Supporting Information
Earmarks and Subcommittee Government in the U.S. Congress

This Supporting Information (SI) appendix contains a series of additional tables that cover robustness checks, alternative model specifications, and different construction of some of the key independent variables, as well as a description of the coding of the "demand" variable that appears in the paper.

Appendix A: Coding of Constituency "Demand"

This appendix details the components of the variables measuring constituency "demand" for the policies produced by the various subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee. We follow Adler (2002), as well as the data and codebook he makes available on his website at: `http://sobek.colorado.edu/~esadler/Congressional_District_Data.html`, to reconstruct the measures and series for the post-2002 (and subsequent) redrawing of district lines. Additionally, we consulted district maps produced by the U.S. Census Bureau to trace boundary lines (`http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/indcdmap_109_112.html`) and match them up with the location of various geographic characteristics and landmarks. Most district-level data were obtained from the Census Bureaus American FactFinder site (and are indicated by Census in the source list) at: `http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml`.

Table S1: Measures of Constituency Demand

Committee	**Measures of Demand (Adler 2002)**
Agriculture	• Percent employed in farming, fishing, and wildlife (Census) • Percent living in rural-farming areas (Census)
Commerce, Justice, Science	• District boarders a coastal area or the Great Lakes • Percent foreign born (Census) • Percent living in urban areas (Census) • Percent African-American (Census) • District is in a city with one of the 25 most active ports [based on whether district contains one of the 25 most active ports by total tonnage in 2007, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2007)]
Defense	• Size of non-civilian military workforce (Census) • Number of major military installations (Congressional Districts, 2003)
Energy and Water	• Location of top 100 research universities [Carnegie Foundation (2010) classification of RU/VH: Research Universities (very high research activity) n=96] • Location of nuclear power facilities [district contains U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensed facilities n=104]

Financial Services	• Percent employed by federal, state, and local government (Census)
Homeland Security	• District boarders a coastal area or the Great Lakes • Percent foreign born (Census)
Labor, HHS, Education	• Median family income (Census) • Percent employed in blue-collar industries (Census) • Percent attending public school (Census) • Percent of workers in state unionized (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009)
Interior and Environment	• Population density (Census) • State acreage (logged) owned by the National Park Service and Bureau of Land Management [from Adler's (2002) data for 105th Congress, 1997-99]
Military Construction, VA	• Size of non-civilian military workforce (Census) • Number of major military installations (Congressional Districts, 2003) • Percent population who are veterans (Census)
Transportation, HUD	• District boarders a coastal area or the Great Lakes • Percent living in urban areas (Census) • Median family income (Census) • Percent unemployed (Census) • Percent employed in transportation and public utilities (Census) • Percent employed in construction (Census) • District contains one of the 50 largest central cities [Census Bureau (2008) ranking of incorporated places with population >100,000]

Note: Bracketed entries indicate specifics with regard to the reconstruction of particular variables when the original source was unclear or unobtainable for the 2000s. We were not able to reproduce for the 2000s three of Adlers measures: relative flood potential (Energy and Water), number of beds in district VA hospital (Military Construction, VA), and total number of military installations (Defense; Military Construction, VA).

References

Adler, E. S. (2002). *Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009. "Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State." 28 January. `http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.htm` (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014).

Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 2010. Carnegie Classifications Data File, 2005 Edition, 11 February. `http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/resources/` (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014).

Census Bureau. 2008. "Table 1: Annual Estimates of the Population for Incorporated Places Over 100,000, Ranked by July 1, 2008 Population: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008." CSV data file. 2008 Population Estimates. United States Census Bureau, Population Division. 1 July. http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2000s/vintage_2008/city.html (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014).

Congressional Districts in the 2000s: A Portrait of America. 2003. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 2007. "Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 2007: Part 5 - National Summaries of Domestic and Foreign Waterborne Commerce." Table 5-2. http://www.navigationdatacenter.us/wcsc/pdf/wcusnatl07.pdf (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2009. "Operating Nuclear Power Reactors by Location or Name." http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/ (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014).

Appendix B: Supplemental Results

The manuscript references a number of additional models that, for the sake of clarity and conciseness, are not presented in full therein. The ordering and flow of the results contained here correspond with the references to this SI in the body of the paper. By way of explanation, the marginal district variables are relatively straightforward, as they simply employ alternative cut-points of 55 and 65 percent, respectively, rather than the 60 percent threshold for competitiveness employed in the paper. Additionally, we constructed an ordinal variable of competitiveness that categorizes districts as increasingly competitive across the following categories: incumbent vote share of greater than or equal to 60 percent, incumbent vote share between 55 percent (inclusive) and 60 percent, and incumbent vote share less than 55 percent.

Table S2: Heckman Selection Model: Total and by Party

	All Earmarks	Democratic	Republican
Outcome			
Chair	0.705*	0.682*	
	(0.222)	(0.222)	
Rank Mbr	2.173*		2.058*
	(0.092)		(0.129)
Cardinal	1.131*	1.124*	
	(0.222)	(0.218)	
Sub Rank Mbr	1.571*		1.509*
	(0.164)		(0.154)
Approps	0.898*	0.854*	0.914*
	(0.084)	(0.121)	(0.109)
Leadership	1.340*	1.334*	1.319*
	(0.187)	(0.305)	(0.082)
Seniority	0.021*	0.028*	0.019
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Marginal District	0.182*	0.376*	0.010
	(0.073)	(0.089)	(0.099)
Demand	−0.000	−0.003	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Democrat	0.195*		
	(0.065)		
Year (2008)	0.123*	0.035	0.174*
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.064)
Constant	15.890*	16.040*	15.966*
	(0.081)	(0.091)	(0.104)
Selection			
Demand	0.041*	0.180*	0.028*
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.010)
Ideology	−1.407*	−2.850*	−2.412*
	(0.346)	(0.590)	(0.386)
Constant	2.071*	2.150*	2.618*
	(0.191)	(0.308)	(0.271)
N	870	469	401
Censored	52	4	48
ρ	−0.828	1.000	−0.892
SE of ρ	0.064	0.000	0.046
Wald χ^2	33.29	20874.27	40.76

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the log of total earmarks in $10,000s.
Selection is whether member received any earmarks.
* $p < 0.05$) (two-tailed).

Table S3: Heckman Selection Model of Democratic Earmarks by Subcommittee

	Agric	CJS	Defense	E&W	FinServ	HomeSec	LaborHHS	Interior	MilCon	Transp
Outcome										
Chair	0.001	−0.915*	0.114	0.645*		−0.821	1.178*	1.044*		1.392*
	(0.624)	(0.186)	(0.139)	(0.315)		(0.483)	(0.142)	(0.286)		(0.160)
Cardinal	2.714*	1.575*	2.988*	3.139*	0.450*	2.967*		1.986*	0.257	2.409*
	(0.302)	(0.099)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.100)	(0.197)		(0.173)	(0.267)	(0.098)
Subcom	1.723*	1.614*	1.779*	1.820*	0.567*	0.645	1.182*	1.226*	0.615*	0.940*
	(0.502)	(0.175)	(0.114)	(0.249)	(0.116)	(0.412)	(0.148)	(0.258)	(0.198)	(0.106)
Approps	0.237	0.462*	0.341*	0.375	0.024	−0.482	0.053	−0.152	−0.148	0.386*
	(0.275)	(0.113)	(0.152)	(0.237)	(0.119)	(0.298)	(0.079)	(0.154)	(0.267)	(0.159)
Leadership	3.285*	1.449*	1.609*	0.941*	−0.143	0.753*	1.489*	1.336*	0.706*	1.775*
	(0.260)	(0.154)	(0.294)	(0.232)	(0.207)	(0.246)	(0.238)	(0.142)	(0.324)	(0.479)
Seniority	−0.015	0.040*	0.023*	0.018	0.015	−0.006	0.011	0.016	0.027	−0.005
	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Demand	0.082	−0.009	0.103*	0.034	0.104	−0.049	−0.023	0.019	−0.055	0.001
	(0.073)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.089)	(0.012)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.016)
Marginal Dist.	0.422	0.129	0.357*	0.108	0.053	−0.855*	0.043	−0.067	0.125	0.264*
	(0.265)	(0.088)	(0.124)	(0.159)	(0.172)	(0.350)	(0.083)	(0.167)	(0.223)	(0.124)
Year (2008)	−0.388*	−0.055	−0.073	0.005	−0.227	−0.166	−0.034	0.192*	0.353*	−0.084
	(0.102)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.124)	(0.207)	(0.054)	(0.093)	(0.140)	(0.054)
Constant	14.287*	13.527*	15.318*	14.025*	12.481*	11.861*	13.786*	13.594*	15.618*	14.319*
	(0.406)	(0.085)	(0.110)	(0.139)	(0.154)	(0.541)	(0.070)	(0.149)	(0.314)	(0.120)
Selection										
Demand	0.255*	0.021	0.222	−0.007	0.112	−0.046	0.036	−0.131*	0.390*	0.036
	(0.083)	(0.040)	(0.143)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.043)
Ideology	−0.094	0.258	0.872	0.705	0.474	0.474	0.026	0.477	1.387*	−0.009
	(0.418)	(0.656)	(0.680)	(0.571)	(0.446)	(0.336)	(0.708)	(0.409)	(0.508)	(0.705)
Constant	0.144	1.943*	1.900*	1.598*	0.097	−0.448*	2.034*	0.576*	0.272	1.968*
	(0.178)	(0.298)	(0.331)	(0.261)	(0.194)	(0.150)	(0.316)	(0.179)	(0.208)	(0.324)
N	469	469	469	469	469	469	469	469	469	469
Censored	219	15	36	44	251	348	10	170	308	10
ρ	−0.873	−0.015	−0.892	−0.733	−0.095	0.825	−0.012	−0.812	−0.797	0.711
SE of ρ	0.100	1.243	0.073	0.105	0.091	0.116	0.101	0.065	0.098	0.120
Wald χ^2	10.12	0.00	16.01	16.99	1.09	10.34	0.01	35.30	16.43	13.52

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses. Dependent variable is the log of total subcommittee earmarks in $10,000s.
Selection is whether member received any earmarks from the relevant subcommittee. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed).

Table S4: Heckman Selection Model of Republican Earmarks by Subcommittee

	Agric	CJS	Defense	E&W	FinServ	HomeSec	LaborHHS	Interior	MilCon	Transp
Outcome										
Rank Mbr	−1.088*	−0.479*	0.537*	−0.392	0.200	0.940*	−0.388	−0.326	0.020	0.702*
	(0.536)	(0.181)	(0.155)	(0.323)	(0.514)	(0.298)	(0.207)	(0.315)	(0.189)	(0.338)
Sub Rank Mbr	1.635*	1.931*	2.650*	2.747*	1.659*	3.425*	1.483*	1.558*	0.930*	1.476*
	(0.181)	(0.093)	(0.218)	(0.141)	(0.381)	(0.266)	(0.146)	(0.091)	(0.308)	(0.152)
Subcom	1.764*	2.101*	1.855*	1.220*	1.488*	0.011	1.467*	1.044*	−0.077	0.701*
	(0.386)	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.286)	(0.338)	(0.241)	(0.185)	(0.275)	(0.216)	(0.316)
Approps	0.420	0.871*	0.629*	0.185	0.748*	0.323	0.790*	0.568*	−0.082	0.754*
	(0.280)	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.375)	(0.230)	(0.237)	(0.109)	(0.159)	(0.361)	(0.166)
Leadership	−0.598*	1.173*	1.850*	0.107			0.962*	0.375*		0.421*
	(0.165)	(0.090)	(0.076)	(0.118)			(0.070)	(0.095)		(0.066)
Seniority	0.013	0.028*	0.030*	0.037	0.044	−0.022	0.019	0.020	0.009	0.014
	(0.041)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.012)
Demand	0.199*	0.003	0.015	0.049	−0.175	0.086	0.050*	0.010	−0.105	−0.032
	(0.072)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.059)	(0.171)	(0.089)	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.024)
Marginal Dist.	0.118	0.315*	0.126	−0.104	0.004	−0.128	0.335*	−0.130	−0.244	0.077
	(0.239)	(0.105)	(0.095)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.197)	(0.100)	(0.134)	(0.200)	(0.111)
Year (2008)	−0.249*	0.163*	0.002	0.042	−0.407*	0.034	0.181*	0.114	0.225	0.236*
	(0.118)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.102)	(0.195)	(0.179)	(0.056)	(0.103)	(0.181)	(0.068)
Constant	13.556*	13.321*	15.336*	14.150*	10.441*	12.765*	13.181*	13.186*	16.845*	14.026*
	(0.415)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.224)	(0.587)	(0.506)	(0.125)	(0.218)	(0.638)	(0.106)
Selection										
Demand	0.162*	0.031	0.120*	0.063	0.035	0.043	0.022	−0.007	0.164*	0.044
	(0.066)	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.070)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Ideology	−1.919*	−3.055*	−2.694*	−2.298*	−1.216	−1.103	−3.120*	−2.585*	−1.537*	−2.534*
	(0.495)	(0.538)	(0.429)	(0.640)	(0.630)	(0.732)	(0.680)	(0.472)	(0.563)	(0.539)
Constant	0.815*	2.471*	2.298*	1.903*	−0.078	−0.399	2.662*	1.430*	0.153	2.470*
	(0.286)	(0.319)	(0.271)	(0.366)	(0.353)	(0.374)	(0.390)	(0.275)	(0.313)	(0.336)
N	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401
Censored	229	98	90	113	308	338	80	199	285	69
ρ	−0.574	−0.739	−0.800	−0.540	0.957	0.763	−0.576	−0.397	−0.944	−0.535
SE of ρ	0.221	0.103	0.067	0.139	0.047	0.201	0.083	0.202	0.064	0.128
Wald χ^2	3.94	17.60	35.27	9.51	11.68	4.33	28.10	3.07	9.02	11.02

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses. Dependent variable is the log of total subcommittee earmarks in $10,000s.
Selection is whether member received any earmarks from the relevant subcommittee. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed).

Table S5: Tobit Regression of Earmark Receipts: Total and by Party

	All Earmarks	Democratic	Republican
Chair	3750.777*	3764.893*	
	(1186.895)	(1200.735)	
Rank Mbr	8913.980*		8695.635*
	(223.122)		(335.654)
Cardinal	3439.419*	3468.105*	
	(1119.106)	(1096.991)	
Sub Rank Mbr	4355.764*		4329.427*
	(901.483)		(833.621)
Approps	1875.038*	1849.167*	1836.453*
	(254.789)	(352.462)	(318.320)
Leadership	2812.397*	4963.329*	527.435
	(1338.753)	(365.870)	(1770.234)
Seniority	60.602*	65.186*	58.795
	(22.924)	(29.921)	(36.176)
Marginal Dist.	308.546*	592.746*	48.803
	(138.590)	(186.953)	(187.737)
Demand	25.312*	14.653	35.879*
	(9.423)	(17.702)	(7.827)
Democrat	649.215*		
	(120.708)		
Year (2008)	−129.160*	−73.229	−187.229
	(60.091)	(73.909)	(96.208)
Constant	606.129*	1148.827*	805.931*
	(175.757)	(196.714)	(243.144)
N	870	469	401
pseudo R^2	0.030	0.024	0.038

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses.
Dependent variable is total earmarks in $10,000s.
* $p < 0.05$) (two-tailed).

Table S6: Tobit Regression Model of Democratic Earmarks by Subcommittee

	Agric	CJS	Defense	E&W	FinServ	HomeSec	LaborHHS	Interior	MilCon	Transp
Chair	51.010	−263.673*	476.874*	765.050*	−3277.905	9.386	156.142	525.959*	−5904.245	1154.794*
	(153.052)	(98.471)	(186.502)	(221.731)	(.)	(76.063)	(101.023)	(60.193)	(.)	(74.436)
Cardinal	640.928*	492.305*	11068.872*	3128.670*	282.189*	1454.497*		557.974*	349.135	1487.577*
	(24.948)	(18.703)	(101.043)	(42.194)	(83.250)	(58.394)		(18.305)	(215.751)	(38.535)
Subcom	466.482*	412.119*	2936.666*	810.285*	262.937*	356.270*	292.109*	247.138*	763.339*	164.792*
	(134.604)	(102.666)	(181.590)	(213.019)	(93.816)	(72.719)	(107.502)	(59.040)	(284.975)	(45.052)
Approps	138.294*	69.812*	254.722*	148.603	121.889	62.623	−27.307	35.524*	444.311*	20.158
	(49.875)	(18.909)	(128.184)	(100.551)	(64.790)	(47.152)	(30.497)	(15.490)	(167.948)	(59.780)
Leadership	658.784	454.251*	2434.301*	240.307*	−35.094	393.843*	416.453*	225.407*	363.690	990.983*
	(469.870)	(24.596)	(503.369)	(58.177)	(84.297)	(80.739)	(179.450)	(21.475)	(319.947)	(399.956)
Seniority	4.041	4.463*	12.650	7.456	11.785	−6.662	5.841	1.522	20.060	−2.572
	(3.537)	(1.473)	(8.699)	(4.338)	(11.661)	(4.857)	(7.103)	(1.611)	(20.049)	(6.199)
Demand	49.813*	−0.290	102.560*	−0.171	52.680	−16.741	−8.269	−15.661*	266.494*	0.342
	(12.538)	(2.142)	(24.706)	(11.921)	(32.335)	(12.765)	(5.917)	(5.060)	(37.575)	(5.437)
Marginal Dist.	37.063	13.083	229.201*	56.710	95.464	43.607	−6.796	14.271	535.315*	−16.325
	(41.869)	(12.546)	(83.469)	(39.893)	(77.384)	(34.936)	(33.360)	(18.317)	(237.750)	(42.266)
Year (2008)	42.741*	−3.318	−41.152	−6.765	43.038	8.387	−7.928	1.818	89.779	−65.072*
	(16.037)	(6.735)	(32.731)	(22.004)	(36.385)	(29.636)	(27.346)	(9.855)	(80.869)	(23.063)
Constant	−98.741*	81.301*	483.872*	118.044*	−373.846*	−181.641*	124.486*	4.050	−685.732*	302.280*
	(36.150)	(11.273)	(69.253)	(31.692)	(177.382)	(48.513)	(31.515)	(13.881)	(246.209)	(53.909)
N	469	469	469	469	469	469	469	469	469	469
pseudo R^2	0.041	0.048	0.087	0.029	0.004	0.049	0.003	0.041	0.052	0.014

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses. Dependent variable is total earmarks in $10,000s. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed).

Table S7: Tobit Regression Model of Republican Earmarks by Subcommittee

	Agric	CJS	Defense	E&W	FinServ	HomeSec	LaborHHS	Interior	MilCon	Transp
Rank Mbr	−451.761*	−102.764	4256.884*	−31.024	−391.420	262.367*	−222.822*	−82.405	83.142	130.411
	(90.766)	(89.713)	(514.737)	(221.691)	(294.042)	(112.429)	(111.161)	(53.889)	(148.855)	(186.358)
Sub Rank Mbr	308.894*	469.797*	9835.726*	2366.208*	473.055*	2132.320*	285.684*	356.117*	938.805	634.722*
	(17.885)	(10.171)	(187.362)	(49.787)	(201.286)	(70.434)	(81.104)	(9.904)	(765.809)	(50.996)
Subcom	584.811*	477.581*	2750.796*	336.333	623.997	−24.603	269.374*	200.661*	764.378*	273.624
	(80.044)	(82.927)	(512.676)	(213.063)	(331.638)	(102.731)	(89.380)	(52.960)	(152.522)	(178.735)
Approps	132.573*	137.161*	525.496*	264.366	358.279	199.342*	85.590*	83.787*	211.754	233.307*
	(40.361)	(32.720)	(169.537)	(211.509)	(196.819)	(56.473)	(29.735)	(27.589)	(182.658)	(62.702)
Leadership	−45.279	4.933	916.272	−188.443			−73.721	5.280		−122.446
	(82.797)	(140.432)	(1186.907)	(261.153)			(169.050)	(72.680)		(184.181)
Seniority	2.099	6.476*	32.836*	13.407	24.861	−0.829	15.190	3.618	24.213	11.893*
	(3.725)	(2.482)	(13.522)	(7.693)	(18.626)	(5.290)	(10.181)	(1.850)	(14.726)	(3.603)
Demand	28.130*	3.590	25.134	29.926	−22.382	19.363	17.411	−1.876	129.010*	−2.197
	(8.183)	(3.375)	(15.074)	(23.595)	(57.626)	(13.711)	(9.958)	(4.600)	(17.002)	(8.171)
Marginal Dist.	−38.139	34.450	100.772	30.007	52.746	10.610	69.002	3.405	−23.864	42.239
	(27.574)	(18.619)	(87.915)	(64.279)	(87.349)	(36.172)	(42.388)	(13.282)	(129.620)	(32.089)
Year (2008)	−32.305*	1.413	−58.266	−23.442	−9.286	−2.820	−30.215*	−8.802	−28.754	−19.970
	(12.813)	(12.097)	(45.643)	(24.066)	(58.913)	(25.094)	(13.173)	(10.260)	(74.133)	(19.377)
Constant	−49.760	−1.672	149.950	2.888	−833.119*	−218.766*	−51.931	−34.697*	−685.676*	55.501
	(29.618)	(18.024)	(97.697)	(54.969)	(399.043)	(56.743)	(79.663)	(16.380)	(126.853)	(29.851)
N	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401	401
pseudo R^2	0.054	0.025	0.074	0.016	0.010	0.098	0.014	0.024	0.034	0.014

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses. Dependent variable is total earmarks in $10,000s. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed).

Table S8: OLS Regression of Earmark Receipts: Marginal District Robustness Checks (Varying Cutoffs)

	Marginal Districts < 65% Vote Share			Marginal Districts < 55% Vote Share		
	All Earmarks	Democratic	Republican	All Earmarks	Democratic	Republican
Chair	0.516*	0.472*		0.668*	0.695*	
	(0.227)	(0.231)		(0.231)	(0.229)	
Rank Mbr	2.360*		2.206*	2.231*		2.121*
	(0.098)		(0.149)	(0.098)		(0.132)
Cardinal	1.071*	1.053*		1.133*	1.136*	
	(0.220)	(0.212)		(0.229)	(0.222)	
Sub Rank Mbr	1.627*		1.630*	1.577*		1.590*
	(0.171)		(0.169)	(0.172)		(0.176)
Approps	0.941*	0.896*	1.053*	0.918*	0.840*	1.060*
	(0.090)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.088)	(0.119)	(0.124)
Leadership	1.401*	1.336*	1.553*	1.338*	1.319*	1.497*
	(0.233)	(0.318)	(0.101)	(0.219)	(0.297)	(0.067)
Seniority	0.024*	0.026*	0.025	0.024*	0.023*	0.028
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Marginal District	0.253*	0.325*	0.135	0.269*	0.285*	0.217
	(0.072)	(0.096)	(0.110)	(0.093)	(0.102)	(0.151)
Demand	0.003	-0.004	0.012*	0.003	-0.006	0.012*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Democrat	0.383*			0.292*		
	(0.071)			(0.069)		
Year (2008)	0.119*	0.069	0.177*	0.118*	0.068	0.176*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.069)
Constant	15.634*	16.029*	15.683*	15.765*	16.110*	15.723*
	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.137)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.119)
N	818	465	353	818	465	353
R^2	0.299	0.266	0.321	0.294	0.252	0.324

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses. Dependent variable is the log of total earmarks in $10,000s.
* $p < 0.05$) (two-tailed).

Table S9: OLS Regression of Earmark Recipients:
Marginal District Robustness Checks (Ordinal Variable)

	All Earmarks	Democratic	Republican
Chair	0.673*	0.682*	
	(0.229)	(0.224)	
Rank Mbr	2.261*		2.148*
	(0.094)		(0.133)
Cardinal	1.127*	1.127*	
	(0.228)	(0.219)	
Sub Rank Mbr	1.586*		1.604*
	(0.180)		(0.176)
Approps	0.927*	0.859*	1.060*
	(0.090)	(0.119)	(0.126)
Leadership	1.354*	1.317*	1.513*
	(0.224)	(0.307)	(0.074)
Seniority	0.025*	0.027*	0.027
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Marginal District	0.151*	0.196*	0.092
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.071)
Demand	0.003	-0.005	0.012*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Democrat	0.319*		
	(0.067)		
Year (2008)	0.118*	0.067	0.177*
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.069)
Constant	15.566*	15.865*	15.622*
	(0.114)	(0.136)	(0.161)
N	818	465	353
R^2	0.297	0.262	0.322

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses.

Dependent variable is the log of total earmarks in $10,000s.

* $p < 0.05$) (two-tailed).

Table S10: OLS Regression of Earmark Recipients:
Marginal District Robustness Checks (Ordinal Variable)

	Agric	CJS	Defense	E&W	FinServ	HomeSec	LaborHHS	Interior	MilCon	Transp
65% - Dem.	0.651*	0.135	0.333*	0.272	-0.053	-0.529	0.049	0.178	0.220	0.272*
	(0.244)	(0.084)	(0.116)	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.364)	(0.074)	(0.142)	(0.191)	(0.128)
65% - Rep.	-0.040	0.145	0.157	0.069	-0.350	-0.153	0.235*	0.043	-0.151	0.121
	(0.254)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.174)	(0.262)	(0.224)	(0.108)	(0.150)	(0.233)	(0.100)
55% - Dem.	0.198	0.182	0.220	0.153	0.280	-0.682	0.089	-0.049	0.171	0.432*
	(0.349)	(0.104)	(0.139)	(0.185)	(0.195)	(0.378)	(0.101)	(0.195)	(0.214)	(0.128)
55% - Rep.	0.241	0.760*	0.207	0.364	-0.187	-0.151	0.611*	0.168	0.139	0.196
	(0.354)	(0.131)	(0.148)	(0.234)	(0.268)	(0.210)	(0.129)	(0.144)	(0.240)	(0.139)
Ordinal - Dem.	0.221	0.087	0.183*	0.087	0.087	-0.471*	0.036	-0.011	0.131	0.188*
	(0.171)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.204)	(0.050)	(0.097)	(0.123)	(0.068)
Ordinal - Rep.	0.127	0.345*	0.141*	0.070	-0.126	-0.113	0.304*	0.008	-0.069	0.093
	(0.170)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.115)	(0.149)	(0.109)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.132)	(0.071)

Standard errors clustered on member in parentheses. Dependent variable is the log of total subcommittee earmarks in $10,000s.

* $p < 0.05$) (two-tailed).