Online appendix

A third term for a popular chancellor. An analysis of voting behavior in the 2013 German federal election

Harald Schoen / Robert Greszki

Figure 1a-f: The impact of candidate preference for Angela Merkel conditioned by her perceived party representativeness on voting behavior for different parties

Note for all figures: Entries are changes in probabilities of casting a vote for a party by preferring Angela Merkel as chancellor in dependence of the perceived party representativeness of Angela Merkel. These results were gleaned from the estimates reported in Table 3 of the paper. Reading example: If somebody considers Angela Merkel not at all representative (0) for her party and changed the chancellor preference to Angela Merkel, the probability of casting a vote for CDU/CSU declines by some 7 percentage points. The remaining variables in the model were set to their means and modes, respectively (PID: other/none; competence: other/none; preference Merkel/Steinbrück: mean value of respondents who do not identify with CDU/CSU or SPD). Vertical lines represent the mean (solid line) plus/minus one standard deviation (dashed lines) of perceived party representativeness of the group under study.




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Change of probability of vote for SPD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


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Change of probability of vote for FDP
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


Change of probability of vote for Greens
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min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


Change of probability of vote for The Left
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15
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-15
-25
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
Change of probability of vote for AfD
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Merkel

Figure 2a-f: The impact of candidate preference for Peer Steinbrück conditioned by his perceived party representativeness on voting behavior for different parties

Note: Entries are changes in probabilities of casting a vote for a party by preferring Angela Merkel as chancellor in dependence of the perceived party representativeness of Angela Merkel. These results were gleaned from the estimates reported in Table 3 of the paper. Reading example: If somebody considers Peer Steinbrück neither/nor (0.5) representative for his party and changed the chancellor preference to Peer Steinbrück, the probability of casting a vote for SPD rises by some 13 percentage points. The remaining variables in the model were set to their means and modes, respectively (PID: other/none; competence: other/none; preference Merkel/Steinbrück: mean value of respondents who do not identify with CDU/CSU or SPD). Vertical lines represent the mean (solid line) plus/minus one standard deviation (dashed lines) of perceived party representativeness of the group under study.




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Change of probability of vote for SPD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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Change of probability of vote for FDP
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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-20
-30
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


Change of probability of vote for The Left
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10
0
-10
-20
-30
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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0
-10
-20
-30
Change of probability of vote for AfD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück

Figure 3a-f: The impact of candidate evaluation for Angela Merkel conditioned by her perceived party representativeness on voting behavior for different parties

Note for all figures: Entries are changes in probabilities of casting a vote for a party by evaluating Angela Merkel from strongly dislike to strongly like in dependence of the perceived party representativeness of Angela Merkel. These results were gleaned from the estimates reported in Table 4 of the paper. The remaining variables in the model were set to their means and modes, respectively (PID: other/none; competence: other/none; preference Merkel/Steinbrück: mean value of respondents who do not identify with CDU/CSU or SPD). Vertical lines represent the mean (solid line) plus/minus one standard deviation (dashed lines) of perceived party representativeness of the group under study.




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-30
-40
Change of probability of vote for SPD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


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-40
Change of probability of vote for FDP
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


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-10
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-30
-40
Change of probability of vote for Greens
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


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-30
-40
Change of probability of vote for The Left
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel


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0
-10
-20
-30
-40
Change of probability of vote for AfD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Merkel

Figure 4a-f: The impact of candidate evaluation for Peer Steinbrück conditioned by his perceived party representativeness on voting behavior for different parties

Note for all figures: Entries are changes in probabilities of casting a vote for a party by evaluating Peer Steinbrück from strongly dislike to strongly like in dependence of the perceived party representativeness of Peer Steinbrück. These results were gleaned from the estimates reported in Table 4 of the paper. The remaining variables in the model were set to their means and modes, respectively (PID: other/none; competence: other/none; preference Merkel/Steinbrück: mean value of respondents who do not identify with CDU/CSU or SPD). Vertical lines represent the mean (solid line) plus/minus one standard deviation (dashed lines) of perceived party representativeness of the group under study.




70
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-30
-50
Change of probability of vote for SPD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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-10
-30
-50
Change of probability of vote for FDP
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


70
50
30
10
-10
-30
-50
Change of probability of vote for Greens
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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-10
-30
-50
Change of probability of vote for The Left
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück


70
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30
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-10
-30
-50
Change of probability of vote for AfD
min.
max.
Party representativeness Steinbrück

Figure 5a-f: The impact of candidate evaluation for Angela Merkel conditioned by her perceived party representativeness on voting behavior for different parties

Note for all figures: Entries are changes in probabilities of casting a vote for a party by evaluating Angela Merkel from -1 standard deviation to +1 standard deviation of the mean evaluation in dependence of the perceived party representativeness of Angela Merkel. These results were gleaned from the estimates reported in Table 4 of the paper. The remaining variables in the model were set to their means and modes, respectively (PID: other/none; competence: other/none; preference Merkel/Steinbrück: mean value of respondents who do not identify with CDU/CSU or SPD). Vertical lines represent the mean (solid line) plus/minus one standard deviation (dashed lines) of perceived party representativeness of the group under study.




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Change of probability of vote for SPD
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Merkel


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Change of probability of vote for FDP
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Merkel


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-30
Change of probability of vote for Greens
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Merkel


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Change of probability of vote for The Left
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Merkel


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-30
Change of probability of vote for AfD
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Merkel

Figure 6a-f: The impact of candidate evaluation for Peer Steinbrück conditioned by his perceived party representativeness on voting behavior for different parties

Note for all figures: Entries are changes in probabilities of casting a vote for a party by evaluating Peer Steinbrück from -1 standard deviation to +1 standard deviation of the mean evaluation in dependence of the perceived party representativeness of Peer Steinbrück. These results were gleaned from the estimates reported in Table 4 of the paper. The remaining variables in the model were set to their means and modes, respectively (PID: other/none; competence: other/none; preference Merkel/Steinbrück: mean value of respondents who do not identify with CDU/CSU or SPD). Vertical lines represent the mean (solid line) plus/minus one standard deviation (dashed lines) of perceived party representativeness of the group under study.




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Change of probability of vote for SPD
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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Change of probability of vote for FDP
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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Change of probability of vote for Greens
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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-30
Change of probability of vote for The Left
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Steinbrück


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-10
-20
-30
Change of probability of vote for AfD
Mean
- 1 SD
Mean
+ 1 SD
Party representativeness Steinbrück