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THE CONCEPT OF EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING

by
Howard Frederick Kamler

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Professor William P. Alston, Chairman
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ABSTRACT

THE CONCEPT OF EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING

by
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Empathy is one technique used by people (e.g., by psychotherapists) to understand the emotional feelings of others. It can be characterized as "empathically feeling the other's emotional feelings, these empathic feelings leading to an understanding of the other's feelings." A brief glance at this concept of empathic understanding raises many interesting questions: What are empathic feelings? How do they resemble and differ from the ordinary emotional feelings of the people with whom the empathizer empathizes? What are the kinds of understanding that empathic feelings lead to? What conditions of empathy significantly distinguish it as a technique of emotional understanding from other techniques of emotional understanding?

Answering these questions necessitates a careful inquiry into the nature of emotional feelings. From time to time, philosophers discussing the "other minds" problem have argued about the kind of justification a person can give for his claim that he has knowledge of the emotional feelings of others. However, there has not been much discussion on what it is a person has knowledge of when he has knowledge of emotional feelings. Accordingly, one of the things I try to do is give an analysis of the concept of emotional feelings that enables us to see clearly what it is a

person has knowledge about when he has knowledge of another's feelings --the major discovery here being that the concept of emotional feelings entails interesting relationships between the feeling state a person has and his wants, beliefs, and other psychological states. (Thus, having knowledge of another's emotional feelings entails having knowledge of his wants, beliefs, and so on.)

Given the analysis of the concept of emotional feelings, I go on to show the essential kinds of feeling-knowledge that are required by one who uses such knowledge to empathize with other people and their emotional feelings. Moreover, we look at how the empathizer uses his feeling-knowledge to imagine the other's feelings. For this imagining state is precisely what empathic feelings are. And so I give an analysis of imagined feeling states, the result being that having empathic feelings (a species of imagined emotional feelings) are ways of thinking "hypothetically" and "all at once" about what one knows to be the content of another person's emotional feelings.

After my discussion of emotional feeling-knowledge and the imagining character of empathic feelings, I go on to explore some of the different senses of "emotional understanding," where "emotional understanding" is restricted to understanding the emotional feelings of people. I show how the different kinds of emotional understanding are identical with different capacities one has to recognize, explain or predict things relevant to a person's emotional feelings. With this foundation, I proceed to show how specific kinds of empathic feelings are causal factors in (i.e., lead to) the actualization of each of the specific kinds of emotional understanding capacities, the total phenomenon here referred to as "empathic understanding."

Finally, the value of empathic understanding as a kind of emotional understanding is weighed against other techniques of emotional understanding, with the result that there are strong pragmatic grounds for thinking of empathic understanding as in some ways superior to the nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is offered as a contribution to philosophical psychology. Specifically, I want to address myself to giving an analysis of the concept of empathy as a kind of emotional understanding. For little philosophical attention has been paid to the notion of emotional empathy,[1] though some philosophers have written on aesthetic empathy.[2] What I have in mind is to talk about the kind of empathy view which claims, in its barest form, that in order for one to emotionally understand another person, one must be able to actually feel what the other person feels--one must empathically understand him. So, for example, a disgruntled wife may tell her husband, "You don't really understand me, for you don't feel what I feel--you just don't empathize with me." Or, in a somewhat less homespun context, some psychotherapists claim as we will see in Chapter V, that in order to fully understand a person's emotional feelings, one, after a fashion, must actually feel what the other person feels. However, merely to know that a person has a certain kind

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[1]See, for example, Martin Buber, I And Thou, trans. R. G. Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (Yale University Press: 1954); and Edith Stein, On the Problem of Empathy, trans. Waltraut Stein (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

[2]Some example discussions of aesthetic empathy can be found in T. Lipps, Aesthetik (Hamburg and Leipzig: L. Voss, 1950); Vernon Lee (Paget), The Beautiful (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1913)--the relevant section is reprinted in A Modern Book of Esthetics, 3rd ed., M. Rader (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960), pp. 370-374. A good account of aesthetic empathy by a psychologist can be found in E. B. Titchener, A Textbook of Psychology (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919), pp. 333, 417.

of emotional feeling without somehow actually feeling the other person's feeling experience is never enough for an understanding of his feelings.

I am not that much concerned with part of the claim made in these examples--viz., I do not care if the housewife and the therapist are right in what seems to be their assumption that "true" understanding of another person's emotional feelings requires empathy. Indeed, I think they are wrong. (The pros and cons of this will be discussed in Chapter VI.) What I am mainly interested in, however, is how we are to understand the empathy aspect of their claims: Just what conditions does the notion of empathic understanding entail? What is one doing when one is empathizing with another person and his feelings? (I will be using the terms "empathy" and "empathic understanding" interchangeably.) By way of introduction to my answer to these questions (the full answer itself constituting the body of this dissertation), let me now briefly offer some very broad logical boundaries to place around the concept of empathy. But let me do this with the proviso that I am not saying that these boundaries will capture the general aspects of what everyone writing on the subject has meant by "empathy". For example, they do not capture what Buber means to be talking about when he speaks of empathy as the "I-Thou" relationship that exists between some people as opposed to the detached "I-It" relationship that exists between most of us. Nor will my discussion capture all the nuances of what many psychotherapists find important about empathy; namely, that it is "helpful" in psychotherapeutic contexts. So they speak of the therapeutic results of empathy. (Rogers, for example, talks of the positive therapeutic results that derive from the empathic therapist's "accepting" attitude toward the patient.)[1] My discussion, rather, will

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[1]Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951).

be a "conceptual analysis" of the empathic understanding phenomenon that is captured in the above kinds of examples, and nothing else. But let me make explicit now the broad psychological parameters that are captured in these examples and to which I will be applying my analysis.

The first general fact about the kind of empathy I mean to be discussing is that in empathizing the empathizer experiences what are called "empathic feelings". And he takes his empathic feelings to be very much like the feelings of the other person with whom he is empathizing. But just to say this is not enough. For there are different ways one might interpret what these empathic feelings are precisely in relation to the other person's feelings. One extreme, but possible, version of what these feelings are could have it that they constitute a kind of direct knowledge of the feelings of others. And what I mean by this is that somehow when one has empathic feelings, one's empathic feelings are numerically identical with the feelings of the other person. One literally feels what the other person feels. It is not certain that they want to hold such a radical position on empathic feelings, but some psychologists use language that would strongly suggest such a thing. For example, one author claims that unless there is this direct awareness on the part of the infant towards the conscious states of his mother, full-blown emotional empathy can never develop in the infant's personality. Indeed,

> [in] 'infantile empathy' the infant feels and bodily perceives the mother and what she feels--through his mouth, his skin, his muscles and even his guts and in his bones, as some linguistic usage has it. Perhaps this is a primordial avenue to 'knowledge' about himself and his world for the human infant. Rooted in his experience of oneness with the mother, the empathic avenue to knowledge serves as an extremely important mode of relating to other human beings throughout life, but it seems to be of crucial

importance during the formative years.[1] (My underlining)

Moreover, when other authors speak of the empathizer and the other person as "sharing" conscious states[2] or as having their conscious states in "communion" with one another,[3] it sounds as though they too may be pushing the same kind of view. Of course, it is not certain that this kind of view of empathic feelings is to be taken literally. However, as it is one possibility (regardless of whether or not it is really what these authors have in mind) for what empathic feelings are, I mention it here.

The other side of this coin has it that empathic feelings are feelings that the empathizer has, but which are numerically distinct from the other person's. Some would have it that the ability for the empathizer to have these feelings is derived from the empathizer's unconsciously having meaningful, nonverbal, subliminal perceptions of the other person's behavior[4] or from the empathizer's consciously observing more obvious behavior--this consciously or unconsciously observed behavior somehow justifying the empathizer's inference as to what the other person's feelings

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[1]P. H. Ornstein and R. J. Kalthoff, "Toward a Conceptual Scheme for Teaching Clinical Psychiatric Evaluation," Comprehensive Psychiatry, Vol. 8, No. 5 (October, 1967), p. 408.

[2]R. Shafer, "Generative Empathy In The Treatment Situation," The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 28 (1959), esp. p. 343.

[3]H. S. Sullivan, Modern Conceptions of Psychiatry (New York: W. A. White Foundation, 1947), p. 17. See also his The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1964), p. 215.

[4]For example: C. B. Truax and R. R. Carkhuff, Toward Effective Counseling and Psychotherapy (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967), Chapters 10, 11 and 12. T. Reik, Listening With The Third Ear (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1949), suggests this kind of point; esp. pp. 131-156. So do P. Ekman and W. V. Friesen, "Nonverbal Behavior in Psychotherapy Research," in Research in Psychotherapy, Vol. III, ed. J. M. Schlien (Washington: American Psychological Association, Inc., 1968), pp. 179-216. Also, Robert Katz, Empathy: Its Nature and Uses (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), and David Rapaport, Organization and Pathology of Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 726-727.

must be like. Finally, the inferred knowledge about these feelings is used by the empathizer in a contrived or unconscious conjuring up of empathic feelings.

Without evaluating the merit of either of these broad claims about empathic feelings (I will do this shortly in Chapter I), I will just make the general point that in emotional empathy an empathizer must feel what the other person feels, whether directly or indirectly. In other words,

(i) the empathizer must have empathic feelings.

A second general point sometimes made about empathy--and certainly one that is important for what I want to discuss--is that it involves an understanding by the empathizer of the other person and his feelings. And thus the reason for my equation between "empathy" and "empathic understanding". Indeed, it has been said that

> Empathy is...an emotional apprehension of the affective experience of another, this sensing being used by the cognitive functions to gain understanding of the other.[1]

What this comes down to is that out of the empathic feeling experience there comes some sort of understanding of the other person and his psychological state. And so, without attempting to clarify this point here, I will simply say that another condition of the kind of empathy I am interested in will be that

(ii) empathic feelings lead to an understanding of the other person and his feelings.

Representative of yet a third way that some psychologists talk about empathy--and certainly something I shall want to discuss--is P. Diskin's

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[1] A. Z. Guiora, "On Clinical Diagnosis and Prediction," Psychological Reports, 17 (Southern Universities Press, 1965), p. 782. R. Shafer, op. cit., also makes this kind of point.

suggestion that

> empathy might be thought of as the ability of A to put himself in the psychological field of B, to predict how B feels about B, how B feels about A, how B feels about relevant attitudes and object relations, and to 'use' this knowledge of self and others in a purposeful manner.[1] (My underlining)

Somehow, out of the empathizer's empathic feelings there sometimes comes the ability for the empathizer to make predictions about different future psychological states of the other person. Adopting this as an important notion for empathic understanding, then, let us say that

> (iii) some empathic feelings lead to an ability to make predictions about the other person's future psychological states.

What I will do now is take (i), (ii), and (iii) as the broad boundaries defining the concept of empathy that I want to discuss. Clearly, and as I have intended, these boundaries are not, as they stand here, very enlightening. What I will do in this dissertation, accordingly, is give a precise analysis of these conditions of empathy. So in Chapters I, II, and III, I will develop the notion of "empathic feelings", trying to get clear on what exactly they are. Basically, what I will be arguing is that empathic feelings are imagined feelings which the empathizer infers--sometimes consciously, but more often unconsciously--from various kinds of knowledge he has about the other person. In Chapter I, I will define what I mean by "imagined" feelings. But my main task will be to show the kinds of epistemic grounds one has when one infers these imagined feelings. To do this, I will try to answer the question, "What is the concept of

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[1] P. Diskin, "A Study of Predictive Empathy And The Ability of Student Teachers to Maintain Harmonious Inter-personal Relations in Selected Elementary Classrooms," unpublished doctor's dissertation, University of Michigan, 1955, p. 13. See also any of R. Dymond's work on empathy. E.g., R. F. Dymond, "A Scale for the Measurement of Empathic Ability," Journal of Consulting Psychology (1949), pp. 127-133.

emotional feelings that the empathizer works under that allows him to reasonably make inferences about the nature of another person's feelings?" The keystone for answering this question--and indeed, the basis for much of the discussion found in the entire dissertation--comes in Chapter II where I will develop a full-scale analysis of the concept of emotional feelings, making clear just what kind of thing a person (any person, not just an empathizer) knows about when he knows about what another person's emotional feelings are like. Given this analysis, I will then return in Chapter III to my discussion of empathic feelings and show how, when given what I will have said about emotional feelings in Chapter II, the empathizer uses the available knowledge about another person's feelings to come to imagine precisely what the other person is feeling.

In Chapters IV and V, I will develop what conditions (ii) and (iii) of empathy seem to come down to. I will do this by setting out in Chapter IV various parameters necessary for talking about the different kinds of capacities people have for <u>understanding</u> another person and his emotional feelings. Then, in Chapter V, I will make use of these paramters to show that indeed empathic feelings lead one to (and I will talk in Chapter V about what is meant by "leading to") an understanding of the other person and his emotional feelings--i.e., that empathic feelings lead one to an <u>empathic understanding</u> of the other person and his feelings. Moreover though, I will show that there are actually many kinds of empathic understanding to which empathic feelings lead. And one of these kinds will involve the predictive aspect of empathy (condition (iii)). This, then, will conclude my analysis of conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of the concept of empathy.

Finally, in Chapter VI, I will try to show how, given my analysis of

empathy, it (empathy) can be seen to have value as a kind of emotional understanding in competition with other kinds of emotional understanding. I will try to show, that is, how this phenomenon which involves the imagining of another's feelings can be at least as helpful in understanding another's feelings as other kinds of emotional understanding can. Moreover, I will argue that in some pragmatic respects empathy seems to be more helpful for emotional understanding than these other kinds.

One last introductory remark. Although the discussion of this dissertation is mainly geared toward clarification of a particular notion of empathy, I want to emphasize that a strong peripheral interest of mine is in saying some interesting things about the concept of emotional feelings --empathic or otherwise. And so when it is appropriate, I will be making observations about emotional feelings in general vis-à-vis their relevance to further clarifying my notion of empathy.

Chapter I

EMPATHIC FEELINGS

Central to cases of empathy is the empathizer's claim that he is able to feel what some other person feels. Somehow, when an empathic person is in the presence of or hears about an individual who has been in an "emotional" situation, the empathic person consequently finds himself in a state of consciousness most generally described as "feeling the other person's feelings." Since most of us have found ourselves in the role of empathizer from time to time, we can probably agree that this description of the empathic conscious state does capture the sense of the experience. It is when we try to go beyond such a description, however, that we become confused about the exact nature of these so-called empathic feelings. In this chapter, I will confront some of this confusion and then try to suggest some possibilities for resolving it, though the final details of the resolution will come in Chapter III.

(i)

(1) As we have seen already, someone might hold that "to feel what another person feels" (i.e., "to have empathic feelings") is actually "to be directly aware of another person's feelings." And what I am taking this claim to mean here is that the empathizer is actually "having" (or "sharing," as it is sometimes put) the other person's feelings.[1] The conscious

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[1]Some philosophers argue that one can be directly aware of another's feelings but that this "direct awareness" does not entail one's "having"

state of the empathizer is taken to be numerically identical with that of the person with whom he is empathizing. While some might want to make sense of this position, it seems to me to be false for the following reasons:

(a) Adopting this notion of empathy would necessitate a severe reformulation of our concept of what a feeling is. If I am directly aware of some emotional feeling or other, then what sense can it make to say that this feeling belongs to somebody else? While some philosophers might be able to make sense of this, I cannot. Feelings are states of consciousness, and part of the concept of a conscious state is that it is had by one and only one person. In fact, many would say that this is one of the things that individuates people. It follows, then, that one and only one person can have any given emotional feeling. And as it seems that "to have an emotional feeling" is a necessary condition of "being directly aware of an emotional feeling," it also follows that one and only one person, namely the owner, can be directly aware of his emotional feelings. Hence, empathic feelings cannot be numerically identical with those of the other person.

(b) There are characteristics of the empathic situation itself which finalize this point. Part of the concept of empathy is that one can empathize with feelings which are not necessarily occurring contemporaneously with the other person's feelings. Imagine, for example, that Sims tells

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them. This is not the view I mean to be discussing here, though points (b) and (c) below would apply to it as well. For such a view see A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956), pp. 199-222; John Wisdom, "Symposium: Other Minds," Other Minds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), pp. 192-217; and for a somewhat different approach to the same point, see Max Scheler, op. cit., "The Perception of Other Minds," Part Three, Chapter III.

Jones of an experience he had last week. Imagine further that Sims no longer is as emotionally involved in the experience as before and so does not feel the same feelings when he relates the week-old story. Finally, imagine Jones' responding to Sims' story by having empathic feelings. If "having empathic feelings" ("feeling the other person's feelings") were actually "being directly aware of the other's feelings," then Jones would be directly aware of the feelings that Sims is having. But Sims is not having the feelings of a week ago. (Not even unconsciously, let us say.) Hence, Jones' empathic feelings cannot be direct awarenesses of Sims' feelings.

(c) And finally: If the empathizer's conscious state were a direct awareness of the other person's feelings (if the two conscious states were numerically identical), then when the other person's feelings subsided, so necessarily would the empathizer's. But no such regularity attaches to cases of empathy. Empathic feelings neither begin nor end their existence and intensity in exact time with the feelings of the other person. Thus again, we see the two sets of feelings are not numerically identical.

(2) One is tempted to say that since empathic feelings are not numerically identical with the other's feelings, they must be exact mirror images of them belonging to the empathizer. And so when one "feels what another person feels," one somehow reproduces for himself what he believes to be the exact same kinds of feelings as the other person's. If, for example, a friend has just received word of the loss of someone quite dear to him, and if he communicates to us that he feels very sad, then we, being empathic, would in all probability be feeling the exact same kind of sadness. Similarly, if he receives a long-sought-after reward, we, being empathic, should feel what we take to be the exact same kind of joy that

he feels. This view of empathic feelings, however, falls short also. For when we look at typical empathy situations, we immediately find reasons to say that empathic feelings are not exact mirror image feelings. Most notably, we see that the phenomenal characteristics of what we can call the "intensity," "controllability," and "behavior determinantness" of empathic feelings differ from these characteristics as they appear in the other person's feelings. Let us see how this is so.

(a) To really empathize with another person, one must, after a fashion, experience the same feeling intensity as the other person. Certainly, for example, if Sims feels extremely angry about the flop of his first movie, then the empathizer's feelings ought to capture something of the same extremity. When Doaks feels the deep agony of having lost a friend in the war, the empathizer is expected to mirror in some fashion or other the same deep agony. The empathizer whose feelings captured only a rather mild twinge of anger in the first case and only a mild agony in the second would certainly be considered lacking in his art. But while accurate empathic feelings ought to "capture" the exact intensity of the other person's feelings, they ought not to "have" it. For had Doaks really felt deep agony to the point where he could neither eat nor sleep, then someone mirroring the exact intensity of Doaks' deep agony would also neither eat nor sleep. And certainly we do not expect such exact mirroring of feeling intensity on the part of the empathizer. Quite the contrary, the empathizer is supposed to be in a position to be of some help to the other person. This would necessitate his being free from the possibly high intensity of the other person's feelings. Consequently, in an important sense, empathic feelings are not exactly mirror images of the other person's feelings.

(b) A person's feelings will be said to be uncontrollable when no mere act of will is the immediate cause[1] of their "coming upon" that person or their "going away." The more intense emotional feelings seem to be uncontrollable in this way--they do not come into consciousness or leave it at our bidding. I do not typically feel angry as a result of my having made a decision to do so (but see footnote). Nor do my feelings of anger usually go away simply because I suddenly decide that I would rather not feel angry any more.

Since most cases of empathy seem to arise in situations where the other person experiences intense and uncontrollable feelings, then most cases of accurate empathy find the empathizer's feelings "capturing" the same uncontrollability. However, at the same time, these empathic feelings cannot "have" the same uncontrollability. For sometimes empathic feelings enter one's consciousness as an immediate result of some act of will. A good empathizer can decide to "feel what the other person feels" and then do it. This is part of his skill. Of course this is not to say that all, or even most, cases of empathizing find the empathizer making such decisions. For as we have stated already in the Introduction, most empathic feelings simply "come upon" the empathizer as a result of unconscious processes. And so most often they are to this extent uncontrollable. However, my point here is that it sometimes occurs that accurate empathic feelings arise in a controlled manner. If this at least sometimes

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[1] I may will to have a particular emotional feeling, this act of will being a mediate cause of the resulting feeling. I may, for example, will to feel happy, and consequently feel happy by first putting myself into situations where I have in the past reacted by feeling happy. In such cases, it is the situations we put ourselves in that act as the immediate causes of our feelings; the original act of will, though, is a mediate cause.

happens, we have illustrated again how empathic feelings cannot be defined (at least not universally) as being exact mirror images of the other person's feelings.

We can strengthen our argument by considering how empathic feelings "go away." For while most ordinary feelings are uncontrollable in the sense that they do not "go away" as an immediate result of our willing them to do so, most empathic feelings are controllable in this sense. If a friend, for example, feels despair to the extent that he cannot control his feelings--if no act of will and no ordinary diversion allow him to rid himself even temporarily of his feelings--we certainly do not expect an empathizer here to have feelings with the exact same kind of uncontrollability. For if he did, we would probably say that he was not really being empathic; he was simply feeling uncontrollable despair. And just as the friend went to him for some empathic "understanding," so would we expect him to go to someone else for the same thing. And so, once again, if one mirrors exactly the same kinds of feelings of another, one is not being empathic; on the contrary, one is being as helpless as the person whose feelings were mirrored. If any third party felt sorry for the friend (the friend with the uncontrollable despair), then we might expect this third party to also feel sorry for the supposed empathizer, for he would be undergoing the same uncontrollable despair as his friend. It is clear, however, that a third party is not expected to have the same attitude toward both the empathizer and the person with whom he is empathizing. So in actual cases of empathy, the empathizer's feelings cannot really "have" the same uncontrollability as the other person's feelings. Accordingly, empathic feelings on still another count are not exact mirror images of the other person's feelings.

(c) When I say that feelings are sometimes behavior determinants, I simply mean that they sometimes seem to cause various kinds of overt behavior. Now whereas most ordinary (nonempathic) feelings typically, though not always,[1] influence the actions of the person having the feelings, empathic feelings do not influence in the same way. While Jones' feelings of embarrassment, for example, seem to influence many of his actions--e.g., they cause him to hide his head (he feels like hiding his head), they seem to push him to apologizing to those in whose presence he became embarrassed (he feels like apologizing to them), and so on--the empathizer's feelings of embarrassment have no such influence over his actions--they do not cause him to hide his head (he does not really feel like hiding his head), etc. Similarly, if Jones' feelings of anger were seemingly to push him to strike out at the object of his anger (if Jones felt like striking out...), the empathizer's feelings would certainly not determine the same kind of action. Of course this is not to say that empathic feelings are not behavior determinants to some extent. They are. Sometimes they lead to some of the mild behavioral manifestations that the other person's lead him to. So if I empathize with a friend's feelings of extreme distress, I may manifest some behavior of mild distress because I have become too "involved" with the friend's feelings. In the main, however, empathic feelings are behavioral determinants only to the extent that when one empathizes, one typically uses one's knowledge about one's empathic conscious state to be in some way of help to the other person.

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[1]One may be able to think up a case of empathy where the empathizer is empathizing with a mere momentary twinge that the other person has, where this fleeting twinge has no apparent affect on any behavior of the other person. However, such is not one of the central cases of empathy.

When we empathize with a friend's sadness, we then decide upon the course of action we will take toward the friend--e.g., we may try to cheer him up, we may offer him some food, we may offer to listen while he "talks it all out," etc.--based upon the empathic feelings we have. But these actions and the infrequent mild behavioral manifestations just mentioned are the only kinds of actions determined by our empathic feelings. Accordingly, here is still another respect in which empathic feelings are not exactly like the feelings of the other person. Although, as with the other two feeling characteristics already discussed, the empathic feeling does in a sense "capture" the behavior determinantness of the other person's feelings. So where Jones feels like hiding his head, while the empathizer does not really have the same inclination, he must in a sense have something about his feelings that captures this feeling characteristic. We will see what this is shortly.

(3) Empathic feelings, then, are neither numerically identical with the feelings of the other person nor exact mirror images of them. A third alternative perhaps is that empathic feelings are feelings just like those of the other person, except that they lack the strength of intensity, controllability, and behavior determinantness of the other person's feelings --i.e., they are mirror images, but not exact mirror images. One might hypothesize, for example, that we, as empathizers, empathize with Jones' highly intense feelings of distress over the crude behavior of his son to the extent that we work ourselves into a state where we too are feeling distressed. However, our mirrored feelings of distress, unlike Jones', will not be quite so intense. For example, where Jones may have partially described his highly intense feelings by pointing out that a good deal of blood was running to his head, we might say that no blood is running to

our heads, though we are having the general kind of feelings called "feelings of distress." Moreover, where Jones' feelings are relatively uncontrollable, ours are completely controllable. And so on. We could sum up this situation by saying that our feelings are of the same kind as Jones', but ours are milder than his. And when we have these milder feelings, we take them to stand for or to be representative of the same feelings as the other person's, though his are believed to be more intense, uncontrollable, etc.

This is certainly one tack we could take in describing empathic feelings. However, it is not the one I care for. For when one empathizes, one just does not believe that one's empathic conscious states are mild versions of the other person's feelings. Empathic feelings are not taken to be milder feelings that "stand for" (whatever that means exactly) the stronger ones of the other person. Rather, as we have pointed out already, there is something about the empathizer's conscious state that "captures" the exact intensity, uncontrollability, etc. of the other person's feelings. This being the case however, the conscious state of the empathizer could not really be a feeling at all. For in (2) we have already seen that the conscious state of the empathizer-- what we call the "empathic feeling"--lacks "having" the intensity, etc. of the other person's feelings. But now if empathic feelings also capture the exact intensity, etc. of the other person's feelings, we must arrive at the point where we have to say that empathic feelings "capture" these qualities but do not "have" them. With ordinary emotional feelings, however, we simply do not make a distinction between characteristics that are "captured" by the feelings and characteristics that are "had" by them. If an emotional feeling captures a certain characteristic, then it has it, and vice versa. And so

since what is called an "empathic feeling" captures characteristics that it does not have, then it is not really a feeling at all, though it shares many similarities with feelings. Our calling it a feeling is just another case where we fail in our speech to distinguish phenomena that are subtly distinct in reality. The reasons for this will become apparent in the course of the following discussion. For now though, let us accommodate this distinction by referring to the empathic phenomenon in inverted commas--"empathic 'feelings'."

(ii)

If empathic 'feelings' are not really feelings, then what kinds of conscious states are they? Our answer is that they are a species of imagined feelings. And what could be more sensible? For indeed, when we empathize, we claim that we imagine just how the other person feels. ("I can imagine just how you feel.") Moreover, adopting this position gives a bit more respectability to the claim that the empathic conscious state can "capture" a set of characteristics without really "having" them. For just as one can imagine seeing green grass without actually seeing green grass, so too can one imagine an intense and highly uncontrollable feeling without actually feeling (having) an intense and highly uncontrollable feeling. Our problems are not over yet though. For we still need to account for how it is that empathic 'feelings' as a species of imagined feelings capture qualities they do not have. Obviously we can do this only if we have a proper analysis of the imagining empathic conscious state. So we will go to this now, although in Chapter III we will finally give a precise account of how 'feelings' capture feeling qualities they do not have.

While we sometimes say that feelings are justified (warranted) or unjustified (unwarranted)--e.g., "How dare you; you are not justified in feeling angry with him"--we say no such thing of empathic 'feelings'. The pointing out of a lack of justification is a way we have of faulting a person for the unreasonableness of his feelings in the given context. We would never think of faulting or praising in quite this sense an empathizer for his imagined feelings though. We do not judge an empathizer--qua empathizer--as being reasonable or unreasonable because of the 'feelings' he has. Of course in quite a different sense we do praise or fault the empathizer for having the particular empathic 'feelings' he has. We might tell him that the way in which he so accurately captured the qualities of the other person's feelings in his empathic 'feelings' was very skillful. Here, however, we are praising a skill that he has, whereas if we had praised him in the former sense, we would have been judging something like the reasonableness of his having the particular 'feeling' he had as opposed to some other 'feeling'.

But what can be said of the fact that we praise the empathizer for his 'feelings' in our second mentioned sense of "praise"? It seems that the empathic skill of having accurate 'feelings' presupposes that the empathizer has knowledge about what the other person's feelings are like. For if, as is the case, the empathizer confidently believes that when he empathizes he knows how the other person feels--viz., in a way similar to the way he 'feels'--then the empathizer must have knowledge about the other person's feelings which warrants his confidence in the accuracy of his 'feelings'. Indeed, just as imagining a popular tune in our heads is one way in which we utilize our knowledge of the tune, so is having empathic 'feelings' one way we utilize our knowledge about the other person's

feelings. And depending upon the type and extent of knowledge that is utilized in having empathic 'feelings', the accuracy of the empathizer's 'feelings' can be partly judged. In order to begin my analysis of empathic 'feelings', let me accordingly sketch some of the types of knowledge and their role in determining the accuracy of the resultant empathic 'feelings'.

(1) There is a minimal kind of knowledge context which affords the empathizer the opportunity to 'feel' the other person's feelings, but hardly in any significant way. This is the context where the genus aspects of the other person's feelings are known to the empathizer, but where the elements of the situation in which the other's feelings arose are not known. Here the empathizer might have a 'feeling' that has the same genus as the other's feeling and thus be in a position to understand the general kind of feeling the other person is having. However, we would not expect him under these circumstances to have 'feelings' that were the same species as the other's feelings. Let me illustrate what I mean: Consider the case where Doaks, while visiting with his friend Brown, comes upon Brown's cousin Sims, a person who Doaks has neither heard of nor seen before. Before a word is spoken, Doaks notices that Sims is crying. Doaks leaves the scene immediately so that Brown might talk to Sims in private. After a short while, Doaks returns. But Sims has left. Doaks asks Brown why Sims was crying. Brown replies that he cannot go into any details, but he can truthfully say that Sims feels sad. And this is all he will say of Sims and his sadness. It is quite conceivable that Doaks might now have empathic 'feelings' for Sims. But what can these empathic 'feelings' be like if they arise under the circumstances we have imagined--they can only be very general. For Doaks has knowledge of only what we might term

the "form" or the feeling. He knows that Sims is having feelings of certain generally defined characteristics.[1] And so the two sets of conscious states might be similar to the extent where we would find Doaks saying something like, "Oh, I know how he feels basically; I've been sad too from time to time." All that seems to be implied here is that if Doaks is having 'feelings' that he believes to be similar to the feelings he believes Sims to have, then Doaks believes that Sims is having a kind of feeling that is similar in certain general respects to feelings that he himself has had and to 'feelings' that he is having. Doaks can understand the general aspects of Sims' feelings, but he cannot be said to (nor would he probably claim to) have a good grasp on the precise nature of Sims' feelings.

To have a better grasp on the precise feelings Sims is having, it seems that Doaks needs more knowledge of the context in which the feelings arose. I should think that one category of relevant information Doaks would want to know about would pertain to the behavior, beliefs, wants, and valuations (values) that were at work in Sims' personality at the time when Sims' feelings of sadness arose--i.e., the standing (i.e., currently functioning) behavioral and psychological states at work in Sims' personality. For example, Doaks' empathic 'feelings' above were surely rather weak because he had no knowledge of Sims' beliefs about the object of his sad feelings. Suppose that Sims' feelings of sadness came about as a result of his believing that a highly prized coin had been lost or stolen

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[1]So for example, if we agreed for argument's sake that defining characteristics of the concept "feels sad" included "feeling disposed to periods of verbal silence," "being aware of a relative lack of concern for comforts," and so on, then Doaks' knowledge of Sims' sad feelings would only be a knowledge of the kind of feeling one has when the above defining characteristics obtain.

(the loss of the coin being the object we are talking about). If one had no such knowledge, then one would be at a disadvantage in discussing his 'feelings'. He would not even be able to say what his 'feelings' were about (viz., the loss of the coin). One could improve the specificity of one's 'feelings' only with such specific knowledge.

Another category of information relevant to improving the accuracy of one's 'feelings' beyond the genus stage would be what we can call the psychological background material of the other person having the feelings. By this expression I mean any information about psychological generalizations that are true about the other person having the actual feelings. For example, let us assume again that Sims has lost his prized coin. Now let us further suppose that Sims has a history of feeling intense sadness when highly prized possessions are lost. This history can be described by the generalization, "Whenever Sims feels sad about the loss of a highly prized object, he feels intensely sad." The addition of such information would, as we shall see shortly, certainly lead one to have 'feelings' beyond mere "genus 'feelings'." Conversely, something like Doaks' ignorance of all these added facts would lead anyone to expect that Doaks' 'feelings' would be nothing more than ghostly appearances of the originals. And accordingly, we can say the following about the kind of general empathic 'feelings' (we will call them EM^1 empathic 'feelings') that Doaks was experiencing in this knowledge context:

> A's EM^1 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his knowledge of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative ignorance of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his ignorance of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

Given this schema, other categories of empathic 'feelings' relative to some of knowledge they presuppose can now be mapped out.

(2) Suppose (as we already have) that in addition to Doaks' knowing about Sims' sadness, he is also familiar with Sims' past psychological performances in various contexts--he knows some generalizations which seem to have been true in the past about Sims' feelings of sadness. He knows, for example, that Sims in the past has always been one to find the extremes of emotions. When he has felt happy, he has felt extremely happy; and when he has felt sad, he has felt extremely sad. Knowing this kind of information might lead Doaks to mildly empathize with Sims. We might now expect him to say something like, "I don't know exactly what it is that's got Sims feeling so sad; but, knowing Sims as I do, I can say that he feels very sad." Now he can talk about and 'feel' extreme sadness. For his 'feelings' are had in what he believes to be the context of Sims' past performances with feelings of sadness. And it is reasonable to believe that Doaks' empathic 'feelings' are closer to Sims' feelings than they would be if Doaks had no knowledge of any psychological background material. Accordingly, we shall say,

> A's EM^2 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his knowledge of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative knowledge of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his ignorance of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

(3) Neither (1) nor (2) really captures the most interesting and familiar knowledge contexts for empathic 'feelings' though. For example, there is certainly the context we have mentioned where, in addition to the knowledge expressed by parameters (a) and (b), the empathizer has knowledge also of some of the standing (i.e., current) beliefs, wants, etc. of

the other person--the empathizer has knowledge also in (c). And so, for example, when, in addition to the knowledge he had when he had his EM^2 'feelings', Doaks also knows what beliefs, wants, etc. Sims has (e.g., Doaks knows that Sims believes his highly prized penny collection has been stolen and he wants, to some specifiable degree, it to be returned), Doaks will have an even more detailed knowledge of Sims' feelings of sadness than before.

However, while this is another interesting knowledge context for empathy, there is one which involves (c) that is more interesting yet. The one I have in mind is the one in which psychologists seem to be especially interested (as I noted in the Introduction).[1] It is one where the empathizer has knowledge of the other person's standing subtle or obvious behavior, wants, beliefs, etc., but where this knowledge alone seems to lead the empathizer to an extensively detailed knowledge of the kind of feeling the other person is having and so to having very precise empathic 'feelings'. (Indeed, many psychologists--e.g., Truax and Carkhuff--would claim that knowledge of certain sorts of behavior alone could be knowledge sufficient for having empathic 'feelings'.) The empathizer need have no knowledge of any psychological background generalizations here. Nor need he have any initial knowledge of the genus aspects of the other's feelings (as he would have to have in the EM^1 and EM^2 contexts), though certainly he might arrive via his knowledge of standing wants, beliefs, etc. at a knowledge of the genus aspects of the feelings as well as a knowledge of the species aspects. In the present empathy context, the empathizer is able to fill in details about the genus feelings, whereas before (EM^1

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[1]With the proper adaptations, Reik, op. cit., would seem to qualify here.

context) he could not. Suppose, for example, that Doaks had no initial knowledge at all about the name of Sims' feelings. So he does not know initially the genus aspects of Sims' feelings of sadness. However, Doaks learns that Sims believes that a 1937 penny collection of his (a very highly prized possession) has been stolen. Furthermore suppose that Doaks learns just how much Sims values the coin collection--Sims offered a $100,000 reward for its return. It is also learned that upon hearing of his loss, Sims started unashamedly to cry. Moreover, he did not want to talk much to anyone except the thief. With knowledge of such beliefs, valuations, behavior, and wants, it would not be unusual at all for Doaks to <u>then</u> 'feel' the same genus feeling as Sims was feeling. Now, however, he would be expected to do this with added specificity. Indeed, empathy under this knowledge context can make it as though Doaks were having the feelings of sadness through the eyes of Sims. Under these epistemic conditions, it would not be odd at all to hear Doaks say to Sims something like, "I can see just how you feel; I understand perfectly well what you're going through." This seems to be the more common empathy context and we will define it in the following manner:

> A's EM^3 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his initial ignorance of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative ignorance of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his knowledge of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

(4) There is still another knowledge context of empathy following the same general schema and in which psychologists are particularly interested.[1] It involves the capacity of the empathizer to make predictions

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[1]It would seem that people like R. Dymond and R. Diskin would qualify here--<u>op. cit.</u>

about various future psychological states--e.g., predictions about future feelings, wants, beliefs, and so on--of the other person, somehow basing these predictions on the empathizer's empathic 'feelings'. We will not pursue an analysis of this phenomenon at this juncture. This will come in Chapters III, IV, and V. However, we can point out here what the epistemic prerequisites would have to be for such a feat. Clearly they would have to involve the kind of knowledge we have placed under the category of psychological background material, as well as under the category of knowledge about the other's standing beliefs, etc. For when accurate predictions are based upon knowledge, they are typically based upon generalizations and some antecedent events. So if we supposed that Doaks had all the knowledge he had in (3), but that he also learned that whenever Sims in the past had had comparable (however this is determined) feelings, they would be causally connected in some way to specific kinds of wants that Sims would have under certain conditions in the future, then Doaks could expect that Sims would have these wants in the future under certain conditions when these feelings arose. It would seem that only with such kinds of knowledge could we account for the empathic skill of making such predictions. Accordingly, we define this last notion of empathy in the following manner:

> A's EM^4 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his initial ignorance of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative knowledge of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative knowledge of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

This, then, exhausts one set of epistemic requirements for the empathizer's 'feelings'. I am not saying that there are not other knowledge

contexts. However, these are the only ones with which I will be concerning myself. And as we will see in Chapters IV and V, the parameters set out here will be of immense help to us when discussing empathic understanding.

There is, however, one final thing I want to say about the knowledge contexts for empathy that we have discussed here. One might object that while we have just shown some of the kinds of knowledge required for empathizing (i.e., required for different kinds of empathic 'feelings'), still, on many occasions of empathizing, one is not really aware of much of this knowledge at all. For example, one is typically not aware of full-blown generalizations during or even immediately preceding the act of empathy. One wants to say that one is simply aware of the 'feelings' one is having. And so perhaps the knowledge we have just sketched is not really necessary for empathizing. In answer to this seeming objection, I would simply point out that while one may not always be conscious of any such knowledge, that does not mean that one is not employing it in having 'feelings'. In short, it is always possible for one to have knowledge without one's consciously knowing that one has knowledge. This is what I meant in the Introduction when I spoke of empathy often arising out of one's ability to unconsciously pick up subtle (subliminal) cues about the other person's feelings from the other person's behavior. It is knowledge that is "recorded," as it were, but which lacks the virtue of being conscious. Sometimes this content is ultimately brought to consciousness, as is often the case in empathy, and sometimes not. Regardless though, since one is not always fully conscious of all of the epistemic elements that are necessary for one's having empathic 'feelings' even though they have been "recorded," they will still be considered admissible in our

discussion of empathy. We will be adopting the established convention of calling such knowledge preconscious, precognitive, or inchoate.

(iii)

So we have seen some of the important knowledge requirements for having different varieties of empathic 'feelings'. And accordingly, we now know of some of the kinds of knowledge necessary for an empathizer to ever skillfully imagine the other person's feelings. However, even after having seen these knowledge requirements for empathy, it seems that we are still for the most part left with our problem of saying what empathic 'feelings' themselves--as species of imagined feelings--really are. Let us get to this now.

(1) Suppose that we wanted another person to think about something we have both seen--e.g., the Empire State Building antennae. We might ask him, "Will you please think about the Empire State Building; think about its tall radio antennae." In response to our request, it would be perfectly natural for the other person to visualize (i.e., to picture in his mind) the antennae of the Empire State Building. What is interesting for us about this situation? First off, we should note that this visualizing (picturing) is a kind of imagining we all do from time to time. For to visualize is to imagine what something looks like. Secondly, we should observe that it seemed perfectly natural to accept one's visualizing--one's imagining the look of--the tall antennae as a fulfillment of our request for one to think about the tall antennae. And so it would seem that visualizing (visual imagination; picturing) is a kind of thinking one does. Indeed, we could have been even more obvious in our example about this fact. We could have phrased our request very naturally as, "Will you please

think about the Empire State Building; try to picture its tall antennae." Here clearly, we take it that picturing--a kind of imagining--is a species of thinking.

Just as visualizing (picturing) the Empire State Building antennae is one way of thinking about them, so too is imagining another person's feelings--i.e., 'feeling' his feelings--one way of thinking about his feelings. Moreover, just as visualizing the Empire State Building antennae would seem to be one way to utilize our knowledge of how they look (visualizing is a way of thinking about what we know),[1] so too would imagining another person's feelings seem to be one way to utilize our knowledge about the other person's feelings. That is to say, in empathizing we come to a point (as we have shown above) where we have knowledge (some perhaps being inchoate) about the characteristics of the other person's feelings. And the way in which we utilize this knowledge in empathy is to consciously think about it--to imagine the feelings that have the characteristics contained in this knowledge.

But just to say that empathic 'feelings' are states of consciousness that can be described as one way of thinking about the knowledge one has of the other person's feelings is not enough to fully characterize empathic 'feelings'. For certainly there are conscious states that fit the same description but which would not be called empathic 'feelings'. This point is clear if we again look at an analogy with visualizing. Suppose that I

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[1] I am not suggesting that visualizing is only a way of utilizing knowledge. Certainly we can visualize something we have no knowledge of. I can base my visualization of a person I have never seen on a description someone gave me (or even on one that I made up). If the description is wrong, then I really had no knowledge of the looks of the person visualized. The visualization was based rather on a false belief I had. So visualizing can be a way of utilizing false beliefs also.

read an accurate description of some visible features of the Empire State Building. Later, in order to relate this description to someone else, I think about (and then discuss) what I have read. I think, for example, about the fact that the Empire State Building is higher than the Crysler Building, that it rises above the New York smog, that there are large antennae on top of it, etc. This is a case of my thinking about knowledge that I have about the Empire State Building. However, this is probably not a case of my imagining (visualizing) the Empire State Building. I am probably merely thinking of certain facts true of the building. I can do this without visualizing anything though. The situation is similar with feelings. Suppose, for example, that a reporter is interested in reporting on the emotional feeling reactions of the President to a Peace March. However, the reporter is not primarily (though perhaps incidentally) interested in imagining how the President feels to the extent of actually 'feeling' what he believes to be the President's feelings. All he is interested in is writing up in some psychology journal the emotional feeling reactions of the President. And so perhaps he notes the fact that the President feels like gritting his teeth, feels like pounding his fists on his desk, feels like stamping his feet, says he feels intensely and uncontrollably angry, etc. Further suppose now that when preparing his article for the psychology journal, the reporter chooses to <u>think</u> about his knowledge of the President's feelings. Here we should expect the reporter to be thinking about the fact that the President feels angry with the Peace Marchers by thinking about his knowledge of the characteristics of the President's angry feelings. But his thinking about knowledge of what the President's feelings are like certainly can be done without his 'feeling' the President's feelings. Accordingly, if we are interested in giving an

analysis of empathic 'feelings', we need to find a way of distinguishing the "thinking about knowledge of feelings" involved in the kind of thought the reporter experiences from the "thinking about knowledge of feelings" involved in the imagined feelings of empathy.

(2) First off, we can describe the thinking involved in empathizing as a hypothetical thinking, as opposed to the nonhypothetical variety found in the reporter's kind of thinking. What I mean is this. Ryle makes the point that "a person with a tune running in his head is using his knowledge of how the tune goes; he is in a certain way realising what he would be hearing, if he were listening to the tune being played."[1] With some alteration, much the same would seem to hold for empathic 'feelings'. When a person "has empathic 'feelings' in his head," he is, as we have already shown, using his knowledge of what the other person's feelings are like. Moreover, he is in a certain way realizing--i.e., thinking about--what he would be feeling if he were in the same kind of emotional context as the one which gave rise to the feelings of the other person. That is to say, he realizes what he would feel like were he to have perhaps the same genus feelings, the same detailed psychological background true of him, and the same standing beliefs, wants, values, etc. that the other person has. Of course the empathizer realizes what he would feel like were he to be in this emotional context only and not in one that included some of his own emotional context as well. For if some of his own emotional context were included, then he would not be thinking about "how he would feel if he were in the same kind of emotional context as the other person," but rather about "how he would feel if he were in the same emotional context of some fictitious

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[1]Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 266. My underlining.

personality which contained emotional context elements of both himself and the other person." (The imposition of the empathizer's own emotional context is thus a limiting factor in the accuracy of the hypothetical thinking of his empathic 'feelings'.)

This hypothetical thinking is clearly one difference that exists between the "thinking about knowledge of feelings" involved in the imagined feelings of empathy and the reporter's type of thoughts about feelings. For taken one way, the hypothetical thinking has a different content than the other kind of thought has. The hypothetical thinking is about "how he (the empathizer) would feel if...," whereas the reporter-type of thought is about "how the other person actually feels." This fact is enough to establish the distinction between the two kinds of thought. However, lest we make too much of this distinction, I should point out, before we proceed any further, that taken in a different way, the contents of the reporter-type of thought and the thought constituted by empathic 'feelings' are the same. For a psychological fact about empathy is that the hypothetical thinking about "how he (the empathizer) would feel if..." is taken by the empathizer to be identical with thinking about "how the other person actually feels." The content of the second kind of thought is perceived by the empathizer to be identical to the content of the first. This psychological fact makes some sense when we consider what is meant by "content" here. "The content of the thought" refers to what the characteristics of feelings (and 'feelings') are, without any regard to whose actual or hypothetical feelings these are characteristics of. Just as the idea of a real cow might be said to contain "cowness" characteristics and the idea of an imaginary cow be said to contain identical "cowness" characteristics, so too does it make sense to speak of empathic 'feelings' and the

reporter-type of thoughts about another person's feelings as having identical content. Accordingly, there is a sense in which the two types of thought contain the same content and a sense in which they do not.

Even though there is this second sense of "content," the point remains that when we look at the first sense, we have some means to distinguish the thinking done in empathic 'feelings' from that done in the reporter's situation. However, there is more to the overall distinction between the two types of thought than the fact that the content of one set of thoughts is hypothetical and the content of the other is not. Indeed, when we think about the thinking done in both cases, the distinction that confronts us most immediately would seem to pertain to the manner of thinking in each case. Certainly the thinking involved in imagining is a different way of thinking about something than the more ordinary "reporter" way. We will clarify this distinction now.

(3) The distinction I have in mind can be extrapolated from something Moreland Perkins says in his "The Picturing In Seeing."[1] Perkins' concern is to show what is distinctive as a way of thinking about visual imagining --what he calls "picturing." He says the following:

> Picturing a thing is a way of thinking of the thing. Suppose that I am vividly picturing the front of a house I have often seen, and that another person is thinking of the front of this house in a way that depends upon his knowing about it only from having read a paragraph describing it, a paragraph which I have written from memory on another occasion of picturing the house exactly as I am now picturing it. Let us suppose that the description given in the paragraph is in this way perfect: it is a complete description of the visible items and features belonging to the front of the house, including their arrangement together. And suppose that the other person remembers and understands everything the paragraph says but that he is not led by this understanding to picture the house to

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[1]Moreland Perkins, "The Picturing In Seeing," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXVII, no. 10 (May 28, 1970), pp. 323-325.

> himself. Let us suppose that my picturing the house is in this way perfect: that I leave out none of the visible items and features, including their arrangement together, that belong to the front of the house. (In the case of both the description and the picturing we may take 'visible' to mean visible to me from some particularly memorable vantage point in front of the house.) Now each of us is utilizing the knowledge he has of the front of the house by thinking of the house. And the information contained in the knowledge each of us possesses concerning the visible items and features belonging to the front of the house may be supposed to be exactly the same. So when I think of the house by picturing the house and he merely thinks of it, the information contained in the thought that each of us thinks may be identical. What, then, is the difference between his thought of the front of the house and mine? This is one: in thinking of the house by picturing it at a certain moment I can become at this moment conscious all at once, instantaneously, of all the visible items and features of the front of the house, whereas it is necessary that his thought of the house be stretched over a good many moments, and it is possible for him in a given instant to become conscious of only one or two items and features of the front of the house, and to become during a given time conscious of all the visible items and features of the house only serially, one small group of items and features following after another in its entrance into his consciousness. This kind of advantage that my thought of the house has over another person's when mine is a perfect picturing of the front of the house and his is an exhaustive but mere thinking about the visible items and features of the front of the house constitutes a mark that distinguishes perfectly picturing a thing from merely thinking, however exhaustively, of the visible items and features of the thing.[1]

We will take what Perkins says about picturing and apply it to imagining feelings in empathy.

Suppose that I am thinking about Jones' feelings of distress over the crude actions of his son by empathically imagining Jones' feelings; and Smith is thinking about Jones' feelings of distress in a way that depends upon his knowing about them only from his having read a paragraph written about them by me. (Certainly Smith could empathize on the basis of what he read. For the sake of the point I want to make though, let us assume that he does not.) I wrote the paragraph on the basis of what my

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[1] Ibid., pp. 324-325.

empathic 'feelings' (i.e., my imaginings of Jones' feelings) were five minutes ago. We will assume that my imagined feelings have not changed at all in the interim and that my memory of what they were like five minutes ago is correct. In keeping with Perkins' story, let us further suppose that my imagined feelings are complete: they leave out none of the "feelable" aspects of Jones' feelings. What we mean by this is simply that I leave out in my 'feelings' none of the aspects (as well as their relations with one another) of Jones' feelings that are possible in principle (if not really in fact) for one to describe. So if Jones' feelings were exhaustively describable as those where Jones feels like stamping his feet, where he feels like pounding his fists, where he feels like punishing his son, and where he feels all of these with intensity x, uncontrollability y, behavior determinantness z, as well as these feeling characteristics having relations p, q, and r to one another, then all of this would be contained in my 'feelings' (in the appropriate hypothetical manner). Accordingly, the paragraph I wrote describing my imagining was also complete. And so too then Smith, who remembers and understands everything in the paragraph and is not led by this understanding to imagine feeling Jones' feelings, has a complete set of thoughts about Jones' feelings. The "feelable" content, in our second sense of "content" (p. 32), of my thoughts (my imaginings) and Smith's thoughts are thus identical. But our thoughts are different from one another in that mine are "instantaneous thoughts" while Smith's are "serial thoughts." I am conscious all at once of what I believe to be all the characteristics of Jones' feelings (my hypothetical feelings), while Smith is conscious of these characteristics one by one. Thus it seems that this "all at once" aspect of empathic 'feelings' is part of what differentiates the thinking constituting empathic 'feelings' from

other kinds of thinking. But let me finalize this point by way of clarification of the "all at once" aspect of empathic 'feelings' (though we will finish the job in Chapter VI).

Does "thinking all at once" mean that individual thoughts about the "feelable" aspects of Jones' feelings were quickly "bunched together" in my consciousness when I had my empathic 'feelings' toward Jones, only to "let them out" one by one in the serial thoughts that went into writing the descriptive paragraph that Smith read? Put another way, is a 'feeling' a state of consciousness constituted by one's thinking, while one is experiencing the 'feeling', all of the individual feeling characteristic thoughts (i.e., Smith's kind of thoughts) almost simultaneously, and then reflectively "reading off" serially each thought from the pack when giving the description of the 'feeling'?

Surely not. Try to imagine what being conscious almost simultaneously of a group of individual thoughts would be like--we would be very busy trying to keep track of the meanings of each member of this almost simultaneous grouping. If anything, this would result in a headache of confusion rather than in a 'feeling'. More than this though, we reject the "almost simultaneous group of individual thoughts" analysis because it makes having 'feelings' something not different in kind from the "reporter" (Smith's) type of thinking. This view would make the two the same kind of thoughts, with one set being experienced a lot faster than the other. So if Smith could just speed up his individual thoughts, then he too would be empathizing with Jones. Until he could do this though, we would have to say that he was slowly empathizing. But this would be absurd. No one would really want to call Smith's situation a kind of empathy--slow or otherwise. Accordingly, the empathic 'feeling' is not the

sum total of serial thoughts tied together in one temporal package. And a fortiori we do not "read off" (in this sense) when describing our 'feelings' the serial thoughts from a large simultaneous grouping of them in order to think each thought more deliberately. All of this is obvious in the case of visual imagination. No one attempts to equate the serial thoughts about the front of Perkins' house with imagined perceptions (pictures) of the front of his house; no one attempts to call the imagined perceptions a simultaneous grouping of individual serial thoughts. It is just because we are not as accustomed to talking about feeling phenomena as we are about visual phenomena that we would even consider identifying 'feelings'--the hypothetical thinking all at once about feelings--with groupings of individual serial thoughts about feelings.

But if the empathic 'feeling' conscious state is different in kind from the appropriate serial thoughts about his 'feelings', then how do we describe it? I suppose the obvious possibility would now be to say that it is

> a unitary conscious state (it is not a group of thoughts or a group of any other kind of conscious states) which constitutes a consciousness of all (since we have hypothesized a "complete 'feeling'") of the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings in a hypothetical manner.

And indeed this is what I believe to be the most appropriate analysis of the empathic 'feeling' state per se. However, if we were to leave the matter at that, we would be leaving unanswered a question that is crucial for our completely understanding the full significance of empathic 'feelings'. So let us proceed to this question now.

(4) Specifically, if what I have said is right about the fact that the all at once empathic 'feeling' state is different in kind from serial thoughts, then how do we account for the fact that we often have individual

serial thoughts about characteristics of our empathic 'feelings' (about the "feelable" characteristics of the other person's feelings) while we say we are experiencing empathic 'feelings'? These are the same thoughts we sometimes have prior to describing our 'feelings'. And these thoughts seem to be based upon the empathic 'feelings' experience we have. Given that empathic 'feelings' are not numerically identical with the thoughts which seem to be based upon them (for certainly if they are not identical in kind, then they are not identical in number either) and which often occur in consciousness at the same time as the empathic 'feelings', then how are they related to these thoughts? Obviously they are logically related; for the content (in our second sense of "content") of our serial thoughts is nothing other than bits and pieces of the content of the empathic 'feeling'. But there is more to the relationship than just this.

(a) We can start to see what more there is to the relationship by first noting again that in serial thought about our 'feelings' we do not "read off" in the manner mentioned the 'feeling' characteristics from a simultaneous grouping of serial type thoughts. However, we do "read off" these characteristics in another way: As empathizer, what I do when I want to serially think about the characteristics of my 'feeling' experience is have the 'feeling'. But instead of serially thinking by separating an individual thought from a simultaneous grouping and inspecting it, I am rather adding a new individual (serial) thought to my consciousness --something in addition to the unitary conscious state I call my 'feeling'. And this new serial thought is causally connected with my 'feeling', as well as logically related. For consider the following analogy: If I want to serially think about and describe the front of the house, then in order to come up with the right thoughts, I may attempt to picture the house.

Here the picturing is attempted because it is assumed to be causally instrumental in my coming up with the right thoughts. Similarly, when I am curious about the nature of one of my 'feeling' characteristics, having the 'feeling' is causally instrumental in my thinking particularly about that characteristic. Now when I am doing this, I am "reading off" the characteristic from the 'feeling' in the sense that by having the 'feeling', I am somehow causally led to having selective thoughts about individual (selective) characteristics of the 'feeling', these thoughts being logically dependent upon what goes into making up the total 'feeling' experience. The causal role of empathic 'feelings' (which affords us the opportunity to "read off" (in the second manner) the characteristics of the 'feeling' itself) has been alluded to in the psychological literature on empathy. As Guiora puts it:

> There is in the empathic act a temporary suspension of ego functions in favor of an immediate, precognitive experience [(i.e., 'feeling' experience)] of another's emotional state as one's own. This fusion of self and nonself is, in a sense, a regressive process, yet the link to cognitive control is not fully severed. The empathic experience emerges from a primitive mode of object relation but does not remain solely as a diffuse global feeling. It progresses, so to say, through a cognitive filter which transforms affective experience into comprehension of the meaning of the experience.[1]

Empathic 'feelings' serve as "cognitive filters" in our terms in that they help to transform the inchoate knowledge a person may have prior to the empathic 'feeling' and experienced all at once in the 'feeling' into conscious knowledge contained in our serial thoughts (i.e., cognitions). Empathic 'feelings' give one the ability to consciously "read off" knowledge about "feelable" feeling characteristics that were inchoate before the

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[1]Guiora, Lane, and Bosworth, "An Exploration of Some Personality Variables In Authentic Pronunciation of A Second Language," unpublished paper for the Center for Research on Language and Language Behavior. Underlining mine.

'feeling' experience. But we will discuss this in more detail in Chapter V.

(b) Not only are empathic 'feelings' logically and causally related to individual thoughts about 'feeling' characteristics, but they are also sometimes related in the same way to thoughts about future behavior and psychological states which the other person can expect to find himself in under certain specifiable conditions. The exact relationship between these kinds of thoughts and empathic 'feelings' will become clearer in Chapter V. Besides predictive thoughts, however, empathic 'feelings' are also involved with individual thoughts about the relations existing between the various characteristics of the other person's feelings (the empathizer's 'feelings'). For empathic 'feelings' capture the relations existing between feeling ('feeling') characteristics just as in visual imagination the image captures all the relations existing between all of the visible aspects of the thing visualized. For example, just as Perkins' visual imagining might capture the relation "there is a stained-glass window to the left of the front door," so may my empathic 'feeling' capture the relation "the high intensity of my 'distress' increases its behavior determinantness." And the empathic 'feeling' experience is instrumental in my having an individual thought about such a relation. The full significance of this will be brought to light in Chapter VI.

(c) We should point out that the empathizer's individual thoughts about the characteristics of the other person's feelings (the empathizer's 'feelings') and their relations with one another do not always follow causally from empathic 'feelings'. There seem to be at least two reasons for this. First, with some feelings it seems that we just have not fully developed a concept of the feeling (and a fortiori of the 'feeling') with

its components ("feelable" aspects). Consequently, we are not able to serially think about and verbalize the aspects of 'feelings' when they are experienced. This is no problem peculiar to 'feelings'. A small child quite often has difficulty with serially thinking about and verbalizing what he sees or visualizes--he has trouble serially thinking and verbalizing about the characteristics of his visual imaginings. ("I can see it in my mind, but I just can't describe it to you.") When the child develops the concept of what is being 'seen', the ability for the child's serially thinking about and describing the characteristics and relations among these characteristics likewise develops. Similarly with 'feelings', children have to develop the concept of the 'feelings' they have before they can serially think and talk about them. Unfortunately, such concepts remain relatively unsophisticated for most people throughout the course of their lives. And thus 'feeling' (and feeling) descriptions remain relatively difficult.

It is not always a lack of conceptual equipment, however, that prevents the empathizer from thinking serially and verbalizing about his 'feeling'. It is perfectly reasonable to suppose that in fact every 'feeling' we have is incomplete. No 'feeling' is in fact a consciousness all at once of all of the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings. It would be a rare person who could collect all the knowledge necessary for imagining the other person's feelings. And so no one actually 'feels' precisely what the other person feels. For no one collects all the emotional context knowledge and hence all the feeling characteristic knowledge of the other person's feelings, though I cannot conceive of any in principle reason barring such a collection. Consequently, we should expect that all actual empathic 'feelings' lack the characteristics of which the

empathizer has had no knowledge of (conscious or inchoate) prior to the 'feeling'. We can call all such 'feelings' "vague"[1] to the extent that they are lacking in some detail or other. And so given that our 'feelings' are "vague" in this way, the possibility of consequent serial thoughts about 'feeling' characteristics is all that much more limited.

This, then, concludes what I have to say about empathic 'feelings' in this chapter. However, I am not finished with them yet. For there is a difficulty that seems to stand out. Namely, we have discussed the point that when we empathize with another person, we think hypothetically about what the "feelable" aspects (i.e., feeling characteristics) of the other person's feelings are like. Moreover, our knowledge about these "feelable" aspects can range from being quite general to being very detailed and extensive. And we have seen that the range of this feeling knowledge depends upon whether we are in an EM^1 empathy knowledge context, or an EM^2 empathy knowledge context, etc. Given this situation, the question I want to ask is what precisely is the relationship that exists between being in one of the empathy knowledge contexts and consequently having varying degrees of knowledge of the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings? What is it about the knowledge found in each of the empathy contexts that allows us to infer things about what the "feelable" aspects of the other person's emotional feelings are like? Put another way, what is it about our concept of emotional feelings that allows us to infer from our empathy context knowledge to what the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings are like? Furthermore, once we make this inference and we have knowledge

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[1]For a similar point, see J. M. Shorter's "Imagination," in D. F. Gustafson's (ed.) Essays in Philosophical Psychology (Doubleday and Co., New York: 1964), esp. pp. 165-166.

about which we can think hypothetically and "all at once," what precisely are we thinking about? That is to say, when, for example, we have EM^1 knowledge and we infer from this what the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings are, what is it precisely that we are inferring? How can we characterize the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings in EM^1 contexts beyond the point of merely saying that they are genus feelings with genus "feelable" aspects to them--how are we to identify what these genus "feelable" aspects are? Likewise for the other empathy contexts. One wants to say that unless we can specify precisely what the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings are which are thought about hypothetically and all at once in each of the four empathy contexts we have looked at, we have not really seen what empathic 'feelings' are. Certainly we have seen what some of the knowledge requirements for having empathic 'feelings' are and we have seen the kind of hypothetical (and "all at once") thought involved in empathic imagining. However, these things constitute only the "structure" of empathic 'feelings' as it were. They are not the content. In order to get at this "feelable" content of the other person's feelings (the empathizer's 'feelings') in empathy situations, we obviously need a general way of talking about the "feelable" aspects of emotional feelings. We do have such ways--e.g., we may talk about "intense" (i.e., the phenomenal characteristics of) feelings or "distress-like" (a kind-name of) feelings. However, it seems that no successful systematic procedure towards this end has been developed fully anywhere. Accordingly, towards offering such an analysis of the "feelable" aspects of feelings--and thus, too, towards offering a basis for answering the questions I have raised about how we can talk precisely and profitably about the "feelable" content of empathic 'feelings' in

particular--I now want to develop an analysis of the concept of emotional feelings. The way in which this analysis can finally be applied to talking about the "feelable" aspects of feelings involved in empathic 'feelings' will be the subject for our discussion in Chapter III. However, this analysis of emotional feelings will also be invaluable to us in our discussion of empathic <u>understanding</u> in Chapter V and our discussion of the value of empathic understanding in Chapter VI.

Chapter II

EMOTIONAL FEELINGS

I will develop in this chapter an analysis of the concept of emotional feelings that will make obvious just how we can demarcate all the "feelable" aspects of any given emotional feeling (thereby allowing us to speak precisely about what is imagined through empathic 'feelings'). The key here will lie in my adaptation of a recent analysis of the general concept of feelings offered by William Alston.[1] However, whereas his concern is with many different categories of feelings--what he calls "adjectival" feelings--mine will be with the emotional variety only. The notion of emotional feelings that I am going to argue for has it that an emotional feeling is a complex of noncognitive conscious states which serve as a good warrant for the belief one typically has when one has an emotional feeling that one is in the complex emotional state about which one is having this complex feeling. The procedure I will follow in arguing for this will go as follows: In part (i), I will review the major highlights of Alston's thesis. In part (ii), I will develop some conceptual machinery necessary for my analysis of emotional feelings, the latter being the concern of part (iii). Finally, in part (iv) I will look at some possible objections one might want to raise against my notion of emotional feelings. In the process of answering these objections, I hope to bring out interesting things one can say about feelings on the basis of my analysis of them.

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[1]William Alston, "Feelings," The Philosophical Review (January, 1969), pp. 3-34. I shall cite the references to this paper in the body of the text.

(i)

In preparation for a review of Alston's analysis, it is important to consider the distinction between the concept of emotional feelings and the concept of emotional states. It has been argued that to be in an emotional state, such as the state of fear, anger, indignation, remorse, embarrassment, shame, pride, grief, sadness, distress, joy, craving, or disgust, is to be in a complex state involving the following components: (1) a cognition of something as in some way desirable or undesirable, (2) feelings of certain kinds, (3) marked bodily sensations of certain kinds, (4) involuntary bodily processes and overt expressions of certain kinds, (5) tendencies to act in certain ways, and (6) an upset or disturbed condition of mind or body.[1] Therefore, when S is in a state of E (where E is one of the above emotion predicates), most of the above components are present in S.[2] Given some such component analysis of emotional

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[1]W. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 479-486. Variations on this same theme--that there are more components to E states than just feelings--can be found throughout the literature, as in J. L. Austin's "Other Minds," Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), esp. pp. 71-84; E. Bedford's "Emotions," The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V. C. Chappell (Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 110-126; G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949); Magda Arnold, Emotion and Personality, Vol. I (Columbia University Press, 1960); Stanley Schacter, "The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological Determinants of Emotional States," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. Berkowitz, Vol. I (New York: Academic Press, 1964), pp. 49-79; and David Rapaport, Emotions and Memory (New York: Science Editions, Inc., 1961), Chapters I and II.

[2]Of course not all of these components need hold in any given instance. For example, psychoanalytic literature is filled with cases where a person is judged to be in a particular emotional state, but at the same time said not to have the appropriate emotional feeling (component #2 above). And so what the above analysis of emotional states really claims is that they are complexes of most of the above components, with the particular missing component varying from instance to instance of emotional states. In other terms, one might think of particular emotional state concepts along the lines of Wittgenstein's "family resemblance" concepts.

states as this, it becomes obvious that a distinction of emotional feelings from emotional states can be made. For example, I can be said to be angry with my brother if most of the above conditions are fulfilled, while I may not, due to excessive repressive forces, feel angry. Here many of the components of being E are present--most notably, elements of (4) and certain characteristic behavioral dispositions or tendencies mentioned in (5)--excepting (2).

Even if emotional feelings are not emotional states though, the concepts of the two phenomena are related. Alston states as the "Dependency Thesis" that "the concept of feeling E is derivative from the concept of (being) E." (Alston, p. 7) This thesis is to be distinguished from the forms of the "Autonomy Thesis" which holds that the two concepts are logically independent of each other. One form of the Autonomy Thesis--the "Special Quality" view--holds that emotional feeling concepts are defined solely in terms of unanalysable phenomenal mental qualities, while another form--the "Bodily Sensation" view--holds that the concept of feelings is defined solely in terms of bodily sensation complexes. More specifically,

> In either case, the concept of a given feeling will be independent of the concept of the state by reference to which it is standardly designated. On the Special Quality view, the concept of feeling embarrassed is the concept of the exemplification in consciousness of one or more unanalysable phenomenal qualities; and on the Bodily Sensation view the concept of feeling embarrassed is the concept of a certain complex of bodily sensations. (Alston, p. 8)

Such views cannot be right though. Alston tells us, for example, that although feeling angry does involve sensations of tightening of certain muscles,

> it is impossible to devise a description in bodily sensation terms that even looks synonymous with 'feels angry'.... Moreover, in so far as we can analyse a given feeling into components, it does not seem to be the case that the components will always be bodily sensations. A felt

> impulse to attack would seem to have as much to do with feeling angry as sensations of muscle tensings.... (Alston, p. 9)

So much then for the Bodily Sensation view. The Special Quality view, however, is also unacceptable, if for no other reason than that it would be difficult, when distinguishing between different E feelings, to distinguish phenomenologically between different "special qualities."

So Alston, accordingly, sets out to find another view of feelings which does not encounter these same difficulties. And this is where he turns to the Dependency Thesis we have mentioned. Specifically, the concept of E feelings is related to the concept of being E in that E feelings, on Alston's analysis, are the conscious state bases for one's belief that one is in the state of <u>being</u> E. This analysis obviously needs some clarification. So let us see now how Alston's view is developed.

First off, an E <u>feeling</u> is a wholely privately accessible (i.e., its owner can get at it in a way superior to the way anyone else can get at it) state of consciousness ("modification of consciousness, way of being conscious"), whereas <u>being</u> E is publicly accessible and "...is never just or primarily a matter of the momentary character of one's conscious experience." (Alston, p. 14) As we have already seen, being E is a mixture of dispositional and physical state components as well. When I am in an emotional state of distress, for example, I am disposed to act in certain ways, I am in certain physical states, and I possess certain conscious states (feelings, beliefs, sensations) typical of being distressed. When I merely feel distressed however, none of the nonconscious state elements here seem to be involved.

Obviously, to leave the analysis of the general concept of feeling E at this point would be tantamount to admitting to the Autonomy Thesis. For merely to say that feelings are states of consciousness is to let ourselves

open to the difficulties raised for those who hold that feelings are special mental qualities or special complexes of sensations. Accordingly, Alston's crucial move here is to wonder whether there might not be some special function that the feeling conscious state performs--some function which ultimately will help us get beyond the difficulties encountered by the Autonomy Thesis. The answer comes in Alston's treatment of the feeling conscious state in terms of its epistemic function: At a brief glance, one might be tempted to say that when one feels E, one knows that one is E. This is quite often the case. However, Alston does not want to go so far as to say that to feel E is to have knowledge of being E. For while it does seem that our concept of feeling E is such that when we say that we feel E we do (have a tendency to) believe that we are E (Alston, p. 19), it is (as I will point out shortly) also always possible (although it is extremely unusual in the case of emotional feelings) to feel E without really being E. And since on most accounts of knowledge "knowing E" entails "E's being the case," "feeling E" cannot be synonymous with "knowing E." However, Alston notes that we do take the E feeling conscious state as excellent evidence for our belief that we are E. And so we can speak of E feelings as states of consciousness that count as reliable bases for the belief that we are E. (Alston, p. 20) Put in Alston's kind of terminology, 'one who feels E is in a position such that he is highly warranted in holding a belief (making a judgment) that he is E.' Accordingly, while the concept of feeling E is not synonymous with knowing that one is E, one can offer the more modest claim that

x feels E $=_{df}$ x is in a conscious state, S_c, such that by virtue of being in S_e:

(a) x believes that he is E, and

(b) x has a high degree of warrant for this belief[1]

But this is not really enough. One could be conscious of being E and fulfill the conditions of this definition and yet still not be feeling E. I might reflectively note (this act of reflection being a kind of conscious state), for example, that I possess most of the public components of being afraid. Perhaps these reflective thoughts are derived from a correct description (given to me by a competent psychologist who has been observing me) of the nonconscious state components of my fear state. On the basis of these thoughts (a kind of conscious state), I conceivably (probably) would believe that I was in a state of fear. And since the psychologist's description was correct, my belief is highly warranted. In such a case I would be fulfilling the conditions specified in our definition. However, this would not be a case of my feeling afraid. I am merely having thoughts. Accordingly, some restrictions must be placed upon the feeling conscious state to distinguish it from the other conscious states. To do this, Alston first points out that the other conscious states which fulfill (a) and (b) are cognitive. What this comes down to is that they are conscious states that contain knowledge of facts which serve as evidence that one is E. In the above example, my conscious state is cognitive because it contains knowledge of facts that are pieces of evidence for the belief that I am afraid. To give another example, we

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[1]Alston's analysis is actually much more careful than this. Because of scattered counterexamples that are found in the wide range of our feeling statements, Alston's conditions read:

(a) x has a prima facie tendency to believe that he is F (where F's are not restricted to emotional states)
(b) x has a prima facie warrant for this belief

Because most cases of E feelings have no need for these qualifiers though, I simply delete them (the qualifiers).

could imagine that on the basis of my knowledge that I am glaring at Jones, I am in a thinking state that fulfills (a) and (b), where E in this case is "being angry." However, I may still not feel angry with Jones, because I may be preoccupied with something else or I may be undergoing some mild repression. Here again, my state of consciousness fulfills (a) and (b) and is cognitive--it contains some bit of knowledge that would lead me to expect that I was E. For feelings, on the other hand, no knowledge of facts that serve as evidence that one is E is apparently contained in the state of consciousness. In this regard, feelings are noncognitive conscious states.

Alston wants to build one more qualification into the noncognitive feeling state. Being in such a state seems to be sufficient warrant for one's belief that one is E. The cognitive state, however, does not work this way. The cognitive state is warrant for such a belief only if the knowledge that the cognitive state contains is evidence for the belief that one is E. Noncognitive feeling states act as warrant without need of any other evidence though. So, for example, if I feel angry and have no other knowledge of any evidence that I am angry, the mere noncognitive feeling state is enough warrant for believing that I am angry. No knowledge of external evidence is necessary. Of course I may also have other knowledge in addition to my feeling angry that lends support to my believing that I am angry, and in giving evidence for my belief I may say that I am also aware of some of the other components of being (e.g., I may note that the blood is rushing to my head as it does only when I am angry). This is perfectly consistent with Alston's thesis. He is saying that "feeling E is enough (in the absence of stronger conflicting considerations)..." (Alston, p. 22) to justify the belief that one is E. "But this

is quite compatible with the person also having other ways of satisfying condition (b). Overdetermination is as pervasive in epistemology as in psychology." (Alston, p. 22)

Accommodating this new description of the feeling conscious state and also making a self-explanatory change in condition (a), my adaptation of Alston's general analysis of feelings will read as follows:

x feels E $=_{df}$ x is in a noncognitive conscious state, S_e, such that by virtue of being in S_e:

(a) If x has the concept of E, x believes that he is E
(b) x has a high degree of warrant for this belief

Alston calls this kind of view of feelings "Immediate Awareness." The thrust of this expression derives from the fact that when one feels E, one is in a conscious state such that this conscious state, in the absence of any other evidence, warrants one's belief that one is E. When one has an E feeling, one is aware immediately that one is E. In short, 'for one to feel E is for one to be immediately aware that one is E.'

This, then, completes my review of what Alston's view of the concept of E feelings would have to be. I have not shown the details of how Alston sees this view of feelings to be an improvement over the Autonomy Thesis. I have merely indicated how for Alston the concept of feeling E is derivative of the concept of (being) E--i.e., condition (a) above. Instead of the concept of feelings referring solely to conscious states (sensations or special mental qualities), Alston's analysis shows that to feel E is to be in a conscious state which performs the epistemic function of immediate awareness of E states. The advantages of this kind of view of feelings over the Autonomy Thesis will become obvious in the following sections.

(ii)

In the midst of his criticism of the Special Quality view, Alston notes that we do not seem to distinguish one emotional feeling from another by only describing two different unanalysable qualities:

> What is the difference between feeling embarrassed and feeling angry? Well, when one feels embarrassed, one feels a tendency to hide one's head, one feels one's face blushing, one wishes one had never done what one is embarrassed about; while when one feels angry, one feels one's fists clenching, jaw muscles tightening, and one feels an impulse to hurt the person at whom one is angry. What we are doing in these cases is to distinguish feeling F_1 from the feeling F_2 by reference to awareness of the components that go to make up the states F_1 and F_2. And it is not that this is just one way of doing the job. There seems to be no alternative. (Alston, p. 11) (My underlining)

One of the things I take Alston to be saying here is that an emotional feeling is a complex of special feeling states--a complex of immediate awarenesses--e.g., to feel embarrassed is to feel a tendency to hide one's head, to feel one's face blushing, etc. Because I believe this point to be correct and of crucial importance for talking about the "feelable" aspects of the other's emotional feelings that the empathizer thinks hypothetically and all at once about, what I propose to do in the remainder of this chapter is further consider the Immediate Awareness view of emotional feelings and refine it by presenting an analysis of emotional feelings in terms of a complex of feeling components.

In order for me to present my component analysis sensibly however, it will be necessary first to do some spadework. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, I must develop a vocabulary for some mental states which we would hesitate to force straight-off into any of the more familiar conscious state categories such as thoughts, feelings, mental images, or sensations. And so this is what the present section will be devoted to.

What I am interested in discussing first can be characterized as

"felt dispositions." To get an initial inkling of what I have in mind with this expression, one need only think hard about what it is like to have a felt disposition to (or, of feeling disposed to) shout out loud after a period of tension. Or one should try to imagine what it would be like to feel disposed toward running out into the street to pull a small child out of the path of an oncoming car.[1] In line with the Immediate Awareness view, we can offer as a preliminary analysis of our inkling here the view that such "felt dispositions" are "immediate awarenesses of certain ways in which one is disposed to do something or other." However, while such a characterization would seem to be correct, it is not terribly enlightening as it stands. Just what does an immediate awareness of the way in which one is disposed really come to? We answer this question now.

(1) In order to do this, it will be helpful to introduce here the concept "being actively disposed." Let us distinguish this concept from something sounding very similar--i.e., from "having a disposition (or dispositional property)." We may say of someone that he has certain dispositions (or dispositional properties) only when certain subjunctive conditional statements are true about him.[2] For example, Sims may have the dispositions J and K expressed in the subjunctive conditionals J: "If Sims were ever threatened in any way, then he would strike out at the cause of the threat" and K: "If Sims were ever to do anything he thought to be

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[1]Of course sometimes, instead of speaking of "felt dispositions," in such cases we speak of "felt impulses," "felt urges," or even "felt tendencies." I would hope that my discussion of "felt dispositions" could shed light on these expressions as well.

[2]My only concern here is to point this out as one necessary condition of dispositions. I will not be concerned with all necessary and sufficient conditions however.

A paradigm discussion of having psychological dispositions or dispositional properties can be found in G. Ryle, op. cit., Ch. V.

wrong, he would always apologize to someone or other." He is said to have these dispositions only as long as the conditionals remain true of him. Of course this does not mean that in order for him to have these dispositions through a given period of time he must manifest them throughout this period. It is quite conceivable that one could have a disposition for years and never manifest it--the antecedent condition might never be realized. We carry with us, as it were, all our dispositions all of the time.

Suppose now that the antecedent conditions but not the consequent conditions of such dispositional statements have been fully realized;[1] although, barring the occurrence of strong countervailing forces the consequent conditions will soon be realized. It is at this point that we may say of someone who has the disposition, that he is actively disposed to do what is specified in the consequent condition of the dispositional statement. And we may say of his total disposition state (his dispositional property) that it is now an active disposition. So, for example, we will say that when the antecedent conditions of J or K have been actualized, Sims is actively disposed to strike out at the cause of the threat or to apologize to someone or other. Or, if we prefer, we can say that Sims' dispositions J and K are now active dispositions. He has not yet performed the full (or perhaps any of the) consequent condition(s), but he will do so soon.

This is too quick though. We certainly have to make some stipulation about how the antecedent conditions affect the active disposition state.

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[1] I stipulate "fully realized" to allow for cases where the consequent condition of the disposition is complex. And so even though the antecedent conditions and some of the consequent conditions have been realized, there is still more to come, barring overriding circumstances.

We would probably not want to say, for example, that whenever the antecedent conditions have been actualized, one is actively disposed to do what is specified in the consequent conditions. For if the countervailing forces were overwhelming enough, we would not consider the disposition active. Take Sims' disposition J, for example. It could be that Sims at some time is threatened. And perhaps under most similar circumstances, he would react by striking out at the cause of this threat. Suppose, however, that on this particular occasion Sims' life has been jeopardized unknowingly by his wife. Perhaps she has said things to the wrong people. In such a situation, it would not be unusual to expect that Sims, due to his strong love for his wife and his knowledge that she put his life in jeopardy unknowingly is not in the least disposed to striking out at his wife. Let us imagine that there is no possibility of this disposition at all. The countervailing forces (his love and his knowledge) are too overwhelming.[1] Since such a case is not really out of the ordinary, it follows that we cannot say that whenever the antecedent conditions of one's dispositions are actualized, one is actively disposed to do what is

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[1] I am aware of the possible difficulty that this "unknowingly" claim could be construed by someone not as one of the countervailing forces, but rather as an antecedent condition of some other dispositional property. So one might claim that my knowledge that my wife jeopardized my life unknowingly was not a countervailing force here that prevented my being actively disposed to strike out at her; rather, my knowledge here is an antecedent condition of a dispositional property I have whereby "if someone were to jeopardize my life unknowingly, then I would not strike out at them." And so it is not that my disposition to strike out was prevented by a countervailing force. It was, rather, that I just was actively disposed to do something else.

Now the possibility of construing things in this way brings out the general problem of how to determine what kinds of things get packed into the antecedent condition of a disposition and what things instead are called countervailing forces of a disposition. This is certainly a difficulty. However, it is not one that I can try to resolve here. So, for the sake of the point I am trying to make in the text, let us just hypothesize that the "unknowingly" clause indicates part of the countervailing forces and not an antecedent condition of some other disposition.

specified in the consequent conditions.

What can we say then? As a reaction to the above example, we might insist that one is actively disposed only when all of the countervailing forces of the situation have been overcome, so that given the actualization of the antecedent conditions of Sims' disposition, the consequent condition must necessarily follow in order for him to be actively disposed. But this too is an unreasonably extreme requirement to place upon active dispositions. Clearly one can be said to be actively disposed to doing something without finally doing it. Indeed, in certain contexts such is the mark of a person with self-control. A parent, for example, might be actively disposed to yelling at his children and yet restrain himself because of some countervailing considerations. Perhaps he does not want to yell in public, as he would have to do in this situation. Certainly just because he does not follow through with the yelling, we would not say that he was not really actively disposed to yelling.

What we are left with then is a situation where, when one is actively disposed to do something, his consequent action does not follow automatically from the actualization of the antecedent conditions and, indeed, it may not follow at all. Obviously, what we need to do is to specify just how heavily the countervailing forces are to be weighed in our definition. For we cannot have active dispositions when the countervailing forces are overwhelming. On the other hand, we do not want to say that we can have an active disposition <u>only</u> when they are <u>all</u> overcome. We have to allow that at least some of the countervailing forces be admissible in an active disposition state. But which ones?

Answering the latter question would take us too far afield. So I will just say for the discussion that there are "crucial" and "noncrucial"

countervailing forces affecting dispositions. When the crucial ones are at hand, then not only is the consequent condition not actualized, but the disposition is not even considered active. When the noncrucial ones appear, though they may in fact prevent the consequent condition from being actualized, they do not prevent the disposition from being considered active. Taking this into account then, let me offer the following analysis of "being actively disposed to..." ("having an active disposition"):

1^1: S is actively disposed at time t to do x (S has active disposition Q at t) if, and only if, S is in a state such that:

(i) S has disposition (dispositional property) Q, where Q $=_{df}$ "If conditions C were to hold, then S would do x if no "crucial" and "noncrucial" countervailing forces existed"

(ii) C occurs (at t) with no "crucial" countervailing forces arising.

Given the concept "being actively disposed to...," I can now go on to say what it is to have a felt disposition. As a preliminary analysis, I have already said (p. 54) that by "felt disposition to..." I mean "immediate awareness of certain ways in which one is disposed to do something or other." This can now be changed to read "immediate awareness of being actively disposed to...." To have the felt disposition to shout out loud, for example, is to be immediately aware of being actively disposed to shout out loud. This may occur in the kind of situation where one finds that he can no longer keep quiet about seeing something that really disgusts him. And just before he "bursts," he has an intensely felt awareness that he will shout out loud.

But what kind of analysis can we give of these felt active dispositions? With the Immediate Awareness view, we can say easily enough that

they are noncognitive conscious states which fulfill the appropriate epistemic function regarding the particular active disposition one is feeling. But how is this to be expressed? Shall we say, in keeping with the kind of analysis found in part (i), that

1^2: S has a felt active disposition at time t to do x if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_d, at t such that by virtue of being in F_d:

(i) If S has the concept of being actively disposed to do x, S believes that he is actively disposed to do x

(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for this belief?

This analysis is fine. However, while it is correct, it also needs some clarification. For we need to bring out foremost what it is for S to believe, in the context of feelings, that he is actively disposed to do x: In felt awarenesses, one's beliefs are certainly not about the full contents of the disposition from which doing x follows. In the "shouting" case, for example, one's beliefs (based upon one's noncognitive conscious state) are not about the particular disposition that has given rise to the consequent active disposition to do the shouting. For one could conceivably say something like, "I felt disposed (I felt the urge) to shout out loud, but I sure don't know why." We are admitting here that there is no necessary awareness of (belief about) the specific character of the antecedent conditions (C) and a fortiori no awareness of the exact nature of the total disposition (dispositional property) either. The only specific awareness is of the shouting (what is specified in the consequent condition of the disposition) that may occur. How can we fit this into our analysis though?

We might take conditions (i) and (ii) of our analysis of active dispositions (1^1) and adapt them to condition (i) of 1^2. Accordingly, we

could say,

1^3: S has a felt active disposition at time t to do x if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_d, at t such that by virtue of being in F_d:

(i) If S has the concept of being actively disposed to do x, S believes that:
(a) If C, then he will do x if no "crucial" and "non-crucial" countervailing forces arise, and
(b) C occurs (at t) with no "crucial" countervailing forces arising

(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for this belief

If we do this however, we get the result from which we have just disassociated ourselves. For our result here would be that we have beliefs about the specific content of the full disposition (antecedent conditions and "crucial"...forces as well as consequent conditions). So this move does not work.

What do we do then? Our answer will be to point out that while one is not aware, when having felt active dispositions, of the full specific content of his active dispositions, he is aware that there is some content or other and that the antecedent condition, whatever it is specifically, has been actualized. For since one believes here that one is disposed to performing some specific action--as opposed to merely believing that one will soon perform this action, but not as a result of some disposition one has--one must be aware of the kind of state that has been analysed in 1^1. But if one is not aware of specific content here, one must be aware of the fact that there is some content to a disposition that one has, though one does not necessarily know what this content is. Moreover, one must be aware that the antecedent conditions of this content have been actualized. We will note these facts in a more compact fashion by saying that when a person--call him S--has a felt active disposition, he believes that $(\exists y)(\exists z)$

[(If a set of antecedent events Cy occur, then S will do Bx if no "crucial" ...forces Qz arise)·(Cy occurs at t)].

Now obviously if someone asked S to describe what his belief state was when he had his felt active disposition to do x, he would not reply, "I was believing that there was some antecedent conditions or other (i.e., $(\exists y)(Cy)$ and some "crucial"...forces Qz or other such that if...." Nevertheless, this is precisely what is required for the contents of his believing that he is disposed to doing x. So we will just say that he has this belief with this complex content, though it is not a full-blown belief to the extent that S can relate to us all of the specific content (viz., $(\exists y)...$). Finally then, our analysis of felt active dispositions will have it that

1^4: S has a felt active disposition at time t to do x if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_d, at t such that by virtue of being in F_d:

(i) If S has the concept of being actively disposed to do x, then S believes that $(\exists y)(\exists z)[(\text{If } Cy, \text{ then S will do Bx if no "crucial"...forces Qz arise})\cdot(Cy_t)]$ (i.e., S believes that he is actively disposed to do x)

(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for his belief

This is what a felt active disposition is then.

Before leaving this notion however, I would like to point out something about 1^4. In it, there is no mention of S's <u>really having</u> the active disposition that he believes he has (that he claims to be feeling). And at first glance, such an omission seems quite odd. For certainly it <u>seems</u> that if one has a felt active disposition, then the active disposition must really exist. What could count as better evidence for the fact that we have a certain active disposition than the fact that we have the appropriate felt active disposition? Well, while in fact it most often

is true that when we have felt active dispositions, we are in that active disposition state, it just is not necessarily true. The noncognitive conscious states of feelings are certainly quite highly reliable bases for believing that we have a given active disposition, but they are not always correct. It is always logically possible that a person might sometimes be in a noncognitive conscious state which highly warrants his belief that he is actively disposed to do x, but which, due to strange psychological forces, simply miss the mark. ("His feelings are out of whack! They are completely out of touch with reality and the way he is acting.")[1]

(2) In order for me to eventually give my analysis of emotional feeling components, it will be necessary for me to develop some more concepts. What I want to do is to develop an analysis of specific kinds of felt active dispositions. And in doing this, I must introduce still more vocabulary.

The first notion to be defined is that of the "type of active disposition." To work up to this definition, let me start by noting that different kinds of mental predicates have been known to receive dispositional

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[1]The case of E feelings, as opposed to some other kinds of feelings, presents an apparent exception. For one might argue that if one feels E, then, as long as one is in the appropriate noncognitive conscious state, that is enough for us to say that one is E--and so feeling E and being E would not seem to be logically independent of one another. This is no problem for what I have just said though. For what I have said only entails that it be logically possible for one to feel E without having the active disposition components of being E. This I still hold. The reason feeling E is said to logically entail being E is because our concept of being E has evolved to the point where feelings are at its core, so to speak. So if one feels E even in the absence of any of the other components of being E, one is said to be E. (There is, however, an exception to acceptance of this point. Psychoanalysts who speak of emotional states seem to take feelings as just one more E state component. Feelings are not quite so close to the core of the concept of being E. If all the components, except the feeling state, are not apparent in a person's state, then that person is said not to be E. This seems only to be peculiar to the psychoanalysts' conception of being E though. We will discuss this notion further in part (iv).)

analyses by philosophers and psychologists--e.g., philosophers sometimes speak of the concepts of beliefs, wants, and valuations as dispositional concepts that are embodied by characteristic clusters of dispositions (dispositional properties) which in turn are expressed by clusters of subjunctive conditionals. Such concepts are what have been called "many-track dispositions"--dispositions that are exemplified by a cluster of many different subjunctive conditionals--as opposed to "single-track dispositions"--dispositions exemplified by a single subjunctive conditional statement. The concept of wants, for example, is sometimes looked on by philosophers as a dispositional concept consisting of some characteristic (want-like) cluster of conditionals. On this view, the concept "Sims' wanting to go to the store" might consist of the disposition conditionals H: "If Sims heard the name of the store mentioned, he would jump for joy," I: "If someone were to tell Sims that they were going to drive past the store, then Sims would jump into the car," J: "If Sims were to think about the sale going on at the store, he would get into his car and go down there," and so on.[1] This cluster of conditionals correctly describes what it is for Sims to want to go to the store. Now when the antecedent condition of one of these conditionals is satisfied, then clearly Sims is

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[1]I am sticking to purely behavioral dispositions here, for they are the only kind relevant to our subsequent discussion. We should at least mention, however, that dispositional analyses of mental concepts need not exclusively contain purely behavioral conditionals. The term that designates behaviorally impure concepts is a theoretical term, because not all the elements of the subjunctive conditional are observational. E.g., we might have said above that part of our "want" was the conditional "If someone were to tell Sims that they were driving past the store, the probability of Sims' getting into the car would be quite high." The consequent condition here is certainly not what we would normally call a piece of observable behavior. And so "wants" as dispositional concepts are of the theoretical variety.

actively disposed to do what is specified in the consequent condition (given the appropriate qualifications). So if someone has just told Sims that they were going to drive past the store, then Sims would be actively disposed to jumping into the car. Moreover, because the disposition I is part of our analysis of "Sims' wanting to go to the store," we can say that Sims has an active want to go to the store. And in general, we will say that Sims actively wants to go to the store if, and only if, he is actively disposed to do something which is specified in a consequent condition of a disposition such that the concept of the disposition in turn is part of the concept "Sims' wanting to go to the store." Putting this in our alternative language, Sims actively wants to go to the store if, and only if, he has an active disposition the concept of which is part of the concept "Sims' wanting to go to the store." Let us generalize from this example now to define the concept "type of active disposition."

By "type of active disposition" I mean that concept to which the active dispositions we may be discussing belong. (H, I, and J, for example, belong to "Sims' wanting to go to the store.") So when some person S has a disposition--call it R: If U, then V if no...--and U has just occurred (thereby making R an active disposition if no "crucial"...forces arise), then if R is an element of the dispositional concept of type T, then we will say that S now has a T-type of active disposition. Or, S has an active disposition of type T. My analysis of this concept will, accordingly, go as follows:

2: S has an active disposition of type T at time t if, and only if,

(i) S has disposition R $=_{df}$ If U, then V if no...
(ii) U occurs (at t) and no "crucial"
(iii) R $\longrightarrow$ T

Any concept that is a dispositional concept--a concept containing clusters

of dispositional conditionals--is a candidate for being such an "active disposition of type T." And so we can speak of "active want dispositions," "active valuational dispositions," "active belief dispositions," and so on.

(3) Given these notions, we can now talk about "felt wants," "felt valuations," and other "felt" active disposition-type concepts. We can get at the first of these notions through the following: Imagine that every time Sims thinks about the fact that he can choose only between Dinty and Doaks for the Presidency, he starts having an intense felt desire or what we more commonly call a yen--i.e., an immediate awareness of intensely wanting--to change the two-party system. In keeping with what we have been saying thus far, such a felt want is an immediate awareness of an active disposition of a want-type--or simply, an immediate awareness of an active want. But what does this kind of state turn out to be upon analysis?

To answer this, let us imagine the situation where Jones has a yen (a felt want) for an ice cream soda. The first fact we should note about Jones' situation is that if he really has the active want which he claims to be feeling here, then he also has an active disposition which is part of the concept of his active want "wanting an ice cream soda." (This much is defined into the notion of an "active disposition of type T.") And in general, when anyone has an active want, we will assume that it is an active want <u>related to</u> (logically entailed by) a particular active disposition to do something. We will thus speak of the active want W_x, where "x" is the "active disposition to do x" that the active want "W" is related to. So we might imagine that on this particular occasion with Jones, "wanting an ice cream soda" is related to the active disposition M: "If Jones were to think of an ice cream soda, he would jump for joy."

Given this situation, what can we say about Jones' felt active disposition? On the Immediate Awareness view, Jones' having this felt want most obviously entails that he is in a noncognitive conscious state. And this noncognitive conscious state acts as a highly warranted basis for the beliefs he has that he is actively disposed to jumping for joy and that he wants (actively) an ice cream soda. What does this come to though? Let us take the belief about "being actively disposed to jumping for joy" first. This means that he has the belief that he will jump for joy soon and that he is disposed to doing this. (This follows from our notion of a felt active disposition.) But now Jones has the particular belief that he wants an ice cream soda. In order to explain the genesis of this belief, we will say first that Jones must believe that whenever he is actively disposed to jumping for joy in the kind of context he is in, this logically entails that he wants an ice cream soda. Of course this is not a belief he is fully conscious of. Nevertheless, it is a belief he carries around with him, as it were. Abiding by the convention pointed to in Chapter I, we call such a belief an inchoate (preconscious) one. Accordingly then, on the basis of the inchoate belief and his belief that he is now actively disposed to jumping for joy, Jones infers that he wants (i.e., that he actively wants) an ice cream soda. Simply stated, Jones infers his beliefs about what his wants are from his beliefs about what his active disposition states are. Obviously the inference process is not a conscious one. And so we will call it inchoate also. Moreover, since Jones' beliefs about his active dispositions were based upon his noncognitive conscious state, then so, by inference, his belief about his active want can be said to be based upon (if only indirectly) it too. This, accordingly, will be the sense in which we are to understand the

felt want. Our schema for this kind of state will go as follows:

3^1: S has a felt active want W_x at time t if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_{W_x}, at t such that by virtue of being in F_{W_x}:

(i) S believes that $(\exists y)(\exists z)[(\text{If } Cy, \text{ then } Bx \text{ if no "crucial" } Qz\ldots)\cdot(Cy_t)]$ (i.e., S believes that he is actively disposed to do x)

(ii) S believes (inchoately) that $(\exists y)(\exists z)\{[(\text{If } Cy, \text{ then } Bx \text{ if no "crucial" } Qz\ldots)\cdot(Cy_t)] \longrightarrow W_x\}$ (i.e., S believes inchoately that whenever he has the active disposition to do x, he has active want W)

(iii) If S has the concept of the active want W_x, then he believes on the basis of (i) and (ii) that he has active want W_x

(iv) S has a high degree of warrant for these beliefs

We can condense all of this to read:

3^2: S has a felt want W at time t if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_W, at t such that by virtue of being in F_W:

(i) If S has the concept of W, then he believes that he has an active disposition of type W

(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for this belief

Besides truly capturing what goes on in felt wants though, this last formulation is quite philosophically interesting for another reason. For it helps resolve a certain nagging problem that weighs upon anyone who does philosophical psychology. The problem I am referring to is the fact that while many philosophers give to a host of mental predicates (e.g., "wants" and "valuations") purely dispositional analyses, clearly, under some circumstances anyway, the states named by these predicates do not always seem to be purely dispositional in nature. When a five-year old, for example, repeatedly stomps his feet and says "I want that red lollipop," somehow a purely dispositional analysis of what is going on rings hollow. The five-year old is saying more than something like "If

you offer me the lollipop, I will accept it." We all imagine that the want here must in some sense be involved with a conscious state that the child is having and not merely with a disposition that he has. But because it seems that the present state of philosophical psychology tacitly assumes that there is some "conscious state analysis of mental predicates"/ "dispositional state analysis of mental predicates" dichotomy, we would seem to be in an undesirable position of having to choose one or the other as the appropriate analysis of the five-year old's want. However, I think that the last version of our felt wants analysis nicely exposes the fact that there is no real dichotomy that has to exist when discussing such mental predicates. For it shows us that we need not throw out our dispositional analysis of the concept of wants for some conscious state type of analysis, and, at the same time, we can still speak of the phenomenon of "wanting" as referring to some conscious state activity. For when the child emphatically says that he wants the lollipop, this is not so much a comment on the concept of S's "wanting a lollipop" as it is a comment on the way in which he is aware of the active want disposition he has--i.e., a comment on the felt active wants he has. When one has such emphatic wants, one is in some noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which one believes (given the concepts of active want dispositions) that one has certain active want dispositions (e.g., one may now be disposed to grabbing for the lollipop). So one might give the concept of S's "wanting a lollipop" a dispositional analysis and still assume consistently that when one emphatically wants something, one is in some conscious state--viz., an immediate awareness of the characteristic (want-like) way that one is now actively disposed. One can feel one's active wants. And consequently our preanalytic intuitions which tell us that

there is some kind of conscious state involved with wants are salvaged without any disruption to the dispositional analysis of the concept of wants. This holds true for all other supposed dispositional mental predicates as well.

(4) An analysis of "felt valuations" will follow along the same general lines as (3). We will be more brief however. First off, we should specify that the concept of valuation also will be taken to be dispositional in nature. For when we value something, we seem to have active dispositions to act, perhaps, in protective ways toward the object of our valuation to a degree commensurable with what we say the strength of the value is. For example, if I highly value my typewriter, then I might be disposed to making certain that it is kept in good condition (i.e., "If it were to get dusty, then I would clean it so as to keep it from getting run down"), that no one stole it (i.e., "If I were finished with it for the day, I would lock it away so as to not have it stolen"), and so on. If I do not value it too much, then I might, accordingly, have fewer of these sorts of dispositions.

Whether or not we have correctly characterized the general kind of disposition (viz., acting in protective ways...) that goes into the concept of valuation (nothing vital here really hangs on it), we have made the point that valuation is a dispositional concept. Assuming this is correct, we might next suspect that there exists among the morass of mental states we possess something we will call the "felt active valuation." And to be sure, examples of such a phenomenon are easy enough to find. When someone rises in a crowd and starts extolling dramatically the virtues of free speech, it would not be unusual at all for him to have at that time an experience of a strongly felt valuation (i.e., a felt active

valuation) of free speech--he literally feels how much he values free speech. Or, perhaps, if someone offered to buy my Weimeraner dog Jake, I might experience at that time a strong felt valuation of the importance of Jake. He might <u>feel very valuable</u> to me at that moment.

In keeping with the kind of analysis presented in 3^2, let us say now that

4: S has a felt active valuation V at time t if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_V, at t such that by virtue of being in F_V:

(i) If S has the concept, then he believes that he has an active disposition of type V

(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for this belief

I will not work out the more precise analysis. However, it follows the model presented in 3^1.

(5) There is one more type of felt disposition state I want to get at here--what I will call the "felt <u>simple</u> active disposition." This is explained easily enough. In (3) and (4) one's active wants and valuations were seen to be related to (entailed by) some active disposition components of the given want or valuation. But now there are dispositions we have that are not related to wants or valuations or any of the other more popular disposition concepts. Rather, they are related only to (entailed by) themselves, as it were. One just has some dispositions to behave in certain ways. And these dispositions do not entail the existence of wants and the like. For example, perhaps whenever I receive bad news about anything, I become disposed to staring off into space and to slowly pacing the floor. This disposition to stare and pace is not exactly a want that I have. Moreover, it does not seem to be part of any want either. It is just what it is--an active disposition which <u>fully describes itself</u>.

Accordingly, we will call all such active dispositions "simple active dispositions." The definition of this state will follow along the lines of 2, but notice that condition (iii) reads "R ⟶ R." Omitting this unnecessary condition (for it is trivially true) though, 2 becomes 1^1. And so when we look for an analysis of the "felt simple active disposition," it accordingly can be given the analysis in 1^2. We will say, then,

5: S has a felt simple active disposition at time t to do x if, and only if, S is in a noncognitive conscious state, F_{sd}, at t such that by virtue of being in F_{sd}:

(i) If S has the concept of being actively disposed to do x, then he believes he has the active disposition to do x

(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for this belief

The more precise analysis of this follows the lines set out in 3^1, though there is no need for conditions comparable to (ii) and (iii).

This, then, concludes my discussion of various kinds of felt disposition states. I have reached the point finally where I can profitably begin an analysis of emotional feeling components. It will become obvious shortly why I have had to go through the tedious work I have gone through in part (ii).

(iii)

As the point of departure, I will recall Alston's observation that we distinguish one feeling from another by making reference to "awarenesses of components" that go into making up the states we are said to be feeling (p. 53). And it is clear that he means to be speaking only of nonconscious state components. For if we also included the conscious state components--e.g., the feelings themselves--then it would be possible to distinguish feelings by referring to different immediate awarenesses of feelings--i.e., by referring to "felt feelings." And this certainly

would not do.

In the case of emotional feelings, then, we distinguish one feeling from another by pointing to the immediate awarenesses we have of the various emotional nonconscious state components. In other words, we distinguish one emotional feeling from another by pointing to the various felt components of the emotional state. When one feels afraid, for example, one characterizes his feeling by citing his immediate awarenesses (feelings) of the nonconscious state components that go into making up his state of being afraid. If the nonconscious state components of the state of being afraid were characterized as rapid poundings of the heart, certain physical processes occurring in the stomach, a tendency to shrink in one's bodily composure, desires to avoid the object of fear, strong valuations of one's life, and so on, then the state of feeling afraid would be characterized by citing the corresponding felt pounding, felt physical processes in the stomach, felt action tendencies, felt desires, felt valuations, and so on. And indeed, this is precisely what we do. To use Alston's illustration again, "when one feels embarrassed, one feels a tendency to hide one's head, one feels one's face blushing, one wishes [(i.e., one has a felt wish that)] one had never done what one is embarrassed about...," with the "feels" here to be taken as immediate awarenesses of the respective components of the state of being embarrassed. Given then that we do describe our emotional feelings in this manner, what I want to do now is see how we can more precisely categorize some of these component awarenesses.

Before we proceed however, let me just point out that these component awarenesses are not to be thought of as strict necessary conditions for the concept of emotional feelings. For if Alston is right in saying

that emotional state concepts are "family resemblance" concepts[1]--and thus can be said to have only more or less "typical," but not "necessary," components comprising them--then we cannot really expect more of emotional feeling concepts. In other words, emotional feeling concepts too are "family resemblance" concepts with more or less typical--i.e., more or less usual--but not strictly necessary, components.

(1) Perhaps the most obvious component of emotional feelings is sensation. Emotional feelings without sensations are hardly imaginable. Mild emotional feelings seem to spell mild sensations, while intense emotional feelings seem to spell intense sensations. For example, when I feel mildly apprehensive about the outcome of the election, I am aware of having a mild form of "tight" sensations somewhere in the vicinity of the temples. Or, when I feel tremendously horrified, I notice an intense sensation of heaviness toward the base of my neck. And so too with the rest of our emotional feelings there seem to be typical sensations for each.

Applying the Immediate Awareness view to sensations, we see that to have a sensation is to have a noncognitive conscious state that highly warrants the belief we have about the kind of physical state our body is in --i.e., sensations are immediate awarenesses of bodily states. Indeed, when I have sensations of tightness in the temples, I do in fact believe, on the highly warranted basis of my noncognitive conscious state, that my muscles are contracting (i.e., that they are tightening) in that region. When I have sensations of an upset stomach (sensations of nausea), I believe, on the highly warranted basis of my noncognitive conscious state, that my stomach is upset (that I am nauseous). When I feel myself blushing,

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[1]See Footnote #2, p. 46.

I believe, on the highly warranted basis of my noncognitive conscious state, that I am blushing (that blood is rushing to my head). Of course not all cases of sensation are as easy to analyze. For in most cases, a description of the physical state of our bodies is more elusive than the description in these examples. When I have a sinking sensation in my stomach, for example, I certainly am not in a conscious state that warrants a belief that my stomach is sinking. However, we can resolve this kind of difficulty by referring to the physical state that we are in in such cases by means of a definite description. What I mean is this. When one has a sinking sensation in the stomach, we can say that he is in a noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which he believes with a high degree of warrant that the physical state his stomach is in at that time is the same as the physical state his stomach is in when his whole body is sinking. The physical state here is best described by the definite description "the physical state one is in when one's body is sinking." So when one has a sinking sensation, his noncognitive conscious state is warrant for his belief that he is in the physical state given in the definite description. To give another example, when one has sensations of dizziness, one is in a noncognitive conscious state which warrants his belief that he is in a physical state given in the description "the physical state one's head is in when one starts to lose one's balance, etc."

The Immediate Awareness view, then, can accommodate the notion of sensations. And accordingly, we can see now how sensations can be construed as a component of emotional feelings. The noncognitive conscious state we have in sensations is a component of the total noncognitive conscious state we have in the total emotional feeling. Of course it is not the whole thing. Sensations could not possibly be the whole of our concept

of emotional feelings. We saw this earlier when we were reviewing Alston's criticisms of the Bodily Sensation view of feelings (p. 47). Moreover, emotional feelings must be more than just sensations, because, otherwise, we would not be able to distinguish the sinking sensations of fear from, let us say, the sinking sensations of a stomach disorder. By the same token though, it is our contention that sensations constitute at least part of the story. In identifying our emotional feelings, we do appeal to the kinds of sensations we have. For example, if we all of a sudden were to have the above sinking sensations in the stomach, then in all likelihood, we would not be tempted to say that we felt happy, mellow, or blissful. Depending upon how the rest of the components were filled out, we would rather expect that we were frightened, horrified, indignant, angry, or perhaps even embarrassed. Accordingly then, we can begin our component analysis of emotional feelings by saying,

e_1: When S feels E (where E is some emotional state), he typically (i.e., usually) has characteristic sensation complexes--i.e., he typically has immediate awarenesses of characteristic complexes of bodily states

(2) If emotional feelings are immediate awarenesses of emotional states, and if emotional states are laden with behavioral disposition (i.e., "behavioral tendency" or "action tendency") components, then it is only reasonable to expect that the feeling of an emotional state would have as components immediate awarenesses of behavioral dispositions.[1] And indeed,

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[1]R. S. Peters has written an essay in which he disputes the view that emotional feelings are in any logical way tied to behavior and, I assume, to behavioral dispositions as well. I do not have the space to go into the matter, but I will just say that Peters' mistake here rests on his false assumption that emotional feelings are logically tied to "wishes" (which do not entail any behavioral states) but not to "wants" which are certainly tied (motivationally) to behavior. I think my discussion in this chapter adequately refutes Peters--"wants" and other behavioral disposition states clearly are involved with emotional feelings. For Peters' discussion, though, see R. S. Peters, "Emotions, Passivity,

when we look at feelings, we are not disappointed. To feel angry at x, for example, is partly to have a felt disposition to pound one's fists at the thought of x. To feel disgusted with y is partly to have the felt disposition to turn one's head away at the very sight of y. And so it is with the rest of our emotional feelings also that we identify them partly on the basis of felt dispositions to behave in certain ways. Put in our own jargon, we identify our emotional feelings partly on the basis of our immediate awarenesses of our active dispositions to behave in certain ways --i.e., on the basis of some of our felt simple active dispositions. So when Sims feels angry at Jones for stealing his 1937 penny collection, Sims' felt disposition to pound his fists on the table is an immediate awareness of what he is "simply" actively disposed to doing. The antecedent conditions of a simple anger disposition, where the statement of this disposition reads "If one were to have something stolen from him, then one would pound (automatically) one's fists," have been fulfilled. Consequently, Sims is actively disposed in a certain way. And he is immediately aware of this simple active disposition.

Thus we have our next emotional feeling component:

e_2: When S feels E (where E is some emotional state), he typically has immediate awarenesses of characteristic E-like simple active dispositions

(3) The next emotional feeling component to be introduced is the felt want. When we have an emotional feeling, we usually have some felt wants directed toward the object of the feeling. This is brought into sharp focus when we see what goes on in distinguishing one feeling from another. Take feelings of guilt and embarrassment for example. When I

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and the Place of Freud's Theory in Psychology," in Scientific Psychology, ed. B. B. Wolman and E. Nagel (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965), pp. 365-383.

feel guilty, it would not be unusual (though again, it is not strictly necessary) if I have a felt want to (a yen to) receive punishment for what I take to be the immoral object of my guilt feelings and if I have a felt want to apologize (or "repent" in some other way) for what I take to be the immoral activity about which I feel guilty. And perhaps in general, when one feels guilty about x, one typically has a felt want to be punished (ceteris paribus) for one's having done immoral x, a felt want to apologize for immoral x, and so on. (Here again, our characterization of the kind of disposition (viz., dispositions to receive punishment and to apologize) we have given is not crucial to anything we are saying.) When I feel embarrassed, on the other hand, I typically have the felt want to hide my head because I think that I look silly in the eyes of the other person, I have a felt want to do something to make up in some way or other for what I have done, and so on. However we fill in the analysis here though, we can see already that feelings of guilt and embarrassment can be distinguished (and so we can identify each one) partly on the basis of some of the typical felt wants involved in the respective emotional feeling concepts. At the very least, we could make a distinction between the characteristic moral felt wants of feelings of guilt and the characteristic non-moral felt wants of feelings of embarrassment.

Making use now of our analysis of what goes on with felt wants (3^2), this third component of feelings becomes "immediate awarenesses of active wants." So when Sims feels angry with Jones, Sims is immediately aware of having the active want-disposition to strike out at Jones in some way or other. When Sims feels disgusted with Jones, he is immediately aware of having the active want-disposition to get out of the presence of Jones. When Sims feels great joy over the Jets' winning the championship, he is

immediately aware of having his active want-disposition to quite vociferously extoll his intense approval and the extraordinary virtues of the Jets. And in general, when one has emotional feelings, one has such immediate awarenesses of active dispositions of the type we call "wants." Accordingly, we can say,

e_3: When S feels E (where E is some emotional state), he typically has immediate awarenesses of characteristic E-like active want dispositions

(4) Felt valuations are also components of emotional feelings. For example, when I feel afraid of the lion in front of me, I find myself having a felt valuation to some extent for the preservation of my life. If I did not value my life (and so did not have a felt valuation either about my life) to any extent here, then certainly it would be quite odd for me to feel afraid. Similarly, other emotional feelings are related to particular valuations: If I did not have a felt valuation about being honest, then I would certainly not feel guilty about stealing the apples from the market. If I had not had a felt valuation about the Mets winning the World Series, then it would have been very odd if I had said that I felt quite exhilarated about their winning the World Series. If Sims did not have a felt high valuation of 1937 pennies, then it would be strange for him to say that he felt angry that some of them were stolen. And so it seems that another component of our concept of emotional feelings is the notion of felt valuations. And since, as we have already mentioned in part (ii), we will be assuming here some kind of dispositional analysis or other for the concept of valuation, we can say that the felt active valuation is still another component of emotional feelings. So if we might imagine that being afraid of the lion in front of us entails that we value our lives to some high degree, which in turn is taken to partly

mean that we have the active disposition to protect our lives to some high degree whenever a serious threat arises, then if we feel afraid of the lion in front of us, we must be immediately aware of the active disposition to protect our seemingly threatened lives. Thus,

e_4: When S feels E (where E is some emotional state), he typically has immediate awarenesses of characteristic E-like active valuation dispositions

(5) So far we have seen that when we feel X, we are in a noncognitive conscious state which warrants the belief that we have want x_1, the belief that we have valuation x_2, the belief that we have simple active disposition x_3, and the belief that we are in bodily state x_4. Are these active disposition and bodily states the only things we have beliefs about when we have feelings though? No. We also have beliefs about the "external situation" or "context" surrounding our emotional state. What I mean is this. Part of what it is for one to have an emotional feeling is for one to "see" or "evaluate" ("evaluate," not "valuate") one's situation in certain characteristic ways. For example, when I feel frightened, I see the object of my fear as threatening in some way. When I feel grieved, I see most everything that goes on around me as being inconsequential. When I feel joyous, I see the world in terms of a place filled with opportunities for me. And I see the object of my feeling in some way as the bearer of these opportunities. In other words, when I have an emotional feeling, I have evaluative beliefs about the nature of the emotional situation--beliefs that size up the "external reality" of the situation. These beliefs are not based wholly upon objective evidence that I have collected pertaining to the external situation. Rather they are partially based on the noncognitive conscious state I am in. And in keeping with the Immediate Awareness view, we can say that just as our beliefs about our wants,

valuations, simple active dispositions, and bodily states here are based with warrant upon noncognitive conscious states, so too then are these evaluative beliefs we have about the external situation based at least partially upon noncognitive conscious states. And so we will say,

e_5: When S feels E (where E is some emotional state), he typically has immediate awarenesses of characteristic E-like ways of looking at the external situation he is in--i.e., he has characteristic felt evaluations of the external situation

We should point out that the immediate awareness here is a bit different from the other cases in that while in the other cases one's belief about x is extremely highly warranted, quite often one's evaluation beliefs (those based upon noncognitive conscious states, that is) are not so warranted. It would not be unusual to hear someone who is commenting on another person's feelings saying something like "It's understandable why you're seeing everything in such a distorted way; you're feeling just so depressed." It is simply a fact about the noncognitive element of our feeling states that while they are quite reliable bases for our beliefs about our own bodily and disposition states, they are not as reliable for our beliefs about the "external situation." But this is probably as it should be. For if we are "closer" to our bodies and their behavior than we are to the world, it seems only reasonable that we know more about our bodies and their behavior than we do about the rest of the world.

(6) Let me now sum up the component analysis of emotional feelings: Let us say that

6^1: When S feels E (where E is some emotional state), he typically has:

(i) characteristic sensations (i.e., felt bodily states)
(ii) characteristic E-like felt simple active dispositions
(iii) characteristic E-like felt wants
(iv) characteristic E-like felt valuations
(v) characteristic E-like felt evaluations of the external situation

Since we find in 6^1 the basic categories of the noncognitive conscious state components that go into making up our emotional feelings, then when we return to the epistemic analysis of emotional feelings, the noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which we believe with a high degree of warrant that we are E becomes a complex noncognitive state of consciousness (comprised of the ones found in 6^1) that warrants the appropriate complex of beliefs about the nonconscious state components of being E. Given this resulting complex of beliefs, and assuming that we have the concept of being E, what happens when we feel E is that we infer from these beliefs and this concept the belief that we are in the appropriate emotional state E. And by-passing explicit mention of this inference in our analysis, we see indeed that when we feel E, we are in a complex noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which we believe with a high degree of warrant that we are E. And so

6^2: S feels E at time t only if S is in a complex noncognitive conscious state (comprised of those components found in 6^1), F_e, at t such that by virtue of being in F_e:

(i) If S has the concept of E, he believes that he is E
(ii) S has a high degree of warrant for this belief

This, then, completes my analysis of emotional feelings. I do not pretend that it exhausts all the possible components of emotional feelings. Thus the reason for the mere "only if" in 6^2. I have not taken into account, for example, any unconscious components. And psychoanalytic evidence strongly suggests that unconscious factors play a part in our feelings--factors such as unconscious wants, wishes, valuations, and evaluations. Since, however, I am mainly interested in discussing only those aspects of everyday feelings which best lend to my consequent discussion of empathy--and 6^1 captures just this--I will be content with the analysis as it stands.

(iv)

I will now look briefly at some possible objections to my analysis:

(1) Someone might object that it is possible for one to have all of the component immediate awarenesses of 6^1 but still not be immediately aware that he is E (i.e., still not feel E), as my analysis would suppose. That is to say, one could believe on the basis of being in the relevant noncognitive conscious states that he had each of the particular components that happen to belong to "being E," but not believe on the basis of these states of consciousness that he had an emotional feeling. A person could believe, for example, that he now has a sinking sensation in the stomach, that he is now immediately aware of being actively disposed to running from the lion in front of him, that he is now immediately aware of how highly he values his life, that he now is immediately aware of what the threatening external situation that he is in is like. One could conceivably believe all of these things on the basis of being in the relevant kinds of noncognitive conscious states and yet not be said to believe on the basis of the resulting complex state of consciousness that he feels afraid of the lion. Indeed, one might see several <u>distinct</u> conscious states instead of an individual complex.

To further this argument, one might raise the point that it is quite conceivable that infants learn to name their felt bodily states (i.e., their sensations) and felt active disposition states ("I <u>want</u> that lollipop") before they learn to name their emotional feelings. And so one might argue that infants can have the requisite component immediate awarenesses and still not necessarily be said to believe that they have emotional feelings. And of course this point is certainly conceivable and probably even true. However, it need not count against our component analysis of feelings.

For what this supposed objection really boils down to is that if one does not have the concept of E feelings, then one does not know how to name the feeling conscious state when it arises--one does not know how to name the complex noncognitive conscious state when it arises. This is certainly true. But this is not to say that when one finally learns the concept of E feelings, it will turn out to be anything more or less than the concept of having a certain complex conscious state by virtue of which one believes that one is E. Indeed, Alston makes a somewhat similar point (Alston, p. 25) when he says that one may feel E without knowing as much, because one can be in a conscious state without being aware that it is the basis of the beliefs one has that one is in an E state. One may know that one is E without knowing that one is feeling E, because one may not know that the conscious state one is in is what is called "feeling E." In other words, one may not yet know the concept "feeling E" and so may not yet recognize that the conscious state which accompanies being E is what we call "feeling E." One must learn the concept first.

(2) One might object to our component analysis on the grounds that there are many times when we are having feelings but are not having the felt components. It often seems that one has emotional feelings without necessarily having any particular component awarenesses of wants, valuations, etc. spelled out. For example, I might feel quite angry with my brother over something he has just said. All I may seem to be aware of here is some noncognitive conscious state--or as it is sometimes put, some phenomenal state--that I call "the feeling of anger." However, I may not be aware of having any felt wants or felt valuations to do anything, for example. So how can a felt want or a felt valuation be a component of my emotional feelings here?

One answer could reasonably be that not all the components we have specified in our analysis are present in every feeling. For as we have pointed out already, none of the components are strict necessary conditions of having feelings. Again, we might think of emotional feeling concepts as "family resemblance" concepts such that a person who has emotional feelings usually has a certain cluster of component awarenesses. However, there can be divergent cases where perhaps one or two of the usual components are missing, but where a person would still be said to have emotional feelings. And this is certainly a reasonable reply to the objection, for I am certain that this is precisely what happens from time to time.

However, this first kind of reply to the objection, while true, is a weak defense. For it does not answer the implied stronger objection that when we are aware of many of our feelings, we are not aware of a good many of the supposed felt components (except, perhaps, the sensation component). I think that there is a good reason for us not to seriously entertain this objection either though. Simply put, our feeling-component claim does not require that the component awarenesses be consciously spelled out whenever we have emotional feelings. We are not to imagine that our analysis demands that whenever we are aware of having an emotional feeling, we are distinctly aware of having individual felt evaluations, felt wants, etc. Our analysis demands only that when we have a feeling, we be in a non-cognitive conscious state which gives us a basis for our belief that we are E. Of course upon analysis of our feelings we could probably summon forth most of these kinds of components. Indeed, as we have already noted, when we in fact draw distinctions between any of our emotional feelings, we do this by pointing to our felt wants, etc. However, when we are just concerned with naming the emotional feelings themselves (and not the drawing

of distinctions between them), we are concerned only with the total conscious state we are in. Given the concept of being E, this total conscious state tells us that we are feeling E.

The critic might come back and insist that still, not all emotional feelings can be broken down into the components I have envisaged: there are many cases of "vague" emotional feelings (i.e., feelings we are not sure how to name) that we have but which no component analysis of emotional feelings can be readily foisted upon. That is to say, we cannot describe such feelings in terms of their component feelings. My reply to this is that while indeed we cannot talk about "vague" feelings in terms of all the components, I submit that the fact that we cannot do this is precisely the reason why we take such emotional feelings to be "vague." They are "vague" <u>because</u> they do not possess enough felt components to constitute one of our full-blown emotional feelings. For example, we might imagine that Sims has just been informed that his daughter has been arrested for loitering. Sims' face becomes very serious. Suppose now that we ask him how he is feeling. And he replies, "Well, it's hard to say. I don't feel exactly ashamed and I don't feel exactly embarrassed; it seems to be something between those two feelings though. But I can't really put my finger on what it is exactly." Quite consistent with our analysis of emotional feelings, we can say that the felt components he does have are common to both shame and embarrassment and the reason he cannot distinguish his emotional feelings is because he does not have any of the felt components that are peculiar to one rather than the other. So, if Sims were suddenly to have the evaluative belief that getting arrested for loitering was somehow morally reprehensible, then I think in all probability his "vague" feelings would change to the definite feelings of shame. When the total

conscious state of Sims is altered by the introduction of the evaluative belief, the emotional feeling alters too. It gets "clearer." For such an evaluative belief is peculiar to feelings of shame as opposed to those of embarrassment. And in general, the greater the specificity of felt components, the "clearer" the emotional feeling becomes--i.e., the better able we are to name our emotional feelings.

(3) A critic of our analysis might argue that emotional feelings are not identical with the complex of the component feelings we have named because, whereas knowledge of the components is publicly accessible, knowledge of emotional feelings is wholly private. For while I can be shown via some public evidence to be wrong about a judgment I make about my felt wants, felt valuations, and other felt dispositions, no one can bring forth evidence that can outweigh my sincere testimony that I feel E. So, for example, I may believe, on the basis of the noncognitive conscious state I am in, that I highly <u>value</u> my ring. However, public evidence might always show my belief to be false. Someone might point out, for example, how I am always offering to sell it even though I am not in need of any money, how I frequently lose it without a second thought, how I physically abuse it, and so on. On the other hand (the critic would argue), if I believe, for example, on the basis of the conscious state I am in, that I feel lonely, then I feel lonely and that is all there is to it. I may always be shown not to <u>be</u> lonely, but certainly I must <u>feel</u> lonely when I say so. Hence, emotional feelings are not identical with the components we have been looking at.

This argument does not really hold up though. For we must remember that our components are <u>felt</u> components and <u>not</u> mere valuations, wants, etc. So if we are having a <u>felt</u> valuation (as is described above), then

it is every bit as much above public disconfirmation as are our full-blown emotional feelings. They are both feelings. Consequently, if we cannot be mistaken about our emotional feelings (and as we shall see shortly, this is not always the case), then our felt valuations must be above public disconfirmation for the same reasons.

(4) A different critic might turn the last one's position upside down. He might say that while the judgments we make about our felt bodily states, felt dispositions, felt wants, etc. are privately accessible only and therefore beyond public disconfirmation, psychoanalysis establishes that some emotional feeling judgments we make are not. And so the feeling components of 6^1 are not identical with emotional feelings. My reply to this argument involves our looking more closely at the psychoanalytic claim that emotional feeling judgments can be publicly overthrown. Do the situations where this occurs necessitate our concluding that all emotional feelings are publicly accessible and so, somehow, emotional feelings are different in kind from the privately accessible feeling components developed in parts (ii) and (iii)? I do not think so. But let me present some of my reasons for saying this.

One context where our sincere testimony that we feel x can turn out to be mistaken is where we make a sincere emotional feeling judgment on a particular occasion only to reflect later and say that we were wrong. "I thought I felt ashamed, but upon reflection I think that I really felt embarrassed." Here we are remembering our feelings and changing our judgment about how the feeling is to be most properly named. Unfortunately, though, while this is certainly a case where our testimony is shown not to be infallible, it is not on a par with the critic's objection. For one might argue that it is still the case that public evidence did not overthrow our

original judgment. We just seem to have remembered the original state of consciousness and renamed (rejudged) it. We presented our own privately accessible memory of the feeling. But certainly no one is denying that the same kind of memory trick could be done for the feeling components as well. Accordingly, this kind of situation does not establish a difference between emotional feelings and the feeling components.

Our best bet for showing how public evidence can sometimes overthrow an emotional feeling judgment seems to lie in a discussion of unconscious feelings. For the psychoanalytic theorist tells us that we might feel x without our being aware of any such thing and that we might not be feeling x even though we believe quite the contrary. So if such unconscious emotional feelings exist, and if the psychoanalyst can in principle point out their occurrence to us, then we cannot really claim always to have a privileged access to our emotional feelings--i.e., at least some emotional feeling judgments can be overthrown by public evidence. And so again, emotional feelings are not identical with feeling components in 6^1. There are many faces to the notion of unconscious feelings however. And depending upon which kind we are talking about, it seems more or less plausible to speak of feelings as being publicly accessible.

(i) What comes to mind first when one starts to wonder about unconscious feelings is that they must be kinds of things that we are not consciously aware of (i.e., they are unconscious). What comes to mind next is that these "things" which we are talking about are typically taken by all to be occurrent states of mind--where "occurrent states of mind" is usually taken to be interchangeable with "conscious states of mind." And accordingly, it seems that talk of unconscious feelings on this view must involve, from the beginning, some self-contradiction. For what does it mean

to talk about occurrent conscious states of which we are not conscious in any way? Certainly such a view of unconscious feelings would have to entail this confusion. Since this is so, we will not take such a view too seriously. However, there is at least one Freudian notion of unconscious feelings which by-passes this contradiction.[1] So let us look at it now.

(ii) This view is somewhat similar to the kind we looked at on pp. 87-88. For it is the kind we are concerned with in situations where we admit that we have had an emotional feeling but that we have misnamed it. However, this situation differs from the other one in that instead of our finding the mistake out on the basis of our memory of the feeling, we find it out on the basis of public evidence that the psychoanalyst puts forward. For example, Jones may think that he felt happy last weekend. But his analyst then shows him--via Jones' associations (which arise at the mere mention of last weekend) of some felt simple dispositions, some felt wants, some felt valuations, some felt evaluations, and some describable sensations which are appropriate to the feeling of annoyance--that he really felt annoyed. Jones, for one reason or another, had misnamed his feelings. The inference from his felt components to his full-blown emotional feelings was incorrectly made. On the basis of the noncognitive conscious state he was in, he mistakenly inferred the belief that he was happy instead of annoyed.[2] What the analyst is doing is challenging Jones' belief that his feeling was one that should be named "happiness" rather than "annoyance." We can say here that in a sense Jones' real feelings were

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[1] S. Freud, "Unconscious Emotions," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIV, trans. J. Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), p. 178.

[2] Freud's jargon has it here that Jones was consciously aware of the affective content of the emotional feeling, but misnamed it by mistaking the ideational content of the feeling.

unconscious to him. And this seems to be one reasonable rendering of "unconscious feelings." For we still admit that Jones is having some conscious feeling state or other when he says he is feeling happy. The only difficulty he is having is naming it. Nevertheless, the unconscious feeling is one which the possessor claims not to have, but which can be shown to be otherwise. Consequently, here is one situation where feeling judgments are not beyond public scrutiny.

But instead of this fact's putting a damper on our proposed component analysis of emotional feelings (for here is a sense where emotional feelings are public while feeling components are not), we can point out to the contrary just how our component analysis nicely explains this public aspect of feelings. For if feelings are "noncognitive conscious states by virtue of which we believe...," it is always possible that one could have a privately accessible noncognitive conscious state that leads one to an improper publicly accessible belief. (I say "publicly accessible belief" because I am assuming a dispositional analysis of the concept of belief.) So Jones may have had the noncognitive conscious state that typically is the basis for believing that he is annoyed, but which, for one psychological reason or another, he instead took on this occasion as the basis for believing that he is happy. The misnaming of feelings arises from the mistaken belief element involved in feelings. And since the belief element can be shown to be wrong by public evidence, a fortiori the feeling judgment is public accessible.

It should also be noticed about this unconscious feeling situation that I am not saying that we can show by behavioral evidence a person's emotional feeling claim to be false. Only sincere reports of felt components ("reports" being a kind of public evidence) count as evidence to

overthrow emotional feeling claims here (and thereby establish the "existence" of unconscious feelings). If the felt components that Jones reported had been appropriate for the kind of emotional feeling he reported, then no amount of other external evidence could have overthrown his emotional feeling claim here. If we pointed out that he was behaving in a way unlike the way he should have been behaving given his claimed feelings, this does not establish that he was not feeling in the way he believed he was feeling. What the inconsistent behavior shows, rather, is that his emotional feelings were simply out of whack with his behavior. (This is indeed a strange phenomenon!) And so the critic's claim that emotional feelings are different from the components of 6^1 because while the latter may be beyond public disconfirmation the former are not is seen to be false. Some feeling judgments can be overthrown. But what is needed for these cases is the person's sincere testimony about his felt components. In other words, the only cases where emotional feeling judgments can be overthrown are where we already accept the position that emotional feelings are complexes of the felt components of 6^1. To debunk 6^1, one would have to show that an emotional feeling report was, through public nonconscious state evidence, inconsistent with a feeling component report. He cannot though.

This will conclude my treatment of some possible objections to the component analysis of emotional feelings I have developed here. What I have tried to do in this chapter is lay a foundation for talking about emotional feelings. And because we now see just how we are justified in talking about emotional feeling "components," we can now speak more sensibly about emotional feelings as having definite kinds of "feelable" aspects. Specifically, when a person has an emotional feeling, he is feeling (i.e.,

he is in a complex noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which he believes with a high degree of warrant that he has) certain nonconscious state components--"feelable" aspects--of his emotional state, where these noncognitive states include characteristic felt wants, felt valuations, felt bodily states, etc. This is how we are to understand emotional feeling concepts.

Chapter III

EMPATHIC 'FEELINGS'

We now know what the components of emotional feelings are and what their relationship is to the components of emotional states. But let us recall what the overriding purpose for attempting an analysis of the concept of emotional feelings was. Reviewing, we saw in Chapter I that empathic 'feelings' are conscious states whereby the empathizer thinks hypothetically and "all at once" about his knowledge of the other person's feelings (i.e., about his knowledge of the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings). Moreover, we saw that the empathizer's 'feelings' often arise out of at least one of four knowledge contexts (e.g., EM^1 'feeling' context, EM^2 'feeling' context, etc.), where each of these knowledge contexts sets the basis for the empathizer's knowledge about the other person's feelings and thus the basis for the content of the empathizer's empathic 'feelings'. With all of this in mind, I said at the end of Chapter I that we could give a still more complete analysis of empathic 'feelings'. For we really could say more about the content of the empathic 'feelings' themselves--i.e., what precisely are the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings that the empathizer, in the context of one of the four kinds of knowledge situation, thinks about hypothetically and "all at once"? And what warrants the empathizer's inference to them? It was toward answering these questions that I embarked upon my analysis of the concept of emotional feelings. I thought that before we could talk about the "feelable" aspects of feelings that are

empathically thought about we needed to have some analysis of what emotional feelings are comprised of in general and how they could be discussed with some precision. Since I have offered such an analysis, then, I am ready now to talk about the "feelable" aspects of the empathic 'feelings' that arise in each of the four knowledge contexts considered in Chapter I.

(i)

(1) One of the empathy contexts discussed in Chapter I has it that

> A's EM^1 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his knowledge of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative ignorance of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his ignorance of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

In this kind of 'feeling' context, it is appropriate for A to claim to know the general kind of feeling of B and no more. For A's only information about B's feeling is testimony of the mere fact that B has some specific kind-name of feeling (e.g., "remorse," "sad," "ecstatic"). And so A does not have very much evidence for imagining very precisely what B's feelings are like. For he has no knowledge of B's individual active dispositions, bodily states, etc. However, the testimony that B has some specifically named kind of feeling is a source of some knowledge for A about B's feelings. A may infer, on the basis of his bare testimonial knowledge that B feels Q and on his understanding of the general components of the concept of "feeling Q," that B has certain general kinds of active dispositions, evaluations, etc. of which he (B) is immediately aware. If B, for example, is said to feel angry, then A can perhaps justifiably infer via the concept of being angry and A's testimonial knowledge

that B feels angry that: there is some object or other x which B highly values to some unspecified degree; B has the evaluative belief that the security of x has been threatened in some way or other; B wants in some way or other to strike out, either directly or symbolically, at the cause of the threat; and perhaps, B is having bodily state reactions within certain specifiable ranges.

Given such information, there seem to be two possibilities A has for imagining B's feelings.

(a) It may be that it is psychologically possible for A to imagine (i.e., to think hypothetically and "all at once") the complex noncognitive conscious state that would be warrant for the belief that he was in the general emotional state. A may be able to imagine, for example, the complex noncognitive conscious state that would warrant the belief (by him) that he was in the state of anger (had he actually been in the state of anger) constituted by the active dispositions of valuing to some degree or other some object x or other, etc. Of course this sounds implausible to the extent that it is difficult to see what could be meant by imagining noncognitive conscious states that would warrant beliefs about <u>some objects or other</u>, that would warrant valuing these unspecified objects to <u>some degree or other</u>, etc. However, this may just be a difficulty with some people's imaginations. I do not see any logical considerations that rule out the possibility of such imaginings. Indeed, in the realm of our regular (i.e., nonempathic) emotional feelings, we talk of feelings with such a "nonspecific" character. For psychologists speak of "free floating" emotional feelings. And so if "free floating" <u>feelings</u> can be allowed, then one would think that <u>imagined</u> ones would be too.

(b) An alternative to (a) would be to say that given A's knowledge,

A recalls a particular feeling that he has actually had of the same genus name as B's but also with active disposition components, bodily state components, etc. of exacting detail. A further admits that his particular 'feeling' with its detailed hypothetical active dispositions, etc. is probably not precisely what B's feeling is like. (For it is about a feeling he has had and thus about specific active dispositions that he has had--not necessarily specifically what the other person is having though.) And finally, A says that his 'feeling' has the same general characteristics as B's to the extent that he (A) is thinking hypothetically about a complex noncognitive conscious state which would warrant the belief (by him) that he is in a particular active emotional state that is generically similar to B's, where "generically similar" is taken to be understood by everyone.

It seems, then, that in giving an analysis of the "feelable" contents of the empathizer's 'feelings' in the EM^1 context, one could reasonably appeal to either (a) or (b).

(2) Looking at the second kind of empathy context, one recalls that

> A's EM^2 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his knowledge of genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative knowledge of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his ignorance of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

Besides having testimonial knowledge of the general kind of feeling B has, A now has the added knowledge about B's psychological history. A may know facts like: in the past, whenever B has felt sad, he has felt extremely sad to the extent where he would be actively disposed to do e, f, g, and some other specifiable things. Given such psychological generalizations

that can be made about B and about which A has knowledge, EM^2 'feelings' are all the closer to being like B's actual feelings. In empathizing, A simply thinks hypothetically and "all at once" about the complex noncognitive conscious state which would warrant the belief that he was actively disposed to do e, f, g, etc. were he actually to be in that active disposition state. Moreover, if A collects psychological background material which tells him about some unusual conditions which affect B's immediate awarenesses of his emotional state--e.g., if A knows that whenever B has active dispositions x_1, ..., x_{15}, he is in a noncognitive conscious state which warrants his belief that he is in active disposition state x_1 only due to unusual psychological factors y_1, y_2, ...--then A will have further knowledge that will make the accuracy of his inferences about the "feelable" aspects of the feeling state B is in at any particular time all the more probable. Consequently, A's empathically imagined feelings have the opportunity of being that much more accurate.

(3) I want to get to the more interesting kinds of empathy contexts --viz., EM^3 and EM^4 'feelings'. However, before I do this, there is something more I must say about the relationship between emotional feelings and emotional states. I must make clear something which I will call the Principel of Emotional Feelings--or just PEF. The principle is an empirical one which, in its barest form states that

PEF': Whenever any S (a human being) is E(some emotion predicate), S feels E

Incorporating our component analysis of feelings into this principle requires a minor reformulation though. For example, if Smith were in the emotional state of anger such that he was actively evaluating that Jones had impugned his reputation, he was actively disposed to highly valuing his reputation, he was actively disposed to wanting to strike out at Jones,

and he was undergoing certain bodily (physical state) changes, then it would be expected that Smith also be in a feeling state such that he was immediately aware of these active dispositions, bodily states, and evaluations. In other words, it would be expected that he felt angry. We reformulate our principle accordingly:

PEF": Whenever any S (a human being) is E (some emotion predicate determined by a complex of active dispositions e_1, ..., e_n, bodily states, and evaluations), S feels E (where the E feeling is a complex of felt E-like active dispositions, bodily states, and evaluations)

PEF", however, needs amending too. For as one of the psychoanalytic cases cited in Chapter II indicated, there are some unusual situations where one is E without feeling E. These are situations where one is unconsciously E because one is not immediately aware that one is E, and are explained by showing that there are unusual psychological conditions at work. For example, it might be explained that Smith does not <u>feel</u> angry while he <u>is</u> angry because he has excessive guilt reactions towards a conscious knowledge of being angry with Jones. And so to avoid the excessive guilt reactions, which might be manifested in the form of free floating feelings of anxiety, Smith has no felt awarenesses of his anger state. Since excessive guilt reactions would certainly be classified by psychologists as unusual psychological conditions existing in Smith's personality, then we exclude these odd feeling contexts by amending our principle:

PEF"': Whenever S is E (where E is some emotion predicate determined by a complex of active dispositions...), then, under normal psychological conditions, S feels E...

What exactly constitutes "normal psychological conditions" we will leave to the psychologists to determine.

There is still one more reformulation which needs to be made. On Alston's analysis of feelings, our principle becomes,

PEF: Whenever S is E (where E is some emotion predicate determined by a complex of active dispositions e_1, ..., e_n, bodily states, and evaluations), then, under normal psychological conditions, S is in a complex noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which he believes with a high degree of warrant that he is E

Given this version of the Principle, I can proceed now to talk about EM^3 'feelings'.

Let us first recall that

> A's EM^3 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his initial ignorance of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative ignorance of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his knowledge of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

It is a knowledge of these standing--i.e., active--behavioral and psychological elements that best tells us just what the precise "feelable" contents of B's present feelings are. For, in general, it can be said that knowledge of these kinds of active psychological (dispositional) states along with PEF go a long way toward giving the empathizer a knowledge of the detailed aspects of the other person's feelings. Let me be more specific though.

Knowledge about the standing psychological elements of another's feelings is gathered through public observation of pieces of behavior which, in turn, lead one to make inferences about the active dispositions the other person has. That is to say, because certain pieces of behavior are sometimes taken to be antecedent or consequent conditions of certain active dispositions, then when one observes these pieces of behavior, one is justified in concluding that one knows that the other person is actively disposed in certain ways. How these observations about pieces of behavior really count as a basis for knowledge about active dispositions is certainly

an interesting question. However, we will be content to simply point out that such observations do count as such a basis from time to time. Imagine, for example, we are back with Sims, who has been notified of the loss of his 1937 penny collection. Observing Sims, we see that he is pacing the floor, with eyes and neck drooping and seemingly glued to the plane of the floor. The sides of his mouth also seem to be disposed at a downward slant. His speech is unusually slow and stays at a monotoned low pitch and intensity. Similarly for the pace of his walk. These, as well as many more subtle ways of carrying himself may all be part of what can be called "sadness behavior." And we take such pieces of behavior to be consequent conditions of activated dispositions. (Again, we are not concerned with what gives us warrant for taking this behavior to be evidence for active dispositions). Moreover, these active dispositions are taken to be part of the state of "being sad."[1] And so one's knowledge of such active dispositions of another person would be some warrant for one's believing that the other person was in a state of sadness. And by PEF, one would be warranted in believing that the other person feels sad--that the other person had a felt awareness of his sadness-like active dispositions.

But the above kinds of behavior only give one a partial knowledge of Sims' active dispositions and thus of Sims' feelings. For what we described above are only what we deemed in Chapter II to be simple active dispositions. They are simple, that is, to the extent that they are activated dispositions which are not part of some active disposition type, such as active wants, valuations, etc. (These simple active dispositions

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[1]For a thoroughly clinical approach to the role of subtle behavior in empathy, see Truax and Carkhuff, op. cit., Chapters 10, 11, and 12.

seem to be what psychologists have in mind when they speak of empathic 'feelings' arising from the empathizer's knowledge of subtle behavioral cues manifested by the other person.) In order to increase one's knowledge of Sims' feelings, an empathizer would also want to have knowledge of Sims' active wants, active valuations, etc. For example, Sims may very much actively want his penny collection returned. He may very much actively value his penny collection. So if one of the conditionals describing the valuing of the penny collection is "If part of the collection were lost, then a large reward would be posted for its return," then it might happen that Sims now is actively disposed to posting a large reward. And consequently, Sims is actively valuing his penny collection. Finally, Sims may actively evaluate that his penny collection has met with foul play. He may see the situation as one where an unfortunate happening has befallen him. Again, we can look to what he says and does to determine this. He may actually say, for example, "What an unfortunate happening has just befallen me."

Of course if the empathizer is not too familiar with Sims, then the empathizer probably lacks some knowledge about Sims' dispositions (dispositional properties). He lacks some knowledge about what kinds of active dispositions certain pieces of behavior are indicative of. So he will not know when the antecedent conditions of these active dispositions have been met. In such a situation, the empathizer must appeal to the fact that certain actions are typically the consequent conditions of particular wants, valuations, etc.[1] For example, though an empathizing stranger may

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[1]A clear example of this would be the following: If A sees B trying to blow up C's car, trying to set C's house afire, and trying to poison C's coffee, then this is good warrant for A's believing that B wants to bring harm to C--even if A does not know B very well.

not know what disposition (dispositional property) the piece of behavior "offering a large reward" is the consequent condition of, it is a fact that typically such actions are consequent conditions of dispositions the statement of which is part of the concept of "valuing highly the object of the reward." So we do have some means of determining what another person's active wants, valuations, etc. are. And to the extent that we have these means, we can collect information that tells us about the complex disposition state another person is in when he is in an emotional state. Moreover, all of this kind of knowledge, along with PEF, allows one to know how the other person feels emotionally. And so with this knowledge the empathizer can empathically imagine the "feelable" aspects of the other's feelings. The empathizer merely thinks hypothetically and "all at once"about the complex noncognitive conscious state that would warrant the belief that he has active dispositions which he knows make up the emotional state of the other person.

(4) It sometimes happens that when a person gets skillful in picking out the precise nature of dispositional emotion states, he also finds himself with a facility to make predictions about the other's feelings, wants, and other psychological states. Again, the empathic 'feelings' which arise in this kind of context are defined in the following way:

> A's EM^4 empathic 'feelings' are the same kind as B's feelings at t only if, in the context of empathizing, (a) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his initial ignorance of the genus characteristics of B's feelings at t, (b) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative knowledge of B's psychological background material at t, and (c) A's empathic 'feelings' arise in the context of his relative knowledge of B's standing behavior, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. at t.

Here A gathers the same information that we saw in (3). However, since in this context he brings more psychological information to the situation,

A's knowledge of B's feelings will be greatly increased. There are different kinds of psychological background materials that are relevant here. First there is the kind of psychological background material which gives one information about how certain pieces of overt behavior are causally related to covert active dispositions. It may be, for example, that a nod of B's head in a certain manner is good evidence for A's believing that B has some active disposition Q, the consequent condition of which, due to the appearance of "noncrucial" countervailing forces, will never be realized. And so, unless one knew that the nod of B's head indicated the presence of active disposition Q, one might observe B without ever suspecting that B was actively disposed in this particular way. For example, a nod of B's head may indicate (though it is not actually specified anywhere in the concept) that B deeply wants C to leave the room. This "want," however, might never be manifested in any obvious way, due to the presence of "noncrucial" countervailing forces which override most of the active dispositions which are part of the concept of this "want"--e.g., B may just have an overriding disposition of not wanting to hurt C's feelings. And so, if A has knowledge of some background generalization about B's covert active dispositions to the effect that "whenever B nods his head in an x-like manner, B actively wants y," A knows all the more about B's emotional state when A sees B nod his head--and, mutatis mutandis (given PEF), about B's emotional feelings.

But there is a more important sense in which psychological background generalizations are involved in the EM^4 context. For we have said that in the EM^4 context, the empathizer's EM^4 'feelings' arise in the context of his being able to make predictions, based upon these 'feelings', about the other person's future feelings, wants, valuations, and so on.

And in order to make these predictions, the empathizer must have some knowledge (though it is probably not a conscious knowledge) of causal relations existing between the other person's feelings and wants, valuations, etc. But now how does the empathizer in this context come by these causal generalizations? Well, when the empathizer collects information about the other person's standing wants, beliefs, etc., we have seen that this puts him in a position to know what the other is feeling and thus in a position to 'feel' the other's feelings. But now what if the empathizer in collecting this data also started formulating (though preconsciously) causal generalizations about the relations between the standing wants, etc. Suppose, for example, he noticed that evaluative belief of type x_1 together with valuation of type y_1 causally resulted in want of type z_1.[1] (Sims' belief that his penny collection was stolen together with his high valuation of it, for example, may be said to be causally related to his resultant desire to cry.) If the empathizer notices this sort of thing, then certainly he is not only in a position to know what the other person's feelings are like (viz., that feeling constituted by felt want z_1, felt valuation y_1, etc.), but he is also in a position to believe that whenever similar beliefs and valuations arise in future situations, then so will similar wants. Since these preconscious generalizations seem to be formulated here in the context of the empathizer's having EM^4 'feelings' and since it seems to be that the predictions based upon these generalizations are not made until one has the EM^4 'feelings', then we say that the 'feelings' are the bases for the predictions. How this is to be understood, I will discuss in Chapter V. The important point to be made

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[1] I am assuming here that the generalizations are accurate. I will not worry about the problem of how this is so.

here is that EM[4] 'feelings' require knowledge of some psychological background generalizations, where some of these generalizations are actually based upon the empathizer's knowledge of the other person's standing wants, evaluations, valuations, etc. and their causal interactions.

(ii)

I think that what I have said so far goes a long way toward answering the question with which this chapter started. For certainly I have shown how we can talk about the "feelable" aspects of the other person's feelings as they arise in the various empathy contexts. I have shown what the empathizer's grounds are for accurately imagining what the other person feels in at least four empathy contexts. However, I have just spoken of some of the components of the other person's feelings that an empathizer wants to be thinking hypothetically and "all at once" about when he empathizes with the other person. I have not said much, though, of how the empathizer is to think hypothetically and "all at once" of the feeling characteristics that we said (in Chapter I) are captured by the empathic 'feelings'. What feeling knowledge does the empathizer have to think hypothetically and "all at once" about when he imagines the intensity, controllability, and behavior determinantness of the other person's feelings? Certainly if the empathizer is to 'feel' the other's feelings accurately, he must have knowledge of these "feelable" characteristics as well as knowledge of the "feelable" aspects manifested by the felt wants, etc. of the other person. Accordingly, I propose the following as a general analysis of the kind of knowledge that is required here for the empathizer.

(1) What kind of knowledge of feelings is required for imagining the

intensity of another person's feelings? It is clear that when one's emotional feelings change in intensity, something happens to one's noncognitive conscious states. One way of explaining this is to say simply that there is an intensity phenomenal quality of these noncognitive conscious states which changes and that is all that is meant by "feelings changing in intensity." If we make this move however, we run into questions about private "intensity" languages. It is not clear that these notorious questions (e.g., Wittgenstein's) cannot be answered. However, as this is not a major concern of ours here, and because looking at feeling intensity in this way does not leave us with much we can ever say about feelings, we will dispense here with discussing "feelings changing in intensity" in this manner.

Another more profitable way of discussing "feelings changing in intensity" makes use of the public element of our component analysis of the concept of emotional feelings and so eliminates the private language difficulties. Our position is that noncognitive conscious states that are feelings change in intensity to the extent that they become noncognitive conscious states by virtue of which one has a highly warranted belief that: (i) one is more (or less, depending upon the direction of the intensity change) actively disposed to do certain things than one was before the feelings were said to have intensified and (ii) certain of one's bodily states have changed in intensity. The fact that anyone can determine the change in intensity of these elements (i and ii) allows us to say more public things about "feelings changing in intensity" than we could with the first position. Given this general analysis of "feelings changing in intensity," let us now look at some of the details of it.

(i) Active dispositions. To discover the conceptual relevance of

active disposition intensity for emotional feeling intensity, one need only look at some examples of what happens to emotional feeling intensities when the intensities of the active disposition components of one's emotional state change. Imagine, for example, what happens when one's fear-like active dispositions decrease in intensity. One may no longer actively want as much to run away from the object of his fear, one may no longer want as much to plot the extinction of the object, one may no longer have all of the previous evaluations about how the object was a threat to one's well-being, etc. In short, one's emotional state is far less intense than it was before. And clearly this phenomenon affects feeling intensities. For as the Chapter II analysis of the concept of emotional feelings suggests, the way in which we can talk about our feelings depends upon the kinds of beliefs about emotional state components that our noncognitive feeling states are bases for. So if some components of our emotional state intensify and we believe this on the basis of the noncognitive conscious state we are in, then the noncognitive conscious state basis for this belief, by our definition of feelings, must also be said to intensify (assuming no unusual psychological conditions have taken hold). Our concept of "feeling intensity" is such that the noncognitive conscious states to which we ascribe emotional feeling intensities draw their ascriptions from the active disposition intensity ascriptions.

Of course there is the ticklish problem of how one actually determines active disposition intensities. And to the extent that I will not try to "solve" this problem, I will not be able to give a recipe for gathering the knowledge required for deciding upon the intensity of emotional feelings either. I will be content simply to say that we do in fact have public ways of deciding which active disposition intensities

people seem to have and so we have public ways of deciding which emotional feeling intensities they have also. For example, if Sims were to have only (a) the active desire (want) to phone a friend to tell him of the victory the Mets have won and (b) the active evaluative belief that this is a good thing, then we would probably say of him that he was midly joyful over the victory--not tremendously excited though. If, on the other hand, Sims were to suddenly have (a), (b), and an active want to hop on a plane for New York to share the moment of victory with the home town fans, and an active want to jump up and down, and so on, then we would probably say of him that he was extremeley (more intensely) excited than he was in the first situation. So we do have ways of deciding on active disposition intensity. (There are certainly other ways.) Likewise then, we do have ways of deciding on emotional feeling intensity. Moreover, we can now see how an empathizer might reasonably claim to be able to imagine just what the other person's emotional feeling intensity is like.

(ii) Bodily states. We have seen in Chapter II that the concept of bodily sensations is part of the concept of emotional feelings. Certainly it seems just as clear that intensity of sensations contributes to one's determination of intensity of emotional feelings. When a mild feeling of being upset with one's brother, for example, changes to a feeling of intense hostility towards him, the change in intensity here is at least in part a change in bodily sensations. For whereas in the more intense context there may be sensations of a felt rapid pounding in the chest, a felt tightness in the temples, a felt tensing of muscles in the arms, shoulders, and face, a sudden felt coldness throughout the body, and so on, in the former more subdued context, the sensations are far less intense--e.g., the felt pounding is, rather, a felt steady beat and there

are no sensations of a tightness, tensing, or coldness at all.

Sensations, on our Chapter II analysis, were seen to be immediate awarenesses of different kinds of bodily states. So we can know what another person's sensations are really like. For if we know the bodily states one has beliefs (based upon one's noncognitive conscious state) about, then we know how to talk about one's felt bodily states (i.e., one's sensations) too.[1] For example, we may observe Jones' red face and legitimately conclude that he has a flushed feeling--that he is in a noncognitive conscious state by virtue of which he believes that his face is in the physical state of being flushed.

Now we can say something about sensation intensity and emotional feeling intensity. Intensity in emotional feelings seems to be partially decided by the increase or decrease in the <u>different kinds of sensations</u> that are present in the emotional state. Thus we sometimes know about an increase in emotional feeling intensity by noting that the other person has sensations which he did not have before--as is seen in our example about the feelings of mild upset and hostility. However, "different kinds of sensations" is not the only way one decides on what is meant when one speaks of an increase or decrease in emotional feeling intensity in this sensation context. For one often speaks of emotional feelings intensifying if the <u>kinds</u> of component sensations remain the same, but those same sensations get more intense. And here it is far more difficult for an

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[1]Of course there are cases (indeed, most cases) where we do not know the beliefs another person has about his bodily states. These are sensations which have no obvious overt manifestations. Here we must base our knowledge of them on what the other person tells us (he may report a sinking sensation). But there are even worse problems than this. For a more complete summary of the difficulties involved in an analysis of sensations, see Carl Ginet's "How Words Mean Kinds of Sensations," <u>Philosophical Review</u>, LXXVII (1968).

observer to gain knowledge of the intensification of sensations. Of course there are easy cases--e.g., the redder my face naturally becomes, the more intense my flushed feeling gets. This redness is an indicator that more blood is rushing to my head. (And it is reasonable to suppose that I believe that more blood is rushing to my head.) However, where there are no obvious overt indicators of the physical state one is in, then it is hard (it is impossible) to tell just what another person has in mind when he speaks of a given kind of sensation increasing in intensity. And indeed, this is where communcation about sensation intensity cuts off.

Given that one can have some knowledge of the intensities of another's felt active dispositions and sensations, one can have a knowledge of another's emotional feeling intensity. And in the sense that an empathizer can have this knowledge and he can use this knowledge to think hypothetically and "all at once" about what the intensity of the other person's sensations is like, the empathizer's empathic 'feelings' can capture the same intensity as the other person's garden variety feelings.

(2) In Chapter I, we introduced the notion of controllability of emotional feelings. A person's feelings were defined to be "uncontrollable" when no mere act of will can be the immediate cause of their "coming on" or of their "going away." What we will do now is see how we can understand in terms of our component analysis of feelings how empathic 'feelings' capture this quality of the other person's feelings.

(i) We start by looking at feelings as being uncontrollable in that they usually do not "come upon" us as an immediate result of some act of will. A person's uncontrollable feelings come upon him partly because he has certain dispositions which have become activated. He does not

explicitly will the antecedent conditions of the dispositions to be actualized. So if part of the concept of "feeling overjoyed about the victory" were to include a disposition expressed in the subjunctive conditional "If I were merely to hear about the game, I would jump up and down," and if I sometimes find myself actively disposed to jumping up and down as a result of the above antecedent condition being actualized, then typically the antecedent condition--and, mutatis mutandis, the active disposition--would have come about as an immediate result of someone else's independent activity; but not as an immediate result of any willful action on my part.[1] Moreover then, since emotional feelings are immediate awarenesses of the active dispositions which are components of the emotional state, then emotional feelings too do not result from any willful action on my part. And the reason why this is so is precisely because we do not have full-blown emotional feelings before we have active dispositions of which we can be immediately aware. The overjoyed feeling which depends upon the activation of the above disposition does not occur because I decide to have a feeling of being overjoyed. Rather, it occurs because we have had an uncontrollable active disposition of which we have become immediately aware. Hence, if one has knowledge of the controllability of another person's active emotional dispositions (and this is public knowledge), then one also has knowledge about the controllability of the other person's feelings. Furthermore, then, when one thinks hypothetically about such knowledge while empathizing, one is having empathic 'feelings' which capture

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[1] I am not saying that they can't. Certainly one of the subjunctive conditionals describing my "feeling overjoyed about the victory" could very well be "if I think about the game, I will shout out loud." And certainly I can decide that I will activate this disposition by thinking about the game. Here it is clear that our active disposition results indirectly from an act of will on our part. My point, however, is just that most active dispositions don't come about in this way.

the controllability of the other person's feelings.

(ii) Some kinds of feelings are uncontrollable in that they cannot "leave" consciousness by a mere act of will--they cannot be wished away. Of course one might rid oneself of these kinds of feelings by putting oneself in such a position that one's feelings will then go away. We may wish no longer to feel woe, for example, and so use our knowledge that "clowns make us feel happy" to go to a circus where there are clowns and thereby dissipate our feelings of sadness. But a mere wish cannot be the immediate cause of the dissipation of such feelings. A case in point is where Jones feels extreme embarrassment over having made an obviously false statement at a public forum. One of the characteristics of Jones' feeling is that it cannot go away by his willing it to. Trying to console him, everyone tells him not to be embarrassed. But nothing seems to work. Let us take our component analysis of feelings and see what is going on in such a situation.

Jones' feelings of embarrassment do not go away readily, because his active dispositions do not go away readily. Imagine, for example, that part of the concept of "feeling embarrassed about having made an obviously false statement at a public forum" is "having a felt disposition to hide one's head (as some sort of symbolic act of self-destruction), having a felt evaluation that people think poorly of one's intellect, having a felt valuation of the opinion of others with regard to one's intellect, having a felt want for others to think well of one's intellect, having a felt want to somehow make up for one's mistake," as well as many, many more felt disposition components. If this is so, then on our analysis, we will say that Jones' feelings of embarrassment do not go away readily because his states of being actively disposed to hide his head,

of having the active evaluation that people think poorly of Jones' intellect, etc. do not readily go away either. Our reason for saying this is that one has uncontrollable emotional feelings only to the extent that one has uncontrollable noncognitive conscious states by virtue of which one believes with warrant that one is in a particular complex active disposition emotional state. And we have already seen that one does not normally have noncognitive conscious states by virtue of which...unless one also in fact is in the complex active disposition state that helps comprise the emotional state. Accordingly, the only way for one to have one's emotional feelings dissipate is for one to have one's complex of active dispositions (that comprise the emotional state) dissipate. If there were no longer any active dispositions to be immediately aware of, then, under normal circumstances, there would no longer be any immediate awareness conscious states either.

It follows then that if we could have knowledge of the controllability of the other person's active dispositions, then we would have knowledge of the controllability of his feelings. And indeed, the empathizer can in principle collect data for such knowledge. For the empathizer is capable of learning what the relevant disposition components for the emotional state the other person is in are. Obviously this is no easy task; but it is possible. In knowing the relevant dispositions, the empathizer knows that certain antecedent conditions result in certain consequent conditions, barring any intervention by certain countervailing forces. With such knowledge, the empathizer is in a position to know when a person is no longer actively disposed in a particular direction --viz., to know when the antecedent conditions no longer hold. The empathizer is also in a position to know what the obstacles are for that

person's getting out of the active disposition state he is in--viz., to know what the other conditions are which sustain the antecedent conditions. Given such knowledge, he also knows when a person will no longer feel a certain way and what the obstacles are for that person's getting out of the emotional feeling state he is in. For example, the empathizer can have knowledge of Jones' embarrassment dispositions:

a: If Jones were to think about having made the obviously false statement, then Jones would hide his head, barring countervailing forces x, y, and z
b: If one were to mention the incident to Jones, he would immediately begin apologizing for his having spoken when he did

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etc.

With such knowledge, the empathizer knows that Jones' feelings will dissipate when the antecedent conditions of the above are no longer actualized; for only then will the active dispositions (and, mutatis mutandis, the emotional feelings) dissipate. The fact that the empathizer also knows about the obstacles that stand in the way of Jones' getting rid of the above antecedent conditions--e.g., the empathizer knows that

a: Jones is compulsive and cannot help but think about having made the obviously false statement
b: Jones is in the presence of some unkind peers who will not stop insisting that Jones uttered a false statement

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etc.--

gives the empathizer knowledge about the controllability of Jones' active dispositions and, mutatis mutandis, gives the empathizer knowledge about the controllability of Jones' feelings. Moreover, if the empathizer thinks hypothetically about this feeling knowledge, then he will have

empathic 'feelings' which capture the controllability characteristic of Jones' feelings.

(3) Finally, let us see what warrants the empathizer's confidence that his 'feelings' capture the behavior determinantness of the other person's feelings. First let us recall that feelings are to be thought of as behavior determinants to the extent that feelings cause behavior. Jones' feelings of embarrassment, for example, are behavior determinants to the extent that they seem to influence many of his actions--e.g., they cause him to hide his head, they seem to push him to apologizing to those in whose presence he became embarrassed, and so on. Jones' feelings of anger are behavior determinants to the extent that they seemingly "push" him (phenomenologically speaking) to strike out at the object of his anger.

Our account of "feelings as behavior determinants" follows, as in (1) and (2), from our component analysis of emotional feelings. The account starts to unfold when we first notice that pieces of the behavior which seemingly are caused by our feelings are precisely the consequent conditions of some active dispositions that we are feeling in emotional feeling situations. When Jones was feeling embarrassed, the hiding of his head was the consequent condition of some activated disposition, the felt disposition of which was part of the complex feeling of embarrassment. Jones' apology to those in whose presence he became embarrassed was the consequent condition of some activated disposition, the felt disposition of which was part of the complex feeling of embarrassment. Similarly, Jones' striking out at the object of his anger was the consequent condition of some activated disposition, the felt disposition of which was part of the complex feeling of anger. Pieces of behavior that are

supposedly caused by feelings are quite explainable, then, in terms of our component analysis of feelings. Of course we should point out that while the pieces of behavior caused by feelings are the consequent conditions of the relevant activated dispositions, this is not to say that all the relevant activated dispositions give rise to the actualization of their consequent conditions. Indeed, there may be strong enough countervailing forces arising to prevent this.

Now part of the empathizer's job is to discern just how much of a behavioral determinant the other person's feelings are. This is done by seeing which active dispositions (that the other person has) are actually realized--by seeing just which consequent conditions of the other person's activated dispositions are being and will be actualized. This obviously involves a tremendously complex task of data collection on the part of the empathizer. For example, he must determine just what active dispositions the other person has, what the possible countervailing forces for their actualization are, and which countervailing forces are and are not functional when the other person is having his feelings. So if the empathizer discerns that Jones is actively disposed (and has the appropriate feeling state to go along with this) to striking out at the object of his anger, and he discerns that Jones will actualize this active disposition only if there is a guarantee that he will receive no punishment from anyone for this action (let us imagine, for the sake of discussion, that this is the only possible countervailing force for this active disposition), and he discerns that Jones has been given this guarantee, then the empathizer can confidently believe that Jones' angry feelings are behavioral determinants to the extent that they will be accompanied by Jones' striking out at the object of his anger. And to the extent that the empathizer

can confidently believe this, then if he thinks hypothetically about this characteristic as it appears in the other person's feelings, the empathizer's empathic 'feelings' can be said to capture the behavior determinantness of the other person's feelings.

And so we can see now what some of the more important "feelable" characteristics of the other person's feelings are which the empathizer must capture in his hypothetical and "all at once" empathic 'feelings'. This, accordingly, will bring us to the end of our discussion of empathic 'feelings'. Moreover, this completes the first part of our analysis of the concept of empathic understanding set forth in the Introduction. There are still two more conditions of "empathic understanding" left to be analyzed though. So we will go to this now.

Chapter IV

EMOTIONAL UNDERSTANDING

What I want to do now is see just how empathic 'feelings' lend to an emotional understanding of the other person and his feelings. In other words, we have to see how empathic 'feelings' could enable the disgruntled wife's husband mentioned in the Introduction to understand his wife and her emotional feelings and how empathic 'feelings' could enable the psychotherapist mentioned in the Introduction to better understand his patients. In order to do this though, it will be helpful if I set the discussion of empathic understanding in a broader context of other kinds of emotional understanding. For there are certain aspects of each of these other kinds of emotional understanding upon which I will draw in my discussion later of the more salient features of empathic understanding. But also, bringing out the character of some of the other kinds of empathic understanding can serve as a foil that emphasizes for us the unique aspects of empathic understanding as a kind of emotional understanding. Thus, in this chapter I will look at an assortment of nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding; then in Chapter V, I will look at related empathic kinds. Obviously it cannot reasonably be expected that I launch in this chapter a discussion of all the nuances of all the various senses of nonempathic "emotional understanding." That would take volumes. So I will be restricting myself to what I take to be relevant highlights of some of them. Moreover, I will restrict myself to cases of where one has an understanding specifically of the emotional feelings of another person, as is the case with

empathy (where one's empathic 'feelings' are said to lead somehow to an understanding of the other person and his feelings). I am making this point explicit because there certainly are cases of emotional understanding where one is not concerned with another's feelings but rather only with another's emotional behavior, or the other's emotional physical states (i.e., the physical states he is in when he is considered to be in an emotional state), etc.

Let me begin my discussion by saying that in talking about "emotional understanding," I will be adopting the position about "understanding" (whether emotional or otherwise) that when we say of a person that he understands something, this is the same as to say that he has certain relevant capacities for doing certain things, where these capacities are described by certain subjunctive conditional statements and where the consequent conditions of these conditionals specify the ability to perform certain operations (as opposed to the actual performance of these operations (as would be the case if we were talking of the dispositions of Chapter II instead of capacities)).[1] So, for example, part of what it is for one to understand a particular work of art X may come down to one's capacity to critically appraise what one sees on the canvas. If one has such a capacity, that is, then the subjunctive conditional statement (or at least some such comparable subjunctive conditional statement) "If one were to look at painting X, then one would be able to give some sort of acceptable appraisal of what he was looking at" is true. To take another

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[1] My view in its most general form seems to be what Ryle has in mind when he characterizes "understanding" as a kind of "knowing how." See Ryle, op. cit., pp. 51-60 and p. 170.

For an interesting discussion of what seems to come down to the same thing as what I am calling "capacities," see Arnold Kaufman's discussion of "abilities" in his "Ability," The Journal of Philosophy, LX, no. 19 (September 12, 1963), 537-551.

example, when one understands the theory of relativity, it is highly likely that one has a capacity to work with the theory in some profitable way--e.g., one might have the capacity to integrate the statement of the theory in with other related hypotheses of physics, one might have the capacity to cite the theory when it can obviously help to explain some new collected data concerning the path of quanta of light through the ionosphere, etc. And so a subjunctive conditional such as "If one were asked to, one would be able to integrate the statement of theory in with other related hypotheses of physics" would probably be true of a person who understands here.

Moreover, just as we saw it appropriate to distinguish in Chapter II between having a disposition (dispositional property)--which can be true of a person even when the antecedent and consequent conditions of the disposition are not actualized--and having an active disposition, so will we now distinguish between a capacity a person has but which he is not actualizing and a capacity a person has that he is actualizing (activating). So, for example, I may have the capacity to explain the theory of relativity. However, if a situation calling for such an explanation does not arise, then in a sense I have a capacity (for I still would be able to give the explanation if the right circumstances were to arise) which is just not active. Whereas if the question about an explanation does arise, and I actually do what I am able to do--viz., give the correct explanation--then we will stipulate that my capacity to explain is active. Obviously the parallel with active dispositions is not exact. For while I can have an active disposition even when the consequent condition has not been actualized (only the antecedent conditions need be actualized for active dispositions), in the case of having an active

capacity, the consequent condition of the subjunctive conditional describing the capacity, by stipulation, must be actualized--actualized in the sense that I must actually do what I am able to do. And keeping this in mind, we will say that when the relevant capacity is active, one's understanding is active.[1]

Given this notion of "understanding," let us see now which kinds of "understanding" capacities are relevant to a discussion of "emotional understanding."

(1) "Understanding^1." Sometimes one's understanding of something boils down to one's having a capacity to recognize that something. So, for example, it is acceptable for me to say that, in one sense, I understand what a rick of straw is if I have the capacity to recognize one when I am confronted with it. And, it is legitimate for me to say that I understand what a golf match is if I have the capacity to recognize one when I happen to see one on the television. Accordingly, we will stipulate that

> S understands^1 x if, and only if, S has a capacity to recognize x

Moreover, it seems that to have such a capacity entails that one have the concept of what is understood--that one knows what a case of what is being understood is like. Of course, such knowledge is often inchoate. Nevertheless, it must be present if we are to make sense of "a capacity to recognize." So if I have the capacity to recognize Haiku poetry, I must already have the concept of what Haiku is--I must have knowledge

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[1]Certainly there is a sense in which we might say that as long as the antecedent conditions of the capacity conditional have been actualized, the capacity can be considered to be active--one is now able to do what is specified in the consequent condition. However, this is not what I am intending for "active capacity." I am requiring this and the fact that what is specified in the consequent condition is actualized.

(perhaps inchoately) of what a case of Haiku is like. In addition I must have the ability to apply this knowledge to cases. Such knowledge along with the ability to apply it in the appropriate circumstances constitute the conditions necessary for "the capacity to recognize." Finally, then, when one actually puts such knowledge to use--i.e., when one accurately applies the right concept--then, because one has an active capacity to recognize x, one will be said to actively understand[1] x. Let us now see how such an understanding can be of help to our concerns about some non-empathic kinds of emotional understanding.

There are at least two familiar situations where this notion of "understanding[1]" contributes to an analysis of "emotional understanding."

(a) As we have noted already in Chapters I and III, one sometimes has a knowledge of the genus characteristics of what another person feels --one sometimes has a knowledge of the general felt active dispositions which the other person has. We have seen that having such knowledge presupposes a knowledge of the kind (name) of emotional feeling that the other person is having together with the concept (i.e., a knowledge of the general kind of components) of that kind of emotional feeling. We can add to this now that one's having knowledge of general felt active dispositions, felt bodily states, etc. involves one's having the capacity to recognize that the general kind of emotional feeling which the other person is having is an instantiation of the kind of feeling that one's concept here is about. And when one uses one's capacity to accurately recognize another's feelings in this way, one is actively emotionally understanding[1] the other person (the other person's feelings). If S had the capacity to recognize Q feelings, then S would perhaps have the following subjunctive conditional true of him: "If W were to tell S that he

(W) was having Q feelings, then S would think that W was having felt active dispositions, felt bodily states, etc. of the general kind q_1, q_2, ..., q_n." Accordingly, if W honestly told S that he (W) was having Q feelings and if S actualized his capacity to recognize Q feelings, then S would be manifesting his understanding[1] of W's Q feelings. S would be actively understanding[1] W's general kind of feelings. We will say, then, that

> Emotional Understanding[1a]: S actively understands[1a] W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge of the generic felt active disposition components (as well as some knowledge of generic active evaluations and bodily states) of W's Q feelings
> (ii) S has some capacity R to recognize an instantiation of Q feelings as an instantiation of the generic felt active disposition components (etc.) of (i)
> (iii) R is actualized at t with respect to W's Q feelings

And so where Doaks, in Chapter I, said that he knew how (i.e., he understood the way) Sims felt when he (Doaks) was told that Sims felt sad, Doaks was actualizing his capacity to recognize the generic aspects of feelings of sadness in accord with these three conditions. Had condition (iii) not occurred, Doaks would have been entitled to say only that he had an understanding[1a] of Sims' feelings, albeit this understanding would not have been active.

(b) I have also noted in previous chapters how one sometimes has knowledge about the specific components of what another person is feeling--one sometimes has a knowledge of the specific standing felt active disposition states, etc. which the other person has. This knowledge may be based upon one's "direct" observations of the other person's active dispositions, bodily states, etc. When one has such knowledge and when one has the capacity to recognize these active disposition characteristics,

etc. as being components of the feelings they in fact are components of when they are manifested by someone, then one understands even more than in (a) how the other person feels. For example, Jones may observe that Sims is actively believing that his penny collection has been stolen and that it may be destroyed subsequently; Jones may observe that Sims is actively disposed to offering a reward for the return of his penny collection (and so he can be said to actively value it); Jones may observe that Sims is actively disposed to breaking out into tears over the loss of his collection; and, Jones may observe that Sims actively wants to be left alone by everyone, with the exception of those people who have information about the lost collection. Moreover, Jones may know that all of these active dispositions about Sims are part of the concept of "being sad." If Jones further knows that when one is sad, one feels sad too (i.e., if Jones knows how to apply PEF here), then, finally, Jones actively understands[1] Sims' precise feelings. Drawing from this kind of case, we can say the following:

> Emotional Understanding[1b]: S actively understands[1b] W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge of the specific kinds of felt active disposition components of W's Q feelings (as well as some knowledge of felt active evaluations and bodily states), where this knowledge is based upon S's "direct" observation of components of W's Q feelings
> (ii) S has some capacity R to recognize an instantiation of specific felt active dispositions of (i) as an instantiation of the components of Q feelings
> (iii) R is actualized at t with respect to W's Q feelings

Clearly, the kind of "recognition" in (b) differs from that in (a). Besides the fact that the feeling components recognized in (b) are more specific than those in (a), there is this further difference. In (a), one starts out, so to speak, knowing what the other person's feelings are.

His active understanding comes in his capacity to use this knowledge to draw conclusions about--to recognize--the other's general active dispositions. In (b) however, one does not begin with a knowledge of the other person's kind of feelings. Rather, one must collect some data about the other person's active dispositions, etc. Using his capacity to draw conclusions about--to recognize--the kind of feeling the other person has, one comes to an active understanding of the other's feelings. The first kind of recognition involves a kind of analysis of knowledge of a given emotional feeling into knowledge of its components, while the second involves a kind of synthesis of knowledge of emotional feeling components into a knowledge of a kind of feeling. The capacity to recognize is a bit different for each case. However, since both do require similar conditions for the capacity to recognize, we shall say that they are both kinds of emotional understanding^{1}.[1]

(2) "Understanding^{2}." What is characteristic about "understanding^{2}" is the capacity to explain. For example, one understands^{2} a logic problem, the movements of the tides, or Brecht's theory of drama to the extent that one knows how--one has the capacity--to give explanations about each of these. So one understands^{2} Brecht's theory of drama to the extent that one has the capacity to explain how, if the play is to count as a good piece of drama, the audience must realize that a play is only a

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[1]There are other kinds of emotional understanding^{1} that seem to be a cross between the spirit of emotional understanding^{1a} and emotional understanding^{1b}. E.g., the conditions of emotional understanding^{1a} and knowledge of specific feeling components as determined by one's knowledge of psychological generalizations relevant to the kind of feeling a person is having (e.g., when Sims feels sad, he feels extremely sad) and/or one's observation of the components of the person's emotional state (along with knowledge of PEF) determines other kinds of emotional understanding^{1}. An analysis of these types of emotional understanding^{1} would follow along the lines of either of the above schemata.

play and not a real life scene. If Smith understood^2 Brecht's theory, then a subjunctive conditional statement comparable to "If S were asked about Brecht's theory, S would be able to explain by saying..." would be true of him. Likewise, if one were to understand^2 a logic problem, one would have a capacity to explain how it is done. If one were to understand^2 the movements of the tides, one would have a capacity to explain how the phases of the moon determine the changes in the levels of the tides. Accordingly, what is first distinctive about "understanding^2" is that

S understands^2 x only if (i) S has a capacity to explain x

We should note further that as well as being a necessary condition, (i) is a sufficient condition of "understanding^2." But, so as not to conceal its importance, we will also include in our analysis of "understanding^2" a condition that is logically dependent upon (i). This condition involves knowledge presupposed by the capacity to explain. For indeed, in order for one to have a capacity to give any explanations, one must have knowledge about what constitutes adequate content for an explanans. For example, given a particular logic problem in the predicate calculus, one may <u>know</u> that step #5 follows from steps #2 and #4 and <u>modus ponens</u>, step #6 follows from steps #5 and #3 and <u>disjunctive syllogism</u>, and so on. This known content is considered adequate for explaining the conclusion of the logic problem. Drawing the general point from this example, then, we will now say that

S understands^2 x if, and only if,

(i) S has a capacity to explain x
(ii) S's explanations are based upon his knowledge about facts which constitute an explanans for x,

where (ii) is logically dependent upon (i). Moreover, we should point

out that the kinds of knowledge required here typically include relevant generalizations and antecedent conditions that count as an explanans for some explanandum. For example, when one explains why the tide is low, one may do this by citing Newton's laws and some relevant antecedent data about the distance between the moon and the point on the earth where the tide is low. When one explains the logic problem, one may cite relevant rules of inference (i.e., generalizations about valid ways of arguing) and some antecedent steps in the logic problem. But let us see how all of this kind of talk lends itself to a discussion of emotional understanding.

When we say that one has an understanding of another person's feelings, we often mean that one can (i.e., one has the capacity to) explain how it is that the other person feels as he does--one has an understanding^2 of the other's feelings. What this boils down to is that one can offer some relevant generalizations and antecedent conditions which count as an explanans of the other person's particular feelings. However, there seem to be some distinct categories that such generalizations can fall into. Accordingly, there are different categories of "understanding^2" that are relevant for an analysis of "emotional understanding^2." I will sketch three possibilities.

(a) The first kind of "understanding^2" is determined by what can be called one's "capacity to give a noncausal and nonuniversal inductive generalization kind of explanation." In the context of emotional understanding, this capacity is captured in the case where Jones has the capacity to offer as an explanation for Sims' feelings of extreme sadness the generalization "Whenever Sims has in the past felt sad at all, he typically would feel extremely sad" and the true antecedent condition that Sims is

now feeling sad. The distinctive feature of the explanation here is the kind of generalization that is offered in the explanans. It merely asserts a particular kind of observed regularity about the intensity of Sims' feelings of sadness. It does not, however, claim any established causal connection between Sims' feelings of sadness and anything else. Moreover, the scope of the generalization spans only over the regularity of Sims' feelings of sadness and not necessarily over anyone else's. (Thus the generalization is "nonuniversal.") Hence, the kind of "emotional understanding^2" illustrated here is defined in the following manner:

> Emotional Understanding^{2a}: S understands^{2a} W's Q feelings if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge about antecedent conditions of W's feelings, these conditions being instantiations of the antecedent conditions of certain noncausal and nonuniversal inductive generalizations (pertaining to W's Q feelings) about which S also has knowledge
> (ii) S has the capacity to give the content of (i) as an explanation of W's Q feelings[1]

(b) There is the "understanding^2" category determined by what I will call one's "capacity to give a causal explanation." The kind of case I have in mind here is captured by the situation where Jones has knowledge of some causal generalizations relevant to Sims' feelings of sadness, as well as knowledge of the general kinds of feelings Sims is having. We might imagine, for example, that Jones knows the causal generalization "Whenever Sims believes that he has lost anything of value,

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[1] I am going to forego giving an analysis of any kind of "active understanding^2" here merely because that is not the way one typically thinks about this sort of emotional understanding. If I was to speak of "active understanding^2" though, I would simply add the condition that: (iii) S's capacity is actualized. But we will see how this applies in the next chapter.

he has reacted by feeling intensely sad." Here the belief about the loss is seen as a cause of Sims' feeling. If Jones also knows that Sims believes that he has just incurred a loss, then Jones is now in a position to offer an explanation for Sims' feelings of sadness. For Jones knows something of the causal psychological factors affecting his feelings of sadness. In principle, these causal psychological factors could be quite complex. And the more knowledge Jones was to have about all of the psychological factors contributing to Sims' feelings of sadness, certainly the more adequate would be the causal explanation that Jones could offer. Indeed, we could imagine an intricate causal psychological explanation consisting of a complex of generalizations about the causal relationships existing among the various wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. involved in Sims' feelings of sadness. And to the extent that one could marshal a complex of causal factors here to explain Sims' feelings of sadness, one's understanding^2 of Sims' feelings would be all that much more thorough.

Of course any degree of complexity of such an explanation is still nonuniversal in that it makes reference only to a causal connection between Sims' valuations, etc. and Sims' feelings of sadness. From time to time though, one certainly is able to give higher level (viz., universal) causal explanations than this. For example, Jones might be able to cite the more theoretical generalization "If any person is fixated in the anal stage of his psycho-sexual development, then because of irrational repressed beliefs initiated in this fixation period about love being withheld by one's parents (due to their anger over one's excessive defication), then whenever one loses something of value and subsequently feels sad, one typically feels extremely sad." Given a knowledge that Sims was fixated in the anal stage of his psycho-sexual development, Jones could now

have an even fuller explanation and thus an even fuller understanding^2 of Sims' feelings. However, regardless of whether or not our psychological generalizations are universal, we can define the second category of emotional understanding^2 by saying that

> Emotional Understanding^{2b}: S understands^{2b} W's Q feelings if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge about antecedent causal conditions of W's feelings, these conditions being instantiations of the antecedent conditions of certain causal generalizations (pertaining to W's Q feelings) about which S also has knowledge
> (ii) S has the capacity to give the content of (i) as an explanation of W's Q feelings

So to the extent that Jones understood^{2b} Sims' feelings of sadness, Jones would be expected to have true of him some conditional comparable to something like "If one were to ask Jones what was wrong with Sims, Jones would be able to answer by offering a causal explanation of Sims' feeling sadness." Having such a conditional true of him would fulfill condition (ii). And the kind of content of the explanation involved in one's capacity here is the requirement demanded by condition (i).

(c) A third category of "understanding^2" and thus a third category of "emotional understanding^2" is determined by what I will call one's "capacity to give a reason explanation." We could imagine, for example, Jones saying something like, "I had good reason to feel angry. After all, he struck me even though I hadn't done anything to him." Implicit here is the assumption of some generalization like R: "If one is offended unwarrantedly, then it is reasonable for one to feel angry with the one who does the offending." And this kind of generalization (along with the appropriate antecedent conditions) is offered as an explanation for one's feelings. The explanation here is what might be called a "conventional" one--i.e., one based upon what we might call "conventions of

reasonableness." The antecedent conditions of these generalizations are the reasons for the consequent conditions--they are the reasons given for the feelings. For example, the antecedent condition of R (i.e., "one is offended unwarrantedly") is the reason for "one's feeling angry with the one who did the offending." If such generalizations are used and conform with prevailing conventions that determine which feelings are to be said to follow reasonably from which conditions, and if the appropriate antecedent conditions of these generalizations have been realized, then one who has a capacity to give a feeling explanation based on such generalizations has a good understanding^{2c} of those feelings. Of course if either (a) the generalization does not meet with the prevailing conventions (perhaps it just meets with the other person's peculiar conventions) or (b) the antecedent conditions of an acceptable generalization have not really been met, then one who has an active capacity to give an explanation of certain feelings, basing the explanation on this generalization, has a poor understanding^{2c} of those feelings. Nevertheless, one still has an understanding^{2c}. And so,

> Emotional understanding^{2c}: S understands^{2c} W's Q feelings if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge about the reasons for W's Q feelings, these reasons being instantiations of the antecedent conditions and Q feelings being the consequent conditions of certain "conventions of reasonableness" generalizations about which S also has knowledge
> (ii) S has the capacity to give the content of (i) as an explanation of W's Q feelings

This, then, completes my survey of the three categories of "understanding^{2}" in emotional contexts.

(3) "Understanding^{3}." The capacity to anticipate or to make predictions also plays a role in understanding. Professional gamblers, for example, are said to understand the sport of horse racing to the extent

that they can accurately (and honestly) anticipate or make predictions about the outcomes of horse races. Generals in armies are said to have an understanding of wars to the extent that they can anticipate or make predictions about the war moves of their adversaries. Physicists are said to have an understanding of laws of physics to the extent that they can make predictions about physical events. All of these people possess capacities regarding predictive feats. Accordingly, we will say minimally that

> S understands[3] x only if (i) S has the capacity to make predictions

It is clear, though, that this cannot be a sufficient condition of any sense of "understanding." For first of all, something needs to be said about the accuracy of the predictions. If one's predictions were always wrong or only sometimes right, then one would really not be said to have an understanding of anything related to one's predictions. Indeed, such a situation would explicitly indicate a severe lack of understanding. I must specify, then, something about the quality of the predictions made. Keeping the qualification here modest, I will say that

> (i) S has the capacity to make generally accurate predictions

I must add to this, however, the obvious intended point that the subject matter of the predictions made are related to x. Here too I will remain somewhat vague and so will not specify exactly what this relation is. For this is basically the issue of "relevance" discussed in the philosophy of science and is certainly an issue that goes beyond the scope of the discussion here. I will be content just to get a feel for this notion by looking at our examples. And indeed, when we look at our examples, we see that wars in general and predicted future war moves are obviously related

in some relevant way. So too are predicted physical events relevantly related to the body of laws of physics. So too are the outcomes of future horse races relevantly related to the "science" of betting on horse races. We will say, then, that

(i) S has the capacity to make generally accurate predictions about x-related matters

Fulfilling (i), however, is still not sufficient for understanding, in any sense of the term. Merely to divine that a specific event will occur at a certain time in the future and then to have this event actually occur at the specified time is not enough for one to be said to have an understanding of anything. For suppose I dream correctly every night about all the winners for the following day at the race track. And suppose further I have no factual knowledge about the sport of racing; I have never even been to a race track. We would, in all likelihood, say of me here that even with my accurate predictions, I did not really understand horse racing. Only certain kinds of qualified predictions can count towards one's understanding. One needs a capacity to make generally accurate predictions which are <u>based upon</u> some relevant factual <u>knowledge</u>. For example, the person who can accurately predict the winners at the race track and is said to really understand horse racing is one who has knowledge about handicapping, knowledge about appraising weather and track conditions, and how both affect various kinds of horses, and knowledge about generalizations concerning the relation between a horse's performance and what kind of track and weather conditions accrue, etc. The capacity to make accurate predictions in physics is based upon one's knowledge of the right laws and right antecedent events. Moreover, to the extent that one makes accurate predictions based upon one's knowledge of the laws of physics along with knowledge of relevant antecedent conditions,

one is said to understand more or less physics. If the predictions were not based upon the laws (generalizations) of physics but rather upon something else, then even if the predictions were correct, this would not be said to indicate an understanding of physics. Rather, this would indicate an understanding of whatever else the predictions were based upon. Similarly, the generals' understanding of wars is based upon knowledge of internalized generalizations that have been made about the conduct of wars as well as the relevant possible antecedent conditions. It seems in general, then, that the relevant kinds of knowledge that are bases for predictions here are x-related generalizations and relevant x-related antecedent events. Of course, as was the case with the knowledge involved in "understanding[1]," one need not be able to formulate one's knowledge of the generalizations required in understanding[3]. This knowledge may be inchoate. Accordingly, we will say that

S understands[3] x if, and only if,

(i) S has the capacity to make generally accurate predictions about x-related matters
(ii) S's predictions are based upon his knowledge of x-related generalizations and relevant x-related antecedent conditions

We abbreviate this third kind of understanding by calling it the capacity to predict. Let us see what this kind of capacity has to offer in the realm of emotional understanding.

The capacity to make predictions about the occurrence of feelings is surely a parameter we sometimes use for deciding upon the understanding one has of another's feelings. For example, if Jones under certain conditions were able to predict with accuracy the situations under which Sims would feel extremely sad in the future, then Jones would be said to have that much more understanding of Sims' feelings of sadness. But what goes

into this kind of capacity? Most notably, the kinds of generalizations we have discussed in (2). That is to say, the same generalizations that are used to explain--to retrodict--feelings can also be used to make predictions about feelings. Jones, for example, could cite as grounds for his predictions about Sims' future feelings the same kinds of generalizations as are found in (2a), (2b), and (2c). And so an analysis of this "emotional understanding^{3}" follows from the analyses in (2a), (2b), and (2c), mutatis mutandis.

There is, however, another emotional understanding situation which involves one's capacity to make predictions, but not necessarily predictions only about the understood feelings themselves. The predictions I am thinking of involve predictions about a person's wants, valuations, etc., as well as about his feelings. (I have discussed this kind of situation in Chapters I and III when talking about EM^{4} empathic 'feelings'.) And the kind of emotional understanding required for such an understanding is modelled on understanding^{3}. Let me explain: One often makes predictions about another person's psychological states on the basis of one's knowledge of psychological generalizations which seem true about the other person. Moreover, the knowledge of these psychological generalizations can often come about as a result of one's first having a knowledge of the components of the other's feelings. For in gathering a knowledge about the feeling components of another's emotional feelings, I must gather knowledge of the component nonconscious states that they are feelings of. And in gathering this latter kind of data, I may begin to formulate (perhaps inchoately) some generalizations that pertain to the psychological states about which I have my emotional feelings. So if I pick out the felt valuations, felt wants, etc. of the other person's feelings, then I

might use this information to formulate (perhaps inchoately) generalizations that can be used to make predictions about the other person's future psychological life. On the basis of the information collected about the other person's feeling components x_1, x_2, ..., x_n, one may start to formulate psychological generalizations about the causal interactions between the component felt active dispositions (etc.) of the feeling and between the active disposition components (etc.) of the other's emotional state. Doaks, for example, might know that Sims' feelings of sadness partly consist of a felt awareness of an active evaluation about the loss of his penny collection, of a strong active valuation of his penny collection, and of an unusually strong active desire for the return of the collection. Furthermore, Doaks might recognize that there is a causal relationship existing between the arousal of the active evaluation, the arousal of the active valuation, and the arousal of the subsequent active desire. On the basis of his observation here, Doaks might begin to formulate the generalization that whenever Sims has active evaluative beliefs of type x_1 (characterized by the loss of a prized possession), and active valuations of type and intensity x_2, then x_1 and x_2 will be quickly followed causally by active desires of type and intensity x_3. In another situation, one might begin to formulate hypotheses relating kinds of observed feelings, wants, evaluative beliefs, etc. with observed antecedent valuations and evaluative beliefs. And on the basis of such generalizations, one may increase one's capacity to make predictions about another's future wants, feelings, valuations, etc.--i.e., one may increase one's capacity to make predictions about the kinds of psychological elements found in the consequent conditions of these generalizations.

Of course if the generalizations used for making these predictions

are based upon the scant evidence that the above example presents, then the accuracy of such generalizations is all the more doubtful. The more data one has to support one's hypotheses about the interaction between another person's wants, evaluative beliefs, valuations, etc.--the immediate awarenesses of which go into making up the components (i.e., the "feelable" aspects) of the other person's emotional feelings--the more warrant one has for believing the hypotheses and subsequent predictions one makes about the other person's psyche. So perhaps the more Doaks observes Sims in sadness feeling situations, the more warrant Doaks will have for formulating his hypotheses about Sims' psyche. Regardless of this warrant though, my point here is that one sometimes does formulate generalizations about the psychological states of another person based upon what one recognizes to be the component active dispositions that the other person feels as well as the causal interaction between them. When these generalizations are accurate and allow one to make equally accurate predictions about future psychological events in the other person's life, then we say that one has gained an understanding--what we are referring to as an understanding^3--of the other person's particular emotional feelings. Accordingly, in characterizing the kind of emotional understanding^3 I am interested in here (I will not characterize the other kinds), I will say that

> Emotional Understanding^3: S understands^3 W's Q feelings if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has the capacity to make generally accurate predictions about Q-related matters
> (ii) S's predictions are based upon his knowledge of Q-related generalizations (where these generalizations are based upon S's knowledge of the causal relationships existing among the Q-like psychological state components about which W has Q feelings) and S's knowledge of the antecedent conditions of such generalizations

As I will indicate shortly, this kind of emotional understanding[3] is precisely what is required for one kind of empathic understanding.

This, then, will conclude my treatment of some of the nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding. We certainly have not exhausted all the possibilities. I am sure there are many more parameters (i.e., capacities) that determine different senses of understanding. However, I have focussed on the understanding parameters discussed in this chapter because they can be used not only to elucidate certain types of nonempathic emotional understanding, but also the empathic variety. So let us go to this now.

Chapter V

EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING

What can be said now about the empathic variety of emotional understanding? In the Introduction we saw that "empathy" is defined by some psychologists in terms of feelings (i.e., empathic 'feelings') leading to an understanding of the other person and his emotional feelings. Accordingly, since I have just shown in Chapter IV some aspects of what it is for one to emotionally understand another person and his feelings, what I will do now is show what it is for empathic 'feelings' (and, in particular, EM^1, EM^2, EM^3, and EM^4 'feelings') to "lead to" some of these different kinds of emotional understanding. In doing this however, I must first make two brief preliminary remarks.

(a) In the Introduction, it may appear as though the psychologists writing on empathic understanding think of empathic 'feelings' as leading only to one sort of emotional understanding--i.e., that there is a singular phenomenon of emotional understanding to which all empathic 'feelings' to varying degrees lead. It is clear from my Chapter IV discussion, however, that there are more than just one sense of emotional understanding and so there is at least a prima facie possibility that there are more than just one kind of empathic understanding. Indeed, what I am going to show in this chapter is that there are in fact different varieties of empathic understanding.

(b) In giving my analysis of the different varieties of empathic understanding, I not only will be drawing from the Chapter IV discussion

of the different kinds of emotional understanding, but also from the Chapter I discussion where we saw that empathic 'feelings' often cause the empathizer to have serial thoughts--what we will be calling here cognitions-- about his 'feelings'. What I want to show in the present chapter is that there is a significant relationship (viz., an identity relationship) between the kinds of cognitions that empathic 'feelings' cause and the kinds of emotional understanding they lead to.

Now let me begin my discussion of the different varieties of empathic understanding.

(i)

The first observation to be made is that all empathic 'feelings' --and, in particular, the four kinds discussed in Chapters I and III (EM^1 'feelings', etc.)--seem to be involved with an emotional understanding^1 of another's emotional feelings (where one's emotional understanding^1 is to be understood as one's capacity to recognize the other's feelings, making no commitment to the particular species of recognition here (i.e., no commitment to either emotional understanding^{1a} or emotional understanding^{1b})). Indeed, the very act of empathically imagining feelings seems to be one kind of active understanding^1--i.e., an active capacity to recognize--of the other's feelings. For it seems fair to suppose that part (a sufficient, but certainly not a necessary, part) of someone's capacity to recognize what another person's feelings are like could be expressed in the subjunctive conditional statement "If S were to gain some relevant knowledge about W's emotional situation, then S would be able to correctly imagine W's feelings." (Indeed, the empathizer manifests his knowledge (he manifests what is specified in the antecedent

condition of the above conditional statement) pertaining to the other's feelings by imagining those feelings. Or as we put it in Chapter I, to have empathic 'feelings' is a way in which one thinks (hypothetically and "all at once") about the knowledge one has of the other person's feelings.) And so if the capacity here were actualized--i.e., if S actually imagined W's feelings--then it would be proper to say that S was actively understanding[1] the other's feelings--i.e., that S was actively emotionally understanding[1] the other person. Consequently, in the first sense of "emotional understanding," to empathically imagine another's feelings is one sense of actively emotionally understanding those feelings. And if we wanted to build a definition of "empathic understanding" upon this notion, we could use the various parameters from our discussion of "emotional understanding[1]" (both senses) in Chapter IV and say that

S empathically understands[1] W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,

(i) S has knowledge of the generic felt active disposition, evaluative, and bodily state components of W's Q feelings or S has knowledge of the specific kinds of felt active disposition, evaluative, and bodily state components of W's Q feelings, where this latter knowledge is based upon S's "direct" observation of components of W's Q feelings[1]

(ii) S has the capacity to recognize an instantiation of Q feelings as an instantiation of the feelings determined by the content of either disjunct in (i), where the consequent condition of a conditional statement expressing this capacity says that S empathically imagines W's Q feelings (i.e., S is able to have EM[1] 'feelings', etc.)

(iii) S's capacity to recognize in (ii) is actualized at t with respect to W's Q feelings

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[1]I have included only the parameters from the Chapter IV version of emotional understanding[1]. It is clear though that we could also recognize another's feelings by having knowledge based upon one's psychological background knowledge of the other person's feelings--i.e., one empathically understands through having EM[2] 'feelings' also.

And in this sense of "empathic understanding," the phenomenon would seem to be a very legitimate way of emotionally understanding[1] the feelings of others.

But this is a weak sense of empathic understanding[1]. For in this sense, having empathic 'feelings' is a kind of understanding (active understanding) of another's emotional feelings. The concept of "empathic understanding" is identical with the concept of "having empathic 'feelings'." And if this were all that people meant by empathy, there would be no difficulty in comprehending it. However, as I have pointed out, some psychologists seem to talk of empathic 'feelings' as "leading to" emotional understanding. And all that I can see this as meaning is that empathic 'feelings' cause an emotional understanding. Accordingly, there is another more important sense in which we must look upon empathic understanding[1], where the understanding is something distinct from but still importantly related to the empathic 'feelings' themselves.

A clarification of this other sense of empathic understanding[1] comes when we recall from Chapter I that empathic 'feelings' sometimes cause the empathizer to have serial thoughts (i.e., cognitions) about the content of the other's feelings--i.e., cognitions about the content of the empathizer's 'feelings'. Now certainly having cognitions in empathic contexts (or nonempathic contexts, for that matter) about what the other person is feeling is a way of manifesting one's understanding[1] of the other's feelings. That is to say, it is fair to suppose that part of a capacity to recognize another's emotional feelings can be expressed in the subjunctive conditional "If S were to find himself in one of the empathy contexts, he would be able to have cognitions of the 'feelable' contents of W's emotional feelings." And if this conditional were

activated (i.e., if S did what he was able to do), then S would be actively understanding[1] W's emotional feelings by having cognitions of general or specific "feelable" aspects of W's feelings.

Let me offer 'cognitions of the behavior determinant "feelable" characteristics of emotional feelings' as a prime illustration of this point. Indeed, people have cognitions about the behavior determinant characteristics in empathy at least as often as they have cognitions about particular felt active simple dispositions, felt wants, etc. (where the latter kinds of "feelable" aspects of course determine the former kinds). The more successful (and certainly most appreciated) empathizer has cognitions about the kinds of behavior that the other person's emotional feelings seem to have "pushed" him to. He is able to "see" (he is able to have cognitions about) just how the other person was disposed to do what he did (or was disposed to do). In this kind of context, we find the empathizer saying things like, "I can understand why you did what you did, for I know how you were feeling. I can understand how your feelings would push you to that kind of action." The empathizer's 'feelings' serve as causes of full-blown cognitions about how the other person "had" to (or "had" to be disposed to) do what he did (or what he was disposed to do). Of course it follows from our Chapter III discussion of the behavior determinant characteristic of feelings that what this comes down to is that the empathizer's 'feelings' serve as causes of cognitions about what is specified in the consequent conditions of some of the active disposition components that he is 'feeling' (and that the other person is feeling). Whatever, having full-blown cognitions about the behavioral determinate aspect of the other person's feelings is a significant way in which an empathizer empathically understands the other person and his feelings. Indeed, it is probably the kind

of empathic understanding most of us are acquainted with in everyday empathy situations. Though we do sometimes as well have cognitions in everyday contexts of individual 'felt' active disposition components and the rest. And these cases serve to illustrate that to the extent that empathic 'feelings' cause such cognitions, we have a perfectly legitimate sense in which empathic 'feelings' can be said to cause an active emotional understanding[1] of the other person's feelings. Hence, there is another sense in which empathic 'feelings' can be said to lead to emotional understanding[1]. And so there is another sense in which we can speak of empathic understanding[1].

Of course, one who has empathic 'feelings' already has knowledge of the components ("feelable" aspects) of the other's feelings. Otherwise he would not be able to have accurate empathic 'feelings'. And so at first glance it might seem that having empathic 'feelings' could in no way be said to be the cause of (could in no way be said to lead to) cognitions about the contents of the other's feelings and therefore an active understanding[1] of the other person and his feelings. However, as we pointed out in Chapter I, to the extent that the knowledge of the components of the other person's feelings that the empathizer acquires in preparation for having empathic 'feelings' is typically preconscious, and to the extent that the having of empathic 'feelings' somehow seems to cause this preconscious knowledge to become full-blown conscious (i.e., cognitive) knowledge, there does seem to be a sense in which we can say that empathic 'feelings' cause (lead to) an understanding[1] of the other person's feelings. And this is precisely the important sense in which I want to think of empathic understanding[1]. So if we again draw on the various parameters from our discussion of "emotional understanding[1]" (both senses) in Chapter IV,

we can say that

> S empathically understands[1] W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge (typically preconscious) of the generic felt active disposition, evaluative, and bodily state components of W's Q feelings or S has knowledge (typically preconscious) of the specific kinds of felt active disposition, evaluative, and bodily state components of W's Q feelings, where this latter knowledge is based upon S's "direct" observation of components of W's Q feelings (i.e., S has knowledge relevant to a recognition of W's Q feelings)
>
> (ii) S has the capacity to recognize an instantiation of Q feelings as an instantiation of the feelings determined by the content of either disjunct in (i), where the consequent condition of a conditional statement expressing this capacity says that S has full-blown conscious cognitions about the components ("feelable" aspects) of W's feelings
>
> (iii) S has empathic 'feelings' (EM^1, EM^2, etc. 'feelings') at t which arise in the context of S's knowledge in (i)
>
> (iv) S's empathic 'feelings' are causes of (i.e., they lead to) S's active capacity (expressed in (ii)) to recognize W's Q feelings at t

This is what I believe Guiora means (in the passage I quoted in Chapter I, p. 39) where he says "...the empathic experience...progresses, so to say, through a cognitive filter which transforms affective experience into comprehension of the meaning of the experience." In empathic understanding[1], the "comprehension of the meaning of the experience" becomes the cognition of much of the heretofore preconscious knowledge the empathizer has about the components (general or specific) of the other person's feelings.

Obviously for the cases of empathy that do not involve one's acquiring knowledge of the other's feelings preconsciously (i.e., where one acquires it consciously), empathic 'feelings' do not "lead to" an understanding of the other's feelings in the sense that we have just discussed. For the conscious acquisition of knowledge about the other's feelings is

prior to the empathizer's empathic feelings and so not caused by them. It is empathy situations such as this where empathy has a minimum of value as a kind of emotional understanding. But we will discuss this further in Chapter VI.

(ii)

Another kind of empathic understanding becomes apparent when we look at the relationship between empathic 'feelings' and a kind of emotional understanding[2] that is suggested especially in the psychiatric literature. Take the following case, for example.[1] A resident psychiatrist working with a particular patient over a period of months was responsible for reporting his findings about the patient's psychological make-up to his superiors in the hospital. On the basis of the resident's case study reports which conveyed knowledge about the patient's psychological background, and on the basis of theoretical psychoanalytic concerns, the resident's superiors concluded that the patient's feelings[2] and behavior were to be understood in a certain way that we will designate T. The resident, however, while agreeing that the appropriate psychological background material along with the theoretical concerns raised by his superiors seemed to adequately explain the patient's feelings and behavior, still he could not wholly agree. For he had begun to have empathic 'feelings' for the patient. And these imagined feelings led him to suspect

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[1]A. Z. Guiora, A. Hammann, R. D. Mann, and H. T. Schmale, "The Continuous Case Seminar," Psychiatry, Vol. 30, no. 1 (February, 1967), pp. 44-59.

[2]Actually, the passage I am referring to does not distinguish an understanding of emotional feelings from an understanding of any other aspects of the patient's emotional state. It just talks in general terms about understanding the patient. But the implications for understanding emotional feelings are clear. So I will feel justified in talking about understanding emotional feelings exclusively here.

that an explanation of the patient's feelings and behavior was actually different than what had been offered by his superiors. What the details of the explanation looked like was not all made clear by the resident. However, the story serves to illustrate the belief of some psychiatrists that having empathic 'feelings' sometimes leads one to gain an understanding^2 of--i.e., a capacity to explain--the other person's emotional feelings. And so on the basis of the psychiatrist's empathic 'feelings', he decides that there is an explanation for the patient's feelings even if it differs from the one that is dictated by theoretical concerns. If the psychiatrist consequently comes up with an alternative explanation based upon his analysis of the empathic 'feelings', then it seems plausible to say that in a sense some kinds of empathic 'feelings' do lead one to gain an understanding^2 of the other person's feelings. What can we say about this?

First off, in looking at our analyses of the four kinds of empathic 'feelings', it would seem that EM^2 'feelings' are the only ones properly involved with understanding in this context. For the empathic understanding that is purportedly based upon 'feelings' in this situation supposedly leads the empathizer to an explanation of the other person's feelings. Clearly though, EM^1, EM^3, and EM^4 'feelings' miss the mark here. For EM^1 and EM^3 'feelings' presuppose only knowledge which, together with the required active capacities, would lead one to a recognition of the other person's feelings. EM^2 and EM^4 'feelings', on the other hand, presuppose knowledge of the kind of psychological background material that is relevant to explaining the other person's feeling states--viz., relevant psychological generalizations. However, since we have stipulated that the knowledge of the generalizations presupposed by EM^4 'feelings' is

actually used for making predictions and not explanations, we will rule out the possibility that EM^4 'feelings' lead one to giving explanations about the other's feelings. So that leaves us with EM^2 'feelings'. They would lead one to giving explanations--i.e., to actualizing a capacity to give explanations. This again involves cognitions. Only now the cognitions are restricted to cognitions of explanation. And the kinds of explanation that the EM^2 'feelings' would lead to in the psychiatric example we have been working with would most probably be in terms of the "nonuniversal inductive generalizations" of emotional understanding^{2a} and the "causal generalizations" of emotional understanding^{2b} which we have discussed in Chapter IV.

Of course, as in part (i), we are not really being perfectly clear here when we say that EM^2 'feelings' lead one to gain an understanding^2 of the other person's feelings. For putting it this way makes it seem that had there been no empathic 'feelings', one might never have found the correct explanation for the other person's feelings. And, for a couple of reasons, that is absurd: (a) Certainly one could formulate the same explanation which is supposedly based upon empathic 'feelings' without having these 'feelings'. One might never have empathic 'feelings' and yet just happen to stumble upon the correct explanation by concentrating on the right generalizations and antecedent facts that one has consciously collected about the other person's active dispositions (and bodily states and evaluations) in the first place. (b) But besides this, one possibly could have EM^2 empathic 'feelings' and never really come up with an explanation of the other person's feelings at all. Once one has had empathic 'feelings' which suggest that there is another explanation to be found, one might just be frustrated in the effort to explain correctly

the other's feelings.

What these objections leave us with is that empathic 'feelings', analogous to what we said in part (i), can be causal conditions of an understanding^2 of another's feelings, but not necessary conditions. And now if we are to make sense of this causal claim, I believe that we will have to interpret it in the following way: One (e.g., the above resident psychiatrist) gathers relevant data about psychological background material about the other person. However, how this information fits together to form an explanation of the other person's psychological states and behavior is not a piece of full-blown conscious knowledge. It is, rather, a kind of preconscious knowledge. One does not yet have any active capacity to offer an explanation based upon the psychological background knowledge in question though. And accordingly, this, it would seem, would be the place where empathic 'feelings' could find their importance in emotional understanding^2. For if empathic 'feelings' sometimes lead the empathizer to an active understanding in terms of an explanation of the other's feelings, then empathic 'feelings' must function here as causes of the active capacity to explain the other person's feelings in terms of the psychological background material on which the empathic 'feelings' are based in the first place. In other words, EM^2 'feelings' must somehow convert one's preconscious knowledge of an explanation into a conscious cognitive knowledge^1--and thus, into an active emotional understanding^2 of the other person's feelings. Indeed, this is another point we were making at the

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^{1}Obviously, the above example of the resident psychiatrist's understanding^2 was incomplete, because, as stated, the details of the resident's empathic explanation were not given. Perhaps he just had a vague 'feeling' that there must be an alternative explanation to the one given. The more interesting cases of empathic understanding^2 are where such vague 'feelings' turn into full-fledged cognitions (which are caused by the 'feelings').

end of Chapter I about the causal function of empathic 'feelings'. But now we see how this causal function of empathic 'feelings' ties in with our speaking of empathic understanding. Accordingly, we can say,

> S empathically understands^2 W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,
>
> (i) S has knowledge of psychological background material relevant to an explanation of W's Q feelings
> (ii) S has EM^2 'feelings' at t which arise in the context of S's knowledge in (i)
> (iii) S's EM^2 'feelings' are causes at t of S's active capacity to explain W's Q feelings in terms of the content of the knowledge in (i)

We should point out that there is another way in which empathic 'feelings' might be said to lead to an understanding^2 of the other person's feelings. One sometimes says that one can see how reasonable the other person's feelings are after one empathically imagines these feelings. We might suppose here that what this means is that one gains an active cognitive capacity to give a "reason explanation" on the basis of having empathic 'feelings'. And so one might sometimes hear something like, "Put yourself in my place. Try to feel exactly what I was feeling. Then you'll see how reasonable it was for me to feel the way I said I felt." As with the other empathic understanding^2 cases though, this kind of claim should not be taken too literally. EM^2 'feelings' do not create the relevant cognitions ex nihilo. For having the appropriate EM^2 'feelings' would actually presuppose having a "reason explanation" for the other person's feelings. That is to say, if one is to get oneself into the 'feeling' state which captures the other person's feelings to the extent where the other person's feelings are seen as reasonable, then the empathizer, in order to have his empathic 'feelings', must know beforehand the reasons for the other person's having his feelings. Otherwise, how could the empathizer ever hope to precisely capture in his 'feelings'

the same "reasonableness" of the other's feelings? Of course, again, knowledge of the reason explanation may be preconscious. Nevertheless, this knowledge must be presupposed if the empathizer is to have his EM^2 'feelings' at all. What the empathic claim would have to say here would be that EM^2 'feelings' again play the role of being causes of the active capacity to offer the proper explanation. In other words, EM^2 'feelings' again play the causal role of converting preconscious knowledge into full-blown conscious knowledge--and thus, into an emotional understanding^{2c} of the other person's feelings.

Finally, I should point out that while we have claimed to be discussing empathic 'feelings' and emotional understanding^2, this too is not exactly right. For in (i), it was determined that all empathic 'feelings' are in one sense (p. 141) instances of one's activated capacity to recognize the other person's feelings. And so anything else we might say about empathic 'feelings' and empathic understanding must presuppose this fact. Accordingly, the discussion in this section has been concerned with the kind of understanding involved with the capacity to explain and the capacity to recognize. To accommodate this fact, let us stipulate that these two capacities constitute an understanding^4 of the other person's feelings. What we have been talking about in this section, then, has been an empathic understanding^4. And so the analysis offered on p. 150 should be expanded for empathic understanding^4 to include the further condition that the empathizer has an empathic understanding^1 of the other person's feelings. Finally then, the resulting schema for empathic understanding^4 would read:

> S empathically understands^4 W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,

(i) S has knowledge of psychological background material relevant to an explanation (in one of the three senses of "explanation") of W's Q feelings
(ii) S has the capacity to recognize an instantiation of the knowledge in (i); the consequent condition of a conditional expressing this capacity is that S is able to have EM^2 'feelings' which are imaginings of W's Q feelings
(iii) S's EM^2 'feelings' are causes at t of S's active (and cognitive) capacity to explain W's Q feelings in terms of the content of (i)

(iii)

Let us stipulate that the capacity to recognize along with the capacity to make accurate predictions constitute understanding^5. Given this slight alteration, and in keeping with what we have just said about understanding^4, we will change a possible discussion of empathic understanding^3 to a discussion of empathic understanding^5, because the latter is concerned with the capacity to recognize feelings as well as with the capacity to make predictions pertaining to them.

It seems that understanding^5 is precisely what our preliminary analysis of empathy given in the Introduction required for empathic understanding--viz., components i, ii, and iii. Before we conclude our discussion of the different kinds of empathic understanding by evaluating understanding^5 in empathic contexts however, we should straighten out certain difficulties arising from our analysis of empathy in the Introduction. First of all, this analysis was offered tentatively as <u>the</u> analysis of empathy. It should be clear by now, though, that there are <u>other</u> possible kinds of empathy--there are other kinds of empathic understanding. Accordingly, our original analysis was too restrictive. A second difficulty with our original analysis is that the second condition--i.e., being able to understand the other's feelings on the basis of empathic

'feelings'--was presented as being logically independent of condition iii--i.e., making predictions on the basis of empathic 'feelings'. However, from what we have said of the concept of "understanding^{3,5}," it should be evident that the third condition entails the second. Of course condition ii could involve other kinds of capacities and so other kinds of understanding. My only point here is to merely indicate that our preliminary analysis of "empathy" ("empathic understanding") as stated leaves a need for qualification. That is not to say, though, that the preliminary analysis was not of some help in pointing us in a fruitful direction for developing an analysis of empathic 'feelings' in Chapters I, II, and III and for developing an analysis of "empathic understanding" in Chapters IV and V.

Now if we just construe the Introductory notion of empathy as a kind of understanding^{5} of another's feelings, then what can be said about it as an analysis of "empathic understanding^{5}"? How are we to understand one's having empathic 'feelings' about another person's feelings, where these empathic 'feelings' are supposed to lead the empathizer to making generally accurate predictions about the other person's future psychological life? The answer to this unfolds immediately when we notice that one's having an empathic understanding^{5} of the other person's feelings entails one's having the kind of emotional understanding^{3} that we spoke of in Chapter IV and, mutatis mutandis, it entails one's having what we can call a kind of emotional understanding^{5}. And so the explanation of this kind of empathic understanding is obvious: When one has empathic 'feelings' that supposedly lead one to make predictions about future psychological states of the other person, one is having EM^{4} 'feelings'. These 'feelings', we have suggested, presuppose a knowledge of the individual active

disposition, bodily state, and evaluative components of the other's feelings, as well as a knowledge of some special psychological background material about the other person. The latter epistemic element was to include knowledge of psychological generalizations about causal relationships existing between active dispositions, these generalizations having been formulated on the basis of one's observations of the causal interaction betwen active disposition components and between the bodily state components, etc. of the other person's feelings. With such knowledge, one could be said to have the raw materials necessary for making predictions about future psychological states of the other person. All that is further needed here would be the active capacity to use this knowledge to make the required predictions. The Introductory analysis of "empathic understanding" says that one who has empathic 'feelings' (the EM[4] 'feelings' we have been talking about) in this context does have such an active capacity. But then one who has EM[4] 'feelings' has fulfilled precisely the conditions necessary and sufficient for what we are calling an emotional understanding[5]. The only difference between "empathic understanding[5]" and "emotional understanding[5]" is that the former requires the imagining of feelings while the latter does not.

One might argue here that since the "having of 'feelings'" is the only condition that distinguishes "empathic understanding[5]" from "emotional understanding[5]," and since the having of empathic 'feelings' <u>per se</u> really adds nothing significant to emotional understanding[5],[1] then

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[1]At first glance, it might <u>seem</u> that the having of empathic 'feelings' adds the condition to emotional understanding[3] that one <u>now</u> has the capacity to recognize the other person's kind of feelings. However, this is more apparent than real. For though we did not include it in our Chapter IV analysis, emotional understanding[3] entails a capacity to recognize feelings. For otherwise what would it mean for one to be able to make

"empathic understanding^5" is an extravagant concept that really does not say anything more interesting about emotional understanding than does "emotional understanding^5." But, again, as with the other varieties of empathic understanding, the empathy position here can say that while adding the logical condition of "imagining the other's feelings" really does not add anything interesting as a logical condition to the notion of "emotional understanding^5," it does add something as a causal condition. For one might argue that while "having empathic 'feelings'" is logically independent of (a) "having knowledge of the components of the other person's feelings," (b) "having knowledge of the causal relationships true about these components," and (c) "having the capacity to make predictions about the other person's future psychological states," "having empathic 'feelings'" may sometimes be a causal factor of a full-blown conscious cognitive knowledge of (a), (b), and thus a causal factor of (c). As a result of having EM^4 'feelings', one develops an active capacity--one comes by the appropriate cognitions--to make predictions that one might not have otherwise had the active capacity to make. Indeed, this causal role of empathic 'feelings' is precisely what the empathic position in the Introduction holds.

Finally then, our analysis of "empathic understanding^5" will read:

S empathically understands^5 W's Q feelings at t if, and only if,

(i) S has knowledge of the components of W's Q feelings and knowledge of the causal relationships true about these components

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predictions about another's future psychological states and feelings on the basis of having certain feelings one has if one is not able to recognize these feelings when they arise? Though I suppose such a situation is imaginable, it is so odd that we will rule it out by stipulation from the cases of emotional understanding in which we are interested.

(ii) S has the capacity to recognize an instantiation of Q feelings as an instantiation of the feelings determined by the knowledge of components in (i); a consequent condition of a conditional expressing this capacity is that S is able to have EM^4 'feelings' which are imaginings of W's Q feelings at t

(iii) S's capacity to recognize is actualized at t with respect to W's Q feelings--i.e., S has EM^4 'feelings' which capture W's Q feelings at t

(iv) S's EM^4 'feelings' are causes at t of S's active (and cognitive) capacity to make predictions about W's future feelings, wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. on the basis of the feeling component and causal relationship knowledge expressed in (i)

With this analysis, we complete our discussion of the various kinds of empathic understanding. And so we have reached the end of the greater part of what we set out to do in the Introduction. For we have been able to show how empathic 'feelings' can be seen to lead to an understanding of the other person and his emotional feelings.

In concluding this chapter however, it would perhaps be fitting to tie some loose ends of our discussion together. I have been speaking probably not too unambiguously about empathic 'feelings' leading to an understanding of the other person and his feelings. The details of my analyses of the various sorts of empathic understanding, however, have focussed explicitly only on the second of these two elements. It does not take much, though, to see how this dicussion has also been implicitly a discussion of "an understanding of the other person" too. For what is meant by "an understanding of the other person"? Well, it seems to me that it can only mean that one understands the "total personality" of the other person. This kind of thing would include the sorts of wants, beliefs, valuations, etc. (as well as emotional feelings) the other has which affect his behavior.[1] But we should see now that even though we have not spoken

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[1] Shafer's definition of "empathic understanding," op. cit., suggests this view.

of empathic understanding along these lines, it should not be too startling to think of empathic 'feelings' as leading to an understanding of these elements of a person's psyche too. For as we have seen in Chapter III, when one acquires preconscious (or conscious) knowledge necessary for having empathic 'feelings', one must acquire preconscious (or conscious) knowledge of the kinds of active wants, beliefs, etc. that are affecting the other person in the situation he finds himself, the immediate awarenesses of these active disposition states constituting the kind of emotional feeling the other person is having and thus the emotional feeling that the empathizer is imagining. So any preconscious knowledge one acquires about the other's feelings actually presupposes a knowledge of the other's active wants, etc. Moreover, if empathic 'feelings' lead one to an active understanding of the other's feelings (i.e., to cognitions about the other's feelings), then it is not unusual that they also sometimes lead one to (i.e., cause) an active understanding of (cognitions about) the other's wants, beliefs, etc. (where the empathizer's knowledge of all of this may have been preconscious before). Consequently, it is quite appropriate to refer to "empathic understanding" as "empathic 'feelings' leading to an understanding of the other person and his feelings," though the second element is certainly what we have been most interested in.

Chapter VI

THE VALUE OF EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING

To this point, I have given an analysis of the concept of empathic understanding. I have shown how it counts as another kind (or rather "other kinds") of emotional understanding (where, again, the emotional understanding I am talking about is being restricted to the understanding of emotional feelings). However, one might grant all that I have said and still be left wondering what the use of it all is other than the fact that we now have a philosophical analysis of still another psychological concept that had heretofore gone unanalyzed. One wants to ask if empathic 'feelings' have any unique characteristics which recommend empathy as a kind of emotional understanding that is as informative about the feelings of others as is, let us say, the application of psychological generalizations about feelings in the absence of any empathic 'feelings'. With a skeptical tone of thought, one wonders if the having of empathic 'feelings' might not just be an imprecise technique people use for gaining "insights" about the nature of the emotional feelings of others--as opposed to the more desirably precise techniques of empirical psychology (the latter drawing conclusions about others' feelings by consciously collecting selected data and by applying the correct scientific generalizations to this data). To dispel these doubts about empathy, I will direct my discussion in this final chapter towards making explicit selected aspects of the value of empathy--(i) first as a psychological technique competing with other nonempathic techniques in psychology for arriving at

an understanding of other people and their emotional feelings; and, (ii) as a kind of imagined first-hand knowledge of the feelings of others, where empathy here is seen to be in fact (if not in principle) even more valuable for gaining emotional understanding than the nonempathic second-hand techniques of psychology are. We will see what is meant by this in part (ii).

(i)

One might argue that one's overriding goal in having any kind of emotional understanding is for one to have a cognitive emotional understanding -- an understanding, that is, which is manifested in one's accurate cognitions (beliefs) about the character of, explanation of, or interesting predictions about the other person's feelings. For certainly such a thing is necessary if one is to know how to "deal" with the other person's feelings. To be sure, if a clinical psychologist, or anyone else for that matter, wants to understand another's feelings, he usually does so either with the intention of helping the other person, or with the intention of merely consciously conceptualizing the other person's feelings (this, perhaps, having some kind of "intrinsic intellectual value"). Certainly in order to have either of these situations, one must have a cognitive understanding of the other person's feelings. For in the first kind of case, one could not be of much help to the other person unless one was consciously aware (i.e., one was cognitively conscious) of facts affecting the other person's emotional feelings--e.g., facts about a description or an explanation of the other's feelings. And to have cognitions of these kinds of facts is precisely to have a cognitive emotional understanding. In the second kind of case, the conscious

conceptualization of the other person's feelings would seem to mean "having a cognitive understanding of the other person's feelings." Accepting for the moment, then, that having relevant cognitions about a person's emotional feelings captures the fundamental goal of any kind of emotional understanding, let us see what value empathy has in terms of this goal.

(1) Clearly the kinds of nonempathic emotional understanding discussed in Chapter IV lead one to the desired kinds of cognitive states; but so do the respective kinds of empathic understanding. That is to say, we have seen (Chapter V) that empathic 'feelings' sometimes cause cognitions of recognition, explanation, and prediction related to feelings another person has or has had. To be fair though, if we want to see the relative values of the cognitive aspects of the nonempathic and empathic kinds of emotional understanding, we must point out that the kinds of cognitions derived in the nonempathic sort are typically of a more detailed nature (and, therefore, probably more desirable to psychology) than those derived from empathy. Let us develop this point through the following analogy.

Consider the case where a baseball player is said to exhibit a real understanding for the art of hitting a baseball. Perhaps he finished last year's season with a batting average of .402. And so we say he has a real understanding for hitting. But his understanding is not manifested by his capacity to explain to rookies how one hits the ball effectively, for the ballplayer may not be able to formulate such an explanation in any detail. Rather, his understanding is exposed in what we call the player's feel for hitting. The player seems to have a capacity (a .402 capacity) to recognize what to do in order to hit the ball successfully. But his capacity is not manifested by precise cognitions about what he should do. He does

not, for example, cognitively know that he should lower his elbows 30 degrees from the horizontal axis of his arms when trying to hit a curve thrown towards the outside corner of home plate. And even if he did possess these cognitions, he would not then be said to have an understanding of hitting, at least not in the sense of this expression as it is being used here. But perhaps the behavior (not the precise cognitions about behavior) of lowering his elbows...is precisely what he needs to do in order to hit the ball. And although he may have no specific cognitions about these facts, he may still behave in accordance with them. Moreover, though, he may have some kind of felt awareness of doing this--on the basis of some feeling (noncognitive conscious state) he happens to have, the ballplayer may be aware (he may have cognitions) of what he has to do in order to hit the inside curve. He believes (he has believed cognitions) that he has to move the bat in this general way and that general way (and perhaps he demonstrates what he means while saying this). But he probably will not be cognitively conscious of the fact "that he has to lower his elbows 30 degrees from the horizontal axis of his arms...." He will have cognitions only about the fact that he moves his arms in certain ways, the exact specification (e.g., 30 degrees...) of which he has no cognitions. Using a concept developed in Chapter II, we can say that the hitter has a felt awareness of his simple active dispositions to hit. But these simple active dispositions, if observed by a careful onlooker, would turn out to be thelowering of the elbows 30 degrees from the horizontal axis of the arms, etc.

We have a similar kind of situation with most emotional feelings. When we have a feeling, we most often are prepared to make some judgment (we have a believed cognition) that we are in some general emotional state;

but we are not always prepared to be too detailed about it. When I am embarrassed, for example, I am typically in a conscious state (a noncognitive one) on the basis of which I believe (I have the cognition) that I am embarrassed. Typically, however, I am not also in a position to say what the specific components of this state that I feel are. Every time I am in the appropriate noncognitive conscious feeling state, I do not typically have a full set of conscious beliefs (cognitions) about what the specific components (i.e., "feelable" aspects) of my state of embarrassment are and so none of what the specific feeling components (e.g., felt wants, etc.) are either. Though this is not to say that I cannot remedy this situation. Indeed, quite often I might reflect upon my feelings and, as a result, begin to notice (have cognitions about) the particular components. The point is that without such reflection my feelings lead only to general cognitions.

Finally, the same kind of situation seems to hold, to an extent, for empathic understanding. In the case of empathic understanding^{1b} (i.e., the empathic understanding^{1} that has specific 'feelings'), for example, the empathizer 'feels' what the other person feels, but does not necessarily have any conscious cognitions about the specific components and characteristics (e.g., intensity) of the other person's feelings. In other words, he does not necessarily have thoughts about the fact that the other person has some felt active dispositions x, y, and z, as well as some felt bodily state w of intensity u. Rather, he may just have a hypothetical felt awareness of the general kind of emotional feeling comprised of these components--the belief based upon his empathic 'feelings' would probably be about the general kind of hypothetical emotional feeling he was having (i.e., about the general kind of feeling the other

person was having). The hypothetical felt awareness itself may in turn be based upon the more specific cognitions that the empathizer has had preconsciously (inchoately). But empathic 'feelings' themselves need not give rise to detailed cognitions. An empathizer may have EM^4 'feelings', for example, because at some time he has preconsciously collected facts about relevant psychological generalizations pertaining to the content of the other person's feelings. But his empathic 'feelings' need not necessarily give rise to full-blown conscious cognitions of the same detailed content.

While the emergence of only "general cognitions" is often the case in empathy however, happily this is not the rule. Indeed, as we have seen already in Chapters I and V, the more interesting cases of empathy are where we not only have an awareness of (cognitions about) the general kind of feeling the other person has (i.e., about the kind of 'feeling' we have), but where we also have some more conscious detailed cognitions about what the components of his feelings are (empathic understanding^1), cognitions about explanations of his feelings (empathic understanding^4), and cognitions about some of his future psychological states (empathic understanding^5)--all of these detailed cognitions seemingly being based upon the appropriate empathic 'feelings'.

Measuring empathic understanding against the nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding, then, we would have to say that if we accept for the moment that "the attainment of detailed cognitions pertaining to feelings" is the primary goal of emotional understanding, then empathic understanding seems to come out with a lower score. It is just not as reliable as the other kinds of emotional understanding for getting us to this goal. For there is never a guarantee that the cognitions we get from empathic

'feelings' will be specific. Even so, the point I want to emphasize here is that empathy at least does to varying degrees get us to the cognitive goal of emotional understanding. This fact alone is amazing enough to warrant our placing some value upon empathy as a technique for obtaining cognitive emotional understanding.

(2) So empathic 'feelings' are sometimes instrumental in the empathizer's attaining detailed cognitions of the other's feelings. However, just to admit to this astonishing fact would be selling empathy short. For it seems that empathic 'feelings' also point the empathizer in a direction, as it were, to look for the detailed cognitions about the other person's feelings (i.e., about his own 'feelings'), regardless of whether or not these cognitions are immediately forthcoming from the mere occurrence of the empathic 'feelings'. There are a couple of things implied by this notion of "point in a direction," so let me explain them.

(a) The very fact that one has empathic 'feelings' indicates to the empathizer that there is some data or other that he has collected about the other person's feelings. And while he may not be conscious of the detailed content of this data now, he at least can be confident that he is employing it in his 'feelings'. He can know that there is some as yet unspecified felt active dispositions which are hypothetical components of his 'feelings' and, hopefully, actual components of the other person's feelings. He would be wise also in suspecting that there is some psychological background material or other that he has collected about the other person which is relevant to the kind of 'felt' active disposition components, 'felt' bodily state components, felt evaluations, and 'feeling' characteristics (e.g., 'feeling' intensity) of the empathic 'feelings' he is having. In general, then, the very act of empathizing is warrant for

the empathizer's believing that he has collected some as yet unspecified data and that he has understood this data to the extent that he can actually imagine the feeling which presupposes this data. When one has empathic 'feelings', therefore, these 'feelings' act as indicators that one already has elements of an understanding of the other person's feelings, though one may not yet have a highly detailed conscious cognitive knowledge about what these particular elements are. In this sense, then, empathic 'feelings' point in a direction.

Of course there is an obvious possible complaint about what I have just said: "Do empathic 'feelings' really point in a direction in the sense that they are indicators? Just because one has empathic 'feelings', does it have to follow that one is therefore necessarily warranted in believing that these imagined feelings accurately capture in any way the character of the other person's feelings? Perhaps they are mere fancies of the supposed empathizer's overworked imagination; indeed, perhaps the other person is having and has had no such feelings at all." The only plausible reply to this objection is that it is certainly always a legitimate possibility. Empathic 'feelings' can be wrong. And so in some instances they are very poor indicators. Even so, the objection here should not be overdone. One should not take it to cast doubt upon the accuracy of all cases of empathy. Certainly there must be some tenability to the accuracy claimed in many cases of empathy. There had to be some reason (viz., accuracy) for talking about empathy (as opposed to mere fancy) in the first place. Indeed, our concept of "empathy," as opposed to our concept of mere "fancy" is such that what we take to be empathic 'feelings' are reliable bases for believing that the other person is having feelings something like the 'feelings' the empathizer is having, even if the

empathizer does not yet have a cognitive knowledge about details of the character of his 'feelings'. Of course, how we determine in any given case that the purported empathizer is in fact having empathic 'feelings' and not mere imagined fancies is another problem. A problem, but not an insurmountable one. After all, we do have ways of checking--e.g., seeing if the predictions of EM^4 'feelings' are borne out, asking the other person if his appraisal of the components of his feelings is like ours, and so on. Regardless of how we finally determine when our 'feelings' are fancies and when they are accurate empathic 'feelings' though, I am making the point about the concept of empathy that empathic 'feelings' are somewhat reliable and so can be said to "point in a direction" to look for knowledge about details of the other's feelings when these details are not forthcoming by the mere existence of the empathic 'feelings'. Put another way, empathic 'feelings' are at least taken by people to be good prima facie warrants for beliefs about the other person's feelings and so the "direction" they "point in" can be generally trusted. Indeed this is so because we just do not have empathic 'feelings' arising at any old time. They usually coincide with our making observations (conscious or preconscious) about another person's emotional state and feelings in at least one of the four empathy contexts we have discussed in Chapters I and III. It is just a fact about empathic 'feelings' that most normally functioning (psychologically speaking) human beings have empathic 'feelings' only when they have collected information about the other person's feeling state. They are not the kinds of things people typically make up. Accordingly, we surely can make a minimal claim that the appearance of empathic 'feelings' in a person is at least warrant for that person's believing that his empathic 'feelings' "point in a direction" for

him to look for filling in the details about the components (i.e., "feelable" aspects) of his 'feelings' (and the other person's feelings).

(b) There is another way in which empathic 'feelings' "point in a direction." Some of our empathic 'feelings', as we have seen, cause very definite cognitions about very definite "feelable" aspects related to the other person's feelings. To this extent, these empathic 'feelings' in a quite obvious sense "point in a direction" to relevant cognitions in that they give us precisely what is required in order for one to attain the goal of emotional understanding that we are working from in this section --viz., detailed cognitions which hopefully are accurate about the other person's feelings.

One might object here: "Even while these specific empathic 'feelings' cause specific cognitions, it is just a matter of human history that they are not infallible. We all empathize and come up with general and specific cognitions about the other person's feelings. Sometimes we are right and sometimes we are wrong. And accordingly, empathic 'feelings' 'pointing in a direction' (in this second case) is not as accurate as may have been implied above." In answering this objection, I must admit that indeed, as is the case with the actual emotional feeling states, empathic 'feelings' too, on occasion, can be inaccurate.[1] (Empathic

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[1]To show that it does happen, here is an example of where a kind of everyday feeling (though not of the emotional variety) goes wrong: When one reads a difficult philosophical passage over and over again, one typically comes to a point where one says, "Oh, now I understand what he's getting at." One has a feeling here that one can identify the exact point that the writer is making. Regardless of what other warrant the reader may have for his belief that he understands, his feeling seems to him to be warrant enough. He feels that there is no more to be asked about the intended meaning of the passage--he feels that his understanding[1] of the passage is complete. He believes on the basis of this feeling of "completeness" (or "closure," as it is sometimes called) that he can describe the contents of the passage if he so desires or if he is asked to. This

'feelings' are certainly far less accurate than are actual emotional feelings.) However, this does not detract from the value of empathic 'feelings' if we are judging them against the other techniques of emotional understanding. For this is no problem peculiar to the empathic sort of emotional understanding. When we emotionally understand in any of the nonempathic senses of the expression, we are also sometimes right and sometimes wrong. Predictions about a person's future psychological states which are based upon select generalizations (about feelings) are not, in principle anyway, any less fallible than the comparable predictions one makes basing them instead upon one's empathic 'feelings'. And if fallibility should not detract from the importance of the more common nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding (I assume it does not), then it should not detract from the importance of empathic understanding either. And so the second sense in which empathic 'feelings' "point in a direction" remains quite relevant for emotional understanding.

(c) Even in the cases of where our 'feelings' are not as cognitively specific about the nature of the other's feelings as they are in (b), they sometimes can "point" to where the empathizer should look in order for him to increase his cognitive understanding of the other person and his feelings.

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feeling is all too common. Of course it often turns out that one's beliefs here are misguided, in the sense that one's active understanding capacities are not always accurate. The reader of the philosophical passage, for example, may have an active capacity to inaccurately describe the intended meaning of the passage. And so we say that the reader does not really understand the passage; he does not have an active capacity which could appropriately be called an active capacity of correct understanding. He does not have a correct active capacity of recognition. Moreover then, his feelings of "completeness" are inappropriate, for they do not really warrant his belief that he correctly recognizes the intended meaning of the passage. Regardless of his error here though, the warrant that the reader has for his belief, whether appropriate or not, is based upon the feeling state he is in. What convinces the reader that he understands is his feeling of "completeness." Sometimes he is right and sometimes he is wrong.

For while empathic 'feelings', as we have shown in (a), indicate that the other person has a certain kind of feeling, empathic 'feelings' also indicate ("point in a direction to") what the contents of the other's feelings are. What I mean is this: If my Chapter II analysis of the concept of emotional feelings is right, then there are very definite lines along which emotional feelings can be discussed--i.e., they are complexes of felt wants, valuations, etc. If a person is aware of this fact and if he is at home enough with the concept of the particular emotional feeling so that he knows how to characterize, for example, the felt wants of the given emotional feeling so as to distinguish them from the felt wants of some other kind of emotional feeling he might have, then when he has empathic 'feelings', he is probably in a good position to say some interesting things about the kinds of components that make up his 'feelings' and, thus, he is in a good position to say the same about the other's feelings too. So if one has a 'feeling' of genus X, then, as we saw in Chapter III, if one has the concept of feeling X, one would be warranted in concluding, if one had an adequate knowledge of the "ins" and "outs" of the concept of feeling X, that the other person probably (assuming that his empathic 'feelings' were prima facie correct) had characteristic X-like felt active wants, characteristic X-like felt simple dispositions, characteristic X-like felt valuations, etc. Here again, the empathizer may turn out to be all wrong; but the very fact that he is having empathic 'feelings' in the first place is enough prima facie warrant for his believing that his 'feelings' capture the same kind and characteristics (e.g., intensity) of feelings that the other is actually having. For again, it simply seems to be a fact about human beings that they normally do not have empathic 'feelings' unless they have collected (perhaps

preconsciously) data relevant to the kind of feelings the other person is having. Moreover, the accuracy of any claims based upon empathy can be checked.

One might admit all that I have said for empathic understanding and still feel a bit dismayed. One may wonder that if even if what I have said about empathic 'feelings' is true, still, what do they have to offer over the nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding? To have empathic 'feelings' seems to be <u>just a technique</u> that some people employ to make conscious some general or detailed cognitions that one has had preconsciously, where the contents of these cognitions are relevant for one's emotionally understanding someone. But as a technique, it seems far inferior to the method of careful data collection. Indeed even if this were not so, we have admitted that the final judgment on the accuracy of any cognitions we derive from empathizing is to be made in the confirmation or disconfirmation of them based upon the public "standards" of scientific investigation. So why take the time to empathize in the first place, if it eventually only gets us to the place from where science starts--namely, the public arena? That is to say, why should we depend upon 'feelings' to make conscious those cognitions that we had to have (if only inchoately) in the first place? Why not just use the public tools (conscious cognitive data collection) of psychology to start out with conscious cognitions about the same facts, by-passing the need for empathic 'feelings' altogether?

The answer is easy enough. Insofar as empathic understanding is <u>another</u> technique which is sometimes helpful in gaining cognitive emotional understanding, this is enough to establish it as something important for psychologists. After all, what can be wrong with having one more

technique to get at an answer?

There are other reasons, though, for believing that the objection does not hold. Both, like the last one, are rather pragmatic. First of all, it seems that the science of psychology as a matter of fact has not progressed yet to the point where the psychologist can gather (make consciously cognitive) all the data that people can in fact gather inchoately through empathic 'feelings'--data which is relevant to understanding (in all senses) the other person's feelings. There just are not any highly developed generalizations, for example, relating subtle subliminal cues (an assortment of simple active dispositions) to emotional feelings, though certainly there are some things psychologists can say about this kind of thing.[1] Empathic 'feelings', on the other hand, can capture inchoately the importance of those cues and in some cases even cause conscious cognitions about them.

The final reason why we should not pay much attention to the above kind of objection is, again, a pragmatic one and probably the most important one. The explanation of this requires our abandoning as the only important goal of emotional understanding "the desire to obtain cognitions about the general kind or specific components and characteristics of the other person's feelings." There is another important goal; and empathic 'feelings' seem to at least approach this goal better than nonempathic methods do. However, in order to finally see just what this goal is and how empathic 'feelings' seem to approach it, we must have a discussion of what seems to be a peculiar quality of emotional feelings and 'feelings' looked on as kinds of real and imagined first-hand knowledge states --namely, that they are the kind of "all at once" conscious states we

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[1]See Ekman and Friesen, op. cit., for example.

talked about in Chapter I. So let us close our treatment of the concept of empathic understanding by going on to discussing this final quality.

(ii)

Seeing the special value of empathy lies in our understanding these propositions:

> (1) When one imagines an emotional feeling, one (in addition to what was said about "imagining" in Chapter I) is thinking hypothetically about a first-hand knowledge of the feeling;
>
> (2) a first-hand knowledge of a feeling is a consciousness of the total relationship each feeling component has to the others all at once; and therefore,
>
> (3) when one imagines a feeling, one is thinking hypothetically about a consciousness of the total relationship of the feeling components.

Let us now see what these propositions mean.

(1) The first proposition follows from a more general truth about all imagined states: when one imagines x (where x is anything at all that is ever said to be imagined), one thinks about how it would be to have a first-hand knowledge of x if one were in the appropriate position to do so, where "first-hand" knowledge is to be thought of as knowledge based upon one's own experience of x. So, for example, when one is asked to imagine another's living room what one does to honor such a request seems to indicate that one takes this as a request to imagine actually seeing (or touching)--i.e., to imagine a kind of first-hand knowledge of--the contents of the living room. One honors the request by thinking about what one would be visually (or tactually) perceiving were one looking at the contents of the living room about which one has knowledge. In short, one thinks hypothetically about a visual perception of the living room. This is just one kind of "first-hand" example; but it serves to illustrate

the general truth I have suggested about imagining--that the request to imagine anything is in actual use a shortened way of asking one to imagine having a first-hand knowledge of that something.

From this particular truth, it follows that in empathy the empathizer imagines a first-hand knowledge[1] of the kind of feeling he believes the other person to have. It is as though he asks and answers the question, "What would it be like to have a first-hand knowledge of that feeling?" And in his answer to the question, the empathizer thinks about what it would be like to have first-hand knowledge of feelings which are like the other person's if he (the empathizer) were in the other person's precise situation (about which the empathizer has knowledge).[2] Since, it would seem, a first-hand knowledge of an emotional feeling amounts to actually having the feeling, then, finally, when one imagines another's emotional feeling, one thinks about what it would be like to have such feelings if one were precisely in what one believes to be the other person's situation. So if one believes that the other person has certain component felt active wants, felt active valuations, etc., and if one knows the characteristics (e.g., intensity, controllability, etc.) of these component feeling states, then when one imagines the other's feeling, one thinks about what it would be like to have an emotional feeling composed of such a complex of "feelable" qualities. Of course, as we mentioned in Chapter I, the empathizer hopefully will not think about any more than just these

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[1]Often in the course of my discussion here, I will make reference to "imagining first-hand knowledge." Obviously since I think that part of the concept of "imagining" is "one thinks hypothetically about first-hand knowledge," it is redundant for me to talk about "imagining first-hand knowledge." However, I will use this expression anyway as a point of emphasis for this important aspect of the concept of "imagining."

[2]This is only a partial description of empathy; for it misses mention of the "all at once" aspect introduced in Chapter I. We will come to this shortly, however.

components and characteristics. That is to say, the most successful empathizer thinks about what it would be like to have an emotional feeling if he were to have the same kind of felt active wants, etc. that the other person has--but hopefully not much more and not much less, though. For without this last stipulation, the empathizer could not really be said to be fully empathizing with the other person, but rather with some fictitious character with a personality containing these other felt active disposition and bodily states, etc.

But even given that the imagining in empathy is actually the thinking of what a first-hand knowledge of certain kinds of feelings would be like if one were in the position to have them, we still do not know what this fact leads to. How does it help us see the pragmatic value that I have claimed empathic understanding has over the nonempathic kinds of emotional understanding? The answer to this starts to become clearer when we look at our second proposition.

(2) --"a firsthand knowledge of a feeling is a consciousness of the total relationship each feeling component has to the others all at once." First let me again make a general observation about all varieties of actual (as opposed to imagined) first-hand knowledge: When one has a first-hand knowledge of some x (where x is anything at all), one has an all at once consciousness of all the aspects of x that are capable of being known by means of the particular kind of first-hand knowledge device being used (i.e., by means of seeing, hearing,[1] feeling feelings, etc.). Let me offer a visual case again for example. When I look across the room, I

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[1]In the "hearing" case, the consciousness "all at once" is, for example, a consciousness "all at once" of the tone, pitch, quality, etc. of a particular note in a song. It is not a consciousness of the whole song though.

have, by virtue of my visual perception (i.e., by virtue of my first-hand visual knowledge) of the other side of the room, an "all at once" consciousness of the clock on the wall, the painting two feet to the left of it, and all other visible objects (i.e., objects that are in my visual field) on the other side of the room. I am conscious, that is, of all the objects at the same time. Moreover, and in keeping with what Perkins (Chapter I) has to say about states of consciousness which have this "all at once" quality, my visual perception is also a consciousness of each of the individual spatial relations that the objects across the room have to one another (e.g., where a spatial relation here is something like the fact that the stool is to the left of the sofa). But it is my view that there is more to the "all at once" nature of my visual perception than just this. For my visual perception is also a consciousness "all at once" of the total relationship that exists between the visible things across the room. I am not talking here about the mere individual relationships existing between these things that I have just cited. (I am not, for example, talking about the fact that the clock is two feet to the right of the painting.) What I am talking about, rather, is the fact that when I have a first-hand visual knowledge of the other side of the room, I am conscious of the relationship constituted by all the above mentioned relationships between objects existing together at one point in time. This kind of "meta-relationship" is sometimes called the "visual gestalt" of what is being perceived. Gestalt psychologists studying perception have various parameters for describing aspects of this phenomenon.[1] But at the

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[1]See, for example, K. Koffka's Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1935) and W. Kohler's Gestalt Psychology (New York: The New American Library, 1947).

core of what is said is the point that one's first-hand visual knowledge is a consciousness of the total physical situation (i.e., the "field" of visible objects)--what I am calling the total relationship existing between the visible objects and between their relations at one point in time. I will take this kind of visual case to again illustrate the general point I want to convey--in this instance the point being that all varieties of first-hand knowledge states are "all at once" phenomena which capture what I have called the total relationship of the components of the thing of which one has first-hand knowledge.

So now we must see how this general point contributes to our understanding of first-hand knowledge of feelings. Again, to have a first-hand knowledge of feelings seems to come down to having those feelings. Moreover, we saw in Chapters I, II, and III some of the complex of feeling components and characteristics that go into making up the emotional feelings we have. Consequently, when a person has a first-hand knowledge of his feeling (when he has a feeling), he has a noncognitive consciousness that consists of a complex of component noncognitive conscious states having certain qualities. This complex feeling state, however, is experienced by a person as a unitary noncognitive conscious state. What I mean by this is that analogous to the case of first-hand visual knowledge, emotional feeling components and characteristics (of which one has first-hand knowledge) are experienced all at once as a unitary phenomenon, as opposed to a conjunction of component phenomena. Furthermore, when a person has a first-hand knowledge of his emotional feelings, he is conscious of the total relationship existing between feeling components and between feeling characteristics at a given time. Emotional feelings take on an emotional feeling gestalt as it were. Indeed, it is precisely this

gestalt character that allows us to say that what we look upon as emotional feeling is something more than simply the sum of its components.

We will speak more about the gestalt aspect of the object of first-hand knowledge of feelings shortly. First however, I want to draw the logical conclusion from (1) and (2).

(3) --"when one imagines a feeling, one is thinking hypothetically about a consciousness of the total relationship of the feeling components 'all at once'." We have seen already in Chapter I how the imagined feelings of empathy are "all at once" phenomena. Now we are able to see more of why this is so. For (1) and (2) tell us that "imagining" involves "thinking hypothetically about first-hand knowledge," where "first-hand knowledge" is an "all at once" phenomenon. And so it follows that imaginings have an "all at once" character too. But our discussion in (1) and (2) do more than just confirm the general point about imagining that we made in Chapter I. For in Chapter I we were temporarily accepting all of an adaptation of Perkins' view of the "all at once" aspect of imaginings--we assumed that the imagining state contains no more content than does a "second-hand knowledge" (i.e., knowledge one has of something when this knowledge is not based upon one's having actually experienced this something) of all the feeling components and characteristics as well as their individual relations to one another. The only difference between imagining something and having a second-hand knowledge of it was supposed to be that one is conscious of the content in the latter case serially while one is conscious of the exact same content in the former case all at once. Now however, we can see that there is more to imagined feelings than just this. Certainly, as in Chapter I, when one has empathic 'feelings', one is in a conscious state whereby one thinks "all at once" of

what all the "feelable" noncognitive conscious state components and characteristics (all the ones of which one has knowledge, that is) of the other person's feelings would be like if one were in the same situation the other person is in. The important addition, however, is that now we see that this "all at once" aspect of empathy is actually "thinking hypothetically about the total relationship that exists between the components and between the characteristics of the other person's feelings." The imagined first-hand knowledge of feelings can give us this quality. But it seems that there is as yet no adequate kind of second-hand knowledge (i.e., the kind of knowledge contained in the nonempathic sorts of emotional understanding) pertaining to another's feelings that is about the total relationship of these things. There is no adequate way that has yet been given to talk "serially" about this total relationship. And so, on pragmatic grounds anyway, empathy would seem to have value where other kinds of emotional understanding are lacking.

Now then, although a final analysis of the gestalt aspect of emotional feelings (and 'feelings') will be left for the gestalt psychologists, I do want to say what I think is crucial to clarifying the logical conditions of the concept of "feeling gestalt."

(a) We can get at the first important point through the visual case again. As we have said, when one sees how something looks, one is conscious of all the aspects of the something all at one time. Indeed, part of our concept of "how a thing looks" seems to be basically the concept of just such a temporally unitary phenomenon. It is the concept of bounded visible points (or areas) in space, as it were, which have a total spatial relationship to each other at a given point in time.[1] Since this

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[1]Of course we can speak about how a thing looks through time--e.g., how it looks from yesterday to today. And so it may seem at first glance

is the way we conceptualize visual phenomena, then if we want to know all about how a thing looks, it is only reasonable to suppose that we need a knowledge state that captures the "total spatial relationship at a given point in time" aspect of visual phenomena. Happily, first-hand visual knowledge and imagining visual states gives us just this.

Things are a bit more difficult when we talk about the "gestalt" or "total relationship" of imagined feelings. For while we speak of total spatial relationships for visual phenomena, what do we talk about with feelings? To be sure, in line with our visual example, part of our concept of having an emotional feeling is that it is a unitary event;[1] the concept of having an emotional feeling is the concept of being conscious of the relations of the complex of feeling components and characteristics "all at once"--i.e., all at a given point in time. For our concepts about the kinds of things that people experience seem to include an element of the way in which these things are experienced by people. And an emotional feeling is experienced as an "all at once" phenomenon (it is experienced, that is, as a unitary conscious state, where in fact it is a complex conscious state). Indeed, if an emotional feeling were not experienced "all at once"--if it were instead experienced as a cluster of components

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that the "total relationship" does not really refer to a point in time. It does though. For when we speak of the look of a thing through time, this is really to talk of the various looks the thing has. When we speak about how the look of a thing has changed (or remained the same) through time, we talk about how it had one particular look at some specified point in time and how it had a different (or similar) look at some other point in time. So "how something looks through time" is actually the comparison of particular looks that occur at given discrete points of time.

[1]What I am saying is that in addition to the necessary conditions of the concept of having emotional feelings we sketched in Chapter II, the concept of having emotional feelings has this further necessary condition: that all of the components and all of the characteristics occur at the same time.

occurring at distinct points in time--then there would be no emotional feeling at all; but, rather, a series of felt wants, felt valuations, etc. So in order to have a complete understanding of another's feelings, one needs a knowledge about the total relationship of the appropriate feeling components.

(b) The second important point about the concept of emotional feeling gestalts involves the clarification of the kind of total relationship that exists between feeling (and a fortiori, between empathic 'feeling') components and characteristics of an emotional feeling (or 'feeling'). Unfortunately, we have no precise vocabulary to designate this relationship. Moreover, we also have no precise vocabulary to designate the kind of individual relationships existing between the individual feeling components and characteristics that are part of the total relationship at any given moment. So where we can speak of "to the left of," "on top of," and so on, as spatial relations existing between components of a visually perceived or a visualized scene which is seen (or 'seen') "all at once," it is certainly not immediately clear how we are to define relations for the emotional feeling (or 'feeling') components.

One possibility is that these relations are causal in nature. And so when one is conscious of his 'feelings', one collects knowledge about the causal relationships of the other person's emotional feeling components (and characteristics) and thinks about what it would be like to have such conscious states "all at once."

However, while the "causal" hypothesis is an attractive possibility, I am tempted to take a safer route in describing the total relationship in feelings and empathic 'feelings'. For it is not really clear to me that when one has a feeling or 'feeling', one necessarily collects data

consciously or unconsciously (preconsciously) about causal relations.[1] And so I will settle instead on saying that the total ("all at once") relationship of emotional feelings (and 'feelings') is a relationship of "feeling components existing together in a person's psyche at a given point in time." That is to say, when one is conscious "all at once" of real or imagined feelings, one is conscious of one's complex of felt active dispositions, felt bodily states, the ways in which one evaluates the external situation, etc. as existing together at one point in time. At least this much seems to be contained in our concepts of the gestalt nature of feelings and empathic 'feelings'. What more can be said about the emotional feeling gestalt phenomena we will leave to the gestalt psychologists to figure out.[2]

(c) Let us consider a possible difficulty with the gestalt notion of empathic 'feelings': I have claimed that empathic 'feelings' are hypothetical thoughts about emotional feeling gestalts. But now how can anyone (including the empathizer) confirm that the feeling gestalt about which the empathizer is hypothetically thinking is like the gestalt that the other person experiences when he has his emotional feelings? Gestalts being first-hand phenomena, then by definition we cannot check this quality

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[1]Obviously there are causal relationships that exist between feeling components. It is not equally obvious, however, that this is the kind of thing one is conscious of when we say one is conscious of his feelings. Of course we have seen that to an extent this does happen in the case of EM^4 'feelings'.

[2]See Kurt Lewin's Principles of Topological Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936), esp. Chapters ii-viii.

Perhaps the total relationship of an emotional feeling can be defined by them as a special kind of "life space" which people have. And so a description of the total component relationship in feelings would become parasitic upon the description a gestalt psychologist gives to "life spaces."

of feelings by second-hand methods--i.e., by the methods of psychology. In other words, there seems to be no ready way to check the accuracy of the gestalt character of the imagined feelings of empathy. It is always conceivable that a supposed empathizer might have all the right feeling components and characteristics in mind, but not have the correct gestalt relationship in mind.

One reply to this objection might be that it is certainly possible. Even if I accepted this objection though, still, the only thing I have tried to establish here is that there is something about empathic understanding as a kind of emotional understanding that is at least pragmatically superior to the nonempathic varieties. And I think I have done this. For we can be assured that empathic understanding at least approaches ("approaching" was the only claim I made earlier) an understanding of the gestalt character of the other person's emotional feelings. The nonempathic kinds, however, cannot now even hope to do this. For while gestalt psychologists may some day be able to give us a second-hand kind of knowledge of other people's emotional feeling gestalts by devising an exhaustive list of the parameters of what goes into an emotional feeling gestalt, there does not seem to be any such list now that comes close to the "all at once" information that the empathizer has.

This is a minimal reply to the objection though. In a more optimistic vein, one might hold, as I have already suggested, that the total relationship which constitutes the emotional feeling gestalt boils down to "the emotional feeling components and characteristics [(i.e., the "feelable" aspects of emotional feelings)] existing together in a person's psyche at the same point in time." The gestalt character of empathy, accordingly, could be accurate on this score. For in this situation,

when one empathizes, one thinks hypothetically about the feeling components and characteristics in terms of this relationship. So to the extent that an empathizer can ever be confident that he has knowledge of all the components of the other person's feelings (Chapter III), then simply getting himself into the psychological state of thinking hypothetically "all at once" about the mere existence of these components--i.e., about what it would be like to have all of them at one time--suffices to establish that he is aware of the other person's emotional feeling gestalt in the same way that the other person is. Of course there is the problem of actually gaining a knowledge of all the emotional feeling components. It is highly unlikely that anyone can ever do this perfectly. The point is though that the more feeling components that are captured in empathy, the closer the empathizer's 'feeling' gestalt at least approaches the other person's feeling gestalt. Of course this reply ultimately rests upon determining finally how we are to characterize precisely what the gestalt relationship is. So I am putting it forward as a reply to the above objection with the appropriate reservations.

(4) Finally, if we place our discussion of emotional feeling gestalts in the context of the supposedly primary aims of emotional understanding that we talked about at the beginning of this chapter--viz., gaining cognitions about the other's feelings--it becomes clear that understanding emotional feeling gestalts does not really help us much. There is certainly not much of an interesting cognition one has about gestalts. What I mean is that one has no cognition by virtue of which he can describe a gestalt, beyond merely saying that it exists. And so the cognitive goal of emotional understanding is not appreciably furthered by the gestalt aspect of empathy. However, it seems to me that the request for someone

to understand our feelings is just not always a request with this goal in mind. Rather, it is quite often a request for one to think about the feeling event as it was experienced by the one making the request. For it is in the experiencing of a phenomenon that that phenomenon obtains part of its meaning for a person. The living room starts to become a living room--as opposed to a set of conjoined objects--when one has first-hand visual knowledge or imagined first-hand visual knowledge of the related objects of a living room "all at once." An emotional feeling starts to become an emotional feeling--as opposed to a mere series of felt wants, felt valuations, etc.--when one has a first-hand knowledge of the related components and characteristics "all at once." And finally then, another person's emotional feeling starts to become an emotional feeling to an empathizer--as opposed to a number of conjoined felt wants, felt valuations, etc. which are thought about hypothetically--when the empathizer has an imagined first-hand knowledge of the related emotional feeling components. Until a person has real or imagined first-hand knowledge of the thing he is interested in understanding though, he does not know fully what the thing means to the other person. Thus, if we can assume that it is sometimes important to know what a particular feeling experience means to another person (indeed, it is therapeutically important (e.g., it may inspire confidence on the part of a patient toward his empathic therapist) --as attested to by people like Carl Rogers, Truax and Carkhuff, and many others--and humanely important--as attested to by someone like Buber), then once again we can see substantial value in empathic understanding. And so too then does an understanding of the concept of empathic understanding that has been developed in this dissertation take on that much more importance.

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