Supporting Information

On–line appendix for: "Bias Will Find a Way: Economic Perceptions, Attributions of Blame, and Partisan–Motivated Reasoning during Crisis."

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A Detailed Description of Measures

Table A1: Description and coding of primary variables

Variable	Wording & Coding
Party identification (q32tot)	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or what? • Conservative (1) • Labour (0) • Liberal Democrat (NA) • Plaid Cymru (NA) • Scottish Nationalist (NA) • Green (NA) • United Kingdom Independence Party (NA) • British National Party (NA) • Other Party (NA) • No none (NA) • Don't know (NA)
Strength of identification (q34)	Would you call yourself very strongly, fairly strongly, or not very strongly [party label]? • Very strongly (1) • Fairly strongly (0.5) • Not very strongly (0) • Don't know (NA)
Economic perceptions (q18)	How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? Has it: • Got a lot better (1) • Got a little better • Stayed the same • Got a little worse • Got a lot worse (0) • Dont know (NA)
Attributions of responsibility (q28)	Which one of the following do you think affects the general economic situation in this country most? • The British Government (1) • The European Union (0) • Both equally (NA) • Neither (0) • Dont know (0)

B Distribution of Respondents Across Waves

After excluding all respondents who do not identify with either the Conservative or the Labour party, the final sample consists of 53,794 respondents distributed across 71 waves. Figure A1 depicts how the number of Labour and Conservative identifiers are distributed across the 71 waves. As can be seen from the figure, the mean number of respondents identifying with the Conservative party is 300 and roughly 400 for the Labour party.



Figure A1: Distribution of the number of party identifiers across the 71 waves.

C Covariate Balance Over Time and Across Partisan Groups



Figure A2: Covariate balance across waves and across partisan groups.

D Addressing the Validity of the Attribution Measure (q28)

This section addresses whether the attribution measure used in the main analysis discriminates respondents who actually blame the British government for the economic collapse from those who do not.

In order to do this, I draw on a related measure from the same dataset. From October 2008 and onwards, respondents were asked the more direct question "Who do you think is responsible for the current financial crisis?" Here respondents were provided with a list of actors and asked to state whether each actor was responsible for the financial crisis. Response categories were "yes," "no," or "don't know." Importantly, respondents were not forced to rank the actors. The list of possible actors included Gordon Brown, George W. Bush, the British government, the European Union, the American government, British banks, American banks, people who took out big mortgages, oil companies, international financiers, none, and other people or organizations.

D.1 Replication of Main Findings

As a first step, one basic question is whether the main finding from the analysis holds up when using the items directly tapping how respondents attribute blame for the financial crisis. That is, when respondents are asked to freely blame a comprehensive selection of actors, do Labour and Conservative identifiers still disagree over the culpability of the British government and, additionally, Gordon Brown?

Figure A3 gives the average predicted probabilities for Labour and Conservative identifiers (left panel) and the difference in these probabilities between party identifiers (right panel), i.e. the average marginal effects of partisanship, on blaming each of the twelve listed actors. The estimates are based on coefficients from twelve different probit models that can be found in Table A2, i.e. separate models

are fitted for each single actor. As can be seen from the right panel of Figure A3, party identifiers disagree – by far – the most over whether Gordon Brown and the British government are responsible. Here the difference in the probability of blaming Gordon Brown and the British government amounts to almost 40% ($p<0.001$) when comparing a typical respondent identifying with Labour as opposed to the Conservatives. This difference is striking when seen in relation to the partisan differences in the probability of blaming any of the other actors.

Furthermore, as can be seen from the left panel in Figure A3, partisans of both stripes generally think that British and American banks as well as international finance bear a large responsibility for the crisis. Given the nature of the financial crisis this is perhaps unsurprising, yet it is reassuring that respondents answer the items in this way because it gives the overall question some face validity. As a benchmark, Conservative identifiers are more likely to mention the British government than international finance when asked about who they think is responsible for the financial crisis.



Figure A3: Partisans disagree over the culpability of Gordon Brown and the British government. Left panel gives the average predicted probability (APP) of blaming each of the actors conditional on party identification. Right panel gives the difference between party identifiers, that is, the average marginal effect (AME) of party identification. Separate probit models have been estimated for each actor with cluster robust standard errors for month of interview. Effects are plotted with a 95 % confidence interval obtained through simulation (1000 iterations). Including fixed effects for month of interview does not change the results and the depicted estimates are highly stable (month-to-month) during the studied period. The effect estimates are based on the coefficients from Table A2.

Table A2: The influence of party identification on blaming different actors for the financial crisis. Estimates are probit coefficients.

	Dependent variable:					
	Gordon Brown	British Gov.	George Bush	EU	American Gov.	British Banks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conservative ID	1.234***	0.899***	0.049	0.281***	0.204***	0.171***
	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Strong identifier	−0.064	−0.250***	0.092*	−0.130**	−0.147***	−0.274***
	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Political attention	1.131***	0.692***	0.413***	0.187*	0.528***	0.703***
	(0.103)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.088)
Gender	−0.118***	0.031	0.057*	0.047	0.044	−0.043
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)
Age	−0.005***	0.0001	−0.001	0.004***	0.002*	−0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Income	−0.002	0.014*	−0.010	−0.0003	0.014*	0.029***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Has mortgage	−0.044	−0.016	0.011	0.034	−0.040	0.028
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.039)
Unemployed	0.080	0.189*	0.154	0.185	0.104	0.102
	(0.121)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.112)
Education	0.038***	0.046***	0.019	−0.033**	0.023**	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Newspaper exposure	−0.058**	0.001	0.046**	−0.011	0.043**	−0.016
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Against EU membership	0.806***	0.621***	−0.038	1.299***	0.133**	0.069
	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.052)	(0.058)
Constant	−2.276***	−1.644***	−1.221***	−1.935***	−1.119***	0.502***
	(0.139)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.112)	(0.122)
Aldrich-Nelson R-sq.	0.217	0.155	0.006	0.092	0.017	0.023
McFadden R-sq.	0.244	0.136	0.006	0.104	0.013	0.023
Cox-Snell R-sq.	0.242	0.168	0.006	0.096	0.017	0.024
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.356	0.227	0.009	0.154	0.023	0.036
Observations	7,834	7,834	7,834	7,834	7,834	7,834
Log Likelihood	−3,370.346	−4,578.435	−4,016.689	−3,421.139	−5,202.757	−4,000.417
Akaike Inf. Crit.	6,764.693	9,180.870	8,057.378	6,866.277	10,429.510	8,024.833

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Continued...

	Dependent variable:					
	American banks	People w/ mortgages	Oil Companies	Int'l Finance	Other Actor	None
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Conservative ID	−0.141***	0.105***	−0.191***	−0.186***	0.014	−0.380***
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.062)	(0.091)
Strong identifier	−0.241***	−0.117**	−0.011	−0.092**	−0.161*	0.017
	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.088)	(0.121)
Political attention	0.860***	0.683***	−0.010	0.793***	0.829***	−0.648***
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.098)	(0.082)	(0.170)	(0.194)
Gender	−0.177***	0.066**	0.143***	−0.014	0.019	0.203**
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.079)
Age	−0.009***	0.006***	0.003	−0.015***	−0.001	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	0.050***	−0.003	−0.044***	0.019**	−0.003	−0.046**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Has mortgage	0.034	−0.313***	0.160***	0.065*	−0.007	−0.065
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.093)
Unemployed	0.189	−0.208*	0.056	0.137	0.052	−0.223
	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.102)	(0.189)	(0.282)
Education	0.042***	0.034***	−0.065***	0.036***	0.070***	−0.053*
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.030)
Newspaper exposure	0.016	0.060***	−0.036	0.061***	0.084**	0.019
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.050)
Against EU membership	−0.263***	0.061	0.222***	−0.227***	−0.242**	−0.190
	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.102)	(0.143)
Constant	0.601***	−1.511***	−0.790***	0.368***	−2.650***	−1.943***
	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.135)	(0.112)	(0.227)	(0.280)
Aldrich-Nelson R-sq.	0.041	0.023	0.018	0.045	0.008	0.011
McFadden R-sq.	0.044	0.020	0.022	0.035	0.026	0.071
Cox-Snell R-sq.	0.042	0.023	0.018	0.046	0.008	0.011
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.067	0.033	0.032	0.062	0.030	0.076
Observations	7,834	7,834	7,834	7,834	7,834	7,834
Log Likelihood	−3,707.633	−4,574.871	−3,146.559	−5,063.177	−1,111.141	−576.442
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,439.266	9,173.742	6,317.118	10,150.350	2,246.281	1,176.885

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.2 Convergent Validity of the Attribution Measure

Because the items tapping whether respondents blame specific actors for the financial crisis are asked in the same survey that capture the attribution measure used in the main analysis, it is possible to correlate the measures to determine how well they reflect each other. For example, the most critical test is whether respondents who think that the British government affects the current economic situation in Britain the most have a higher probability of directly blaming the British government for the financial crisis compared to those respondents who do not think the British government affects the current economic situation.

Figure A4 gives the change in the predicted probability of blaming Gordon Brown, the British government and so forth for the financial crisis when answering that "the British government" affects the economy as opposed to "European Union" or "neither" on the main attribution measure. As Figure A4 shows quite clearly, when stating that the British government affects the current economic situation – as opposed to stating the European Union or neither – the probability of directly blaming Gordon Brown and the British government increases by around 20 % ($p < 0.001$). The opposite is true when respondents are asked to assess whether the European Union is responsible for the financial crisis. Here, the marginal effect of stating that the British government affects the economy is around -10 % ($p < 0.001$). That is, when respondents say that the British government affects the economy, they are 10% less likely to blame the European Union for the financial crisis. Since the main attribution measure is asked within the context of questions on the European Union, these relationships are reassuring. In other words, when respondents think the British government affects the economy they are markedly more likely to also blame government and Gordon Brown for the financial crisis and less likely to blame the European Union.

Figure A4 also shows that the relationships between the financial crisis items and the main attribution measure are not as strong when it comes to respondents

stating that actors such as George W. Bush, the American government and banks are responsible. In some cases, e.g. in blaming George W. Bush, the American government, and British banks, the marginal effects are slightly positive. Yet the important point is that none of these marginal effects come close to those associated with blaming Gordon Brown and the British government. Thus, in terms of discriminating those respondents who think the government is responsible from those who do not, the attribution measure that is used in the analysis seems to do its job.



Figure A4: Stating that the British government affects the economy is clearly associated with blaming the British government and Gordon Brown for the financial crisis and vice versa for the EU. Point estimates give the change in predicted probability of blaming each of the twelve actors for the financial crisis (listed on the y-axis) when stating that "the British government" affects the current economic situation as opposed to stating "the European Union" or "neither". Point estimates are plotted with a 95 % confidence interval obtained through simulation (1000 iterations). Standard errors are clustered with respect to month. The full table output from the models is given in Table A3.

Table A3: The association between the main attribution measure and the twelve items tapping responsibility for the financial crisis. Estimates are probit coefficients.

	Dependent variable:					
	Gordon Brown	British Gov.	EU	George Bush	American Gov.	Int'l Finance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
British Gov. Affects Econ	0.554^{***}	0.560^{***}	-0.332^{***}	0.080^{**}	0.126^{***}	-0.081^{***}
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Constant	-0.985^{***}	-0.570^{***}	-0.753^{***}	-0.884^{***}	-0.367^{***}	0.241^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Aldrich-Nelson R-sq.	0.036	0.044	0.012	0.001	0.002	0.001
McFadden R-sq.	0.033	0.034	0.013	0.001	0.002	0.001
Cox-Snell R-sq.	0.037	0.044	0.012	0.001	0.002	0.001
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.054	0.060	0.020	0.001	0.003	0.001
Observations	7,152	7,152	7,152	7,152	7,152	7,152
Log Likelihood	−3,997.276	−4,680.986	−3,258.905	−3,593.617	−4,759.337	−4,870.161
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,998.552	9,365.972	6,521.811	7,191.234	9,522.674	9,744.322

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Continued...

	Dependent variable:					
	British Banks	American banks	People w/ mortgages	Oil Companies	Other Actor	None
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
British Gov. Affects Econ	0.192***	0.009	0.091***	−0.216***	−0.035	−0.159**
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.075)
Constant	0.599***	0.765***	−0.657***	−1.006***	−1.788***	−2.065***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.054)
Aldrich-Nelson R-sq.	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001
McFadden R-sq.	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.004
Cox-Snell R-sq.	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001
Nagelkerke R-sq.	0.007	0.000	0.002	0.008	0.000	0.004
Observations	7,152	7,152	7,152	7,152	7,152	7,152
Log Likelihood	−3,914.649	−3,774.175	−4,192.163	−2,740.167	−1,090.443	−574.440
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,833.298	7,552.351	8,388.327	5,484.334	2,184.886	1,152.879

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3 Do Different Respondents Attribute Different Meaning to the Response Categories?

On average, respondents do seem to implicate the Labour party, that is, the government and Gordon Brown, when they state that the British government affects the economic situation in the country. However, different subgroups of individuals may infer different meanings from the response categories. This is especially problematic if these subgroups are defined by covariates, e.g. party identification, which are themselves related to the outcome. For example, if respondents identifying with the Conservative party clearly associate the answer "the British government affects current economic conditions" with "the British government is responsible for the financial crisis" (evidenced by a positive correlation between the two variables) but respondents identifying with the Labour party connect the categories in the opposite way (as evidenced by a negative correlation), this would have implications for inferences. In order to test for this possibility, I ran two different probit models predicting the two most important items: whether a respondent blames the British government and Gordon Brown. As in previous models, the main independent variable is the attribution measure as in previous models; however, now the attribution measure is interacted with every covariate used in the analysis. Thus, significant and substantive interactions between covariates and the main attribution measure would indicate that some particular respondents infer different meanings from the response categories. Interaction terms of a magnitude that will lead to a shift in the sign of the marginal effect of the main attribution measure would indicate instances where respondents connect the response categories in vastly different ways[1].

From Tables A4 and A5 two things are important. First, in comparison with

[1]It bears notice that the test used here focuses on the marginal effect of x – conditional on z – on latent y and not the effects on the probability of observing y=1. In the latter case, interaction effects can be brought about by compression alone; that is, the fact that probabilities are bounded by 0 and 1 makes the marginal effect of x conditional on z even when a multiplicative term with x and z is not included in the model (for a recent discussion see Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010).

a basic model that does not include any interaction terms (Column 1), the first order effect of stating that the British government affects the economy only changes modestly across all of the different models. While this coefficient only gives the marginal effect of stating that the British government affects the economy when the interacting variable is 0, the fact that the first order effect hardly changes across the models suggests that the association between the two measures is robust. Second, when introducing an interaction term separately for every single covariate, it is only in a very limited number of cases that a significant interaction term is found, specifically gender and income in Table A4 and whether the respondent has a mortgage in Table A5. In none of these cases is the size of the second order effect large enough to change the sign of the first order effect of the main attribution measure. In addition, a joint F-test testing for the contribution in explanatory power contributed by including all of the interaction terms in one single model is insignificant in both instances ($F=1.09$, $p=0.36$ and $F=1.01$, $p=0.44$). All in all, different types of respondents do not seem to interpret the response categories in vastly different ways.

Table A4: Predicting whether respondents blame the British government for the financial crisis. Probit regression.

	Dependent variable:											
	British government is responsible for financial crisis											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
British gov affects econ.	0.428***	0.476***	0.360***	0.441***	0.409***	0.367***	0.429***	0.426***	0.394***	0.686***	0.363***	0.492***
	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.153)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Conservative ID	0.889***	0.954***	0.887***	0.889***	0.889***	0.889***	0.889***	0.889***	0.889***	0.890***	0.889***	0.888***
	(0.041)	(0.067)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Strength of ID	−0.166***	−0.166***	−0.258***	−0.166***	−0.166***	−0.167***	−0.166***	−0.166***	−0.167***	−0.165***	−0.166***	−0.166***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.099)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Economic Perceptions	−0.850***	−0.851***	−0.853***	−0.800***	−0.850***	−0.851***	−0.850***	−0.850***	−0.850***	−0.848***	−0.850***	−0.848***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.132)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Political attention	0.475***	0.479***	0.474***	0.475***	0.459***	0.481***	0.475***	0.474***	0.475***	0.471***	0.473***	0.475***
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.168)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Male	0.060	0.061	0.061	0.061	0.060	−0.027	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.063	0.060	0.062
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Has mortgage	−0.014	−0.013	−0.015	−0.014	−0.014	−0.011	−0.013	−0.014	−0.013	−0.016	−0.014	−0.015
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Unemployed	0.110	0.110	0.111	0.108	0.109	0.109	0.110	0.072	0.109	0.106	0.107	0.110
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.221)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Education	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.003	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Income	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.029*	0.004	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Newspaper exposure	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003	−0.002	−0.026	−0.003
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.027)
Age	−0.007	−0.008	−0.006	−0.007	−0.007	−0.009	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.028)
Affects econ X Conservative ID		−0.103										
		(0.083)										
Affects econ X Strength of ID			0.146									
			(0.122)									
Affects econ X Economic Perceptions				−0.077								
				(0.163)								
Affects econ X Political attention					0.026							
					(0.205)							
Affects econ X Male						0.141*						
						(0.083)						
Affects econ X Has mortgage							−0.002					
							(0.083)					
Affects econ X Unemployed								0.059				
								(0.273)				
Affects econ X Education									0.008			
									(0.028)			
Affects econ X Income										−0.040**		
										(0.019)		
Affects econ X Newspaper exposure											0.036	
											(0.053)	
Affects econ X Age												−0.021
												(0.031)
Constant	−1.061***	−1.091***	−1.018***	−1.071***	−1.050***	−1.021***	−1.061***	−1.059***	−1.041***	−1.215***	−1.017***	−1.101***
	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.155)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.147)	(0.143)	(0.142)
Observations	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718
Log Likelihood	−2,691.667	−2,690.898	−2,690.961	−2,691.555	−2,691.659	−2,690.236	−2,691.667	−2,691.644	−2,691.626	−2,689.337	−2,691.436	−2,691.445
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,409.333	5,409.797	5,409.923	5,411.111	5,411.317	5,408.472	5,411.333	5,411.288	5,411.252	5,406.673	5,410.872	5,410.890

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Predicting whether respondents blame the British government for the financial crisis. Probit regression.

	Dependent variable:											
	Gordon Brown is responsible for financial crisis											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
British gov affects econ.	0.436***	0.512***	0.359***	0.455***	0.232	0.418***	0.535***	0.436***	0.427***	0.662***	0.333***	0.582***
	(0.049)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.057)	(0.189)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Conservative ID	1.232***	1.314***	1.232***	1.233***	1.230***	1.232***	1.234***	1.232***	1.233***	1.233***	1.233***	1.231***
	(0.048)	(0.083)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Strength of ID	0.048	0.049	−0.060	0.049	0.048	0.048	0.050	0.048	0.048	0.050	0.049	0.047
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.119)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Economic Perceptions	−0.834***	−0.836***	−0.837***	−0.746***	−0.838***	−0.835***	−0.833***	−0.834***	−0.834***	−0.834***	−0.834***	−0.831***
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.176)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Political attention	0.830***	0.835***	0.831***	0.833***	0.644***	0.832***	0.834***	0.830***	0.830***	0.827***	0.827***	0.833***
	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.211)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.131)
Male	−0.065	−0.064	−0.065	−0.065	−0.063	−0.096	−0.066	−0.065	−0.065	−0.063	−0.066	−0.063
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Has mortgage	−0.041	−0.040	−0.043	−0.041	−0.042	−0.040	0.086	−0.041	−0.041	−0.043	−0.042	−0.044
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.084)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Unemployed	0.147	0.148	0.148	0.146	0.145	0.146	0.150	0.123	0.147	0.144	0.142	0.147
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.262)	(0.145)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.145)
Education	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	−0.019	−0.019	−0.019	−0.019	−0.018	−0.019	−0.019*	−0.019	−0.019	0.005	−0.019	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Newspaper exposure	−0.090***	−0.089***	−0.090***	−0.090***	−0.090***	−0.090***	−0.088***	−0.090***	−0.090***	−0.089***	−0.132**	−0.090***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.031)
Age	−0.056***	−0.057***	−0.055***	−0.056***	−0.056***	−0.057***	−0.056***	−0.056***	−0.056***	−0.056***	−0.056***	−0.021
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.033)
Affects econ X Conservative ID		−0.122										
		(0.100)										
Affects econ X Strength of ID			0.161									
			(0.142)									
Affects econ X Economic Perceptions				−0.129								
				(0.211)								
Affects econ X Political attention					0.280							
					(0.249)							
Affects econ X Male						0.045						
						(0.098)						
Affects econ X Has mortgage							−0.187*					
							(0.096)					
Affects econ X Unemployed								0.034				
								(0.312)				
Affects econ X Education									0.002			
									(0.033)			
Affects econ X Income										−0.035		
										(0.022)		
Affects econ X Newspaper exposure											0.060	
											(0.064)	
Affects econ X Age												−0.049
												(0.036)
Constant	−1.661***	−1.714***	−1.609***	−1.676***	−1.527***	−1.648***	−1.731***	−1.660***	−1.655***	−1.809***	−1.586***	−1.763***
	(0.150)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.151)	(0.190)	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.169)	(0.168)
Observations	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718	4,718
Log Likelihood	−2,041.956	−2,041.218	−2,041.320	−2,041.769	−2,041.315	−2,041.850	−2,040.094	−2,041.950	−2,041.953	−2,040.612	−2,041.512	−2,041.059
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,109.911	4,110.436	4,110.640	4,111.538	4,110.629	4,111.700	4,108.189	4,111.899	4,111.906	4,109.224	4,111.023	4,110.118

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

E Addressing Potential Selection Bias

One may worry that the differences and similarities I observe between partisans before and after the crisis are not due to the fact the economic situation has suddenly become indisputably clear, but that the individuals who report that they identify with either party are not the same before and after the outbreak of the crisis. As already shown in Figure A2 in Appendix C, there are no signs of any abrupt shifts in any of the covariates following the outbreak of the crisis.

However, what is not assessed in this case is another potential selection mechanism: reverse causation. That is, that voters may select into party identities based on how the economy is performing. While the cross–sectional structure of the data does not allow for a direct test of this, the extraordinary macroeconomic circumstances during the crisis period allow for testing at the aggregate level. More specifically, if voters select into party identities based on how the economy is performing one will only expect this selection process to go in one direction during the collapse of the British economy, i.e. voters should only select *out of*, not *in to*, Labour during this period. Thus, one observable implication of reverse causality is that the proportion of the sample identifying with Labour should drop in response to the economic recession. As can be seen from Figure A5, which depicts how the proportion of Labour and Conservative identifiers – compared to the whole sample – changes across time, this does not seem to be the case. In fact, the proportions are slightly upward trending and stable after the outbreak of the crisis suggesting that the financial crisis did not cause any large differences in the number of voters willing to admit to their party loyalties.



Figure A5: The proportion of party identifiers does not change in response to the economic collapse. Proportion of party identifiers relative to the whole sample (within each wave) across the 71 waves.

E.1 Addressing the issue of reverse causation using the nine–wave BES panel data set (2005–2010)

Although there is little aggregate–level evidence to suggest that voters select into party identities based on how they perceive the state of the national economy, inferring individual–level stability from aggregate level stability still involves assumptions about the direction of the selection process. In other words, while a strong case can be made that selection into party identities based on economic dissatisfaction will mostly go in one direction during the economic recession, this still involves assumptions. Thus in order to further rule out that the results presented in the analysis are not merely a story about reverse causation, I use a nine–wave panel data set that was collected during the same time period (2005–2010), within the same country and by the same election study team (the BES). While the panel data is not as temporally fine–grained and does not contain the same attribution of responsibility items as the CMS, it does allow for a direct test of whether reverse causation is likely to hamper inferences gained from the cross–sectional data. In what follows,

I demonstrate that there is very little evidence – even at the individual level – to suggest that this is the case.

First of all, a voter may select out of a given party identity in two distinct ways: 1) by refusing to answer the question or by not taking the survey (missingness) or 2) by changing her party identification over time (transition). Figure A7 maps out these quantities of interest and, not least, whether there are different probabilities of missingness and transition across the two partisan groups over time. Panel A, which gives the probability of missingness,[2] shows – not surprisingly – that there is panel attrition over time. Hence, as time passes, more and more respondents end up missing (note that the probability of missingness seems inflated because reentry is not allowed into the panel, see fn. 2). What is important to note, however, is that there do not seem to be any abrupt changes in the probability of missingness around the onset of financial crisis (2008–2009), and that there are no differences in missingness between the two partisan groups over time. In other words, conditional on party identification measured in Wave 1, there are no differences in the probability of missingness between the two partisan groups over time. Panel B gives the transition probabilities (i.e. the diagonal from a simple transition matrix), that is, the probability of identifying with the same party as in Wave 1 when re–interviewed in Waves 2 through 9. As can be seen from Panel B, there is generally a high degree of stability in party identification, in that the probability of transitioning hovers at around 20%. This rings especially true when taking into account that the figure does not distinguish between measurement error and true change, i.e. transition probabilities are likely to be biased upwards. However, there is a slight tendency for Labour identifiers to select out of the partisan group at a higher rate than Conservatives. While this trend can hardly explain the abrupt changes observed in the

[2]A respondent is treated as missing when she either refused to answer the survey question or did not answer any of the questions at all (dropout). For the sake of simplicity, reentry into the panel is not allowed and hence once an individual has been treated as missing in one wave this will continue to the be case in all consecutive waves.

cross–sectional analysis, it may still pose a minor problem if transition probabilities are systematically related to individual–level characteristics such as an individual's perception of the national economy, or other characteristics that may themselves be related to the perceptions of the national economy.



Figure A6: The probability of missingness (A) and changing party identification (B) conditional on party identification measured in Wave 1. All probabilities are relative to Wave 1.

Thus, the most straightforward test of whether ruling out reverse causation matters to the inferences drawn from the cross–sectional evidence is to see whether changes in perceptions of the national economy look similar when conditioning only on party identification measured in Wave 1. In this case, any change that make take place in how partisans perceive economic conditions cannot explain their party identification because this is measured prior to this change. To test this, I ran a mixed effects model with a random intercept – to take account of the fact that observations are nested within units – explaining retrospective perceptions of the national economy as a function of time of interview as well as party identification measured in Wave 1, that is, $t = 1$. The estimates and fit statistics from the model shown in Table A6 and Figure A7 graphically depict the estimates from the model. Focusing on Figure A7, the evidence is strikingly similar to the results from the CMS. In fact, when looking at how differences between partisans change over time,

the point estimates obtained from the panel model literally map onto the estimates that are obtained using the CMS data. All in all, it is thus highly unlikely that reverse causation poses any problem to the inferences gained from the cross–sectional data.



Figure A7: Retrospective perceptions of the national economy conditional on party identification (A) and the differences between partisans (B) over time. Party identification is measured in Wave 1. Point estimates are from Table A6.

Table A6: Estimates from random intercept model explaining retrospective perceptions of the national economy conditional on party identification and time of interview. Including versus excluding controls does not alter the results, thus controls are not included.

Constant	0.563^{***}
Wave 2	0.016^{**}
Wave 3	-0.001
Wave 4	-0.084^{***}
Wave 5	-0.386^{***}
Wave 6	-0.373^{***}
Wave 7	-0.145^{***}
Wave 8	-0.110^{***}
Wave 9	-0.145^{***}
Conservative $ID_{t=1}$	-0.239^{***}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 2	-0.035^{***}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 3	-0.030^{**}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 4	0.023^{*}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 5	0.138^{***}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 6	0.118^{***}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 7	0.006
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 8	-0.030^{**}
$ConID_{t=1}$ x Wave 9	0.001
Observations	12,274
Units	2176
Waves	9
Adjusted R^2	0.394
F Statistic	470.363^{***} (df = 17)
Hausman test	12.1725 (df=17,p=0.73)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 Standard errors are clustered with respect to time.

F Definition of the AME and APP

Average marginal effects are basically computed by first – and *for each single case* – calculating the change in predicted probability for a one unit change in the independent variable, or the marginal effect for each case, and secondly by averaging across all of these cases in order to get the average marginal effect. In this sense, controls are allowed to take on their observed value and the average marginal effect can be interpreted as the marginal effect for a typical respondent. More formally the AME in period t is defined as:

$$AME_t = \frac{1}{n_t}\sum_{i=1}^{n_t}[Pr(y_{it} = 1|\boldsymbol{X}_{it}, PartyID_{it} = 0) - Pr(y_{it} = 1|\boldsymbol{X}_{it}, PartyID_{it} = 1)]$$

In the analysis, the standard errors of the average marginal effects are obtained using simulation (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). Assuming that the sampling distribution of the estimates is asymptotically normal, the standard errors of the average marginal effects were simulated by resampling the estimates from a multivariate normal distribution with means equal to the estimates from the model, and a variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of the model. Average marginal effects were then calculated for each of these simulated draws using the original data set. This yields an approximate normal distribution of the parameter with a standard deviation equal to the standard error of the average marginal effect.

The average predicted probability within a given time period t for partisan group k is simply:

$APP_{tk} = \frac{1}{n_t}\sum_{i=1}^{n_t}[Pr(y_{it} = 1|\boldsymbol{X}_{it}, PartyID_{it} = k)]$, and hence:

$$AME_t = APP_{t,k=0} - APP_{t,k=1}.$$

G Replication of Figure 5 Without Collapsing Survey Waves



H Using an Ordered Probit Model to Explain Partisan Reponses to the Financial Crisis

In the analysis I treated one of the dependent variables, retrospective perceptions of the national economy, as a continuous measure. While modeling retrospective perceptions of the national economy in an OLS setting yields more intuitive and discernable patterns, it may also hide considerable nuance. This is largely the case because all of the response categories are treated as equally spaced and consequently averaged together into a mean response. Alternatively, an ordered probit model allows for more nuance in that it estimates the probability of observing *each* of the values the dependent variable can take on, depending on a set of covariates. The question, then, is whether this alternative approach alters the conclusions made in the analysis.

Figure A8 gives the cumulative probabilities of answering each of the five categories on the response variable – that is whether the economy has gotten a lot better, better, stayed around the same, gotten worse or got a lot worse – for Labour and Conservative identifiers respectively. As can be seen from the figure, there are stark differences in how Labour and Conservative identifiers perceive national economic conditions leading up to the outbreak of the crisis. For example, for a typical Conservative identifier, the cumulative probability of stating that the economy has gotten worse or gotten a lot worse amounts to roughly 70–80 % (marked by the lower two grey areas). For a typical Labour identifier, this probability is markedly lower: 20–30 %. At the other end of the scale similar differences are evident. For example, leading up to the outbreak of the crisis the cumulative probability of stating that the economy had gotten better or a lot better was roughly 30–40 % for a typical Labour identifier. For a typical Conservative identifier, the cumulative probability is less than 10 %. Hence, in corroborating the results presented in the analysis there are stark and relatively stable differences in how Conservative and Labour identifiers perceive national economic conditions. More importantly, the cumulative

probabilities change dramatically in response to the outbreak of the financial crisis in late 2007. For example, in 2009 virtually no Labour identifier believed that the British economy had gotten better or at least stayed around the same. Hence, for a typical Labour identifier the cumulative probability of stating that the economy had gotten worse or gotten a lot worse approximates 100 % where the same pattern is evident for Conservative identifiers. Overall, these findings strongly support the results from the OLS model presented in the analysis.



Figure A8: Cumulative probabilities of economic perceptions conditional on party identification, 2004–2010.

One aspect, however, warrants more careful notice. As can be seen from Figure A8, there are still differences in how party identifiers perceive economic conditions when the crisis is at its heighest, i.e. in the beginning in 2009. In order to grasp

these differences more clearly, Figure A9 gives the average predicted probabilities of stating that the economy is actually performing negatively, Pr($\leq$ Got worse), and the average predicted probability of saying the economy has gotten 'a lot worse', Pr(Got a lot worse), conditional on a respondents party identification. The entries have been obtained by fitting a single ordered probit model for the period between the outbreak of the crisis leading up to the election, where time – that is the month of the interview – has been included as a dummy variable interacted with a respondent's party identification.

Figure A9 gives two important insights. Partisans converge completely in whether they think the economy is performing negatively (left panel), yet, differences remain when looking at the average predicted probability of answering the most extreme value, that is, got 'a lot worse' (right panel). In other words, this means that partisans still disagree over *how* bad economic conditions are. Specifically, a typical Conservative identifier is 17 % more likely to state that the economy is performing 'a lot worse' than a typical Labour identifier when the crisis is at its heighest. Thus, this suggests that the reason why I still find a significant, albeit much smaller, partisan gap in the OLS model in the analysis is because Conservative and Labour identifiers still disagree over *how* bad economic conditions are. However compared to the magnitude of the differences found prior to the outbreak of the crisis, this difference is relatively small.



Figure A9: The time–varying dynamics in the average predicted probability of stating that the economy has gotten worse or more extreme, Pr($\leq$ Got worse), and stating that the economy got a lot worse, Pr(Got a lot worse), conditional on a respondent's party identification. Entries are from an ordered probit model ($\tau_1 = -1.71$; $\tau_2 = -0.54$; $\tau_3 = 0.04$; $\tau_4 = 1.6$) controlling for age, gender, income, unemployment status, education, political attention, strength of party identification and whether the respondent has a mortgage. 'Month post the outbreak of the crisis' has been included as a dummy variable interacted with a respondents party identification, hence changes over time are not assumed to follow any functional form (i.e. a second order polynomial).

I Comparing the Percentage of Non–Identifiers Across Different Survey Modes

	CMS (2004-2010) Internet Panel	BES (2005) Face–to–Face	BES (2010) Face–to–Face
Identifies with a party	78.4% (N=68,505)	80.3 % (N=3,108)	77.2%(N=3,870)
No party identification	15.9% (N=13,917)	18.6 % (N=719)	15.5%(N=778)
Don't Know	5.6% (N=4,938)	1.1 % (N=44)	7.2%(N=362)

Table C7: Comparing proportions of party identifiers and non-identifiers across different survey modes. Both the pre and post election cross–sections are included in the case of the BES–2005 and BES–2010 face–to–face surveys. The CMS includes respondents who are interviewed before May 2010, that is, the period covered in the main analysis. A respondent is recorded as having no party identification if the person answers "none/no" to the party identification question. The question reads: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat or what?"

J Including Liberal Democrats and Non-identifiers in the Analysis

For presentational reasons, the analysis has focused on voters who identify with either one of the main parties, that is, the Conservative and Labour Parties. As can be seen from Table A8, which gives the total distribution of party identifiers across all 71 waves, Labour and Conservative identifiers also make up a clear majority of the sample, with a total of 59.3 %. Yet those who do not identify with any party and those who identify with the Liberal Democrats also make up a fairly large share of the sample.

Table A8: The distribution of party identifiers across all 71 waves.

Party Identification	Frequency	Percentage
Conservative	21,236	24.3
Labour	30,558	35.0
Liberal Democrat	8,211	9.4
None	13,917	16.0
Plaid Cymru	372	0.4
Scottish Nationalist Party	1,443	1.7
Greens	2,011	2.3
UK Independence Party	2,487	2.8
British National Party	784	.9
Other party	1,403	1.6
Don't Know	4938	5.7
Total	87,360	100.00

Hence, while the Labour and Conservative parties have traditionally been the two competing parties in British politics, other parties, and namely those voters who do not identify with any party, could also serve as a relevant counterfactual. For example, one would expect to find the largest disagreement in perceptions of economic conditions when comparing Labour and Conservative identifiers because these partisans have widely different motives for rationalizing economic conditions, whereas such motives should not influence the way independents perceive economic conditions. Following this line of reasoning, one would expect independents to per-

ceive economic conditions "neutrally" or somewhere in between the ways in which the highly partisan Labour and Conservative identifiers perceive these conditions. Generally, this is also the pattern that is evident in Figure A10 which gives the predicted means of retrospective perceptions of the national economy for voters identifying with Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats or with no party. Here, the voters who do not identify with any party consistently perceive national economic conditions as being *less* prosperous than Labour identifiers and *more* prosperous than Conservative identifiers. The pattern observed for Liberal Democrats more or less matches that of independents.



Figure A10: Predicted means of retrospective perceptions of the national economy conditional on a respondents party identification, 2004-2010. Lines are simple moving averages (averaged over 4 periods). Q: How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? (0 = Got a lot worse).

When looking at Figure A11 which addresses the attribution of responsibility, the pattern is markedly more noisy and should thus be interpreted with caution. Overall, however, the tendency seems to be the same: Independents and Liberal Democrats are somewhere in between Labour and Conservatives.



Figure A11: Average predicted probability of blaming the government for economic conditions across partisan groups, 2004-2010. Lines are simple moving averages (averaged over 4 periods).

K Conditioning Effects of the Information Environment?

The primary objective of this study was to compare how two groups of citizens with widely different partisan motivations responded to a sudden and unambiguous change in the national economy. Thus far, the study has not devoted attention to the processes that may have mediated the response from the different partisan groups. While the dominant explanations rooted in the theory of motivated reasoning hinge on individuals actively seeking out and/or interpreting economic information selectively, a slightly different mechanism is also conceivable: partisans happen to subscribe to highly partisan news outlets and "blindly" follow the news diet they receive. Taking the overt partisan leanings of the British newspaper press into account and the fact that British party elites portrayed the issue of responsibility very differently (Hellwig and Coffey, 2011), this mechanism is plausible. In short, maybe partisans' responses to the economic crisis were primarily driven by the potentially congenial news they received from the mass media without much reasoning involved.

Table A9: Distribution of party identifiers on exposure to daily newspapers.

Question: How often do you read daily newspapers?*	Frequency	Percent
Every day	21,234	41 %
Sometimes	19,158	37 %
Not at all	11,388	22 %
Total	51,780	100 %

*: Numbers are based on respondents identifying with either Labour or the Conservative Party.

If the observed patterns are a simple response to the information environment, one observable implication would be markedly different changes over time for partisans reporting low vs. high exposure to news. Here I report the results from models, where the main analysis is broken down by a respondent's level of exposure to newspapers. As shown in Figures A12 and A13, the overtime patterns are almost

identical to what is found in the main analysis. Specifically, convergence in economic perceptions and polarization in attribution of responsibility are clearly evident regardless of a respondent's level of exposure to the newspapers. Thus, controlling for a respondent's attentiveness to the information environment does not alter the main results.



Figure A12: Predicted means (upper panels) and the difference in Labour and Conservatives' retrospective perceptions of the national economy (lower panels) plotted with 95 % CIs. Panel A gives estimates from a model that is fitted for respondents stating that they never read newspapers, Panel B for respondents stating "sometimes," and Panel C for respondents stating "every day." Lines are simple moving averages with a 2–period bin. Q: How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? (0 = Got a lot worse; 1 = Got a lot better).



Figure A13: Average predicted probability of blaming the government for economic conditions across partisan groups (upper panels) and the average marginal effect of party identification on attributions of responsibility (lower panels). Panel A gives estimates from a model that is fitted for respondents stating that they never read newspapers, Panel B for respondents stating "sometimes," and Panel C for respondents stating "every day." Point estimates are plotted with a 95 % confidence interval obtained through simulation (1000 iterations). Because a non–trivial number of cases were dropped from the analysis due to the coding of the dependent variable, the monthly waves are collapsed into 6-month periods to retain a sufficient number of cases. Q: Which one of the following do you think affects the general economic situation in this country the most? (1 = the British government, 0 = other).

L Full Table Outputs for the Main Analysis

	Economic Perceptions (OLS estimates)	Attributions of Blame (Probit estimates)
Constant	0.478***	−0.277*
	(0.015)	(0.133)
Conservative ID	−0.278***	0.254
	(0.019)	(0.161)
Month: 2	−0.005	0.144
	(0.020)	(0.177)
Month: 3	−0.031	0.369*
	(0.018)	(0.157)
Month: 4	−0.031	0.191
	(0.019)	(0.171)
Month: 5	−0.073***	0.061
	(0.019)	(0.164)
Month: 6	−0.063**	−0.085
	(0.020)	(0.172)
Month: 7	−0.019	0.045
	(0.019)	(0.170)
Month: 8	−0.010	0.207
	(0.019)	(0.170)
Month: 9	−0.004	0.172
	(0.018)	(0.161)
Month: 10	0.028	0.168
	(0.019)	(0.167)
Month: 11	0.018	0.172
	(0.018)	(0.164)
Month: 12	0.044*	0.444**
	(0.018)	(0.167)
Month: 13	0.013	0.248
	(0.018)	(0.160)
Month: 14	−0.037*	0.149
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 15	−0.056**	0.171
	(0.018)	(0.156)
Month: 16	−0.063***	0.018
	(0.018)	(0.154)
Month: 17	−0.089***	−0.103
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 18	−0.086***	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.151)
Month: 19	−0.062***	−0.083
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 20	−0.067***	−0.218
	(0.018)	(0.155)

Continued...

	Economic Perceptions	Attributions of Blame
Month: 21	−0.076***	−0.092
	(0.018)	(0.157)
Month: 22	−0.105***	−0.237
	(0.018)	(0.154)
Month: 23	−0.080***	−0.148
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 24	−0.100***	−0.129
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 25	−0.073***	−0.158
	(0.018)	(0.156)
Month: 26	−0.116***	0.007
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 27	−0.091***	−0.157
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 28	−0.105***	−0.143
	(0.018)	(0.160)
Month: 29	−0.065***	−0.274
	(0.017)	(0.145)
Month: 30	−0.114***	−0.287
	(0.018)	(0.154)
Month: 31	−0.111***	−0.373*
	(0.018)	(0.152)
Month: 32	−0.127***	−0.141
	(0.017)	(0.151)
Month: 33	−0.084***	−0.034
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 34	−0.102***	−0.165
	(0.018)	(0.155)
Month: 35	−0.095***	−0.159
	(0.018)	(0.151)
Month: 36	−0.061***	0.068
	(0.018)	(0.152)
Month: 37	−0.063***	−0.123
	(0.019)	(0.159)
Month: 38	−0.090***	−0.100
	(0.018)	(0.152)
Month: 39	−0.101***	−0.309*
	(0.018)	(0.153)
Month: 40	−0.134***	−0.183
	(0.018)	(0.153)
Month: 41	−0.099***	−0.328*
	(0.018)	(0.157)
Month: 42	−0.097***	−0.372*
	(0.018)	(0.154)
Month: 43	−0.191***	−0.184
	(0.017)	(0.148)

Continued...

	Economic Perceptions	Attributions of Blame
Month: 44	−0.241***	−0.273
	(0.017)	(0.150)
Month: 45	−0.210***	−0.443**
	(0.018)	(0.153)
Month: 46	−0.292***	−0.603***
	(0.018)	(0.149)
Month: 47	−0.349***	−0.274
	(0.018)	(0.153)
Month: 48	−0.402***	−0.525***
	(0.018)	(0.157)
Month: 49	−0.397***	−0.756***
	(0.017)	(0.150)
Month: 50	−0.432***	−0.450**
	(0.018)	(0.152)
Month: 51	−0.416***	−0.607***
	(0.018)	(0.158)
Month: 52	−0.445***	−0.819***
	(0.018)	(0.153)
Month: 53	−0.447***	−0.475**
	(0.018)	(0.159)
Month: 54	−0.468***	−0.511**
	(0.018)	(0.157)
Month: 55	−0.473***	−0.683***
	(0.019)	(0.159)
Month: 56	−0.508***	−0.556***
	(0.018)	(0.163)
Month: 57	−0.486***	−0.574***
	(0.019)	(0.162)
Month: 58	−0.483***	−0.444**
	(0.019)	(0.171)
Month: 59	−0.453***	−0.484**
	(0.019)	(0.166)
Month: 60	−0.438***	−0.567***
	(0.018)	(0.153)
Month: 61	−0.367***	−0.601***
	(0.016)	(0.142)
Month: 62	−0.355***	−0.532**
	(0.019)	(0.164)
Month: 63	−0.318***	−0.565***
	(0.019)	(0.160)
Month: 64	−0.163***	−0.588***
	(0.018)	(0.161)
Month: 65	−0.219***	−0.325
	(0.019)	(0.166)
Month: 66	−0.138***	−0.334*
	(0.019)	(0.165)

Continued...

	Economic Perceptions	Attributions of Blame
Month: 67	−0.146***	−0.494**
	(0.019)	(0.161)
Month: 68	−0.098***	−0.539***
	(0.019)	(0.161)
Month: 69	−0.093***	−0.484**
	(0.019)	(0.161)
Month: 70	−0.067***	−0.207
	(0.019)	(0.169)
Month: 71	−0.033	−0.379*
	(0.019)	(0.164)
Strength of ID	0.060***	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.031)
Political awareness	−0.050***	0.361***
	(0.006)	(0.054)
Male	−0.017***	−0.119***
	(0.002)	(0.021)
Age	0.001***	0.012***
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Income	0.001*	0.026***
	(0.001)	(0.005)
Has mortgage	−0.011***	0.018
	(0.003)	(0.024)
Unemployed	−0.038***	0.016
	(0.009)	(0.075)
Education	0.002*	0.021**
	(0.001)	(0.008)
Newspaper exposure	0.012***	0.008
	(0.002)	(0.013)
Against British EU membership		−0.938***
		(0.036)
Conservative × Month: 2	0.030	0.107
	(0.029)	(0.261)
Conservative × Month: 3	0.072**	−0.028
	(0.026)	(0.231)
Conservative × Month: 4	0.047	−0.266
	(0.027)	(0.241)
Conservative × Month: 5	0.063*	−0.178
	(0.027)	(0.232)
Conservative × Month: 6	0.064*	−0.120
	(0.029)	(0.247)
Conservative × Month: 7	0.008	−0.385
	(0.028)	(0.245)
Conservative × Month: 8	−0.002	−0.313
	(0.027)	(0.233)
Conservative × Month: 9	−0.014	−0.198
	(0.027)	(0.236)
Conservative × Month: 10	−0.005	−0.249
	(0.028)	(0.244)

Continued...

	Economic Perceptions	Attributions of Blame
Conservative × Month: 11	−0.024	−0.449
	(0.028)	(0.242)
Conservative × Month: 12	−0.021	−0.505*
	(0.028)	(0.240)
Conservative × Month: 13	0.022	−0.688**
	(0.027)	(0.236)
Conservative × Month: 14	0.015	−0.355
	(0.027)	(0.232)
Conservative × Month: 15	0.047	−0.271
	(0.026)	(0.226)
Conservative × Month: 16	0.031	−0.238
	(0.027)	(0.225)
Conservative × Month: 17	0.056*	−0.067
	(0.027)	(0.232)
Conservative × Month: 18	0.023	−0.278
	(0.026)	(0.227)
Conservative × Month: 19	0.035	−0.154
	(0.027)	(0.233)
Conservative × Month: 20	0.017	−0.151
	(0.026)	(0.227)
Conservative × Month: 21	0.027	−0.279
	(0.026)	(0.227)
Conservative × Month: 22	0.033	0.008
	(0.027)	(0.229)
Conservative × Month: 23	0.032	−0.205
	(0.027)	(0.230)
Conservative × Month: 24	0.050	−0.127
	(0.028)	(0.239)
Conservative × Month: 25	0.040	−0.238
	(0.027)	(0.230)
Conservative × Month: 26	0.070**	−0.482*
	(0.027)	(0.240)
Conservative × Month: 27	0.053*	−0.148
	(0.027)	(0.231)
Conservative × Month: 28	0.035	−0.275
	(0.027)	(0.238)
Conservative × Month: 29	0.016	0.049
	(0.025)	(0.214)
Conservative × Month: 30	0.067*	−0.103
	(0.027)	(0.231)
Conservative × Month: 31	0.088***	−0.050
	(0.027)	(0.230)
Conservative × Month: 32	0.031	−0.148
	(0.026)	(0.219)
Conservative × Month: 33	−0.012	−0.309
	(0.026)	(0.228)

Continued...

	Economic Perceptions	Attributions of Blame
Conservative × Month: 34	0.055*	−0.018
	(0.027)	(0.231)
Conservative × Month: 35	0.030	0.111
	(0.026)	(0.227)
Conservative × Month: 36	0.017	−0.172
	(0.027)	(0.231)
Conservative × Month: 37	0.019	−0.290
	(0.027)	(0.232)
Conservative × Month: 38	0.013	−0.141
	(0.026)	(0.222)
Conservative × Month: 39	0.019	−0.187
	(0.027)	(0.225)
Conservative × Month: 40	0.093***	−0.230
	(0.027)	(0.229)
Conservative × Month: 41	0.020	−0.124
	(0.027)	(0.232)
Conservative × Month: 42	0.023	−0.018
	(0.027)	(0.227)
Conservative × Month: 43	0.051*	−0.376
	(0.026)	(0.219)
Conservative × Month: 44	0.084**	0.049
	(0.026)	(0.225)
Conservative × Month: 45	0.057*	0.205
	(0.026)	(0.225)
Conservative × Month: 46	0.082**	0.374
	(0.026)	(0.223)
Conservative × Month: 47	0.122***	0.285
	(0.027)	(0.229)
Conservative × Month: 48	0.165***	0.387
	(0.026)	(0.231)
Conservative × Month: 49	0.147***	0.826***
	(0.026)	(0.226)
Conservative × Month: 50	0.181***	0.145
	(0.026)	(0.226)
Conservative × Month: 51	0.160***	0.474*
	(0.027)	(0.228)
Conservative × Month: 52	0.183***	0.398
	(0.026)	(0.226)
Conservative × Month: 53	0.187***	0.408
	(0.027)	(0.234)
Conservative × Month: 54	0.200***	0.196
	(0.026)	(0.228)
Conservative × Month: 55	0.188***	0.438
	(0.027)	(0.236)

Continued...

	Economic Perceptions	Attributions of Blame
Conservative × Month: 56	0.229***	0.362
	(0.027)	(0.238)
Conservative × Month: 57	0.224***	0.518*
	(0.028)	(0.246)
Conservative × Month: 58	0.223***	0.795**
	(0.027)	(0.253)
Conservative × Month: 59	0.183***	0.458
	(0.028)	(0.242)
Conservative × Month: 60	0.190***	0.303
	(0.027)	(0.227)
Conservative × Month: 61	0.159***	0.487*
	(0.024)	(0.207)
Conservative × Month: 62	0.144***	0.419
	(0.027)	(0.237)
Conservative × Month: 63	0.153***	0.569*
	(0.027)	(0.239)
Conservative × Month: 64	0.044	0.583*
	(0.027)	(0.236)
Conservative × Month: 65	0.100***	0.516*
	(0.027)	(0.244)
Conservative × Month: 66	0.043	0.119
	(0.028)	(0.239)
Conservative × Month: 67	0.065*	0.513*
	(0.028)	(0.239)
Conservative × Month: 68	0.014	0.448
	(0.028)	(0.244)
Conservative × Month: 69	0.044	0.489*
	(0.028)	(0.243)
Conservative × Month: 70	−0.009	0.240
	(0.028)	(0.247)
Conservative × Month: 71	−0.019	0.082
	(0.028)	(0.246)
adj. R-squared	0.425	
σ	0.202	
Aldrich-Nelson R-sq.		0.105
McFadden R-sq.		0.089
Cox-Snell R-sq.		0.110
Nagelkerke R-sq.		0.151
N	32892	18503

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