Supplementary Appendix for Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German-Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis

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A Additional Tables

In this section, we present tables with full results for all figures of the main text and Online Appendix that plot regression output. Due to space constraints, the table corresponding to Figure C.3 of the Online Appendix is separately provided in the output folder of the replication material on the APSR Dataverse.

Table A.1: Vote share by party anti-Germanism and reprisal status

Dep. Variable	Vote share	
	(1) Pro-German parties	(2) Anti-German parties
Reprisal × Oct '09	0.00146	0.000418
	(0.00145)	(0.00117)
Reprisal × May '12	-0.0154**	0.00481
	(0.00705)	(0.00336)
Reprisal × Jun '12	-0.0131**	0.0191***
	(0.00630)	(0.00541)
Reprisal × Jan '15	-0.0391***	0.0295***
	(0.00782)	(0.00656)
Observations	5159	5159
R-squared	0.959	0.914

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure 4 of the main paper. The dependent variable is, respectively, the aggregate vote share of ND and PASOK (column 1) and Syriza, KKE and LAOS (column 2). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal unit level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

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Table A.2: Anti-German party vote shares by martyr status and public commemoration activity

Dep. Variable	Anti-German party vote share
	(1)
Oct '09 × Reprisal	0.00265
	(0.00272)
May '12 × Reprisal	-0.0109
	(0.00805)
Jun '12 × Reprisal	-0.0151
	(0.0126)
Jan '15 × Reprisal	-0.00630
	(0.0164)
Oct '09 × Martyr	-0.00233
	(0.00302)
May '12 × Martyr	0.0182**
	(0.00908)
Jun '12 × Martyr	0.0339**
	(0.0143)
Jan '15 × Martyr	0.0400**
	(0.0190)
Oct '09 × Memorial (non-martyr)	-0.00258
	(0.00308)
May '12 × Memorial (non-martyr)	0.0168*
	(0.00891)
Jun '12 × Memorial (non-martyr)	0.0408***
	(0.0144)
Jan '15 × Memorial (non-martyr)	0.0394**
	(0.0180)
Observations	5159
R-squared	0.914

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure 6 of the main paper. The dependent variable is the aggregate vote share of Syriza, KKE and LAOS. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal unit level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.3: Vote share by party and reprisal status, disaggregated

Dep. Variable	Vote share				
	(1) Syriza	(2) LAOS	(3) KKE	(4) ND	(5) PASOK
Oct '09 × Reprisal	0.00196***	-0.00252***	0.000979	-0.0000256	0.00149
	(0.000686)	(0.000808)	(0.000654)	(0.00263)	(0.00246)
May '12 × Reprisal	-0.00282	0.00444***	0.00327**	-0.00810*	-0.00739
	(0.00310)	(0.000944)	(0.00144)	(0.00472)	(0.00512)
Jun '12 × Reprisal	0.00770	0.00641***	0.00509***	-0.00889**	-0.00438
	(0.00529)	(0.000902)	(0.00145)	(0.00386)	(0.00496)
Jan '15 × Reprisal	0.0189***	0.00549***	0.00527***	-0.00893**	-0.0303***
	(0.00607)	(0.000970)	(0.00141)	(0.00431)	(0.00716)
Sep '15 × Reprisal	0.0195***		0.00648***	-0.00482	
	(0.00544)		(0.00141)	(0.00359)	
Observations	6194	5159	6194	6194	5159
R-squared	0.933	0.782	0.925	0.909	0.949

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure A.2 of the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal unit level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.4: Probability of being assigned martyr status, by cutoffs of destruction

Dep. Variable	Change in probability of being assigned martyr status
	(1)
Destruction $>$ 10%	-0.0175
	(0.111)
Destruction $>$ 20%	-0.211**
	(0.0953)
Destruction $>$ 30%	0.0625
	(0.0616)
Destruction $>$ 40%	0.0708
	(0.109)
Destruction $>$ 50%	0.405**
	(0.167)
Destruction $>$ 60%	-0.244
	(0.180)
Destruction $>$ 70%	0.106
	(0.171)
Destruction $>$ 80%	0.0444
	(0.162)
Destruction $>$ 90%	0.141
	(0.112)
Observations	277
R-squared	0.166

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure A.3 of the Online Appendix. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p$<$ 0.01, ** p$<$ 0.05, * p$<$ 0.1.

Table A.5: Long-run effect of monthly article share

Dep. Variable	Share German cars	
	(1)	(2)
Article share × Share towns	-3.411**	
	(1.684)	
Article share$_{t-1}$ × Share towns	-0.206	
	(1.209)	
Article share$_{t-2}$ × Share towns	1.170	
	(2.351)	
Article share$_{t-3}$ × Share towns	-0.417	
	(1.425)	
Article share$_{t-4}$ × Share towns	0.973	
	(1.390)	
Article share$_{t-5}$ × Share towns	0.925	
	(1.074)	
Article share$_{t-6}$ × Share towns	-2.451	
	(1.696)	
		(3.592)
Article share$_{t-1}$ × Share martyr towns		-0.0861
		(3.449)
Article share$_{t-2}$ × Share martyr towns		3.725
		(7.484)
Article share$_{t-3}$ × Share martyr towns		-2.935
		(4.242)
Article share$_{t-4}$ × Share martyr towns		3.292
		(3.919)
Article share$_{t-5}$ × Share martyr towns		-0.412
		(5.517)
Article share$_{t-6}$ × Share martyr towns		-3.032
		(3.941)
Observations	3937	3937
R-squared	0.393	0.393

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure A.4 of the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.6: Evolution of the share of dealerships selling German cars, by exposure to reprisals

Dep. Variable	Share of dealerships that sell German cars
	(1)
Share towns × 2009	0.0310
	(0.401)
Share towns × 2010	-0.149
	(0.604)
Share towns × 2011	0.0171
	(0.534)
Share towns × 2012	-0.0584
	(0.493)
Share towns × 2013	0.361
	(0.558)
Share towns × 2014	0.533
	(0.558)
Observations	275
R-squared	0.520

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure A.6 of the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.7: Over time change in number of dealerships by exposure to reprisals and type of car sold

Dep. Variable	IHS(# of Dealers)	
	(1)	(2)
	No German cars	At least one German car
Share towns × 2009	1.359	3.120
	(2.078)	(3.586)
Share towns × 2010	2.049	2.579
	(1.740)	(4.110)
Share towns × 2011	-2.735	-3.142
	(2.897)	(2.150)
Share towns × 2012	6.056**	4.144
	(2.260)	(3.847)
Share towns × 2013	2.976	4.860
	(2.084)	(3.488)
Share towns × 2014	0.989	5.116
	(2.167)	(3.302)
Observations	336	336
R-squared	0.869	0.865

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure C.7 of the Online Appendix. is, respectively, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the number of dealerships that do not sell German cars (column 1) or sell at least one German car (column 2). Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture leve Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.8: Effect of reprisal status on party vote shares at different levels of aggregation

Dep. Variable	Vote share				
	(1) Syriza	(2) LAOS	(3) KKE	(4) ND	(5) PASOK
	Panel A: Municipal unit				
Reprisal × Oct '09	0.00196***	-0.00252***	0.000979	-0.0000256	0.00149
	(0.000686)	(0.000808)	(0.000654)	(0.00263)	(0.00246)
Reprisal × May '12	-0.00282	0.00444***	0.00327**	-0.00810*	-0.00739
	(0.00310)	(0.000944)	(0.00144)	(0.00472)	(0.00512)
Reprisal × Jun '12	0.00770	0.00641***	0.00509***	-0.00889**	-0.00438
	(0.00529)	(0.000902)	(0.00145)	(0.00386)	(0.00496)
Reprisal × Jan '15	0.0189***	0.00549***	0.00527***	-0.00893**	-0.0303***
	(0.00607)	(0.000970)	(0.00141)	(0.00431)	(0.00716)
Reprisal × Sep '15	0.0195***		0.00648***	-0.00482	
	(0.00544)		(0.00141)	(0.00359)	
Observations	6194	5159	6194	6194	5159
R-squared	0.933	0.782	0.925	0.909	0.949
	Panel B: Electoral periphery				
Reprisal × Oct '09	0.00173	-0.00702*	0.00734**	-0.0221	0.0153
	(0.00437)	(0.00376)	(0.00311)	(0.0333)	(0.0258)
Reprisal × May '12	0.000576	0.0105**	0.0167**	-0.0600*	-0.0342
	(0.0162)	(0.00501)	(0.00813)	(0.0323)	(0.0362)
Reprisal × Jun '12	0.0385	0.0151***	0.0187**	-0.0664**	-0.0140
	(0.0349)	(0.00531)	(0.00855)	(0.0260)	(0.0385)
Reprisal × Jan '15	0.0668*	0.0137**	0.0209**	-0.0581**	-0.0765*
	(0.0378)	(0.00614)	(0.00814)	(0.0241)	(0.0412)
Reprisal × Sep '15	0.0763**		0.0228***	-0.0510**	
	(0.0298)		(0.00829)	(0.0209)	
Observations	336	280	336	336	280
R-squared	0.967	0.888	0.938	0.955	0.975

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure C.10 of the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the municipal unit (Panel A) or electoral periphery (Panel B). Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.9: Examining the role of spillovers

Dep. Variable	Vote share				
	(1) Syriza	(2) LAOS	(3) KKE	(4) ND	(5) PASOK
	Panel A: Municipal unit				
Reprisal × Oct '09	0.00196***	-0.00252***	0.000979	-0.0000256	0.00149
	(0.000686)	(0.000808)	(0.000654)	(0.00263)	(0.00246)
Reprisal × May '12	-0.00282	0.00444***	0.00327**	-0.00810*	-0.00739
	(0.00310)	(0.000944)	(0.00144)	(0.00472)	(0.00512)
Reprisal × Jun '12	0.00770	0.00641***	0.00509***	-0.00889**	-0.00438
	(0.00529)	(0.000902)	(0.00145)	(0.00386)	(0.00496)
Reprisal × Jan '15	0.0189***	0.00549***	0.00527***	-0.00893**	-0.0303***
	(0.00607)	(0.000970)	(0.00141)	(0.00431)	(0.00716)
Reprisal × Sep '15	0.0195***		0.00648***	-0.00482	
	(0.00544)		(0.00141)	(0.00359)	
Observations	6194	5159	6194	6194	5159
R-squared	0.933	0.782	0.925	0.909	0.949
	Panel B: Municipal unit, excluding direct spillovers				
Reprisal × Oct '09	0.00152	-0.00188*	0.00270***	0.00578*	-0.00570*
	(0.00115)	(0.000973)	(0.000976)	(0.00312)	(0.00298)
Reprisal × May '12	0.000760	0.00632***	0.00836***	-0.0106*	0.00134
	(0.00485)	(0.00118)	(0.00207)	(0.00605)	(0.00663)
Reprisal × Jun '12	0.00773	0.00630***	0.00869***	-0.0212***	0.00513
	(0.00748)	(0.00113)	(0.00220)	(0.00582)	(0.00649)
Reprisal × Jan '15	0.0208**	0.00483***	0.00930***	-0.0281***	-0.0208**
	(0.00903)	(0.00126)	(0.00221)	(0.00652)	(0.00847)
Reprisal × Sep '15	0.0241***		0.0116***	-0.0205***	
	(0.00756)		(0.00212)	(0.00555)	
Observations	2332	1941	2332	2332	1941
R-squared	0.913	0.792	0.918	0.889	0.945
	Panel C: Electoral periphery				
Reprisal × Oct '09	0.00173	-0.00702*	0.00734**	-0.0221	0.0153
	(0.00437)	(0.00376)	(0.00311)	(0.0333)	(0.0258)
Reprisal × May '12	0.000576	0.0105**	0.0167**	-0.0600*	-0.0342
	(0.0162)	(0.00501)	(0.00813)	(0.0323)	(0.0362)
Reprisal × Jun '12	0.0385	0.0151***	0.0187**	-0.0664**	-0.0140
	(0.0349)	(0.00531)	(0.00855)	(0.0260)	(0.0385)
Reprisal × Jan '15	0.0668*	0.0137**	0.0209**	-0.0581**	-0.0765*
	(0.0378)	(0.00614)	(0.00814)	(0.0241)	(0.0412)
Reprisal × Sep '15	0.0763**		0.0228***	-0.0510**	
	(0.0298)		(0.00829)	(0.0209)	
Observations	336	280	336	336	280
R-squared	0.967	0.888	0.938	0.955	0.975

Notes: Table reports estimation results plotted in graphical form in Figure C.11 of the Online Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the municipal unit (Panels A and B) or electoral periphery (Panel B). Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B Survey Instrument

Table B.1: Survey instrument

	Introduction
	Good morning/Good evening, We are calling from the Public Opinion Research Unit of the University of Macedonia. We are conducting a study on political behavior in the context of a research program conducted by the Universities of Zurich and Stanford. Could I speak for seven minutes with the youngest member of your family that is 18 years or older and is at home right now? Thank you very much. I would like to inform you that your phone number has been selected at random, it is not known to anyone and all your responses will remain confidential. I would also like to inform you that the principal investigators in this study are the professors Hans-Joachim Voth from the University of Zurich and Vasiliki Fouka from Stanford University. At the end of the interview you will be provided with the contact information of the researchers and Stanford IRB so you can address them in case you have any questions. Finally, I would like to let you know that we can stop the interview whenever you wish. Would you like to begin with the study?
	Consumer behavior
Q.1	Let me start by asking you which municipal district you live in.
Q.2	Would you mind telling us what brand is the car you are driving?
Q.3	And do you remember in which year and month you bought it?
Q.4	If you had no financial constraints, which brand of car would you buy?
	Opinions on Greek debt crisis
	We would now like to ask you a few questions on your opinions on the Greek crisis. I will start by mentioning to you a few explanations of the economic crisis in Greece that one hears in the media. For each one, I will ask you to tell me whether you strongly agree with the explanation, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree or strongly disagree. [Order of statements randomized]
Q.5	The world financial crisis of 2008 eventually reached Greece, causing massive unemployment and problems in the financial sector.
Q.6	The EU failed to support Greece during a major economic downturn.
Q.7	Germany imposed austerity when Greece was weak. This is what caused the country's economic crisis.
Q.8	Corruption and incompetent economic management in Greece over the last decades eventually led to a crisis; It was inevitable sooner or later.
Q.9	If you had to blame just one actor for the Greek crisis, which one would you name? [Randomize order of options.] The EU Greek politicians German politicians The IMF US Bankers DK/NA
	Nationalism and political behavior

Cont.

Table B.1: Survey instrument

	And let's now end with a few more questions on you personally.
Q.10	Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement? "I am proud to be Greek."
Q.11	Have you ever attended a demonstration?
Q.12	Have you ever joined a strike?
Q.13	Did you lose your job within the last 5 years?
	Demographics
Q.14	In which year were you born?
Q.15	Where you born?
	Municipal district of residence Other
Q.16	And were your parents born in the same municipal district you now reside?
	Both born here Only one born here Both born elsewhere
Q.17	Which is the highest level of education you have completed?
	Elementary school Middle school High school Tertiary education (2 years) University degree (4 years) Postgraduate degree None of these
Q.18	Your net monthly income including taxes or social security contributions is:
	Under 500 euros 501 to 1000 euros 1001 to 1500 euros 1501 to 2000 euros 2001 to 3000 euros 3001 to 5000 euros Over 5001 euros DK/NA 88
	End of survey
	Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions or complaints on this study you can contact the principal investigator Vasiliki Fouka. If you wish to address your complaints to someone independent from the research team you can contact the Stanford Institutional Review Board. Have a nice day.