EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT SCHEME (EUBS): A CONJOINT EXPERIMENT

1. Survey authors

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2. Survey information

2.1 *survey design.* This is a Conjoint Experiment survey carried out by IPSOS on behalf of a team based at the University of Amsterdam. The survey aims at testing attitudes towards alternative European Unemployment Benefit Schemes (EUBS). We model different EUBSs as varying across 6 dimensions (first column in table 1): the size of the programme, country-level conditionality, impact on cross-country redistribution, impact on taxation, level of administration, and individual-level conditionality. Each of these dimensions has multiple levels (column 2 in table 1); there is a total of 324 alternative combinations. Each respondent is confronted with randomly selected pairs and he/she is asked to (1) pick the preferred combination, and (2) report how much each combination is liked or disliked (independently from each-other). The experiment is repeated three times. In the second part of the survey, several demographic and attitudinal questions are asked. An attention check concludes the survey to ensure that robustness checks can be carried out on the subsample of respondents passing/failing such test.

Figures 1 and 2 below, taken from the test-environment, show how the conjoint will look for a respondent taking the survey in English.

2.2 *Data collection.* The Survey is carried out in 13 countries: NL, BE, FR, ES, IT, AT, DE, PL, DK, EE, FI, HU, IE. The countries have been selected so to ensure variation in (1) welfare state models, (2) economic performance over the last 10 years, (3) geographical location, (4) Euro Area membership. The international survey company IPSOS has been selected to carry out the research on behalf of the researchers after a 2-stages, competitive bidding process involving 11 Survey companies. A pre-test of the experiment has been carried out in IT and the NL, over a reduced sample of 300 individuals, to verify the correct working of the survey. The full survey will include a new sample of 1500 individuals in each of the 13 surveyed countries. **At the moment of this pre-registration, the fieldwork is yet to begin.** Representativeness of the sample will be strengthened by strict quotas for education, age, gender and NUTS-1 geographical distribution. International comparison for education has been achieved by using a 9-level categorization based upon ISCED-11 categories. Respondents will be able to respond to their survey in their own national language. In the case of Spain, Belgium and Estonia, respondents will be able to take the survey in Spanish or Catalan, in French or Flemish, and in Russian or Estonian.

Figure 1- a conjoint experiment example

	Option 1	Option 2
How much does the new programme subsidize the national unemployment benefit, when a country is in need?	40% of the last wage, covering the first 6 months of unemployment	40% of the last wage, covering the first 6 months of unemployment
Are there conditions for unemployed people?	Yes, the unemployed must apply for at least one job per week, and accept any suitable job offer, or lose the benefit	Yes, the unemployed must accept any suitable job offer lose the benefit
Are there conditions that countries in need must fulfil to obtain the support?	No conditions	No conditions
May some countries receive more support from the programme than they pay into it?	Yes, in the long run countries can receive more support from the programme than they paid into the programme	Yes, in the long run countries can receive more support the programme than they paid into the programme
Who will administer the programme?	The European Union	The European Union
What is the long-term impact on the taxes you have to pay?	In the long run, taxes will increase with 0.5% of income for everyone in your country	No impact in the long-run: the level of taxes remains the same in your country

Figure 2- Questions associated with the conjoint



The remainder of this Pre-Registration file follows closely the format suggested by professional standards for pre-registration procedures, such as those proposed by the Open Science Foundation and by the website "AsPredicted".

3. What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

3.1 Hypotheses associated with specific dimensions of the Conjoint Analysis

Table 1: Conjoint Analysis (dimensions and levels) and dimension, level- specific expectations

Dimension	Levels	Expectations w.r.t. average attitudes	Expectations w.r.t. the impact of country-level factors (mainly, but not only, sociotropic concerns)	Expectations w.r.t. the impact of individual characteristics
How much does the new programme subsidize the national unemployment benefit, when a country is in need?	40% of the last wage, covering the first 6 months of unemployment 60% of the last wage, covering the first 6 months of unemployment 70% of the last wage, covering the first 6 months of unemployment	*On average, the more generous is the scheme, the higher is the support*	*In countries facing economic difficulties there is a stronger preference for more generous schemes.* *Alternative hypotheses w.r.t. countries with high current levels of unemployment benefits:* - *In countries with high current levels of unemployment benefits there is stronger preference for more generous schemes.* - *In countries with low current levels of unemployment benefits there is a stronger preference for more generous schemes.* Explanation: on the one hand, it is plausible that countries with high unemployment benefits may want to maintain that level. On the other hand, it is possible that countries with low unemployment benefits would like to have higher benefits, if ensured by the EU. Hence, we do not have a stronger prior about this relationship. *In countries that are net contributors to the EU budget, there is a stronger preference for less generous schemes* *The stronger the fiscal adjustment in the country during the crisis, the stronger the preference for more generous systems* *W.r.t. the migration crisis, countries can be sorted as "countries of arrival" (where migrants enter the EU) and "countries of destination" (where migrants attempt to move). We expect that, in countries of arrival, there is a stronger preference for generous*	*Disadvantaged individuals are more likely to prefer higher generosity* *High educated individuals (as different from other elements of disadvantage) are more likely to prefer higher generosity* *Individuals thinking that unemployed in their country have a high standard of living are more likely to prefer less generous schemes, even in countries with low current levels of unemployment benefits* *Individuals holding a left-wing ideology are more likely to prefer more generous schemes.* *Labour unions members are more likely to prefer more generous schemes.* *Individuals with a positive attitude towards labour unions are more likely to prefer more generous schemes.* *Individuals with supranational identity are more likely to support more generous schemes, compared to exclusive nationalists* *Individuals with supranational identity are more likely to support higher generosity*

			schemes when those allow for cross-country redistribution	
Are there conditions that countries in need must fulfil to obtain the support?	No conditions A country can only receive support if it offers education and training opportunities for all its unemployed citizens	*On average, the tighter the conditionality, the stronger the support*	*In countries facing economic difficulties there is a stronger preference for less tight conditions* *In countries that are net contributors to the EU budget there is a stronger preference for more tight conditionality* *In countries with high current levels of ALMP-spending on training, there is preference for more tight conditionality* *The stronger the fiscal adjustment in the country during the crisis, the stronger the preference for less tight conditionality.* In federal countries there is a stronger preference for tighter conditionality.	*Disadvantaged individuals are more likely to prefer less tight conditionality* *Alternative hypotheses w.r.t. individuals with a recent unemployment experience:* - *Individuals with recent unemployment experience are more likely to prefer **tighter** conditionality.* - *Individuals with recent unemployment experience are more likely to prefer less conditionality.* Explanation: On the one hand, individuals who recently lost a job may have a direct experience of unemployment and may know that active labour market policies help re-employment. On the other hand, individuals who recently lost a job may consider active labour market policies as too strict on themselves. We do not have a strong priori on this relationship. *Labour unions members are more likely to prefer more generous benefits* *Individuals with supranational identity are less likely to support tight conditionality, compared to exclusive nationalists* *citizens in federal states are possibly more used to conditionalities in welfare systems. Hence, citizens in Federal countries are more likely to support packages with stronger conditionality.*
May some countries receive more support from the programme than they pay into it?	No, in the long run countries cannot receive more support from the programme than they paid into the programme. ("insurance option") Yes, in the long run countries can receive more support from the programme than they paid into the programme ("tolerant option") Yes, in the long run, poor countries will receive more support from the programme than they paid into it, while rich	*On average, we expect a stronger support for the balanced, "insurance" option*	*The richer the country, the higher the preference for the insurance option.* *In countries facing economic difficulties there is a lower preference for the insurance option* *In countries that are net contributors to the EU budget, there is a stronger preference for the insurance option.* *The stronger the fiscal adjustment in the country during the crisis, the weaker the preference for the insurance option.* *In countries of migration arrival there is a stronger preference for the redistributive option.*	*Disadvantaged individuals are more likely to prefer the redistributive option* *Individuals with supranational identity are more likely to support the "tolerant" option than exclusive nationalists* *Individuals with supranational identity are more likely to support the redistributive option over the insurance option* *Left-wing individuals are more likely to prefer the redistributive option*

	countries will receive less support from the programme than they paid into it. ("redistributive option")			
What is the long-term impact on the taxes you have to pay for your unemployment insurance?	No impact in the long-run: the level of taxes remains the same in your country In the long run, taxes will increase with 0.5% of income for everyone in your country In the long run, taxes will increase with 1% of income only for the rich in your country	*On average, the lower the tax increase, the higher the support. This means that option 1 will be preferred to both option 2 and 3.* *If there is a tax increase, the more progressive the tax increase, the stronger the preference. This means that option 3 will be preferred to option 2.*	*The more unequal is the country, the more taxation of only the rich will be preferred.* OR *The more unequal is the country, the less taxation for only the rich will be preferred* *In countries facing economic difficulties there is a preference for higher levels of more taxation of only the rich*	*Disadvantaged individuals are more likely to prefer taxation of only the rich.* *Individuals with supranational identity are less likely to support the "no increase in taxation" option than other respondents.* *Labour unions members are more likely to prefer taxation for only the rich.* *Left-wing individuals are more likely to prefer taxation for only the rich.*
Who will administer the programme?	The European Union National Governments	*On average, we expect more support for the maintaining of national oversight*	*The higher the Capacity of the state, the stronger the preference for National Administration* *The lower the (perceived) corruption in the country, the higher the preference for National Administration* *In countries with Eurosceptic governments there is a stronger preference for National Administration* *Ceteris paribus, in countries that are net contributors to the EU budget, there is a stronger preference for European Administration.*	*Individuals with supranational identity are more likely to support European Administration than exclusive nationalists* *Individuals with supranational identity are more likely to support European administration over national administration* *I* *The relationship between income and administration is expected to be positive up to a certain threshold: the higher the income, the stronger the preference for European Administration; and then turn negative for top-earners.* *The lower the trust in the National institutions, the lower the preference for National Administration*

				The higher the trust in the European Union, the higher the preference for National Administration *Voters of opposition parties in countries with Eurosceptic governments are more likely to prefer European Administration.* *Voters of opposition parties in countries with pro-European governments are more likely to prefer National Administration*
Are there conditions for unemployed people?	No conditions Yes, the unemployed must accept any suitable job offer or lose the benefit Yes, the unemployed must apply for at least one job per week, **and** accept any suitable job offer, or lose the benefit	*On average, the stronger the conditionality, the higher the support*	*In country facing economic difficulties there is a preference for less tight conditions* *In countries that are net contributors to the EU budget, there is a preference for more tight conditionality* *In countries with strict eligibility and activation conditions for unemployment benefits, there is a preference for tight conditionality* *The stronger the fiscal adjustment in the country during the crisis, the stronger the preference for less tight systems* *In federal countries there is a stronger preference for tighter conditionality.*	*Disadvantaged individuals are more likely to prefer less tight conditionality* ***Elderly,** left-wing individuals are more likely to prefer less tight conditionality.* ***Elderly,** right-wing individuals are more likely to prefer tighter conditionality.* ***Young,** left-wing individuals are more likely to prefer tighter conditionality* ***Young,** right-wing individuals are more likely to prefer less-tight conditionality* *Alternative hypotheses:* - *Individuals with recent unemployment experience are more likely to prefer **tighter** conditionality.* - *Individuals with recent unemployment experience are more likely to prefer less conditionality.* Explanation: On the one hand, individuals who recently lost a job may have a direct experience of unemployment and may know that active labour market policies help re-employment. On the other hand, individuals who recently lost a job may consider active labour market policies as too strict on themselves. We do not have a strong priori on this relationship. *Labour unions members prefer are more likely to prefer less conditionality.* *Individuals with supranational identity are less likely to support individual conditionality than exclusive nationalists* *In countries where conditionality is low, higher conditionality in the package is associated with stronger support by right wing individuals.* *In countries where conditionality is high, higher conditionality is opposed by left-wing individuals.*

				citizens in federal states are possibly more used to conditionalities in welfare systems. Hence, citizens in Federal countries are more likely to support packages with stronger conditionality.

2.2. *hypotheses not associated with specific dimensions of the conjoint experiment.*

a. **Left voters composition hypothesis:** highly educated, left-wing voters will have a higher average preference for the schemes than low-educated, left-wing voters.
b. **Welfare chauvinism (1) :** the lower the socioeconomic status of an individual, the more likely the individual is a welfare chauvinist (individuals are defined as welfare chauvinist if they have both strong preference for redistribution but low average preference for all schemes).
c. **Welfare chauvinism (2)** the higher the GDP per capita of a country, the more likely citizens will be welfare chauvinists.
d. **Welfare chauvinism (3-** interaction) individuals of low socioeconomic status in low GDP countries are less likely to be welfare chauvinists than individuals of low socioeconomic status in high GDP counties
e. **Welfare chauvinism (4 – interaction)** individuals of low socioeconomic status in low welfare expenditure countries are less likely to be welfare chauvinists than individuals of low socioeconomic status in high welfare expenditure countries
f. **Welfare chauvinism (5- identity)** individuals with exclusive national identities are more likely to be welfare chauvinists than individuals with supranational identities.
g. **Overall economic performance:** countries facing economic difficulties, and individuals in countries facing economic difficulties, will have, ceteris paribus, higher average support (across all packages) than countries, and individuals in countries, with no economic difficulties.
h. **Fiscal Consolidation hypothesis:** The more effective fiscal consolidation has been (measured, for instance, by a composite index bringing together the nr. of quarters needed both to bring per-capita GDP back to the pre-crisis level *and* to bring deficit under the 3% threshold), the lower is the preference for altering the status quo (the latter identified by a country-specific variable including national generosity & conditionality). i.e. the preference will be stronger the closer is the package with the current national system.
i. **The "demos" hypothesis.** The stronger the European identity of the individual, the higher is the average level of support across packages. We expect this, since it is plausible that collective identity constitutes a driver for preferences w.r.t allocation of collective solidarity, since it determines the ingroups and outgroups.
j. **The "reciprocity" hypothesis:** The stronger is the solidarity received by a given country or region over a period of time, the stronger is their sense of belonging to the community, and therefore the stronger is the average preference across all packages.

We expect this since countries, and regions, experiencing higher solidarity throughout their recent history will have developed stronger Europeanized identities, and therefore will be more willing to participate in risk-sharing instruments.

k. **The "multilevel identity" hypothesis:** Citizens in federal states are used to "multilevel identities" and therefore, ceteris paribus, *exclusive national* identification is less of a constraint for the overall preference towards packages than in Unitary countries. Ceteris paribus, citizens in federal countries will have a higher average approval of packages than citizens in unitary countries.
l. **Income sources hypothesis:** people gaining the largest share of income from investments and/or other financial instruments are in general more supportive of EUBS than non-investors.
m. **Insecurity hypothesis.** The higher is the economic insecurity of the individual (economic insecurity, professional insecurity, relative income position, and worries about globalization & robotics) the stronger the average support for EUBS.

4. Data collection. Have any data been collected for this study already?

"it's complicated". A preliminary version of the survey experiment has been carried out on a sub-scale sample 300 individuals in two countries (IT & NL) to ensure that the survey experiment works as expected. The full version of the survey that will be carried out on a full-scale sample of 1500 individuals in 13 countries features a rather different conjoint experiment. Hence, we consider that the data collection, yet to be started at the moment of this registration, constitutes a different exercise than the pre-test.

5. Key dependent variables. Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

The key dependent two variables are represented by the dimensions of the conjoint. Each individual is "treated" three times, since the experiment is replicated thrice. The dimensions of the conjoint are the following: the replacement rate (3 levels), the country-level conditionality (2 levels), the cross-country degree of redistribution (3 levels), the impact on domestic taxation (3 levels), the level of administration (2 levels) and the individual-level conditionality (3 levels). For three times, the individuals are administered with 2 randomly selected packages. For each iteration of 2 different packages, the individuals are asking to indicate both a relative preference (by means of a binary choice for the most preferred package) and an absolute level of support for each of the two packages, the latter measured on a 5-points Likert scale.

6. Conditions/treatments. How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

Th conjoint experiment is composed by 6 dimensions, for a total of 324 packages. Each individual is administered with 2 random packages, 3 times.

7. Analyses. Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

The analysis will be carried out by means of distribution statistics and several typologies of regression models, including , linear regression models, panel models, logit models, and multilevel models.

8. Sample Size. How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size?

The pre-test was carried out collecting data on 300 individuals in each of the 2 countries surveyed. The sample size for the full experiment is composed by 1500 individuals in each of the 13 countries surveyed. The sample is collected by means of the IPSOS online panel, and it includes demographic quotas for education (3 levels), regional distribution (country-specific), age (4 levels) and gender (2 levels).