CENTER FOR **PUBLIC LEADERSHIP** ✦ FALL 2004 VOL. 2 NO. 1

COMPASS

WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: PROGRESS REPORT ✦ THE BEST AIDS MEDICINE
BUT I DON'T WANT TO BE A LEADER! ✦ WILL YOUR TEAM PULL TOGETHER IN A CRISIS?
FOR BETTER DECISIONS, LISTEN TO YOUR LIMBIC SYSTEM ✦ FERRARI'S WINNING FORMULA

CENTER FOR PUBLIC LEADERSHIP
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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

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FROM THE EDITOR

Decisions, Decisions

More or less by accident, the latest issue of *Compass* has acquired a meta-theme: the choices we make. Take this issue's cover story by Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode. The authors conclude that longstanding bias cannot by itself account for the relative paucity of women in senior leadership positions in U.S. business and government. Some women, the authors write, are choosing not to lead—because they object to the terms on which leadership is offered.

In "Thinking With the Whole Brain," Cathy L. Greenberg, Colonel Thomas J. Williams, and Daniel Baker focus not on what we decide but how. Drawing on the latest brain research, they show how we are genetically programmed to use our emotions as well as our intellects when we make decisions and how our decision-making capability suffers if we suppress or ignore our feelings.

Herman B. Leonard and Arnold M. Howitt consider, in "The Heat of the Moment," how differing cultures affect the decision-making process during a crisis. When political leaders, technical analysts, and operational leaders such as fire chiefs and generals find themselves in the same crisis command center, their differences can produce robust decisions—or dissension and communication breakdowns.

Of course, not every article fits within this issue's thematic framework. Penny George's "But I Don't Want to Be a Leader!" is a deeply personal account of a life transformed. And be sure to read Stephanie Gruner's illuminating study of Team Ferrari's winning ways.

As always, we hope you'll decide to tell us how we're doing. You'll find us at compass@ksg.harvard.edu.

"The weird thing is we can't find anyone qualified to replace him."

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Howard Stern Makes a Splash

What Snapple's corporate history tells us about the shock jock's anti-Bush campaign.

HOWARD STERN has a way with a grudge. The radio shock jock, who commands a wide following among young men, is a morning drive-time fixture on hundreds of stations around the country, interspersing raunchy fantasies and interviews with porn starlets with rants against the various objects of his animus. His listeners take those rants to heart. Consider what happened in 1994, when Stern conceived a profound dislike for Quaker Oats. The company had just acquired Snapple beverages and, in one of its first moves as new owner, had dropped Stern (and fellow loudmouth Rush Limbaugh) from the ranks of Snapple's celebrity endorsers. Stern had been an early fan of Snapple beverages and took a great deal of credit for the brand's grass-roots popularity. He viewed the loss of his endorsement gig as an act of betrayal by clueless, terminally cautious corporate bureaucrats. Railing against the company on the air, he derided the brand as "crapple" and urged a boycott by his listeners. There is no record of how badly Stern's campaign hurt Snapple sales, but industry veterans say it definitely had an impact. And it is true that Snapple shipments declined during every quarter of Quaker's ill-starred time as owner.

The story would be just a footnote of business history were it not for one thing: Stern has now developed a king-size grudge against President George W. Bush, and the radio personality is determined to give the president the full Snapple treatment. He has vowed to "work like a dog" to deny Bush re-election, and he is counting on his listeners to deliver millions of anti-Bush votes. "My audience will vote in a bloc," he says. "We're also in a lot of key states."

The origins of Stern's campaign go back to February 2004. In the wake of Janet Jackson's breast-exposing "wardrobe malfunction" during halftime of the Super Bowl, the Federal Communications Commission launched a decency campaign. The agency slapped Clear Channel Broadcasting, some of whose stations carried Stern's show, with a $495,000 fine for airing a Stern broadcast that was deemed indecent. Clear Channel subsequently dropped Stern from six of its stations. The move enraged Stern, who accused the FCC and Clear Channel of punishing him not for on-air obscenity but for criticizing Bush on his program. (To free himself of FCC oversight, Stern recently signed on with Sirius Satellite radio, begining in 2006.)

Had FCC Chairman Michael Powell known about the Snapple case, he might not have been so quick to levy the fine. As formidable as Stern is as an endorser, he is even more effective as an avenger. Stern's endorsements were sporadic, but his denunciations were delivered with obsessive frequency. Likewise, Stern's anti-Bush comments prior to the FCC fine were infrequent and could be considered just a bit of anti-authoritarian background noise. But since the fine, Stern's attacks on Bush have been focused, precise, and relentless. A page on www.howardstern.com contains links to each of Stern's diatribes, as well as a lengthy list of anti-Bush Web sites.

Some commentators doubt that Stern's listeners, routinely dismissed as slackers and louts, will actually show up at the polls on election day. But like the skilled communicator he is, the radio host has framed his campaign in terms that are likely to energize his audience. He presents the FCC's actions (and those of Clear Channel, which he labels a corporate stooge of the Bush re-election effort) as an attack not on him personally but on his audience. In other words, the FCC and Clear Channel are trying to take the lis-

Illustrations: Michael Witte

teners' favorite radio program away from them. By voting against Bush (and for Kerry—Stern is no fan of Ralph Nader), listeners won't be defending Stern, they'll be protecting their own interests.

This is the point that Snapple—and perhaps the Bush campaign—missed about Stern. His broadcasts are frequently puerile, offensive, and unfunny. Like him or not, though, he is an effective leader who maintains a strong connection with his audience. He knows how to appeal to his listeners' self-interest and capitalize on their general oppositional tendencies. And in the process, he is offering them a crash course in informed dissent. As this issue of *Compass* goes to press, election day is still several weeks away, and the outcome of the presidential contest is very much in doubt. If Kerry wins, he'll owe Stern at least a muted thank-you. A Bush victory, it's safe to say, would be achieved without the slacker vote. ✦

'My Patients Don't Want to Be Pitied'

Dr. Nawal Nour teaches immigrant women from Africa—and their doctors—how they can live healthy lives after genital cutting.

DR. NAWAL NOUR, founder and director of the African Women's Health Center at Brigham and Women's Hospital in Boston, conducts two-day seminars in cities around the country. She needs two days because she is educating two distinct populations: African women, many of them refugees from war and civil disorder in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan; and their medical caregivers, most of whom stand on the other side of a broad cultural and linguistic divide. Both sessions focus on providing health care, especially reproductive, obstetric, and gynecological health care, to women who have undergone female genital cutting, or FGC.

More than 130 million women around the world have been subjected to FGC. Increasing numbers of them live in the United States. In most cases, their physicians aren't prepared for the challenges of FGC, which in its most extreme form, called infibulation, involves cutting away the clitoris and external labia and sewing together the remaining edges, leaving only a small hole for the flow of urine and menses. Too often, says Nour, American physicians react inappropriately, instilling an aversion to health care professionals in a population that is already medically underserved. She tells the story of a Somalian woman who visited a New York City emergency room with complaints of persistent nausea and vomiting. The examining physician became distracted by the woman's genital scarring and called in colleagues and medical students to observe her. Humiliated by the experience, the woman didn't visit another health care provider for several years, until a medical emergency necessitated it.

SPECIAL CARE: Dr. Nawal Nour runs the African Women's Health Center, which specializes in providing health care for women who have been circumcised.

Unlike most of her medical colleagues in the U.S., Nour is familiar with FGC. Raised in Sudan and Egypt by an American mother and Sudanese father, she grew up among girls who took for granted that when the time came, they too would be circumcised. Asked by her friends when she was going to be circumcised, Nour replied, "Never!" Nour's father, a Sudanese government official, was an unusual Sudanese man: He encouraged his daughter's education. When she turned 18, Nour came to the United States to study at Brown University. She earned a medical degree from Harvard Medical School in 1994 and a master's in public health five years later.

An admirer of Western medicine, Nour nonetheless grew frustrated that most of her colleagues knew nothing about a practice as widespread as FGC. More than once she watched in horror as a doctor noted in a chart that a circumcised patient had "normal external genitalia." Were she not there to intervene, a

patient would be unlikely to receive the special care that women who undergo FGC need. In 1999, Nour opened the African Women's Health Center. Before she opened the practice, she asked African women in Boston and surrounding communities where it ought to be located. Should the clinic be sited in the inner-city neighborhoods where many African immigrants live? "No," came the resounding answer. The clinic should be at Brigham and Women's—"the same hospital where the wealthy women go," as one patient told her.

After a slow start, the clinic now treats fifteen to twenty patients a day. They come from all over New England, receiving care that is, in Nour's words, "linguistically and culturally appropriate." In part, that means not denouncing the patients' parents for circumcising their daughters. Nour is profoundly opposed to FGC, but, she says, "the majority of parents are not doing this to their daughters but rather for their daughters. Girls who are uncircumcised can be shunned by their community. They are labeled as being filthy and undesirable. Parents fear that they may never marry."

Many patients whom Nour sees undergo a twenty-minute surgical procedure that restores the vaginal opening to its normal dimensions. Other cases require more extensive care. But whatever the treatment, the patients at the African Women's Health Center are treated as something more than their scars. "My patients don't want to be pitied," Nour says. "They want to be seen as healthy, beautiful individuals contributing to society, and they want to be evaluated with respect and dignity by healthcare providers."

A recipient of a $500,000 MacArthur Foundation "genius grant" in 2003, Nour is now devoting considerable energy to preventing FGC rather than treating it. Noting that many immigrant families send their daughters back to Africa to be circumcised, she is leading an effort to make it illegal to transport United States nationals or permanent resident girls younger than 18 to another country for cutting. "This issue is growing in an alarming fashion," she says, "and we must work with the African community to stop it." ✦

Photo: © Rick Friedman/Corbis

Born Leaders?

Stagnant incomes, skyrocketing college costs, and the shrinking leadership pool.

BACK IN THE LATE 1920S, before the Hays Office imposed its prudish Production Code on Hollywood, American movies could get pretty racy. Case in point: *Shopworn,* which stars a then-unknown Barbara Stanwyck as a working-class go-getter who sleeps her way to the top of a big New York corporation—literally. Each time Barbara bags a new boyfriend at work, we see an exterior shot of her office building, the camera panning up another ten stories or so from the previous exterior. When at last she lands the company president, the visual joke concludes with a triumphant shot of the building's pinnacle.

The whole premise seems quaint today, and not just because society's standards of raciness have broadened a bit. From today's perspective, what's most unbelievable about the film is the idea that the company president would have anything to do with someone so lacking in status, education, and wealth. Sorry, Barbara: "Marrying up" is no longer a plausible means of economic advancement. These days, as one academic article after another attests, those at the top of the socioeconomic tree marry other occupants of the uppermost branches. Those perched on the lower branches marry others similarly situated. Such "assortative mating"—the sociologists' term for the tendency to marry a member of one's own class—is now the norm in the U.S. And it's just one of many reasons that economic inequality is growing as economic and social mobility slow to a near-standstill. Don't take our word for it: Last winter *BusinessWeek* ran a cover story, "Waking Up from the American Dream," that detailed how most Americans have a small and diminishing chance of moving up in socioeconomic class.

Evidently, Americans accept this arrangement—at any rate they keep returning to office the politicians whose policies reinforce the divisions between the haves and have-nots. But it may be worth considering what happens to U.S. institutions as class barriers grow more difficult to surmount. If Americans lose faith in the national myth that anyone can climb from the poorhouse to the penthouse, what will become of the country's vaunted entrepreneurial spirit? And if higher education continues to evolve into a preserve of the very well-off, where will the next generation of leaders come from? Historically, America has drawn many of its leaders from a pool of those who, by dint of hard work and ingenuity, have succeeded in gaining an education and raising themselves into the middle class. Will the essential character of America change when opportunities for leadership are an accident of birth rather than the result of endeavor? ✦

Leadership Is the Best Medicine

The global fight against AIDS needs leaders willing to talk plainly about the behaviors that spread the disease.

by Steve Mirsky

A front-page story in the August 12, 2004, edition of the *New York Times* detailed a new problem facing Zimbabwe, the beleaguered southern African country where one-quarter of the adult population is infected with the human immunodeficiency virus, or HIV. The article, headlined "Donor Mistrust Worsens AIDS in Zimbabwe," reported that funding sources, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, have stopped sending money to the government of President Robert Mugabe. The reason: They can't trust Mugabe to spend their money as intended, on antiretroviral drugs.

In the same edition of the newspaper, a one-paragraph wire-service item at the bottom of the World Briefings section noted that the government of Brazil, which will hand out 600 million condoms in 2004, "intends to distribute three billion free condoms every year, mainly to the poor and young, in a bid to prevent the spread of AIDS." Brazil began distributing condoms in 1995 and free drugs to AIDS patients in 1996. Since those efforts were launched, the number of AIDS-related deaths in Brazil has been halved.

The two articles neatly summed up the global AIDS pandemic: a few islands of success and hope amid a mounting disaster. What distinguish the success stories are leaders willing to face up to the causes of the crisis and speak honestly about the means to counter it.

There is still no AIDS vaccine, although three candidate vaccines began human clinical trials in the past year. Antiretroviral therapy (ARV), which has made such a difference in developed countries, is still unavailable to many in the developing world. The drugs' cost is too high, and there is no public health infrastructure to guarantee distribution and regimen adherence. (Brazil is a notable exception on this front: The government has made free drugs available since 1996, in part by buying or manufacturing its own generic versions in defiance of the large pharmaceutical companies.) Prevention remains the primary weapon against the virus, and it's a potent one: The World Health Organization and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS estimate that currently available techniques could prevent 63 percent of the new infections expected between 2002 and 2010. But prevention is impossible in the absence of the will to look squarely at the disease and the conditions that enable its spread, especially sex and drugs.

Public health experts have long agreed on the steps needed to check the spread of HIV/AIDS. "While awaiting a vaccine and better therapeutic interventions, our primary prevention strategy must be focused on educational efforts to influence social, cultural, and behavioral factors," Thomas Quinn wrote in the British journal the *Lancet* in 1996. Quinn, a faculty member of Johns Hopkins University, leads a research group that studies HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases at the National Institutes of Health's National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases. He has studied AIDS in Africa for more than two decades. Eight years after his *Lancet* article, Quinn's message has not changed. "Until you get rid of drug abuse, prostitution, and other social ailments, you're going to have an AIDS epidemic," he says. "It takes a concerted international effort, plowing away at social and political change. But you can speed the process."

Leadership is crucial to the effort, says Helene Gayle, Director of the HIV, TB, and Reproductive Health Program for the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. "Political leaders can play a decisive role in a country's response to HIV by discussing the disease openly and by supporting HIV prevention and treatment initiatives for the populations at highest risk," she said in 2003. "This is not easy—there are powerful taboos in almost all countries against talking about sex and drug use—but it is essential to protect the health and well-being of every nation's population."

Political leaders in the developed world, as well as in Africa, could learn something from the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni. Ugandans "have poverty and social problems," Quinn says, "but they have political leadership. The president himself took personal responsibility in leading the effort. He didn't assign an AIDS czar; He took his own reputation and laid it on the line. He went to the people and said, 'If we don't change our behavior, this epidemic is going to kill us.'"

Museveni's leadership is detailed in *The Invisible People,* Greg Behrman's history of AIDS policy in the U.S. and around the world. "Through the 1980s and '90s," writes Behrman, who coordinated the Council on Foreign Relations Roundtable on Improving U.S. Global AIDS Policy, "Museveni instructed all national, regional,

Photo: Courtesy of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

and local leaders to speak openly and vociferously about AIDS. When other African leaders would not even acknowledge the disease, Museveni was screaming about it, insisting that fighting AIDS was 'a patriotic duty.' His government enlisted thousands of community workers in a grassroots effort to modify high-risk behavior." The approach was dubbed ABC. It urged Ugandans to practice Abstinence or, if they were sexually active, to Be faithful. But the ABC program recognized that some people will neither abstain nor be faithful. Those people must use Condoms. "Nonmarital sexual activity, particularly among young people, dropped precipitously," Behrman reports of Uganda. "Condom usage among those engaged in promiscuous behavior skyrocketed." The result: In a decade, the infection rate was cut in half, from a high of perhaps 20 percent. The price of prevention: $1.80 per adult per year.

VITAL SIGNS: "Political leaders can play a decisive role in a country's response to HIV," says Dr. Helene Gayle of the Gates Foundation.

Another African country that has made inroads against the epidemic is Botswana, which is afflicted with an infection rate approaching 40 percent (the highest on earth until recently eclipsed by Swaziland) and an average life expectancy that has dropped from seventy-one years to thirty-nine years. In 2000, the Gates Foundation, pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co., and the government of Botswana entered into the African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnerships, or ACHAP. Gates and Merck supply funding for education, infrastructure, and treatment, and Merck donates some HIV medications. Botswana's President Festus Mogae, for his part, made Botswana attractive to philanthropists. "You have a good government [in Botswana], a government not engaging in denial and with substantial capabilities," says Louis Galambos, a historian at Johns Hopkins University who studies public-private partnerships. "And you have a high level of transparency for sub-Saharan Africa. You know where the money is going, where the drugs are going, and you have a high level of determination to do something about the crisis." ACHAP has achieved a drug-regimen adherence rate of 85 percent, a number some claimed was unachievable in the developing world. And 85 percent of those receiving therapy have achieved complete viral suppression after six months, according to Linda Distlerath, vice president of Global Health Policy at Merck and a member of the ACHAP board of directors.

Much of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, however, is on the verge of turning into an AIDS wasteland. The region is already home to more than 70 percent of the world's infections. South Africa, with a 20 percent infection rate, is the current world leader in absolute numbers of infected individuals, with some five million. Providing a rare bit of good news, Zackie Achmat, an HIV-positive South African activist, has successfully campaigned to bring cheap, generic copies of patented drugs into the country. Thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies sued to block the imports, but in 2001, bowing to worldwide pressure, they withdrew their suit. More recently, Achmat has put his life on the line in the effort to gain wider distribution of ARV drugs. Although he can afford the medications, he refuses to take them until the public health system makes them available to the entire population of AIDS patients in his country.

Few signs of hope can be found in the so-called "next-wave" countries of India, Russia, China, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, which are home to 40 percent of the world's population. The U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) estimates that the total number of infections in those countries will rise to fifty to seventy-five million by 2010, from fourteen to twenty-three million today. "Indian officials had shunned acknowledgment and public discussion about the disease for years," Behrman writes in *The Invisible People*. He reports that when Bill Gates announced in 2002 that his foundation was giving India $100 million to fight AIDS, the health minister accused the Microsoft chairman of "spreading panic."

The Gates Foundation's anti-AIDS initiative in India, known as Avahan, has the potential to prevent millions of infections. Avahan targets the highest-risk segments of the population, who are also the most likely to spread HIV. For example, truck drivers and the prostitutes they patronize are the objects of an intensive prevention effort. Long-haul truckers and prostitutes have also been pinpointed as a major HIV transmission system in Africa and possibly the United States. But studies of the trucker-prostitute nexus in the United States have stirred opposition from groups such as the Traditional Values Coalition, an alliance of conservative and Christian fundamentalist organizations. "What plausible defense can be constructed for 'investigating' the sexual practices of prostitutes who service truckers?" the Coalition's director asks in an open letter published on its website. Replies Quinn, the Johns Hopkins researcher: "We need to know how to prevent behavior that leads to epidemics, and so we need to study it. And then from studying it, we can design interventions."

After much delay, American anti-AIDS

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE? Critics call the AIDS policy of President George W. Bush (shown here with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni) "an emergency plan, not a viable long-term strategy."

efforts are gaining momentum. U.S. funding to combat global AIDS was a mere trickle until 2003, when President George W. Bush announced a commitment to pour $15 billion into the fight during the next five years. Most of the funding goes directly to a handful of countries, through U.S. embassies that disburse it directly for healthcare. "This influx of the funds coming from the richest country in the world was badly needed," Quinn says. "You can criticize aspects—it only targeted fifteen countries. [But] I can tell you, in Uganda it's working. Congress just approved the money, and already people are getting care."

Other elements of U.S. policy bother public health experts. A recent editorial in the *Lancet* deplored the Bush administration's emphasis on abstinence and reluctance to encourage condom use. "Abstinence only works where women have the means to make it work," the *Lancet's* editors pointed out, "an unobtainable position for many, if not most, women living in some of the poorest regions of the world. Here, violence and forced intergenerational sex are often the norm."

Some critics say that the United States is missing an opportunity to assert leadership. The president's funding commitment "provides the United States with the clout to assemble international partners to map out long-term goals for progress, a coordinated game plan for getting there, a global budget, and pledges for the necessary funds," Behrman noted in an opinion piece co-authored with Princeton Lyman, director of Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "If the United States took that step, the world would have, for the very first time, a long-term strategy." But that's not what the United States is doing. "The five-year goals are to prevent seven million new infections, to get two million people on drug treatment, and to care for ten million people suffering from AIDS worldwide," Behrman and Lyman write. "The administration deserves to be commended for its emergency plan. But that is all it is. With tens of millions of infections projected during the next five years, even if the initiative's goals are met, AIDS still will be much more dangerous and lethal at the end of five years than it is today. U.S. global AIDS policy must be said, therefore, to consist of an emergency plan, not a viable long-term strategy."

The global AIDS pandemic claims eight thousand lives a day. The price of action is high, but it must be weighed against the price of inaction. "In 1993," the Gates Foundation's Gayle told the International AIDS Conference in Barcelona in 2002, "the then-World Health Organization's Global Program on AIDS projected that as little as $1.5 billion invested in prevention could reduce by half the number of new infections that would occur by the year 2000 and save $90 billion in associated costs. Today that cost is $4.8 billion. We will pay now or pay later." ✦

STEVE MIRSKY is a writer and editor at *Scientific American* magazine in New York City. He was a Knight Science Journalism Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2003-2004.

Sex, Drugs and Rock 'n' Roll

Throughout the AIDS crisis, loud advocacy by individuals has spurred governmental and agency action. The rock star Bono (left), known for having toured not only with the band U2 but with former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, has shown that one motivated person with clout can transfer that clout to the cause. Activists credit Bono with having a fundamental influence on turning ultraconservative Jesse Helms into a veritable AIDS advocate toward the end of his Senate tenure. Bill Gates, with clout and cash, is making global health, especially AIDS, a major philanthropic venture of his foundation. And former President Bill Clinton, who talked a good game on AIDS but did very little about it while in office, is now spearheading treatment funding efforts through his foundation. Clinton remarked to Gates at the World Economic Forum in 2002, "Maybe an impeached president, a monopolist, and an aging rock star can do something about this." ✦

Bono Photo: Paolo Cocco/AFP/Getty Images; Bush Photo: © Reuters/CORBIS



EDUCATOR MARGOT STERN STROM: 'For me, history has always been telling stories.'

Photo: Kathleen Dooher

'Children are the Greatest Moral Philosophers'

A conversation with Margot Stern Strom, founder of educational innovator Facing History and Ourselves.

by Harris Collingwood

It was the silence that finally got to Margot Stern Strom. Growing up in Memphis during the 1950s, Strom walked every day past segregated drinking fountains and public buildings with "No Coloreds" signs posted outside them. She knew that Thursdays were "Coloreds Only" days at the local zoo and that local shoe stores had separate sections in the back where black people could try on shoes. She sensed that there was something strange about the way her neighbors and teachers discussed the Civil War. "They told us the South won all the important battles," she says during an interview in her office in Brookline, Massachusetts. "When it came to who won the war, well, they left that kind of vague."

But what her teachers and neighbors talked about was not as disturbing as what they didn't talk about. Although it was the 1950s, and the civil rights movement was gathering momentum and making headlines, no one talked about the segregation and racial discrimination that pervaded life in Memphis and throughout the South. "The signs were up on every building," she says, "but nobody talked about it. Everyone knew what the rules were at the zoo, but nobody talked about it." Coming from what she calls "the most liberal family on the block," she knew that the Jim Crow laws that ruled her part of the country were wrong, and she sensed that there was also something wrong in remaining silent. "Not talking about it was a way of perpetuating it, and I didn't want to be part of that."

Flash forward to the mid-1970s. After earning a master's degree in history from Memphis State University, Strom had discovered a passion for teaching at a high school in Skokie, Illinois, where she worked while her husband was in medical school. "I loved it," she says. "I was learning from everyone." She eventually moved on to the Runkle School in Brookline, where she started to develop curricula. As part of that effort, she was studying moral development at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. At a conference on teaching the Holocaust, she heard presentations about the history of anti-Semitism and the meaning of genocide. She found herself wondering why she had never heard the campaign to wipe out Europe's Jews discussed in that way. "The Holocaust was a pivotal event in twentieth century history. I had a master's in history, and no one in the course of my education had addressed the question of the Holocaust. It was the water fountains in Memphis all over again. I knew I had to teach it. Not teaching it was the same as remaining silent."

Thus was born the teaching organization now known as Facing History and Ourselves (FHAO). With funding from the Brookline school department, Strom and colleague Bill Parsons worked up lesson plans for teaching about the Holocaust. A year later, armed with a federal grant, Strom left the classroom to concentrate full-time on running the project.

In the quarter-century since that Holocaust conference, FHAO has grown into a truly global enterprise, with headquarters in a refurbished school building in Brookline and satellite offices scattered around the U.S. and in Switzerland. The curriculum reaches some 1.4 million high-school-age children in schools around the

Ask the impertinent question, make the students uncomfortable, bring them face to face with the enormous power to do harm that human beings possess.

world, from South Africa to the Czech Republic and from Norway to Peru. Harvard Law School announced last year the creation of a $2 million Facing History and Ourselves fund to support courses, research, and conferences on combating discrimination and prejudice. Using the Internet to link classrooms and distribute teaching materials, the FHAO curriculum uses historical events to engage students in discussions of identity, stereotyping, and discrimination. Evaluators from the Ford Foundation report that students who have gone through the program show greater maturity than their peers and are less likely to fight or give voice to racist attitudes.

IMPERTINENT QUESTIONS

Strom has always had a soft spot for disturbers of the peace. Her conversation is studded with references to figures such as philosopher Hannah Arendt, desegregation pioneer James Meredith, and Lillian Smith, whose book, *Killers of the Dream,* traces the tangled lines of race, sex, and class in Southern life. She has a special fondness for scientific ethicist Jacob Bronowski, whose description of "the essence of science" might also describe Strom's view of the essence of education. "Ask an impertinent question," Bronowski said, "and you are on the way to a pertinent answer." As part of a delegation sent to study the effects of the atomic bomb, Bronowski visited the ruins of Nagasaki in 1945. The experience—"a moment beyond imagination," Strom calls it—shook him to his core, and upon his return, he told the world leaders he encountered that they should hold their convocations in the Japanese city. No, no, one official told him. That would make the delegates uncomfortable. "Hello?" says Strom, incredulous. "Of course it would make them uncomfortable. That's the whole point!"

And there you have the essence of the Strom teaching method: Ask the impertinent question, make the students uncomfortable, bring them face to face with the enormous power to do harm that human beings possess. She is a believer in the revelatory power of unease. She admires Arendt's reports from the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann. Arendt's dispatches, Strom says, forced readers to say to themselves, "I always thought one way, but now I must reexamine it."

It's not that Strom enjoys seeing students squirm. But she derives great satisfaction from helping them think their way through life's complexities and contradictions. She has enormous faith in the ability of young people to engage in moral reasoning and arrive at a conclusion that does them credit. Of course, their teacher can't just sit back and let the discussion wander where it will. "In the classroom, you have to be the adult," she says. "You have to keep everyone's focus on the task." But that's not the same as keeping strict order. To Strom, noise in the classroom is the sound of learning in progress. "Keeping kids in order," she says, "is really the fear that they know more than you do."

Strom doesn't come right out and say it, but she seems to agree with educator Robert Coles that children have an innate moral sense. She brightens when a visitor points out that at the root of the word "educate" are the Latin words "to lead out." Startled, she demands to know if her visitor looked up the etymology as preparation for the interview. "That's what teaching is," she says. "It's leadership. It's drawing out what the kids already know." She wonders if that explains why her teachers back in Memphis didn't talk about the Jim Crow culture. "Maybe they thought we couldn't handle it," she says. "But maybe they knew we could. Maybe they knew that if we talked about it," she says, "we'd realize there was something wrong with it and do something revolutionary."

'I DISTURBED HIS PEACE'

The basic text of FHAO is called *The Holocaust and Human Behavior.* It was written and assembled by Strom and Parsons back at the Runkle School in 1975 and has been almost continuously revised and updated ever since. If you refer to it as a textbook, you will be swiftly corrected. "It's a resource book, not a textbook," says Strom. The distinction is important, because the FHAO curriculum is more a framework—"a scope and a sequence," in the words of one educational periodical—than a strict series of lesson plans. Each class is different. But the aim of the curriculum is unvarying. "The Holocaust is the ultimate betrayal of democracy and progress in the modern world," Strom said in a 1995 interview. "It developed over twenty years, so students can pick it apart and see how it could happen, including the opportunities for the Germans and other nations to stop it that weren't taken."

The instruction goes far beyond readings from a standard history text. The curriculum draws on resources in disciplines that range from the arts to economics, using materials in *The Holocaust and Human Behavior* and other print sources, as well as videos and content posted on the FHAO Web site (facing.org). Teachers

Photo: Kait Stokes

TEACHING IN ACTION: The FHAO curriculum uses historical events to engage students in discussions of identity, stereotyping, and discrimination.

customize the course to their own classrooms and school cultures. As one teacher writes, "The resource book enriches the dry bones of history with empathy, personal anecdotes, and explorative questions that enhance collaboration among students and deeper connections within and beyond each individual." Strom denies that there is any great art to making history interesting to students. "For me, history has always been telling stories," she says, "and we teachers are the storytellers."

Students begin their journey by examining questions of personal and group identity and the complex ways in which individuals interact with, and are shaped by, the societies they live in. In the course of the inquiry, students confront instances of stereotyping, discrimination, and prejudice, drawing links between examples from history and the everyday realities of their own classrooms and playgrounds. It can be—is supposed to be—an unsettling experience. Strom recalls that a student once approached her after hours with a complaint. "I hate this class," he said. When Strom asked why, the boy said that since he started taking the class, he felt guilty when he picked on the neighborhood oddball. "It's not fun anymore," he lamented. Strom was delighted—she still is, growing animated as she recounts the anecdote despite a wearying cough that ultimately leads her to cut short the interview. "I disturbed his peace," she says. Then she corrects herself: "No, it wasn't me. It was the history that did it."

Many experienced educators are amazed at how effectively the FHAO curriculum manages to engage students in history, a subject to which many seem to have an almost instinctive aversion. Says one teacher in Amsterdam: "The Facing History resource book provided an excellent spine for the course. As a historian I had been a little worried that the students would not gain the depth of understanding I usually try to impart. But in fact I saw a deeper student involvement. I discovered that using different kinds of reading allowed us to reach more students than ever before—especially those who usually groan when they hear the word 'history.'"

Once they've explored the questions of individual and group identity, students move on to an intensive study of Germany's post-World War I democracy, the Weimar Republic, and the causes of its collapse and the subsequent rise of Hitler and the National Socialists. Throughout their study of the history, they are brought back to questions of individual choice and individual responsibility by their teachers. Was it possible to defy the Nazis? And what role did ordinary citizens play in helping the Nazis further their murderous ideology? The questions have particular relevance in some of the countries where the Facing History curriculum is taught. A teacher in Germany wrote, "Having experienced the process of elections set in Germany in 1930, I was struck with the complexity of our choices and the obvious justifications of those who voted for the Nazi party. The [FHAO] experiment with changing identities showed how complex the problem was. We cannot make simple judgments about their choices in 1930 and later. What we have become aware of is that similar choices can meet us any time in the future, and there's no certainty how the majority will vote."

'SEEDS WAITING FOR THE SUN'

In addition to studying the Holocaust, many classes also discuss more recent history—apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda and Cambodia, the American civil rights movement, even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A 2002 article in *Ed.*, the magazine of Harvard Graduate School of Education, describes a Facing History class conducted in a New York City high school near where the twin towers of the World Trade Center once stood. The session begins with the instructor asking students to discuss the famous dictum, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." It takes a while for the students to get past the word "men". Does the term really comprehend people of both sexes? Once the semantic issue is settled, however, the students ardently debate, for the better part of an hour, whether people are inherently good or inherently evil—or whether they contain the potential for both. It's a striking scene: A few months after the attacks on the World Trade Center, just blocks from where the twin towers once stood, teenagers are arguing whether Osama bin Laden was evil or, at least by his own lights, good.

Strom acknowledges the potential for such classroom discussions to go off-track and devolve into a sort of mushy relativism in which morality is purely subjective and no one standard is more worthy or admirable than another. It's the teacher's responsibility to keep the classroom on an even keel, suspending judgment as students examine views and attitudes that had long gone unexamined but at the same time "staying within certain tolerances," as Strom puts it. "We're not rudderless here." Teachers have to keep their ears open. "You have to introduce questions—questions about leadership, questions about abuses of power. And you have to look and listen for where kids think differently from one another. When you find those spots, you can get the kids to look at where their beliefs come from."

A visitor wonders if it isn't somewhat dangerous to raise such volatile issues with high-schoolers. Strom almost bristles at the notion. "The questions are complex; they're not dangerous," she says. "It's when you don't raise them that the danger arises. The kids can handle the ambiguity. The sad thing is to reserve these questions for college philosophy courses. That's a tragedy. These questions are matters of everyday reality for these kids. Ethics, power, obedience, conformity—these are the essentials of the classroom, the lunchroom, the playground. And we, the teachers, don't introduce these parallels. The kids already know them, and it's the teacher's job to help lead it out of them—just like the Latin word says. It's in their responses that you see what moral philosophers they are. Children are the greatest moral philosophers."

Or they can be, if they are guided through the process of moral reasoning. The scholar and educator Howard Gardner once wrote, "We must accept the harsh reality that one can be intelligent without being moral; creative without being ethical; sensitive to emotions without using that sensitivity in the service of others." FHAO aims to prevent students from ever being split off from their own moral impulses in that way. Strom is unapologetic that such an undertaking is an act of love. In a striking moment during the interview, she says, "Kids need to know that their teacher loves them dearly." She speaks fervently of "all those kids sitting in the classrooms waiting to be touched. They're like seeds waiting for the sun."

Storyteller, interrogator, disturber of the peace—Strom has many ways of describing the teacher's role. But above all, she sees teachers as leaders. She speaks proudly of the rigorous, constant evaluation of the FHAO curriculum. But she is also aware that evaluators can't capture the most profound effects of the curriculum, which occur within each student. "It's with a good teacher," she says, "that you can be led to see that you matter." ✦

HARRIS COLLINGWOOD is managing editor of *Compass*.

The Antidote to Fear

Effective crisis communications can avert panic and save lives. That's why leaders need to understand how the public processes threat information.

by Robert J. Blendon and John M. Benson

In 1994 in Surat, India, there was a small outbreak of bubonic plague. Local health officials assured the public that they would be able to screen for the disease and provide drugs to anyone exposed to it. Nevertheless, half a million people—one-third of the city's population—fled. Among the first to flee were doctors and pharmacists.

Why did announcements intended to reassure the public alarm them instead? Public health emergencies such as the debacle in Surat offer important lessons in crisis communications for public officials and other community leaders. By studying how the public processes threat information, leaders can learn to tailor their messages in ways that protect public safety, improve the quality of public information, and prevent small alarms from turning into large-scale panics.

Since 2001, we have seen an anthrax attack through the mail, the threat of a smallpox attack by foreign terrorists, and an outbreak of SARS, a new infectious disease that had a staggering effect on Toronto's economy. In light of such events, it's no surprise that 48 percent of Americans say they worry a great deal or quite a lot about bioterrorism, according to a 2004 survey by the Council for Excellence in Government. If fears of an attack are ever realized, an effective response may well hinge on the quality of crisis communications.

IRRATIONAL, BUT NOT UNREASONABLE

Historical examples such as Surat teach us that the public may respond in ways that are contrary to what health officials think best. So it's worth studying polling data and scholarly literature to learn more about the public's response to biological threats.

The first thing to note is that reactions that appear irrational often have a rational basis. If they feel threatened, people generally act to protect themselves and their families based on their perceptions of the situation, as Perry and Lindell demonstrated in a 2003 article in the *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*. Differing threats evoke differing public reactions. According to a 1987 article by Slovic in *Science,* people are likely to be more worried if the threat can cause terrible suffering or harm or if the hazard is invisible or its source unknown. In the face of a continuing threat such as an epidemic, people are likely to become more anxious over time. In an event like a bombing, they tend to become less anxious.

Concrete information is the most effective antidote for public anxiety. People will want to know how worried they should be, whether or not the threat is deadly, contagious, or long-lasting, what steps they should take to protect themselves, where it is safe or unsafe to go, and whether there is a safe and effective vaccine or treatment. In addition, they will want to know if and where the vaccine or treatment is available to them and what the government is doing to protect them. They will rely on the media to tell them if they can trust government officials to give correct advice and to provide needed services to protect the public's health. Reliable information is vital, because people will act based on the information or knowledge they have, even if it is incorrect, as Nelkin and Hilgartner demonstrated in the *Milbank Quarterly* in 1986.

The public does not take a lot of precautions until there is an actual event, as Osborn noted in a 1994 article. Then they start taking action in both appropriate and inappropriate ways. For instance, in September 1985, four years after AIDS was first discovered, an ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found that more than one-third of Americans mistakenly thought that AIDS was as contagious as the common cold. Four in ten respondents to a contemporaneous Harris poll said that children diagnosed with AIDS should not be allowed to attend school, citing fears for the safety of their own children.

Such fears are now generally recognized as unfounded, but a more recent example demonstrates how difficult it can be to correct public misapprehensions. The last case of smallpox in the United States was reported in 1949, the last case in the world in 1977. But in a 2003 piece in the *New England Journal of Medicine,* the authors of the current article (with several co-authors), wrote that 30 percent of the U.S. public believed that during the past five years there had been cases of smallpox in the United States; 63 percent thought there had been cases somewhere in the world. Those who thought there had been cases of smallpox in the past five years were more likely to say they were concerned there would be a terrorist attack using smallpox, and they were more likely to support government action, according to a survey by the Harvard School of Public Health and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.

THE PRICE OF MISTRUST

Public mistrust of authority can make it difficult for leaders to manage the response to a crisis. Immediately after the partial meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1978, officials recommended evacuation for pregnant women and preschool-age children within five miles of the accident. The recommendation affected about 2,500 people, or 1 percent of the population. Everyone else within a ten-mile radius was advised to "shelter in place"—that is, to stay where they were. But the public did not believe the authorities. As a result, 144,000 people within a fifteen-mile radius of the plant (about 39 percent of the population) evac-

uated the area, according to a 1983 article by Johnson and Zeigler.

The SARS epidemic of 2003 illustrates the economic consequences of the public response to a biological threat. As the authors of the present article described in *Clinical Infectious Diseases* in 2004, 16 percent of survey respondents in the Toronto metropolitan area reported avoiding public events. About one-third of U.S. adults believed that SARS had made it unsafe to travel to Canada. Public response to the SARS outbreak had a large economic effect, as tourism in Greater Toronto declined by 28 percent.

Another problem for public leaders is that epidemics can lead to episodes of substantial discrimination against groups in the affected communities. In 1986, 18 percent of Americans surveyed in a Gallup poll said they avoided people they knew or suspected to be homosexuals in order to reduce the chances of contracting AIDS. During the SARS outbreak of 2003, 19 percent of Toronto-area residents avoided Asian restaurants or stores and 17 percent avoided people who may have recently traveled to Asia.

A threatened public often demands that political leaders join them in extreme and unwarranted discrimination. Four in ten New York City residents in 1985, responding to a WABC/*New York Daily News* survey, thought that people with AIDS should be quarantined, even though public health officials said such action was unneeded.

The corollary of such behavior is the general belief that various groups will be favored or discriminated against in a biological crisis. Nearly three-fourths of Americans (72 percent) believe that if an outbreak of smallpox occurred and not everyone could get vaccinated quickly, wealthy and influential people would get vaccinated first. More than four in ten (43 percent) think the elderly would be discriminated against when it comes to getting vaccinated, and 45 percent of African-Americans think they would suffer discrimination.

Fear Factor

Bioterrorism tops the list of Americans' terrorism worries.

Percent of poll respondents saying they worry a great deal or quite a lot about:

Bioterrorism	48%
Chemical weapons	37%
Nuclear attack	23%
Suicide bomber	21%
Airplane hijacking	13%
Cyberterrorism	8%

Council for Excellence in Government, 2004

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC LEADERS

Based on such findings, we have several key recommendations for public leaders responsible for crisis communications.

First, leaders must recognize that the level of trust in government officials is not very high, nor do most Americans have much confidence in their national medical leaders. Only 37 percent of Americans polled by Gallup in 2003 say they trust the government in Washington to do what is right almost always or most of the time. Only 32 percent responding to a 2004 Harris Interactive survey indicated that they have a great deal of confidence in national medical leaders.

Public trust does seem to increase the closer people feel to the source of information. At a time of biological threat, Americans are more likely to trust advice from their own doctors than from public officials. Three-fourths (77 percent) of the public say they would trust their own doctor a great deal or quite a lot as a source of reliable information during a local outbreak. In addition, a recent study showed that if the threat of a smallpox attack increased, Americans' decisions about vaccination are likely to be influenced strongly by what practicing physicians do. Thus we recommend that public leaders make it a priority to communicate with primary care and emergency room doctors before and during a biological crisis.

Research also shows that during a crisis, perceived managerial competence is a key factor affecting the public's trust in its officials. Most people will use what they see in the media to judge whether or not officials are handling the crisis competently. Leaders should emphasize early and often during a crisis that first responders are at work, a system is in place to address the situation, and vulnerable groups are not being discriminated against. Officials should also present people with detailed, concrete actions to take to protect themselves and their families during a time of uncertainty. This action plan should be updated with frequent press conferences. In addition, public leaders need to behave in ways that are consistent with the advice they are giving to the public. The hazards of inconsistent behavior were vividly illustrated during the 1996 outbreak of Mad Cow Disease in the United Kingdom. The British government's efforts to assure the public of the safety of the beef supply were severely undermined when the chair of the government's advisory committee admitted that his grandson was not allowed to eat beef.

Finally, leaders must be sensitive to widespread concerns about discrimination. The evidence suggests that in a crisis, minority groups, civil liberties watchdogs, and those concerned about the elderly will demand that the government treat these groups equitably. Where possbile, it is important to formulate policies that avoid coercion. Police power should be used only as a last resort. Also, when implementing controversial policies, officials should make an effort to explain, even over-explain, the basis for governmental decisions and the rationale behind policy changes. Because the public may not trust advice from government leaders during a biological crisis, it is important to secure endorsements from major medical and scientific leaders for government policies before they are implemented. ✦

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BY THE NUMBERS

All Trust Is Local

Americans look close to home for trustworthy information during a crisis.

During a local outbreak of disease caused by bioterrorism, percent saying they would trust a great deal or quite a lot:

Own doctor	77%
Director of local fire department	61%
Director of local hospital	53%
Director of state or local health department	53%
State governor	52%
Local religious leader	48%

Source: Harvard School of Public Health/ Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Survey Project on Americans' Response to Biological Terrorism, October 24-28, 2001

Viable

Some forty years ago, Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* helped launch the contemporary women's movement by naming a "problem that has no name." In answer to Freud's classic question, "What do women want?" Friedan proclaimed, "We can no longer ignore that voice within women that says: 'I want something more than my husband and my children and my home.'"

Except that now, it seems, a husband and children and a home are exactly what some women want—the very women whose education and professional attainments qualify them for positions of high leadership. From *Time* to the *New York Times Magazine,* from talk shows to the water cooler, the buzz is all about women dropping out of full-time work, even at the highest professional levels, to stay home with their children. It's this "opt-out revolution," Lisa Belkin argues in the *New York Times Magazine,* and not persistent inequities and stereotypes, that accounts for women's underrepresentation in the leadership ranks of American business and government.

As the term "opt out" implies, Belkin is at odds with Friedan. While Friedan and other leaders of the women's movement stressed women's desire for something more than husbands, children, and well-appointed homes, Belkin and her allies claim that many women are reasonably content, for years at a stretch, with exactly that. Friedan described a society that limited women's choices; Belkin sees a society in which women are exercising choices to reject the workplace.

Jamie Gorelick, a former high-ranking official in the Clinton-era Justice Department and a member of the independent 9/11 investigative commission, might be the poster child for Belkin's revolution. In 2003, she left her position as vice chair of Fannie Mae and declined to be considered for its COO post, explaining to *Fortune* magazine that she had two children and didn't want that "pace in my life." The "dirty little secret," she added, "is that women demand a lot more satisfaction in their lives than men do."

Who is correct, Friedan or Belkin? Is the relative shortage of women leaders in government and private enterprise the result of discrimination, or have women chosen not to lead? The two answers, we suggest, are not mutually exclusive. Our findings do not lead us to suspend the struggle to expand women's opportunities for power, authority, and influence. Rather, we argue for reframing the problem of leadership to account for both gender biases, which can be addressed through greater equity in the workplace and in society more generally, as well as gender differences, which must be addressed through greater diversity in the workplace and society. To gain a sense of the interplay of the two forces, we consider where women are now, why we are where we are, and what needs to change.

Options: Rethinking Women and Leadership

DESPITE DECADES OF PROGRESS, WOMEN REMAIN UNDERREPRESENTED IN SENIOR LEADERSHIP POSITIONS. ARE THEY VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION, OR HAVE WOMEN CHOSEN NOT TO LEAD?

by Barbara Kellerman and Deborah L. Rhode

PROGRESS AND FRUSTRATION

In the forty years that have passed since Friedan's manifesto, American society has experienced a transformation in gender-related attitudes, practices, and policies. About 16 percent of *Fortune* 500 corporate officers are now women, and that percentage has doubled over the last decade. The percent of women holding top corporate positions—executive vice-president to CEO—quadrupled during the same period, up from 2 percent to over 8 percent. Eight *Fortune* 500 companies have a female chief executive, compared with only two in 1995. Women hold fourteen Senate seats and sixty House seats in the 108th United States Congress. Women now constitute nearly 14 percent of members of Congress, up from 10 percent in 1992, and nearly one-quarter of the members are women of color. Twenty-one percent of college presidents are female, compared with almost none a decade ago.

But progress has been partial and painfully slow. With respect to leadership, in particular, women still have a long way to go. Almost a sixth of the *Fortune* 500 companies still have no female officers. Fewer than 2 percent of corporate offices are held by African-American, Asian-American, or Hispanic women. The vast majority of women in top jobs in corporate America hold staff jobs rather than the line positions that typically produce CEOs. Women account for just 6 percent of the top corporate earners. In academia, women faculty members earn 14 percent less than men. Despite four decades of equal opportunity legislation, the workforce remains segregated and stratified by gender. Women are overrepresented at the bottom and underrepresented at the top, even controlling for educational qualifications. The best-trained women are still concentrated in different kinds of jobs than men—jobs with less pay, status, and power.

As for politics and government, the United States ranks fifty-ninth in the world in electing women leaders. Congress gained three fewer women in the last decade than it did in the single 1992 election, the fabled "year of the woman." Fewer women ran for state legislative offices in 2000 than did in 1992, and the number of women in state politics has been stagnant at about 20 percent for the last decade.

What accounts for such persistent and pervasive disparities? Why, forty years after Friedan wrote of the "problem that has no name," have we done so well at labeling the problem but are still so far from solving it?

For one thing, gender bias has not been—and cannot be—legislated away. Women remain underrepresented in positions of leadership in part because of the mismatch between the characteristics traditionally associated with women and the characteristics traditionally associated with leadership. As Rakesh Khurana has observed, the "great man" model of leadership—the heroic savior—is still with us. And the term "man" is not used generically. Although recent theories of leadership stress interpersonal qualities commonly associated with women, such as cooperation and collaboration, most qualities associated with leaders are still masculine: dominance, authority, driving ambition, unflinching decisiveness, fierce determination, and so on.

Such expectations of leaders confront women with a double standard and a double bind. They may appear too soft, unable or unwilling to make the tough calls required in positions of greatest influence. Or if they mimic the male model, they are often viewed as strident and overly aggressive. An overview of more than a hundred studies confirms that women are rated lower when they adopt stereotypically masculine authoritative styles, particularly when the evaluators are men or when the woman's role is one typically occupied by men. Since other research suggests that individuals with masculine styles are more likely to emerge as leaders than those with feminine styles, women face trade-offs that men do not. Even in experimental situations where male and female performances are objectively equal, women are held to higher standards, and their competence is rated lower.

Many women internalize these stereotypes, which creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. Researchers consistently find that most women see themselves as less deserving of rewards than men are for the same performance. On average, female workers are also less willing to take

Illustration: John Perlock

the risks, or to seek the challenges, that would equip them for leadership roles.

Commentators who focus on women's choice to leave the workplace typically fail to acknowledge the social forces that constrain it. Women are, and are expected to be, the primary caregivers, especially of the very young and very old. Many men are committed to equality more in principle than in practice; they are unwilling or (in their own view) unable to structure their lives to promote it. If, as Belkin and others insist, women are choosing not to run the world, it is partly because, to paraphrase Gloria Steinem, men are choosing not to run the washer-dryer.

Double standards in domestic roles are deeply rooted in cultural attitudes, managerial policies, and social priorities. Fewer than 15 percent of *Fortune* 100 companies offer the same paid parental leave to fathers as to mothers, and an even smaller percentage of men take any extended period of time away from their jobs for family reasons. As one director of professional development noted, the traditional expectation was that fathers with newborn infants would "just go to the hospital, take a look, and come right back to work." This pattern no longer holds, but workplaces that only grudgingly accommodate mothers can be even more resistant to fathers. Daddy tracks are noticeable for their absence. As one man put it, it is now "okay [for fathers] to say that they would like to spend more time with the kids, but it is not okay to do it, except once in a while."

WORK-FAMILY ISSUES ARE SEEN AS PROBLEMS PRIMARILY FOR WOMEN, BUT DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES ARE STILL DOMINATED BY MEN.

As long as work-family issues are seen as problems primarily for women, potential solutions are likely to receive inadequate attention in decision-making structures still dominated by men. Within those structures, caretaking is considered primarily an individual rather than a social responsibility, adding to women's work in the home and limiting their opportunities in the world outside it. America is almost alone among industrialized nations in failing to guarantee paid parental leaves. And high-quality, affordable childcare is unavailable for many women attempting to work their way up the leadership ladder.

Over the past forty years, we have made more progress in getting women access to roles traditionally occupied by men than in getting men to assume domestic roles traditionally occupied by women. And we have made even less progress in altering social policy to accommodate the needs of both sexes on family-related issues. The resilience of traditional gender patterns is reflected in two especially telling sets of statistics. Three-quarters of women have a spouse or a partner with a full-time job; three-quarters of men have a spouse or a partner who spends at least part-time at home. Almost a fifth of women with graduate or professional degrees are not in the paid labor force; only five percent of similarly credentialed men have opted out.

WHAT PRICE POWER?

Various researchers have attempted to find a biological basis for this achievement gap. But for every bit of data that supports the hypothesis that gender roles are biologically determined, there is at least as much data to challenge it. More compelling is a growing body of research that challenges conventional views that women want just what men want. Put another way, if women are underrepresented in leadership positions, the reason is not simply that men stand in their way. Recent surveys indicate that many women, especially women with young children, are not sufficiently determined to get to the top. For a variety of reasons, women are often ambivalent about seeking power and making the sacrifices necessary to obtain it.

There is countervailing evidence for this hypothesis as well. A recent survey by Catalyst, a New York research group that studies gender and workplace issues, reports that a majority of senior executives want to become their employer's chief executive. The numbers remain roughly the same whether the respondents are male or female, childless or not. Those findings, says Catalyst, seem to challenge "the assertion that there aren't more women at the top because they don't want to be there." But it is important to note that the survey sample consisted of those who already had made the choices necessary to become senior executives.

Belkin's small sample was skewed in the other direction. It consisted of an Atlanta book group of full-time homemakers with Princeton degrees, a group of San Francisco mothers with MBAs, and "countless" readers with whom the author had corresponded. All were well educated and economically privileged women who could afford to choose to leave the paid workforce because their high-earning partners chose differently. Such selective samples preclude definitive conclusions.

Countering both the Catalyst and Belkin arguments are studies that suggest that at least some differences in women's and men's positions in the workplace reflect different choices, many of which involve small children. A recent *Fortune* magazine article described a number of such studies and then raised the heretical question: "Do women lack power in business because they just don't want it enough?"

As the article acknowledged, the very question comes treacherously close to blaming the victim. But the signs that women have mixed feelings about conventional measures of workplace achievement are too striking to ignore. For example, Catalyst recently reported that about a quarter of women not yet in senior posts say they don't want those jobs. About a fifth of the hundred-odd women who have appeared on the *Fortune* 50 over the past five years have left their prestigious positions, generally of their own volition. And a recent survey by *Fast Company* identifies a significant minority of high-ranking women who have not opted out entirely but have chosen a life less consumed by work—which means, among other things, a life less consumed by leadership.

Such studies reinforce a conclusion unnerving to many feminists: When women aren't in positions that carry the greatest power, authority, and influence, it is not always because women can't get them—it is sometimes because they don't want them. The question is why. At least some of the reasons take us back to the gender roles and stereotypes with which we began.

First and foremost, forever foremost, there are the children. Women both bear the children and remain their primary caretakers.

Most women want to have at least one child, and they are increasingly aware that involved parenting is difficult for anyone at the top.

The difficulties of reconciling family and leadership responsibilities are starkly demonstrated by the demographics. Fully 42 percent of high-achieving women in corporate America are childless at the age of forty. Moreover, among those who do have children, 40 percent feel that their husbands create more work around the house than they contribute. Men, in contrast, do not experience the same conflict between success and parenting—or to put it more pointedly, between leadership and parenting. In one representative survey, 79 percent of high-achieving men reported wanting children—and 75 percent had them.

Motherhood, it is apparent, entails more significant personal and professional implications than does fatherhood, which in turn affects access to leadership. More women than men drop out of the paid work force, typically for periods ranging from several months to several years. More women than men work part-time. And more women than men leave large organizations to strike out on their own for jobs with fewer and more flexible hours.

Yet family considerations are not the only reason that women appear less committed than men to climbing the leadership ladder. The gender biases noted earlier take a toll as well. Women who do seek leadership are slammed for seeming overly ambitious or aggressive. Others decline to risk the negative evaluations that such "unfeminine" styles evoke.

That's not the whole story, though. Many women are less professionally ambitious than men because they are more personally ambitious than men. They dream of making a difference in ways that are personally more meaningful than achievement in conventional corporate and professional settings. Many women also have personal commitments and interests that seem impossible to reconcile with the all-consuming demands of leadership roles.

THE PATH TO LEADERSHIP

Of course, only economically privileged women confront such questions as whether to work, how much to work, and whether to pursue leadership roles in the paid labor force or in the community. Yet the women who have those options also tend to be the ones with the greatest education and the best chance of achieving leadership positions. They were expected to be the role models, and if they did hold positions of power they could, in theory at least, create change for the benefit of others.

Ruth Mandel, a pioneer in the field of women's studies, has well captured the current dilemma, an impasse partly created by women who could aim higher but opt not to: "Nothing will change the picture of leadership and perhaps the practice of leadership unless women themselves choose to pursue leadership. In the United States, far and away, this matter of women's choice stands as the single greatest remaining challenge to achieve parity for women in leadership....I am not saying that women at one time were choosing to lead and now are not. I am saying that today women can enter a path to leadership that has been cleared of many of the old impediments. They confront more opportunities and options than ever before. Nonetheless, women must choose to walk the path."

We have argued that the reasons for women's still-limited access to power, authority, and influence reflect both gender *biases* and gender *differences*. For women to gain ground at the leadership level, they must pursue two related but distinct strategies. Women must fight against gender biases by demanding equity; and they must fight for recognition of gender differences by demanding accommodation of diversity. These battles should be intertwined, fought simultaneously, and planned strategically, with tactics that are both political and legal.

The goals that women should be fighting for are substantially the same as those that inspired the contemporary women's movement. They include:

- Changes in public policy concerning equal opportunity enforcement, affirmative action, quality child and elder care, paid family leave, and meaningful part-time work.
- Changes in organizational policies that increase those organizations' commitment to equity and diversity and that place a priority on accommodating workers with significant family, community, or other socially valued commitments.
- Changes in the academy to support research on gender-related issues, particularly the socialization patterns, workplace practices, and public policies that could promote gender equality and a better quality of life for both sexes.
- Changes in individual and group behaviors that will revitalize the women's movement and enable it to work more effectively toward shared goals.

To promote those goals, the law can be an important tool, but its effectiveness should not be overstated, and the need for its reform should not be underestimated. Legal prohibitions on sex-based discrimination and harassment, and legal entitlements concerning family leave and affirmative action remain crucial forces in the struggle for equal employment opportunity. Multimillion-dollar victories in class action lawsuits like those against Merrill Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney, and Morgan Stanley, and the pending litigation against Wal-Mart, send a powerful message about the price of gender inequities. Women must continue to pursue such remedies while also pressing for changes that would make the law more effective in enhancing employment opportunities.

As experts have frequently noted, our current legal framework is a highly inadequate response to "second-generation" sex discrimination, which is based less on demonstrable prejudice than on unconscious stereotypes and workplace structures that are gender neutral in form but not in fact. For the vast majority of victims, the difficulties of proof are insurmountable or the financial and psychological costs of litigation are prohibitive. Women who pursue more informal internal remedies often experience an arbitration or mediation system stacked against them. Employers control the system and are generally adept at minimizing the risk of adverse decisions, substantial financial liability, and unfavorable publicity. For victims who lack the resources to pursue litigation, federal and state enforcement agencies are a poor backup; their resources are insufficient to pursue more than a small fraction of complaints. And even the rare women who win in court often end up losing in life, given the informal blacklisting and unflattering personal disclosures that may result from litigation.

Many hard-won legal guarantees remain limited in scope. The federal Family and Medical Leave Act still leaves more than half of the labor force unprotected. It provides job security only to those who can afford to take unpaid leave and excludes individuals who work for small employers or in part-time positions. And temporary-leave provisions do little to solve the long-term needs of those with substantial childrearing or elder care responsibilities.

There are no simple solutions. Gender-related laws remain too limited in scope and too expensive in application to reach most of the causes of women's underrepresentation in leadership positions. But we can certainly work to make those laws more effective and accessible. We can insist on greater resources for governmental enforcement agencies. We can provide financial contributions to women's rights organizations that litigate important cases and lobby for essential reforms. We can press for legislative mandates and workplace policies

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THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT

Crisis management teams bring together people from different institutional cultures. Managing their inevitable conflicts can be a leader's toughest challenge.

by Herman B. "Dutch" Leonard and Arnold M. Howitt

Ordinary house fires rarely receive front-page treatment. House fires can be traumatic and sometimes lethal to those directly involved, but they are nonetheless largely routine to those fighting them. Though no two fires are exactly alike, first responders have developed a repertoire of fire-fighting routines that are adaptable to nearly every contingency they are likely to encounter within an ordinary house fire situation. These circumstances require a speedy response by trained operators, but do not demand the involvement of political authorities or of specialists in disaster relief. There's no need to call in the mayor or the Federal Emergency Management Agency. A house fire is a *routine* emergency.

Suppose, though, that a wildland fire fanned by high winds descends from a mountainside to threaten hundreds of residences in a bedroom community. With so many lives and so much property at risk, decisions must be made about priorities and tradeoffs. Which neighborhoods are protected first, and which cannot be saved? The situation thus takes on political dimensions that are beyond the expertise and authority of the firefighters. Such a conflagration has grown beyond being a routine emergency – it has become *a crisis.*

The difference is not just one of scale but also of kind. A crisis is *sui generis,* and no suitable prescribed response to it can be found in the standard emergency-response repertoire. Because of its novelty, scale, and complexity, successfully handling a cri-

Photo: © Paul Colangelo/CORBIS

INTO THE UNKNOWN: Crises such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks test how well political and operational leaders, with their very different priorities and perspectives, can interact without interfering.

sis will generally require the involvement of a range of managers and decision-makers—not just **operating managers**, but **political leaders** and **technical specialists** as well.

What happens when these three types of actors interact under the stress of a true crisis? Thrown together, often for the first time, in the middle of uncertain, poorly understood, rapidly evolving situations, they must improvise and then direct complex and often unplanned and unpracticed new activities. How will they perform? Will they take advantage of the divergent backgrounds, skills, expertise, and inclinations of their members and successfully manage the conflicts and frictions that will inevitably arise? Or will they break down into infighting, inadequate communication, and ineffectiveness? In what follows, we attempt to answer those questions by examining cases of both effective and ineffective crisis response, and we draw from those cases some lessons for crisis-management teams—and, in particular, for their leaders.

PLAYERS AND ROLES

Crisis-management teams tend to be made up of three kinds of players. The members of the three groups generally have different backgrounds, training, skills, mindsets, and mental models—different ways of looking at the world and processing challenges. Their outlooks shaped by training and experience, they have divergent views about priorities, the pace at which the situation needs to be assessed and responded to, and the importance and value of different forms of expertise. Each often finds the other groups' inclinations at best baffling and at worst intensely frustrating, and they may find it very difficult to form a positive basis for collaboration, especially while under high stress.

The Politicians The most senior people present during a crisis are generally political officials—elected officials, in most cases. They hold most of the objective authority and will be asked to make or affirm most of the most important decisions. Elected political officials and their senior political staff members tend to treat every situation as unique. Experienced improvisers, they vary widely in their inclinations to intervene. Some resist the impulse toward immediate action, preferring to see how events are playing out before committing to one course of action or another. Others may feel an intense pressure to act, to be seen taking charge and exercising leadership.

Whatever their inclinations toward action, the politicians are often out of phase with their operational commanders. They may prefer more immediate action than their commanders are ready to mobilize, or they may want to accumulate additional alternatives when their operational commanders want authorization to proceed immediately. In either case, political leaders generally (and logically) give priority to political considerations. They will have to deal with the political fallout, so they will tend to seek information about consequences to different groups and may weigh outcomes differently than other participants. When they do decide that action is required, they are familiar and comfortable with making judgments in the absence of complete data.

The Analysts Political leaders are often accompanied by lower-level appointed officials or substantive experts whose role is mainly to advise and give decision support. They are sometimes joined by additional experts called in because of their specific substantive knowledge of the situation. These analysts help structure decisions, develop options, and assess facts and likely consequences of the various alternatives under consideration. This group may be sensitive to political concerns, but their greater substantive expertise will generally incline them to focus on the technical facts of the situation and to try to predict its evolution and consequences. They often find the novelty of a crisis situation to be particularly challenging. Since, by its nature, novelty implies that prior experience and analysis may not be completely reliable guides, they may be reluctant to act or decide quickly. While they understand the urgency of the situation, they are hesitant to choose from only a short list of quickly conceived options. They tend to resist early commitment, preferring to maintain some degree of operational flexibility while they gather more data, seek additional options, and more thoroughly consider potential consequences.

The Operational Commanders Joining the political officials and the substantive experts—and often the first actually to arrive on the scene—is a third cadre: the senior operational commanders of the response units involved. In domestic crises these often include police, fire, public health, and medical services. In national security crises, military, intelligence agency, and federal law enforcement commanders are usually brought into the team.

Tactical commanders tend to feel the pressure of time. Their experience and training strongly reinforce the belief that crises, like emergencies, require "prompt and decisive action" (a culturally revealing phrase often invoked at the FBI). They are acutely aware that lives hang in the balance, and they want to assess, plan, and begin execution as quickly as they can. Once they have developed a grasp of the essential features of a problem, they will move quickly to formulate options, create a general plan, and then begin to issue operational orders.

They believe in policies—and their policies about what to do and how to do it have often been worked out and confirmed in prior emergencies. The policies, deeply embedded through training, routines, and daily practice, are designed to allow a nimble, adaptive response to individual situations by customizing the available routines. The details of how the general routine will be applied are variable, and a good deal of training and practice goes into developing the skills of customization. The general routine, however, is emphatically not regarded as variable—it is a durable framework within which the variations required to address a specific event can take place.

Operational commanders (and the organizations they command) tend to be quite resistant to policy changes at any time—and especially resistant to policy changes under stress in crisis conditions. Their experience teaches them that unrehearsed and poorly executed routines are actively dangerous. New general routines will, by definition, not have been carefully worked out and tested for hidden flaws, and they may bristle with unforeseen dangers that experience hasn't had a chance to expose.

As a general rule, we can say that operational commanders are practiced and adept at rapid *tactical* innovation—at customizing and adapting their basic approaches to the problem at hand. Through long experience, they are skilled at doing so under stress. They are much less inclined toward sudden *policy* or *strategy* changes. They will turn conservative and unyielding when faced with a suggestion to deploy their people in a novel way or combine forces with some other, unfamiliar organization or apply one step of a routine but suspend other steps. To their way of thinking, deviations from routine

produce danger and unexpected outcomes—unexpected outcomes that are likely to be sharply negative.

SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

The interactions between the politicians, analysts, and operators add a significant element of uncertainty to an already ambiguous and volatile situation. Given the divergent backgrounds, priorities, and problem-solving styles of the three groups and their leaders, conflict is all but inevitable in a sustained crisis. If that conflict is carefully managed and contained, it can actually improve the performance of the crisis management team by forcing leaders to consider options that they wouldn't consider under more normal circumstances. Left unaddressed, however, interparty conflict can lead to communications breakdowns, suboptimal decision-making, and disastrous outcomes, as in the first case we consider—and very nearly in the second case as well.

Philadelphia MOVE confrontation, May 13, 1985 Entrenched animosities can cripple a crisis management team. Philadelphia Mayor Wilson Goode had been feuding with his senior police and fire officials for years before a longstanding, episodically violent confrontation between members of the radical MOVE organization and Philadelphia public safety officials reached a flashpoint in May 1985. In an attempt to end an armed standoff at MOVE's headquarters—actually a home in a residential neighborhood—police developed (and the Mayor approved) a plan to storm the building. When their initial approaches failed—in an unexpectedly intense hail of gunfire from within the fortified bunker—they moved quickly to a previously developed alternate plan (about which the Mayor had not been informed in advance) to drop an explosive device on the roof to blow a hole in the structure. Police would then charge through the hole to subdue those inside.

Goode was consulted about this risky variation from the originally approved plan only about twenty minutes before the device was dropped. He gave his concurrence, and the subsequent explosion started a fire. Without consulting the mayor, officials on the scene decided not to fight the blaze immediately, hoping that it would cause the roof to collapse and allow them to enter. When informed about the fire, Goode ordered it fought, but this order came too late. The fire burned out of control, eventually consuming an entire city block consisting of about 60 dwellings. Six adults and five children trapped in the MOVE house died in the fire.

Megafires: Montana 1988, Montana 2000, Oregon 2002, Southern California 2003 Even when operational and political leaders are not locked in an adversarial relationship, their differing priorities can lead to conflict and muddle. Consider recent megafires in the western U.S.

Conditions of extended and extreme drought in wildland areas can result in a "megafire"—a widespread conflagration so intense that it cannot be effectively fought. Megafires occurred in Idaho and Montana in 1988 (the infamous "Yellowstone fires"), in Montana in 2000, in Oregon in 2002, and in the Southern California area in 2003.

Confronted by a megafire, operational commanders perform a sort of triage, implicitly or explicitly shifting their objectives from containment of the fire—a virtual impossibility—to the limited protection of specific highly valued assets, such as residences in a defensible area or culturally significant sites. Other areas will be more or less explicitly sacrificed as indefensible.

The operational imperatives of a megafire, however, are in sharp conflict with the priorities of political leaders. Politicians, mobilized by constituents anxious to protect their families and homes, find such sacrifices hard to accept and insist on different responses. Often they offer operational commanders additional resources, with the expectation that those additional resources will be used to try to contain the fire and seek to defend any and all threatened property. In San Diego in 2003, political officials offered firefighting commanders the services of 6,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel stationed in the vicinity of the fires. Deploying 6,000 untrained, energetic amateurs onto the firelines, however, would have been an invitation to catastrophe. Firefighting officials in charge of the Southern California fires politely declined the politicians' offer of help, but their fire-fighting abilities were hardly aided by the distraction of having to engage political officials in operational discussions.

> Elected political officials and their senior political staff members tend to treat every situation as unique.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 16-29, 1962 When the Soviet Union's secret construction of nuclear-capable missile launch sites in Cuba was discovered by U.S. surveillance in October 1962, President Kennedy formed a working group, called the ExComm, to develop options and recommend courses of action. It consisted of political advisers, substantive experts, and operational commanders. Early ExComm meetings were characterized by strong pressure from the operational commanders to choose quickly among a small number of options, all involving the use of military force. The military commanders felt the pressure of time; their intelligence sources reported to them that the missiles were not yet operational but would be soon, and that there were not yet any other operational Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. (This intelligence turned out to be wrong. The Soviets, scholars have recently learned, already had tactical nuclear weapons on the island and had orders to use them in case of a U.S. invasion.) They believed they had the element of tactical surprise on their side, but not for long. The Soviets would soon figure out that the Americans had discovered the missiles. The military's chance to strike without warning was evaporating—and as a consequence, they felt great urgency to act forcefully, decisively, and quickly. In turn, they pressured the President to authorize one of several rapidly developed plans for direct military intervention, each adapting a standard form of military action.

Although many members of the ExComm team found the military leaders' arguments persuasive, the President himself demurred. In the early days of the crisis, against the recommendations of his military advisors, he consistently sought to widen the available decision space. The President found all of the military options unattractive. He felt the pressure of time, but not as acutely as his operational commanders did. He repeatedly asked ExComm members to develop more options without accepting or rejecting the options he had been given already. The President actively kept a series of possible options under analysis, accumulating alternatives and hesitating to commit to a course of action that would irrevocably reduce his available options.

Kennedy and his closest political confidants also focused on some aspects of the proposed options that others had largely overlooked. In a move that was significant both politically and operationally, the President shifted the definition of the conflict by insisting that the adversary was the Soviet Union and not, as some of the options and discussion implicitly assumed, Cuba. Attorney General Robert Kennedy asked how people, now and in the future, would interpret what could be characterized as a "sneak attack" on Soviet bases in Cuba.

The President and Attorney General had called attention to the long-term political and diplomatic impacts of military action—something that the generals themselves were less likely to focus on. By reframing both the adversary and the interpretation of a surprise attack, the political leaders significantly shifted participants' thinking about the advisability of military intervention.

For their part, the substantive experts wanted more data and more analysis before reaching a decision. To the frustration of the operational commanders, they insisted on going over and over again the various options and their possible consequences. They sought additional expert guidance—about how Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev might react, about how the military options would play out. They continually elaborated scenarios, playing "what if?" ("If we do X, they will do Y. What will we then do? If we do that, what will they then do?")

Finally, once a general course of action—a naval blockade (carefully labeled a "quarantine" for political and diplomatic reasons) coupled with intense back-channel diplomacy—had been chosen, politicians and their advisers tried to customize how it would be carried out. Political participants wanted to know if they could change some of the standard procedures for the blockade. The Chief of Naval Operations, George W. Anderson, Jr., was reportedly horrified by the thought that inexperienced, high-ranking amateurs, far removed from the operational setting, would order on-site personnel to follow untested approaches pregnant with unintended consequences. He curtly informed his superiors that the Navy already knew how to operate a blockade. In the event, however, he was overruled. On orders from the President and the Secretary of Defense, some of the blockade procedures were indeed modified.

In the end, the ExComm team managed to integrate the disparate views and inclinations of its members effectively. They avoided what we now know would have been the catastrophic consequences of nuclear confrontation if the U.S. had intervened militarily in Cuba. Part of what helped the group overcome the difficulties stemming from its internal conflicts and differing perspectives were the stakes involved—it was not lost on anyone that literally millions of lives hung in the balance. It was also crucial that team members—and especially the team leader—were able to recognize, respect, and value the different forms of contribution and expertise required to craft an effective response to such a novel challenge.

Baltimore CSX Tunnel Fire, July 2001 When a CSX train carrying hazardous chemicals derailed in a tunnel underneath Baltimore's central district and caught fire, first responders initially had difficulty assessing the scope, scale, and severity of the crisis. It was clear, though, that it had a potentially enormous footprint. The city center stretched over several square miles, and tens of thousands of people could have been affected by toxic smoke, explosion, or collapsing buildings. The political considerations were also alarming: cordoning off or evacuating the city center would have caused widespread fear, the possibility of panic, and enormous disruption to traffic and commerce. Faced with a dilemma, Mayor Martin O'Malley consciously subordinated his political priorities to what he saw as first-order public safety concerns. He focused, he said later, on being "the best deputy the fire chief ever had." Operational leaders, in turn, sought and processed more information about the train cargo and its potential for destructive outcomes before triggering emergency responses. What might have been a collision was resolved, at least in the early hours of the event, by a decision to let operational considerations, informed by data about the nature of the fire, dominate.

Terrorist attacks on the United States, September 11, 2001 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a single pattern

"The best deputy the fire chief ever had." When a railcar carrying hazardous chemicals caught fire underneath Baltimore's city center, Mayor Martin O'Malley consciously subordinated political concerns to operational necessity.

Photo: Getty Images

In 1962, as his generals pressed him to take immediate military action to knock out Cuba's nuclear threat, President John F. Kennedy sought to widen the decision space available to him.

emerged. In New York, at the Pentagon, and at the White House, leaders of different types quickly established a division of labor. The most senior political officials worked principally on political matters—largely, formulating and communicating political messages—while operational officials took the lead on organizing the rescue and recovery efforts.

In New York, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani relied heavily on his experienced Office of Emergency Management to plan, coordinate, and direct physical operations. He concentrated on communications—encouraging rescue workers, publicly grieving and empathizing with the victims and their families, demonstrating calm and determination in the midst of terrible trauma, publicly modeling coping skills, and generally assisting all who saw him in psychologically processing the unfolding events. His performance was political in the best sense of the term. In the first days and hours after the attacks, New Yorkers—and the nation—turned to him more than to any other public official for guidance, interpretation, and as a model for feeling emotion but not being incapacitated by it.

At the White House, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice deliberately stepped back from chairing the committee of officials in the security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies that were assessing the situation and directing operational responses. Richard Clarke, Special Assistant to the President for Counterterrorism, instead chaired the committee. Clarke was a career (that is, non-political) official who had overseen the construction of much of the nation's counterterrorism response apparatus and knew the system better than anyone. Rice, meanwhile, joined Vice President Cheney in a secure bunker. Maintaining an open telephone line to Clarke, they began work on a set of distinctly political issues.

The federal response, from its earliest moments, was marked by the separation of the political and operational levels, both physically and functionally. Each group quickly focused on different work. Clarke directed actions that included grounding all non-military air traffic, closing the borders, and closing all ports to traffic either in or out. Decisions with the deepest potential political ramifications—for example, whether military aircraft could shoot down domestic airliners that were deemed to constitute a threat—were referred to the political group.

The political group, meanwhile, focused on a different set of questions. When should President Bush return to Washington? What should he say? What message should be communicated to the public, to allies, to foes? What contacts should be made with allies, and through what channels? In the days that followed, as the immediate technical demands of rescue and recovery response became reasonably manageable, the political group increasingly focused on public and diplomatic communications and policy guidance, seeking to define the nature of the attacks (acts of war), specifying the enemy (worldwide terrorism, starting with but not limited to al Qaeda), and mobilizing a coalition of nations to address terrorism as an international challenge.

Not every decision taken by either group during the crisis was necessarily optimal. But the working division of labor between political and operational groups in each location seems to have helped both to focus more effectively on their respective tasks.

MANAGING THE INEVITABLE CONFLICTS

In any major crisis, there are three kinds of work to be done. Physical, technical, and operational work is generally best understood, planned in detail, and executed by operational commanders. Cognitive work—understanding the larger picture, seeing the stakes and implications, structuring decisions and providing analytical decision support—is often best attended to by substantive experts and analysts. Political work—balancing competing values, making crucial decisions about strategy, providing interpretation and perspective, asking for sacrifices, legitimating the choices made, organizing support for the actions taken, and helping the public to process and cope emotionally with the events—lies in the realm of politicians.

There is always potential for conflict among the three groups when they're thrown together by a crisis under emotional and physical stress. In instances such as the MOVE confrontation in Philadelphia, these conflicts seriously degrade decision-making and contribute to catastrophe. In others, the conflicts cause tensions that create distractions and additional stress for those involved, even if they are eventually successfully resolved (as they were in the Southern California megafires). But in other cases—the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Baltimore tunnel fire, and both New York and Washington in the wake of 9/11—people with different skills and inclinations are able to divide the work and collaborate productively.

The events themselves provide one important force for collaboration—in crises, people generally seem more willing to

Photo: © CORBIS

work for the good of the whole. But good intentions are not themselves enough. People with different inclinations are not necessarily looking for conflict, but their different assumptions and points of view may nonetheless divide them.

One form of overcoming implicit or explicit conflicts is illustrated by the Baltimore tunnel fire, where the mayor decided that the operational matters trumped political considerations. That may work in the short run for intense life-safety crises, but in longer-running and more complex matters such as the Cuban missile crisis or megafires, the conflicts among competing values can become acute, requiring a political resolution, because the clash of values is an intrinsically political matter.

Another model for managing the potential for conflict is suggested by Condoleezza Rice's stepping back from the operational crisis management team in the White House on September 11. She consciously separated the cognitive and operational work, on one hand, from the political processing, on the other. Likewise, the Office of Emergency Management's coordination of the technical response in New York City freed the mayor to undertake crucial political communications work. That separation of roles was absent during the Southern California megafire, resulting in unnecessary and unproductive tensions and distraction.

The separation of political and operational matters can never be perfect or complete. Moreover, it is important that both the political and the operational components of crisis decision and management systems incorporate the insights of technical and substantive specialists, who are likely to note the ways in which the novel elements of the crisis may require innovative operational and political approaches.

The shoot-down order for domestic aircraft on 9/11, for example, was an operational matter, but it had such important implications that it had to be processed by the highest political officials. Once taken, though, the political decision raised a host of operational questions: In what circumstances would civilian aircraft be shot down? On what evidence? With what protocols? After what attempts to communicate with the aircraft? After what other alternatives had been tried and exhausted? In short, how, exactly, was the policy to be implemented? Working out such details is an important part of determining exactly what the policy actually means. In a crisis, setting new policies requires rapid improvisation.

This seems a promising direction for further work in engineering crisis response systems and in managing cultural collisions in the midst of crises. Where crises primarily require an operational response, the detailed design and direction of that response should be largely under the direction of operational commanders. When the operational choices have significant political ramifications—and especially when they involve decisions that bring important values into conflict—it falls to the politicians to make the decisions, explain them, and rally the support necessary to sustain them.

Most crises in the United States will probably involve multiple jurisdictions. A major disaster might involve federal, state, county, and city officials—and might easily involve officials from multiple states, counties, and/or cities. The fire at the Pentagon on 9/11 offers a good illustration. The attack was on the grounds of a federal facility (the nation's military headquarters) located across the river from Washington in Arlington, Virginia. The response initially involved civilian and military Defense Department officials and Arlington County officials, but rapidly came to include federal law enforcement officials, the Washington, D.C. fire department, and many other agencies. The agencies represented at the site stand in different jurisdictional hierarchies, and none has authority over the others. Establishing effective operational command in such a situation is difficult and not always successful. In this case, all major responding agencies save one, the Washington, D.C. fire department, accepted the command of the Arlington County Assistant Fire Chief, James Schwartz, as incident commander.

No uniformly applied mechanism or policy exists for quickly resolving such disputes on-site—though the development of the National Incident Management System may be a useful step in that direction. More worrisome, there is no corresponding mechanism for forming a nexus of coordinated political decision-making, communication, and action during a large-scale disaster. Developing—and practicing—a flexible, workable protocol for establishing a form of unified political command among multiple political jurisdictions that have no previously defined hierarchical structure should be a high priority for those seeking to make responses to future crisis situations more effective.

In the absence of such a mechanism, what can be done in advance and in the moment to mitigate the potential clash of cultures at the heart of the crisis response team?

Perhaps the single most important form of prior preparation would be to practice multi-jurisdictional, multi-level responses. Crises bring together disparate groups of people because different approaches are needed. The challenge is for them to collaborate effectively when a crisis throws them together suddenly. Prior practice—through scenario planning, tabletop exercises, or physical drills—can build the mutually respectful relationships that enable each group to contribute its expertise without driving the others to distraction.

In the midst of a crisis, the critical challenge is for participants to remember that everyone has a distinct role to play and to stay reasonably within their respective domains. As in Southern California, political leaders risk disaster when they intervene at too low a level in operational decisions. As in Philadelphia, operational commanders place the response at risk when they fail to perceive the political consequences of their actions and fail to involve political leaders in decision-making. Analysts can be helpful when they can structure decisions and options for consideration and supply information about likely consequences. When they give free rein to their instincts to seek more data, however, they can be a roadblock to timely decision-making.

Extending somewhat the logic of a recent RAND study, effective response in a crisis can be defined as a good enough decision, made soon enough to matter, communicated well enough to be understood, carried out well enough to work. Effective management of the three cultures present at the crisis management table can help get the choices framed, the decisions reached, the relevant people told, and the actions executed. Failure to work in advance and in the moment on helping these cultures interact in a positive way can lead to a clash of cultures that will degrade the effectiveness of the response—with potentially disastrous results. ✦

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A Report From Leadership 2004

This year's gathering focused on the evil that leaders can do.

For the third consecutive year, the Center for Public Leadership in 2004 sponsored a leadership conference, held on March 11-12 in Cambridge. The conference, titled "Misuses of Power: Causes and Corrections," was co-sponsored by the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and organized by CPL research director Barbara Kellerman and Roderick M. Kramer, a professor of organizational behavior at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

A conference organized around a topic as broad as "Misuses of Power" can and should take in a wide range of references. Nonetheless, as Harvard psychology Professor Richard Hackman mentioned in his summary remarks at the conclusion of the conference, several clear themes did emerge from the various presentations. Speakers and panelists tended to focus on three aspects of the topic: how misuses of power manifest themselves; how they originate; and what can be done to minimize or mitigate them.

Conference participants approached the general themes from various angles, depending on their discipline and scholarly inclinations. In this article, the themes noted by Professor Hackman will serve as the template for our discussion.

1 The Origins of Misuses of Power

There are two main reasons why people misuse power, claimed Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter of the Harvard Business School. First, she said flatly, people misuse power "because they can." Second, and perhaps more insidiously, people misuse power "because those with power feel morally superior." The first instance—people misusing power "because they can"—occurs, Kanter said, in systems that lack checks and balances. She also took implicit issue with the notion that power corrupts slowly and gradually. Rather, she said, misuses of power by those who wield it unchecked are characterized by bold strokes. Kanter also took note of the "learned helplessness" of organizations where misuses of power are likely to occur. People in such organizations view with contempt those who hold power and take it for granted that they will misuse it.

Commenting on the misuse of power by those who act out of feelings of moral superiority, Kanter made reference to the current polarized political climate in the United States. Those who are certain of the rectitude of their own cause and the moral bankruptcy of their opponents misuse power because they think they are the only ones with the moral authority to exercise power. Because they deny their opponents and critics any legitimacy, they don't listen to their warnings. This misuse of power is most dangerous when leaders, acting out of a sense of entitlement and excessive moral certainty, make secret decisions, restrict information flow, and exert unilateral control over a situation.

Warren Bennis of the University of Southern California focused on the structural and systemic origins of misuses of power. Referring to the business scandals that have claimed the headlines since the collapse of Enron in 2001, Bennis posited that the incentive structures in many contemporary business organizations encourage executives to misuse power in order to enrich themselves and retain their jobs. But Bennis also considered another structure: the "social architecture" of a business organization—the web of subtle pressures and ingrained customs that allow misuses of power to proceed unchecked and almost unnoticed.

Photos: Tom Fitzsimmons

SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF POWER: Among those contributing to the Leadership 2004 conference in Cambridge were Stanford University law Professor Deborah Rhode, former White House adviser and current Kennedy School faculty member Roger Porter, Frances Hesselbein of the Leader to Leader Institute, historian Ernest May, and conference co-organizer Roderick Kramer of the Stanford business school.

Social architecture allows people to blame the experts for misuses of power (e.g. "the accountants signed off on it," "the lawyers were okay with it"). Bureaucratic silos allow misuses of power to continue unchecked because they are invisible to those outside the silo. Of course, some misuses of power occur simply because of denial or willful ignorance. Others occur because of hubris—the sense of moral superiority that Kanter remarked upon. Groupthink and peer pressure can make it difficult to oppose or even point out misuses of power, and the sheer force of habit can deaden people to wrongdoing. In some organizations, the leader can be so intimidating that opposition or whistle-blowing is unthinkable. And other organizations rely on peer pressure and groupthink to enforce belief in fictions that are supposedly vital to the organization's survival.

Michael Jensen of the Harvard Business School extended Bennis's thoughts, introducing a concept that he called the "agency costs of overvalued equity." When a stock is first overvalued, the people of the organization feel euphoric. It means a windfall for many employees and executives. But then management realizes it has stepped onto a treadmill. Executives must continue to deliver above average performance (or the illusion of above-average performance) in order to sustain the market's overvaluation.

There is, by definition, no way to justify an overvaluation. In a doomed attempt to justify the market's overvaluation, management purchases assets of genuine value. But the very act of acquisition transfers the firm's margin of overvaluation to the assets it has purchased. Eventually, by trying to defend the margin of overvaluation, managers destroy the entire company.

Business school Professor Kathleen McGinn also discussed structural factors underlying misuses of power. The structure of power, especially in asymmetric negotiations, causes intentional and unintentional misuses of power. In this context, a supply contract with Wal-Mart is often called a catastrophic success because of the constraints the retailer can impose on its suppliers by virtue of its market dominance. People and organizations in Wal-Mart's position have a strong incentive to misuse power—again, because they can. For example, McGinn said, people in power are less likely to share information and less likely to listen at the negotiating table. And power itself tends to change the negotiating environment and limit the options available to regulators.

Business school Professor Rakesh Khurana spoke at the conference about the power of dominant reality. This type of power is misused in three ways. A leader can misuse his charisma, using sheer force of personality to convince the people in his organization that he is incapable of misusing power. Another way for leaders to define the dominant reality is through language. By using language to focus the organization on noble ends, an unscrupulous leader can employ immoral or unethical means to those ends with very little opposition. Leaders can also take advantage of the general reluctance to take on responsibility and accountability. By being willing to take on those burdens, a charismatic leader can amass a range of powers, including those that are in conflict, such as the power both to propose and approve acquisitions or to execute and account for securities transactions.

2 What Misuses of Power Look Like

Joseph Nye, Jr., outgoing dean of the Kennedy School, was the conference's keynote speaker. Drawing on his continuing study of hard and soft power, Nye pointed out that soft power—persuasion, example, and other means of attracting (rather than coercing) people to a particular goal or cause—is typically found in democracies, not in authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian governments, all power is hard, resting as it does on the overt or implicit threat of force. Democratic leaders, by contrast, must be charismatic and personable, with the credibility and charm that transmit the attraction of shared values and encourage people to fall in behind a leader.

That is not to argue that soft power is necessarily ethically superior to hard power. During the question period that followed his remarks, Nye resisted the idea of a strict normative framework for soft and hard power, saying that power is simply an instrument that can be used for good or bad ends. He pointed out that Osama bin Laden relies on soft power, not hard, to win recruits for al Qaeda.

Divinity professor and Memorial Church minister Peter J. Gomes focused his presentation on the misuses of power from a religious perspective. He acknowledged that the clergy has a tendency to misuse power, primarily because of the nature of the calling: Rather than engaging in managerial or entrepreneurial

Conference Presenters and Participants

Graham T. Allison, Kennedy School of Government (KSG)
Francis M. Bator, KSG (emeritus)
Max H. Bazerman, Harvard Business School (HBS)
Warren Bennis, University of Southern California
Linda Bilmes, KSG
Marion Fremont-Smith, KSG
Marshall Ganz, KSG
Howard Gardner, Harvard Graduate School of Education
David Gergen, KSG
Peter J. Gomes, Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS)
J. Richard Hackman, Harvard FAS
Brain J. Hall, HBS
Ronald A. Heifetz, KSG
Ira A. Jackson, KSG
Michael Jensen, HBS (emeritus)
Elaine Kamarck, KSG
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, HBS
Barbara Kellerman, KSG
Alex Keyssar, KSG
Rakesh Khurana,HBS
Roderick M. Kramer, Stanford Business School
Ernest R. May, Harvard FAS
Kathleen L. McGinn, HBS
Robert H. Mnookin, Harvard Law School
Mark Moore, KSG
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., KSG
Joel Podolny, HBS/Harvard FAS
Roger Porter, KSG
Deborah L. Rhode, Stanford Law School
Michael L. Tushman, HBS

pursuits, members of the clergy do business with the infinite and absolute. In addition, clergy members can invoke the deity to buttress their claims—a resort not available to the average business or government leader. This presumption of divine support can lead to professional arrogance while conveniently ignoring the reality that all mortals are fallible.

Such arrogance, Gomes said, represents "a fundamental form of the misuse of power." It is difficult for members of the clergy to resist the temptation to misuse their power, Gomes said, given the deference they are normally afforded. Further eroding accountability is the clergy's tendency to ascribe noble motives to their brethren in the field. Gomes found a hopeful sign in the emergence of the Catholic laity as a countervailing force that is skeptical of clergy claims and demands accountability.

Gomes noted that religious power is almost entirely soft power because it relies on influence, not force. Echoing Nye, he pointed out that "soft" is not a synonym for "virtuous" and made the case that the accumulation of influence is both a danger and a splendid opportunity. The civil rights movement, he argued, was "a religious crusade with a good law department." It sought to appeal not to people's sense of justice but to their sense of righteousness and guilt. That is a potentially dangerous appeal, even when used to pursue good. To illustrate the dangers, he cited Father Charles E. Coughlin, a Catholic priest who, in the 1930s, used his radio program to challenge President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's social agenda. Generating his authority from his association with the Church, Coughlin pushed a conservative line that garnered millions of adherents until his anti-Semitic statements grew so outrageous that the Church disavowed him and his beliefs.

Historian Francis Bator offered an alternative view of the manifestations of the misuses of power. In remarks made on the second day of the conference, he pointed out that misuses of power could not be judged by their outcomes. President John F. Kennedy may have misused his power during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and such misuses could not be excused even though the crisis was resolved peacefully. Likewise, Lyndon Baines Johnson would have been wrong to give General William

ANGLES OF INQUIRY: Scholars from a wide range of disciplines joined the conversation, including Peter Gomes, minister of Harvard's Memorial Church, historian Francis Bator, Rakesh Khurana of the Harvard Business School, Harvard psychology Professor Richard Hackman, and Kathleen McGinn of Harvard Business School.

C. Westmoreland free rein in Vietnam, even if Westmoreland had not led the nation into a quagmire. If historians are to learn from the past, Bator contended, they must base their judgments on process, not outcomes.

3 Preventing or Controlling Misuses of Power

There were as many prescriptions for preventing misuses of power as there were conference participants. But the solutions tended to fall into one of two categories, the personal and the structural.

In an interesting note, both Roger Porter of the Center for Business and Government at the Kennedy School and Elaine Kamarck of the Kennedy School pointed out that just as some structures encourage misuses of power, others actually prevent them. Porter noted that the U.S. system of checks and balances tends to mitigate misuses of power—indeed, he wondered if there are not too many constraints. Further, those structural restraints are reinforced by the high ethical sense of the people who work in government. (Somewhat mischievously, Richard Hackman asked Porter if wrongdoers simply learned to steer clear of their ethically upright colleagues in government).

Some of Elaine Kamarck's remarks paralleled those of Porter. She observed that before the expansion of the federal government during Franklin Roosevelt's administration, misuses of presidential power were rare simply because the president held relatively little power. What's more, Congress, through its control of expenditures, exerts a significant check on presidential power. Kamarck expressed the belief that because of the president's lack of spending power, the U.S. has relatively little to reason to worry about presidential misuses of power. When there was a significant misuse of power—by Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal—the misdeeds were detected and punished fairly quickly. Watergate, Kamarck implied, demonstrated the adequacy of Constitutional protections against presidential misuses of power.

Not everyone agreed with this line of reasoning. Historian Ernest R. May noted that changes in the science of persuasion, not to mention the information explosion, had changed the nature of misuses of power, as well as the means of addressing them. Competition among businesses has grown so complex and multifarious that it has lost much of its effectiveness as a corrective. Likewise, transparency creates a blinding overload of data that hobbles judgment. And the power of regulation has been vitiated as it has evolved into "a province of enrichment for the legal fraternity." But while social and scientific changes have created new opportunities for the misuse of power, the best solutions are the same as they have always been: Organizations, corporations, and governments still must earn the trust of their constituents.

Stanford Law School Professor Deborah L. Rhode took a somewhat cynical view of the prospects for meaningful reform or improvement in business virtue. She noted that in the wake of earlier scandals, such as the savings and loan scandals of the mid-1980s, members of the legal profession reemphasized their role as client advocates. Pursuing the client's interests, it was said, would serve the law by reinforcing individuals' rights and preserving the trust and candor that support lawful compliance. But Rhode contended that this calculus is more charming than practical, since it breaks down when the client is an organization. Lawyers who collude with clients fail in their role as counselors. They cannot provide an external check when their interests are identified with organizational success. And there is a built-in conflict when lawyers are hired by management to represent shareholders.

There are at least two ways to alleviate these misaligned incentives, Rhode said. The first is to strengthen the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirement that lawyers report fraud internally. And that provision of the act needs a parallel provision for lawyers to go public with their complaints when their clients make an inadequate response. Second, significant progress will require a larger public role in establishing ethics for professionals, although the American Bar Association is sure to object.

Harvard Law School Professor Robert H. Mnookin favored structural checks to lawyers' misuses of power. He noted that lawyers misuse their power in their economic dealings with clients, for example by allowing negotiations to drag on while they charge by the hour for their services. He proposed four categories of solutions. First, to discourage lawyers from endlessly racking up billable hours, their fees should decline as a negotiation drags on. Second, organizations should consider the need for an internal watchdog. Third, a method of transparent, reputational bonding could leverage market-style forces as an incentive to reputable conduct. Metrics, such as the premium paid for a bond, are incentives if clients react to them. Fourth, professional norms are still useful and an acknowledged means of regulating behavior.

Warren Bennis reminded participants of the role of the leader in preventing misuses of power. He did not ignore structural solutions, arguing for improved corporate governance and splitting the roles of a corporate CEO and chairman. But it was more important, he said, for leaders to widen their sources of information, actively encourage dissent, and challenge their organization's sacred cows.

Indeed, nearly all the participants agreed that the ultimate check on misuses of power resides in the individual. Structures and safeguards can be imposed on institutions and professions, but in the end, those structures and safeguards rely on the human ethical sense—the ability to distinguish right from wrong. And as long as that ability is less than fully reliable, misuses of power will persist. ✦

Kennedy School students Scott Kofmehl, Justin Oliver, Missy Ryan, Ian Schillinger, and Basil Waite contributed to the preparation of this article.

NOW, *THIS* IS HOW EUROPE SHOULD WORK

by Stephanie Gruner

How a German, a Frenchman, a South

It is a hot July day, and the spectators at the French Grand Prix in Magny-Cours are on their feet screaming. All eyes follow a bright red car sweeping around the twisting track at some 200 miles an hour, sounding more like a fighter jet than an automobile. The red car is in the lead, but the race is tight and, with only twelve laps to go, the driver pulls into the pit for a fourth stop. It's a startling move—cars normally stop no more than three times in a race. As victory hangs in the balance, the pit crew takes fewer than ten seconds to change the car's tires, top up its fuel, and even clean the windshield. Then the car is off again, charging toward the finish line. It crosses first, the famous prancing horse logo of Ferrari on the nose of the car and Michael Schumacher at the wheel.

After the race, Schumacher explains to reporters how he won. He never mentions his own considerable talents. He speaks of the precision of the pit crew, the efforts of the tire manufacturer, and the long nights put in by the car's mechanics and engineers. If there is one person responsible for the win, says a team official, it is Luca Baldisserri, the chief race engineer, whose idea it was to make four pit stops. Because Schumacher's car would take on less fuel at each stop than rival cars, Baldisserri reasoned, it would run lighter and faster than the rest of the field. When the team trophy is presented, Baldisserri, along with Ferrari's drivers, climbs up on the podium to accept.

Behind a winning team, there is usually a dominant ego. Think of Lance Armstrong's U.S. Postal Service cycling team, Vince Lombardi's Packers, or George Steinbrenner's Yankees. The history of Formula One auto racing is full of such outsized figures, from Enzo Ferrari himself to team masterminds such as Williams's Frank Williams and McLaren's Ron Dennis. This Ferrari team is different. It's an ensemble production with an international cast, including, in addition to Germany's Schumacher, Luca di Montezemolo, an Italian; Jean Todt, a Frenchman; Ross Brawn, an Englishman; Rory Byrne, a South African; and Paolo Martinelli, another Italian.

Ferrari hasn't just succeeded with its multinational leadership model: It has dominated. Schumacher's win in France was his ninth in the first ten races of the eighteen-race Formula One series. Ferrari has won the last six team championships in a row, wrapping up the 2004 title in August at the Gran Prix of Hungary. Schumacher has won the last five driver's championships. Even Ferrari's fans, the famous *tifosi,* are growing bored by the team's winning streak.

Students of international management, however, are fascinated. "Whereas with other teams, it's been perhaps a superb person, a great engine or driver, at Ferrari what makes the difference is the way that they have integrated it all together in a very open and honest way," says Mark Jenkins, a professor of competitive strategy at Nottingham University and the co-author of a forthcoming book on the business lessons of Formula One. "It's bringing together people, technology, and funding—the whole package." The lessons for business aren't hard to find—in fact, Formula One is itself big business. Teams pay hundreds of millions of dollars to compete for the title. The series brings in billions of dollars in annual revenue from advertising, sponsorships, and television rights. Only the summer Olympic Games and World Cup Soccer draw more television viewers. In this high-stakes competition, Ferrari, based in the small town of Maranello, Italy, has crushed competitors like Mercedes and BMW. Along the way, it has built one of the world's most recognized brands.

Ferrari began with a single autocratic figure—Enzo Ferrari, who enjoys almost mythical status in his native Italy. A former racecar driver himself, he built racecars in his Maranello factory after World War II. They debuted in May 1947, at a race in Piacenza, Italy. Two weeks later, they won their first race—the Rome Grand Prix. In 1950, when modern Formula One racing was born, a Ferrari was on the starting line. It is the only team to have raced in each of Formula One's subsequent seasons.

Enzo Ferrari dominated the early days of Ferrari racing—he designed the engines, selected the drivers, and told them how to

Photos: Getty images

ROLE PLAYERS: By sticking to their assigned tasks, Ferrari's pit crew routinely gets driver Michael Schumacher back on the road within ten seconds.

race. And from the 1950s through the 1970s, Ferrari enjoyed consistent success in Formula One (or F1, to the cognoscenti), winning nine driver's championships. In the 1980s, though, the good times petered out. Ferrari might win the odd race, but after 1983, the team and driver titles mostly went to England, home of the McLaren and Williams teams. Enzo hired and fired a succession of race directors and technical managers, but the team's fortunes continued to decline. In 1988, Enzo died, and an era came to an end.

In August 1991, Luca di Montezemolo, who had served as Ferrari's racing director during the team's last golden age, the 1970s, returned to Maranello, this time as managing director of the car and racing divisions. He found a racing team in disarray. The cars were so poorly built that Ferrari driver Alain Prost claimed, "A truck would be easier to drive." Lead driver Gilles Villeneuve had been killed in a racing accident. The team was riven by infighting, and turnover was high. Umberto Zapelloni, sports editor for Italy's

African, an Englishman, and, yes, several Italians built Ferrari into the world's greatest racing team

Corriere della Sera and author of a new book on Ferrari, recalls that the team was like a "hotel lobby," with all the comings and goings. The team didn't win a single race in the 1991 season.

Montezemolo moved to squelch the infighting. "We hope that the only noise around here," he famously announced, "will be our engine as it sets new lap records at Fiorano," the Ferrari test track. To establish a tangible connection with the team's winning past, Montezemolo brought back Niki Lauda, a champion Ferrari driver from the 1970s, to consult. Harvey Postlethwaite, who had worked for the team in the early 1980s, returned to work on chassis design. But Ferrari again failed to win a race in 1992.

In an unexpected move, Montezemolo next reached outside the clubby F1 community to hire Frenchman Jean Todt, a former rally driver, as his race director for the 1993 season. "It was not easy to choose a Frenchman," says Luca Colajanni, who handles the team's media affairs. "We are an Italian team. To present a Frenchman with no experience in Formula One? The choice was criticized."

Montezemolo shared none of the critics' concerns. He and Todt continued to look for talent outside Italy, in 1995 luring two-time world champion Schumacher away from the Benetton team and, a year later, hiring two of Schumacher's former Benetton colleagues, technical director Ross Brawn and chief designer Rory Byrne. Ferrari's *tifosi* held their collective breath and waited to see what would happen.

What happened was success—though not quite enough success, at least at first. In 1997, 1998, and 1999, Ferrari lost the driver's championship in the last race of each season. Then in 2000, Schumacher brought the driver's title back to Maranello after twenty-one years. All Italy celebrated, in true Italian fashion: Church bells rang out across the countryside, Ferrari owners staged impromptu parades, and spontaneous celebrations erupted in village squares.

Since then, Team Ferrari has only grown stronger. It has won each season's team title, and Schumacher has won each driver's championship. In 2002, Ferrari enjoyed nearly complete domination, winning fifteen of seventeen races. "The legendary" became Schumacher's unofficial first name. "I'm not a legend," he insists. "This team is a legend."

So how does a team become a legend? The best answers come from the team members themselves.

BAN THE BLAME

"When we got here," recounts Ross Brawn, who as technical director is responsible for the car and race strategy, "it was a blame culture. If something went wrong, it was someone's fault. We had to change that." Before Todt's arrival in 1993, mistakes cost people their jobs. Management focused on discovering problems rather than solving them. Workers, not surprisingly, tended to hide their mistakes rather than admit them and learn from them. The new team set about changing that mentality, chiefly by example. Brawn and Byrne had worked together for years and enjoyed an easy rapport. Neither was afraid of speaking his mind. Both were attentive to the other's opinions. Both were quick to admit error and seek help. "People make mistakes," says Brawn with a shrug of his broad shoulders. Colleagues noticed the way the two operated—casually sharing problems in the Ferrari-red Maranello hallways, asking advice—and started to emulate them.

RESPECT EACH OTHER'S ROLES

Like any other large enterprise, Formula One is too complex for one person to manage everything. It is a sport of checklists. The complicated rules and design limitations change annually. Each car has thousands of mechanical parts governed by ever more elaborate software. Just getting to the race means moving nearly a quarter of Ferrari's roughly 800-person staff and shipping thirty-five tons of equipment. The team arrives at each race with three cars, a spare chassis, eighty chairs, ninety kilos of pasta, and a cook. They move this traveling circus eighteen times a year, to places as far away as Australia and China.

For all its complexity, F1 positively bristles with control freaks. McLaren's Ron Dennis, for instance, is the type of person who would straighten the pictures in other people's offices. Ferrari, by contrast, is structured to discourage micromanagement and disperse decision-making. Anyone assigned a task is trusted to handle it. Each member of the pit crew has a role—fuel handler, windshield cleaner, tire changer. The crew trains together, coming up with contingency plans for every possible eventuality. If someone has a problem, a fallback plan kicks in and work continues uninterrupted. There's no interference and little improvisation. Dropping one's task to help a team member in trouble, explains team manager Stefano Domenicali, only compounds the error.

Ferrari's respect for roles produces a level of discipline that's almost scary. Consider the 2003 Austrian Grand Prix. On lap twenty-three, Schumacher is leading as he pulls in for his first pit stop. A small amount of fuel leaks from the refueling nozzle and, as it touches the hot chassis, it bursts into flame, engulfing the rear of the car. The television cameras show Schumacher calmly sitting in the car as the pit crew douses the blaze and finishes its duties. Just a routine accident, managed with routine procedures. Schumacher roars off and, despite the delay, wins the race. In the post-race press confer-

ence, he explains that he never doubted the pit crew, never thought about escaping the flames. His only thoughts were about how he would make up the time when he got back on the track.

COMMUNICATE, THEN COMMUNICATE SOME MORE

Ferrari holds meetings early and often. A team meeting is convened shortly after every race. Fresh from the track, the participants are still full of adrenalin, and the emotional temperature runs high. That's fine with Brawn—it's important to gather everyone's first impressions, he explains, before they become more "reasonable." Even after a victory, the focus is on improving performance. "If everyone is focused on the car that won, we can't go forward," says Brawn. "We have to focus on the car that didn't finish. There's a very fragile difference between success and failure."

Back in the factory, the meetings continue. At a Monday postrace meeting, forty key leaders and team members, including Todt, Brawn, engine director Martinelli, and the senior engineers and mechanics, review all faults and set objectives for the next race. A group twice that size meets monthly to review progress on team tasks. The entire company meets quarterly to hear Todt, Brawn, and Martinelli inventory the team's successes and failures. "We try to be as full and frank to everybody as we can be," Brawn explains. "There's no burying of heads in the sand."

JUST ANOTHER TEAMMATE: Champion driver Michael Schumacher (center) celebrates a Ferrari win with fellow members of the race crew.

The doctrine of open communication extends beyond the walls of the Ferrari factory. F1 teams usually insist on paranoiac secrecy, keeping even drivers and employees in the dark about issues like tire choice, suspension adjustments, and strategies. Not Ferrari. It shares its research and development with Bridgestone, which supplies tires, and Shell, which supplies fuel and lubricants. Bridgestone initially balked at this innovation. The Japanese tire company feared trade secrets would leak to its competitors. Even after the tire engineers agreed to share information, they held back some data. "We weren't going high enough," Brawn recalls. "In their normal polite fashion, the engineers were not telling us what the real problem was." It took a series of problems with the tires and another visit from Brawn before Bridgestone's top managers ordered their engineers to share everything they knew.

Communication at an internationally diverse company such as Ferrari can get complicated. Workers are predominantly Italian, but there are also Germans, Swiss, Austrians, French, and British. The logistics director is a Serb. The differences are more than linguistic. Different cultures have different ways of thinking. Tell a British worker how to do something, and he'll do it that way forever more, says Brawn. Tell an Italian how, and he'll do it that way once and then return to his old way of doing things. "It's just a different way of understanding," he says. "You just have to explain you always want it done that way."

HANG TOGETHER, OR HANG SEPARATELY

Everyone at Ferrari shares in its successes and failures—a habit learned, says Todt, during the lean years. The 1996 season began with a string of losses, and the press began demanding Todt's head. The usually guarded Schumacher made his thoughts known. "If you want to destroy Ferrari," he said bluntly, "you can kick out Todt. If you want the team to grow, let him stay." Todt stayed. The calls for his ouster resumed at the end of the 1999 season when, for the third year in a row, the team lost the world championship at the last race of the year. It was the turn of Montezemolo, the big boss, to reiterate the team's faith in Todt. "There's always a moment when you question what you are doing," Montezemolo admits. "But we were conscious of our skills and quality, and therefore I had confidence in those who deserved it." Todt now heads the entire Ferrari group, not just the racing team.

When Ferrari began winning, the team made sure the success was spread around. In 1999, 450 team workers unveiled Ferrari's newest race car. That's usually an honor reserved for team presidents and sponsors. Immediately after each victory, Jean Todt sends a letter of thanks from the racetrack to be posted the next morning in the factory. When Ferrari wins the trophy awarded the best team in a race or a series, you never know who will appear on the podium to accept it. It could be Jean Todt or Ross Brawn. It could just as easily be an unknown engineer or pit crew member. The message is clear—at Ferrari, all triumphs are collective. Schumacher, in particular, is always quick to share his glory. His press conferences routinely commence with expressions of gratitude to mechanics, engineers, and other team members. And when his lead is large enough to permit it—which is most of the time—he slows down on the last lap in order to salute the pit crew before crossing the finish line.

Schumacher's behavior after the French Grand Prix was typical. After the podium celebrations, he put away his trophy and began a tour of the Ferrari pit and garage facilities. He made a point to shake every team member's hand and thank every pit crew member. "After they win a race, most drivers go off to their motor home or their Lear Jet," says Jenkins, the Nottingham University professor. "Michael Schumacher goes around and thanks all the engineers and mechanics. You just don't see any other driver take that effort and focus." You also don't see other drivers winning with Schumacher's metronomic regularity. Think there's a connection? ✦

STEPHANIE GRUNER lives in Lucca, Italy. A former *Wall Street Journal* staff reporter, she covers business and travel.

Illustration: David Plunkert

Thinking With the Whole Brain

New scientific findings make clear that good thinking is a surprisingly emotional phenomenon. Here's how decision-makers can put that knowledge to work.

by Cathy L. Greenberg and Colonel Thomas J. Williams, with Daniel Baker

It's an action-movie staple: Our heroine is faced with a decision that could determine the fate of the entire planet. She has no one to help her. Her false friends back at the Agency have cold-heartedly betrayed her. She has just watched her lovable sidekick die horribly at the hands of the bad guys. Understandably, our heroine is just a little stressed out. Nonetheless, she swallows her feelings and, as the clock ticks toward doomsday, makes the crucial decision that saves the entire planet. The plot reaches its satisfying conclusion. Cue the swelling music. Roll credits.

Ah, we all love a Hollywood ending. But there's just one problem. Rewind the film to the shot in which our heroine suppresses her feelings. Right...there. At that moment, our heroine has just about ensured that her decision would be less than optimal—and quite possibly dead wrong.

But wait. The ability to stifle one's emotions despite great stress—isn't that the very essence of what Ernest Hemingway called "grace under pressure"? Doesn't leadership demand the ability to ignore emotional turmoil and make coolly rational decisions? Well, no. New research into the human brain and nervous system makes it increasingly clear that good thinking is a surprisingly emotional phenomenon. If we ignore or suppress our emotions when making important decisions, we deprive ourselves of valuable information and energy. These findings have enormous implications for many business executives, military officers, and public-safety officials—anyone, in fact, required to make highly consequential decisions under pressure.

We work with high-level decision-makers in business, public service, and the military, and we apply this new understanding of the human mind to help these decision-makers make the most of their cognitive abilities and attain what we call Whole Brain Function. When a decision-maker is using her whole brain, her frontal lobes coordinate and integrate the activity of her brain and nervous system. What are the frontal lobes? They are the crowning achievement in the evolution of the nervous system, found only in human beings and to a lesser degree in some of the great apes. As the seat of moral and ethical reasoning, the frontal lobes are the "executive brain"—the place where the autonomic responses of the limbic system, such as respiration, cardiac activity, and nervous-system functions, join together in a physiological nexus between actions and feelings. Whole Brain Function frees us from routine and leads us into civility, virtue, creativity, and innovation.

Whole Brain Function is achieved when the frontal lobes are fulfilling their executive role in optimal fashion, a state most effectively achieved when our nervous systems are in balance and harmony and our emotions are positive. Later in this article, we will suggest exercises that can help you induce a state of Whole Brain Function in yourself and apply it to help bring about favorable outcomes in the high-stakes decisions you make.

But first we'll take a closer look at the human brain and limbic system physiology. We'll examine the assumptions that underlie conventional definitions of good decision-making and then review how well those assumptions hold up in light of new findings about the operations of the mind and the mind's reliance on the responses of the body.

MEMORY, FEELING, AND DISSOCIATION

Together, the brain and spinal cord make up our primary system for sensing and responding to our environments. We largely relate to the world through our five core senses—sight, sound, taste, touch and smell. The senses, in turn, deliver stimuli to the brain via the spinal cord. The spinal cord and the brain, which house the central functions of the nervous system, are constantly under fire to safeguard the body from harm. Through feedback loops, they transfer chemical messages between the brain and our heart and muscles, resulting in actions or responses from the body.

Over the course of human evolution, our brains have developed thousands of connections with complex feedback loops and safeguards to both activate and protect us. For example, when our fingers come into contact with something hot, our reaction is to immediately pull our hand back so that we are not burned. The experience stimulates our sense memory, and we store the sensory content of the incident in our minds for future reference. Because we are able to draw on our sense memory, we can make better decisions in the future: In this case, we can avoid being burned again.

By an analogous process, we create emotional sense memories in reaction to decisions and actions that produce states of emotional pain or well-being. But unless we cultivate our emotional intelligence, we may find it difficult to relate physiological responses to their associated emotional states. Indeed, we have learned to sever the association between decisions and their emotional consequences. Decisions occur in the rational realm, feelings occur in the emotional realm, and never the twain shall meet.

> If we look at our earliest ancestors, we see that they relied heavily on their limbic systems to survive.

This separation (or in psychological terms, "dissociation") runs counter to thousands of years of human experience. Our early ancestors relied heavily on their limbic systems to survive. When they experienced a threat, they responded with the emotion of fear, which stimulated them to take action. Similarly, when our earlier ancestors encountered opportunities to eat or have sex or take secure shelter, they acted in response to the positive emotions associated with those activities. In other words, they relied on the emotional content of their prior experiences to make the decisions that enhanced their chances for survival.

Since the Industrial Age, however, we have abandoned much of the decision support provided to us by our limbic systems. Instead, the decisions that we rely on for our survival are determined by data, analytic methods, and organizational hierarchies. In a world increasingly driven by knowledge and information, this makes sense—up to a point. When we assess our prospects for financial survival, we learn less by consulting our emotions than by consulting the daily stock price reports.

All the same, we tacitly recognize that in many instances, especially those of great complexity and urgency, good decision-making involves dimensions beyond the purely rational. Thus, we hear prominent decision-makers, such as former General Electric CEO Jack Welch, attribute much of their success to their ability to make decisions based on their "gut instincts" or their "nose for a deal." What such expressions indicate is that the decision-maker's rational analysis of a situation is supported, clarified, and augmented by the emotions that associate themselves with that analysis. Those emotions can, in fact, tilt a decision in one direction or another. All the data may seem to argue in favor of one conclusion, but the decision-maker may reject the conclusion if her "gut instinct" rebels against it—if, in other words, the decision-making process is dissociated. On the other hand, if she goes ahead and makes a decision in spite of emotional and physiological signals that urge a different course, she may later regret the move and admit that she "should have listened to her instincts."

IT'S STILL A JUNGLE OUT THERE

Even if we recognize the value of emotionally intelligent decision-making, however, we may have difficulty gaining a clear reading of our emotional state in highly stressful situations—often the very circumstances in which we are called upon to make important decisions. By way of example, let's consider a business-world counterpart to the action-movie heroine we met at the beginning of this article. On a typical workday, our business-world heroine arrives at work just in time to race to her office, collect a few things, and head off to the meeting. Her mind is spinning and she can't seem to catch her breath. She tries to go through a mental checklist of everything she was supposed to bring to the meeting and the talking points she wants to raise, but she can't concentrate.

She hurries to the meeting room, barely glancing at the colleagues she passes. She doesn't have time for them now. She's late. She rushes into the conference room,

"I, too hate being a greedy bastard, but we have a responsibility to our shareholders."

tripping on a seam in the carpet. Her files and print-outs and binders tumble to the floor. As she kneels down to pick up the mess, she looks up. Oh, perfect. It's her boss, looming over her. No wonder her secret nickname for him is A.T. Hun.

He couldn't be more of an alpha male if he beat his chest and bellowed. This guy doesn't need to read *Winning Through Intimidation:* He inspired it. But even with Mr. Hun glowering down at her, our heroine manages to gather up her things, grab a seat at the conference table, and take a deep breath. The meeting begins, and she is the designated piñata. For every answer she gives, he has three questions. For every helpful reply, he has a complaint. It's going to be like this all day. Such is the theatre of daily combat in the corporate conference room.

How can anyone make good decisions under such stressful circumstances? Yet it must be possible. Our ancestors dealt with circumstances that make even a meeting with Mr. Hun seem like a Sunday picnic. Their decisions were good enough to establish human beings as the planet's dominant species, clever and adaptable enough to land us in circumstances where survival depends on relearning decision-making strategies that our ancestors knew by instinct.

Fortunately, those strategies can indeed be relearned. By teaching ourselves to track the internal physiological phenomena that accompany decision-making, we can learn to process information in a way that integrates our rational and emotional intelligences. The decisions produced in this manner will be right as a matter of factual analysis and also in accord with our most deeply held values.

LEARNING TO READ THE SIGNALS

One tool that can be useful in building new decision-making acumen is self-regulated bio-feedback. As we have discussed, decision-making includes both analytical and sensory data. This exercise focuses on the sensory component, which is often invisible or inaccessible to many of those responsible for making today's most vital decisions. It will help you recognize the physiological responses associated with positive and negative emotional states. By monitoring your physiological responses as you consider a pending decision and its possible results, you can discover which of your options produces in you the harmonic resonance of reason and emotion (or of frontal lobes and limbic system) that is characteristic of Whole Brain Function.

This exercise requires nothing more than a timer, a pen or pencil, and a comfortable chair in a quiet room. Begin by sitting in a comfortable position, keeping your hands and legs unfolded and relaxed. Make sure your notepad and pen are close at hand. Now start the timer, and for the next three minutes, close your eyes and recall, in as much detail as possible, a workplace situation that has triggered significant, negative emotional reaction. The intent of this exercise is to help you reactivate some of those same emotions with a similar degree of intensity as when you first experienced them. Due to mood-congruent memory processes, you'll likely find other, related memories being activated. However, try to focus only on the work-related memory. Remember the intent is to help activate your whole brain function, not upset you by recalling unresolved issues.

Divide the three minutes into three distinct phases. Use the first minute to focus on the emotional experience. Use the second minute to tap into the physiological responses that accompany your emotional experience. Devote the third minute to mentally reviewing and arranging your physiological responses so that you can easily write them down when your three minutes are up.

Time's up. List your physiological responses to the memory. One method you can use is to jot down in advance a number of possible responses. Once you've done the emotional-recall exercise, check off the physiological changes you experienced. But be sure to leave room for responses you didn't think to list in advance. Your checklist might look something like this:

Rapid breathing
Shallow breathing
Rapid heartbeat
Muscle tension (note where)
Dry mouth
Salivation
Ringing ears
Stomach pressure
"Butterflies" in the stomach or gut

Now, repeat the exercise, this time focusing on a positive memory. Think of a happy occasion, particularly one in which an action of yours had its desired outcome. Again, list your physiological responses: relaxation (note which muscles); a feeling of lightness; full, easy respiration; involuntary smiling; a surge of energy, etc.

Now you have a list of variables to remind you of your physiological responses to positive and negative emotional states. Your next step is to think of a decision that you will have to make in the near future. Take a seat, relax, and get comfortable. Now use your imagination to visualize what your world will be like after you've taken one of the options available to you. Try to put as many details as possible into the picture. Now take three minutes to tap into your physiological responses. Write down your impressions, then look at the recall list and compare your responses.

Do your responses resemble those associated with the previously recalled positive memory or the negative one? If you register an overwhelmingly positive response, you know that your frontal lobes and limbic system are in harmony with your choice, and you have been thinking with your whole brain. Alternatively, if your responses resemble your uneasy physical reactions to your negative memory, then you know that your gut is telling you to reject this option, however rational it may appear. If your responses are mixed, you are not ready to make this decision and need to gather more data, either factual or emotional.

Decision-making is an individual process—no two people follow precisely the same method. But however you proceed, you can only benefit from being mindful of the effects that prior experiences have on your decision making. Such prior experiences are the basis of intuition—the gut instinct that can help you make well-rounded decisions that are informed by analytical data and energized by sensory and physiological input. With enough practice, you can relearn what our ancestors knew all along: how to listen to the limbic system and make decisions with the whole brain. ✦

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Chris Bert.

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"I am transformed." Penny George survived cancer and gained a sense of her life's purpose.

But I Don't Want to Be a Leader!

I thought leadership was for other people—until a close encounter with death showed me a new way to live.

by Penny George

Facing death opened me to what my life could really be. Before I was diagnosed with cancer in 1996, my life was busy and for the most part quite satisfying. I was a wife, a mother of two not-quite-grown sons, and an organizational psychologist with a thriving practice. Though at times I felt like a hamster on a wheel, most days I felt incredibly fortunate to have such a fulfilling life. I had no sense that it was only a prelude to a fuller, richer life.

What I enjoyed most about my work in those days was helping people know themselves better so that they could be more discerning about what they were called to do in life. I also found deep satisfaction in helping organizations make good hiring decisions and develop the potential of their key people. My special talent, I thought, was to help other people find their calling. And I loved my work. But deep down, I had to admit that I didn't have a calling. I never dreamed that I would find one at sixty, thanks to a grave illness that left me with the powerful and guiding sense of purpose that had been missing from my life.

Today I am an ex-psychologist. I am also president of the George Family Foundation and president of a national collaboration of individuals and family foundations committed to integrative medicine (see "How Bravewell Is Changing Medicine" on the next page). We are, all of us, dedicated to returning medicine to its ancient roots in healing, which entails nothing less than overhauling how medicine is taught and practiced in this country. In the past I would not have dared so ambitious a dream. But today I feel part of a force much greater than I am and greater, even, than the remarkable people called to our cause.

As I reflect on what has happened to me since my illness, I realize that I am not a different person exactly; I am still myself, only more so. I still have self-doubts and see too many shades of gray at times. I will never like conflict and still too often wait for consensus when clearer judgment would make things more efficient. But today I can also speak from the heart to a room full of people, say no clearly and without guilt, even to someone I love, and ask people and organizations to contribute money to a cause that truly matters. Ambiguity, once the trigger for anxiety, is now pregnant with possibility, mystery, and hope. My inadequacies interest me less than the thought of what I can accomplish with the talents I possess. The prospect of my death, which once filled me with dread, now gives me added intensity to do what I can to make the world better.

I am transformed, thanks to my illness and what it led me to do for myself. Like others before me who have been given a temporary reprieve from mortality, I have a story to tell. I am compelled to share it

because today my work, my calling, is to change medicine so that more people can find their own positive transformation.

THE CALL COMES

What set me on this path was a simple message on my cell phone, left one gray February afternoon by my gynecologist: "Penny, the mammogram indicates that you probably have breast cancer. You should get to a surgeon for a biopsy as soon as possible. Here are a couple of names for you to call." My first reaction was that I didn't have time for cancer. My next was that since I was not a fighter, I might die. What I'd read about cancer survivors suggested that the fighters and the "difficult" patients did best.

Dutiful surgeon's daughter that I was, I chose the customary medical treatment, including mastectomy and chemotherapy. That was fine as far as it went. But it couldn't answer the questions that nagged at me most: How do I regain control of my life? How can I restore my energy after my chemo treatments so I can go back to work? What can I do to increase my odds of survival? The initial part of my journey was about answering those kinds of questions.

As a psychologist, I was open-minded about the infinite and highly individual ways in which healing occurs. I was also inclined by nature to take responsibility for myself. So in addition to the conventional Western treatment options, I began to explore a myriad of healing modalities—acupuncture and herbs, the medicinal value of certain foods, energy work, and hypnotherapy—to address the side effects of treatment and possibly prevent a recurrence of cancer. Massage, psychotherapy, and meditation de-stressed a lifestyle that had become overwhelming.

After chemotherapy was completed, I sensed a need to reflect on the direction of my life. Career had always been a big part of my identity, but my enthusiasm for my work as a psychologist was evaporating. This was a big disappointment, because after twenty years of work, I had finally completed my doctorate and begun a private practice with a friend and colleague. My vocational life had just become exactly what I'd always wanted, and here I was losing interest in it. If I was no longer to practice psychology, what was I going to do with my one precious and unrepeatable life?

A VISION IN THE DESERT

I had heard about something called a Vision Quest run by a psychologist in Durango, Colorado. A Vision Quest is a rite of transition practiced by the Plains Indians and other indigenous cultures. This version consisted of eleven days of ritual and ceremony, including four days and nights fasting alone in a canyon in the desert wilderness. It was one of the most powerful experiences of my life. I came away from that canyon knowing that it was time to move on from my work as a psychologist and to develop other parts of myself.

Not long after the Vision Quest, I began to speak to various groups about what was then called complementary and alternative medicine or CAM—the acupuncture and herbs, the energy work and meditation and more. Public speaking had always been for me a source of debilitating anxiety. But because I believed that people needed to know about the tremendous potential of these modalities, I found myself accepting invitations to speak, and people who heard me were appreciative and receptive.

My passion for integrative medicine grew with my expanding knowledge. I was beginning to crystallize a vision for medicine that would soon be the guiding cause of my life. But just giving a talk wasn't nearly enough. I was now, through our family foundation, in a position to make a real difference. "We are going to change medi-

How Bravewell Is Changing Medicine

Fewer than three years into its mission, the Bravewell Collaborative is changing American medicine. We helped bring the Consortium of Academic Health Centers for Integrative Medicine into being and to expand from the original six members to twenty-five of the leading medical schools in the country. We underwrote an article, published in the leading journal of academic medicine, describing the attitudes, beliefs, skills, and values necessary for physicians to be effective in the twenty-first century. We are now helping medical schools get access to the consortium's curriculum.

We convinced management consultants McKinsey & Co. to undertake a pro-bono study of the leading clinical centers of integrative medicine, analyzing the needs of these centers and how philanthropy could best enhance clinical care in the country. We have implemented McKinsey's recommendation to create a network of clinical centers and provide them with marketing and business planning.

In November 2003, we held the first Bravewell Leadership Award event in New York City, honoring a physician leader with a $100,000 cash prize. This event brought together nearly 500 people from the integrative medicine community across the country.

We are currently seeking sponsors for a two-hour PBS program on integrative medicine called "Good Medicine." PBS has committed to air the special on prime time next year as part of its Year of Health—if we can raise three million dollars from outside the Collaborative. ✦ *–P.G.*

Photo: Ray Ng

> I was beginning to crystallize a vision for medicine that would soon be the guiding cause of my life.

cine," I announced to my husband Bill one day. I'll never forget his disbelieving look as he said, "Do you have any idea what you're saying?" It's probably just as well that I was naïve about the challenges ahead.

At the same time that I was discovering my purpose in life, a seismic shift was going on within medicine. The public was spending more out-of-pocket on complementary therapies than was spent on primary care—and with greater satisfaction. People were not opting out of conventional medical treatment but were demanding the best of both conventional and complementary care. The medical establishment took notice, and over the next couple of years, what had once been called alternative medicine, and then CAM, morphed into integrative medicine.

Integrative medicine puts the focus back where it belongs: on the patient's need for healing. Patients are not just diseases or symptoms, but whole people interconnected in body, mind, and spirit, with internal resources for healing that they often don't even know about. We need to empower people to take charge of their own healing, to individualize their care, to help them heal even if they can't be cured, and to live high-quality lives in the face of chronic illness.

As I wound down my psychology practice, I took charge of the George Family Foundation, which Bill and I had created a couple of years before my diagnosis. Bill encouraged me to use the foundation to help transform medicine from a narrow disease focus to one that focuses on prevention and wellness. We created and funded the position of Healing Coach at the cancer center where I'd been treated. We then helped fund the development of the curriculum for the CancerGuides program at the Center for Mind-Body Medicine, which trains professionals across the nation to help cancer patients find their own healing path. Now we support the leading tertiary hospital in the Twin Cities through its Institute for Health and Healing, and we have helped underwrite Duke University's integrative medicine program.

BUILDING A NETWORK

My work with the George Family Foundation brought me into contact with other foundations with similar aims. In early 2001, I invited twenty physician leaders from across the country to meet with a similar number of laypeople in order to create an agenda for change. In two days of work together, we formulated two primary strategies to accelerate the acceptance of integrative medicine. We would get behind a newly formed consortium of academic health centers committed to integrative medicine; and we would bring together a larger group of philanthropists to collaborate on changing the big systemic issues that were beyond the scope of any single person or foundation. Six months later, the George Family Foundation convened a larger group of funders. By the end of this meeting, the group had agreed to create an operating foundation that is now called the Bravewell Collaborative for Integrative Medicine (www.bcintegrativemedicine.org). Its goals:

- to change how physicians are trained and educated
- to deliver high-quality integrative care by ensuring the viability of the best clinical centers across the country
- to champion the best physician leaders in the field
- to increase public awareness about the effectiveness and value of integrative medicine

The Collaborative has been in existence for fewer than three years. It has accomplished a great deal in that time (see sidebar). Little by little, we really are changing the way medicine is practiced. Of course, we still have a long, long way to go, and I doubt we'll get there in my lifetime. But as the shift to integrative medicine has taken on an inevitable momentum, so has my life, and for that I have to thank the cancer that might one day take my life.

Like many other cancer survivors, I am grateful for what the disease taught me about fully living in the present. I am grateful, too, for the opportunity to help others find the transformative potential in illness through integrative medicine. I have learned that the greatest growth comes from confronting pain, uncertainty, and fear rather than avoiding them. I have also learned that all of us have the capacity for leadership when we have meaning and purpose in our lives. Sometimes, when we least expect it, we receive a call to leadership. By saying yes to that call when it comes, we can accomplish things that we never dreamed possible. ✦

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"Let the healing begin!"

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that will ensure more equitable informal dispute resolution systems. And we can support candidates for political and judicial positions who are committed to gender equality and the legal strategies that might help achieve it. Expanding parental leave entitlements and childcare programs, creating tax incentives for family-friendly workplace policies, and mandating more affirmative action in fields where women are underrepresented are obvious priorities for a society that is committed to equal opportunity in practice as well as principle.

Legal reforms cannot be obtained without political strategies. Our agenda, while ambitious, should be viewed in context. We do not see most American women as downtrodden. We realize that more than a few American women control large sums of money and that many (ourselves included) have very good jobs. And we are certainly aware that, by global standards, the overwhelming majority of American women are extremely well off. But in terms of basic gender equity, American women still have a long way to go. And neither governmental policy nor business practices ensure that women (or men for that matter) can care adequately for their families and participate actively in their communities while exercising leadership roles.

Women are not well positioned to address that problem. Despite their numerical majority, women still lack the positions of influence, in both the public and private sectors, necessary to achieve the agenda set forth above. That, in turn, means that women need to employ strategies most readily available to those without conventional sources of leverage. We refer to three in particular:

First, women must envision themselves as agents of change. Instead of reconciling ourselves to unequal burdens in the home and to unequal pay, status, and power in the world outside, we need to demand gender equity and the strategies necessary to achieve it.

Second, women must be ready, willing, and able to take a stand. The first step is a revival of old-fashioned consciousness-raising. We need to increase awareness of gender inequities and inspire a passion for challenging them. This will, in turn, require some willingness to assume short-term risks in the interest of long-term gains. As political theorists and activists across the globe remind us, there are no substitutes for speaking truth to power. Of course, that strategy must be selective. In order to reach positions of influence, women need to target their efforts and pick battles that they have some prospect of winning. But the challenge is to succeed within organizations without losing the capacity or commitment to change them. Silence in the face of inequality can only perpetuate it.

Third, women must take collective action. Fundamental change begins with individual commitment, but it requires group efforts. Women need to be more strategic in forging alliances and enlisting the collaboration of other individuals, small groups, and large organizations in the interest of common causes. Since the 1960s, both national and grassroots women's groups, all with their own particular missions and constituencies, have dramatically increased in size and number. But unity, even around key issues, has been lacking. Moreover, attempts to involve women from different points along the socioeconomic and demographic spectrum have been insufficient.

We need also to include men in our struggle. Women must insist, endlessly it seems, that the most crucial women's issues are issues not only for women. They are concerns in which both sexes have a stake. Increasing numbers of men want more balance in their lives. And their families, communities, and workplaces would benefit greatly if they achieved it. As a growing body of research makes clear, balanced lives serve bottom lines; they reduce employers' training and recruitment expenses and improve workers' health and productivity. A diverse workforce serves equally important objectives. In today's increasingly competitive global economy, no organization can secure long-term success with policies that penalize half of the talent pool for leadership.

We cannot know with any certainty what, in an ideal world, women would truly want. But in this far from perfect world, we know well enough what women do not want—enough to forge a constructive agenda for reform. Forcing professionals of either sex to opt on or off leadership tracks as they are currently structured is not the answer. Choice on these terms is not a solution. It is part of the problem. ✦

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

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

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

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Warren Bennis

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2-4-6-8, EVERYBODY INTEGRATE

The Encyclopedia of Leadership **Reviewed by Miles F. Shore, M.D.**

by George Goethals and Georgia Sorenson, General Editors; James MacGregor Burns, Senior Editor

According to the Latin and Greek origins of the word, an encyclopedia is supposed to provide a general education in a particular field. The editors of the *Encyclopedia of Leadership* have chosen to do so with a formidable work that covers a vast array of areas related to leadership. In four volumes, 1,927 pages, and 1.2 million words, its 373 entries by 309 contributors offer information on nineteen different topic areas, from Arts and Intellectual Leadership through Case Studies, Cross Cultural, and Situational Factors to Women and Gender. Some of the authors qualify as originators of concepts or studies of leadership. Others are scholars whose knowledge of the subject reflects years of teaching and study in the field. A reasonable number are leaders who can describe the phenomena of leadership as experienced. Whatever the source, the entries reflect judicious appraisal of the concepts and thorough documentation. And at an aggregate fifteen pounds, the encyclopedia, when consulted, offers the assiduous leadership scholar a lagniappe of fitness training.



The editors have something larger in mind than solely a broad sweep of the field of leadership. Referring to the role of Diderot's eighteenth-century *Encyclopedie* in propagating work on the ideas of the French Enlightenment, James MacGregor Burns, the senior editor, suggests that the *Encyclopedia of Leadership* may play a similar role in stimulating leadership studies. Burns, whose classic work *Leadership* helped to define the field, argues that leadership is a discipline that draws substantially from other disciplines: philosophy, sociology, political science, anthropology, and, of course, psychology. And he notes that leadership studies, in turn, contribute to each of these disciplines by offering real-world tests of theory and a set of unique human experiences that may contribute constructively to these other disciplines.

> Leadership studies apply methods from a variety of disciplines to examine the relationship between leaders and followers.

In positing that such a broadly cast field as leadership is a discipline, the Encyclopedia follows a recent trend in rethinking established disciplines that have been based in analytic methods. The medical sciences have, in the past 100 years, gone beyond the whole person to tissues, cells, and subcellular structures such as mitochondria, chromosomes, and genes.

More recently, medical scientists have become aware of the limits of analytic methods that study finer and finer elements of biological systems. A new movement to study the interaction of those elements is taking shape.

Likewise, the "New History" launched some forty years ago sent historical studies in a new direction. Moving beyond traditional history, which dealt with the vicissitudes of nation-states, wars, treaties, rulers and other prominent protagonists, the new historians used modern methods of data analysis and statistical treatments to recapture the fine grain of human experience, often of ordinary people. Of late, a reaction to the analytic methods of the New History has opened a new conversation about the appropriate dimensions of historical scholarship. As in medical science, more and more in-depth information about smaller and smaller elements of data has been thought by at least some scholars to be an impediment to useful understanding of the past. The call has gone out to balance analytic historical studies with a renewal of narrative history, which integrates disparate elements to give a broad picture, useful to those who wish to apply the lessons of history to present dilemmas. In this conversation, narrative history would obviously draw upon analytic studies to weave a richer context than was available when narrative history occupied center stage.

In this climate of integration of fields of knowledge, leadership may find a congenial reception for its claims of status as a discipline. Rather than being defined as a discipline by a particular method, or by a particular set of elements not addressed in the same way by another field of study, leadership can confidently assert its status as an integrative discipline, applying a variety of methods

from a variety of disciplines to study the peculiar relationship between leaders and followers in all its combinations and permutations.

The *Encyclopedia of Leadership* exuberantly supports such an assertion. Its content ranges widely across fields of interest, periods of history, and national and ethnic divides. There are myriad biographies of leaders. Some are ones you would expect: Roosevelt, Stalin, Grant, Charlemagne, Jomo Kenyatta, Mao Zedong, and Winston Churchill. More surprising are Confucius, Walt Disney, Coco Chanel, Vince Lombardi, Saladin, and Shaka Zulu. Case studies include the demise of apartheid, the Bay of Pigs, Green parties, the Jonestown mass suicide, the Lewis and Clark expedition, D-Day, the founding of East Timor, and Ben and Jerry's ice cream. Of course there is a host of entries on politics and government. Fewer in number but still significant are entries on the arts and intellectual leadership. They include Mozart, Beethoven, Martha Graham, Pablo Picasso, Rachel Carson, and the Beatles. In these entries, the challenge to highlight the leadership aspects of their subjects' careers is variably met. The discussion of Picasso is an average art history account of his career, with little emphasis on his leadership. In contrast, the article on Beethoven discusses, with effective nuance, how his abrasive style coupled with an uncompromising commitment to humane values was the basis of his artistic and personal influence—i.e., his leadership.

In a number of categories, the issues of particular interest to scholars of leadership are given ample and rich treatment. Leadership styles, for example, are addressed in several entries, among them: Autocratic Leadership, Dysfunctional Leadership, Innovative Leadership, Shared Leadership, and Strategic Leadership. The Personal Characteristics of Leaders category includes discussions of Charisma, Creativity, Optimism, Tacit Knowledge, Ethics, Achievement, Motivation, and the Big Five Personality Traits. The authors are often scholars who have specialized in the areas under discussion. The entries are thus authoritative and heavily documented, while avoiding the narrowness of doctrinaire presentation-by-guru. For example, the entry on Followership, written by a major scholar of that concept, is a model of comprehensive exposition with a crisp history of the term and the concept, a schematization of followership styles, a description of the various paths to followership, external influences, and the ethics of followership. A sidebar presents a long excerpt from "Of Followers and Friends," written by Francis Bacon in the sixteenth century, warning against certain types of followers.

The discussion of Emotional Intelligence (EI) is similarly skillful. While offering a respectful presentation of Daniel Goleman's books and articles, which have made the concept of emotional intelligence available to a large popular audience, author David R. Caruso of Yale begins his essay on EI with a description of the scholarly work of Salovey and Mayer on which Goleman based his original publications. The article is appropriately critical of the concept in the best sense, raising questions about the existence of emotional intelligence, its role in leadership, whether it can be measured, and how it can be applied to the practice of leadership. It ends with cautionary advice about how to ensure that EI makes a positive contribution to the study and practice of leadership.

For a book written by multiple authors, the *Encyclopedia of Leadership* is remarkably easy to read, reflecting skilled editing. The articles are lucid, interesting, informative, and impressively documented. The illustrations are both decorative and useful. Particularly helpful is the format of the book, which makes it unusually easy to use. Taking their cue from the computer revolution, all four volumes begin with the same list of entries organized alphabetically, followed by a reader's guide that groups related entries under topics—Arts and Intellectual Leadership, Biographies, Business, Case Studies, etc. There follows an alphabetical list of sidebars such as Bay

"Hmm, what would Satan do?"

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of Pigs, Rachel Carson, Modern Olympics Movement, and War on Terrorism. The reader in search of a particular topic thus has several points of entry.

The *Encyclopedia of Leadership* is a massive work that may well fulfill its aspirations as a stimulus to the flowering of leadership as an academic discipline. Whatever that fate, there is no question that it will serve a host of audiences as the unequivocal reference and authority in the field for years to come. For teachers of leadership it offers an authoritative entrée to a rich helping of topics, with copious references to the pertinent literature following each article. It also is a goldmine of examples of leadership, both good and dysfunctional, with enough personal detail to serve anyone wishing to illustrate presentations on leadership. For fledgling or advanced students of leadership, it is a reliable guide to the major scholars, topics, and literature, organized skillfully for easy access. Its "Bibliography of Significant Books on Leadership" will be useful to guide students of leadership at whatever level to major sources of information. It also offers a comprehensive directory of leadership programs throughout the world—some 250 in all—with guidance to websites that keep track of developments in such programs.

The *Encyclopedia of Leadership* is a model of a modern reference book that should be in every professional library, taking its place alongside other distinguished reference works. It also belongs in the personal collection of every person seriously interested in leadership, whether as student, scholar, or practitioner. ✦

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DOT-CONNED: FOLLOWERS AND FOLLY

An excerpt from *Bad Leadership,* the new book by Barbara Kellerman



BAD LEADERSHIP IS A GROUP EFFORT. *So argues Barbara Kellerman in* Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters, *published in September as part of the Leadership for the Common Good series, a partnership between Harvard Business School Press and the Center for Public Leadership at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Kellerman, research director of the Center, offers case studies to illustrate the seven types of bad leadership: incompetent, rigid, intemperate, callous, corrupt, insular, and evil. Leadership, she contends, is not the work of one person but a web woven by leaders and followers within a particular social and political context.*

During the dot-com boom of the late 1990s, Mary Meeker was the star stock-picker at the firm then called Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. Meeker believed in the Internet's wealth-creating potential, and thousands of investors relied on her pronouncements. Her optimism didn't waver even as it became clear that the bubble was popping. But if she rigidly refused to acknowledge reality, so did her followers. In this excerpt, Kellerman describes followers' contributions to the collective folly known as the dot-com mania.

THE FOLLOWERS

AMERICANS ARE SPOILED. IN ONE GENERATION the average American home grew from fifteen hundred square feet to about twenty-two hundred square feet, and nearly three-quarters of new American cars have cruise control and power door locks. We spend $40 billion a year on our lawns alone—an amount roughly equal to the entire federal tax revenue of India. In fact, those among us who are members of college-graduate households are richer than 99.9 percent of all human beings who have ever lived. But still we want more.

Moreover, because (as discussed in chapter 2) Americans are optimists who trust the system, we are willing to place bets on getting rich quickly. This explains at least in part why, during the 1990s, many of us speculated in markets that had already gone way up. As David Brooks has put it, "The lure of plenty, pervading the [American] landscape, encourages risk and adventure." An article in *Journal of International Business Studies* confirms that Americans are more comfortable with the idea of taking risks, including financial risks, than citizens of any of the other nine nations studied.

This tells us something about the base on which the New Economy was built. It also helps to explain why by 2001, nearly half of all American households held stocks either directly or through mutual funds.

Mary Meeker could not have been a leader in the financial services industry without legions of followers willing to put their money where her mouth was. She was the expert who told us what to believe and how to behave, and we freely went along. Because many of us continued to buy after the market had, by every historical measure, climbed too far too fast, it can fairly be claimed that the Internet boom and subsequent bust were as much our fault as they were the fault of Wall Street professionals who misled us. In other words, even though Meeker stayed stuck, her bad leadership depended absolutely on those of us who were so eager to make a killing that we fell in line.

Throughout the go-go nineties, Meeker's followers remained in hot pursuit. In 1999, Morgan Stanley's telephone operators took more calls for Meeker than for anyone else at the firm. On a typical day, she received numerous voice and e-mail messages and many requests for interviews and appearances. To cope with the clamor, Morgan Stanley provided Meeker with a staff of six.

Meeker's bid to add to the ranks of investors in her thrall was strongly supported by, among others, the media. As Cassidy observed, the overall standard of reporting during the dot-com heyday was dismal. The print media had fawned over and finally crowned Meeker "queen," and the electronic media, especially CNBC, had become a fan club for corporate America. "All across the country—in bars, banks, health clubs, airports, and doctors' waiting rooms—televisions were permanently switched to CNBC. The network's reporters didn't hype stocks directly. Rather they helped to create a populist investing culture in which adulation of the stock market was the norm."

Moreover, for years CNBC acted as if there was no such thing as a conflict of interest. Network anchors failed to question guest analysts about dual loyalties. Nor were fund managers asked about positions they held in the stocks they touted. But of course, it takes two: one to sell and one to buy, one to lead and one to follow. Although the CNBC audience had good reason to believe that the so-called experts were objective analysts, many investors chose not to question the experts, not to cast doubt on those in positions of authority. Like Meeker herself, they—we—preferred to believe good news rather than bad; and so they—we—continued to hold even after the suspiciously rapid and strong run-up in prices.

Meeker also received support from the larger community of investment professionals. Although there were some exceptions—some financial analysts who kept their feet on the ground while the Internet bubble swelled—most, like Meeker, were caught up in the frenzy of speculation that characterizes a stock market bubble shortly before it bursts. In other words, Meeker belonged to a like-minded group whose members bought into the idea of a New Economy. Genuine dissidents were few, and even the occasional dissenting voices were drowned out by cheerleaders for Wall Street. The overwhelming majority of those who peopled the financial services industry shared Meeker's disposition to positive thinking.

Meeker's third source of support, however tacit, came from government regulators who did not seek aggressively to protect the interests of ordinary investors. The mutual fund scandals that broke in 2003—mainly because of ground-breaking investigations by New York State Attorney General Elliot Spitzer—are no more and no less than another example of the degree to which the government colluded in the excesses, if only unwittingly. This is not to absolve Meeker of bad leadership. Rather it is to indicate that she was part of a go-go economy in which those who were supposed to exercise oversight, but did not, also played a part.

On the day the World Trade Center was attacked, the bear market was eighteen months old. The Dow had reached its high in January 2000, and the NASDAQ three months later. Between 1990 and 2000, $14 trillion in paper wealth was created. But by 2001, only one year later, $4.5 trillion had vaporized.

It was around December 2000 that the conventional wisdom started to change. Voices of caution were heard more frequently, and they had a greater sense of urgency. The *New York Times* featured articles with headlines such as "How Did So Many Get It So Wrong?" and "Buy, They Say, But What Do They Do?" The *Montreal Gazette* warned its readers, "Don't Follow the Herd: Investors Shouldn't Rely on Stock Analysts' Advice." And Mary Meeker was savaged for having advised followers to buy Priceline at $165 a share in 1999 and then falling "silent" as the stock collapsed less than a year later.

By 2001, many of Meeker's erstwhile followers were disenchanted. The "days when investors reacted to a favorable mention from Meeker by bidding a company's stock up ten or twenty points" were over. In fact, Meeker's rigid refusal to change course during the changing times finally incurred her followers' wrath to such a degree that some turned on her full force: They sued her. In August 2001, the onetime queen of the Internet was the target of a trio of class action lawsuits alleging that her analysis of three stocks—AOL Time Warner, Amazon.com, and eBay—was biased. The suit charged that Meeker had acted not as an objective analyst but rather as a subjective salesperson whose main interest was to keep her corporate clients happy. Meeker was accused of being "virtually indistinguishable from an investment banker."

Meeker's rigid refusal to change course during changing times finally incurred her followers' wrath to the degree that some sued her.

Although the eight class action lawsuits against Mary Meeker were ultimately dismissed, the fact that they were filed is revealing. During the mid- to late 1990s, investors, especially individual investors as opposed to institutional investors, had good reason to believe that Meeker was providing advice based on her own independent research and judgment. But by 2001, many of Meeker's followers were angry over their losses, and some even felt duped. Ignoring their own earlier eagerness to follow the lead of a woman who symbolized the New Economy, they lashed out. The queen was dethroned by her subjects who only two years earlier had hung on her every word. ✦

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SHOULD HAVE SEEN IT COMING

An excerpt from *Predictable Surprises,* by Max H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins

Why don't we act on what we know? That's the question asked by Max H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins at the beginning of Part II of their new book, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them. *The book is part of the Leadership for the Common Good Series, a partnership between Harvard Business School Press and the Center for Public Leadership. Books in the series aim to provoke conversations about the role of leaders in business, government, and society, to enrich leadership theory and enhance leadership practice, and to set the agenda for defining effective leadership in the future.*

Bazerman and Watkins define a predictable surprise as "an event or set of events that take an individual or group by surprise, despite prior awareness of all the information necessary to anticipate the events and their consequences." In their book, they examine why predictable surprises occur and argue that they grow out of an identifiable set of human and systemic weaknesses and biases. They then suggest how leaders can overcome those weaknesses and biases and learn to anticipate and prevent predictable surprises. The authors use real-life events to make their case, showing, for example, how federal authorities might have assembled evidence from a range of sources and "connected the dots" in time to prevent the atrocities of September 11, 2001.

In the excerpt that follows, Bazerman and Watkins explore the cognitive roots of predictable surprises—the mental hard-wiring that regularly leads us to underestimate the severity of problems, interpret events in self-serving fashion, and strive to maintain the status quo until confronted by vivid evidence that such a course will lead to disaster. The example they use to advance their argument—the depletion of Atlantic fish stocks—may initially seem far-fetched, but the behavior that they describe turns out to be a classic instance of a predictable surprise and of what economists call the tragedy of the commons.

COGNITIVE ROOTS

The Role of Human Biases

Think of the typical environmental activist, and you are unlikely to picture a chef in a busy kitchen, doling out hundreds of servings of meat and seafood a night. Yet many of the chefs who, throughout the 1980s and 90s, introduced their customers to exotic dishes such as swordfish, Chilean sea bass, monkfish, sand dabs, Pacific snapper, and turbot now recognize that they fostered an unsustainable appetite for these species. They've since become leaders of a grassroots boycott of endangered fish, aiming to raise public awareness of the problem and give threatened species time to recover. The chefs became activists only after other groups, particularly national governments, failed to convince fishers of the need for changes in their harvesting behavior. By 2002, more than five hundred chefs nationwide had taken Chilean sea bass off of their menus. Since restaurants account for 70 percent of seafood sales, the chefs' boycott has had a real impact.

But for many formerly plentiful and popular fish species, as well as entire fishing communities, the boycott came decades too late. In the 1960s, improved fishing technology subsidized by governments led to unsustainable fishing practices along the coast of New England. Trawlers from around the world descended upon the region, guided by Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, and depleted one fishing area after another. Within years, a supply of healthy, tasty fish that had thrived for centuries suddenly fell into jeopardy.

Facing considerable political pressure from the fishers, the U.S. government slowly moved to expand its coastal waters and push back foreign boats. Before long, domestic fishers were fighting tenaciously for an increasingly small fraction of a scarce resource. In 1977, the New England Council enacted fishing quotas on cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder, but under heavy lobbying from the fishers, revoked the limits in 1982.

Time and again, fishers shrugged off warnings from scientists that their livelihood would never recover if they did not harvest at sustainable levels. Positioning the mounting crisis as a choice between saving fish versus saving jobs, the fishers successfully lobbied the federal government to continue its financial support of fishing fleets. In doing so, the government not only failed to reverse the trend but actually contributed to an increase in the rate of extinction. Halibut, haddock, and cod disappeared from the Grand Banks, and fishers switched to less desirable dogfish, skate, and monkfish. Bluefin tuna fishers moved on to swordfish; when swordfish disappeared, the fishers pursued yellowfin tuna. Atlantic halibut, haddock, and cod have been replaced by smaller, less tasty, and more polluted fish.

In 2002, Ransom Myers and Boris Worm published the most extensive summary to date of the decline of the world's supply of the biggest and most important fish species, based on detailed global analyses. They document the disappearance of 90 percent of each of the world's largest ocean species, including swordfish, marlin, cod, halibut, and tuna.

They further show that it takes only about fifteen years for humans to destroy 80 percent of the population of any given species once that species has been targeted for exploitation. According to private analysts and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, fishing subsidies amounted to about $15 billion per year as of 2003—or more than a quarter of the $55 billion annual global seafood trade. "With modern satellite technology, fish finders and global positioning equipment, you can track and kill the last fish," Phil Kline, a former fishing-boat captain who advises the conservation group Oceana on policy, told the *Los Angeles Times*. "There is no place for fish to hide. It's like the era of the buffalo."

The destruction of fisheries worldwide in modern times is one of the most clear-cut predictable surprises that the natural environment has ever faced. Species have diminished due to frenzied harvesting caused by too many fishers hunting down too many fish. Again and again, biologists warn governments of the threat of species depletion and even extinction; the government at first ignores but eventually accepts the data; fishers lobby against action; and the government backs off and continues its industry subsidies. By the time the government finally takes action, the long-term value of the fisheries has been destroyed, and the fishers find themselves out of business anyway.

Time after the time, governments and fishers take far too long to act. Why?

The problem of overfishing is an example of a collective action problem known as "the tragedy of the commons." Collectively all the fishers would be better off if the common resource ("the commons") were conserved. But because each individual fisher has incentives to overconsume the resource, he can be expected to block cooperative agreements that would ensure the long-term health and sustainability of fish stocks. The predictable result of such irrational behavior is the depletion of fishing basins and species extinction. In chapter 5, we will show how incentives function within commons dilemmas and we will focus on the root cause of such incentives: the innate cognitive biases that predispose people to behave in a manner that, in the long term, harms them, the organizations they belong to, and society as a whole.



In the last few decades, researchers have shown that human judgment and decision-making deviates from rationality. People rely on simplifying strategies, or cognitive heuristics, that lead them to make predictable errors. These errors, identified by behavioral decision researchers, have been applied to medicine, law, business, and public policy. In this chapter, we use this literature to describe and document the five cognitive biases most clearly responsible for predictable surprises:

1. We tend to have positive illusions that lead us to conclude that a problem doesn't exist or is not severe enough to merit action.

2. We tend to interpret events in an egocentric manner. That is, when considering the fairness of proposed solutions to a looming crisis, we allocate credit and blame in ways that are self-serving.

3. We overly discount the future, reducing our courage to act now to prevent some disaster that we believe to be quite distant.

4. We tend to maintain the status quo and refuse to accept any harm that would bring about a greater good. In other words, we are reluctant to accept that some dramatic change will occur if we fail to address a mounting problem. Rather than confront unpalatable choices, we avoid action altogether.

5. Most of us don't want to invest in preventing a problem that we have not personally experienced or witnessed through vivid data. Thus, far too often, we only fix problems after we ourselves experience significant harm or after we can clearly imagine ourselves or those close to us in peril.

In the remainder of the chapter, we explore these common biases and connect them to a number of other predictable surprises. We also show how biases can infect your own work decisions, and we provide advice for eliminating them from your behavioral repertoire. As you will see, these cognitive mistakes resonate with the stories presented in earlier chapters and permeate the common failure to respond to predictable surprises. ✦

In the last few decades, researchers have shown that human judgment and decision-making deviates from rationality. People rely on simplifying strategies that lead them to make predictable errors.

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Commitment to Public Service

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Harvard University has a long and proud tradition of leadership in public life, from educating the future leaders of the United States and the world to an unparalleled excellence in research and scholarship directed at the pressing issues that affect the quality of life in this country and across the globe.

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Zuckerman Fellows will receive one year of tuition and health insurance fees and a stipend of $30,000. In addition to the training Fellows will receive at the Graduate School of Education, the Kennedy School of Government, or the School of Public Health, they will participate in a co-curricular program that will allow Fellows to learn from one another's academic and professional experience, explore leadership challenges and failures, and meet eminent practioners of leadership in seminars and field trips.

Zuckerman Fellows will be chosen based on leadership ability, intellectual and academic accomplishment, integrity, character, and a serious commitment to public service. In all cases, Fellows will need to secure admission to the Graduate School of Education, Kennedy School of Government, or School of Public Health through the normal admissions process.

For more information, please visit **www.scholarship.harvard.edu.**



HARVARD

Meet the Executive Director

October 2004 marks the one-year anniversary of Betsy Myers's arrival at the Center for Public Leadership as Executive Director.

The Center's primary mission is to create a better world through better leadership. To Myers, that means, first and foremost, serving the future leaders of tomorrow at the Kennedy School, where Myers herself studied as a Public Service Fellow, earning a master's in public administration in 2000. Using data gathered in student focus groups, Myers has launched a series of leadership conversations with KSG faculty, as well as practitioners from diverse disciplines and professions. In addition, CPL Director David Gergen will lead monthly discussions focusing on the leadership aspects of current events such as the fall 2004 presidential campaigns. And Senior Fellow Shalom Saar will teach and facilitate a series of leadership skill-building workshops entitled "Know Thyself."

Before joining CPL, Myers served as Director of Alumni Affairs at the Kennedy School. From 1993 to 1997, she served in government, first as the Small Business Administration's director for the Office of Women's Business Ownership and later as deputy assistant to President Clinton and first director of the Office of Women's Initiatives. In this capacity, Myers became widely known as a national speaker and advocate for women's issues. Some well-known features of Myers's tenure in the White House were the discussions she arranged between senior administration officials (including Harvard University President Larry Summers) and women around the country. Myers would distill the findings from thousands of such conversations into policy recommendations.

Herself an entrepreneur, Myers founded Myers Insurance and Financial Services in Los Angeles. The firm specialized in serving women-owned businesses, providing insurance, employee benefits, and retirement planning and investment advice. She lives in Watertown, Massachusetts, with her husband, Rob Keller, and daughter, Madison. ✦

"The Problem That Has No Name"

In recent American history no one proved the power of the pen more persuasively than Betty Friedan. By means of a single book, excerpted below, she played a pivotal part in raising the consciousness of American women. She changed how they thought and, within a few years, how they behaved.

Friedan's achievement is the more remarkable because her 1963 cry for change was to an audience that was not, in any conventional sense of this word, oppressed. Friedan was onto something momentous in *The Feminine Mystique*. There was a problem that had no name—a problem she identified forevermore.

Change does not take place in a vacuum. It is no accident that *The Feminine Mystique* was published the same year as Martin Luther King's *Letters from a Birmingham Jail*. The time was ripe for voices long muted to be heard.

—Barbara Kellerman

Excerpt from Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique *(Norton, 1963)*

The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the middle of the twentieth century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and Brownies, lay beside her husband at night—she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question—"Is this all?"

For over fifteen years there was no word of this yearning in the millions of words written about women, for women, in all the columns, books and articles by experts telling women their role was to seek fulfillment as wives and mothers. Over and over women heard in voices of tradition and of Freudian sophistication that they could desire no greater destiny than to glory in their own femininity. Experts told them how to catch a man and keep him; how to breastfeed children and handle their toilet training, how to cope with sibling rivalry and adolescent rebellion; how to buy a dishwasher, bake bread, cook gourmet snails, and build a swimming pool with their own hands; how to dress, look, and act more feminine and make marriage more exciting; how to keep their husbands from dying young and their sons from growing into delinquents. They were taught to pity the neurotic, unfeminine, unhappy women who wanted to be poets or physicists or presidents. They learned that truly feminine women do not want careers, higher education, political rights—the independence and the opportunities that the old-fashioned feminists fought for. Some women, in their forties and fifties, still remembered painfully giving up those dreams, but most of the younger women no longer even thought about them....

It is easy to see the concrete details that trap the suburban housewife, the continual demands on her time. But the chains that bind her in her trap are chains in her own mind and spirit.

How can any woman see the whole truth within the bounds of her own life? How can she believe that voice inside herself, when it denies the conventional, accepted truths by which she has been living?...

I became aware of a growing body of evidence, much of which has not been reported publicly because it does not fit current modes of thought about women—evidence which throws into question the standards of feminine normality, feminine adjustment, feminine fulfillment, and feminine maturity by which most women are still trying to live.

I began to see in a strange new light the American return to early marriage and the large families that are causing the population explosion: the recent movement to natural childbirth and breastfeeding; suburban conformity; and the new neuroses, character pathologies and sexual problems being reported by the doctors. I began to see new dimensions to old problems that have long been taken for granted among women: menstrual difficulties, sexual frigidity, promiscuity, pregnancy fears, childbirth depression, the high incidence of emotional breakdown and suicide among women in their twenties and thirties, the menopause crises, the so-called passivity and immaturity of American men, the discrepancy between women's tested intellectual abilities in childhood and their adult achievement, the changing incidence of adult sexual orgasm in American women, and the persistent problems in psychotherapy and in women's education.

If I am right, the problem that has no name stirring in the minds of so many American women today is not a matter of loss of femininity or too much education, or the demands of domesticity. It is far more important than anyone recognizes.... It may well be the key to our future as a nation and a culture. We can no longer ignore that voice within women that says: "I want something more than my husband and my children and my home." ✦

Friedan Photo: © Corbis; Myers photo: © Tom Fitzsimmons

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