Online Appendix

A. Coding Procedure (quoted from Risse 2024)



Figure A1. Coding procedure

The coding procedure can be regarded as a decision tree with up to five steps. If the resolution is substantially about another topic than arms control (step 1), it is categorized as 0. For instance, resolution 50/70M emphasizes the importance of environmental norms in the negotiation of disarmament agreements and urges states to ensure "that the process of implementation of such treaties and agreements is environmentally sound" (UNGA 1995, 18). Thus, support for this resolution is less contingent on support for arms control, but rather on a state's stance on environmental protection.

If the resolution deals with arms control, but merely on a technical or procedural level, instead of substantial policies (step 2), it is also assigned to Category 0. Resolution 49/85 proposes a certain agenda for negotiations in the First Committee (UNGA 1994b). Dissent on this would rather reflect different preferences on the course of action than on the benefits of arms control.

Yet, if the resolution is substantially about existing or potential arms control policies, this leads to the question of whether it undermines arms control in certain ways (step 3) or prioritizes[1] certain types of arms control or negotiations over others (step 4.1). If neither is the case, it will be categorized as 1.[2] This category for example includes most resolutions that either propose or welcome new measures, or that attempt to strengthen existing measures.

On the contrary, if the resolution does not *undermine* arms control, but *prioritizes* certain types or procedures over others, the next question is whether this is at the core of the resolution, or whether the main focus is on the strengthening of arms control (step 5). In the latter case, the resolution will be assigned to Category 2. For example, resolution 49/74 aims at preventing space armament and thus tends to strengthen arms control. Yet, operational paragraph 5 stipulates that negotiations on that matter should be pursued primarily in the Conference on Disarmament (UNGA 1994a). States might abstain on this resolution, not because they disagree with the overall goal, but because they prefer a different procedure.

If prioritization of certain issues or procedures is central to the resolution, and it is for instance emphasized in multiple preambular and operational paragraphs and/or the title, it is coded

[1] Although the Final Document of the UNGA's First Special Session devoted to Disarmament, which was adopted by consensus, claims that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority" (UNGA 1978, 5), states in fact disagree on this (e.g., Krause and Latham 1998, 25; Wunderlich et al. 2013, 263). Arguably, to be supportive of arms control, a state does not necessarily need to agree with this prioritization.

[2] It is no coincidence that this category is chosen when all questions in the decision tree are negated. As D'Acquisto (2017, 42) puts it, "[t]he aim of diplomatic wording is to avoid direct, brutal, primary, and unproductive confrontation at all cost". Accordingly, all resolutions are written in a very positive tone and emphasize the benefits of arms control. The primary challenge of the coding is thus to detect passages that run counter to this.

as a 0. For instance, resolution 71/63 emphasizes nuclear disarmament as "the highest priority" (UNGA 2016a, 2), further demands the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament "as soon as possible and as the highest priority" (ibid., 6) in multiple paragraphs, and aims at the conclusion of negotiations and concrete measures "within a specified framework of time" (ibid.). In such a case, states might – despite being supportive of arms control – not only abstain, but even vote against the resolution if they disagree with the proposed procedure. Thus, none of the voting choices necessarily indicate support or non-support for arms control.

If the resolution does *undermine* arms control (back to step 3), this leads to the question of whether this is central to the resolution, or if it strengthens other aspects of arms control simultaneously (step 4.2). In the latter case, the resolution is categorized as 3. Resolution 71/61 strengthens multilateral approaches to arms control, but at the same time rejects other types of approaches, such as plurilateral or bilateral measures (UNGA 2016b). States that are supportive of arms control as such thus will not vote in favor of this resolution.[3]

Finally, in case rejection of arms control is in fact central to the resolution, it is assigned to Category 4. This is for example the case for resolution 57/54, which deals with dual-use transfers. It criticizes "undue restrictions on exports to developing countries" and "the growing proliferation of ad hoc and exclusive export control regimes and arrangements for dual-use goods and technologies" (UNGA 2002, 1).

In addition to this, there are three types of exceptional cases that need to be mentioned. First, specific time frames in relation to either the negotiation or implementation of certain measures are controversially debated in the UNGA, with states arguing that this impedes arms

[3] One might argue that strong proponents of multilateralism will still vote in favor of this resolution. Yet, I argue that a state that supports arms control will not support the erosion of any aspects of it. Moreover, as indicated above, it is necessary to take into account the diplomatic wording of resolutions that tend to conceal their "true" purpose.

control, as it exerts disproportionate pressure. Therefore, resolutions that demand such time frames – as is the case with resolution 71/63 described above – are treated similar to prioritizations of certain procedures. Such resolutions are thus coded as 2 or 0 – depending on whether that claim is central to the resolution.

Second, while references to single states are generally not considered in the coding procedure, there is one exception to this. If a state (or a group of states) is unfairly singled out *objectively*, the resolution is assigned to Category 3, because it undermines other states' commitments and impedes a balanced approach. For example, resolution 49/78 (UNGA 1994c) on nuclear arms control in the Middle East only explicitly demands that Israel accedes to the NPT and disregards several other Middle Eastern states that at the time had also failed to ratify the treaty. In contrast, the same resolution in session 51 (UNGA 1996) is coded as 1 – because all other states in that region had joined the NPT in the meantime.

Third, resolutions that aim at substantively changing existing arms control measures are also assigned to Category 3, as they might impede these measures. However, this only refers to resolutions that attempt to change the overall nature of an agreement, and not to those that merely aim at improving the functionality of existing agreements. For example, this applies to resolution 53/77S (UNGA 1998), which de-legitimizes the UN Register of Conventional Arms through a demand for its expansion to weapons of mass destruction.

B. Country-Level Means of Arms Control Support (ACS) and Major Power Rivalries (MPR)

Rank	Country	ACS	MPR
1	Japan	0.98	1
2	Kiribati	0.976	0
3	Seychelles	0.972	0
4	New Zealand	0.971	0
5	Ukraine	0.97	0.264
6	Armenia	0.969	0
7	Ireland	0.969	0
8	Switzerland	0.969	0
9	Malta	0.968	0
10	Austria	0.967	0
11	Sweden	0.967	0
12	Liechtenstein	0.967	0
13	San Marino	0.967	0
14	Argentina	0.966	0
15	Tajikistan	0.965	0
16	Cyprus	0.964	0
17	Moldova	0.962	0
18	Kazakhstan	0.962	0
19	Kyrgyzstan	0.961	0
20	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.96	0
21	Belarus	0.959	0
22	Finland	0.958	0
23	Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.958	0
24	Azerbaijan	0.958	0
25	East Timor	0.958	0
26	North Macedonia	0.958	0
27	Tonga	0.958	0
28	Georgia	0.957	1
29	Montenegro	0.957	0
30	Uzbekistan	0.957	0
31	Samoa	0.957	0
32	Nauru	0.956	0
33	Turkmenistan	0.956	0
34	Serbia	0.955	0.06
35	Tuvalu	0.953	0
36	Australia	0.953	0
37	Croatia	0.953	0
38	South Korea	0.953	0.577
39	Andorra	0.952	0
40	Dominica	0.951	0
41	Rwanda	0.951	0
42	Norway	0.951	0
43	Iceland	0.95	0
44	Gambia	0.95	0
45	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.95	0
46	Liberia	0.95	0
47	Angola	0.95	0
48	Chad	0.95	0
49	Solomon Islands	0.949	0

Rank	Country	ACS	MPR
50	Comoros	0.949	0
51	São Tomé and Príncipe	0.949	0
52	Somalia	0.949	0
53	Paraguay	0.948	0
54	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.948	0
55	Portugal	0.947	0
56	Papua New Guinea	0.947	0
57	Cape Verde	0.946	0
58	Vanuatu	0.946	0
59	Equatorial Guinea	0.946	0
60	Cambodia	0.946	0
61	Bulgaria	0.946	0
62	Congo	0.946	0
63	Chile	0.945	0
64	Gabon	0.945	0
65	Lesotho	0.945	0
66	South Africa	0.945	0
67	Suriname	0.945	0
68	Antigua and Barbuda	0.945	0
69	Uruguay	0.945	0
70	Monaco	0.945	0
71	Central African Republic	0.944	0
72	Greece	0.944	0
73	Saint Lucia	0.944	0
74	Grenada	0.944	0
75	Malawi	0.944	0
76	Guinea-Bissau	0.944	0
77	Benin	0.944	0
78	Albania	0.944	0
79	Belize	0.944	0
80	Eswatini	0.943	0
81	El Salvador	0.943	0
82	Slovenia	0.943	0
83	Afghanistan	0.943	0.274
84	Romania	0.943	0
85	Estonia	0.943	0
86	Dominican Republic	0.943	0
87	Niger	0.943	0
88	Bahamas	0.943	0
89	Burundi	0.943	0
90	Brazil	0.943	0
91	Germany	0.943	0
92	Eritrea	0.943	0
93	Iraq	0.943	0.061
94	Barbados	0.942	0
95	Jamaica	0.942	0
96	Luxembourg	0.942	0
97	Denmark	0.942	0
98	Honduras	0.942	0

B. Country-Level Means (continued)

Rank	Country	ACS	MPR
99	Italy	0.942	0
100	Sierra Leone	0.942	0
101	Haiti	0.942	0.526
102	Peru	0.942	0.299
103	Belgium	0.942	0
104	Guyana	0.942	0
105	Madagascar	0.942	0
106	Zambia	0.941	0
107	Mozambique	0.941	0
108	Burkina Faso	0.941	0
109	Guatemala	0.941	0.038
110	Mongolia	0.941	0
111	Maldives	0.941	0
112	Mali	0.941	0
113	Brunei	0.941	0
114	Netherlands	0.941	0
115	Fiji	0.941	0
116	Slovakia	0.941	0
117	Namibia	0.941	0
118	Botswana	0.941	0
119	Costa Rica	0.94	0
120	Thailand	0.94	0
121	Togo	0.94	0
122	Guinea	0.94	0
123	Ghana	0.94	0
124	Canada	0.94	0
125	Kenya	0.94	0
126	Malaysia	0.939	0
127	Spain	0.939	0
128	Bangladesh	0.939	0
129	Philippines	0.939	1
130	Panama	0.939	0
131	Nigeria	0.939	0
132	Mauritania	0.939	0
133	Senegal	0.938	0
134	Tanzania	0.938	0
135	Czech Republic	0.938	0
136	Singapore	0.938	0
137	Colombia	0.937	0
138	Ivory Coast	0.937	0.096
139	Lithuania	0.937	0
140	Turkey	0.937	0
141	Latvia	0.937	0
142	Sri Lanka	0.937	0
143	Nepal	0.936	0
144	Trinidad and Tobago	0.936	0
145	Uganda	0.935	0
146	Ecuador	0.935	0
147	Poland	0.935	0
148	Hungary	0.935	0
149	Zimbabwe	0.934	0
150	Laos	0.934	0
151	Tunisia	0.934	0
152	Venezuela	0.933	0.658
153	Mexico	0.933	0
154	Nicaragua	0.933	0
155	Ethiopia	0.932	0
156	Jordan	0.932	0
157	Cameroon	0.932	0
158	Djibouti	0.932	0
159	Indonesia	0.93	0
160	Marshall Islands	0.93	0
161	United Arab Emirates	0.929	0
162	China	0.929	1
163	Morocco	0.928	0
164	Bolivia	0.928	0
165	Oman	0.926	0
166	Qatar	0.926	0
167	Kuwait	0.926	0
168	Sudan	0.926	0
169	Yemen	0.925	0
170	Bahrain	0.925	0
171	Algeria	0.922	0
172	Mauritius	0.922	0
173	Vietnam	0.921	1
174	Bhutan	0.921	0
175	Libya	0.921	0.71
176	Saudi Arabia	0.918	0
177	South Sudan	0.918	0
178	Lebanon	0.916	0
179	Micronesia	0.913	0
180	Myanmar	0.911	0
181	Egypt	0.908	0
182	Palau	0.904	0
183	Cuba	0.9	1
184	Russia	0.898	1
185	Iran	0.894	1
186	Syria	0.892	1
187	Pakistan	0.891	0.658
188	United Kingdom	0.889	1
189	France	0.884	0
190	North Korea	0.86	1
191	Israel	0.851	0
192	India	0.85	0.123
193	United States of America	0.808	1

C. Changes over Time

Country	Major Power Rival(s)	Arms Control Support (No Rival)	Arms Control Support (Rival)
Afghanistan	Russia (1994 – 2001), United States (1998 – 2001)	0.954	0.91
Guatemala	United Kingdom (1994)	0.94	0.921
Haiti	United States (1994 – 2004)	0.953	0.929
India	China (1994 – 1996)	0.849	0.839
Iraq	France (1994 – 2003), United Kingdom (1994 – 2003), United States (1994 – 2003)	0.943	0.905
Ivory Coast	France (2004 – 2005)	0.935	0.938
Libya	France (2011), United States (1994 – 2011)	0.941	0.909
Pakistan	United States (2002 –)	0.892	0.889
Peru	United States (1993 – 2000)	0.948	0.922
Serbia	France (1994 – 2000), United Kingdom (1994 – 2000), United States (1994 – 2001)	0.957	0.94
South Korea	China (1994), Japan (1994 – 2006)	0.963	0.95
Ukraine	Russia (1994 – 1997, 2014 –)	0.971	0.972
Venezuela	United States (2002 –)	0.92	0.948

D. Description and Discussion of Control Variables

The regression models include a number of control variables that may confound the relationship between rivalries with major powers and support for arms control to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias. *Democracy level*, as identified by the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (version 11.1) (Coppedge et al. 2021), might decrease interstate rivalries (Stinnett and Diehl 2001) and increase support for arms control (e.g., Becker, Müller, and Wisotzki 2008).

I measure economic development through *GDP per capita* (UNSD 2020). This could have a negative effect on the demand for international regulations (Efrat 2010), while affecting rivalries simultaneously (Boehmer and Sobek 2005).

Trade openness, defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP per capita, is identified through the Penn World Table's National Account data (version 10.0) (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). It might affect both variables due to an increased demand for interstate cooperation.

Depending on their *government ideology*, states also pursue different foreign policies, potentially affecting the dependent as well as the independent variable. The Database of Political Institutions (Scartascini, Cruz, and Keefer 2021) differs between five categories: left, right, center (reference category), others, and none.

Intrastate conflict is a dummy variable capturing whether a state experienced an intrastate (or internationalized intrastate) conflict with more than 25 battle-related deaths in a given year. Intrastate conflicts can cause interstate disputes (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008) and lead to higher levels of armament (Collier and Hoeffler 2007), which in turn affects arms control support. This variable is measured relying on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 21.1) (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021).

The main model does not eliminate cross-country variation, which is why I incorporate several mostly time-constant controls. These include dummies for *regions*, namely Africa (reference category), Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021).[4] Regional culture presumably has an effect on arms control preferences (Boryczka et al. 1997). At the same time, interstate conflicts occur more frequently in certain areas (Steinberg 2005).

I also control for *EU* and *NATO* membership: Affiliation with these organizations should affect the occurrence of rivalries with major powers, while EU members are expected to have a more positive and NATO members a more negative stance toward arms control (Müller, Below, and Wisotzki 2013).

Nuclear weapons possession arguably decreases support for arms control, while it could either deter or attract potential rivals. The same holds true for *arms production*. I therefore include a dummy variable indicating whether a state hosts one of the public or private arms companies included in the SIPRI Arms Industry Database (SIPRI 2024).[5]

Finally, I include four resolution-specific variables to account for agenda changes and enhance statistical efficiency. The *topic* of a resolution indicates whether it deals with nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons (reference category), conventional weapons, or another issue (Risse 2024). I further include the coded *category* (reference category is 1) and the *global relevance* of a resolution; that is, whether it is concerned with a certain country or region (0) or the entire world (1) (Risse 2024). Resolutions' *salience* is measured as the number of references

[4] This categorization also stems from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021).

[5] The dataset identifies the top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world on an annual basis. As this means that some companies might be included in some years but only just drop out in others, I treat the variable as time-invariant, including all countries that appear on the list in at least one year.

to the resolution in UNGA speeches, relying on the data by Finke (2023). This dataset includes the raw text of all speeches that were given in the UNGA plenary or in the First Committee since the 49th session.

E. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/Mode	N
Support for Arms Control	0	1	0.939	189,203
Major Power Rival	0	1	0.09	178,398
Major Power Status	0	1	0.039	189,203
Democracy	0.015	0.919	0.529	170,743
GDPPC	104.6	181,602.2	13,213.2	189,203
Trade Openness	0.019	5.521	0.864	189,203
Intrastate Conflict	0	1	0.142	189,203
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	0	1	0.048	189,203
EU Member	0	1	0.012	189,203
NATO Member	0	1	0.131	189,203
Government Ideology	-	-	Other	175,130
Region	-	-	Europe	189,203
Salience	0	48	4.808	189,203
Global Relevance	0	1	0.735	189,203
Topic	-	-	Others	189,203
Category	-	-	1	189,203

F. Regression Tables

Table A1: Main Effect

1. Model without control variables

2. Full model

	No Controls		**Full Model**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.030 (0.002)***	0.000	-0.009 (0.003)**	0.001
Major Power Status			0.017 (0.006)**	0.007
Democracy			0.012 (0.004)**	0.003
GDPPC (logged)			-0.000 (0.001)	0.875
Trade Openness (logged)			0.002 (0.001)	0.262
Intrastate Conflict			-0.003 (0.002)*	0.050
EU Member			-0.005 (0.003)†	0.078
NATO Member			-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor			-0.068 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer			0.004 (0.003)	0.289
Salience (logged)			-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance			-0.021 (0.016)	0.188
Gov. Ideology Dummies			✓	
Regional Dummies			✓	
Topic Dummies			✓	
Category Dummies			✓	
Observations	178,398		159,423	
Country-Clusters			169	
Resolution-Clusters			119	
Year-Clusters			22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A2: Fixed Effects Model

	Fixed Effects	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.006 (0.002)**	0.006
Democracy	0.017 (0.011)	0.138
GDPPC (logged)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.725
Trade Openness (logged)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.874
Intrastate Conflict	-0.002 (0.003)	0.495
Salience (logged)	-0.014 (0.006)*	0.030
Global Relevance	-0.015 (0.011)	0.186
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓	
Topic Dummies	✓	
Category Dummies	✓	
Observations	159,423	
Country-Clusters	169 (FE+CSE)	
Resolution-Clusters	119 (CSE)	
Year-Clusters	22 (FE+CSE)	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A3: Interaction Effect

1. Model without control variables

2. Main model

	No Controls		**Full Model**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power (MP) Rival	-0.027 (0.002)***	0.000	-0.010 (0.003)***	0.000
Major Power Status	-0.027 (0.005)***	0.000	0.004 (0.009)	0.651
MP Rival*MP Status	0.014 (0.006)*	0.019	0.020 (0.010)*	0.049
Democracy			0.012 (0.004)**	0.003
GDPPC (logged)			-0.000 (0.001)	0.780
Trade Openness (logged)			0.002 (0.001)	0.266
Intrastate Conflict			-0.003 (0.002)*	0.045
EU Member			-0.005 (0.003)	0.116
NATO Member			-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor			-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer			0.004 (0.003)	0.277
Salience (logged)			-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance			-0.021 (0.016)	0.188
Gov. Ideology Dummies			✓	
Regional Dummies			✓	
Topic Dummies			✓	
Category Dummies			✓	
Observations	178,398		159,423	
Country-Clusters			169	
Resolution-Clusters			119	
Year-Clusters			22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A4: Robustness Checks I

1. Removing resolution-level control variables

2. Adding non-major power rivals and major power allies as control variables

	No Resolution-Level Controls		**Additional Controls**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.010 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.010 (0.003)***	0.000
Major Power Status	0.004 (0.009)	0.659	0.005 (0.009)	0.601
MP Rival*MP Status	0.020 (0.010)*	0.049	0.021 (0.010)*	0.035
Democracy	0.012 (0.004)**	0.002	0.012 (0.004)**	0.003
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.877	-0.000 (0.001)	0.745
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.216	0.002 (0.001)	0.216
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.047	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.044
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.118	-0.006 (0.003)†	0.060
NATO Member	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.017 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.003 (0.003)	0.299	0.004 (0.003)	0.232
Non-Major Power Rival			-0.000 (0.002)	0.972
Major Power Ally			0.005 (0.002)*	0.022
Salience (logged)			-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance			-0.021 (0.016)	0.188
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies			✓	
Category Dummies			✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A5: Robustness Checks II

1. Ordinal independent variable: most severe rivalry with a major power

2. Count independent variable: number of rivalries with a major power

	Ordinal IV		**Count IV**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Lesser Major Power Rival	-0.001 (0.003)	0.670		
Severe Major Power Rival	-0.023 (0.004)***	0.000		
Lesser MP Rival*MP Status	0.010 (0.011)	0.348		
Severe MP Rival*MP Status	0.036 (0.011)**	0.002		
No. Major Power Rivals (logged)			-0.016 (0.004)***	0.000
No. MP Rivals (logged)*MP Status			0.026 (0.008)**	0.002
Major Power Status	0.004 (0.009)	0.610	0.003 (0.008)	0.704
Democracy	0.010 (0.004)*	0.011	0.011 (0.004)**	0.004
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.625	-0.000 (0.001)	0.794
Trade Openness (logged)	0.001 (0.001)	0.391	0.001 (0.001)	0.365
Intrastate Conflict	-0.004 (0.002)*	0.016	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.040
EU Member	-0.004 (0.003)	0.135	-0.004 (0.003)	0.134
NATO Member	-0.015 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.070 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.003 (0.003)	0.293	0.003 (0.003)	0.282
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189	-0.021 (0.016)	0.188
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A6: Robustness Checks III

1. Ordered logit: ordinal dependent variable

2. Logit: binary dependent variable (merging neutral and opposing votes)

	Ordinal DV		**Binary DV**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.353 (0.079)***	0.000	-0.394 (0.079)***	0.000
Major Power Status	0.239 (0.254)	0.347	0.435 (0.242)†	0.072
MP Rival*MP Status	0.614 (0.288)*	0.035	0.479 (0.274)†	0.081
Democracy	0.319 (0.120)**	0.008	0.207 (0.119)†	0.081
GDPPC (logged)	-0.018 (0.027)	0.494	-0.029 (0.026)	0.272
Trade Openness (logged)	0.058 (0.044)	0.182	0.084 (0.043)†	0.051
Intrastate Conflict	-0.118 (0.047)*	0.012	-0.127 (0.048)**	0.008
EU Member	-0.079 (0.089)	0.374	-0.008 (0.086)	0.923
NATO Member	-0.559 (0.089)***	0.000	-0.558 (0.085)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-1.586 (0.140)***	0.000	-1.568 (0.137)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.018 (0.095)	0.851	-0.093 (0.091)	0.307
Salience (logged)	-0.235 (0.031)***	0.000	-0.245 (0.031)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-1.527 (0.759)*	0.044	-1.502 (0.705)*	0.033
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A7: Robustness Checks IV

1. Linear model: country-year as the unit of analysis

2. Lagging all country-year variables by one year

	CY Level		**Lagged IVs**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.010 (0.002)***	0.000	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.002
Major Power Status	0.001 (0.010)	0.896	0.005 (0.009)	0.560
MP Rival*MP Status	0.019 (0.011)†	0.091	0.017 (0.010)	0.106
Democracy	0.008 (0.004)*	0.017	0.016 (0.004)***	0.000
GDPPC (logged)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.439	-0.000 (0.001)	0.791
Trade Openness (logged)	0.003 (0.001)*	0.010	0.001 (0.001)	0.301
Intrastate Conflict	-0.001 (0.001)	0.382	-0.003 (0.002)†	0.051
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)†	0.062	-0.007 (0.003)*	0.021
NATO Member	-0.010 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.015 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.063 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.003 (0.004)	0.336	0.002 (0.003)	0.483
Salience (logged)			-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance			-0.021 (0.016)	0.199
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies			✓	
Category Dummies			✓	
Observations	3,550		168,865	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters			120	
Year-Clusters	22		23	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A8: Robustness Checks V

1. Including only resolutions in Category 1

2. Including only resolutions in Categories 1 and 2

	Category 1		**Category 1+2**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.008 (0.002)***	0.001	-0.006 (0.002)**	0.005
Major Power Status	0.004 (0.011)	0.700	0.002 (0.012)	0.885
MP Rival*MP Status	0.009 (0.012)	0.478	0.008 (0.013)	0.565
Democracy	-0.001 (0.004)	0.693	-0.002 (0.004)	0.638
GDPPC (logged)	-0.002 (0.001)†	0.086	-0.002 (0.001)†	0.079
Trade Openness (logged)	0.004 (0.001)**	0.004	0.002 (0.001)†	0.076
Intrastate Conflict	-0.002 (0.001)†	0.062	-0.003 (0.001)*	0.023
EU Member	0.011 (0.003)***	0.000	0.007 (0.002)**	0.003
NATO Member	-0.002 (0.003)	0.388	-0.005 (0.003)†	0.054
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.071 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.066 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	-0.008 (0.004)*	0.036	-0.011 (0.004)**	0.008
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.008 (0.016)	0.602	-0.008 (0.015)	0.593
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies			✓	
Observations	132,197		149,961	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	94		108	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A9: Robustness Checks VI

1. Including only resolutions in Categories 3 and 4

2. Including only roll-call votes

	Category 3+4		**Excl. Consensus**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.031 (0.016)†	0.052	-0.022 (0.006)***	0.000
Major Power Status	-0.185 (0.147)	0.210	0.009 (0.020)	0.651
MP Rival*MP Status	0.302 (0.165)†	0.069	0.044 (0.022)*	0.048
Democracy	0.091 (0.026)***	0.001	0.027 (0.009)**	0.002
GDPPC (logged)	-0.022 (0.009)*	0.011	-0.000 (0.002)	0.823
Trade Openness (logged)	0.026 (0.010)**	0.007	0.004 (0.003)	0.190
Intrastate Conflict	0.000 (0.008)	0.980	-0.007 (0.003)*	0.049
EU Member	0.035 (0.017)*	0.046	-0.010 (0.006)	0.131
NATO Member	0.024 (0.019)	0.197	-0.030 (0.006)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	0.009 (0.043)	0.837	-0.149 (0.011)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.291 (0.051)***	0.000	0.008 (0.007)	0.281
Salience (logged)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.550	-0.007 (0.002)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.271 (0.084)**	0.015	-0.021 (0.025)	0.397
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	9,462		73,170	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	11		78	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A10: Robustness Checks VII

1. Rivalries with nuclear weapons possessors

2. Rivalries with arms producers

	Nuclear Rival		**Arms Prod. Rival**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Nuclear Rival	-0.009 (0.003)**	0.001		
Arms Producer Rival			-0.009 (0.003)***	0.001
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.077 (0.009)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.004 (0.003)	0.290	0.002 (0.003)	0.600
Nuclear Rival*Nuclear W. Poss.	0.013 (0.010)	0.180		
Arms Prod. Rival*Arms Producer			0.015 (0.006)*	0.014
Democracy	0.013 (0.004)**	0.001	0.012 (0.004)**	0.002
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.756	-0.000 (0.001)	0.883
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.249	0.002 (0.001)	0.275
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)†	0.059	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.037
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.103	-0.005 (0.003)	0.132
NATO Member	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Major Power Status	0.016 (0.006)*	0.011	0.008 (0.007)	0.258
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A11: Robustness Checks VIII

1. Rivalries with major powers including India and Brazil

2. Rivalries with states above the 95th percentile of CINC scores

	Incl. India+Brazil		**CINC 95th Perc.**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
MP Rival (+IN+BR)	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.002		
CINC95 Rival			-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000
MP Status (+IN+BR)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.410		
CINC95			0.002 (0.005)	0.715
MP Rival*MP Status (+IN+BR)	0.020 (0.008)**	0.008		
CINC95 Rival*CINC95			0.019 (0.006)**	0.001
Democracy	0.012 (0.004)**	0.002	0.011 (0.004)**	0.006
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.769	-0.000 (0.001)	0.764
Trade Openness (logged)	0.001 (0.001)	0.336	0.001 (0.001)	0.319
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.035	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.044
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.124	-0.005 (0.003)	0.118
NATO Member	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.066 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.066 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.005 (0.003)	0.150	0.003 (0.003)	0.357
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A12: Robustness Checks IX

1. Rivalries with states above the 95th percentile of GDP

2. Rivalries with states above the 95th percentile of military expenditure

	GDP 95th Perc.		**Mil.Ex. 95th Perc.**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
GDP95 Rival	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.002		
MilX95 Rival			-0.008 (0.003)**	0.002
GDP95	-0.002 (0.004)	0.658		
MilX95			-0.003 (0.005)	0.539
GDP95 Rival*GDP95	0.021 (0.007)**	0.005		
MiLX95 Rival*MilX95			0.009 (0.006)	0.141
Democracy	0.012 (0.004)**	0.003	0.012 (0.004)**	0.003
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.877	-0.000 (0.001)	0.875
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.276	0.001 (0.001)	0.358
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.035	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.039
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.118	-0.005 (0.003)	0.104
NATO Member	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.065 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.062 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.005 (0.003)	0.168	0.005 (0.003)	0.111
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A13: Robustness Checks X + Exploratory Analyses I

1. Rivalries with states above the 95th percentile of diplomatic missions

2. Rivalries with states above the 90th percentile of diplomatic missions

	Diplo. 95th Perc.		**Diplo. 90th Perc.**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Diplo95 Rival	-0.007 (0.003)**	0.005		
Diplo90 Rival			-0.010 (0.002)***	0.000
Diplo95	-0.006 (0.005)	0.259		
Diplo90			-0.004 (0.003)	0.267
Diplo95 Rival*Diplo95	0.018 (0.007)*	0.011		
Diplo90 Rival*Diplo90			0.011 (0.004)*	0.016
Democracy	0.012 (0.004)**	0.002	0.012 (0.004)**	0.003
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.827	-0.000 (0.001)	0.892
Trade Openness (logged)	0.001 (0.001)	0.370	0.001 (0.001)	0.477
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.046	-0.003 (0.002)†	0.063
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.127	-0.005 (0.003)	0.104
NATO Member	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.013 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.066 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.063 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.005 (0.003)	0.136	0.006 (0.004)	0.121
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.188	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A14: Exploratory Analyses II

1. Rivalries with states above the 75th percentile of diplomatic missions

2. Rivalries with states with higher status (i.e., more diplomatic missions)

	Diplo. 75th Perc.		**All Higher Status**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Diplo75 Rival	-0.002 (0.002)	0.311		
Higher Status Rival			-0.002 (0.002)	0.238
Diplo75	-0.005 (0.003)†	0.051		
MP Status			0.013 (0.006)*	0.041
Diplo75 Rival*Diplo75	0.001 (0.003)	0.768		
Democracy	0.014 (0.004)***	0.001	0.014 (0.004)***	0.001
GDPPC (logged)	0.000 (0.001)	0.743	-0.000 (0.001)	0.736
Trade Openness (logged)	0.001 (0.002)	0.492	0.002 (0.001)	0.143
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)†	0.052	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.049
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.106	-0.005 (0.003)†	0.090
NATO Member	-0.013 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.063 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.008 (0.003)*	0.031	0.003 (0.003)	0.306
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.188	-0.021 (0.016)	0.188
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A15: Exploratory Analyses III

1. Rivalries with non-major powers

2. Rivalries with major powers that are co-authors of the resolution under consideration

	Non-MP Rival		**MP Author Rival**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Non-Major Power Rival	-0.001 (0.002)	0.434		
MP Author Rival			-0.051 (0.004)***	0.000
Major Power Status	-0.010 (0.007)	0.164	0.015 (0.006)*	0.018
Non-MP Rival*MP Status	0.034 (0.006)***	0.000		
MP Author Rival*MP Status			0.030 (0.007)***	0.000
Democracy	0.015 (0.004)***	0.000	0.012 (0.004)**	0.002
GDPPC (logged)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.598	-0.000 (0.001)	0.815
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.105	0.001 (0.001)	0.332
Intrastate Conflict	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.037	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.038
EU Member	-0.005 (0.003)	0.133	-0.005 (0.003)†	0.089
NATO Member	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.071 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.004 (0.003)	0.290	0.004 (0.003)	0.254
Salience (logged)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.016)	0.189	-0.020 (0.016)	0.200
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	159,423		159,423	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A16: Exploratory Analyses IV

1. Rivalries with the United States

2. Rivalries with major powers other than the United States

	US Rival		**Other MP Rival**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
US Rival	-0.016 (0.003)***	0.000		
Other MP Rival			-0.008 (0.004)*	0.030
Major Power Status			0.004 (0.009)	0.638
Oth. MP Rival*MP Status			0.019 (0.011)†	0.072
Democracy	0.010 (0.004)**	0.007	0.014 (0.004)***	0.000
GDPPC (logged)	0.001 (0.001)	0.402	-0.000 (0.001)	0.623
Trade Openness (logged)	0.001 (0.001)	0.472	0.002 (0.001)	0.138
Intrastate Conflict	-0.000 (0.002)	0.780	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.037
EU Member	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.005	-0.005 (0.003)†	0.098
NATO Member	-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.014 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.067 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.070 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.002 (0.003)	0.576	0.004 (0.003)	0.253
Salience (logged)	-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.015)	0.177	-0.021 (0.016)	0.188
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	152,397		159,423	
Country-Clusters	162		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A17: Exploratory Analyses V

1. Rivalries with China

2. Rivalries with the United Kingdom

	China Rival		**UK Rival**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
China Rival	-0.021 (0.006)***	0.000		
UK Rival			-0.013 (0.017)	0.435
Democracy	0.014 (0.004)***	0.000	0.014 (0.004)***	0.000
GDPPC (logged)	0.000 (0.001)	0.784	0.000 (0.001)	0.683
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.131	0.002 (0.001)	0.121
Intrastate Conflict	-0.000 (0.002)	0.942	-0.000 (0.002)	0.830
EU Member	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.003	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.003
NATO Member	-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.072 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.002 (0.003)	0.420	0.002 (0.003)	0.439
Salience (logged)	-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.015)	0.177	-0.021 (0.015)	0.177
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	152,397		152,397	
Country-Clusters	162		162	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A18: Exploratory Analyses VI

1. Rivalries with Russia

2. Rivalries with Japan

	Russia Rival		**Japan Rival**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Russia Rival	-0.002 (0.006)	0.759		
Japan Rival			-0.010 (0.007)	0.137
Democracy	0.014 (0.004)***	0.000	0.014 (0.004)***	0.000
GDPPC (logged)	0.000 (0.001)	0.710	0.000 (0.001)	0.663
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.115	0.002 (0.001)	0.181
Intrastate Conflict	-0.000 (0.002)	0.812	-0.001 (0.002)	0.718
EU Member	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.003	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.003
NATO Member	-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.002 (0.003)	0.431	0.002 (0.003)	0.405
Salience (logged)	-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.015)	0.177	-0.021 (0.015)	0.177
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	152,397		152,397	
Country-Clusters	162		162	
Resolution-Clusters	119		119	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A19: Exploratory Analyses VII

1. Rivalries with France

2. Including only resolutions on weapons of mass destruction

	France Rival		**WMD**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
France Rival	-0.010 (0.009)	0.274		
Major Power Rival			-0.007 (0.005)	0.137
Major Power Status			0.011 (0.016)	0.501
MP Rival*MP Status			0.039 (0.018)*	0.034
Democracy	0.014 (0.004)***	0.000	-0.001 (0.007)	0.920
GDPPC (logged)	0.000 (0.001)	0.694	-0.002 (0.002)	0.300
Trade Openness (logged)	0.002 (0.001)	0.117	0.004 (0.003)	0.176
Intrastate Conflict	-0.000 (0.002)	0.820	-0.007 (0.003)*	0.014
EU Member	-0.008 (0.003)**	0.003	-0.005 (0.005)	0.333
NATO Member	-0.011 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.037 (0.005)***	0.000
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.069 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.128 (0.009)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.002 (0.003)	0.440	-0.002 (0.006)	0.764
Salience (logged)	-0.004 (0.001)***	0.000	-0.009 (0.002)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.015)	0.177	-0.032 (0.030)	0.286
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	152,397		65,178	
Country-Clusters	162		169	
Resolution-Clusters	119		51	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A20: Exploratory Analyses VIII

1. Including only resolutions on conventional weapons

2. Including only resolutions on other topics

	Conventional Weapons		**Others**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.017 (0.004)***	0.000	-0.008 (0.003)*	0.013
Major Power Status	0.024 (0.016)	0.124	-0.011 (0.008)	0.173
MP Rival*MP Status	-0.004 (0.018)	0.801	0.011 (0.009)	0.240
Democracy	0.034 (0.006)***	0.000	0.018 (0.004)***	0.000
GDPPC (logged)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.201	0.002 (0.001)*	0.039
Trade Openness (logged)	0.006 (0.002)**	0.003	-0.003 (0.002)*	0.038
Intrastate Conflict	0.002 (0.002)	0.428	-0.002 (0.002)	0.442
EU Member	-0.000 (0.004)	0.985	-0.007 (0.003)*	0.044
NATO Member	0.002 (0.004)	0.714	0.001 (0.003)	0.670
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.047 (0.008)***	0.000	-0.022 (0.005)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.000 (0.006)	0.954	0.010 (0.003)***	0.001
Salience (logged)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.260	-0.003 (0.001)*	0.048
Global Relevance	-0.021 (0.021)	0.333	-0.005 (0.019)	0.793
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	28,595		65,650	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	22		22	
Year-Clusters	19		49	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

Table A21: Exploratory Analyses IX

1. Including only resolutions with above-average references to disarmament

2. Including only resolutions with above-average references to non-proliferation

	Disarmament		**Non-Proliferation**	
	Coefficients	***p* Values**	**Coefficients**	***p* Values**
Major Power Rival	-0.005 (0.003)	0.144	-0.016 (0.006)**	0.007
Major Power Status	0.006 (0.008)	0.502	0.002 (0.017)	0.892
MP Rival*MP Status	0.017 (0.010)†	0.078	0.051 (0.019)**	0.009
Democracy	0.008 (0.005)†	0.082	0.011 (0.008)	0.157
GDPPC (logged)	0.000 (0.001)	0.706	0.001 (0.002)	0.542
Trade Openness (logged)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.992	0.004 (0.003)	0.133
Intrastate Conflict	-0.004 (0.002)*	0.044	-0.003 (0.003)	0.405
EU Member	0.001 (0.004)	0.722	0.018 (0.006)**	0.004
NATO Member	-0.021 (0.003)***	0.000	-0.020 (0.006)**	0.001
Nuclear Weapons Possessor	-0.083 (0.005)***	0.000	-0.161 (0.010)***	0.000
Arms Producer	0.005 (0.003)	0.138	0.002 (0.006)	0.735
Salience (logged)	-0.007 (0.002)***	0.000	-0.008 (0.002)***	0.000
Global Relevance	-0.020 (0.018)	0.269	-0.050 (0.020)*	0.016
Gov. Ideology Dummies	✓		✓	
Regional Dummies	✓		✓	
Topic Dummies	✓		✓	
Category Dummies	✓		✓	
Observations	59,421		42,233	
Country-Clusters	169		169	
Resolution-Clusters	47		48	
Year-Clusters	22		22	

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: $^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$.

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