl. United States		
	Basic	Control 1	Control 2	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	2.217**	2.659**	3.073**	2.358**	3.025**	3.036**
	(0.556)	(0.618)	(0.621)	(0.620)	(0.630)	(0.595)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.410*	-0.377*	0.146	-0.102	-0.125	0.194
	(0.161)	(0.192)	(0.239)	(0.193)	(0.228)	(0.272)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-2.747**	-3.251**	-3.474**	-1.362+	-2.110*	-2.134*
	(0.722)	(0.785)	(0.785)	(0.827)	(0.870)	(0.858)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		-0.514	-0.671*		-0.765*	-1.058**
		(0.318)	(0.341)		(0.366)	(0.357)
Economic Turmoil (A)		0.499	0.230		0.453	0.269
		(0.305)	(0.316)		(0.300)	(0.331)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.438*	-0.075		-0.107	-0.306
		(0.183)	(0.246)		(0.222)	(0.296)
End of Cold War		-0.624*	-0.476		-0.708+	-0.780
		(0.300)	(0.339)		(0.424)	(0.485)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			-0.429			0.312
			(0.263)			(0.361)
Regime Transition (B)			0.100			0.780+
			(0.366)			(0.461)
SOLS Change (B)			0.236			-0.023
			(0.335)			(0.595)
Sender-to-Target GDP Ratio			-0.775**			-0.810*
			(0.291)			(0.338)
Sender Costs			0.244			0.385
			(0.335)			(0.380)
High Politics			0.457**			0.795**
			(0.149)			(0.274)
Sender Commitment			-0.628**			-0.346
			(0.173)			(0.310)
Constant	-3.260**	-2.825**	-2.728**	-2.883**	-2.679**	-2.712**
	(0.167)	(0.264)	(0.290)	(0.199)	(0.307)	(0.333)
Observations	27478	26678	23189	9152	8769	7645
Sanctions Cases	888	853	736	351	336	295
Log lik.	-1538.7	-1478.8	-1225.3	-625.5	-591.7	-520.2
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the sanctions case in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Change in Dyadic Import Patterns:

Table B19: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Regime Transitions Dropped, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.042**	0.041**	0.040**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.165**	-0.104**	-0.065**
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.174**	0.0623**
		(0.012)	(0.014)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.016	-0.040**
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.295+	0.214
		(0.150)	(0.149)
End of Cold War		0.154**	0.187**
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Economic Turmoil		0.026**	0.037**
		(0.010)	(0.010)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.116**
			(0.014)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.134**
			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.003
			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.061**
			(0.022)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.063**
			(0.013)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.073**
			(0.014)
GDP (A)			-0.075**
			(0.010)
GDP (B)			-0.041**
			(0.010)
Constant	0.981**	0.872**	3.525**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.232)
N	392,410	385,344	367,350
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.002	0.005
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table B20: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Regime Transitions Dropped, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.083**	0.073**	0.057**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.158**	-0.098**	-0.062**
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.059**	-0.047*	-0.025
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.174**	0.062**
		(0.012)	(0.014)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.016	-0.040**
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.295*	0.215
		(0.150)	(0.149)
End of Cold War		0.153**	0.187**
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Economic Turmoil		0.026**	0.036**
		(0.010)	(0.010)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.116**
			(0.014)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.134**
			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.003
			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.061**
			(0.022)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.063**
			(0.013)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.073**
			(0.014)
GDP (A)			-0.074**
			(0.010)
GDP (B)			-0.041**
			(0.010)
Constant	0.978**	0.870**	3.515**
	(0.007)	(0.00985)	(0.232)
N	392,410	385,344	367,350
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.002	0.005
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table B21: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Full Sample, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.023**	0.018**	0.027**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.086**	-0.063**	-0.049**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.006	-0.001
		(0.013)	(0.014)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.105**	0.068**
		(0.009)	(0.011)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.049**	-0.052**
		(0.008)	(0.009)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.010	0.053
		(0.091)	(0.095)
End of Cold War		0.175**	0.208**
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Economic Turmoil		0.023**	0.025**
		(0.005)	(0.006)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.147**
			(0.010)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.188**
			(0.011)
SOLS Change (B)			0.010
			(0.006)
Regime Transition (B)			0.030*
			(0.013)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.111**
			(0.010)
Domestic Conflict (B)			-0.002
			(0.010)
GDP (A)			0.056**
			(0.007)
GDP (B)			0.057**
			(0.007)
Constant	0.640**	0.589**	-1.798**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.175)
N	888,655	862,728	744,712
Adjusted R^2	0.000	0.002	0.004
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B22: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Full Sample, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.032**	0.025**	0.039**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.083**	-0.062**	-0.047**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.019+	-0.012	-0.023+
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.010	-0.008
		(0.013)	(0.015)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.105**	0.067**
		(0.009)	(0.011)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.049**	-0.052**
		(0.008)	(0.009)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.0104	0.0534
		(0.091)	(0.095)
End of Cold War		0.175**	0.208**
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Economic Turmoil		0.023**	0.024**
		(0.005)	(0.006)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.147**
			(0.010)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.187**
			(0.011)
SOLS Change (B)			0.010
			(0.006)
Regime Transition (B)			0.030*
			(0.013)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.111**
			(0.010)
Domestic Conflict (B)			-0.002
			(0.010)
GDP (A)			0.056**
			(0.007)
GDP (B)			0.057**
			(0.007)
Constant	0.639**	0.589**	-1.805**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.175)
N	888,655	862,728	744,712
Adjusted R^2	0.000	0.002	0.004
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table B23: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, No FE and Two-Way FE, Pooled Models

	No FE			Two-Way FE		
	Basic	Control 1	Control 2	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.058**	0.050**	0.049**	0.037**	0.032**	0.030**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.240**	-0.229**	-0.151**	-0.048**	-0.048**	-0.044**
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.005	0.036		0.015	0.020
		(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.022)	(0.023)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.004	-0.003		0.0003	-0.017
		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.015)	(0.016)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.076**	-0.054**		-0.022	-0.024+
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.271+	0.226		0.225	0.157
		(0.144)	(0.141)		(0.147)	(0.148)
Economic Turmoil		0.075**	0.066**		0.033**	0.030**
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.010)	(0.010)
End of Cold War		0.185**	0.200**			
		(0.011)	(0.011)			
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.170**			-0.088**
			(0.010)			(0.0144)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.222**			-0.084**
			(0.010)			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.041**			-0.011
			(0.009)			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.124**			0.057**
			(0.022)			(0.021)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			-0.043**			-0.015
			(0.011)			(0.016)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.098**			0.082**
			(0.015)			(0.015)
GDP (A)			-0.052**			-0.067**
			(0.003)			(0.012)
GDP (B)			-0.116**			-0.035**
			(0.002)			(0.012)
Constant	1.015**	0.981**	4.850**	1.523**	1.370**	3.540**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.363)
N	401,492	394,101	375,707	401,492	394,101	375,707
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.006	0.034	0.009	0.008	0.009
Directed Dyad FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on directed dyad. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table B24: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, No FE and Two-Way FE, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.058**	0.049**	0.032+	0.063**	0.060**	0.060**
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.240**	-0.229**	-0.158**	-0.040**	-0.043**	-0.038*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.001	0.002	0.034	-0.043*	-0.043*	-0.046*
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.004	0.040+		-0.001	0.002
		(0.024)	(0.024)		(0.024)	(0.024)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.004	-0.007		-0.000	-0.018
		(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.015)	(0.016)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.076**	-0.046**		-0.021	-0.023+
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.271+	0.221		0.225	0.157
		(0.144)	(0.136)		(0.147)	(0.148)
Economic Turmoil		0.075**	0.066**		0.033**	0.030**
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.010)	(0.010)
End of Cold War		0.185**	0.200**			
		(0.011)	(0.011)			
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.171**			-0.088**
			(0.010)			(0.014)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.223**			-0.084**
			(0.010)			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.039**			-0.011
			(0.009)			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.120**			0.058**
			(0.022)			(0.021)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			-0.040**			-0.015
			(0.011)			(0.016)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.098**			0.082**
			(0.014)			(0.015)
GDP (A)			-0.054**			-0.067**
			(0.003)			(0.012)
GDP (B)			-0.116**			-0.035**
			(0.002)			(0.012)
Constant	1.015**	0.981**	4.918**	1.520**	1.369**	3.536**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.079)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.363)
N	401,492	394,101	375,707	401,492	394,101	375,707
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.006	0.034	0.009	0.008	0.009
Directed Dyad FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Appendix C: Other Leader Transition

This appendix presents the results discussed in Section 4.2.1. For each issue, we display pooled models that include *Other leader transitions* as a predictor of the dependent variable.

Table C1: Military Alliance Termination, Other Leader Transition, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	1.265**	1.076*	1.118*
	(0.355)	(0.480)	(0.465)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-2.054**	-2.088**	-1.893**
	(0.375)	(0.450)	(0.426)
Other Leader Transition (A)	-0.919	-1.012	-1.623
	(0.725)	(0.733)	(1.027)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.360	0.256
		(0.679)	(0.701)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		0.919**	0.568*
		(0.265)	(0.283)
Threat Decrease (A)		-0.931	-1.251+
		(0.727)	(0.753)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.708+	-0.321
		(0.396)	(0.408)
End of Cold War		-0.287	-0.236
		(0.611)	(0.663)
Asymmetric Alliance			0.656*
			(0.279)
Non-military Cooperation			-1.198**
			(0.318)
Treaty			0.054
			(0.412)
Peacetime Cooperation			0.382*
			(0.168)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			1.581**
			(0.298)
Threat Increase (B)			0.144
			(0.382)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.599
			(0.540)
Constant	-4.515**	-4.547**	-4.900**
	(0.223)	(0.323)	(0.552)
Observations	16,506	12,883	12,461
Alliance Phases	435	414	397
Log lik.	-437.3	-394.3	-326.8
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the alliance phase in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table C2: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, Other Leader Transition, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.105*	0.151**
	(0.053)	(0.055)
Other Leader Transition	0.119*	0.160**
	(0.054)	(0.051)
Continuing Democracy	-0.493**	-0.289**
	(0.057)	(0.066)
Regime Transition		-0.097
		(0.117)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.272**
		(0.063)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.102*
		(0.049)
Economic Turmoil		-0.071
		(0.052)
Wealth		-0.356**
		(0.055)
End of Cold War		0.027
		(0.060)
Constant	-2.158**	0.648
	(0.025)	(0.460)
Observations	8,714	7,369
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.037
Country FE	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table C3: Sender Termination of Economic Sanctions, Other Leader Transition, Pooled Models

	Sample Incl. United States			Sample Excl. United States		
	Basic	Control 1	Control 2	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.079	0.007	0.192	1.310**	1.296**	1.302**
	(0.332)	(0.349)	(0.362)	(0.397)	(0.449)	(0.449)
Other Leader Transition (A)	0.135	0.170	0.074	-0.369	-0.386	-0.990
	(0.414)	(0.421)	(0.477)	(0.732)	(0.734)	(1.018)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.532**	-0.489**	-0.013	-0.220	-0.263	0.003
	(0.155)	(0.185)	(0.235)	(0.186)	(0.224)	(0.263)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		-0.404	-0.441		-0.551	-0.771*
		(0.323)	(0.334)		(0.362)	(0.345)
Economic Turmoil (A)		0.451	0.127		0.305	0.110
		(0.289)	(0.313)		(0.292)	(0.329)
Regime Transition (A)		0.727	0.252		0.193	-0.200
		(0.500)	(0.686)		(0.576)	(0.752)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.397*	-0.094		-0.079	-0.307
		(0.184)	(0.246)		(0.222)	(0.295)
End of Cold War		-0.569+	-0.434		-0.616	-0.670
		(0.306)	(0.343)		(0.446)	(0.480)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			-0.404			0.324
			(0.264)			(0.355)
Regime Transition (B)			0.148			0.847+
			(0.389)			(0.470)
SOLS Change (B)			0.251			0.032
			(0.333)			(0.584)
Sender-to-Target GDP Ratio			-0.702*			-0.666*
			(0.292)			(0.333)
Sender Costs			0.345			0.483
			(0.329)			(0.374)
High Politics			0.453**			0.731**
			(0.148)			(0.269)
Sender Commitment			-0.542**			-0.142
			(0.164)			(0.276)
Constant	-3.166**	-2.791**	-2.679**	-2.818**	-2.630**	-2.694**
	(0.159)	(0.258)	(0.281)	(0.195)	(0.304)	(0.321)
Observations	27,608	26,771	23,258	9,282	8,862	7,714
Sanctions Cases	896	857	740	359	340	299
Log lik.	-1564.9	-1506.1	-1248.4	-646.9	-614.8	-537.9
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the sanctions case in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table C4: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Other Leader Transition, Pooled Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.045**	0.046**	0.044**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Other Leader Transition (A)	0.032**	0.029**	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.162**	-0.107**	-0.070**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.013	0.005
		(0.022)	(0.023)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.169**	0.056**
		(0.012)	(0.014)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.018	-0.042**
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.271+	0.192
		(0.150)	(0.149)
End of Cold War		0.155**	0.189**
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Economic Turmoil		0.0311**	0.041**
		(0.010)	(0.010)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.115**
			(0.014)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.135**
			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.003
			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.057**
			(0.021)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.066**
			(0.013)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.071**
			(0.014)
GDP (A)			-0.074**
			(0.010)
GDP (B)			-0.042**
			(0.010)
Constant	0.978**	0.873**	3.523**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.230)
N	401,492	394,101	375,707
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.002	0.005
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Appendix D: Irregular Leadership Change

This appendix reports results discussed in Section 4.2.2. For the UNGA and trade dependent variables, we show interaction models with a) the *Irregular* variable and b) the *Irregular Exclusive* variable. For the alliance and sanctions dependent variables, we only show interaction models including *Irregular*. The *Irregular Exclusive* variable was dropped from our models because it predicts cases perfectly.

Table D1: Military Alliance Termination, Irregular Leader Transition, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.817*	0.614	0.890*
	(0.374)	(0.428)	(0.446)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-1.776**	-1.737**	-1.517**
	(0.402)	(0.417)	(0.407)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.094	-0.300	-0.542
	(0.752)	(0.857)	(0.825)
Irregular Leader Transition (A)	1.806**	1.837**	1.428**
	(0.411)	(0.438)	(0.461)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.149	0.291
		(0.605)	(0.665)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		0.941**	0.569*
		(0.265)	(0.286)
Threat Decrease (A)		-0.995	-1.231+
		(0.740)	(0.746)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.756+	-0.376
		(0.400)	(0.413)
End of Cold War		-0.150	-0.160
		(0.578)	(0.659)
Asymmetric Alliance			0.622*
			(0.286)
Non-military Cooperation			-1.170**
			(0.319)
Treaty			0.083
			(0.401)
Peacetime Cooperation			0.382*
			(0.170)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			1.586**
			(0.303)
Threat Increase (B)			0.210
			(0.380)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.614
			(0.543)
Constant	-4.645**	-4.673**	-5.088**
	(0.236)	(0.333)	(0.560)
Observations	16,506	12,883	12,461
Alliance Phases	435	414	397
Log lik.	-432.3	-390.1	-325.2
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the alliance phase in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table D2: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, Irregular Leader Transition, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.100	0.161
	(0.103)	(0.113)
Continuing Democracy	-0.467**	-0.266**
	(0.064)	(0.067)
SOLS Change X Continuing Democracy	-0.074	-0.126
	(0.122)	(0.133)
Irregular Leader Transition	0.266**	0.240*
	(0.101)	(0.108)
Regime Transition		-0.142
		(0.124)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.269**
		(0.063)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.104*
		(0.049)
Economic Turmoil		-0.072
		(0.052)
Wealth		-0.353**
		(0.055)
End of Cold War		0.030
		(0.060)
Constant	-2.145**	0.629
	(0.027)	(0.457)
Observations	8,213	7,364
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.037
Country FE	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table D3: Change in UNGA Ideal Points, Exclusive Irregular Leader Transition, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1
SOLS Change	0.219*	0.281**
	(0.085)	(0.090)
Continuing Democracy	-0.468**	-0.268**
	(0.064)	(0.067)
SOLS Change X Continuing Democracy	-0.192+	-0.245*
	(0.109)	(0.115)
Exclusive Irregular Leader Transition	0.165	0.106
	(0.161)	(0.173)
Regime Transition		-0.167
		(0.125)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally		0.271**
		(0.063)
Δ Military Capabilities		0.103*
		(0.049)
Economic Turmoil		-0.071
		(0.052)
Wealth		-0.354**
		(0.055)
End of Cold War		0.027
		(0.060)
Constant	-2.144**	0.639
	(0.027)	(0.457)
Observations	8,213	7,364
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.037
Country FE	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the country in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table D4: Sender Termination of Economic Sanctions, Irregular Leader Transition, Interaction Models

	Sample Incl. United States			Sample Excl. United States		
	Basic	Control 1	Control 2	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	1.894**	2.384**	2.723**	1.878**	2.463**	2.591**
	(0.603)	(0.827)	(0.851)	(0.628)	(0.807)	(0.719)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.445**	-0.422*	0.082	-0.140	-0.175	0.117
	(0.159)	(0.188)	(0.237)	(0.192)	(0.227)	(0.270)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-2.444**	-3.013**	-3.174**	-1.012	-1.715+	-1.837*
	(0.737)	(0.915)	(0.926)	(0.789)	(0.910)	(0.850)
Irregular Leader Transition (A)	0.379	-0.233	-0.148	0.836	0.237	0.014
	(0.929)	(1.151)	(1.068)	(0.887)	(1.084)	(1.014)
Δ Military Capabilities (A)		-0.489	-0.584+		-0.668+	-0.926**
		(0.309)	(0.331)		(0.344)	(0.355)
Economic Turmoil (A)		0.404	0.086		0.292	0.094
		(0.305)	(0.331)		(0.305)	(0.344)
Regime Transition (A)		0.463	-0.107		0.122	-0.313
		(0.633)	(0.892)		(0.660)	(0.859)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		-0.413*	-0.087		-0.089	-0.305
		(0.184)	(0.246)		(0.219)	(0.292)
End of Cold War		-0.614*	-0.479		-0.672	-0.767
		(0.297)	(0.334)		(0.419)	(0.468)
Δ Military Capabilities (B)			-0.427			0.328
			(0.262)			(0.357)
Regime Transition (B)			0.101			0.772+
			(0.363)			(0.448)
SOLS Change (B)			0.243			0.004
			(0.334)			(0.593)
Sender-to-Target GDP Ratio			-0.720*			-0.687*
			(0.293)			(0.337)
Sender Costs			0.359			0.515
			(0.331)			(0.373)
High Politics			0.440**			0.721**
			(0.148)			(0.272)
Sender Commitment			-0.581**			-0.202
			(0.170)			(0.292)
Constant	-3.233**	-2.813**	-2.710**	-2.857**	-2.653**	-2.717**
	(0.163)	(0.262)	(0.287)	(0.199)	(0.305)	(0.324)
Observations	27,608	26,771	23,258	9,282	8,862	7,714
Sanctions Cases	896	857	740	359	340	299
Log lik.	-1558.8	-1498.9	-1240.5	-645.2	-612.0	-535.6
Time Polynomials	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the sanctions case in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table D5: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Irregular Leader Transition, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.074**	0.086**	0.0767**
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.156**	-0.103**	-0.068**
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.016)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.050*	-0.060**	-0.045+
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Irregular Leader Transition (A)	-0.015	-0.026	-0.030
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.033	-0.010
		(0.024)	(0.025)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.168**	0.056**
		(0.012)	(0.014)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.016	-0.041**
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.270+	0.192
		(0.150)	(0.149)
End of Cold War		0.155**	0.189**
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Economic Turmoil		0.031**	0.042**
		(0.010)	(0.010)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.116**
			(0.014)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.135**
			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.003
			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.057**
			(0.021)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.066**
			(0.013)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.071**
			(0.014)
GDP (A)			-0.074**
			(0.010)
GDP (B)			-0.042**
			(0.010)
Constant	0.979**	0.875**	3.525**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.230)
N	401,492	394,101	375,707
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.002	0.005
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Table D6: Change in Dyadic Import Patterns, Exclusive Irregular Leader Transition, Interaction Models

	Basic	Control 1	Control 2
SOLS Change (A)	0.067**	0.072**	0.060**
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.155**	-0.103**	-0.067**
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
SOLS Change (A) X Continuing Democracy (A)	-0.043*	-0.046*	-0.029
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Exclusive Irregular Leader Transition (A)	0.005	-0.006	-0.003
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Regime Transition (A)		-0.030	-0.006
		(0.024)	(0.024)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (A)		0.168**	0.056**
		(0.012)	(0.014)
Domestic Conflict (A)		-0.017	-0.041**
		(0.013)	(0.013)
Interstate Conflict (A-B)		0.270+	0.192
		(0.150)	(0.149)
End of Cold War		0.155**	0.189**
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Economic Turmoil		0.031**	0.041**
		(0.010)	(0.010)
Joint GATT/WTO Membership			-0.116**
			(0.014)
Joint PTA Membership			-0.135**
			(0.015)
SOLS Change (B)			-0.003
			(0.009)
Regime Transition (B)			0.057**
			(0.021)
U.S. or U.S.S.R. Cold War Ally (B)			0.066**
			(0.013)
Domestic Conflict (B)			0.071**
			(0.014)
GDP (A)			-0.074**
			(0.010)
GDP (B)			-0.042**
			(0.010)
Constant	0.978**	0.874**	3.524**
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.230)
N	401,492	394,101	375,707
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.002	0.005
Directed Dyad FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust SE clustered on the directed dyad in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.