Appendix: Job Insecurity, Economic Resources, and Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from South Korea

Contents

A Data and Variables

Table A1. Data information

	Data	Year	Source	Website
1	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)	1948-2022	Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project	`https://v-dem.net/`
2	Democratic Party Commentaries	2008.01.01.-2023.07.12.	Party website	`https://theminjoo.kr/main/sub/news/list.php?sno=&par=&&par=&brd=11&cate=105`
3	People Power Party Commentaries*	2008.01.01.-2023.07.12.	Party website	`https://www.peoplepowerparty.kr/news/comment/BBSDD0001?gubun2=BBSDD0005&page=1`
4	World Values Survey (WVS)	1996, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2018	The World Values Survey Association	`https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp`
5	Korean General Social Survey (KGSS)	2021	Sungkyunkwan University Survey Research Center	`https://kgss.skku.edu/kgss/data.do`

Table A2. Variables for V-Dem**

	Variable	Description
1	Electoral Democracy Index	To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved? *"The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices."*
2	Liberal Democracy Index	To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved? *"This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account."*
3	Political Polarization	Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps? *"Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner." = 0 ∼ "Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner." = 4 Rescaled to the interval of 0 to 1 to align with the range of other indices.*

*The commentaries of the spokespersons collected were utilized for empirical verification of the recent trend of increased offensiveness in political communications in Korea. To accomplish this, the evaluation employed the KNU Korean Sentiment Lexicon, which encompasses a comprehensive collection of 14,854 sentiment words, each assigned scores ranging from -2 to +2. By adopting this standardized approach, sentiments of the comments were categorized as positive if their scores exceeded +1, negative if they fell below -1, and neutral if they remained within this range.

**Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Anja Neundorf, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2023. "V-Dem Codebook v13" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Table A3. Variables for WVS

	Variable	Description
1	Undemocratic Political Attitude	I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. *Very bad = 1 ∼ Very good = 4*
2	Job Insecurity	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? Losing my job or not finding a job. *Not at all = 1 ∼ Very much = 4*
3	Labour Market Outsider	What is the status of your job? *Regular (정규직 임금근로자) = 0, Non-regular (비정규직 임금근로자) = 1*
4	Level of Assets	What do you think of the status of your net assets? (total property - total debt) *Lowest class = 1 ∼ Highest class = 10*
5	Household Income	On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. *Lower step = 1 ∼ Tenth step = 10*
6	Age	*∼ 24 = 1, 25 ∼ 34 = 2, 35 ∼ 44 = 3, 45 ∼ 54 = 4, 55 ∼ 64 = 5, 65 ∼ = 6*
7	Gender	*Female = 0, Male = 1*
8	Education	*Early childhood education = 0 ∼ Doctoral or equivalent = 8*
9	Ideological Orientation	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? *Left = 1 ∼ Right = 10*
10	Affective Polarization	Please put your feeling about politicians or political parties on the following 10-point feeling thermometer: Democratic Party; Liberty Korea Party *Strongly dislike = 1 ∼ Strongly like = 10* *(The score was calculated by taking the absolute difference between the ratings of the Democratic Party and the Liberty Korea Party.)*
11	Province	*Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Gyeongsang, Jeolla*
12	Happiness	Taking all things together, would you say you are: *Not at all happy = 1 ∼ Very happy = 4*
13	Financial Satisfaction	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If '1' means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and '10' means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation? *Dissatisfied = 1 ∼ Satisfied = 10*
14	Trust in Political Institutions	I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?: The Government, The Civil Services, Parliament, The Political Parties *None at all = 1, Not very much = 2, Quite a lot = 3, A great deal = 4* *(The index was computed by averaging the four ratings.)*
15	Trust in Parties and Parliament	*None at all = 1 ∼ A great deal = 4* *(The index was derived by averaging the two ratings pertaining to political parties and parliament.)*

Table A4. Variables for KGSS

	Variable	Description
1	Undemocratic Political Attitude	Please tell us which of the following is the closest to your opinion. *Democracy is always better than any other alternative political systems = 0 Sometimes dictatorship might be better than democracy; It does not matter for people like me whether we live in a democracy or dictatorship = 1*
2	Job Insecurity	If you wish, can you work at your workplace further? *Yes = 0, No = 1*
3	Labour Market Outsider	*Regular employee = 0, Temporary employee; Daily employee; Part-time = 1*
4	Household Income	How much is your pre-tax household income, including earnings, dividends, capital gains, and pension? *The reported household income was divided by the square root of the number of household members, and subsequently matched with the income decile data provided by Statistics Korea. Bottom income bracket = 1 $\sim$ Top income bracket = 10**
5	Age	$\sim$ *29 = 1, 30 $\sim$ 39 = 2, 40 $\sim$ 49 = 3, 50 $\sim$ 59 = 4, 60 $\sim$ 69 = 5, 70 $\sim$ = 6*
6	Gender	*Female = 0, Male = 1*
7	Education	*No formal school = 0 $\sim$ Graduate school (PhD) = 7*
8	Ideological Orientation	To what degree do you think yourself politically liberal or conservative? *Very liberal = 1 $\sim$ Very conservative = 5*
9	Affective Polarization	Please indicate how much you like or dislike following parties with numbers between 0 to 10. 0 means strongly dislike, 5 means neither like nor dislike, and 10 means strongly like: Democratic Party; People Power Party *Dislike very much = 0 $\sim$ Like very much = 10 (The score was calculated by taking the absolute difference between the ratings of the Democratic Party and the People Power Party.)*
10	Province	*Seoul, Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungcheong, Gyeongsang, Jeolla, Jeju*

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*Pre-fiscal equalized income boundary values by decile (in ten thousand KRW) for the year 2021: p10 = 753, p20 = 1,541, p30 = 2,123, p40 = 2,678, p50 = 3,204, p60 = 3,816, p70 = 4,537, p80 = 5,555, p90 = 7,327.

Table A5. Descriptive statistics for WVS

	Number of observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Med	Max
Undemocratic Political Attitude	1245	2.758	0.791	1	3	4
Job Insecurity	1245	2.881	0.809	1	3	4
Labour Market Outsider	624	0.194	0.396	0	0	1
Level of Assets	1245	4.634	1.399	1	5	10
Household Income	1245	4.840	1.378	1	5	8
Age	1245	3.603	1.468	1	4	6
Gender (1=male)	1245	0.488	0.500	0	0	1
Education	1245	4.118	1.606	0	3	8
Ideological Orientation	1245	5.265	1.755	1	5	10
Affective Polarization	1245	2.876	2.058	0	3	9
Happiness	1245	2.931	0.385	1	3	4
Financial Satisfaction	1245	6.082	1.465	1	6	10
Trust in Political Institutions	1245	2.273	0.533	1	2.25	4
Trust in Parties and Parliament	1245	2.028	0.651	1	2	4
Province	Seoul 245 Ulsan 27	Busan 84 Gyeonggi 314	Daegu 61 Gangwon 37	Incheon 82 Chungcheong 94	Gwangju 34 Gyeongsang 143	Daejeon 34 Jeolla 90

Table A6. Descriptive statistics for KGSS

	Number of observations	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Med	Max	
Undemocratic Political Attitude	1168	0.261	0.439	0	0	1	
Job Insecurity	480	0.125	0.331	0	0	1	
Labour Market Outsider	479	0.284	0.451	0	0	1	
Household Income	1147	5.330	2.555	1	5	10	
Age	1205	3.744	1.551	1	4	6	
Gender (1=male)	1205	0.422	0.494	0	0	1	
Education	1203	3.239	1.504	0	3	7	
Ideological Orientation	1163	2.954	0.972	1	3	5	
Affective Polarization	1170	2.737	2.532	0	2	10	
Province	Seoul 234	Gyeonggi 355	Gangwon 38	Chungcheong 132	Gyeongsang 314	Jeolla 120	Jeju 12

Joint categories of job insecurity and economic resources

Table A7 to A9 display the joint distributions of job insecurity and economic resources. In the WVS dataset, 73.2% of respondents (52.0% "a great deal" and 21.2% "very much"), reported concerns about job loss or difficulty finding employment. In the KGSS dataset, approximately 12.5% of workers find themselves unable to continue working at their current workspace, despite their desire to do so. It is evident that the dataset displays a relative dearth of participants at the both ends of the income spectrum. Especially, the exclusion of the most affluent samples has been discussed as a limitation of the survey methodology. In general, we observe a modest pattern where individuals with greater assets or income are those who perceive lower levels of job insecurity. In the WVS data, the Pearson correlation coefficient for job insecurity and assets was -0.090, while the coefficient for job insecurity and income was -0.058. In the KGSS data, it was -0.227.

Table A7. Joint category of job insecurity and assets (WVS)

		Assets										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Job insecurity	1	2	4	12	19	17	12	10	2	0	0	78
		(0.2%)	(0.3%)	(1.0%)	(1.5%)	(1.4%)	(1.0%)	(0.8%)	(0.2%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(6.3%)
	2	6	5	34	64	65	48	29	5	0	0	256
		(0.5%)	(0.4%)	(2.7%)	(5.1%)	(5.2%)	(3.9%)	(2.3%)	(0.4%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(20.6%)
	3	5	29	82	166	192	125	42	5	0	1	647
		(0.4%)	(2.3%)	(6.6%)	(13.3%)	(15.4%)	(10.0%)	(3.4%)	(0.4%)	(0.0%)	(0.1%)	(52.0%)
	4	8	20	39	73	72	37	12	3	0	0	264
		(0.6%)	(1.6%)	(3.1%)	(5.9%)	(5.8%)	(3.0%)	(1.0%)	(0.2%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(21.2%)
		21	58	167	322	346	222	93	15	0	1	1245
		(1.7%)	(4.7%)	(13.4%)	(25.9%)	(27.8%)	(17.8%)	(7.5%)	(1.2%)	(0.0%)	(0.1%)	(100%)

Table A8. Joint category of job insecurity and income (WVS)

		Income										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Job insecurity	1	2	4	10	18	18	12	11	3	0	0	78
		(0.2%)	(0.3%)	(0.8%)	(1.4%)	(1.4%)	(1.0%)	(0.9%)	(0.2%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(6.3%)
	2	6	5	33	46	67	59	33	7	0	0	256
		(0.5%)	(0.4%)	(2.7%)	(3.7%)	(5.4%)	(4.7%)	(2.7%)	(0.6%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(20.6%)
	3	3	23	60	156	212	123	63	7	0	0	647
		(0.2%)	(1.8%)	(4.8%)	(12.5%)	(17.0%)	(9.9%)	(5.1%)	(0.6%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(52.0%)
	4	0	22	28	63	83	47	17	4	0	0	264
		(0.0%)	(1.8%)	(2.2%)	(5.1%)	(6.7%)	(3.8%)	(1.4%)	(0.3%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(21.2%)
		11	54	131	283	380	241	124	21	0	0	1245
		(0.9%)	(4.3%)	(10.5%)	(22.7%)	(30.5%)	(19.4%)	(10.0%)	(1.7%)	(0.0%)	(0.0%)	(100%)

Table A9. Joint category of job insecurity and income (KGSS)

		Income											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	
Job insecurity	0	1	20	25	42	55	73	54	70	44	26	10	420
		(0.1%)	(1.7%)	(2.1%)	(3.5%)	(4.6%)	(6.1%)	(4.5%)	(5.8%)	(3.7%)	(2.2%)	(0.8%)	(34.9%)
	1	4	12	6	4	7	10	4	5	4	1	3	60
		(0.3%)	(1.0%)	(0.5%)	(0.3%)	(0.6%)	(0.8%)	(0.3%)	(0.4%)	(0.3%)	(0.1%)	(0.2%)	(5.0%)
	NA	59	112	90	83	67	78	69	49	42	31	45	725
		(4.9%)	(9.3%)	(7.5%)	(6.9%)	(5.6%)	(6.5%)	(5.7%)	(4.1%)	(3.5%)	(2.6%)	(3.7%)	(60.2%)
		64	144	121	129	129	161	127	124	90	58	58	1205
		(5.3%)	(12.0%)	(10.0%)	(10.7%)	(10.7%)	(13.4%)	(10.5%)	(10.3%)	(7.5%)	(4.8%)	(4.8%)	(100%)

B Supporting Results

Table A10. Job insecurity, assets, income, and undemocratic attitudes (WVS)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Job insecurity	0.243**	0.245**	0.250**	0.721**	0.799**		
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.223)	(0.231)		
Labour market outsider						1.006	1.733*
						(0.745)	(0.801)
Assets				0.216		−0.018	
				(0.147)		(0.098)	
Income	0.055	0.026	−0.202	0.084	0.352*	−0.003	0.028
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.216)	(0.065)	(0.137)	(0.096)	(0.074)
Age	0.068	0.055	0.050	0.054	0.052	−0.012	−0.025
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Gender (1=male)	0.014	0.021	0.020	0.011	0.017	0.327*	0.317+
	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.163)	(0.163)
Education	0.017	0.020	0.020	0.015	0.012	0.058	0.055
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Ideological orientation	−0.070*	−0.027	−0.028	−0.029	−0.028	0.021	0.017
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Affective polarization	0.040	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.0001	−0.013	−0.011
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Income^2			0.024				
			(0.022)				
Assets × Job insecurity				−0.104*			
				(0.046)			
Income × Job insecurity					−0.116*		
					(0.046)		
Assets × Labour market outsider						−0.213	
						(0.160)	
Income × Labour market outsider							−0.361*
							(0.166)
Province fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	624	624
Log likelihood	−1436.010	−1391.672	−1391.088	−1388.237	−1388.487	−714.345	−713.071

Note: Estimated coefficients from ordered logit models. Standard errors are in parentheses. Cut points were estimated but not reported here.
+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 (two-tailed).

Table A11. Job insecurity, assets, income, and undemocratic attitudes (WVS, OLS)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Job insecurity	0.103**	0.095**	0.098**	0.273**	0.324**		
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.088)	(0.091)		
Labour market outsider						0.300	0.623+
						(0.296)	(0.320)
Assets				0.084		−0.011	
				(0.058)		(0.040)	
Income	0.026	0.014	−0.086	0.035	0.148**	0.001	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.085)	(0.026)	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.030)
Age	0.026	0.018	0.016	0.018	0.017	−0.007	−0.014
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Gender (1=male)	0.012	0.017	0.016	0.014	0.017	0.139*	0.137*
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Education	0.008	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.020	0.017
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Ideological orientation	−0.029*	−0.011	−0.012	−0.011	−0.011	0.007	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Affective polarization	0.016	−0.0001	0.0003	0.0005	0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income^2			0.011				
			(0.009)				
Assets × Job insecurity				−0.039*			
				(0.018)			
Income × Job insecurity					−0.048**		
					(0.018)		
Assets × Labour market outsider						−0.067	
						(0.064)	
Income × Labour market outsider							−0.134*
							(0.066)
Province fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	624	624
R^2	0.020	0.084	0.085	0.088	0.089	0.078	0.082

Note: OLS coefficient estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 (two-tailed).

Table A12. Job insecurity, assets, income, and undemocratic attitudes (WVS, GLM)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Job insecurity	0.259**	0.253**	0.254**	0.654**	0.777**		
	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.253)	(0.263)		
Labour market outsider						0.505	1.444
						(0.811)	(0.890)
Assets				0.166		−0.003	
				(0.166)		(0.109)	
Income	0.066	0.019	−0.034	0.079	0.322*	0.037	0.080
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.239)	(0.074)	(0.154)	(0.109)	(0.084)
Age	0.064	0.043	0.042	0.044	0.041	0.038	0.024
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Gender (1=male)	0.024	0.048	0.047	0.039	0.044	0.333+	0.320+
	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Education	−0.006	−0.012	−0.012	−0.016	−0.020	0.049	0.047
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Ideological orientation	−0.025	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.048	0.044
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Affective polarization	0.017	−0.022	−0.022	−0.021	−0.017	−0.049	−0.049
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Income^2			0.006				
			(0.025)				
Assets × Job insecurity				−0.089+			
				(0.052)			
Income × Job insecurity					−0.110*		
					(0.052)		
Assets × Labour market outsider						−0.096	
						(0.176)	
Income × Labour market outsider							−0.291
							(0.182)
Province fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245	624	624
Log likelihood	−784.753	−752.486	−752.460	−750.298	−750.258	−379.492	−378.374

Note: Estimated coefficients from binary logit models (very bad; fairly bad = 0, fairly good; very good = 1). Standard errors are in parentheses. $+$p<0.1; $*$p<0.05; $**$p<0.01 (two-tailed).

Table A13. Job insecurity, income, and undemocratic attitudes (KGSS)

	Binary logit model					Linear probability model				
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
Job insecurity	0.759*	0.786*	0.695*	2.300**		0.152*	0.156*	0.136*	0.437**	
	(0.340)	(0.345)	(0.349)	(0.788)		(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.154)	
Labour market outsider					1.699*					0.296*
					(0.737)					(0.133)
Income	0.137*	0.129*	−0.398	0.186**	0.213**	0.025*	0.024*	−0.080	0.032**	0.037**
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.257)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.049)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Age	−0.040	−0.037	−0.063	−0.043	−0.032	−0.007	−0.006	−0.011	−0.007	−0.006
	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Gender (1=male)	0.031	0.041	0.094	0.067	0.078	0.005	0.007	0.017	0.010	0.013
	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Education	−0.113	−0.090	−0.100	−0.103	−0.089	−0.021	−0.017	−0.019	−0.018	−0.016
	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Ideological orientation	−0.064	−0.016	−0.014	−0.024	−0.019	−0.012	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.003
	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Affective polarization	−0.062	−0.073	−0.077	−0.072	−0.075	−0.011	−0.013	−0.014	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Income^2			0.044*					0.009*		
			(0.021)					(0.004)		
Income × Job insecurity				−0.289*					−0.055*	
				(0.138)					(0.027)	
Income × Labour market outsider					−0.230+					−0.041+
					(0.119)					(0.022)
Province fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	430	430	430	430	429	430	430	430	430	429
Log likelihood	−239.187	−237.227	−235.077	−234.970	−235.865					
R^2						0.025	0.035	0.046	0.045	0.040

Note: Estimated coefficients from binary logit models ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5]), and linear probability models ([6], [7], [8], [9], [10]). Standard errors are in parentheses. Cut points were estimated but not reported here.
$^+$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.01 (two-tailed).

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Table A14. Mechanism test: consequences of job insecurity (WVS)

	[1] Happiness	[2] Financial Satisfaction	[3] Trust in Political Institutions	[4] Trust in Parties and Parliament
Job insecurity	−0.231*	−0.259**	−0.030+	−0.054*
	(0.106)	(0.049)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Income	0.396**	0.343**	0.049**	0.053**
	(0.067)	(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Age	0.140*	0.041	0.024*	0.010
	(0.065)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Gender (1=male)	−0.297+	−0.054	−0.051+	−0.041
	(0.164)	(0.076)	(0.029)	(0.035)
Education	0.204**	0.087**	−0.014	−0.026*
	(0.060)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Ideological orientation	−0.002	0.081**	0.003	0.017
	(0.053)	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Affective polarization	0.047	0.039*	−0.011	−0.016+
	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	1,245
Log likelihood	−591.011			
R^2		0.200	0.147	0.151

Note: Estimated coefficients from ordered logit model ([1]), and linear regression models ([2], [3], [4]).
Standard errors are in parentheses.   +$p<0.1$; *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$ (two-tailed).

Individuals born from 1962 to 1971 are labeled as the "democratization (386) generation," those born prior to 1962 are referred to as the "industrialization generation," and those born after 1971 are denoted as the "post-democratization generation." The baseline for the generation variable is the "democratization (386) generation."

Table A15. Additional control: generational cohort dummies

	WVS			KGSS	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Job insecurity	0.235**	0.733**	0.820**	0.781*	2.325**
	(0.070)	(0.223)	(0.232)	(0.346)	(0.791)
Assets		0.232			
		(0.147)			
Income	0.016	0.071	0.359**	0.130*	0.189**
	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.137)	(0.059)	(0.067)
Age	0.043	0.040	0.038	−0.199	−0.219
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.189)	(0.190)
Gender (1=male)	0.022	0.012	0.018	0.032	0.058
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.231)	(0.233)
Education	0.010	0.004	0.001	−0.086	−0.098
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.106)	(0.108)
Ideological orientation	−0.027	−0.030	−0.028	−0.018	−0.027
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Affective polarization	−0.004	−0.002	0.001	−0.074	−0.074
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Generation (Industrialization)	−0.244	−0.259	−0.275	0.019	0.053
	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.415)	(0.422)
Generation (Post-democratization)	−0.221	−0.239	−0.246	−0.515	−0.542
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.429)	(0.430)
Assets × Job insecurity		−0.109*			
		(0.046)			
Income × Job insecurity			−0.123**		−0.294*
			(0.046)		(0.138)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,245	1,245	1,245	430	430
Log likelihood	−1390.221	−1386.593	−1386.682	−236.486	−234.161

Note: Estimated coefficients from ordered logit models ([1], [2], [3]), and binary logit models ([4], [5], [6]). Standard errors are in parentheses. $^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 (two-tailed).

Partisanship, gender, age group, and support for undemocratic leadership

Regarding responses to the question about a political system featuring a strong leader who is not bound to parliament and elections in the governance process of the country, Figures A1 to A3 provide a detailed breakdown based on partisanship, gender, and age groups, respectively. Initially, conservatives, males, and older age groups exhibited stronger preferences for undemocratic leaders, but these disparities have dwindled in recent years, coinciding with an overall increase in support. In general, the acceptance or endorsement of undemocratic leadership is high, and has risen significantly, irrespective of various individual characteristics.

Figure A1. Figure 2A disaggregated by partisanship

Note. "If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?" *Grand National Party (2005, 2010), Liberty Korea Party (2018) = Conservative; Democratic Party (2005, 2010, 2018) = Liberal.* While cognizant of its limitations, this question demonstrated its relevance to respondents' partisanship as it remained the only consistently available question across the three waves (5-7) of the WVS from 2005 to 2018.

Figure A2. Figure 2A disaggregated by gender

Male (Strong Leader: ■ Very Bad ■ Fairly Bad ■ Fairly Good □ Very Good)

1996 — 33.1%
2001 — 32.8%
2005 — 51.6%
2010 — 51.7%
2018 — 67.2%

Female (Strong Leader: ■ Very Bad ■ Fairly Bad ■ Fairly Good □ Very Good)

1996 — 30.6%
2001 — 23.9%
2005 — 44.1%
2010 — 45.2%
2018 — 66.4%

Figure A3. Figure 2A disaggregated by age group

20s–30s (Strong Leader: ■ Very Bad ■ Fairly Bad ■ Fairly Good ■ Very Good)

1996 — 29%
2001 — 20.8%
2005 — 47.3%
2010 — 44.3%
2018 — 66.4%

40s–50s (Strong Leader: ■ Very Bad ■ Fairly Bad ■ Fairly Good ■ Very Good)

1996 — 33.9%
2001 — 34.3%
2005 — 50.3%
2010 — 51.2%
2018 — 67.4%

60s–70s (Strong Leader: ■ Very Bad ■ Fairly Bad ■ Fairly Good ■ Very Good)

1996 — 45.5%
2001 — 55.6%
2005 — 43.8%
2010 — 52.1%
2018 — 66.1%

Figure A4. Jackknife analysis (Province, WVS, Model [4] in Table A10)

Figure A5. Jackknife analysis (Province, KGSS, Model [4] in Table A13)

Figure A6. Jackknife analysis (Age, WVS, Model [4] in Table A10)

Figure A7. Jackknife analysis (Age, KGSS, Model [4] in Table A13)

Polarization and democratic backsliding

It is widely recognized that political communications in Korea have experienced an escalation in offensive content compared to previous periods. To empirically examine this phenomenon, we conduct a sentiment analysis by scraping party spokepersons' commentaries from the two major political parties in Korea, namely the opposition center-left Democratic Party and the incumbent conservative People Power Party, from their respective websites. Sentiments were measured based on all commentaries during each period, encompassing general expressions without specifying particular individuals, events, or entities they referred to. The data corpus under consideration encompasses the period from January 1st, 2008, to July 12th, 2023. The KNU Korean Sentiment Lexicon,* comprising a total of 14,854 sentiment words and assigning scores ranging from -2 to +2 to each word, served as the standard method employed for conducting the evaluation. Sentiments of comments with scores exceeding +1 were classified as positive, those falling below -1 as negative, and all others were considered neutral. The findings depicted in Figure 2 affirm a notable intensification of negative tones in recent times, evident from the increased occurrence of documents manifesting negative sentiments from both parties. This observation gives rise to legitimate concerns regarding the potential fragility in the context of polarization and democratic backsliding.

Figure A8. Sentiment analysis of party spokespersons' commentaries

Note. Computed from a dataset compiled by the authors through the extraction of party spokespersons' commentaries from their respective official websites. The bar graph illustrates the distribution of commentaries categorized as positive, neutral, or negative for each year. Data for the year 2023 is inclusive up to July 12, 2023.

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*Park, Sang-Min, Chul-Won Na, Min-Seong Choi, Da-Hee Lee, and Byung-Won Oh. "KNU Korean Sentiment Lexicon: Bi-LSTM-based Method for Building a Korean Sentiment Lexicon (Bi-LSTM 기반의 한국어 감성사전 구축 방안)." *Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems* 24, no. 4 (2018): 219-240.