Online Appendix
Why do Armed Groups Return to War After Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration? Introducing the DDR-40 Dataset (1980-2020)

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February 8, 2026

Contents

1 Data Sources **4**
- 1.1 Academic and Non-Academic Sources . . . 4
- 1.2 LexisNexis News Articles . . . 4
- 1.3 Consultations with Officials . . . 4
- 1.4 Inter-Coder Reliability . . . 4
- 1.5 Ethics and Transparency Procedures . . . 5

2 Programs in DDR-40 **6**

3 Codebook **18**
- 3.1 Variables in DDR-40 . . . 18
- 3.2 DDR Program Features . . . 19
  - 3.2.1 DDR ID-Year (`id_year`) . . . 19
  - 3.2.2 Conflict ID (`conflict_id`) . . . 19
  - 3.2.3 Target Group(s) for DDR (`groups`) . . . 19
  - 3.2.4 Target Numbers for DDR (`numbers`) . . . 19
  - 3.2.5 Multiple Groups (`multiple_groups`) . . . 19
  - 3.2.6 Group Type (`group_type`) . . . 20
  - 3.2.7 Cantonment (`cantonment`) . . . 20
  - 3.2.8 DDR Establishment (`establishment`) . . . 20
  - 3.2.9 DDR Execution Body (`execution`) . . . 20
  - 3.2.10 DDR Budget (`budget`) . . . 21
  - 3.2.11 Disarmament (`disarmament_implementation`) . . . 21
  - 3.2.12 Demobilization (`demobilization_implementation`) . . . 22
  - 3.2.13 Reintegration (`reintegration_implementation`) . . . 22
- 3.3 Peace Accord Provisions and Implementation . . . 23

3.3.1 Amnesty Provision (amnesty_provision) . . . 23
3.3.2 Amnesty Implementation (amnesty_implementation) . . . 23
3.3.3 Prisoner Release Provision (prisoner_release_provision) . . . 23
3.3.4 Prisoner Release Implementation (prisoner_release_implementation) 24
3.3.5 Truth or Reconciliation Provision (truth_reconciliation_provision) 24
3.3.6 Truth or Reconciliation Implementation (truth_reconciliation_implementation) . . . 24
3.3.7 Women's Rights Provision (womens_rights_provision) . . . 25
3.3.8 Women's Rights Implementation (womens_rights_implementation) . . . 25
3.3.9 Children's Rights Provision (childrens_rights_provision) . . . 26
3.3.10 Children's Rights Implementation (childrens_rights_implementation) . . . 26
3.3.11 Boundary Demarcation Provision (boundary_demarcation_provision) . . . 26
3.3.12 Boundary Demarcation Implementation (boundary_demarcation_implementation) . . . 27
3.3.13 Decentralization/Federalism Provision (decentralization_provision) . . . 27
3.3.14 Decentralization/Federalism Implementation (decentralization_implementation) . . . 27
3.3.15 Dispute Resolution Committee Provision (dispute_resolution_provision) . . . 28
3.3.16 Dispute Resolution Committee Implementation (dispute_resolution_implementation) . . . 28
3.3.17 Constitutional Reform Provision (constitutional_reform_provision) . . . 29
3.3.18 Constitutional Reform Implementation (constitutional_reform_implementation) . . . 29
3.3.19 Electoral/Political Party Reform Provision (electoral_reform_provision) . . . 29
3.3.20 Electoral/Political Party Reform Implementation (electoral_reform_implementation) . . . 30
3.3.21 Executive Reform Provision (executive_reform_provision) . . . 30
3.3.22 Executive Reform Implementation (executive_reform_implementation) . . . 31
3.3.23 Judiciary Reform Provision (judiciary_reform_provision) . . . 31
3.3.24 Judiciary Reform Implementation (judiciary_reform_implementation) . . . 31
3.3.25 Military Reform Provision (military_reform_provision) . . . 32

3.3.26 Military Reform Implementation (military_reform_implementation) . . . 32
3.3.27 Legislative Reform Provision (legislative_reform_provision) . . . 33
3.3.28 Legislative Reform Implementation (legislative_reform_implementation) . . . 33
3.3.29 Economic and Social Development Provision (development_provision) . . . 33
3.3.30 Economic and Social Development Implementation (development_implementation) . . . 34
3.3.31 Natural Resource Management Reform Provision (natural_resources_provision) . . . 34
3.3.32 Natural Resource Management Reform Implementation (natural_resources_implementation) . . . 35
3.4 Outcomes . . . 35
3.4.1 Rearmed during DDR (rearmed) . . . 35
3.4.2 Factions Rearmed during DDR (factions_rearmed) . . . 35
3.4.3 Rearmed post-DDR (rearmed_post_ddr) . . . 36
3.4.4 Date of Recurrence (recurrence_date) . . . 36
3.4.5 Recurrence Side B (recurred_side_b) . . . 36
3.4.6 Recurrence Conflict ID (recurred_conflict_id) . . . 36

4 Descriptive Statistics 37

5 Preliminary Data Analysis 40

1. Data Sources

1.1. Academic and Non-Academic Sources

The dataset was compiled using a range of sources, including academic books and journal articles, as well as non-academic materials across nine languages representing the official languages of the countries in the dataset: English, French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Persian, Arabic, and Urdu. Non-academic sources include peace and ceasefire agreements, UN Secretary-General reports, U.S. Department of State country assessments, publications from the Organization for International Migration (IOM), truth commission findings, World Bank publications, reports from human rights organizations, and LexisNexis news articles. The multilingual approach ensured a thorough examination of DDR programs. Cross-checking these varied materials permits triangulation of troop estimates, budget figures, and yearly implementation scores.

1.2. LexisNexis News Articles

Daily and weekly newspapers indexed in LexisNexis complemented official documents by providing near–real-time reporting on the implementation of DDR and other terms of peace agreements. For each program-year, I ran language-specific keyword searches (e.g., "desarme" + "FARC" + year) and coded only those items corroborated by at least one additional source. These press accounts often supply the first public record of shifts in program funding, leadership changes in DDR commissions, or emerging splinter factions, information that is later confirmed in UN or NGO reports but at a much slower cadence.

1.3. Consultations with Officials

For programs launched before robust online archiving existed or in settings where official transparency is limited, I conducted semi-structured consultations with practitioners at UN Headquarters, the World Bank's Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), and national DDR commissions. These conversations yielded internal memos, budget execution spreadsheets, and end-of-mission "lessons-learned" notes that are not publicly available but are cited in aggregate form in the narrative justifications. Practitioner feedback also helped refine coding rules: for example, distinguishing between temporary "weapons registration" drives and genuine disarmament, or clarifying when reinsertion stipends counted as the first tranche of a multi-year reintegration package. All confidential documents were stored on encrypted drives, and only de-identified, program-level information was transferred to the public dataset.

1.4. Inter-Coder Reliability

Three graduate students completed a one-week training on the codebook and decision rules, after which each independently recoded a stratified 70 percent sample. Agreement was high across the board: Krippendorff's α reached .82 for disarmament implementation, .79 for demobilization, and .77 for reintegration, while Cohen's κ exceeded .80 for all binary indicators. Every discrepancy was resolved in a two-step adjudication: coders first revisited

the cited passage together, and if ambiguity persisted the author consulted supplementary sources to make a final determination.

1.5. Ethics and Transparency Procedures

Consistent with the desk-research guidelines set out by Hoover Green and Cohen (2021), this project adopted four safeguards to protect human subjects indirectly represented in source documents and to maximize production transparency. First, all observations are derived from documents that are publicly accessible. No privileged or personally identifying material is reproduced. Second, whenever primary documents list individual names, village-level camp locations, or weapons serial numbers, those details are aggregated to the program–year level before entry. The released data therefore cannot be used to re-identify former combatants or pinpoint stockpiles. Third, each numeric code is linked in the program narrative to a specific page or paragraph of the underlying document and the full source matrix is deposited on Harvard Dataverse.

2. Programs in DDR-40

Table 1: List of DDR Programs with Rearmament Outcomes

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Afghanistan - 2003	333	1	1	1	333
Afghanistan - 2004	333	1	1	1	333
Afghanistan - 2005	333	1	1	1	333
Afghanistan - 2006	333	1	1	1	333
Afghanistan - 2007	333	1	1	1	333
Afghanistan - 2008	333	1	1	1	333
Angola - I - 1991	327	1	1	1	327
Angola - I - 1992	327	1	1	1	327
Angola - II - 1995	327	1	1	1	327
Angola - II - 1996	327	1	1	1	327
Angola - II - 1997	327	1	1	1	327
Angola - II - 1998	327	1	1	1	327
Angola - III - 2002	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2003	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2004	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2005	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2006	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2007	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2008	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - III - 2009	0	0	0	0	0
Angola - IV - 2003	387	1	1	1	387
Angola - IV - 2004	387	1	1	1	387
Angola - IV - 2005	387	1	1	1	387
Angola - IV - 2006	387	1	1	1	387
Angola - IV - 2007	387	1	1	1	387
Bangladesh - 1998	322	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 1996	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 1997	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 1998	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 1999	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2000	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2001	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2002	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2003	397	0	0	0	0

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Bosnia - 2004	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2005	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2006	397	0	0	0	0
Bosnia - 2007	397	0	0	0	0
Burundi - I - 2004	287	0	1	0	287
Burundi - I - 2005	287	0	1	0	287
Burundi - I - 2006	287	0	1	0	287
Burundi - I - 2007	287	0	1	0	287
Burundi - I - 2008	287	0	1	0	287
Burundi - II - 2009	287	0	0	1	287
Burundi - II - 2010	287	0	0	1	287
Burundi - II - 2011	287	0	0	1	287
CAR - I - 1997	416	0	0	1	416
CAR - I - 1998	416	0	0	1	416
CAR - I - 1999	416	0	0	1	416
CAR - I - 2000	416	0	0	1	416
CAR - II - 2004	416	1	1	1	416
CAR - II - 2005	416	1	1	1	416
CAR - II - 2006	416	1	1	1	416
CAR - II - 2007	416	1	1	1	416
CAR - II - 2008	416	1	1	1	416
CAR - III - 2015	416	1	1	NA	NA
CAR - III - 2016	416	1	1	NA	NA
CAR - III - 2017	416	1	1	NA	NA
CAR - III - 2018	416	1	1	NA	NA
CAR - III - 2019	416	1	1	NA	NA
CAR - III - 2020	416	1	1	NA	NA
Cambodia - I - 1992	300	0	1	1	300
Cambodia - I - 1993	300	0	1	1	300
Cambodia - II - 2000	300	0	0	0	0
Cambodia - II - 2001	300	0	0	0	0
Cambodia - II - 2002	300	0	0	0	0
Cambodia - II - 2003	300	0	0	0	0
Cambodia - II - 2004	300	0	0	0	0
Cameroon - 2017	4129	1	1	NA	NA
Cameroon - 2018	4129	1	1	NA	NA
Cameroon - 2019	4129	1	1	NA	NA

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Cameroon - 2020	4129	1	1	NA	NA
Chad - I - 1991	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1992	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1993	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1994	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1995	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1996	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1997	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1998	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - I - 1999	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - II - 2005	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - II - 2006	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - II - 2007	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - II - 2008	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - II - 2009	288	1	1	1	288
Chad - II - 2010	288	1	1	1	288
Colombia - I - 1990	289	0	0	0	0
Colombia - II - 1991	289	0	0	1	289
Colombia - III - 1994	289	0	0	0	0
Colombia - IV - 2003	289	0	0	1	14486
Colombia - IV - 2004	289	0	0	1	14486
Colombia - IV - 2005	289	0	0	1	14486
Colombia - IV - 2006	289	0	0	1	14486
Colombia - V - 2017	289	0	1	NA	NA
Colombia - V - 2018	289	0	1	NA	NA
Colombia - V - 2019	289	0	1	NA	NA
Colombia - V - 2020	289	0	1	NA	NA
Comoros - 2010	362	0	0	0	0
Comoros - 2011	362	0	0	0	0
Comoros - 2012	362	0	0	0	0
Congo - I - 2000	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2001	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2002	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2003	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2004	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2005	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2006	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - I - 2007	408	0	1	1	408

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Congo - I - 2008	408	0	1	1	408
Congo - II - 2018	408	0	0	0	0
Congo - II - 2019	408	0	0	0	0
Congo - II - 2020	408	0	0	0	0
Croatia - 1996	390	0	0	0	0
Croatia - 1997	390	0	0	0	0
DRC - I - 2000	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - I - 2001	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - I - 2002	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - I - 2003	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2004	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2005	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2006	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2007	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2008	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2009	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2010	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - II - 2011	283	1	1	1	283
DRC - III - 2004	283	0	0	1	283
DRC - III - 2005	283	0	0	1	283
DRC - III - 2006	283	0	0	1	283
DRC - III - 2007	283	0	0	1	283
DRC - IV - 2013	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2014	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2015	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2016	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2017	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2018	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2019	283	1	1	NA	NA
DRC - IV - 2020	283	1	1	NA	NA
Djibouti - I - 1995	379	0	1	0	379
Djibouti - I - 1996	379	0	1	0	379
Djibouti - I - 1997	379	0	1	0	379
Djibouti - I - 1998	379	0	1	0	379
Djibouti - I - 1999	379	0	1	0	379
Djibouti - I - 2000	379	0	0	0	379
Djibouti - I - 2001	379	0	0	0	379
Djibouti - I - 2002	379	0	0	0	379

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Djibouti - II - 2001	379	0	0	0	0
East - Timor - 1999	330	0	0	0	0
East - Timor - 2000	330	0	0	0	0
East - Timor - 2001	330	0	0	0	0
East - Timor - 2002	330	0	0	0	0
East - Timor - 2003	330	0	0	0	0
East - Timor - 2004	330	0	0	0	0
El - Salvador - 1992	316	0	0	0	0
El - Salvador - 1993	316	0	0	0	0
Eritrea - I - 1993	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - I - 1994	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - I - 1995	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2002	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2003	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2004	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2005	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2006	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2007	409	0	0	1	409
Eritrea - II - 2008	409	0	0	1	409
Ethiopia - 1991	413	1	1	0	413
Ethiopia - 1992	413	1	1	0	413
Ethiopia - 1993	413	1	1	0	413
Ethiopia - 1994	413	1	1	0	413
Ethiopia - 1995	413	1	1	0	413
Ethiopia - II - 2000	413	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia - II - 2001	413	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia - II - 2002	413	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia - II - 2003	413	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia - II - 2004	413	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia - II - 2005	413	0	0	0	0
Guatemala - 1997	233	0	0	0	0
Guatemala - 1998	233	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau - 2000	410	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau - 2001	410	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau - 2002	410	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau - 2003	410	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau - 2004	410	0	0	0	0

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Guinea-Bissau - 2005	410	0	0	0	0
Guinea-Bissau - 2006	410	0	0	0	0
Haiti - I - 1994	381	0	0	1	381
Haiti - I - 1995	381	0	0	1	381
Haiti - I - 1996	381	0	0	1	381
Haiti - I - 1997	381	0	0	1	381
Haiti - II - 2004	381	0	0	0	0
Haiti - II - 2005	381	0	0	0	0
Haiti - II - 2006	381	0	0	0	0
Haiti - II - 2007	381	0	0	0	0
India - 1993	421	1	1	1	421
India - 1994	421	1	1	1	421
India - 1995	421	1	1	1	421
India - 1996	421	1	1	1	421
Indonesia - 2005	366	0	0	0	0
Indonesia - 2006	366	0	0	0	0
Indonesia - 2007	366	0	0	0	0
Indonesia - 2008	366	0	0	0	0
Indonesia - 2009	366	0	0	0	0
Iraq - 2004	259	1	1	1	259
Iraq - 2005	259	1	1	1	259
Ivory Coast - I - 2003	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - I - 2004	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - I - 2005	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - I - 2006	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - II - 2007	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - II - 2008	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - II - 2009	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - II - 2010	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - II - 2011	419	1	1	1	419
Ivory Coast - III - 2012	419	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast - III - 2013	419	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast - III - 2014	419	0	0	0	0
Ivory Coast - III - 2015	419	0	0	0	0
Kosovo - 1999	412	0	0	0	0
Kosovo - 2000	412	0	0	0	0
Kosovo - 2001	412	0	0	0	0

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Kosovo - 2002	412	0	0	0	0
Kosovo - 2003	412	0	0	0	0
Kosovo - 2004	412	0	0	0	0
Lebanon - 1991	260	0	0	0	0
Liberia - 2003	341	0	0	0	0
Liberia - 2004	341	0	0	0	0
Liberia - 2005	341	0	0	0	0
Liberia - 2006	341	0	0	0	0
Liberia - 2007	341	0	0	0	0
Liberia - 2008	341	0	0	0	0
Libya - 2020	11346	1	1	NA	NA
Mali - 1995	372	0	0	1	372
Mali - 1996	372	0	0	1	372
Mali - 1997	372	0	0	1	372
Mali - II - 2015	372	1	1	NA	NA
Mali - II - 2016	372	1	1	NA	NA
Mali - II - 2017	372	1	1	NA	NA
Mali - II - 2018	372	1	1	NA	NA
Mali - II - 2019	372	1	1	NA	NA
Mali - II - 2020	372	1	1	NA	NA
Mozambique - I - 1992	332	0	0	1	332
Mozambique - I - 1993	332	0	0	1	332
Mozambique - I - 1994	332	0	0	1	332
Mozambique - II - 2018	332	0	0	0	0
Mozambique - II - 2019	332	0	0	0	0
Mozambique - II - 2020	332	0	0	0	0
Namibia - 1989	298	0	0	0	0
Namibia - 1990	298	0	0	0	0
Namibia - 1991	298	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2007	269	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2008	269	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2009	269	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2010	269	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2011	269	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2012	269	0	0	0	0
Nepal - 2013	269	0	0	0	0

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Nicaragua - I - 1989	336	1	0	0	336
Nicaragua - I - 1990	336	1	0	0	336
Nicaragua - I - 1991	336	1	0	0	336
Nicaragua - I - 1992	336	1	0	0	336
Nicaragua - II - 1994	336	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua - II - 1995	336	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua - II - 1996	336	0	0	0	0
Nicaragua - II - 1997	336	0	0	0	0
Niger - I - 1995	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 1996	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 1997	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 1998	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 1999	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 2000	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 2001	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 2002	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 2003	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 2004	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - I - 2005	430	0	0	1	430
Niger - II - 2006	430	0	0	0	0
Niger - II - 2007	430	0	0	0	0
Nigeria - 2009	425	0	0	0	0
Nigeria - 2010	425	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea - 2001	369	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea - 2002	369	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea - 2003	369	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea - 2004	369	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea - 2005	369	0	0	0	0
Philippines - I - 1997	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 1998	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 1999	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 2000	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 2001	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 2002	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 2003	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 2004	308	0	1	1	308
Philippines - I - 2005	308	0	1	1	308

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Philippines - II - 2014	308	0	1	NA	308
Philippines - II - 2015	308	0	1	NA	308
Philippines - II - 2016	308	0	1	NA	308
Philippines - II - 2017	308	0	1	NA	308
Philippines - II - 2018	308	0	1	NA	308
Philippines - II - 2019	308	0	1	NA	308
Philippines - II - 2020	308	0	1	NA	308
Rwanda - I - 1997	374	0	0	0	0
Rwanda - I - 1998	374	0	0	0	0
Rwanda - I - 1999	374	0	0	0	0
Rwanda - I - 2000	374	0	0	0	0
Rwanda - I - 2001	374	0	0	0	0
Rwanda - II - 2002	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - II - 2003	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - II - 2004	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - II - 2005	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - II - 2006	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - II - 2007	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - II - 2008	374	1	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2009	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2010	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2011	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2012	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2013	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2014	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2015	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2016	374	0	1	1	374
Rwanda - III - 2017	374	0	1	1	374
Senegal - 2005	375	0	0	1	375
Senegal - 2006	375	0	0	1	375
Senegal - 2007	375	0	0	1	375
Senegal - 2008	375	0	0	1	375
Sierra Leone - 1998	382	1	1	0	382
Sierra Leone - 1999	382	1	1	0	382
Sierra Leone - 2000	382	1	1	0	382
Sierra Leone - 2001	382	1	1	0	382
Sierra Leone - 2002	382	1	1	0	382
Sierra Leone - 2003	382	1	1	0	382

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Sierra Leone - 2004	382	1	1	0	382
Solomon Islands - 2000	0	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands - 2001	0	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands - 2002	0	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands - 2003	0	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands - 2004	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia - I - 2003	337	1	1	1	337
Somalia - I - 2004	337	1	1	1	337
Somalia - I - 2005	337	1	1	1	337
Somalia - I - 2006	337	1	1	1	337
Somalia - I - 2007	337	1	1	1	337
Somalia - II - 2013	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2014	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2015	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2016	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2017	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2018	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2019	337	1	1	NA	337
Somalia - II - 2020	337	1	1	NA	337
South Africa - 1993	345	0	0	0	0
South Africa - 1994	345	0	0	0	0
South Africa - 1995	345	0	0	0	0
South Africa - 1996	345	0	0	0	0
South Africa - 1997	345	0	0	0	0
South Sudan - 2011	11345	1	1	1	11345
South Sudan - 2012	11345	1	1	1	11345
South Sudan - 2013	11345	1	1	1	11345
Sri Lanka - 2009	352	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka - 2010	352	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka - 2011	352	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka - 2012	352	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka - 2013	352	0	0	0	0
Sudan - 2005	309	0	1	1	309
Sudan - 2006	309	0	1	1	309
Sudan - 2007	309	0	1	1	309
Sudan - 2008	309	0	1	1	309
Sudan - 2009	309	0	1	1	309

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Sudan - 2010	309	0	1	1	309
Sudan - 2011	309	0	1	1	309
Sudan - 2012	309	0	1	1	309
Tajikistan - 1997	337	0	1	1	395
Tajikistan - 1998	337	0	1	1	395
Tajikistan - 1999	337	0	1	1	395
Tajikistan - 2000	337	0	1	1	395
Tajikistan - 2001	337	0	1	1	395
Tajikistan - 2002	337	0	1	1	395
Tajikistan - 2003	337	0	1	1	395
Uganda - I - 1992	314	0	0	0	0
Uganda - I - 1993	314	0	0	0	0
Uganda - I - 1994	314	0	0	0	0
Uganda - I - 1995	314	0	0	0	0
Uganda - I - 1996	314	0	0	0	0
Uganda - II - 2000	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2001	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2002	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2003	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2004	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2005	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2006	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2007	314	1	1	1	314
Uganda - II - 2008	314	1	1	1	314
United Kingdom - 2002	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 2004	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 1998	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 1999	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 2000	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 2001	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 2003	315	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom - 2005	315	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe - 1980	318	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe - 1981	318	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe - 1982	318	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe - 1983	318	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe - 1984	318	0	0	0	0

Table 1: (continued)

ID-year	Conflict ID	Rearmed	Factions rearmed	Rearmed post-DDR	Recurred conflict ID
Zimbabwe - 1985	318	0	0	0	0

3. Codebook

3.1. Variables in DDR-40

Table 2: Variables in DDR-40

Category	Variable
I. Program features	Target group(s) for DDR
	Target numbers for DDR
	Multiple groups
	Disarmament implementation
	Demobilization implementation
	Reintegration implementation
	Cantonment
	DDR establishment
	DDR implementation actor(s)
	DDR budget
II. Peace agreement provisions and implementation	Amnesty
	Prisoner release
	Truth or reconciliation mechanism
	Women's rights
	Children's rights
	Economic and social reform
	Dispute resolution committee
	Boundary demarcation
	Natural resource management
	Decentralization/federalism
	Constitutional reform
	Electoral or political reform
	Executive branch reform
	Judiciary reform
	Military reform
	Legislative branch reform
III. Outcomes	Rearmed during DDR
	Factions rearmed during DDR
	Rearmed after DDR

3.2. DDR Program Features

3.2.1 DDR ID-Year (id_year)

Program ID-Year: This variable represents a unique year-specific ID assigned to each DDR program within the dataset. The ID is composed of a country code and the year the program was initiated, providing a clear reference to each distinct DDR effort. For instance, DRCI-2000 refers to the first DDR program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that started in the year 2000. The program ID helps differentiate multiple DDR programs within the same country and facilitates tracking the progression and outcomes of DDR efforts over time. DRCI-2003 refers to the last year of the first program in the DRC and DRCII-2004 to the first year of the second program.

3.2.2 Conflict ID (conflict_id)

Conflict ID: This variable provides the unique ID of the conflict during or after which DDR took place. This ID corresponds to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

3.2.3 Target Group(s) for DDR (groups)

Target Group(s) for DDR: This variable identifies the specific groups that are the focus of the DDR program. These groups may include rebels, militias, or national armed forces. The identification of the target group is crucial as it shapes the objectives and strategies of the DDR process. For instance, demobilizing state armed forces may involve different processes and challenges compared to disarming non-state armed groups such as rebels or militias.

3.2.4 Target Numbers for DDR (numbers)

Target Numbers for DDR: This variable indicates the number of combatants or individuals that the DDR program aims to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate. The target numbers are often outlined in the peace agreement or operational plan and serve as a benchmark for the program's success. These numbers may reflect the estimated total number of combatants within the target group(s) or a specific subset deemed necessary for achieving peace and stability.

3.2.5 Multiple Groups (multiple_groups)

Multiple Groups: This binary variable (0 or 1) indicates whether the DDR process involves more than one armed group. A value of 1 suggests that multiple groups, such as different factions, militias, or rebel groups, are participating in the DDR process, while a value of 0 indicates that only a single group is involved. The presence of multiple groups can complicate the DDR process, requiring additional negotiation, coordination, and resources.

3.2.6 Group Type (`group_type`)

Group Type: A categorical indicator that specifies the organizational nature of the group undergoing DDR, since command cohesion, or its absence, may shape DDR implementation and the risk of relapse.

- **Military**: regular state armed forces.
- **Integrated**: a non-state armed group with a unified command and clear hierarchy (e.g., FARC in Colombia undergoing DDR starting in 2017).
- **Fragmented**: a non-state coalition composed of semi-autonomous factions with weak central control (e.g., AUC paramilitaries in Colombia undergoing DDR from 2003 to 2006).

3.2.7 Cantonment (`cantonment`)

Cantonment: Cantonment refers to the temporary accommodation of combatants in designated camps or sites during the demobilization process. This variable tracks the number of months that combatants are cantoned. Cantonment sites serve as locations where combatants are disarmed, provided with basic needs, and prepared for reintegration into civilian life. The effectiveness of cantonment is often linked to the availability of adequate facilities, security, and the timely provision of services.

3.2.8 DDR Establishment (`establishment`)

DDR Establishment: This variable captures the origin or basis for the establishment of the DDR program. It identifies whether the DDR process was initiated as part of a peace agreement, a national government initiative, or an international effort led by external actors such as the United Nations, the World Bank, or regional organizations. Understanding the source of the DDR initiative provides insight into the program's legitimacy, scope, and potential challenges.

3.2.9 DDR Execution Body (`execution`)

DDR Implementation Actor(s): This variable specifies the primary actors responsible for implementing the DDR program. The options include:

- **National:** Implementation is led by the national government or local authorities.
- **International:** Implementation is led by international organizations, such as the United Nations or regional bodies.
- **National with International Support:** A collaborative approach where the national government leads the process with significant support from international actors. This support may include funding, technical assistance, or the provision of security.

3.2.10 DDR Budget (budget)

DDR Budget: This variable represents the total budget allocated to the DDR program, expressed in millions of USD. The budget can be used for various aspects of the DDR process, including:

- **Disarmament:** Funding the collection, documentation, and disposal of weapons.
- **Cantonment:** Establishing and maintaining camps or sites where combatants are housed during the demobilization process.
- **Reintegration:** Providing former combatants with vocational training, education, employment opportunities, and psychosocial support to facilitate their return to civilian life.
- **Logistics and Administration:** Covering the costs of transportation, staff salaries, monitoring, and evaluation.
- **Security:** Ensuring the protection of DDR participants and staff, particularly in volatile regions.

3.2.11 Disarmament (disarmament_implementation)

Disarmament: Following the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM), compiled by Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015), DDR-40 codes disarmament as the following. The collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs.

Highest Degree of Implementation Achieved (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Disarmament Observed:** Sources indicate that registration and processing have occurred, but the number of former combatants who have turned in a weapon is minimal. If this level of progress were to continue, full implementation in two to three years would be unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Disarmament Observed:** This coding indicates that significant numbers of former combatants have turned in their weapons. Progress may not be swift, but the rate of progress suggests that full implementation is a realistic goal within the time frame specified in the Accord. As a useful metric, somewhere around $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{4}$ of the expected suspected stock of weapons have been turned in by the end of this year.
- **Full Implementation of Disarmament Observed:** This coding indicates that most of the weapons held by former combatants have been turned in.

3.2.12 Demobilization (demobilization_implementation)

Demobilization: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes demobilization as the following. The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. Demobilization typically occurs in organizational stages. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

Highest Degree of Implementation Achieved (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Demobilization Observed:** Sources indicate that registration and processing have occurred, but the number of former combatants who have registered or have been demobilized is minimal. If this level of progress were to continue, full implementation in two to three years would be unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Demobilization Observed:** This coding indicates that significant numbers of former combatants have been demobilized. Progress may not be swift, but the rate of progress suggests that full implementation is a realistic goal within the time frame spelled out in the Accord. One metric might be that something between $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{4}$ of the expected number of troops have entered the demobilization process by the end of this year.
- **Full Implementation of Demobilization Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the anticipated number of participants in the demobilization program have been demobilized.

3.2.13 Reintegration (reintegration_implementation)

Reintegration: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes reintegration as the following. Reintegration programs govern the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and often involve compensation packages to assist the troops in reintegrating back into society. This might include registration at demobilization facilities and job placement or job training.
Highest Degree of Implementation Achieved (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Reintegration Observed:** Relative to what the reintegration program stipulated in the Accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made thus far toward completing the task. The program has not integrated a significant number of former combatants; possibly is being boycotted in some way. If this level of progress were to continue, full implementation within the time stipulated in the Accord would be unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Reintegration Observed:** Relative to what the reintegration program calls for, several rounds of combatants have gone through the program and have been reintegrated back into society. Given this rate of progress,

full implementation in several years is a realistic goal.

- **Full Implementation of Reintegration Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the rebel combatants who have registered have been reintegrated into civil society.

3.3. Peace Accord Provisions and Implementation

3.3.1 Amnesty Provision (`amnesty_provision`)

Amnesty: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes amnesty as the following. Amnesty provisions determine the rules for who is given amnesty for crimes they may have committed during the war. At times, this involves granting immunity to the perpetrators of war crimes. Sometimes an amnesty provision may not be part of the peace agreement but instead was enacted as a law to begin the process. For example, in Mozambique, RENAMO joined the peace process under an amnesty law that was passed a few years earlier. Amnesty will be coded differently across cases. Amnesty is sometimes issued as a blanket law which covers everyone and at other times it is given on a case by case basis.

Provision for Amnesty (0 or 1) Is there a provision for Amnesty in the accord or in the design of the DDR program?

3.3.2 Amnesty Implementation (`amnesty_implementation`)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Amnesty Observed:** A minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward amnesty as described in the accord. Minimal progress toward amnesty suggests a sluggish approach. The process of granting amnesty may have begun, but few have actually received the benefit, aside perhaps the leadership. It is certainly possible that amnesty is moving slow because it is being blocked or delayed. At this rate, implementation of full amnesty within one year is unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Amnesty Observed:** Relative to the language in the accord, the state of implementation progress towards amnesty is intermediate. Amnesty is proceeding, but is not done. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable within 12 months.
- **Full Implementation of Amnesty Observed:** This coding indicates that amnesty, as called for in the accord, has been granted to the target group.

3.3.3 Prisoner Release Provision (`prisoner_release_provision`)

Prisoner Release: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes prisoner release as the following. The release of some or all political prisoners taken and held during the conflict.

Provision for Prisoner Release (0 or 1) Is there a provision for Prisoner Release in the accord or in the design of the DDR program?

3.3.4 Prisoner Release Implementation (prisoner_release_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Prisoner Release Observed:** A minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward releasing prisoners as described in the accord. Minimal progress suggests a sluggish approach. The process may have begun, but few have actually been released, aside from perhaps a few leaders. It is certainly possible that the release is being blocked or delayed. At this rate, implementation within one year is unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Prisoner Release Observed:** Relative to the language in the accord, the state of implementation progress is intermediate. Prisoner release is proceeding, but is not complete. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable within 12 months.
- **Full Implementation of Prisoner Release Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all prisoners were released, as called for in the accord. Most of the time, the government refuses to release 10 to 20 prisoners. This is acceptable under this category.

3.3.5 Truth or Reconciliation Provision (truth_reconciliation_provision)

Truth or Reconciliation Mechanisms: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes truth or reconciliation mechanism as the following. Truth or Reconciliation Mechanisms are temporary, official bodies set up to help reconcile the parties to a conflict. Often, this takes the form of truth commissions, which investigate a past history of violations of human rights by the military, other government forces, or rebel forces (Hayner 1994). Truth Commissions often involve fact-finding missions in an effort to record all those who have disappeared during the conflict and are sometimes allowed to make judgments as to who is responsible for confirmed murders, etc.

Provision for Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism (0 or 1) Is there a provision for a Truth Commission in the accord?

3.3.6 Truth or Reconciliation Implementation (truth_reconciliation_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism Observed:** Minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward setting up an operational truth or reconciliation mechanism. The process to establish the institutional framework and jurisdiction of the commission may have begun, but the group is not yet working.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism Observed:** With regard to an existing and operational truth commission or other reconciliation commission, progress is in an intermediate state. The institutional framework

for the commission is in place and members have been appointed. It appears that the process of collecting and interviewing victims is underway. For a reconciliation committee, meetings between parties are taking place.

- **Full Implementation of Truth or Reconciliation Mechanism Observed:** This coding indicates that the institutional commission as described by the accord is almost in place, or is fully in place.

3.3.7 Women's Rights Provision (womens_rights_provision)

Women's Rights: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes women's rights as the following. The peace agreement or the DDR program may include several provisions regarding women's rights. The central components of these are usually women's civil liberties, civil rights, and economic rights. Civil liberties and civil rights include institutional changes such as proportional representation of women in the parliament, civil service, national armed forces, or police forces. Women's rights also involve rights to education and marriage practices and the establishment of women's groups or commissions to help oversee the socio-political status of women. Women's economic rights deal with work and wages and/or the right to own, sell, or inherit property.

Provision for Women's Rights (0 or 1) Is there a provision regarding women's rights in the accord or in the design of the DDR program?

3.3.8 Women's Rights Implementation (womens_rights_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Women's Rights Provision Observed:** Relative to what is called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward women's rights. The process of debating and drafting the changes has begun, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Women's Rights Provision Observed:** Relative to the accord's specifications, changes toward improving the rights of women are in an intermediate state. In this case, intermediate suggests that the political and legal process has produced changes in the rules or laws affecting women, but the decision has not been implemented fully. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable.
- **Full Implementation of Women's Rights Provision Observed:** This coding indicates that the changes as described by the accord are almost in place, or are fully in place.

3.3.9 Children's Rights Provision (childrens_rights_provision)

Children's Rights: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes children's rights as the following. Often child rights provisions are intended to expedite the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and to protect children in the post-accord environment through increased services targeted to children.

Provision for Children's Rights (0 or 1) Is there a provision for this theme/subject in the accord or in the design of the DDR program?

3.3.10 Children's Rights Implementation (childrens_rights_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Children's Rights Provision Observed:** Minimal progress has been made this year towards improving children's rights by making institutional and/or legal changes. The process of debating and drafting the changes has begun, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized. At this rate, it might be questionable whether any such changes will actually be produced.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Children's Rights Provision Observed:** Relative to the accord's specifications, changes toward improving the rights of children are in an intermediate state. In this case, intermediate suggests that the political and legal process has produced changes in the rules or laws affecting children, but the decision has not been implemented fully. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable.
- **Full Implementation of Children's Rights Provision Observed:** This coding indicates that the changes, as described by the accord, are almost in place, or are fully in place.

3.3.11 Boundary Demarcation Provision (boundary_demarcation_provision)

Boundary Demarcation: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes boundary demarcation as the following. Boundary demarcations often follow major civil conflicts and involve agreements to change the existing boundaries of provinces or political units within the country. This may involve creating a new autonomous region or changing the boundaries of an existing autonomous region.

Provision for Boundary Demarcation (0 or 1) Is there a provision for Boundary Demarcation in the accord?

3.3.12 Boundary Demarcation Implementation (boundary_demarcation_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Boundary Demarcation Observed:** Relative to the changes called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward boundary demarcation changes. The process of debating and drafting the proposed changes has begun, but the actual changes are yet to be realized.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Boundary Demarcation Observed:** Relative to the changes called for in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. There appears to be a process unfolding about making changes to existing boundaries. Intermediate means that progress has been made towards reform and the amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable in 1 or 2 years.
- **Full Implementation of Boundary Demarcation Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the changes called for in the accord were implemented. The changes are in effect.

3.3.13 Decentralization/Federalism Provision (decentralization_provision)

Decentralization/Federalism: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes decentralization/federalism as the following. Decentralization/Federalism is a process of transferring governmental power over the collection and allocation of resources, governmental functions, and decision making away from a centralized authority and toward the actual area being governed, whether a region, state, or local municipality.

Provision for Decentralization/Federalism (1 or 0) Is there a provision in the accord for Decentralization/Federalism? If yes, continue; if no, stop.

3.3.14 Decentralization/Federalism Implementation (decentralization_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation Achieved (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Decentralization/Federalism Observed:** Use this category if the new legislation was passed or the new institution was created, but little else has been accomplished toward actually transferring the government duties or functions to the new location. This category suggests a non-viable rate of progress. If this level of progress were to continue, full implementation would be very unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Decentralization/Federalism Observed:** This coding indicates that Decentralization/Federalism is being implemented at a rate that is viable. New institutions have been set up and are operational, even if the full purview

of responsibilities and decision-making authority have yet to be transferred. If this rate continues, full implementation is very likely.

- **Full Implementation of Decentralization/Federalism Observed:** This coding indicates that Decentralization/Federalism was fully implemented. Governmental power has been devolved to a regional, state, or local level, and the duties specified in the accord were in fact transferred, so that the new leaders have administrative authority over the new areas. Continue using this code to the end of the time series.

3.3.15 Dispute Resolution Committee Provision (`dispute_resolution_provision`)

Dispute Resolution Committee: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes dispute resolution as the following. Dispute Resolution Committees are national, regional, or local bodies set up to solve disagreements that arise during the implementation process. The focus of these committees is the accord and implementing the accord. This is a method of channeling conflicts through institutions rather than resolving differences in the streets or in the national media. For example, Nepal created a high-level political resolution mechanism whose function was to address disputes related to post-conflict issues, including management of Maoist combatants and producing a consensus government. Such bodies are usually temporary.

Provision for Dispute Resolution Committee (0 or 1) Is there a provision for this theme/subject in the accord?

3.3.16 Dispute Resolution Committee Implementation (`dispute_resolution_implementation`)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Dispute Resolution Committee Observed:** Minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward setting up a dispute resolution committee. The institutional framework is being formally established. The process may have begun for choosing members, but the group is either not yet meeting or the two sides are not cooperating. At this rate, it is questionable whether the group will ever be functional.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Dispute Resolution Committee Observed:** With regard to an existing and operational committee, progress is in an intermediate state. The institutional framework for the commission is in place and members have been appointed. Both sides are showing a fair amount of willingness to meet and resolve disputes that are arising over the implementation of the peace agreement.
- **Full Implementation of Dispute Resolution Committee Observed:** This coding indicates that the committee as described by the accord is operational and the members have shown a commitment on prior occasions to solve problems.

3.3.17 Constitutional Reform Provision (constitutional_reform_provision)

Constitutional Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes constitutional reform as the following. Replacing an existing constitution with a new constitution; changing or adding to an existing constitution; or creating a new constitution where there was no constitution before. These changes can originate from a joint committee, an appointed commission, or an elected constituent assembly. Does the accord call for changes to be made to the constitution and at some point was there reform? Components of the accord are also sometimes written into the constitution.

Provision for Constitutional Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for Constitutional Reform in the accord?

3.3.18 Constitutional Reform Implementation (constitutional_reform_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Constitutional Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward constitutional reform. The process of drafting may be ongoing, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized; there is also the possibility that the reforms are being delayed. At this rate, implementation is in jeopardy.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Constitutional Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Progress has been made toward reforming the constitution, and some changes are evident. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable in 1 or 2 years.
- **Full Implementation of Constitutional Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the reforms called for in the accord were implemented. The constitution has been changed along the lines of what was called for by the accord.

3.3.19 Electoral/Political Party Reform Provision (electoral_reform_provision)

Electoral/Political Party Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes electoral or political party reform as the following. Electoral or Political Reforms involve changes to the electoral system that affect opportunities for participation by individuals in the voting process and/or the ability of political parties to participate in elections. Electoral reform can involve allowing rebel groups to become active political parties and/or implementing new rules to make the system more democratic and inclusive. Code if it also suggests internal democracy within the party (indicated when the individual who gets the highest support from members of the party will become party president). This provision can be broken down into 2 sub-categories:

Electoral Reform and Political Party Reform. Electoral Reform deals with changes to electoral rules, institutions, or arrangements. Were elections held for the first time? Was a new proportional representation system or a mixed system introduced? Political Party Reform involves how political parties choose their leaders and other rules that determine how parties organize themselves and operate.

Provision for Electoral/Political Party Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for Electoral/Political Party Reform in the accord?

3.3.20 Electoral/Political Party Reform Implementation (`electoral_reform_implementation`)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Electoral/Political Party Reform Observed:** Relative to the changes called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward electoral/political party reform. The process of debating and drafting new rules has begun, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized; there is also the possibility that they are being deliberately delayed or blocked.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Electoral/Political Party Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Intermediate means that progress has been made towards changing the way elections are conducted or who may participate as political parties. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable in 1 or 2 years.
- **Full Implementation of Electoral/Political Party Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the changes called for in the accord were implemented. The electoral/party system is now operating under new rules.

3.3.21 Executive Reform Provision (`executive_reform_provision`)

Executive Branch Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes executive reform as the following. Executive Branch Reform has been implemented when institutional changes are made to the selection process for choosing an executive or to the powers inherent to the executive branch, including term limits, as called for by the accord. Executive branch reform can also include the appointment of rebel leaders if the appointments are intended to be permanent. If the word "transitional" is used, this constitutes power-sharing rather than executive reform. If executive power-sharing is permanent, this constitutes executive branch reform. A provision limiting the interference of the executive branch of government in the affairs of the legislature would surely qualify as an executive reform. Thus, the coding criterion is similar to the power-division argument presented by Roeder and Rothchild (2005).

Provision for Executive Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for executive branch reforms in the accord?

3.3.22 Executive Reform Implementation (executive_reform_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Executive Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward executive reform. The process of debating and drafting new legislation concerning executive reform has begun, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized or are being deliberately delayed.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Executive Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Progress has been made and some changes are evident. Given the amount of progress thus far, full implementation seems within reach.
- **Full Implementation of Executive Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the reforms called for by the accord were implemented. There are some indications that the process is completed.

3.3.23 Judiciary Reform Provision (judiciary_reform_provision)

Judiciary Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes judiciary reform as the following. Judiciary Reform covers the process of selecting judges and/or changing the relationship of the judicial branch to other branches of government. Adopting a system of proportional representation to increase minority representation in the judiciary branch of the government would be an ideal example of judiciary reform. Accords also often call for changes in bar processes that allow lawyers more access to judges.

Provision for Judiciary Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for judiciary reforms in the accord?

3.3.24 Judiciary Reform Implementation (judiciary_reform_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Judiciary Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward judicial reform. For example, the political actors or Joint Committee are debating and drafting new legislation concerning judicial reforms, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized or are being deliberately delayed.

- **Intermediate Implementation of Judiciary Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Progress has been made in the legislature regarding judicial reforms, and some changes in the judicial branch are evident.
- **Full Implementation of Judiciary Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the judicial reforms called for in the accord were implemented. Reports indicate that new judges have been appointed based on the new laws.

3.3.25 Military Reform Provision (`military_reform_provision`)

Military Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes military reform as the following. Military reform usually takes the shape of integrating opposition forces into the national military, creating a new military, creating new separate units, downsizing the size of the national military, installing a new training regimen for soldiers, and/or changing the structure of civil-military relations. Military reform can include one or multiple of these initiatives, as stipulated in the Accord.

Provision for Military Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for military reforms in the accord?

3.3.26 Military Reform Implementation (`military_reform_implementation`)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Military Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made thus far toward those goals. If creating a new armed force, or integrating rebel forces, the screening process is underway but little integration has occurred. If downsizing, a similar process is underway for government troops. If training, segments of the military have entered the new training program. If this level of progress were to continue, full implementation would be unlikely.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Military Reforms Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the military, government, and numerical benchmarks of achievement toward those goals are being reported. If creating a new armed force, there are reports that recruits have joined the new army. If integration is the goal, several rounds of rebels have joined the national military, or new rebel units have been formed. If downsizing is the program, there are reports of the remaining number of troops. If training, several rounds of troops should have completed the program by now. A useful metric would be somewhere between $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{4}$ complete. If this same level of progress were to continue, full implementation in two to three years would be a very realistic goal.

- **Full Implementation of Military Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the reforms called for in the accord have been implemented.

3.3.27 Legislative Reform Provision (legislative_reform_provision)

Legislative Branch Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes legislative reform as the following. Legislative Branch Reform involves institutional changes in the rules that affect the composition of the legislature (ethnic parties, minority group quotas, caste group quotas, quotas for women), and/or reform in the procedures and rules governing lawmaking. Permanent power-sharing arrangements in the legislature should be captured under this provision.

Provision for Legislative Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for legislative reforms in the accord?

3.3.28 Legislative Reform Implementation (legislative_reform_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Legislative Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made this year toward legislative reform. The process of debating and drafting new rules has begun, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized; they are possibly being deliberately delayed.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Legislative Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Progress has been made toward reform, and some changes are evident. For example, the reform bills are currently under consideration in the legislature or in the executive branch. The amount of progress achieved thus far suggests that implementation is viable in 1 or 2 years.
- **Full Implementation of Legislative Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that almost all of the legislative reforms called for in the accord were implemented. The legislature is now operating under the new rules.

3.3.29 Economic and Social Development Provision (development_provision)

Economic and Social Development: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes economic and social development as the following. Economic and Social Development provisions aim to improve the economic and social development of certain populations and/or regions. Such changes include, but are not limited to, land reform and economic or social aid programs. This provision covers a large range of issues related to socio-economic development at the national and local levels that will likely become more and more diversified as our coding project continues. For the first phase of coding, the focus should be on provisions designed to

change, improve, or address the needs of marginalized and underprivileged segments of the population who typically live in certain regions within the country. Since civil wars tend to occur in less developed states, accords often contain provisions on land reforms.

Provision for Economic and Social Development Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for this subject in the accord?

3.3.30 Economic and Social Development Implementation (development_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Economic and Social Development Reform Observed:** Relative to the changes called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made toward economic and social development reform. The process of debating and drafting new programs and policies has begun, but the actual reforms are yet to be realized.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Economic and Social Development Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Meaningful efforts toward socio-economic reform in the specified areas are underway, but not all the scheduled programs are operational. In this sense, intermediate means that programs are in the mid-stages of development.
- **Full Implementation of Economic and Social Development Reform Observed:** Full implementation, in this case, suggests that programs were created to address the problems described in the accord and these programs are underway. Reports indicate that population segments are participating and benefiting from these programs.

3.3.31 Natural Resource Management Reform Provision (natural_resources_provision)

Natural Resource Management Reform: Following PAM, DDR-40 codes natural resource management as the following. Natural Resource Management Reform governs the use of mineral, forest, land, and water resources. These provisions are usually intended to redress what an ethnic minority group views as inequitable gain from resources in their region or homeland. It is difficult to deal with these issues, which are essentially legal disputes in many regards, in the language of an accord.

Provision for Natural Resource Management Reform (0 or 1) Is there a provision for this subject in the accord?

3.3.32 Natural Resource Management Reform Implementation (natural_resources_implementation)

Highest Degree of Implementation in the Year: (Current Year + Previous Years) (1, 2, or 3)

- **Minimal Implementation of Natural Resource Management Reform Observed:** Relative to the changes called for in the accord, a minimal amount of progress has been made toward natural resource management reform. Reforms have not yet been passed, but the political and legal process is ongoing.
- **Intermediate Implementation of Natural Resource Management Reform Observed:** Relative to the total amount of reforms specified in the accord, the state of implementation is intermediate. Intermediate suggests that the laws governing natural resource management have been altered or changed, but only partially implemented. Stated differently, intermediate implies that reforms are in the mid-stages of development. In light of the amount of progress achieved thus far, being able to point to meaningful reforms may be viable.
- **Full Implementation of Natural Resource Management Reform Observed:** This coding indicates that most of the changes called for in the accord were implemented. Sometimes, little is actually required by the government for full implementation. Also, outcomes may not be affected at all, even if the rules of resource management have been changed.

3.4. Outcomes

The variables in this section capture the recurrence of conflict during or after DDR and are hand-coded based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 24.1 and UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset version 24.1 (Davies et al. 2024).

3.4.1 Rearmed during DDR (rearmed)

Rearmed during DDR: This variable captures whether the group undergoing DDR rearmed almost in its entirety during the DDR process. The coding for this variable is binary, with a value of 1 indicating that the group rearmed and a value of 0 indicating that they did not.

3.4.2 Factions Rearmed during DDR (factions_rearmed)

Factions Rearmed during DDR: This variable indicates whether specific factions within the larger group rearmed during the DDR process. The coding is binary, where a value of 1 indicates that some factions rearmed, and 0 indicates that no factions rearmed. For instance, the fourth DDR program in Colombia started in 2017. In 2018, a faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC–EP), about 2,000-3,000 combatants rearmed, while the other 8,000-9,000 remained within the DDR program.

3.4.3 Rearmed post-DDR (`rearmed_post_ddr`)

Rearmed post-DDR: This variable captures whether either the whole group or factions within it rearmed after the DDR process was completed. The coding is binary, with 1 indicating rearmament post-DDR and 0 indicating no rearmament.

3.4.4 Date of Recurrence (`recurrence_date`)

Date of Recurrence: This variable records the year when the conflict recurrence was first observed.

3.4.5 Recurrence Side B (`recurred_side_b`)

Recurrence Side B: This variable captures the identity of the opposing side (Side B) in the recurred incidence of conflict. This ID corresponds to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

3.4.6 Recurrence Conflict ID (`recurred_conflict_id`)

Recurrence Conflict ID: This variable provides the unique ID of the conflict in which recurrence was observed. This ID corresponds to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

4. Descriptive Statistics

This section presents correlation tables of variables related to DDR program features and implementation scores for peace agreement provisions. Table 2 shows that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration implementations are strongly correlated with each other, particularly with disarmament showing a significant positive relationship with both demobilization and reintegration (0.68 and 0.38, respectively). Predictably, budget is positively associated with disarmament and reintegration, suggesting that higher financial resources might facilitate these processes. However, the correlation between multiple groups and rearmed status is notably strong (0.39), indicating that programs involving multiple groups may face higher challenges in preventing rearmament. Table 3 shows that economic and social reforms are significantly correlated with decentralization (0.58) and boundary demarcation (0.41), suggesting that these areas may advance together. The overall pattern of correlations underscores the interconnectedness of different peace agreement features.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix of DDR Program Features

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. numbers										
2. multiple groups	-0.12*									
3. disarmament impl.	0.26***	-0.13*								
4. demobilization impl.	0.19***	-0.09	0.68***							
5. reintegration impl.	0.14**	-0.16**	0.38***	0.55***						
6. cantonment	-0.07	-0.26***	0.10*	0.06	0.02					
7. budget	0.27***	0.01	0.18***	0.18***	0.22***	0.03				
8. rearmed	0.02	0.39***	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.23***	-0.15**	-0.16**			
9. factions rearmed	-0.00	0.25***	-0.29***	-0.21***	-0.12*	-0.11*	0.03	0.69***		
10. rearmed post DDR	-0.12*	0.25***	-0.27***	-0.25***	-0.26***	-0.26***	-0.03	0.43***	0.61***	

Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Implementation Scores

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. amnesty	1														
2. prisoner	0.33***	1													
3. truth	-0.02	0.22***	1												
4. women	-0.14**	0.37***	0.29***	1											
5. children	-0.02	0.30***	0.28***	0.41***	1										
6. develop	0.17***	0.26***	0.09	-0.06	-0.05	1									
7. dispute	0.29***	0.54***	0.30***	0.29***	0.15**	0.18***	1								
8. boundary	0.12*	0.40***	0.19***	0.20***	0.03	0.58***	0.47***	1							
9. resources	0.17***	0.29***	0.34***	0.20***	0.04	0.41***	0.36***	0.36***	1						
10. decentral	0.12*	0.40***	0.19***	0.20***	0.03	0.58***	0.47***	1							
11. const	-0.05	0.22***	0.28***	0.37***	0.15**	0.25***	0.29***	0.17***	0.47***	0.36***	1				
12. electoral	0.31***	0.29***	0.40***	0.29***	0.14**	0.25***	0.33***	0.46***	0.47***	0.36***	0.47***	1			
13. executive	0.05	0.30***	0.16**	0.23***	0.19***	0.36***	0.33***	0.22***	0.43***	0.36***	0.47***	0.48***	1		
14. judiciary	-0.04	0.23***	0.44***	0.27***	0.22***	0.15**	0.29***	0.16***	0.39***	0.41***	0.47***	0.48***	0.48***	1	
15. military	0.24***	0.16**	0.17***	0.09	0.22***	0.02	0.17***	0.29***	0.11*	0.39***	0.47***	0.48***	0.48***	0.58***	1
16. legis	0.03	0.21***	0.20***	0.07	0.14**	0.37***	0.40***	0.13**	0.38***	0.32***	0.47***	0.48***	0.48***	0.58***	0.58***

5. Preliminary Data Analysis

Table 5 presents the full results for peace agreement provisions reported in the manuscript (Table 6). I complement the parametric specifications with a decision-tree classifier. The non-parametric, machine learning algorithm can uncover interactions, non–linear thresholds, and functional forms that the logit models might miss. Figure 1 depicts a pruned classification tree that predicts the probability of rearmament using the same covariate set as the logit models in the manuscript. The tree's first split is on disarmament implementation: programs that meet at least the "intermediate" threshold (score ≥ 2) are routed to the left-hand branch, where the predicted probability of relapse immediately drops from 0.50 to 0.34. This mirrors the negative and significant disarmament coefficient in every parametric specification. Conditional on satisfactory disarmament, the next most discriminating variables are multiple groups and caseload; both also emerge as strong risk factors in the logit results. On the high-risk side of the root node – where disarmament is weak – program size, unusually large budgets, short cantonment periods, and poor demobilization performance steer observations toward terminal nodes with predicted relapse probabilities above 0.70, again echoing the main finding that large and weakly coordinated programs struggle most.

Next, following Di Salvatore (2019), I test the impact of program implementation on a continuous measure of *homicide rates*. Since the data on homicide rates is not available for many of the programs in DDR-40, the replication only reflects a quarter of the program-years in the original sample. Table 6 presents two OLS specifications with country and year fixed effects: Model (1) is the baseline, whereas Model (2) introduces a control for whether the target armed group is a non-state entity. The negative association for *disarmament* attenuates once non-state group type is controlled (from $\beta = -1.693,\ p = 0.117$ to $\beta = -0.254,\ p = 0.759$). Implementation of demobilization has a statistically significant and negative effect with homicides across both models ($\beta = -2.592,\ p < 0.05$ in Model 1; $\beta = -1.808,\ p < 0.05$ in Model 2), suggesting that physically separating combatants is more reliably associated with reductions in everyday violence than weapons collection alone. Thus, while the presence of troop-heavy UN peacekeeping missions is associated with a rise in homicides (Di Salvatore 2019), this deadly surge may be reduced through DDR.

In line with the main results reported in the manuscript, fragmentation remains a robust driver of violence: programs involving multiple armed groups exhibit substantially higher homicide rates ($\beta = 17.303,\ p < 0.001$ in Model 1; $\beta = 8.073,\ p < 0.01$ in Model 2). This finding is consistent with the case study evidence, that breaking command-and-control structures in the aftermath of war increases chances of rearmament (Sharif 2022). Once group type is incorporated, non-state actors are linked to a pronounced escalation in homicides ($\beta = 35.861,\ p < 0.001$), a finding that echoes their elevated propensity to rearm in the logit models in the main manuscript and is perhaps not surprising. The homicide results broadly confirm the protective associations of negotiated institutional arrangements, which are consistent with case-specific evidence on post-conflict violence reduction (Sharif and Zuluaga 2026). DDR initiatives embedded in peace agreements are associated with markedly lower homicide rates (Model 2: $\beta = -113.476,\ p < 0.001$). Hybrid execution – with national authorities operating with sustained international support – continues to correlate with lower violence ($\beta = -38.299,\ p < 0.001$), while purely international execution shows

no clear relationship with homicides. The UN peacekeeping indicator does not display a consistent association with homicide rates (positive and insignificant in Model 1; negative and insignificant in Model 2).

Table 5: Random Effects Logistic Regression Estimates of Peace Provisions (Implementation Levels 1–3)

	Dependent variable: Rearmament during DDR						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Amnesty 1	2.12						
	(7.32)						
Amnesty 2	−5.63						
	(11.33)						
Amnesty 3	−24.56*						
	(10.20)						
Prisoner Release 1		27.17+					
		(15.85)					
Prisoner Release 2		2.74					
		(5.95)					
Prisoner Release 3		−21.62**					
		(7.81)					
Executive Reform 1			0.01				
			(11.47)				
Executive Reform 2			0.40				
			(9.70)				
Executive Reform 3			−22.45*				
			(11.27)				
Constitutional Reform 1				1.91			
				(4.95)			
Constitutional Reform 2				10.83			
				(8.44)			
Constitutional Reform 3				11.07*			
				(5.63)			
Decentralization 1					−10.47		
					(8.23)		
Decentralization 2					−21.95		
					(16.96)		
Decentralization 3					−20.68*		
					(8.67)		
Legislative Reform 1						−18.71*	
						(9.41)	
Legislative Reform 2						−0.98	
						(14.50)	
Legislative Reform 3						10.23	
						(9.77)	
Dispute Resolution 1							7.36
							(8.22)
Dispute Resolution 2							−19.72
							(15.61)
Dispute Resolution 3							−33.22**
							(12.38)
Number of combatants	0.09	0.17**	0.10**	0.21**	0.17***	0.21**	0.24**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Multiple groups	44.63**	60.95***	67.94***	38.52***	78.28***	93.99***	58.40***
	(16.61)	(12.69)	(17.01)	(10.55)	(15.47)	(22.68)	(15.61)
Group type: non-state	8.19	12.19	−14.45+	46.73**	−4.19	−8.27	19.79+
	(9.92)	(12.04)	(7.62)	(15.57)	(5.88)	(7.45)	(12.01)
Execution: international	−3.33	−0.83	1.37	−13.89*	−13.58**	−2.22	0.06
	(6.91)	(4.74)	(4.15)	(6.30)	(4.74)	(8.47)	(5.95)

Continued on next page

	Dependent variable: Rearmament during DDR						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Execution: national w/ int	0.88	1.18	2.06	6.98^{+}	4.40	6.12^{+}	3.74
	(3.84)	(3.32)	(3.42)	(4.35)	(4.77)	(3.81)	(4.67)
Disarmament implementation	−3.34	−3.03	-5.10^{+}	-6.55^{**}	-10.97^{**}	−6.60	−5.60
	(2.04)	(3.34)	(2.92)	(2.50)	(3.57)	(4.21)	(3.96)
Demobilization implementation	2.31	1.58	2.48	0.03	6.24	1.33	2.15
	(2.39)	(3.71)	(3.64)	(2.60)	(3.95)	(3.81)	(5.37)
Reintegration implementation	-2.84^{+}	−2.16	−1.86	−3.36	−3.35	−3.14	−2.06
	(1.63)	(1.77)	(1.43)	(2.72)	(2.74)	(2.13)	(1.70)
Establishment: international	−4.29	−12.94	−4.66	4.70	13.59	0.17	-26.27^{*}
	(10.12)	(10.76)	(10.55)	(15.83)	(8.80)	(12.23)	(11.16)
Establishment: peace agreement	-29.30^{***}	-36.54^{**}	-31.74^{**}	-15.84^{+}	-12.29^{+}	-30.24^{*}	-47.70^{***}
	(7.41)	(11.17)	(10.04)	(8.74)	(6.34)	(12.44)	(14.08)
Cantonment (log)	19.54^{***}	25.36^{***}	28.94^{***}	3.20	16.10^{***}	20.81^{***}	17.12^{***}
	(5.92)	(5.08)	(6.20)	(2.00)	(4.53)	(5.55)	(4.73)
Observations	407	407	407	407	407	407	407
AIC	139.4	141.5	144.6	138.5	135.9	139.7	140.4
Log likelihood	−53.7	−54.8	−56.3	−53.3	−51.9	−53.8	−54.2

Note: $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses.



Figure 1: Decision tree showing the influence of program features on rearmament during DDR

Table 6: OLS Estimates of Homicide Rate (Baseline and with Non-State Group Type)

	Dependent variable: Homicide rate	
	(1)	(2)
Disarmament implementation	−1.693	−0.254
	(1.057)	(0.820)
Demobilization implementation	−2.592*	−1.808*
	(1.104)	(0.828)
Reintegration implementation	−1.116	−0.399
	(0.818)	(0.617)
Number of combatants	0.010	0.070
	(0.076)	(0.057)
Multiple groups	17.303***	8.073**
	(2.253)	(2.297)
Group type: non-state	—	35.861***
		(6.142)
Execution: International	19.180	6.497
	(17.402)	(13.055)
Execution: National with international support	−31.621***	−38.299***
	(4.843)	(3.761)
UNPKO	1.589	−1.231
	(3.735)	(2.805)
Cantonment (log)	−3.421*	−0.686
	(1.423)	(1.152)
Establishment: international initiative	−32.729·	−30.365*
	(16.451)	(12.177)
Establishment: peace agreement	−103.704**	−113.476***
	(30.376)	(22.533)
Budget per combatant (log)	11.137*	10.746**
	(4.579)	(3.388)
Intercept	41.423***	17.465**
	(5.095)	(5.572)
Observations	101	101
Residual standard error	2.82 (df = 40)	2.09 (df = 39)
Adjusted R-squared	0.976	0.987
AIC	531.443	469.372

Note: $+p < 0.1$; $*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses.

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