Supporting Information for
Distributive Politics, the Electoral Connection, and the Antebellum U.S. Congress: The Case of Military Service Pensions

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The published version of our paper references a number of additional logit models that, for the sake of conciseness, are only briefly discussed in passing. In this document we present those results. The numbering of the tables and logit models follows that of the article itself, with a letter denoting the order in which the models appear in the body of the paper itself. For instance, Table 1's Model 1a is a slight respecification of Model 1 in Table 1 of the published article.

Table 1: Senate and House Votes, 1818

	Senate								House
	To Add Means-Test	To Reduce Service Requirement from Three to Two Years		To Reduce Service Requirement from 2 Years to 9 Mos.		Third Reading			Amdt. to Broaden Eligibility
	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(4a)	(5a)	(6a)	(6b)	(6c)	(7a)
D-Nominate 1		-2.31 (1.60)	-5.09** (1.70)	1.31 (1.07)	0.43 (1.14)	5.64** (2.16)			-3.59*** (0.74)
D-Nominate 2		-8.04 (5.29)	-4.14 (3.69)	1.32 (2.10)	1.58 (3.04)	10.53 (7.03)			-4.37*** (1.21)
Eligible/ Population								42.48 (21.83)	
Mid-Atlantic		3.35 (1.84)					-17.01*** (0.90)		
South		5.72 (4.69)					-17.01*** (0.89)		
West		3.12 (2.58)							
Party	2.83* (1.18)								
Constant	-0.89 (0.46)	-2.90 (2.09)	0.23 (0.74)	0.13 (0.38)	0.76 (0.68)		17.30*** (0.44)	-0.49 (0.90)	-0.70*** (0.22)
N	32	31	19	31	19	20	20	20	153
χ^2	5.78*	9.09	11.05**	1.68	0.58	9.31***	589.15***	3.79	42.00***
% Corr Pred	75.0	80.6	74.2	67.7	52.6	87.1	74.2	65.0	80.4
PRE (baseline)	.429	.538	0.455	0.333	-0.286	.570	0.140	-0.167	0.5

Source: *Annals of Congress*, 15-1, 2/18/1818, p. 211; 2/25, p. 220; 2/25, p. 221; 2/26, pp. 222-23; 3/5, p. 1109.
Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 2: House and Senate Votes, 1820

	House				Senate	
	To Repeal the Pension Act		To Postpone Consideration of Means-Test Amendment	To Pass Means-Test Amendment	To Pass House Means-Test Amendment	
	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(4a)	(5a)	(5b)
D-Nominate 1	-3.62***	-3.33**			-12.43***	-7.38
	(0.86)	(1.06)			(3.26)	(5.38)
D-Nominate 2	-3.16*	-3.27*			0.94	-3.13
	(1.36)	(1.34)			(2.93)	(3.54)
Mid-Atlantic			-0.62	0.47		
			(0.44)	(0.48)		
South			-3.02***	3.39***		
			(0.63)	(0.65)		
West			-1.86**	2.23***		
			(0.62)	(0.65)		
Pensioners/ Population		-75.39				-4474.50
		(204.61)				(2469.34)
Constant	-1.82***	-1.67***	0.69*	-1.13**	0.98	4.88*
	(0.26)	(0.47)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.55)	(2.20)
N	154	154	159	152	41	41
χ^2	29.38***	30.42***	27.78***	36.22***	16.98***	7.76*
% Corr Pred	80.5	80.5	69.8	76.3	90.2	95.1
PRE (baseline)	0.063	0.063	0.238	0.5	0.765	0.882

Source: *Annals of Congress*, 16-1, 3/31/1820, pp. 1709-10; 4/1/1820, pp. 1715-16; 4/25/1820, p. 640.
Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3: Senate and House Votes, 1828

	Senate		House	
	Engrossment and Third Reading of Bill		Passage of 1828 Pension Act	
	(1a)	(1b)	(3a)	(3b)
D-Nominate 1	1.43		2.40***	
	(0.89)		(0.73)	
D-Nominate 2	1.10*		-2.10***	
	(0.45)		(0.38)	
Mid-Atlantic				
South				
West				
Party (Adams)		1.01		1.66***
		(0.65)		(0.36)
Constant	0.29	0.15	0.88***	-0.02
	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.19)	(0.22)
N	47	47	173	173
χ^2	8.95*	2.39	38.07***	20.88***
% Corr Pred	72.3	63.8	80.9	67.1
PRE (baseline)	0.235	0.0	0.431	0.017

Source: *Register of Debates*, 20-1, 3/12/1828, p. 428; 4/30/1828, p. 713; 5/13/1828, p. 2670.
Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 4: House and Senate Votes, 1832

	House		Senate	
	Passage of the 1832 Pension Act		To Order the Third Reading of S. 1, the Pension Act of 1832	
	(2a)	(2b)	(3a)	(3b)
D-Nominate 1		1.76 (1.83)	5.06** (1.82)	
D-Nominate 2		-2.38*** (0.67)	2.91*** (0.72)	
South		-3.04** (1.02)		
West		-1.43 (0.87)		
Party (Jackson)	-2.01*** (0.47)	-1.50 (1.14)		-2.13** (0.71)
Veteran Population				
Constant	2.38*** (0.43)	4.11*** (1.08)	-0.55 (0.53)	1.50** (0.56)
N	174	174	45	45
χ^2	18.06***	56.23***	16.94***	8.94**
% Corr Pred	72.4	92.0	91.1	73.3
PRE (baseline)	0.0	0.708	0.789	0.368

Source: *Register of Debates*, 22-1, 5/2/1832, pp. 2712-13; 5/18/1832, p. 933.
Table entries are logit coefficients, with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Baseline model for PRE calculation is a minority-vote model.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$