Supplementary Appendix For "How Prior Military Experience Influences The Future Militarized Behavior Of Leaders

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Overview And Summary Statistics

This appendix covers several different issues referenced in the accompanying paper and provides additional statistical results demonstrating the robustness and importance of the findings in the paper. Appendix Table 1 below shows summary statistics for the core variables included in the militarized dispute initiation models displayed in the main paper.

Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics For Core MID Initiation Model Variables

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Military Service, No Combat	11495	0.107873	0.310233	0	1
Military Service, Combat	11497	0.264243	0.440948	0	1
Rebel Service	11498	0.343712	0.474967	0	1
Prior War Win	11495	0.097869	0.29715	0	1
Prior War Loss	11490	0.086423	0.281	0	1
Prior Rebel Win	11490	0.088338	0.283798	0	1
Prior Rebel Loss	11490	0.028895	0.167518	0	1
Age	11525	55.98725	11.59844	12	92
Material Capabilities	11525	0.01559	0.039587	6.46E-06	0.383864
Autocracy	11052	0.318404	0.465878	0	1
Tau B With System Leader	11344	0.087308	0.331113	-0.36683	1

Coding Of Military Experience Variables

We utilize the following military service variables in the paper. They are coded as described below.

Military Service: Coded a 1 if a leader had any military service background and a 0 otherwise.

Military Experience, No Combat: Coded a 1 if a leader had military experience but not combat experience, and a 0 otherwise.

Combat: Coded a 1 if a leader had combat experience and a 0 otherwise. We define a leader as having seen combat if multiple sources suggest direct or indirect exposure to enemy fire while in

the military. If that data was not available, absent contrary evidence, we coded leaders as having seen combat if there was evidence they were in an active combat zone facing the risk of death while in the military. This addendum became necessary because, for many leaders, especially those who served prior to World War II, even detailed biographies only revealed whether or not a given person was in a war zone while fighting occurred. If we restricted the combat coding to only those leaders where multiple sources suggested the leader actively faced enemy fire with an imminent risk of death, it would have been impossible to code almost a half of the data. When we had more specific data, we used that data.

Rebel: Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a rebel movement, including a coup, and a 0 otherwise. The important factor for testing our theory is risk propensity, which would include more than just a formal guerilla movement. This is why we tested to ensure our results were robust to including controls for whether leaders entered office irregularly or through a coup (see below).

Rebel Experience, No Combat (not used in paper due to lower data coverage and reliability): Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a rebel movement but did not experience combat, and a 0 otherwise.

Rebel Combat (not used in paper due to lower data coverage and reliability): Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a rebel movement and experienced combat, and a 0 otherwise.

Prior War Win: Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a war as a member of a uniformed military and their side won in a war counted as a war by the Correlates of War Project (interstate, intrastate, and/or extra-systemic), and a 0 otherwise

Prior War Loss: Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a war as a member of a uniformed military and their side lost in a war counted as a war by the Correlates of War Project (interstate, intrastate, and/or extra-systemic), and a 0 otherwise

Prior Rebel Win: Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a war as a member of a rebel group and their side won in a war counted as a war by the Correlates of War Project (interstate, intrastate, and/or extra-systemic), and a 0 otherwise

Prior Rebel Loss: Coded a 1 if a leader participated in a war as a member of a rebel group and their side lost in a war counted as a war by the Correlates of War Project (interstate, intrastate, and/or extra-systemic), and a 0 otherwise

Military Experience Data By Region

Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics on Basic Military and Rebel Experience of Global Heads-Of-State, 1875-2001

	No Military Service	Military Service	Data Coverage	No Rebel Group Participation	Rebel Group Participation	Data Coverage
Americas	59.68%	40.29%	99.97%	61.61%	38.12%	99.72%
Europe	68.48%	31.46%	99.94%	76.53%	23.41%	99.96%
Sub-Saharan Africa	60.04%	39.96%	100%	59.67%	40.23%	99.89%
Middle East & North Africa	53.48%%	45.53%	99.36%	54.97%	44.39%	99.36%
Asia	62.95%	36.22%	99.17%	59.82%	39.82%	99.65%
Oceania	84.74%	15.26%	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%

	No Combat	Combat	Data Coverage
Americas	71.09%	28.84%	99.93%
Europe	74.60%	25.34%	99.94%
Sub-Saharan Africa	72.27%	27.68%	99.95%
Middle East & North	78.76%	20.60%	99.36%

Africa			
Asia	69.79%	29.38%	99.17%
Oceania	86.35%	13.65%	100.00%

A few things stand out in a first glance at these summary statistics of the variables of interest. For example, as we might expect given their relative lack of involvement with international conflict, the percentage of Oceanic leaders that have participated in military activities across the board is significantly lower than in the other regions. There is also some regional variation with regard to military service versus actual combat experience. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example the percentage of leaders that saw combat during their military career is almost identical to the percentage that served in militaries, which makes sense given the external and internal instability faced by many Sub-Saharan African countries. In contrast, while the Middle East and North Africa has a larger percentage of leaders with formal military service as Sub-Saharan Africa, it has fewer leaders with rebel experience. There are also differences in the combat rate. The gap between the military service rate and the combat rate could indicate any number of things, ranging from a lower propensity for countries in a given region to go to war to courtesy appointments that do not involve battlefield participation even in time of war.

Table 2 also shows the rates of rebel group participation by national leaders. Over 40% of the national leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa, which features a high number of civil wars and internal conflicts, participated in a rebel group at some point before assuming office. In contrast, 23.41% of European leaders participated in rebel activities before taking office. Many of those come from leaders who participated in resistance movements in occupied German territories in World War II, meaning as that generation passes away, the number has been declining over the last few decades.

Explaining Other Variation In Military Service

The two factors examined in the paper – military service and rebel service – do not encompass all of the differences in the experiences of people in the military, or even all of the important differences. While service in a uniformed military or rebel group is one way to think about military experience, another input, especially for those that see combat, is how those militaries actually do on the battlefield. For example, while he did not become head of state, Colin Powell's skepticism about limited interventions after the Vietnam War arguably flowed from his first-hand experiences in the US military during America's struggles in the Vietnam War.[1] Perhaps a different outcome would have led to a different set of beliefs on the part of Powell with regard to the use of military force. More generally, drawing on George and Kennedy, success or failure on the battlefield should influence the efficacy beliefs of leaders. Kennedy shows how Nehru's success with particular strategies earlier in life, for example, predisposed him to use those strategies again once he became a national leader.[2] Success or failure in war may be a particularly important experience – exactly the type of analogy that a leader might draw on when considering whether a use of force is likely to succeed.[3]

Another possibility is that even the account described in the paper is incomplete because it does not explicitly account for the particular branch of the armed services in which a leader previously participated. Feaver and Gelpi find, for example, that Air Force and Marine respondents favored international human rights interventions more than Army officers.[4] The services were nearly identical when it came to interventions for traditional foreign policy goals,

[1] (Powell and Persico 1995)
[2] (George 1980; Kennedy 2011)
[3] (Khong 1992). We control for the generational effects of analogical reasoning below.
[4] (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 61-62)

however. Janowitz similarly found very little in the way of differences between the uniformed services.[5]

In the broader universe of leaders described below, nearly all of them served in ground forces or in conflicts that did not feature participation from multiple service branches. While there are a few leaders who served in navies, as opposed to armies, there are no air force officers in our universe, as far as we can tell. There is also no theoretical reason to assume that branch differences matter or matter more than the overall effect of military service, though we recognize that this is a relevant factor. It is important to not impose our current Western conception of the branches of the armed forces onto conflicts in Latin and South America in the 19th century, for example, when these divides were not as poignant. That being said, data limitations prevented us from gathering this data for the entire universe, so this limits what we can say about this factor.

It was also not possible to systematically gather data on whether leaders with military experience served as officers or enlisted. While that granularity of data is possible to get for modern, Westernized militaries, that level of detail was inaccessible for the vast majority of leaders. Most future leaders, though not all, served as officers. Additionally, Jason Dempsey's recent survey research on the preferences of the US Army shows that, on key foreign policy issues, officers and enlisted personnel have similar attitudes.[6] There are some missions, such as disaster relief, where enlisted personnel were more supportive of action than officers. This is consistent with the Feaver and Gelpi findings comparing military and civilian elite,[7] suggesting that socialization within the military may alter preferences for officers more than enlisted personnel. One problem is that all of this research focuses on active duty personnel, rather than

[5] (Janowitz 1960, 253)
[6] (Dempsey 2010).
[7] (Feaver and Gelpi 2004)

veterans. It is also only definitively applicable to the United States, meaning any differences might not be generalizable.

If these small differences are generalizable and enlisted personnel have preferences more likely the civilian population, it means including these leaders as having military service actually biases against our finding significant results. Thus, even though we do not have complete data on this point, it is more likely to bias the overall results against our hypotheses than anything else. Finally, attempting to find data on whether someone served as an officer or as a soldier, like gathering data on the branch in which someone served, represents a potential path for future research. Neither of these factors is likely to matter, however, if military service in general does not matter.

Another possibility is that, rather than different military experiences serving to socialize leaders and shape their beliefs and risk propensity, people with greater levels of risk acceptance predominately select into the military. This would be an issue of particular concern for countries with volunteer militaries, such as the United States today. Thus, future leaders with military experience will naturally be more risk acceptant than an average member of the population without military service. If this argument is true, it does not actually undermine our results. Our results would still demonstrate the military background experiences of leaders represent important information that can help predict the way a country will act when that leader is in office. However, data from the United States also shows that a diverse set of factors, including educational benefits, social networks, and a sense of obligation influence why people join the military.[8] Dempsey's 2004 survey of the US Army found that educational benefits actually play a primary role in driving people to join.[9] The well-document difficulty the Army and Marines, in

[8] (G2 - United States Army Accessions Command 2008). For more on this topic see (Krebs 2009).
[9] (Dempsey 2010, 45-47)

particular, had recruiting between 2004 and 2009 suggests that, as the risk of death from joining the military increased, the propensity for people to select into the military has declined. Recruiting difficulties only eased as the economy decline and joining the military became a more attractive career option once again.[10] Statistical models of the propensity to enlist conducted by Beth Asch and others at the RAND Corporation demonstrate that financial bonuses and the unemployment rate both play an important role in determining military enlistments.[11] While it is possible that the people who find those benefits attractive also happen to be more risk acceptant, and that evidence is limited since it is only applicable to the United States, there is no systematic evidence suggesting that this particular selection effect exists. A variety of factors motivate people to join the military and most of them are not related to the propensity to engage in violent behavior after someone has left the military. Additionally, as we describe below, there are reasons to think the selection of riskier people into the military and then politics is a particular problem for some types of regimes, though not others. Finally, for countries with conscription militaries during particular time periods, selection into the military may happen as a matter of law, rather than as a personal choice. We can control for this factor by coding whether or not a country has a conscript or volunteer army during a particular time period.

Micro-Level Survey Data On Military Experience

One challenge in trying to differentiate the impact of military service from combat experience is that most surveys that ask respondents about their foreign policy beliefs only ask respondents, in the background section of the survey, whether or not they have prior military experience. Most surveys do ask enough about service backgrounds to allow us to differentiate

[10] (Alvarez 2009)
[11] (Asch et al. 2010 22-24)

between prior military service that did not include combat and prior military service that did include combat service. As referenced in the paper, however, there are a few existing surveys that do allow us to separately estimate the effect of military service from the effect of combat service. Both provide general support for the core theoretical argument advanced in the paper that those with prior military service but not combat experience, especially in regimes featuring civilian control of the military, are more risk prone than those with combat experience.

The Jennings-Niemi panel study, first conducted in 1965, measured the political attitudes of seniors in high school originally interviewed in 1965. Of the 853 males interviewed in 1965, the survey researchers received second-wave data on 674 of them in 1974. In 1974, the survey researchers asked respondents about their prior military service and specifically differentiated between whether or not respondents had served in the Vietnam War or not. Given that the Vietnam War was the only ongoing conflict the United States was engaged in at the time, this allows us to differentiate two groups – those with military service who served in Vietnam and those that did not. To some extent, this conflates the "success" mechanism referenced in the paper and discussed below and the "combat" mechanism, since service in Vietnam both involved combat and an eventual American defeat. That being said, it represents a first cut, and one of the few available in existing survey data, at evaluating the differences between those with combat service and those without combat service. In the third wave of the study, in 1982, the researchers asked respondents a question about the extent to which they supported American engagement around the world (Jennings and Markus 1977; Jennings et al. 1991). Higher scores represent greater support for an active American role in the world. This question is not perfect for our purposes. It reflects general beliefs about the world and is more about foreign policy itself than the actual use of force. However, it is the best proxy in the Jennings and Niemi survey

instrument. The results show that those with military service who did *not* deploy to Vietnam show a much higher propensity to support an active American foreign policy (N=206, Mean=4.024) than either those with no prior military service (N=899, Mean=3.73) or those who deployed to Vietnam (N=123, Mean=3.84). In a regression analysis, while there is no relationship between serving in Vietnam and foreign policy beliefs, there is a significant and positive relationship between service not in Vietnam and support for an active US foreign policy.[12]

Another source of micro-level survey data comes from Feaver and Gelpi. While the 1998-1999 survey has been used by several researchers, that survey did not ask questions to related to combat experience, specifically, A Feaver, Gelpi, and Reifler survey conducted by the Parker Group in 2003 did, however, obtain more detail about the military service backgrounds of respondents.[13] It was a national random sample with 1203 respondents. Respondents were asked a range of questions about their political attitudes as they related to the war in Iraq as well as their willingness to see the US use armed force in a variety of situations. This study is unique among the various surveys conducted on US military action over the last decade because it explicitly asked not just whether participants had served in the military, but whether they had seen combat. While limited to the United States and focused on the general population, rather than leaders, this does allow us to differentiate, to some extent, between those with military service in general, those that have seen combat, and those with no service at all. They asked respondents about their willingness to support the US using force in several different scenarios and across several different levels of casualties. We would expect that differences between those with combat and those with military service but no combat experience should be relatively muted

[12] For replication data, contact the authors.
[13] (Gelpi et al. 2009)

in this situation. The United States is a democracy and the beliefs of those with military service in general should be more militaristic than the general population, but much closer to the general population than those with military service in regimes that lack civilian control of the military. In many of the scenarios, we do not find significant differences between combat and military service without combat, but there are several scenarios where differences emerge. One is an Iran intervention scenario with 5000 posited casualties. The results below show trends consistent with our theory and the Jennings and Niemi data cited above. Support is much larger for those with military service but no combat experience (N=129, Mean=0.287) than for those with no military service (N=933, Mean=0.211) or those with combat experience (N=80, Mean=0.25), though the total N is fairly low for those with military service overall, limiting the generalizability of these results (it also only reflects one particular scenario). In a regression analysis, as with the Jennings and Niemi data, while there is no relationship between combat experience and support for intervention, there is a significant and positive relationship between intervention and those with military service but no combat experience.[14]

Simple Statistical Correlations Between Military Experience And MID Initiation

Appendix Table 3 below shows simple correlations between different types of military service, prior success and failure if that service included combat in a war, and MID initiation.

[14] For replication data, contact the authors.

Appendix Figure 1: Correlation Between Military Service and MID Initiation



All relationships significant with chi2 tests at the $p < 0.01$ level

The differences are all statistically different with chi2 tests at the .01 level, demonstrating that different types of military experiences on the part of leaders do correlate with the propensity of those leaders to get involved in militarized disputes.

Additionally, the differences between the "military service, no combat" category and the "combat" category are statistically significant as well. This provides strong initial evidence in support of our claim that variations in the military backgrounds of leaders have significant effects. However, one potential issue is that smaller categories might be skewed by the presence of especially dispute-prone leaders, such as Mao. This accentuates the need to control for additional factors to ensure that we are isolating the relative effect of leaders.

Replication Of Table 1 Including Suppressed Variables

To save space, we suppressed a few of the variables in Table 1, including peace year controls and lower-order interaction terms. They are presented below.

Appendix Table 3: Full Version of Table 1

	Model 1 (MID model)	*Model 2 (War model)*	*Model 3 (MID interaction with* POLITY*)*	*Model 4 (MID interaction with* AUTOCRACY*)*	*Model 5 (MID interaction with* MILITARY REGIME*)*
Military Service, No Combat	0.393**	0.524**	0.845***	0.158	0.485**
	(0.153)	(0.266)	(0.279)	(0.187)	(0.212)
Military Service, Combat	0.0887	-0.563	0.377	0.0796	-0.249
	(0.162)	(0.346)	(0.272)	(0.218)	(0.385)
Rebel Service	0.474***	0.385	0.674**	0.671***	0.672***
	(0.165)	(0.282)	(0.330)	(0.258)	(0.252)
Prior War Win	0.0845	0.681	0.0908	0.0417	0.244
	(0.177)	(0.463)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.262)
Prior War Loss	0.145	0.857*	0.143	0.115	-0.0407
	(0.166)	(0.457)	(0.163)	(0.161)	(0.214)
Rebel War Win	-0.306*	0.611*	-0.322*	-0.250	-0.327
	(0.173)	(0.362)	(0.193)	(0.167)	(0.223)
Rebel War Loss	0.230	-0.340	0.240	0.284	0.184
	(0.249)	(0.445)	(0.250)	(0.251)	(0.321)
Military Service, No Combat * Polity			-0.0428*		
			(0.0230)		
Military Service, Combat * Polity			-0.0158		
			(0.0174)		
Rebel Service * Polity			-0.00880		
			(0.0182)		
Military Service, No Combat * Autocracy				0.881***	
				(0.266)	
Military Service, Combat * Autocracy				0.644***	
				(0.244)	
Rebel Service * Autocracy				-0.154	
				(0.225)	
Military Service, No Combat * Military Dictatorship					-0.790*
					(0.459)
Military Service, Combat * Military Dictatorship					0.709*
					(0.420)
Rebel Service * Military Dictatorship					-0.542
					(0.334)
Leader Age	0.0104*	-0.00354	0.0109*	0.00940*	0.0172**
	(0.00620)	(0.00875)	(0.00621)	(0.00562)	(0.00796)

Autocracy	0.132	0.140		-0.177	
	(0.115)	(0.295)		(0.174)	
Polity			-0.00428		
			(0.0103)		
Military Dictatorship					0.387
					(0.317)
Material Capabilities	11.66***	12.66***	11.68***	11.54***	13.65***
	(1.525)	(2.008)	(1.515)	(1.495)	(3.097)
Tau B With System	0.108	-0.597*	0.159	0.117	-0.185
Leader	(0.138)	(0.322)	(0.133)	(0.136)	(0.157)
Office Tenure	0.000910	0.0526	0.000402	0.00149	-0.00109
	(0.00155)	(0.0326)	(0.00168)	(0.00160)	(0.00213)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.892***	1.220***	0.908***	0.893***	0.954***
	(0.0833)	(0.314)	(0.0842)	(0.0829)	(0.107)
Peace Years 1	0.00245***	0.000713	0.00242***	0.00243***	0.00290***
	(0.000261)	(0.000781)	(0.000261)	(0.000259)	(0.000351)
Peace Years 2	-0.00185***	-0.000295	-0.00185***	-0.00184***	-0.00227***
	(0.000227)	(0.000821)	(0.000229)	(0.000226)	(0.000314)
Peace Years 3	0.000445***	-0.0000921	0.000447***	0.000442***	0.000585***
	(0.0000701)	(0.000373)	(0.0000713)	(0.0000701)	(0.000102)
Military Service, No			-0.347	-0.319	0.726*
Combat * Rebel Service			(0.363)	(0.325)	(0.437)
Military Service, Combat			-0.313	-0.359	-0.134
* Rebel Service			(0.268)	(0.267)	(0.373)
Constant	-2.719***	-5.154***	-2.694***	-2.645***	-3.025***
	(0.330)	(0.507)	(0.330)	(0.321)	(0.453)
Observations	11300	10004	10851	11300	7374
Pseudo R^2	0.191	0.122	0.192	0.195	0.214
ll	-4433.6	-515.9	-4318.2	-4414.7	-2838.5

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Replication Of Table 1 With Additional Control Variables

The next section of the Appendix shows additional models designed to demonstrate the robustness of the main results presented in the paper.

Additional Control Variables

In the main models in the paper, we limit the number of control variables given the large number of leader variables and leader-specific controls already in our model. The table below shows that our results are consistent even when adding a series of additional controls, including trade openness, whether the country is a major power, the system concentration of power, and the

number of borders a country has. We also include education and prior occupation background variables to ensure that our results are not biased by just including the various prior military service variables. We suppress the presentation of these additional leader variables below, along with lower order interaction terms and our peace year variables, for space reasons. Note that in one of the models (Model 3), the combat variable moves closer to significance, showing how complicated the interaction is between political regime type and military service.

Appendix Table 4: Replication Of Models 1-4 From Table 1 With Additional Control Variables

	Model 1 (MID model)	*Model 3 (MID interaction with* POLITY*)*	*Model 4 (MID interaction with* AUTOCRACY*)*	*Model 5 (MID interaction with* MILITARY REGIME*)*
	Coef/SE	Coef/SE	Coef/SE	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.393*	0.928***	0.216	0.690**
	(0.202)	(0.307)	(0.199)	(0.272)
Military Service, Combat	0.237	0.463	0.178	-0.0936
	(0.182)	(0.285)	(0.248)	(0.407)
Rebel Service	0.555***	0.841***	0.699***	0.686***
	(0.152)	(0.262)	(0.187)	(0.208)
Prior War Win	0.0832	0.109	0.0571	0.302
	(0.182)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.272)
Prior War Loss	-0.0695	-0.0657	-0.105	-0.132
	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.217)
Rebel War Win	-0.236	-0.266	-0.199	-0.268
	(0.160)	(0.170)	(0.159)	(0.221)
Rebel War Loss	-0.178	-0.179	-0.142	-0.238
	(0.235)	(0.240)	(0.236)	(0.318)
Military Service, No Combat * Polity		-0.0438*		
		(0.0256)		
Military Service, Combat * Polity		-0.0135		
		(0.0156)		
Rebel Service * Polity		-0.0169		
		(0.0161)		
Military Service, No Combat * Autocracy			0.861***	
			(0.279)	
Military Service, Combat * Autocracy			0.576***	
			(0.221)	
Rebel Service * Autocracy			-0.0398	
			(0.205)	
Military Service, No Combat * Military				-0.771
				(0.493)

Dictatorship				
Military Service, Combat * Military Dictatorship				0.724* (0.435)
Rebel Service * Military Dictatorship				-0.437 (0.351)
Leader Age	0.00147 (0.00476)	0.00196 (0.00481)	0.000738 (0.00462)	0.0111* (0.00652)
Autocracy	0.0600 (0.122)		-0.275 (0.208)	
Polity		-0.00185 (0.0108)		
Military Dictatorship				0.546* (0.328)
Material Capabilities	6.487*** (1.546)	6.534*** (1.540)	6.318*** (1.535)	8.757** (3.466)
Tau B With System Leader	0.147 (0.133)	0.194 (0.136)	0.134 (0.136)	0.0983 (0.169)
Office Tenure	0.00248 (0.00160)	0.00186 (0.00169)	0.00286* (0.00161)	-0.000348 (0.00232)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.793*** (0.0761)	0.815*** (0.0773)	0.798*** (0.0759)	0.887*** (0.0992)
Major Power	0.674*** (0.188)	0.672*** (0.186)	0.741*** (0.186)	0.159 (0.353)
System Concentration	-0.175 (1.021)	-0.110 (1.044)	0.332 (1.295)	1.501 (1.935)
Number of Great Powers in Int'l System	0.00862 (0.0422)	0.0126 (0.0406)	-0.0138 (0.0450)	0.106 (0.0896)
Total Borders	0.101*** (0.0161)	0.100*** (0.0163)	0.0970*** (0.0161)	0.100*** (0.0213)
Irregular Entry	0.0831 (0.153)	0.0115 (0.147)	0.0784 (0.148)	0.0586 (0.165)
Post-Cold War			0.127 (0.180)	
Civilian Dictatorship				0.240 (0.162)
Constant	-3.169*** (0.579)	-3.295*** (0.598)	-3.115*** (0.594)	-4.686*** (1.074)
Observations	11300	10851	11300	7374
Pseudo R^2	0.216	0.216	0.219	0.232
ll	-4300.2	-4187.6	-4284.6	-2772.2

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fixed Effects Model

Despite our attempts to cluster standard errors by the leader, there is always the possibility that effects due to particular countries or time periods are skewing our results. In addition, since we

cluster standard errors on the leader, we are unable to cluster them based on the country. Given that some of the variables vary by country, this potentially introduces error into our models. One potential solution is to estimate a fixed effects model that corrects for this possibility. This is not an optimal solution for our data. Fixed effect models drop data anytime there is not variance in the dependent variable. This means countries that never experience a militarized dispute get excluded from the dataset entirely and we lose analytical leverage. Including those countries is important since the variables in the model might be why they have not experienced a MID in the first place. Taking these concerns into consideration, however, we did estimate a fixed effects logit model grouped on country and year. The results are consistent with the tables in the paper and show the robustness of our findings.

Appendix Table 5: Fixed Effects Model Showing the Monadic Impact of Military Service on the Initiation of Militarized Disputes, 1875-2001

	Country/Year Fixed Effects
	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.226*
	(0.116)
Military Service, Combat	0.132
	(0.120)
Rebel Service	0.159*
	(0.0946)
Prior War Win	-0.0210
	(0.145)
Prior War Loss	0.000539
	(0.149)
Prior Rebel Win	-0.250*
	(0.138)
Prior Rebel Loss	0.338*
	(0.189)
Leader Age	0.00248
	(0.00321)
Autocracy	0.0380
	(0.0877)
Material Capabilities	4.160**

	(1.698)
Tau B With System Leader	0.382***
	(0.121)
Office Tenure	0.00608
	(0.0129)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.578***
	(0.0716)
Peace Years 1	0.000977***
	(0.000206)
Peace Years 2	-0.000702***
	(0.000181)
Peace Years 3	0.000148***
	(0.0000569)
Constant	
Observations	9425
Pseudo R^2	0.028
ll	-3195.8

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Bootstrapping Model

One concern with our results is that the standard errors are clustered on the leader, which means the standard error for country-level variables such as material capabilities and regime type are incorrect. To some extent there is very little we can do to correct this. We did, however, estimate a bootstrapped model based on a modified version of Model 1 in Table 1 that clusters on the country code and then groups within that based on the leader variable. The results, shown below, are consistent with the results presented in the paper.

Appendix Table 6: Bootstrapped Results Clustering On Country Code And Grouped On The Leader

	Bootstrapped Model
	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.393**
	(0.153)
Military Service, Combat	0.0887
	(0.164)

Rebel Service	0.474***
	(0.161)
Prior War Win	0.0845
	(0.185)
Prior War Loss	0.145
	(0.176)
Rebel War Win	-0.306*
	(0.182)
Rebel War Loss	0.230
	(0.272)
Leader Age	0.0104*
	(0.00607)
Autocracy	0.132
	(0.121)
Material Capabilities	11.66***
	(1.624)
Tau B With System Leader	0.108
	(0.139)
Time In Office	0.000910
	(0.00165)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.892***
	(0.0813)
Peace Years 1	0.00245***
	(0.000275)
Peace Years 2	-0.00185***
	(0.000241)
Peace Years 3	0.000445***
	(0.0000753)
Constant	-2.719***
	(0.322)
Observations	11300
Pseudo R^2	0.191
ll	-4433.6

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Two-Stage War Model (Multinomial Logit)

As described in the paper, Table 7 below shows that the results are consistent when using a multinomial model where the first stage is MID initiation and the second stage is escalation to both sides using force and war.

Appendix Table 7: Multinomial Logit Model Showing Initiation and Escalation

	Initiation Model		Escalation Model
	Coef/SE		Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.420**	Military Service, No Combat	0.346**
	(0.183)		(0.171)
Military Service, Combat	-0.00302	Military Service, Combat	0.264
	(0.178)		(0.198)
Rebel Service	0.443**	Rebel Service	0.532***
	(0.208)		(0.154)
Prior War Win	0.0437	Prior War Win	0.180
	(0.195)		(0.241)
Prior War Loss	0.273	Prior War Loss	-0.112
	(0.169)		(0.242)
Rebel War Win	-0.406**	Rebel War Win	-0.0816
	(0.203)		(0.206)
Rebel War Loss	0.121	Rebel War Loss	0.437
	(0.288)		(0.266)
Leader Age	0.0161**	Leader Age	-0.00130
	(0.00784)		(0.00492)
Autocracy	0.149	Autocracy	0.112
	(0.131)		(0.138)
Material Capabilities	12.70***	Material Capabilities	8.713***
	(1.585)		(1.736)
Tau B With System Leader	0.221	Tau B With System Leader	-0.180
	(0.163)		(0.160)
Office Tenure	0.00149	Office Tenure	-0.000682
	(0.00169)		(0.00219)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.913***	Five Year Challenge Lag	0.847***
	(0.0956)		(0.119)
Peace Years 1	0.00221***	Peace Years 1	0.00307***
	(0.000292)		(0.000449)
Peace Years 2	-0.00168***	Peace Years 2	-0.00231***
	(0.000254)		(0.000387)
Peace Years 3	0.000404***	Peace Years 3	0.000550***
	(0.0000786)		(0.000117)
Constant	-3.472***	Constant	-3.115***
	(0.417)		(0.273)
Observations	11300		
Pseudo R^2	0.162		
ll	-5688.0		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Rare Events War Initiation Model

Another concern is that, since war is a rare event, running a regular logit model biases our estimates (King and Zeng 2001). We therefore also estimated a rare events logit model based on Model 2 of Table 1 using the ReLogit program. The results, presented below, show that even when war is treated as a rare event, prior military experience – though not combat service – makes war initiation more likely, as do prior defeats. Interestingly, the rebel variable loses significance at conventional levels ($p = .153$), though it is still substantively in the correct direction.

Appendix Table 8: Rare Events Logit Model Showing the Monadic Impact of Military Service on the Initiation of Wars, 1875-2001

	Rare Events War Initiation
Military Service, No Combat	0.535**
	(0.266)
Military Service, Combat	-0.538
	(0.345)
Rebel Service	0.396
	(0.282)
Prior War Win	0.695
	(0.460)
Prior War Loss	0.872*
	(0.456)
Rebel War Win	0.607*
	(0.362)
Rebel War Loss	-0.318
	(0.445)
Leader Age	-0.00349
	(0.00873)
Autocracy	0.132
	(0.293)
Material Capabilities	12.59***
	(2.000)
Tau B With System Leader	-0.581*
	(0.322)
Office Tenure	0.0657**

	(0.0333)
Five Year War Lag	1.196***
	(0.308)
Peace Years	0.000821
	(0.000754)
Peace Years 2	-0.000418
	(0.000777)
Peace Years 3	-0.0000339
	(0.000346)
Constant	-5.118***
	(0.505)
Observations	10004
Pseudo R^2	
ll	

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Coarsened Exact Matching Models

Another potential challenge in estimating the relative effect of leader background experiences is the way that imbalance in national-level or individual-level characteristics across the data might skew our estimates for our key treatment variable, in this case military service. To reduce imbalance, we employ coarsened exact matching, a matching method developed by Iacus, King, and Porro.[15] One challenge here is similar to the standard error issue that led us to use bootstrapping as a robustness test – we have both unit (country) level variables and individual level variables in our model. We therefore attempt matching across both dimensions separately in an attempt to more effectively isolate the effect of military service. We also collapse our two uniformed military service variables, *Military Service, No Combat* and *Combat* into a binary *Military Service* variable for simplicity sake and drop the prior war victory/defeat variables. While this reduces our ability to use matching to fully understand all of the relationships

[15] (Iacus et al. 2011)

described in the paper, it makes the results below significantly more accurate. Given the multiple ways we measure military service, we could not use just one of them as a proper "treatment".

In the case of matching on unit level variables such as national power and regime type, using CEM weights reduces our imbalance from .38 to .25, and in the case of matching on our alternative leader experience variables such as age and education, employing CEM reduces imbalance from .75 to .17. The results also continue to provide strong support to our theory, showing the robustness of our results even under more stringent testing conditions.

Appendix Table 9: Coarsened Exact Matching Models Showing the Monadic Impact of Military Service on Militarized Dispute Initiation, 1875-2001

	Model 1: Matching On Leader Attributes	Model 2: Matching On Country Attributes
	Coef/SE	Coef/SE
Military Service	0.303**	0.565***
	(0.135)	(0.209)
Rebel Service	0.468***	0.589***
	(0.157)	(0.224)
Prior War Win	0.00352	-0.0585
	(0.158)	(0.306)
Prior War Loss	0.0154	-0.607
	(0.156)	(0.439)
Prior Rebel Win	-0.296*	-0.227
	(0.174)	(0.314)
Prior Rebel Loss	-0.0695	0.453
	(0.255)	(0.344)
Leader Age	0.00546	-0.00243
	(0.00621)	(0.00715)
Tau B With System Leader	0.161	-0.000781
	(0.149)	(0.217)
Office Tenure	-0.00269	-0.00705
	(0.0175)	(0.0317)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.885***	0.861***
	(0.0909)	(0.131)
Autocracy	0.00252***	0.00203***
	(0.000305)	(0.000421)
Material Capabilities	-0.00194***	-0.00142***
	(0.000261)	(0.000358)
Peace Years 1	0.000477***	0.000287***
	(0.0000782)	(0.000106)

Peace Years 2	0.0606	0.110
	(0.125)	(0.180)
Peace Years 3	12.40***	11.14***
	(1.220)	(2.016)
Constant	-2.478***	-2.144***
	(0.326)	(0.372)
Observations	10985	5420
Pseudo R^2	0.177	0.211
ll	-4301.6	-1910.9

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Generational Effects Model

Another possible confounding issue is that leaders have generational beliefs about war drawn from the last war that their country participated in. For example, many argue that the experience of the Vietnam War made a generation of Americans more skeptical about the use of military force (though the issue is clearly more complicated than that, and that implication does not appear to be equally distributed between political parties, among other issues). Therefore, we estimate a model, based on Model 1 in Table 1, that includes 3 binary variables: Last War Win is a 1 if a country won its last war, and a 0 otherwise. Last War Draw is a 1 if a country experienced a draw in its last war, and a 0 otherwise. Last War Loss is a 1 if a country experienced a loss in its last war, and a 0 otherwise.[16]

Appendix Table 10: Generational Effects Test Showing the Monadic Impact of Military Service on Militarized Dispute Initiation, 1875-2001

	Generational Effects Test
	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.376***
	(0.143)
Military Service, Combat	0.0997
	(0.166)
Rebel Service	0.435***

[16] The results are also consistent if we estimate a second model where the value of these variables is missing if the country had not fought any interstate wars prior to a given leader-year.

	(0.150)
Last War Win	-0.0486
	(0.183)
Last War Loss	0.118
	(0.169)
Rebel War Win	-0.292*
	(0.168)
Rebel War Loss	0.165
	(0.244)
Leader Age	0.00673
	(0.00543)
Autocracy	0.159
	(0.112)
Material Capabilities	10.60***
	(1.527)
Tau B With System Leader	-0.0709
	(0.150)
Office Tenure	0.000872
	(0.00159)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.773***
	(0.0787)
Last War Win (Country)	0.679***
	(0.129)
Last War Draw (Country)	0.921***
	(0.199)
Last War Loss (Country)	0.561***
	(0.115)
Peace Years 1	0.00222***
	(0.000249)
Peace Years 2	-0.00167***
	(0.000218)
Peace Years 3	0.000396***
	(0.0000680)
Constant	-2.879***
	(0.299)
Observations	11300
Pseudo R^2	0.202
ll	-4374.2

Revolutionary Regimes Models (Controlling For Rebel Selection)

As discussed in the paper, our findings for rebel experience are robust even when we add specific controls designed to account for whether or not a country is likely to have a leader in office with prior rebel experience. These controls are whether a country was in a civil war in the

last five years,[17] whether the leader entered office through irregular means, and whether the leader is considered "revolutionary" in terms of domestic policy preferences. Model 1 is based on Carter et al.'s coding of revolutionary regimes.[18] Model 2 is based on Colgan's coding of revolutionary leaders.[19] As the results below show, the findings show that our rebel experience variable is not simply driven by factors that make countries more likely to have rebels, or revolutionary leaders.

Appendix Table 11: Robustness Controlling For Rebel Selection

	Model 1: Carter et. al	Model 2: Colgan
	Coef/SE	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.378*	0.415**
	(0.218)	(0.186)
Military Service, Combat	0.167	0.180
	(0.239)	(0.247)
Rebel Service	0.411***	0.387**
	(0.153)	(0.156)
Prior War Win	-0.00140	-0.0890
	(0.240)	(0.273)
Prior War Loss	0.0768	0.00184
	(0.200)	(0.216)
Prior Rebel Win	-0.280	-0.386*
	(0.199)	(0.211)
Prior Rebel Loss	-0.117	0.0538
	(0.292)	(0.357)
Leader Age	0.00447	0.00471
	(0.00532)	(0.00581)
Autocracy	-0.00493	-0.0485
	(0.135)	(0.146)
Material Capabilities	12.56***	11.72***
	(2.857)	(3.567)
Tau B With System Leader	-0.155	0.0370
	(0.172)	(0.179)
Office Tenure	0.0108	0.0334
	(0.0231)	(0.0233)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.741***	0.642***
	(0.0976)	(0.105)
Five Year Civil War Lag	0.692***	0.703***
	(0.113)	(0.111)

[17] (Gleditsch et al. 2002)
[18] (Carter et al. 2012)
[19] (Colgan 2010)

Revolutionary Leader (Colgan)		0.887*** (0.177)
Revolutionary Leader (Carter et al.)	0.527** (0.267)	
Irregular Entry	0.0890 (0.153)	-0.217 (0.161)
Constant	-3.116*** (0.368)	-3.030*** (0.418)
Observations	7634	6607
Pseudo R^2	0.233	0.224
ll	-2882.1	-2506.9

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Generational effects, peace year splines, and additional leader variables suppressed for space reasons

* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

National Military Service Models (Controlling For Military Service Selection)

As briefly referenced in the paper text, we estimated a modified instrumental probit model where both stages are probit. We model whether a leader is likely to have prior military service with three instruments that are unrelated to our dependent variable of interest. Our three instruments are whether a country had conscription when a leader joined the military, which is a period far enough in the past it is statistically unrelated to whether a country faces a conflict today. We also instrument based on whether a leader took over as a result of an irregular transition (positively correlated to prior military service) or foreign-imposed regime change (negatively correlated). None of these variables is directly related to the probability of militarized disputes (though, to be fair, there are theoretical arguments for why a relationship might exist for the latter two instruments, meaning these are certainly not perfect instruments).

The second stage inserts the predicted values into the dispute initiation model instead of the actual military service variable.[20] For simplicity's sake, we reduce our military service variables down to a simple binary that is 0 if a leader did not have any military service, and 1 otherwise. This is necessary since we do not have a way to separately model the probability of a

[20] We use the CMP program in Stata 11.0 so that both stages of the model are probit.

leader with military service but not combat experience entering office versus a leader with combat experience, based on our conscription instrument. Other variables might help predict those differences, such as the prior military behavior of a country, but those are correlated with the dependent variable. Both model 2 and model 3 below show that, even when we explicitly endogenize military service as a function of relevant instruments, it still has a significant impact on militarized behavior. We are therefore at least somewhat confident that our results are not simply artifacts of a selection process that lands risk-acceptant leaders (based on prior military service) in office during times when countries are especially likely to experience militarized disputes.

Appendix Table 12: Robustness Controlling For National Military Service

	Instrumenting Military Service
Military Service	0.223***
	(0.0816)
Rebel Service	0.224***
	(0.0639)
Leader Age	0.00184
	(0.00304)
Autocracy	0.00181
	(0.0762)
Material Capabilities	4.101***
	(0.935)
Tau B With System Leader	0.0345
	(0.0723)
Office Tenure	0.00677
	(0.00785)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.448***
	(0.0429)
Irregular Entry	0.00910
	(0.0920)
Major Power	0.399***
	(0.114)
System Concentration	-0.223
	(0.799)
Number of Great Powers in Int'l System	-0.0212
	(0.0237)

Total Borders	0.0543***
	(0.00933)
Post Cold War	0.102
	(0.107)
Constant	-1.510***
	(0.299)
Military Service	
Irregular Entry	0.865***
	(0.196)
Conscription	0.0218
	(0.148)
Foreign Imposed Entry	-0.948**
	(0.414)
Constant	-0.499***
	(0.123)
atanhrho_12	
Constant	-0.0902
	(0.0628)
Observations	11421
Pseudo R^2	
ll	-8153.6

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Peace year variables included but suppressed.

Low Risk Countries Robustness Test

As described in the robustness section of the paper, we estimate a series of models focused just on those countries that have not faced a militarized dispute over the last five years, so-called low-risk countries. While the results in table 2 of the paper itself focus on the interactive models, this model shows that the results are consistent in an un-interacted setup as well.

Appendix Table 13: Robustness Controlling For Low-Risk Countries

	Model 1: Countries at Low Risk of MIDs
	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.593***
	(0.199)
Military Service, Combat	0.271
	(0.193)
Rebel Service	0.408**
	(0.178)
Prior War Win	-0.203

	(0.257)
Prior War Loss	0.101
	(0.198)
Prior Rebel Win	0.00497
	(0.218)
Prior Rebel Loss	-0.103
	(0.403)
Material Capabilities	14.10***
	(2.154)
Leader Age	0.00702
	(0.00567)
Autocracy	-0.135
	(0.145)
Tau B With System Leader	0.129
	(0.184)
Office Tenure	0.00111
	(0.00191)
Peace Years 1	0.00199***
	(0.000324)
Peace Years 2	-0.00151***
	(0.000280)
Peace Years 3	0.000362***
	(0.0000859)
Constant	-2.601***
	(0.302)
_	
MID Initiation: cc1 initiated a MID vs. cc2 in year (0=no, 1=yes), cow data	
Observations	6020
Pseudo R^2	0.110
ll	-1679.8

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Count Of MID Initiations Robustness Test

To ensure the results are not driven by the fact that there are additional observations leaders who initiate multiple MIDs in a year, we created a count dependent variable this is simply the count of the number of MIDs a leader initiated in a given year. We then estimated both a negative binomial and poisson model. The results are presented below in Table 14 and are consistent with our overall findings.

Appendix Table 14: Models With Number Of MIDs Initiated Per Year As The Dependent Variable

	Negative Binomial Model	Poisson Model
	Coef/SE	Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat	0.318**	0.314**
	(0.127)	(0.134)
Military Service, Combat	0.0603	0.0440
	(0.134)	(0.153)
Rebel Service	0.411***	0.348*
	(0.152)	(0.178)
Prior War Win	0.0308	0.0282
	(0.143)	(0.167)
Prior War Loss	0.170	0.243
	(0.146)	(0.201)
Rebel War Win	-0.280*	-0.286*
	(0.144)	(0.158)
Rebel War Loss	0.102	0.199
	(0.184)	(0.181)
Leader Age	0.00950*	0.0102
	(0.00555)	(0.00680)
Autocracy	0.100	0.181
	(0.0997)	(0.129)
Material Capabilities	8.426***	7.130***
	(1.055)	(1.025)
Tau B With System Leader	0.0464	0.0360
	(0.110)	(0.120)
Office Tenure	0.00554	0.00608
	(0.0117)	(0.0113)
Five Year Challenge Lag	0.764***	0.766***
	(0.0723)	(0.0762)
Peace Years 1	0.00214***	0.00231***
	(0.000227)	(0.000245)
Peace Years 2	-0.00162***	-0.00176***
	(0.000199)	(0.000213)
Peace Years 3	0.000386***	0.000427***
	(0.0000620)	(0.0000659)
Constant	-2.731***	-2.732***
	(0.295)	(0.349)
lnalpha		
Constant	0.0472	
	(0.208)	
Observations	10708	10708
Pseudo R^2		.
ll	-4985.8	-5183.0

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Dyadic Robustness Test

One concern is that our results reflect one type of bias inherent to monadic data – the inability to control for the attributes of other actors. For example, the probability a country initiates a militarized dispute against a particular country in a given year depends in part on the characteristics of the potential defender. To account for this concern, below we estimate a dyadic model with our leader experience variables. The unit of analysis is the directed dyad from 1869-2001, meaning all dispute initiations occur on side A of the dyad (Bennett and Stam 2000). Following King and Zeng, we sample 100% of dispute dyads and 10% of non-dispute dyads (King and Zeng). There are multiple observations per-year for some countries if they had multiple leaders or MID initiations in a year. This does not influence the results, just as it does not for the monadic models in the paper. We do not have a strong expectation about the results for Side B, but the results for the military service variables for Side A should look as they do in our monadic analysis.

We also additional control variables, including the relative balance of power between both sides, if both sides are contiguous, if the sides are in the midst of an arms race, if either side is a democracy or autocracy, the level of satisfaction within the dyad, whether the two sides have a defensive military alliance, whether both sides are a democracy, our generational war participation controls (whether the side won/lost/draw its last war), and whether or not the international system is bipolar. We gathered the data for these variables from EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000), except for the generational war control, which is described above. We also include the controls for leader selection used in the main regressions in the paper – the length of time each leader has been in office and whether or not the country has been challenged in a MID

in the last five years. We use Huber-White robust standard errors and cluster the standard errors on the dyad (to avoid the bias induced by particularly risk-prone dyads). Unfortunately, this means we cannot cluster on the leader, as we do in our monadic models.

Appendix Table 10: Dyadic MID Initiation Results

	Dyadic Model		
	Coef/SE		Coef/SE
Military Service, No Combat Side A	0.536***	Joint Democracy	-0.811***
	(0.0989)		(0.165)
Military Service, Combat Side A	0.170	Autocracy Side A	0.0533
	(0.115)		(0.0934)
Rebel Service Side A	0.177*	Autocracy Side B	-0.0955
	(0.0997)		(0.0890)
Prior War Win Side A	0.271*	Defensive	1.063***
	(0.147)	Alliance	(0.239)
Prior War Loss Side A	0.117	Arms Race	0.117*
	(0.133)		(0.0710)
Prior Rebel Win Side A	-0.166	Contiguity	3.110***
	(0.135)		(0.0972)
Prior Rebel Loss Side A	0.286*	Bipolarity	-0.986***
	(0.171)		(0.101)
Leader Age Side A	0.0187***	Balance of Power	0.656***
	(0.00331)		(0.124)
Time In Office Side A	0.00101	Dyadic	-1.485***
	(0.00112)	Satisfaction	(0.392)
Military Service, No Combat Side B	0.302***	Time in Office	0.00483***
	(0.115)	Side B	(0.00129)
Military Service, Combat Side B	-0.0679	Five Year	0.935***
	(0.129)	Challenge Lag Side A	(0.0664)
Rebel Service Side B	-0.263***	Five Year	1.092***
	(0.0923)	Challenge Lag Side B	(0.0636)
Prior War Win Side B	0.530***	Irregular Entry	-0.172*
	(0.159)	Side A	(0.0885)
Prior War Loss Side B	0.409***	Irregular Entry	0.00812
	(0.154)	Side B	(0.0810)
Prior Rebel Win Side B	0.181	(cwpceyrs-k1)	0.00249***
	(0.142)	cubed	(0.000145)
Prior Rebel Loss Side B	0.327	(cwpceyrs-k2)	-0.00183***
	(0.223)	cubed	(0.000114)
Leader Age Side B	0.0111***	(cwpceyrs-k3)	0.000416***
	(0.00310)	cubed	(0.0000289)

Democracy Side A	0.344***	Constant	-5.995***
	(0.115)		(0.354)
Democracy Side B	0.615***		
	(0.110)		
Observations	113992		
Pseudo R^2	0.345		
ll	-6879.6		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The results show the consistency of our results across both monadic and dyadic specifications. Our military service variables of interest perform in the same or substantively similar ways to the monadic models. If anything, the dyadic setup demonstrates the larger influence of our military service variables, given the significance of some of the prior war variables. Our theory focuses exclusively on Side A in the dyadic interaction, but it is relevant to note a few of the results for the military experience variables for Side B. For example, leaders with military experience but not combat experience are not just more likely to initiate disputes, they are also more likely to be the subject of militarized challenges. As explained in the paper, the overall trends further undermine the possibility that some sort of leader selection on the basis of military service undermines our results. After all, if a country thought selecting a leader with a particular background, in this case, military experience without combat experience, would make it the target of more militarized dispute initiations, it would be unlikely to select a leader on that basis. Regardless, the general results are extremely supportive of our theory and show the robustness of our findings.

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