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Additional Robustness Checks

I conduct several robustness checks which are relevant for discussion of the role of political competition, using alternative measures of Opposition Strength, Turnover Frequency, and Democracy. **Table 3** presents several of these checks. Model 5 and 6 include alternative measures of opposition strength. Model 5 uses the vote share of all opposition parties, not just the largest party. Model 6 incorporates changes over time in the vote share of the largest opposition party. I measure the difference between the largest opposition party's vote share in each year and the average vote share over the prior four years (that is, the difference between vote share in year *t* and the average of vote shares in years *t - 4* through years *t - 1).* Thus, this variable measures deviation from the recent mean in the extent to which opposition parties pose a credible challenge to those in power. In both of these models, Opposition Strength remains statistically significant, yielding greater confidence that the results are not artifacts of any particular operationalization of this variable.

Model 7 addresses a potential concern regarding the Turnover Frequency variable: the possibility that the only salient effect of turnover in party control of the executive is that new ruling parties are likely to pass FOI laws in their first few years in power, as was the case in Mexico, India, and many other countries. If this effect were strong, then it is possible that the difference between observations with zero recent instances of turnover and observations with greater than zero such instances could be driving the magnitude of the Turnover Frequency coefficient. We can test for this possibility by including each level of the Turnover Frequency variable in the model as separate dummy variables. Model 7 includes three such dummy variables: an indicator for one turnover instance, an indicator for two instances, and an indicator for three or four instances. Since only one observation in the sample had four instances of

turnover in the preceding years, I group that observation together with those which had three instances. An indicator for observations with no turnover instances in the preceding years is omitted as the reference category. If the coefficients for two turnover instances and three turnover instances are smaller or similar in magnitude to the coefficient for one turnover instance, then we can conclude that the presence of any turnover at all, rather than political uncertainty, is driving the model results. However, the results in Model 7 show that this is not the case. Rather, the coefficient for one instance of turnover is 0.97, while the coefficients for two and three instances of turnover are 1.4 and 1.91, respectively, and all three are statistically significant. This supports the interpretation of these results as evidence of the role of political uncertainty in driving FOI passage. Even beyond the effect of one occurrence of turnover in party control of the executive over the preceding years, greater frequencies of turnover make FOI passage even more likely.

Model 8 employs an alternative measure of Democracy from Freedom House to ensure that the statistical significance of the political competition variables does not depend on the particular measure of Democracy included as a control variable. Indeed, Opposition Strength and Turnover Frequency remain statistically significant in this model. Finally, Model 9 includes a measure of Veto Players, the Checks variables from the Database of Political Institutions, but it is not statistically significant.

Models 10, 11, and 12 are referenced in the main text. Press Freedom (Model 10) has no significant effect on FOI passage, and its inclusion in the model does not change the sign or significance of the political competition or international socialization variables. I also include a dummy variable for presidential systems (Model 11). This variable is not significant, and its inclusion does not change the sign or significance of the main results. Model 12 includes

interaction terms between presidential systems and both political competition variables. While the interaction term with Turnover Frequency is not statistically significant, the interaction with Opposition Strength variable is significant (Model 12). The results indicate that the effects of this form of political competition are attenuated, though still positive, under presidential systems.

As noted in the main text, **Table 4** shows models employing alternative universes of cases. Model 13 includes all countries for the period from 1990 to 2008. Model 14 includes only developing and transition countries, but beginning in 1983, the earliest point at which data on all variables was available. Model 15 includes all countries going back to 1983. In all of these, the effects of both political competition variables are positive and significant, showing that the main results do not depend on this choice.

Table 5 shows the results of robustness checks including different control variables or other modeling choices. Model 16 includes the logged extant FDI Stock in each country, based on data from the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the most reliable source of FDI data for developing countries due to lower rates of non-reporting than other sources. Model 17 includes Economic Growth, from the World Development Indicators. Model 18 includes a dummy variable for instances of negative economic growth. Model 19 includes Armed Conflict, an indicator for years with greater than 500 battle-related deaths, using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Model 20 includes an indicator of Judicial Independence, from the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset. Model 21 includes an indicator of how many years remain in the executive's term in office (for the subset of the data where there are finite terms), from the Database of Political Indicators. None of these variables are statistically significant, and they do not impact the sign and significance of the main political competition variables. Model 22 includes interaction terms between each of the key political competition variables and the

Polity2 democracy scale. Neither interaction term is statistically significant, showing that the effects of the competition variables are not significantly greater or smaller in more or less democratic states.

Table 6 presents the results of models using alternative forms of event history models. Instead of using a logit implementation of the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model, as in the main paper, here I use accelerated failure time models with a series of different distributions for the baseline hazard: Weibull (Model 23), log-normal (Model 24), log-logistic (Model 25), and extreme-value (Model 26). For all but one of these, both key political competition variables are positive and statistically significant, while with a log-normal hazard, Opposition Strength is statistically significant while Turnover Frequency is not.

Finally, **Table 7** presents the results of models which explicitly model a spatial autoregressive term to capture the spatial dependence in the data. I accomplish this by using Klier and McMillen's (2008) linearized GMM probit model of a dichotomous dependent variable with a spatially autocorrelated underlying latent variable. In this model, I include duration-dependent dummy variables to capture the changing baseline rate of FOI passage. However, constructing the *W* matrix which captures spatial linkages among the observations poses special challenges, given that countries drop out of the dataset once they have passed FOI laws.

To accomplish this task, I create an *N* by *N* matrix, where *N* equals the number of observations in the dataset, which is not the same as the number of countries multiplied by the number of years (since countries drop out once they have passed a law). Each entry in this matrix represents the connection of country *i* in year t_i with country *j* in year t_j. Where t_j is greater than t_i, the entry takes a value of zero, to avoid allowing spatial influence backwards in time. This approach allows me to use either a *W* matrix based on geographic distance (as in the Regional

Context variable) or a *W* matrix based on shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (as in the IGO Context variable).

Model 27 omits the Regional Context variable and instead uses a geographic *W* matrix to estimate spatial autocorrelation, while Model 28 omits the IGO Context variable and instead uses a *W* matrix based on shared IGO memberships. In both, the two political competition variables remain positive and statistically significant. The spatial parameter is statistically significant for Model 27 but not for Model 28.

Illustrative Cases

South Korea

In South Korea, the Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies was enacted on December 31, 1996 (Banisar 2006). The history of the law and the timing of its passage highlight the importance of political competition and uncertainty. Indeed, Hong (2000, p. 54) noted that the law was "the culminating point in the development towards the legal guarantee of freedom of information, though it was relatively late and delayed considering the growing popular pressure for institutionalizing free access to information."

In 1987, a democratic transition took place as President Chun Doo-Hwan, a former general who had come to power in a 1980 coup, agreed to leave office and accede to the outcome of elections. However, Chun's ally Roh Tae-Woo won the presidential election as the two main opposition candidates split much of the vote. In 1989, the Constitutional Court ruled that there was a constitutional right to information, arguing that fulfillment of the constitutional right to freedom of expression required access to government information (Youm 1994, Banisar 2006, Peled and Rabin 2011). However, as with many similar court rulings in other countries, specific legislation by the government was required to actually enact the information regime called for in the court ruling. Also in 1989, the Korean Public Law Association prepared a draft FOI law, the first time such a law had been proposed (Sung 2009). Other NGOs advocated for similar drafts, including the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice (Sung 2009).

During the 1992 presidential campaign, both Roh Tae-Woo and the two opposition candidates made promises to enact a FOI law once elected (Sung 2009, Lee and Moon 2011). The election was won by Kim Young-Sam, who became the first civilian president in decades. Nonetheless, although he pledged a massive anti-corruption campaign, embarked on many

economic and political reforms, and arrested his two predecessors on corruption charges, passage of a FOI law was delayed for several years until political conditions changed. The government published "Guides for Managing Disclosure of Administrative Information" in March 1994, but this was simply a proclamation with no actual effect (Sung 2009). While a committee to draft legislation was organized in July 1994, and the law was submitted to the national assembly in 1995, actual passage of the law was delayed (Sung 2009, Lee and Moon 2011).

In the April 1996 parliamentary elections, three years into Kim Young-Sam's five-year term, his ruling New Korea Party (formerly the Democratic Liberal Party) lost its absolute parliamentary majority. In the December 1997 presidential elections following the Asian financial crisis, his party (he was constitutionally limited to a single term), now renamed the Grand National Party, was defeated and opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung was elected.

The timing of the law's passage is illustrative of the role of political competition and uncertainty. While Kim Young-Sam's party's control of both the executive and legislative branches prior to the April 1996 elections could have allowed more rapid passage of the information disclosure law, passage was delayed until December 1996. The law was passed only once the strong electoral performance of the opposition signaled a more competitive political environment and greater uncertainty over the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections for the ruling party. Passage was not, however, delayed until the next administration. This pattern of timing – after gains by opposition parties but before any turnover in executive control – is consistent with explanations based on incentives deriving from political competition. While numerous factors likely played a role in the specific timing of the information disclosure law's passage, the insurance argument highlights the ruling party's interest in insurance: Binding a future government not to deprive them of access to government information, and

institutionalizing oversight that might impede any potential future government predation. Additionally, passing the law made a more credible commitment to future transparency than earlier proclamations, which were not institutionalized.

Nigeria

A similar pattern can be seen in Nigeria, where the Freedom of Information Act was signed by President Goodluck Jonathan on May 28, 2011, over eleven years after a similar law was first submitted to the country's legislature in 1999. Civil society activity on the issue in Nigeria actually began in 1993, when three NGOs – Media Rights Agenda, Civil Liberties Organisation, and the Nigeria Union of Journalists – began working together to campaign for enactment of a FOI law, producing the first draft law in 1994 (Media Rights Agenda 2003). Despite a series of workshops with other civil society groups, and subsequent draft laws, the campaign was unable to make any progress under the military rule of Sani Abacha. The Executive Director of the Civil Liberties Organisation was even among those jailed by the Abacha regime (Obe 2007).

Work on the issue began again during the transition period following Abacha's 1998 death. In March 1999, Media Rights Agenda joined with the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission and the international NGO Article 19 to hold a conference attended by members of domestic and international NGOs, United Nations representatives, and even some Nigerian politicians. The workshop produced a consensus document and new changes to the draft law, and resulted in a new campaign to pressure newly-elected President Olusẹgun Obasanjo to present the law to the National Assembly (Media Rights Agenda 2003).

The election of Obasanjo initially offered extremely optimistic signs for the FOI advocacy movement. Although he had previously served as military head of state in the late

1970s, Obasanjo had gone on to speak out against the Abacha regime's human rights abuses, and was even a founding member of the international anti-corruption NGO Transparency International. In his May 29, 1999 inaugural address, Obasanjo pledged to make the eradication of corruption a cornerstone of his administration, calling corruption "the greatest single bane of our society today" and pledging that "all rules and regulations designed to help honesty and transparency in dealing with government will be restored and enforced" (Media Rights Agenda 2003, Obe 2007).

Yet Obasanjo declined to present the FOI law draft, in favor of his own anti-corruption approach. His Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, however, resulted in no convictions by the end of his first term in 2003, and in fact "was soon perceived as a weapon with which the executive branch of the federal government was undermining and threatening political opponents both in the federal legislature, and in the state governments" (Obe 2007). While the draft legislation was ultimately introduced by individual legislators later in 1999, it took almost five years for the law to be approved by the House of Representatives, and two more years to be approved by the Senate, during which time it was intermittently criticized by Obasanjo. The two versions were finally harmonized and sent to President Obasanjo for his signature in February 2007, shortly before the end of his final term in office. Obasanjo not only refused to sign the bill, citing unspecified concerns over national security, but also refused to return it to the legislature, meaning that the bill lapsed when the legislative term ended.[1]

Edetaen Ojo of the Media Rights Association summarized the draft law's experience in the Obasanjo era:

[1] "Nigeria: No right to know." *Next*. July 9, 2010.

> "The Legislature was constantly fighting to ward off the influence of an overbearing president; the Legislature recognized the need for a Freedom of Information law; the legislators resisted subtle opposition to the Bill by the Executive; Legislators in both chambers passed the Bill unanimously. Ironically, President Obasanjo who came to power professing transparency and accountability, refused to sign the Bill into Law."[2]

Civil society advocacy also continued through this period, led by a coalition of over 150 Nigerian NGOs called the Freedom of Information Coalition. International NGOs including Article 19, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the Carter Center, and the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative also provided resources and attempted to exert international pressure for the Nigerian government to pass the law. Obasanjo's chosen successor, Umaru Yar'Adua, was elected in April 2007 in elections that were marked by violence and widely considered fraudulent. While the FOI law was re-submitted to both houses of the National Assembly, delays continued, with legislators often refusing to hear reports on the bill and frequent attempts to water down its language. This pattern of delay, legislative opposition, and absence of executive leadership on the issue persisted following Yar'Adua's May 2010 death and succession by his Vice President Goodluck Jonathan.

Beginning in January 2011, however, legislative action on the FOI law surprisingly resumed, and in February 2011 Jonathan indicated his willingness to sign the law, rather than veto it as Obasanjo had.[3] The law also became more salient with the upcoming April 2011

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[2] "Nigeria: FOI Bill - Vital Tool On the Legislative Shelf." *This Day*. August 18, 2010.

[3] "Nigerian House Passes FOI Bill Without Opposition." *FreedomInfo*. February 25, 2011.

elections. Not only did a wide coalition of civil society groups want "firm commitment from government that the FOI bill will be passed before the general elections,"[4] but it was even supported by the Nigeria Labour Congress, an organization with more than 30 affiliated unions and roughly 6 million members.[5]

After one of Jonathan's top advisers strongly criticized the law, calling it unpatriotic and unconstitutional, Jonathan's spokesman rebuked the aide, emphasizing that he spoke only for himself and not for the President.[6] Finally, at a March 30 presidential debate, Jonathan publicly pledged that he would sign the bill as soon as it was passed by both houses of the legislature.[7] While this did not occur until after Jonathan had already won the election, a harmonized version of the bill was passed by both houses on May 24, and Jonathan signed the bill into law on May 28, 2011, shortly before the end of the outgoing legislative session. Jonathan was widely hailed for signing the bill. The President of the Nigerian Guild of Editors called it "a personal commitment to openness, transparency, accountability and good governance" on the President's part.[8]

After so many years of delay (despite strong advocacy from domestic civil society groups and pressure from international NGOs), the sudden success of Nigeria's FOI law could be

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[4] "FOIB passage : How effective can the Law bite?" *Vanguard*. March 10, 2011.

[5] "NLC tasks Judiciary on 2011 elections." *Vanguard*. January 3, 2011.

[6] "Jonathan's aide, Abba-Aji, vows to scuttle FoI Bill." *Vanguard*. March 1, 2011; "FoI Bill: Presidency disowns Abba Aji." *Vanguard*. March 2, 2011.

[7] "Jonathan pledges to sign FoI Bill into law." *The Guardian Nigeria*. March 31, 2011.

[8] "FoI Act and You! How the Freedom of Information Act affects you." *Vanguard*. June 4, 2011.

attributable to numerous proximate factors, including decisions by key legislative figures, troubling disclosures of corruption from releases by WikiLeaks, or increasing pressure from international actors. However, there is a strong case to be made that the increased competitiveness of the political system played a key role.

The political system remained uncompetitive for the majority of the period of Nigeria's history in question, in that the incumbent head of state could use their control of military force, patronage networks, or ability to manipulate election results to ensure that they or their supporters would remain in power. The only exception to this pattern, until recently, was the initial election of Obasanjo in 1999. That particular instance of increased competition did not lead to FOI passage, however, given Obasanjo's unwillingness to support the law and his generally insincere approach to anti-corruption efforts.

While Obasanjo's 2003 reelection and the 2007 election of his chosen successor Yar'Adua were largely uncompetitive due to elections marked by extensive fraud, the unexpected transition from Yar'Adua to Jonathan brought a political outsider (and former zoologist) to power. The April 2011 presidential elections, in which Jonathan was returned to power, were hailed as among the country's fairest elections ever.[9] Some evidence as to expectations ahead of the elections come from a survey commissioned by the International Republican Institute, in which "a total of 3,030 face-to-face interviews were conducted throughout Nigeria from November 29 - December 7, 2010."[10]

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[9] "Nigeria's President Wins Election." *The New York Times*. April 18, 2011.

[10] See <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20February%201%20Survey%20of%20Nigerian%

One question asked: "How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The national elections in 2011 will be mostly free, fair and credible?" Seventy-seven percent of respondents agreed either very strongly (28 percent) or somewhat (49 percent). Another question asked: "How confident are you that the upcoming 2011 elections will be more credible than the elections held in 2007?" Seventy-four percent of respondents answered either very confident (37 percent) or somewhat confident (37 percent). Indeed, in another survey conducted almost one year later, respondents were asked to compare the election to previous election years.[11] Majorities of respondents thought that there had been more security at polling centers (73 percent), less violence (60 percent), and less corruption among election commission officials (64 percent). Finally, when asked "overall, how confident are you that the ballots cast in your state were collated without error, interference or tampering by INEC, parties or politicians?," seventy-three percent of respondents were either very confident (34 percent) or somewhat confident (39 percent).

Given Jonathan's apparent unwillingness to use electoral fraud to maintain power, his support for the FOI law must be understood in the context of the possibility that he might lose the upcoming elections. While Jonathan won the elections with over 58 percent of the vote and the best-performing opposition candidate only received roughly 32 percent, the same opposition party had received only roughly 19 percent of the vote in the 2007 presidential election. The

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20Public%20Opinion,%20November%2029-December%207,%202010.pdf>. Last accessed January 28, 2013.

[11] See <http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-national-public-opinion-poll-post-election-perceptions-ni>. Last accessed January 28, 2013.

2011 opposition performance thus demonstrated, for the first time in years, the viability of the opposition in fair elections, and thus the potential for future turnover in party control.

There is also evidence that the public was impressed with the Jonathan's commitment to combating corruption and governing in an accountable manner. The International Republican Institute poll conducted after the election (between October 20 and November 3, 2011, with a sample size of 3,078), asked the following question:

> "How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: In the recent April 2011 elections, those who were elected and assumed office in May are more concerned than their predecessors with respect to the issues and priorities that most affect the people."

Sixty-four percent of respondents either strongly agreed (20 percent) or somewhat agreed (44 percent), while only twenty-eight percent somewhat (19 percent) or strongly (9 percent) disagreed. The next question asked:

> "And still thinking about the recent April 2011 elections and those who were elected and assumed office in May, do you think the level of corruption will increase, decrease or stay the same?"

Fifty-two percent of respondents thought that the level of corruption would decrease, while only 18 percent answered "Stay the Same," and only 23 percent thought it would increase. Finally, when asked "Overall, what characteristic was most important to you in deciding which candidates to vote for?," the most popular response was "Honesty/Integrity," chosen by fifty-three percent of respondents. The second most popular response, "Experience/Qualifications,"

was chosen by only 16 percent. These responses indicate that beliefs as to who would be an honest, accountable leader were very salient to voters, and that the public's evaluation of Jonathan's commitment to combat corruption and govern in an accountable manner was very positive.

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Additional Tables and Figures

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Opposition Strength		2.456*		2.926**
		(1.280)		(1.311)
Turnover Frequency			0.611***	0.673***
			(0.214)	(0.220)
Democracy	0.116***	0.082**	0.081**	0.037
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.042)
Regional Context	2.116**	2.078**	2.072**	2.015*
	(1.035)	(1.042)	(1.030)	(1.039)
IGO Context	6.780**	7.297**	7.074**	7.709**
	(3.041)	(3.040)	(3.058)	(3.056)
New Democracy	−0.278	−0.189	−0.458	−0.374
	(0.604)	(0.608)	(0.621)	(0.631)
International NGOs	−0.066	−0.072	−0.054	−0.052
	(0.303)	(0.311)	(0.308)	(0.318)
Corruption	0.015	0.008	0.100	0.095
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.182)	(0.184)
Economic Development	−0.047	−0.106	−0.112	−0.182
	(0.270)	(0.274)	(0.268)	(0.272)
Trade Exposure	−0.043	−0.154	0.063	−0.034
	(0.363)	(0.377)	(0.354)	(0.367)
Aid Dependence	−0.124	−0.162	−0.183	−0.234
	(0.228)	(0.232)	(0.227)	(0.231)
IMF Credit	−0.084	−0.120	−0.138	−0.174
	(0.399)	(0.399)	(0.400)	(0.402)
N	2033	2033	2033	2033
AIC	420.830	419.112	415.027	411.997

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table 1: Primary results, repeated from main body of paper. Results of event history models of FOI passage. Model 1 is a base model. Model 2 includes Opposition Strength. Model 3 includes Turnover Frequency. Model 4 includes both. Logit coefficients are presented, along with standard errors in parentheses. Constant term and duration-dependent dummy variables included in all models but not presented to save space.

Country	Year	Country	Year
Sweden	1766	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2001
Finland	1951	Panama	2001
United States of America	1966	Poland	2001
Denmark	1970	Romania	2001
Norway	1970	Angola	2002
France	1978	Jamaica	2002
Netherlands	1978	Mexico	2002
Australia	1982	Pakistan	2002
Canada	1982	Peru	2002
New Zealand	1982	Tajikstan	2002
Colombia	1985	Zimbabwe	2002
Greece	1986	Armenia	2003
Austria	1987	Croatia	2003
Italy	1990	Kosovo	2003
Hungary	1992	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2003
Ukraine	1992	Slovenia	2003
Portugal	1993	Turkey	2003
Belgium	1994	Antigua and Barbuda	2004
Belize	1994	Dominican Republic	2004
Iceland	1996	Ecuador	2004
Lithuania	1996	Serbia	2004
South Korea	1996	Switzerland	2004
Ireland	1997	Azerbaijan	2005
Thailand	1997	Germany	2005
Uzbekistan	1997	India	2005
Israel	1998	Montenegro	2005
Latvia	1998	Uganda	2005
Albania	1999	Honduras	2006
Czech Republic	1999	Macedonia	2006
Georgia	1999	China	2007
Japan	1999	Jordan	2007
Liechtenstein	1999	Kyrgyzstan	2007
Trinidad and Tobago	1999	Nepal	2007
Bulgaria	2000	Nicaragua	2007
Estonia	2000	Bangladesh	2008
Moldova	2000	Chile	2008
Slovakia	2000	Guatemala	2008
South Africa	2000	Indonesia	2008
United Kingdom	2000	Uruguay	2008

Table 2: Countries which had passed Freedom of Information laws through the end of 2008, with years of passage.

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Opposition Strength			2.831**	2.710**	3.218**	3.007**	3.005**	7.003***
			(1.324)	(1.170)	(1.376)	(1.297)	(1.307)	(2.245)
Turnover Frequency	0.637***	0.621***		0.618***	0.742***	0.644***	0.628***	0.924***
	(0.216)	(0.217)		(0.210)	(0.230)	(0.217)	(0.224)	(0.338)
Opp. Strength (All)	1.723*							
	(0.888)							
Opp. Strength (Change)		2.602*						
		(1.451)						
Turnover Frequency: 1			0.967**					
			(0.404)					
Turnover Frequency: 2			1.404***					
			(0.543)					
Turnover Frequency: 3			1.916**					
			(0.939)					
Democracy	0.044	0.074**	0.032		0.031	0.003	0.032	0.056
	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.043)		(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Democracy (Freedom House)				0.587**				
				(0.286)				
Veto Players					−0.048			
					(0.114)			
Press Freedom						0.495		
						(0.338)		
Presidential							−0.381	1.373
							(0.381)	(0.898)
Pres. × Opp. Strength								−6.074**
								(2.680)
Pres. × Turn. Freq.								−0.415
								(0.427)
Regional Context	1.965*	2.099**	1.985*	1.618	1.479	1.761*	2.067**	1.886*
	(1.023)	(1.032)	(1.035)	(1.074)	(1.100)	(1.026)	(1.045)	(1.057)
IGO Context	7.282**	7.611**	8.054***	12.943***	12.368***	8.930***	7.101**	7.772**
	(3.007)	(3.088)	(3.072)	(4.363)	(4.534)	(3.013)	(3.136)	(3.273)
New Democracy	−0.325	−0.428	−0.423	−0.232	−0.093	−0.349	−0.442	−0.544
	(0.624)	(0.625)	(0.635)	(0.537)	(0.583)	(0.619)	(0.646)	(0.677)
International NGOs	−0.112	−0.058	−0.056	−0.236	−0.130	−0.079	−0.023	0.080
	(0.312)	(0.313)	(0.315)	(0.241)	(0.297)	(0.359)	(0.330)	(0.349)
Corruption	0.123	0.105	0.108	−0.031	0.107	0.025	0.073	0.125
	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.191)
Economic Development	−0.175	−0.100	−0.185	−0.110	−0.233	−0.238	−0.155	−0.218
	(0.277)	(0.269)	(0.272)	(0.274)	(0.286)	(0.274)	(0.272)	(0.279)
Trade Exposure	0.007	0.026	−0.044	−0.054	0.045	−0.036	−0.037	0.167
	(0.362)	(0.358)	(0.369)	(0.369)	(0.380)	(0.379)	(0.364)	(0.394)
Aid Dependence	−0.232	−0.176	−0.225	−0.127	−0.248	−0.298	−0.219	−0.180
	(0.230)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.211)	(0.234)	(0.242)	(0.232)	(0.248)
IMF Credit	−0.104	−0.076	−0.205	−0.144	−0.174	−0.068	−0.154	−0.109
	(0.405)	(0.400)	(0.410)	(0.398)	(0.408)	(0.400)	(0.403)	(0.414)
N	2033	2033	2033	2044	1950	1970	2033	2033
AIC	413.182	414.009	415.176	421.675	395.934	419.184	413.023	411.009

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table 3: Robustness checks employing alternative or additional domestic political variables. Models 5 and 6 include alternative operationalizations of Opposition Strength variable. Model 7 treats Turnover Frequency as individual categories for each level. Model 8 uses an alternative measure of Democracy. Model 9 includes a measure of Veto Players. Model 10 includes Press Freedom. Model 11 includes a dummy variable for Presidential systems, and Model 12 interacts this dummy variable with the two political competition measures. Constant term and duration-dependent dummy variables included in all models but not presented to save space.

	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Opposition Strength	1.977*	3.061**	2.022*
	(1.197)	(1.279)	(1.154)
Turnover Frequency	0.548***	0.683***	0.525***
	(0.209)	(0.214)	(0.199)
Democracy	0.060	0.052	0.077*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Regional Context	2.120**	1.900*	1.769*
	(1.004)	(1.064)	(0.993)
IGO Context	5.589*	8.059***	6.633***
	(2.966)	(2.629)	(2.454)
New Democracy	−0.401	−0.330	−0.401
	(0.596)	(0.596)	(0.571)
International NGOs	−0.044	0.002	−0.087
	(0.278)	(0.310)	(0.289)
Corruption	−0.115	0.056	−0.145
	(0.153)	(0.180)	(0.145)
Economic Development	−0.050	−0.209	−0.065
	(0.266)	(0.263)	(0.252)
Trade Exposure	0.178	0.049	0.206
	(0.353)	(0.357)	(0.340)
Aid Dependence	−0.214	−0.258	−0.271
	(0.217)	(0.226)	(0.213)
IMF Credit	−0.175	−0.177	−0.182
	(0.397)	(0.402)	(0.393)
N	2112	2681	2825
AIC	466.301	445.146	517.804

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table 4: Robustness checks using alternative universes of cases for the analysis. Model 13 includes all countries for the period from 1990 to 2008. Model 14 includes only developing and transition countries, but beginning in 1983, the earliest point at which data on all variables was available. Model 15 includes all countries going back to 1983. Constant term and duration-dependent dummy variables included in all models but not presented to save space.

	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22
Opposition Strength	3.529***	2.942**	2.912**	2.954**	3.521***	3.430**	4.092**
	(1.333)	(1.312)	(1.316)	(1.330)	(1.360)	(1.332)	(1.928)
Turnover Frequency	0.768***	0.639***	0.621***	0.673***	0.762***	0.631***	0.397
	(0.227)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.221)	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.461)
Democracy	0.003	0.036	0.039	0.036	0.026	0.037	0.043
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Dem. × Opp. Strength							−0.196
							(0.257)
Dem. × Turn. Freq.							0.041
							(0.057)
Regional Context	1.504	2.001*	2.066**	1.955*	2.054*	1.167	2.068**
	(1.111)	(1.045)	(1.046)	(1.028)	(1.073)	(1.092)	(1.051)
IGO Context	8.077**	7.827**	7.623**	8.731***	6.610**	8.195***	7.522**
	(3.182)	(3.079)	(3.078)	(3.097)	(3.130)	(3.051)	(3.081)
New Democracy	−0.332	−0.403	−0.376	−0.488	−0.364	−0.276	−0.410
	(0.627)	(0.629)	(0.624)	(0.640)	(0.625)	(0.615)	(0.634)
International NGOs	0.470	−0.029	−0.010	0.023	0.441	−0.168	−0.074
	(0.387)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.330)	(0.399)	(0.320)	(0.317)
Corruption	0.105	0.093	0.099	0.100	0.178	0.010	0.115
	(0.186)	(0.184)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.195)	(0.187)	(0.185)
Economic Development	−0.200	−0.194	−0.198	−0.286	−0.170	−0.056	−0.189
	(0.278)	(0.273)	(0.272)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.285)	(0.279)
Trade Exposure	0.262	−0.008	−0.004	−0.101	0.168	0.014	−0.028
	(0.397)	(0.366)	(0.365)	(0.370)	(0.374)	(0.379)	(0.363)
Aid Dependence	−0.067	−0.239	−0.228	−0.291	−0.070	−0.255	−0.249
	(0.251)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.239)	(0.252)	(0.242)	(0.232)
IMF Credit	−0.131	−0.199	−0.210	−0.106	−0.148	−0.444	−0.149
	(0.408)	(0.403)	(0.403)	(0.407)	(0.411)	(0.409)	(0.401)
FDI Stock	−0.002						
	(0.004)						
Econ. Growth		−2.286					
		(3.463)					
Negative Growth (Dummy)			0.519				
			(0.428)				
Armed Conflict				−0.968			
				(0.708)			
Judicial Independence					−0.354		
					(0.308)		
Years Left in Term						0.109	
						(0.111)	
N	1985	2025	2025	2010	2022	1673	2033
AIC	403.170	414.725	413.771	412.039	398.743	390.896	414.999

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table 5: Additional robustness checks. Models 16 through 21 each include additional control variables. Model 22 includes interaction terms between Democracy and each political competition measure. Constant term and duration-dependent dummy variables included in all models but not presented to save space.

	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
Opposition Strength	1.009*	1.777*	1.171*	0.745*
	(0.604)	(1.045)	(0.663)	(0.431)
Turnover Frequency	0.250**	0.246	0.212*	0.187**
	(0.106)	(0.163)	(0.107)	(0.068)
Democracy	0.015	0.032	0.018	0.009
	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Regional Context	1.124**	1.959*	1.384**	0.882**
	(0.426)	(0.940)	(0.568)	(0.299)
IGO Context	−0.046	2.825	0.375	−0.993
	(1.278)	(3.058)	(1.488)	(0.788)
New Democracy	−0.106	−0.083	−0.058	−0.080
	(0.225)	(0.369)	(0.250)	(0.165)
International NGOs	0.070	−0.189	−0.095	0.187
	(0.140)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.128)
Corruption	0.022	−0.001	0.030	0.005
	(0.070)	(0.132)	(0.084)	(0.055)
Economic Development	−0.017	−0.005	0.013	0.002
	(0.105)	(0.178)	(0.116)	(0.080)
Trade Exposure	−0.011	−0.280	−0.140	0.026
	(0.147)	(0.230)	(0.163)	(0.123)
Aid Dependence	−0.072	−0.160	−0.084	−0.031
	(0.096)	(0.152)	(0.107)	(0.075)
IMF Credit	−0.029	−0.135	−0.048	−0.009
	(0.155)	(0.269)	(0.178)	(0.114)
log(Scale Parameter)	4.524***	2.958*	3.192**	5.029***
	(1.426)	(1.399)	(1.112)	(1.400)
log(Shape Parameter)	0.878**	0.271	1.145***	0.862***
	(0.300)	(0.279)	(0.236)	(0.265)
AIC	404.478	409.153	408.728	406.145
N	2033	2033	2033	2033

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Table 6: Robustness checks employing parametric accelerated failure time models. Model 23 employs a Weibull baseline hazard, Model 24 log-normal, Model 25 log-logistic, and Model 26 extreme-value.

	Model 27	Model 28
Opposition Strength	1.338***	0.741*
	(0.341)	(0.351)
Turnover Frequency	0.228***	0.256***
	(0.066)	(0.072)
Democracy	0.005	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regional Context		1.583***
		(0.281)
IGO Context	5.199***	
	(0.804)	
New Democracy	−0.153	−0.034
	(0.198)	(0.21)
International NGOs	−0.056	0.127
	(0.068)	(0.084)
Corruption	0.063	0.038
	(0.051)	(0.052)
Economic Development	−0.158*	0.039
	(0.071)	(0.077)
Trade Exposure	−0.19*	0.058
	(0.09)	(0.103)
Aid Dependence	−0.039	0.007
	(0.058)	(0.062)
IMF Credit	−0.102	−0.004
	(0.119)	(0.122)
Spatial Parameter	0.018***	−0.026
	(0.006)	(0.024)
N	2033	2033

Standard errors in parentheses

* significant at $p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$

Table 7: Robustness checks including spatial autoregressive terms in linearized GMM probit models. Model 27 employs a spatial matrix based on geographic distance, while Model 28 employs a spatial matrix based on shared IGO memberships. Constant term and duration-dependent dummy variables included in all models but not presented to save space.