Social Camouflage and the Conditional Effects of Racial Diversity on Race-Targeted Policies

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Abstract

A recent important work by Weber et al. (2014) indicates that racial diversity amplify the impact of negative stereotypes on Whites' race-related policy attitudes, and reliance on stereotypes is magnified among low self-monitors (who are true-to-themselves) in diverse context more than high self-monitors (who are concerned about social appropriateness). Building on this work, this article reveals that racial diversity influences white policy attitudes conditional on other social contexts such as residential mobility and racial peer groups' attitudes. Firstly, we argue that quality of inter-racial interaction rather than quantity matters in shaping policy attitudes by showing that Whites' policy opposition in highly diverse areas with high residential turnover is as strong as in low diverse areas with low mobility. Second, we argue that interaction within racial peer groups matters by showing that Whites tend to align their policy attitudes to those of their ideological and economic social reference groups even when racial diversity is salient. More importantly, chameleon-like high self-monitors, who were considered to adjust their policy attitudes to egalitarian social norms in racially diverse context in previous studies, amplify their negative stereotype and strongly oppose these policies when their ideology peer groups oppose race-targeted economic policies.[1]

[1]We appreciate Christopher Weber for generously sharing supplemental census data. For the complete replication dataset containing Census variables, contact the autors at boramlee01@fas.harvard.edu.

1. Introduction

Political scientists continue to dispute the relevance of racial considerations in American politics. Across several disciplines and through various methodological techniques, research continues to produce evidence that racial negativity remains a primary determinant of white Americans' attitudes toward a range of race-related policies, including affirmative action, welfare spending, and capital punishment (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). A recent and growing agenda within this body of academic work seeks to identify specific circumstances under which race is politically consequential. The key assertion made by these scholars is simple: *context matters*. A recent contribution to this line of work has been made by Christopher Weber, Howard Lavine, Leonie Huddy, and Christopher M. Federico (2014). Their work lends nuance to research concerning the political effects of racial attitudes and provide evidence for a link between diverse local contexts and the relationship between racial stereotypes and policy attitudes.

In this paper, we replicate the work of Weber et al. (2014). Weber and colleagues seek to answer whether diverse local contexts strengthen or weaken the relationship between racial stereotypes about African Americans and attitudes towards race-targeted policies. They draw from social psychology research on self-monitoring which suggests that individuals are not equally susceptible to social norms. The concept of self-monitoring was developed to capture individual differences in sensitivity to situational norms. Scholars have used this measure to assess the extent to which people are motivated to adjust their attitudes and behavior to fit such norms (Snyder 1974, 1979; Snyder and Gangestad 1986). The Self-Monitoring Scale (Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Snyder 1974; Snyder and Gangestad 1986), indicates that high self-monitors are chronically concerned with the appropriateness of their behavior and highly attuned to social context. Unlike low-self monitors, high-self monitors adjust their beliefs, attitudes, and behavior on the basis of salient norms. Weber et al. focus on white Americans who are relatively indifferent to social norms (low self-monitors) and who live in racially diverse areas provide the best test of whether contextual racial diversity primes racial stereotypes and heightens their political effects.

Using a state-wide opinion survey, Weber and colleagues find that black-white racial diversity at the zip-code level strengthens the connection between racial stereotypes and racerelated policy attitudes among whites. This effect is found to be strongest among *low selfmonitors*. We extend the analysis by including additional measures of local context. We argue that factors additional to the racial composition at the local level affect the relationship between racial stereotypes and policy attitudes. In particular, we find that the impact of racial composition on attitudes is *conditional on the socioeconomic context*, as measured by *residential mobility*. In particular, we find that when

diversity and mobility are both high, the effect of racial stereotypes on policy attitudes is as strong and significant as when mobility and diversity are low. In other words, in a racially diverse and highly transient context, whites who endorse the "Blacks are lazy" stereotype are as likely to oppose race-targeted policies as whites living in areas that are predominantly white and with little residential turnover. We believe two distinct mechanisms are taking place in each of these contexts. Drawing from the research on intergroup conflict, we describe the former context as a maximum threat context. In this situation, exposure to other racial and ethnic groups is associated with less support for policies benefiting other groups. Given that these contexts have high residential turnover, we argue that there may be relatively less opportunities for whites to have favorable exposure and interaction with minority groups, particularly African Americans. To explain the latter context, we believe that predominantly white areas with little residential turnover may rely more on stereotypes about Blacks simply because they are do not interact with Blacks in their communities.

We also make use of social psychology work to gain a better understanding of how egalitarian social norms vary by local characteristics. Weber and colleagues believe diversity has two opposing influences. Firstly, they believe racially diverse areas activate whites' racial attitudes and heighten the political salience of racial stereotypes. Secondly, they believe that the heightened political effect of race in racially diverse contexts is complicated by the existence of stronger egalitarian social norms. In our work, we consider the possibility that other local characteristics, in addition to racial diversity, shape egalitarian social norms. By focusing on high self-monitors, we provide evidence that different ideological and economic contexts produce different egalitarian social norms. We track the patterns of censorship that high-self monitors demonstrate across these additional contexts. We find that context-sensitive chameleon-like individuals demonstrate varying levels of opposition towards race-targeted policies, even while holding constant their held stereotypes about African Americans. Thus, we demonstrate that ideology and economics influence the strength egalitarian social norms. We conclude with a discussion about the complexities of measuring "local context" and provide a more nuanced understanding of egalitarian social norms.

2. Literature Review

1) Conditional Model of Racial Context

Political scientists continue to find evidence that racial antagonism is a primary determinant of white Americans' attitudes toward race-related policies (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1993; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Other research contests that political principles are at play. These scholars argue that economic individualism, egalitarianism, and limited government, not racial antag-

onism, are the primary determinants of whites' policy preferences (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Wilson 1979; Sears et al. 2000). In this paper, we do not delve into the racial antagonism versus political principles debate. Instead, we focus on how place influences attitudes.

Social scientists largely agree that racial attitudes are profoundly shaped by people's surroundings. While the influence of social environments on racial attitudes is unquestioned, there is less agreement on the direction and the magnitude of such effect. Scholars have studied in various forms, how a person's residential context affects both their attitudes toward different racial groups and attitudes toward race-targeted policies. One environmental factor that has been extensively studied is the racial diversity of a person's residential context. Literature on the subject often measures racial diversity as the proportion of the black population within a given area, although recent work has made use of diversity measures that reflect the presence and size of other racial and ethnic minority groups (Oliver and Wong 2003; Branton and Jones 2005).[2]

The relationship between racial composition and racial attitudes has been also observed at many levels, including the census tract, neighborhood, zip code, county, and metropolitan area. These differences are often due to data-availability, but some arguments do exist explaining why some geographical contexts are more consequential than others. Indeed, results have varied across levels of analysis. For example, at larger geographical levels, work suggests that whites who live in highly diverse metropolitan areas or counties may be more prone to racial negativity (Key 1949; Giles and Buckner 1993; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Taylor 1998). At smaller geographical levels, the effect of diversity is actually found to be weaker or even reversed. One explanation for this observed reversal may be that self-selection drives particular people to settle in specific neighborhoods, thus producing lower levels of racial negativity in contexts with increased racial diversity (Forbes 1997; Oliver 2010).

The two perspectives on the relationship between racial composition and attitudes are also not without debate. While both the intergroup contact and intergroup conflict perspectives hold that attitudes toward race-targeted policies are associated with the racial composition of the area in which individuals reside, the two perspectives differ on the predicted nature of the relationship. The intergroup contact literature argues that increased interracial group exposure and contact is associated with more positive racial attitudes (e.g., Forbes 1997; Jackman and Crane1986; Sigelman et al. 1996). Alternatively, the intergroup conflict perspective suggests that as the size of a minority group's population increases, prejudicial attitudes increase (Bobo 1988; Glaser 1994; Key 1949).

We argue that a lack of conclusive results may be explained by the way context is measured. For

[2]Some authors advocate for diversity measures that capture racial and ethnic diversity, as these measures better reflect a current United States that is increasingly more racially and ethnically diverse.

most of this literature, the primary measure of context has been racial diversity. While significant, this way of measuring context leaves out other very important characteristics of place that play into whether interracial group contact is positive or negative. In our paper, we make use a conditional model of racial diversity. We take lead from previous work that has advocated for models of context to incorporate the socioeconomic context. To illustrate the contribution of conditional models, we highlight the work of Branton and Jones (2005). These authors find evidence that the effect of racial composition on attitudes is conditional on socioeconomic context. Conditioning on a high education context, Branton and Jones (2005) find that as the racial and ethnic diversity of a county increases, the probability of supporting a racial policy increases. However, conditioning on a low education context, as racial and ethnic diversity increases, the probability of supporting a policy decreases. These results help to reconcile the apparent anomaly in the literature where both positive and negative relationships between racial and ethnic composition and attitudes have been found. In our paper, we extend the work of Weber et al. (2014) by incorporating measures of socioeconomic status at the area level. We expect that residential mobility will moderate the strength and direction of the relationship between racial diversity and attitudes about race and race-targeted policies.

Our primary variable of socioeconomic status is residential mobility. From research on socioeconomic context, we develop expectations regarding the relationship between racial context and attitudes. Extensive work has shown that socioeconomic environment structures racial attitudes (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003). Huckfeldt and Kohfeld argue that racial conflict arises not only in response to interaction among groups, but as a function of other contextual factors. For example, low socioeconomic status settings may lead to greater exposure to high levels of crime, social disorder, and physical decay (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). This particular kind of exposure may lead to greater outgroup hostility and general distrust of other individuals. All together, we believe the structure of racial attitudes should vary depending on whether individuals live in a different contexts of diversity and mobility. We expect that the influence of racial attitudes on race-targeted policies will vary depending on whether an individual lives in a highly diverse and a highly mobile context or a highly diverse and low mobile context.

Previous work leads us to believe that the "highly diverse and highly mobile" context can be characterized as a maximum-threat context, as the social milieu is racially and ethnically diverse and the population is highly transient (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Branton and Jones 2005). In line with the intergroup conflict research, we expect that in this type of environment, there is increased perceived threat between or among groups and less opportunities for meaningfully positive intergroup contact to take place. If we are correct that highly mobile contexts produce superficial exposure to other

racial and ethnic groups, these contexts should be associated with a stronger relationship between racial attitudes and opposition to race-targeted policies. In contrast, "high diverse and low mobile" contexts may be conducive to positive exposure effects. We expect that low mobility environments coupled with high levels of diversity to result in more favorable exposure of whites to minority groups. In accordance with the intergroup contact literature, in this type of contextual environment, lower levels of perceived threat between groups may lead to a weaker relationship between racial attitudes and opposition to race-targeted policies.

2) Egalitarian Social Norms and Self-Monitoring

In their work, Weber et al. (2014) argue that the heightened political effect of race in racially diverse contexts is complicated by the existence of stronger egalitarian racial norms, an increasingly pervasive norm of racial tolerance that inhibits the open expression of negative racial stereotypes and other forms of racial negativity (e.g., Mendelberg 2001; Sears and Henry 2005). Since overt racism has become increasingly unacceptable, white survey respondents have become less willing to endorse negative racial beliefs than in the past (Huddy and Feldman 2009). In fact, these pressures may be stronger among individuals living in the same racially diverse settings that increase the cognitive accessibility and policy influence of racial stereotypes. This prediction is supported by research on race-of-interviewer effects in which white respondents evince less racial negativity when an interviewer is black rather than white (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Thus, diverse geographic contexts appear to produce two opposing influences: it increases the salience of race and potentially heightens the effect of stereotypes on race-related policy, and at the same time they evoke tolerant racial norms that may inhibit the expression of racial negativity (Allport 1954; Pettigrew et al. 1982).

Weber et al. (2014) use the work on self-monitoring to disentangle these effects. Social psychological research on self-monitoring suggests that individuals are not equally susceptible to social norms. The concept of self-monitoring was developed to capture individual differences in sensitivity to situational norms. This measure has been used to assess the extent to which people are motivated to adjust their attitudes and behavior to fit such norms (Snyder 1974, 1979; Snyder and Gangestad 1986). The Self-Monitoring Scale (Gangestad and Snyder 2000; Snyder 1974; Snyder and Gangestad 1986), indicates that high self-monitors are chronically concerned with the appropriateness of their behavior and highly attuned to social context. Unlike low-self monitors, high-self monitors adjust their beliefs, attitudes, and behavior on the basis of salient norms. Weber et al. (2014) argue that white Americans who are relatively indifferent to social norms and who live in racially diverse areas provide the best test of whether contextual racial diversity primes racial stereotypes and heightens their political effects. To extend the work of Weber et al. (2014), we examine the interactive effect of

racial diversity and residential mobility in one's local area and individual differences in the sensitivity to tolerant social norms by tracking the patterns of censorship that high-self monitors demonstrate across these additional contexts.

3. Theory

1) Racial Stereotype in the Context of Racial Diversity and Residential Mobility

First, we test how White population's opposition in race-targeted economic policies change depending on residential mobility and racial diversity in local areas. We hypothesize that racial diversity *per se* in a community does not change White populations' attitudes. By assuming that living in the same area leads to positive interactive experiences among different racial groups, these studies do not account for the possibility that certain types of interaction might increase inter-racial hostility.

We argue that irregular and discontinuous inter-racial interaction in highly mobile and diverse areas would rather strengthen the effect of racial stereotype and consequently increase policy opposition. To illustrate, we find that when White people live in racially diverse areas and have less opportunities to interact with Black neighbors due to high mobility, it is more likely that their negative stereotypes translates into concrete policy opposition. This is plausible because discontinued and irregular interaction in these areas does not allow White population to have positive experiences that may dispel negative stereotypes, and rather makes it easier for them to rely on the negative stereotypes in shaping their policy positions on African Americans. As a corollary, we argue that residents in less mobile and highly diverse areas will have the most favorable policy attitudes due to close interaction with Black population in the area. To sum up, we expect to see favorable policy attitudes on race-targeted economic policies and less reliance on negative stereotypes, when racial diversity is high and residential mobility is low, in which case, White residents have sufficient opportunities to change their perceptions on Blacks (See Table 1).

Table 1: Expected Patterns of Opposition to Racial Policy and Effects of Race-based Negative Stereotype

	Diversity Low	Diversity High
Mobility Low	Oppose	Support
Mobility High	Support	Oppose

Hypothesis 1: When racial diversity and residential mobility are high or diversity and mobility are low, we see more reliance on negative stereotypes in forming attitudes on racial race-targeted economic policies.

2) Racial Stereotypes, Peer Group Opinions and Self-monitors

2-1. Which Peer Group Counts?

In the next step, we show how peer groups' opinions on racial economic policies affect individuals' policy attitudes. Even in the presence of racial diversity in local area, some respondents may be impervious to diversity norm if one's White neighbors provide more informative heuristics in shaping policy preferences. Especially when they hold similar positions in economic, ideological or political spectrums, their policy attitudes might show a stronger relationship. If this is the case, individual policy attitudes are not always determined by racial diversity of residential areas, but more likely to be shaped by their racial peers' policy attitudes. Some existing studies on stereotype and inter-group racial stereotypes reveal that providing "information that other racial peers agree with the individual's racial stereotype bolstered it such that they were more resistant to subsequent attempts to change their stereotypes" (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost 2001). To further specify whose consensus information matters, we attempt to show which racial peers' opnions matter more to individual respondents in forming their policy attitudes.[3] In this light, we test three competing contexts: opinions of economic, ideology and partisan peers.

First, in shaping policy attitudes, we show that people are influenced by the opinions on race-targeted policies held by racial peers sharing similar income status. Controlling for geographical proximity at the area level, similarity of economic positions might serve as an effective heuristic: low-income Whites competing for the limited welfare benefits might resent aid to Blacks, while high-income Whites might project themselves as contributors to unwanted redistribution of wealth. In both cases, Whites have reasons to resent aid to Blacks. We do not test how these causal mechanisms work differently for people in different income brackets. What we show is whether individuals align their policy preferences according to that of groups whose economic status is similar. Thus, within the same area, we hypothesize that respondents of similar income status living in the same area have similar policy attitudes, because their similar situations put them in similar perception of threat from other racial groups.

Hypothesis 2-1: One's racial policy attitudes are influenced by his or her racial peers with similar economic status due to similar perception of threat.

We also test whether policy attitudes are affected by opinions of racial peers holding similar ideological positions. Studies on ideological segregation and homophily show that constituents' network is ideologically divided and learning effects might occur only among those sharing similar ideological

[3]Certainly, context of networks will differ depending on the levels of analysis (i.e. zipcode, area, or state level). In this case, however, we study the impact of peer groups' opinions at the area level. Although we have zip-code level data, we lack observations (and variations) at zip-code levels to study peer effects among White residents. For this reason, we take a larger unit of analysis.

perspectives. We test whether ideological peers' policy attitudes at the area level have influence on individuals' policy attitudes. By including ideological context at the area level, we attempt to investigate how opinions of ideology-based peer groups change the outcome in diversity norm is present in local areas. Weber et al. argue that racial diversity produces local norms of tolerance in residential areas. When the tolerant social norms are salient, according to Weber et al., those who are responsive to tolerant local norms (high SMs) change their policy attitudes. Building on their findings, we further test whether diversity is all that matters. To elaborate, even in the presence of broader local norms of tolerance, individuals could find a normative space detached from the norms of tolerance. Conservatives in racially diverse areas could be such an example. Conversely, in a place where the tolerance norms are absent, liberals might entertain the tolerance norms among themselves. In sum, liberal versus conservative contexts might produce different norms on how to talk about race without regard to racial composition of residential areas.

Hypothesis 2-2: One's racial policy attitudes are influenced by his or her racial peers with similar ideology, as different ideological contexts produce different norms about race.

In addition, we test whether co-partisan peer groups' opinions matter. Ideology and partisanship might have different implications. Partisan affiliation might be caused by sources other than ideology. While it is difficult to change one's ideological perspectives, partisan identification might weaken or strengthen according to policy pursuits of the parties or performance of party leaderships. Particularly in the context of race-targeted economic policies, ideological and partisan divide may have different implications. For example, opposition to racial policies from conservatives might be based on their ideological disagreement on "big government" rather than the fact that these policies are implemented by the Democratic Party and vice versa for liberals. In this case, conservatives might not support the Republican Party when the party's policies are not in line with the ideological perspectives. To tease out differences in these subtly disparate groups, we test which reference groups' opinions matter more. Additionally, in the previous models, we test whether respondents are discriminating on who the main executors are in helping Blacks. For example, if our speculations on ideology vs. partisanship are correct, we should see conservative respondents' stronger opposition to government-led aid policies than business or religious groups-led actions, and weaker influence of party identification. Since the survey contains items in which main agents vary, we use these items and compare the performance of ideology and partisanship (housing integration measures executed by local government, business & religious groups, and unspecificed actors).

Hypothesis 2-3: Policy attitudes are influenced by his or her racial peers with the same party identification.

2-2. Peer groups and Self-Monitors

Our more important contributions are revealing how self-monitors adapt their policy positions in different types of peer group. Individuals with high self-monitoring orientation continuously adapt their behavior to make a favorable impression on others, whereas low self-monitors are true to themselves without concern for opinions around them (Snyder 1987). High self-monitors are chameleon-like and strategic in the pursuit of social influence, whereas low self-monitors prefer to stick to their own opinion. Our main interest is in showing how high self-monitors adapt their policy views to those of economic, ideological or partisan peer groups. Previous findings show that high self-monitors with strong negative stereotypes of Blacks are less likely to rely on negative stereotypes in diverse local areas, as they are responsive to local social norms of diversity (Weber, Lavine, Huddy & Federico 2014). We question whether high self-monitors will continue to filter out negative stereotypes even when their peers share the stereotypes and express opposition to these policies. High self-monitors, by definition, might amplify their negative stereotypes and express opposition to these policies in the knowledge that their racial peers share the same negative stereotypes or vice versa for policy support. Depending on who their racial reference groups are and how their peers feel about other racial groups, they might amplify or mitigate their stereotypes in shaping policy attitudes. As illustrated, racial diversity of local areas may not be the only determinant of white policy attitudes. In this light, we hypothesize that high self-monitors holding negative stereotypes of Blacks may rely more on these stereotypes when their reference peer groups express opposition to these policies. Because these chameleon-like high self-monitors know that their peers will oppose, they rely more on negative stereotypes rather than forming policy preferences independently. Conversely, in peer groups that expresse favorable opinion on economic aid to Blacks, high self-monitors are expected not to rely on the negative stereotypes (even when they strongly endorse these stereotypes) in shaping policy attitudes.

Hyptohesis 2-4: High self-monitors endorsing negative stereotypes of Blacks rely more on these stereotypes when their reference peer groups (i.e. economic, ideology, partisan-based) express opposition to the policies; High self-monitors holding negative stereotypes rely less on these stereotypes when peer groups have favorable attitudes on race-targeted economic policies.

Lastly, we show, for comparison, that high self-monitors' policy attitudes are not influcned by random people living in the same area. This is to corroborate our findings on self-monitors' behaviors and contrast this to a context in which socio-economic markers are absent. Self-monitors are those who align their attitudes to those of specific target groups in which they hope to gain social influence.

Since this adaptation is strategic and target-specific, we expect that the high self-monitors' policy attitudes do not show a correlation to those of random people, even if they are in the same racial group living in the same area.

Hyptohesis 2-5: High self-monitors' policy attitudes are not influenced by opinions of randomly chosen racial peers living in the same area.

4. Data & Methods

1) Data and Measures

The data is drawn from the New York State Racial Attitudes Survey (NYRAS). The survey was conducted in the summer of 2000 through telephone interviews (Weber et al. 2014). Our sample respondents are 754 non-Hispanic, non-Asian Whites living in the state of New York. The survey was conducted in two stages over one year interval. In addition, we use the US Census data for the year of 2000 to add contextual information.

Policy Attitudes Our dependent variable is the respondents' policy attitudes on race-targeted economic policies (Weber et al. 2014). Ranging from 0 to 1, higher score represents stronger opposition to race-targeted economic policies. Following Weber et al., we transformed responses for each item into a Normal distribution and averaged these into a single index ($\mu = 0.46$, $SD = 0.28$). Questions measure attitudes towards housing integration, economic aid to blacks, and affirmative action. The composite indicator consists of averaged score of responses to two items on housing integration, two on economic aid, and two on affirmative actions.[4]

Contextual Measures As contextual variables, we use diversity of racial composition and residential mobility at the area code level. There are 10 areas in our sample. For example, the sample contains demographic information on suburban counties, as well as urban areas. For the sake of confidentiality, we anonymize area codes that might reveal information on locations. Contextual variables are drawn from the 2000 US Census. Based on the zip code level demographic information we have, we calculated area level information by getting mean values of zip code areas (weighted by proportion of population for each zip code). We chose higher unit of analysis, because we are interested in racial segregation at the level of county or metropolitan units rather than smaller zipcodes. Also, considering that residents in New York State has the longest commute time as of 2000, New York State residents' interaction might not be limited to the small residential zipcode areas. In this light, we make an assumption that individuals' perception on inter-racial relationship might be influenced

[4]For more detailed information on survey items, see the codebook we share. Dependent variable is composed of integr, locgov, helpblk, spended, affact1, and affact2.

by local contexts within larger geographical units as well.

First, racial diversity is measured by the proportion of racial composition in each area. In sum, `areadif` is derived by subtracting the proportion of White popoulation from that of Black residents in each area. In our sample, `areadif` varies from -0.1 to 0.2 ($\mu = 0.03$, $SD = 0.09$). Secondly, population mobility of area is measured by the proportion of housing units occupied by renters to the total housing units in the areas. By using this proxy, we assume that renters are less likely to stay in the area than homeowners and have less opportunities to internalize local norms. `areaimmobile` in our code range from -0.46 to 0.06, where 0.06 represents the most immobile area in our sample and -0.46 the most mobile ($\mu = -0.13$, $SD = 0.15$). In the code, we used the measure of 'immobility' (the proportion of units occupied by homeowners to the total housing units). However, in the Results section, our interpretations of the results are based on how mobile an area is, not immobile.

Self-monitoring Self-monitor item measures how much individual respondents care about what others expect of themselves. `smonitor` in the data is a composite index of four items in the survey: `i_expec`, `i_nojoy`, `i_deciv`, and `i_amnot`. The questions are as follows: "In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else", "Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time", "I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them", and "I am not always the person I appear to be". In our data, `smonitor` varies from -0.29 to 0.71 ($\mu = 0.002$, $SD = 0.22$).

Lazy Stereotype White endorsement of lazy stereotype was measured by the item asking "On a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 represents lazy and 10 represents hard working, where would you rate most Blacks?" `workbla0`, the variable we used for endorsement of lazy stereotype was re-scaled to vary from -1 to 1, in which 1 represents strongest endorsement of lazy stereotype on Blacks ($\mu = 0.003$, $SD = 0.16$).

Neighbors For the latter part of analysis on self-monitors and peer groups, we create measures tapping into average score of dependent variable (policy attitudes) of peer groups within each area. Since we are interested in exploring the impact of policy attitudes of peer reference groups such as ideology-based, partisan, (income-based) economic peer groups, we create three indicators of peer group opinions. These are labeled `idnet`, `pidnet`, and `incomenet` respectively. For example, if a respondent living in Brooklyn is highly liberal, her `idnet` score is the averaged policy attitudes score of those whose id score is greater than the 66th percentile of the liberal score living in the same area (We divided the id peer group into three categories: liberal, median, and conservative). If her income level is median of the income distribution within the area, her `incomenet` score is the averaged policy attitudes score of those whose income is greater than the 33th and less than the

66th percentiles of the income distribution in the area. Regarding party id, we divided the reference group into two: Democrats or Republicans: if she is a Democrat, her `pidnet` score is averaged policy attitudes of peer Democrats in the same area. In so doing, we assume that individuals are influenced by the opinions of others who are similarly positioned in the socio-economic structure, and use their reference groups' attitudes to shape their own policy positions. In addition, we include `rnetwork`, an indicator of averaged policy attitudes score of 10 randomly selected peers within each area. This is to test whether people are affected by other people within the same area even in the absence of socio-economic markers to tell who their peers are and whose information matters.

Political predispositions In line with Weber et al., we control for individual repondents' political predispositions. Weber and his colleagues included two items in the Americen National Election Studies (ANES) to tap into egalitarianism. Those are "how much individual respondents are worried about equality" and "gone too far with equal rights". The combined index is `egalitarianism`, which ranges from -0.55 to 0.45 on the scale of -1 to 1 ($\mu = -0.004$, $SD = 0.29$). Control for individualism is included using two ANES items asking whether they blame themselves if they do not get ahead and people are poor because they don't work hard. `individualism` in the data ranges from -0.41 to 0.59 on a scale of -1 to 1 ($\mu = -0.0007$, $SD = 0.27$). Also, we control for ideological stance and partisanship of individual respondents. Based on the ANES 7-point measure, `libcon` indicates how much conservative respondents are, and `pid` tabs into identification with the Republican Party. As regards demographic controls, we include gender (1= female), education (1 = college education or greater), and age.

2) Model Specification

As we mean-centered and standardized all the independent variables to range from -1 to 1, we use Ordinary Least Square regression to estimate the robustness of our theories. We conduct three tests based on Normal distribution:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_i + x_{ij}\beta + u_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$
$$N \sim (\mu, \sigma_{ij})$$

Note that we include fixed effects at the area level, since we are interested in variations within given areas. By opting for a fixed effects model over random effects, we are assuming that there is less reason to suspect the effect of unobservable omitted variable. In other words, we have less theoretical reason to believe that unobservable variables not included in our models have impacts on where residens live. Also, we choose to use fixed effects, as our goal is to make an inference about the State of New York

rather than extrapolating the results outside the sample.[5]

Also, we report cluster stard errors at the area level. Although fixed effects are included, we still want to partial out the fixed effects and address remaining within group error correlations. Based on these assumptions, we test the following three models:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_i + x_{ij} \cdot \beta_{controls} + \texttt{diversity} \cdot \beta_1 + \texttt{mobility} \cdot \beta_2 + \texttt{lazy} \cdot \beta_3 + \texttt{diversity} \cdot \texttt{lazy} \cdot \beta_4 + \texttt{lazy} \cdot \texttt{mobility} \cdot \beta_5 + \texttt{diversity} \cdot \texttt{mobility} \cdot \beta_6 + \texttt{diversity} \cdot \texttt{mobility} \cdot \texttt{lazy} \cdot \beta_7 + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \ . \ . \ .$$

Hypothesis 1

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_i + x_{ij} \cdot \beta_{controls} + \texttt{rnetwork} \cdot \beta_1 + \texttt{incomenet} \cdot \beta_2 + \texttt{idnet} \cdot \beta_3 + \texttt{pidnet} \cdot \beta_4 + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \ . \ . \ .$$

Hypothesis 2-1 to 2-3

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_i + x_{ij} \cdot \beta_{controls} + \texttt{neighbors} \cdot \beta_1 + \texttt{smonitor} \cdot \texttt{neighbors} \cdot \beta_2 + \texttt{smonitor} \cdot \texttt{lazy} \cdot \beta_3 + \texttt{lazy} \cdot \texttt{neighbors} \cdot \beta_4 + \texttt{smonitor} \cdot \texttt{lazy} \cdot \texttt{neighbors} \cdot \beta_5 + u_j + \epsilon_{ij}$$

. . . Hypothesis 2-4 to 2-5

5. Results

1) Stereotype in the Context of Diversity and Mobility

We test how negative stereotypes of Blacks ("lazy" in this case) affect white policy attitudes in different contexts of racial diversity and residential mobility. Results are presented in Table 2. In Model 1, we include variables on respondents' political predispositions and demographic characteristics. In addition, in the interactive model (Model 2), we add contextual variables on racial diversity (`areaidf`) and residential mobility (`areaimmobile`) of ten areas. In Model 2, we included lower-order terms of the three-way interaction term (both first and second-order). However, as we are using fixed effects of areas, coefficients on the first order variables at the area level (`areadif` and `areaimmobile`) are dropped in the results. The three-way interaction term in Model 2 is designed to show how the effect of "lazy" stereotype of Blacks have different effects on policy attitudes in disparate local contexts of racial diversity and residential mobility.[6] As explained, we use OLS in estimating Model 1 and 2, as our dependent and independent variables are continuous. Following Weber et al., our independent variables except for age range from -1 to 1, and the scale of our mean-centered dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1 (1 is the strongest opposition to race-targeted economic policies).

[5]To make sure whether there is auto-correlation in error terms, we ran Durbin-Watson test on all the following models.

[6]Weber et al. use three-way interaction models to study the effect of negative stereotypes, self-monitors, and diversity on policy opposition. Our approach is similar to their model specification.

Table 2: Political consequences of lazy stereotype in context: Diversity and Mobility

	Policies	Policies	Housing	Local Gov.	Home own.
Models	(1. OLS)	(2. OLS)	(3. Logit)	(4. Logit)	(5. Logit)
Actors	(-)	(-)	(Biz & Religious)	(Government)	(Unspecified)
Egalitarianism	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.32^{**}	-0.21^{***}	-0.14^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Individualism	0.18^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.33^{***}	0.50^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.06)
Party ID (Republican)	0.02	0.02	0.12	0.11	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.06)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.25^{***}	0.25^{***}	0.43^{***}	0.81^{***}	0.11^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.06)
Gender	-0.04^{**}	-0.04^{*}	-0.13^{**}	-0.23^{***}	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Education	-0.01	-0.01	-0.12	0.10	-0.12^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)
Self-monitor	-0.15^{**}	-0.15^{**}	-0.24	-0.42^{**}	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.08)
Age	0.07^{*}	0.07^{*}	0.71^{***}	0.70^{***}	0.34^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.09)
Lazy stereotype	0.16^{***}	0.17^{***}	0.59^{***}	0.44^{**}	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.23)
Income	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.10	0.07	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Lazy x Diversity		-2.47^{***}	-4.40	-2.48	-4.85^{*}
		(0.74)	(3.13)	(1.56)	(2.86)
Lazy x Mobility		0.42	2.25	-1.85	2.87^{*}
		(0.61)	(1.74)	(2.07)	(1.49)
Lazy x Diversity x Mobility		-10.63^{***}	-29.20^{**}	-9.85	-31.83^{***}
		(3.74)	(13.15)	(10.85)	(10.13)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

In line with the existing findings, White support of lazy stereotypes of Blacks has significant positive effects on opposition to economic aid to Blacks ($\beta = 0.17$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .01$). That is, the more lazy respondents reported Blacks to be, the more they opposed these policies. More importantly, we hypothesized that lazy stereotype will have different effects according to local contexts of mobility and diversity. We expected that residents in racially diverse and mobile area rely as much on negative stereotypes as those in less diverse and less mobile areas. In highly mobile and diverse area and less mobile and less diverse areas (i.e. diverse urban areas & white suburbs), we predicted that less opportunities to interact with Blacks might amplify Whites' reliance on negative stereotypes. In line with our hypothesis, the coefficient on three-way interaction term negative and significant ($\beta = -10.63$, $SE = 13.15$, $p < .05$). As both diversity and mobility increase or decrease, respondents rely more on their pre-existing negative stereotypes in shaping their policy attitudes. We can find the same relationship in less diverse areas of low mobility. This means that negative stereotypes will have high influence on Whites' policy attitudes when the local context is highly mobile and diverse as well as when mobility and diversity are low (See Table 3).

Table 3: Effect of Stereotypes on Policy Opposition at Varying Levels of Diversity and Immobility

	Mobility (10th)	Mobility (25th)	Mobility (75th)	Mobility (90th)
Diversity (10th)	0.36 (0.09)***	0.27 (0.06)***	0.17 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.28)
Diversity (25th)	0.35 (0.09)***	0.26 (0.06)***	0.17 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.28)
Diversity (75th)	-0.09 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)	0.15 (0.10)
Diversity (90th)	-0.37 (0.18)**	-0.24 (0.14)*	-0.09 (0.11)	0.31 (0.04)***

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

To further explore the effect of lazy stereotype on policy opposition at varying levels of mobility and diversity, we present simple slopes of marginal effect of `lazy` on policy opposition in Table 3. At low levels of diversity and mobility (the 10th percentile of each distribution), the effect of lazy stereotype is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.36$, $SE = 0.09$, $p < .01$). This is in line with our theory that residents in less diverse and less mobile areas rely more on negative stereotypes in shaping attitudes on race-targeted economic policies. As diversity increases and mobility remains low, the relationship between stereotype and policy opposition turns out to be negative and significant (the 10th percentile of `mobility` and 90th percentile of `diversity`). Indeed, it is difficult to provide intuitive interpretations of the negative effect of lazy stereotype on policy opposition. According to this finding, stronger white endorsement of lazy stereotype of Blacks have negative impact on opposition to race-targeted aid. Although we lack data for conclusive interpretations, we speculate that white perception on Black in these highly diverse and less mobile areas might be more complex. In other words, it might

not be a dichotomy of "All Blacks are lazy or hard-working". For example, if Black neighbors in these areas are more successful than the average Black population, their continued interaction with those selected Blacks might have caused cognitive dissonance on perception of Blacks and what can be done on racially disadvantaged groups. Whites who hold stereotypes of Blacks being lazy might struggle to find a connection between their successful Black neighbors and "lazy" Blacks outside their tight-knit communities. In the face of disparate life patterns, White holders of negative stereotypes might think lazy Blacks can be like their successful neighbors when appropriate aid is provided. For Whites who interact with Blacks deviating from their racial stereotypes, laziness may not be an incorrigible trait, but a treatable symptom.[7]

More importantly, when diversity and mobility are both high, the effect of racial stereotype is as strong and significant as when mobility and diversity are low. Compare $\beta = 0.31$ ($p < .01$) when `mobility` and `diversity` are the 90th percentile vs. $\beta = 0.36$ ($p < .01$) when both `mobility` and `diversity` are the 10th percentile. For example, in a racially diverse and mobile local context, those who endorse lazy stereotype are as likely to oppose race-targeted economic policies than those in diverse areas with low mobility. More importantly, the effect of negative stereotype in diverse and mobile areas have similarly strong and positive impact on policy opposition as in areas with low mobility and low diversity. These two contexts are where we observe the strongest impact of negative stereotypes and opposition to these policies.

Graphical demonstration shows relationships between lazy stereotype and policy attitudes in disparate contexts (Figure 1).[8] The plot depicts effect of stereotype on policy attitudes at disparate levels of diversity and mobility. Solid blue line represents the effect on policy attitudes (y-axis) on the continuous spectrum of lazy stereotype (x-axis). Gray polygon marks 95% confidence bands. Each panel shows 1) highly diverse and highly mobile, 2) highly diverse and low mobile, 3) low diverse and low mobile, and 4) low diverse and highly mobile contexts (clockwise). As explicated, endorsement of lazy stereotype has similar positive effect on opposition to race-targeted policies both in highly mobile and highly diverse context and low mobile and low diverse areas (Top-left and bottom-right panels). On the contrary, when mobility is high and diversity is low, the effect is relatively flat and not significant (Bottom-left). In a racially diverse areas where residential mobility is low, lazy stereotype has significant and negative effect on policy opposition (top-right).

To sum up, these results show that the effect of negative stereotype is strong and positively connected to opposition to race-targeted economic policies not only in White suburbs but as well

[7] Admittedly, we do not have data to prove this mechanism. We welcome any comments and suggestions.

[8] Note that the y-axis in the plot denotes marginal 'effect' of stereotype on dependent variable, not the change in the outcome variable.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Racial Stereotype on Policy Opposition at Different Levels of Mobility and Racial Diversity



in diverse urban areas. Furthermore, although we are cautious to be conclusive, effect of negative stereotypes might reduce opposition to Black-targeted economic policies in highly diverse and tight-knit communities.

Lastly, we test whether `Ideology` and `Party ID` have different impact on policy opposition. In Theory section, we raised the possibility that ideological similarity and party identification might have different effect on policy opposition. Particularly, we suspected that ideological divide on "small vs. big government" could predict attitudes on economic aid to Blacks better than partisan affiliations. Results from Models 1 to 4 in Table 2 confirm our theory. Furthermore, we hypothesized that discriminating conservatives (or liberals) should have different support for aid to Blacks as the main agents vary from governments to non-governmental entities. Results from Models 3 to 5 are evidence that people discriminate based on their ideological predispositions. Dependent variables in Models 3 to 5 are opposition to 'business and religious group-led housing integration', 'local government-led housing integration' and 'home ownership of Blacks wherein main agent of policy implementation is unspecified'. If individuals are discriminating based on small vs. big government spectrum, we should observe a pattern in which conservatives' opposition to local government-led economic policies is stronger (Model 4) than to private sector-led aid (Model 3). Indeed, coefficient on `Ideology` is twice larger in Model 4 than in Model 3. This means that conservatives show stronger opposition to local governments-led racial economic policies ($\beta = 0.81$, $p < .01$) than to business or religious groups-led aid measures ($\beta = 0.43$, $p < .01$). Furthermore, `Ideology`'s relationship to policy attitudes is not significant when main agent is unspecified as in Model 5. This is evidence that respondents do discriminate based on their ideological perspectives on who should implement aid measures.

2) Racial Stereotype, Self-monitors, and Socio-economic Racial Peers

As previous studies point out, chameleon-like high self-monitors tend to cater their policy attitudes into their social surroundings than true-to-themselves low self-monitors. Weber and his colleagues show high self-monitors in a racially diverse context tend to adjust to the local norms of tolerance. We show that high self-monitors' adaptive behavior is not just limited to diversity context. Through Models 6 to 9, we test whether the policy attitudes of similarly positioned White peer groups within local proximity matter more to high self-monitors than low self-monitors. To be specific, `neighbors` variable in Model 7 is the averaged policy attitudes of individual repondents' residential neighbors who are in the same income stratum. Similarly, `neighbors` in Model 8 and 9 measure average policy attitudes of neighbors who hold similar ideological positions or party identification in the same area. Additionally, `neighbors` in Model 6 is included to show whether individual policy attitudes are

influenced by opinions of random neighbors living in the same area. Thus, `neighbors` in Model 6 is averaged policy attitudes of randomly selected 10 other respondents living in the same local area. We include this model for a comparative purpose. High self-monitors are not likely to be influenced by just anybody in the neighborhood. Rather, they need additional socio-economic markers other than race to shape their policy preferences, and gain social influence among like-minded peers. Thus, these models narrow down socio-economic contexts in local areas that might connect or disconnect these people from local norms of tolerance, and reveal how psychological orientation influences policy preference in different reference groups.

We explore this relationship through three-way interaction terms of `self-monitor`, `lazy`, and `neighbors`. Since we expect that effect of negative stereotype varies depending on the types of reference groups, the expected sign of the three-way interaction term is positive.[9] As one's self-monitoring orientation and reference groups' policy opposition increase, her reliance on negative stereotype will increase and lead to stronger policy opposition.

As we expected, randomly selected peer groups do not have significant influence on policy opposition of high self-monitors. By contrast, policy attitudes of economic and ideological peer groups turn out to have substantial and positive effect on high SMs' policy attitudes. The three-way interaction term in Model 6 is positive but not significant, whereas it has substantial influence on policy attitudes in Model 7 (Economic peers) and Model 8 (Ideology peers). Contrary to our expectation, partisan peers turn out not significant at the conventional significance levels.

Table 5 and Figure 2 demonstrate the effect of lazy stereotype on policy opposition at varying levels of self-monitoring orientations and peer groups' policy attitudes. Three plots in the first row of Figure 2 offer comparative insights on the relationship between stereotype and policy attitudes in different social surroundings. Particularly, our focus is on comparing disparate attitudes of low and high self-monitors when their peer groups' attitudes change. In each frame, we hypothesize that individuals could select into ideological or economic peer groups within areas. Based on these assumptions, we test how the interaction of one's lazy stereotype and self-monitoring orientations shows different dynamics when surrounded by different peers.

Across three levels of policy opposition in ideology and economic peer groups, the relationship between negative stereotype and policy opposition is consistently positive for low self-monitors (See Table 5 and Figure 2). In Table 5, we offer simple slopes of effect of lazy stereotype at different levels of self-monitoring orientations, and levels of policy opposition expressed by their ideology and economic peer groups (For example, `Highly opposing` in the top panel means their ideology peer

[9]Recall that we are using area-level fixed effects. The fixed effects control for diversity and mobility at the area level.

Table 4: Stereotypes, Self-monitoring Orientation and Peer Groups on Policy Opposition

	Types of Reference Peer Groups			
	(6. Random)	(7. Economic)	(8. Ideology)	(9. Partisan)
Egalitarianism	-0.15^{***}	-0.15^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.13^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Individualism	0.18^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Party ID (Republican)	0.04	0.03	0.04	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Ideology (Conserv.)	0.23^{***}	0.23^{***}	0.05	0.23^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)
Gender	-0.04^{*}	-0.04^{**}	-0.04^{**}	-0.04^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.0002	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Self-monitor	0.17	0.45^{**}	-0.19	-0.08
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.22)
Age	0.06	0.07^{*}	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Income	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Lazy	0.45	0.05	0.17	0.30
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.14)	(0.26)
Neighbor	-0.03	0.26^{***}	0.63^{**}	0.43
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.27)	(0.28)
SM x Neighbor	-0.65^{*}	-1.28^{**}	0.11	-0.13
	(0.39)	(0.51)	(0.40)	(0.46)
SM x Lazy	-2.57^{*}	-2.34^{***}	-2.41^{***}	-1.80
	(1.38)	(0.73)	(0.68)	(1.84)
Lazy x Neighbor	-0.56	0.29	0.08	-0.22
	(0.63)	(0.68)	(0.25)	(0.54)
SM x Lazy x Neighbor	4.31	4.06^{**}	4.52^{**}	2.76
	(3.16)	(1.83)	(1.75)	(3.95)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Table 5: Effect of Stereotypes at Varying Levels of Self-monitoring and Peer groups' Predispositions

(Ideology peer)	Highly Favorable (10th)	Favorable (25th)	Opposing (75th)	Highly Opposing (90th)
SM (10th)	0.47 (0.09)***	0.44 (0.09)***	0.16 (0.12)**	0.12 (0.14)
SM (25th)	0.18 (0.08)**	0.32 (0.07)***	0.30 (0.07)***	0.19 (0.07)**
SM (75th)	0.08 (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)	0.28 (0.14)**	0.27 (0.08)***
SM (90th)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.27 (0.13)**	0.33 (0.15)**
(Economic peer)	Highly Favorable (10th)	Favorable (25th)	Opposing (75th)	Highly Opposing (90th)
SM (10th)	0.55 (0.17)***	0.39 (0.09)***	0.22 (0.10)**	0.14 (0.13)
SM (25th)	0.35 (0.15)**	0.28 (0.07)***	0.22 (0.07)***	0.25 (0.13)**
SM (75th)	0.04 (0.14)	0.13 (0.06)	0.21 (0.09)**	0.19 (0.10)*
SM (90th)	-0.16 (0.16)	0.02 (0.08)	0.21 (0.13)	0.30 (0.18)*

Figure 2: Political Consequences of Negative Racial Stereotype at Varying Levels of Self-monitoring Orientations and Socio-economic Contexts



(a) Ideology peer groups opposing aid



(b) Ideology peer groups supporting aid



(c) Ideology peer groups of median attitude



(d) Economic peer groups opposing aid



(e) Economic peer groups supporting aid



(f) Economic peer groups of median attitude

groups' policy attitudes lean towards opposition).

In line with the findings in psychology literature, true-to-themselves low self-monitors do not change their policy positions to fit into those of their peers. Except for the 90th percentile of policy attitudes in income and ideology peer groups in Table 5, low SMs at the 10th percentile of distribution show that there is a positive and significant relationship between stereotypes and policy opposition.

On the contrary, high SMs show different behavioral patterns in each context as their ideology and economic peer groups change policy attitudes. Directly speaking, high SMs' strategic policy endorsement is more striking when their ideology peer group's opinions change than economic peer group does. High SMs rely more on stereotypes when their ideology peer groups oppose the policies than when their economic peer groups do. Before comparing those two, let us explain how high SMs behave in each peer group.

Firstly, high SMs adapt their policy attitudes according to those of their ideological peer groups. As depicted in the top-left plot in Figure 2, high SMs amplify their negative stereotypes when their peer groups oppose. In this 'opposing' ideology peer groups, high SMs are more likely to express policy opposition than low SMs when endorsement of stereotype is maximum: the effect of stereotype on policy opposition in highly opposing ideology peer group is 0.19 ($p < .01$) for the 25th percentile low SMs and 0.33 ($p < .05$) for the 90th percentile high SMs. Not only that the slope of effect is

steeper for high SMs, the same level of stereotype leads to stronger policy opposition among high SMs than low SMs. Compare the high and low SMs' policy opposition (heights of z-axis in Figure 2) when endorsement of stereotype is maximum. High SMs are more likely to rely on negative stereotypes when they are surrounded by opposing ideology peers, and we speculate that this is attributable to their yearnings for social influences in this peer group.

Compare the above results to high SMs' reliance on stereotype and policy attitudes when their ideology peer groups are favorable to aid. In this case, the relationship between endorsement of stereotype and policy opposition is weak and insignificant (the 10th and 25th percentile of ideology `neighbors`). In the top-middle panel of Figure 2, the positive and significant relationship between stereotype and policy opposition disappears as self-monitoring orientations increase. This tells us that high SMs conceal or rely less on racial stereotypes when their peer groups support race-targeted policies. This is in stark contrast to high SMs' behavior in opposing ideology peer groups. This is evidence of different local norms that are at play. While Weber et al.'s work show that diverse places produce tolerant social norms, our findings suggest that tolerant social norms might not only a product of diversity, but also of ideology (and income as will be explained below).

Similarly, when one's income peer groups express favorable positions on economic aid to Blacks, the relationship between stereotypes and policy opposition significantly weakens as `self-monitor` increases. To illustrate, in the 10th and 25th percentile of the economic peer groups' policy attitude distribution (opposition is low), we could not find significant evidence that high SMs at the 75th and 90th percentile rely on lazy stereotypes. This is graphically demonstrated in the bottom-middle panel of Figure 2. However, as the economic peer groups' opposition increases, the relationship between stereotype and policy opposition becomes positive and significant: When SM is 75th percentile and economic peers' opposition is as high as the 75th percentile, effect of lazy stereotype is 0.21 ($p < .05$). In the bottom-left of Figure 2, this relationship is depicted.

One interesting comparison can be made on high SMs' behaviors in ideology and economic peer groups. While high SMs similarly adjust their policy attitudes according to those of their id and economic peer groups, political consequences of amplification of negative stereotype is higher when their ideology peer groups are opposing than when economic peer groups do. Compare the top-left (id peers) and bottom-left (econ peers) plots in Figure 2. High SMs' endorsement of lazy stereotype translates into stronger opposition when their ideology peer groups oppose (When `self-monitor` and `lazy stereotype` are at their maximum, policy attitude is $z = 0.7$ in opposing ideology peers and $z = 0.45$ in opposing economic peers). Furthermore, in opposing ideology peer groups, high SMs' reliance on stereotype is magnified more than low SMs when their endorsement of stereotype is

maximum ($z = 0.7$ for high SMs and $z = 0.6$ for low SMs when stereotype is maximum). This reveals that high SMs in opposing ideology peer groups amplify their reliance on negative stereotypes and more efficiently connect this to policy opposition compared to their low SM counterparts and high SM counterparts in economic peer groups.

In sum, high SMs do change their behavior differently in different reference peer groups. When their reference point is ideology peer groups, high SMs' political consequences of being in an ideology peer group expressing opposition to race-targeted economic policies might be more dramatic than when thier economic peer groups oppose. High SMs, who are strategic and seek for social influence, tend to amplify their negative stereotypes in the knowledge that their ideology peer group will endorse the negative stereotype. When their ideology peer group is favorable to economic aid, high SMs tend to conceal or less rely on their negative stereotype. Thus illustrated, ideology peer groups' opinions might bring about more dramatic change in policy attitudes for high SMs than economic peer groups can.

Lastly, these results are slightly different from the evidence we found on the general impact of peer groups on individuals' policy opposition (hypotheses 2-1 to 2-3). We present these results in Table 6 in Appendix. Generally, as shown in Model 5 in Table 6, economic peer groups' policy opinions turn out to have stronger influence on one's policy attitude ($\beta = 0.32$ $p < .01$). In contrast, ideology and partisan peer groups have relatively weak influence (For id peer group, $\beta = 0.56$, $p < .1$; partisan peer group, $\beta = 0.33$, $p > .1$). What this tells us is illuminating. While economic peer groups' opinions might matter more in a general context, the dynamic might be different for high SMs. Once they find an ideologically safe social space (or peer groups), they let their guards down and magnify the usage of negative stereotype. They cannot be certain that economic peer groups might be safe to express their negative stereotypes. These findings further shed light on social ramifications of ideological peer groups expressing strong opposition to race-based economic policies. Tea Party movement might be one example. Many scholars and experts question why such a massive mobilization was feasible within a short period of time. Although our work does not directly speak to this literature, it might offer relevant insights. These ideology-based peer groups expressing strong opposition might provide a safe social space where high SMs could shape policy positions based on negative stereotypes and still satisfactorily pursue social influence without being judged. We further discuss implications in the concluding remarks.

Discussion

Evidence from the existing studies on how racial diversity influences Whites' attitudes on race-related

policies is mixed. A recent important work shows that "racial context may *interactively* amplify the impact of stereotypes on whites' race-related policy attitudes" (Weber et al. 2014). Building up on this work, this article reveals that racial context measured by racial diversity might have different faces depending on patterns of social relationships in communities. Particularly, the first part of analysis shows that dynamics of inter-racial group interaction is as much important as racial diversity. By showing that policy opposition is as strong in highly diverse and highly mobile areas as in low diverse and low mobile areas, we argue that people might amplify reliance on negative stereotypes of the other race even in diverse racial context, if they have less opportunities to change their perception on the other racial group due to high mobility. In the next step, this article shows that interaction *within* racial groups matter as much as interaction *between* racial groups in shaping Whites' policy attitudes. Even when racial diversity is controlled for using fixed effects, the findings in our second analysis (in Appendix) show that Whites tend to align their policy attitudes to those of their white social reference groups. More strikingly, our third analysis finds that high SMs tend to amplify their negative stereotypes of Blacks and most efficiently connect this stereotype to policy opposition, when their ideological peer groups are opposed to race-targeted economic policies. Evidence points to a possibility that interaction within racial peer groups has important impact on formation of policy attitudes. Combining the results from three analyses, we suspect that different normative contexts generated by racial peer groups could have significant influence on individuals' race-related policy attitudes, that might weaken or strengthen egalitarian local norms. By studying these high self-monitoring chameleons, we are able to gain a better understanding on how social norms of tolerance strengthen or weaken in different racial and social contexts. In other words, by tracking the patterns that high SMs reveal, we demonstrate that there is no uniform "tolerant social norms" that operate in all localities even when racial diversity is salient. Chameleons endorsing negative stereotypes do not have to hide or restrain themselves uniformly in racially diverse context, *if they can find an environments with weaker egalitarian social norms* .

These findings have important policy implications. Both academics and policymakers have had hard time understanding the fast conservative ideology-based mobilization shown in the Tea Party. The Tea Party puzzled us mainly because it gained momentum so fast when institutional appratus was absent (i.e. partisan affiliation to the Republican Party), and the Tea Partiers started to resent federal spendings to "undeserving groups", the definition of which has dimension of racial stereotypes according to Williamson, Skocpol & Coggin (Williamson, Skocpol &Coggin, 2011). As illustrated, the Tea Party was able to mobilize people against "undeserving groups". In this case, it would seem that they were successful in doing so because people already had some set of racial biases. In this

vein, this relates to our work in that race and attitudes about race are still politically consequential. If this is a correct interpretation, under certin conditions, underlying negative racial stereotypes can be drawn to the surface so quickly to not only influence individual policy attitudes but also 'mobilize' these opposing groups to concrete action through grassroots interaction among racial peers.

Resonating Weber et al.'s point on potential direction of future studies, we suggest that a similar line of research on places other than New York State will further enrich insights on race-related policy attitude formation. Especially, in Southern or Western contexts in which another salient racial group (Latino) is present, the effect of stereotypes might show different dynamics. In this light, it will be fruitful to study how racial stereotypes of other ethnic minorities such as Latinos and Asians might shed new light on stereotypes and white perception on deservedness of economic aid. Stereotypes of Latinos that they are "illegal" or "fertile (and burdening welfare system)" might shed new light on how racial stereotypes affect race-related policy attitudes. Especially, it remains to be studied whether "illegal" stereotype of Latinos might spill over and influence white perception on "legal" Latinos. Also, studying how supposedly positive "hard working" stereotype of Asians might change or does not change white perception of who is qualified for welfare benefits might be one direction to go.

Relatedly, future work should incorporate more comprehensive measures of diversity. Black-white measures of diversity not only ignore the increasing levels of racial and ethnic diversity in the United States, but also assume that attitudes towards one racial group are not influenced by interactions with other racial groups. Finally, as our work demonstrates, conditional models of racial diversity may better help to explain the influence of social environments on racial attitudes. Future models testing the effect of racial diversity on racial attitudes and policy preferences should take into account the interaction between racial context and socioeconomic context. With these further attempts to put inter-racial relations in context, we will be able to see clearly multifaceted faces of racial diversity in American politics.

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Appendix

Table 6: Opposition in the Context of Different Peer Groups

	(Random)	(Economic)	(Ideology)	(Partisan)	(All)
Egalitarianism	-0.15^{***}	-0.15^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}	-0.14^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Individualism	0.18^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.18^{***}	0.19^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Party ID (Republican)	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.24^{***}	0.24^{***}	0.07	0.24^{***}	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Gender	-0.04^{*}	-0.04	-0.04^{*}	-0.04^{*}	-0.04^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.002	-0.01	-0.003	-0.002	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Self-monitor	-0.13^{**}	-0.12^{*}	-0.13^{**}	-0.12^{*}	-0.12^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Income	0.02	0.02^{*}	0.03	0.02	0.02^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Lazy stereotype	0.16^{**}	0.15^{**}	0.16^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.16^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Random Network	-0.05	-0.08	-0.07	-0.06	-0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Economic Network		0.32^{***}			0.32^{***}
		(0.05)			(0.06)
Ideology Network			0.59^{*}		0.56^{*}
			(0.31)		(0.29)
Party Network				0.40	0.33
				(0.27)	(0.21)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$