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MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY CHILDHOOD

University of Melbourne (Australia) PH.D. 1984

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MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN EARLY CHILDHOOD

Rosemary Anne Milne

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
the University of Melbourne.

1984

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DEDICATION

To all teachers of young children, especially to my mother - my first teacher.

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SUMMARY

This study is of moral development in young children, with a focus on justice as fairness, a term appropriate to the life experience of three- and four-year-old children. The subjects were twenty-eight children attending two groups in a preschool centre (sessional kindergarten), eighteen female and ten male. The ages ranged from three years four months to four years eight months at the commencement of the study. The children were studied for one year at their kindergarten. Five problem areas were explored: (1) moral reasoning; (2) behaviour in peer conflict interactions; (3) relationship between moral reasoning in response to hypothetical dilemmas and behaviour in real-life conflicts; (4) construction of an instrument to describe and measure early moral reasoning and behaviour; (5) moral education within a preschool setting. Semi-structured interviews using Kohlberg-type dilemmas, and naturalistic observations of spontaneous social interactions in free play situations, were the methods used. Pretest and post-test interviews and observations were six months apart. Teachers of one group of children participated in a moral education project which included a process for using naturally-occurring peer conflict in the kindergarten to facilitate moral development. An important tool in this project was the diaries, kept by teachers, of peer conflicts and teacher interventions, and the discussions with the teachers of the events they had recorded. A developmental sequence of eight levels was constructed as both a description of, and a

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measuring instrument for, moral development in preschool children. This sequence delineates smaller steps than in traditional moral development stage theory. It focuses on the criteria used to judge what is fair, and can be applied both to moral reasoning in real-life or hypothetical situations, and to moral behaviour in peer conflict interactions.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

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NEED FOR INVESTIGATION

Early childhood, specifically under five years of age, has been comparatively neglected in research into moral development. Yet this age period may be of maximum importance, as it is in other areas of development. Because little was known about early moral development and many questions emerged in research with older children, this investigation was undertaken to attempt to add to existing knowledge of moral reasoning and moral behaviour in the preschool years (three to five years).

As the investigation proceeded through preliminary studies, it became clear that the investigation should be focused on one area of morality: the child's concept of justice and its effect on behaviour. This is represented within children's experience by the terms "fair" and "not fair" and their concept of equal rights as "sharing".

The investigation reported here is part of a wider project, a moral education program appropriate to children in preschool centres. Therefore it has taken place with children attending a preschool centre.

One of the ultimate goals of the wider project was to explore and test ways for the facilitation of moral development within a preschool environment. It was speedily apparent that,

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in order to approach this goal of early moral education, it was necessary first to gain more understanding of moral development in early childhood than was available from research and theory to date.

The scarcity of data on moral development in young children is further pronounced when we consider the local scene. There is no substantial body of Australian research on moral development or moral education at any age level. A central claim of cognitive-development theory is the universality of stages of moral development (Kohlberg, 1969; 1976) yet this has not been adequately substantiated with Australian subjects. Many more Australian studies are needed to contribute to cross-cultural validation of stage models in theories of moral development.

Cognitive-development Approach

The orientation of this study is that of cognitive-development theory. In the last two decades, the research studies of Kohlberg and others in the area of moral development (which are discussed in the next chapter) have shown cognitive-development theory to be a fruitful base from which to gain further understanding of the moral development of older subjects, particularly adolescents and young adults. Kohlberg claimed that his formulation of the structure of developmental stages of moral reasoning in adolescents and young adults has been empirically validated - at least sufficiently to go on to the next step in theory building (Kohlberg, 1979).

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The next step in the cognitive-development approach has focused on field work in schools to attempt to use the stage formulation to bring about and measure changes in moral reasoning. There is now some evidence to show that moral changes (although slight) can be promoted by moral education programs in secondary schools (Hersh et al, 1980). However, the theory lacks a body of evidence of equal weight relating to primary or "elementary" school children, and has very little at all at the preschool level.

The delineation of age spans in relation to moral stages in cognitive-development theory is very broad:

> the preconventional moral level (Stage 1 and Stage 2) is the level of most children under eight or nine years, the conventional level (Stage 3 and Stage 4) is the level of most adolescents and adults in our society and, it is claimed, in other societies, and the postconventional level (Stage 5 and Stage 6) is reached by a minority of adults and is usually reached only after the age of 20. (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 33).

Preschool children thus may be expected to be operating for the majority of their moral judgments at or below the first (preconventional) level since, according to Kohlberg, Stage 1 is usually not attained before eight years of age, i.e. before the advent of Piaget's concrete-operational stage of cognitive development. It is of importance to those working with preschool children (of approximately three- to five-years-of-age) that researchers try to clarify finer developmental steps within the earlier levels of moral development. This is necessary so that

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early childhood educators can try to match educational experiences, designed to facilitate movement through the early levels, with each child's present stage level.

Much of the present knowledge about the moral development of preschool children is assumed from research findings in which the youngest subjects were selected from primary school populations. The primary school subjects are sometimes as young as four-and-a-half or five years of age but more often older. Kohlberg's original group of subjects, used for the first-stage formulation and validation of the theory of stage sequences in moral development, ranged from eight years of age upwards (Kohlberg, 1963).

The present state of knowledge is inadequate as a basis for early moral education, and whether Kohlberg's theoretical framework can be useful for understanding moral development in the early childhood years is as yet largely undetermined. My own interest in the cognitive-development theory of moral development was heightened as a result of, rather than in spite of, gaps in Kohlbergian theory in relation to preschool children. It was to see if some of those gaps could be filled within the theoretical framework, that the investigation reported here was commenced.

The expectation that a Kohlbergian framework could provide a useful orientation was strengthened by the direct links this theory has through its roots to Piaget's theory of cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1963). Piagetian theory had already

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demonstrated its usefulness in helping to understand the thinking of preoperational children in the broader intellectual area, so there was a reasonable expectation that a moral theory with strong Piagetian roots would be useful in the further exploration of the moral reasoning of preoperational children.

Kohlberg's theory also attempted to grapple with the philosophical problem of how to justify moral education. This problem is embedded in any attempt to facilitate moral development or moral education within a publicly subsidized system of education. Since the present investigation was a precursor to later investigation of such facilitation, it was desirable that the ethical problem be considered in the initial stages.

Kohlberg claimed that the cognitive-development approach to moral education made it possible to justify moral education on philosophical (as well as psychological) grounds and that it thus could justify the educational processes necessary for steering a middle course between the two educational extremes of moral indoctrination on the one hand and the teaching of a stance of extreme moral relativity on the other hand. Kohlberg's philosophical claim is, he argued, based upon psychological evidence of spontaneously-occurring, culturally-universal, stage sequences in moral development. By this argument Kohlberg claimed that it is logically possible to move from the empirical evidence of what "is" the case in moral development sequences, to the prescriptive "ought" by which moral education can be justified, and its aims articulated, in a democratic society (Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg &

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Mayer, 1972).

Objections have been raised, and not entirely refuted, in relation to important aspects of the empirical evidence on which Kohlberg's philosophical stance rests, in particular, the existence of a universal, invariant stage sequence (Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Simpson, 1974). Important criticisms also remain concerning the adequacy of Kohlberg's philosophical concept of morality, and his attempt to overcome the Naturalistic Fallacy of moving from "is" to "ought" (Alston, 1971; Crittenden, 1979; Peters, 1971).

There is a need to take account of these and other objections, and of the contributions of other theories and models of moral development. This is recognized and discussed further in Chapter Two. I concur with the statement of Hersh that

> the complexity of moral development causes us to believe that no one model, of those available at present, is sufficient to the task of moral education. (Hersh et al, 1980, p. viii).

In cognitive-development theory and research, the focus on moral reasoning has resulted in a lack of attention to affective, motivational and behavioural factors in moral development. These factors are coming to be recognized as having theoretical importance (Kohlberg, 1976) but have not yet been sufficiently integrated into research designs within Kohlberg's theoretical framework.

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All of the above problems show limitations in the theory to date. Notwithstanding the theoretical gaps, and in many ways because of them, the present study is set within a framework of cognitive-development theory of moral development. It therefore owes most to the contributions of Kohlberg to moral development research. However, recent important work by Rest supports modification of some major aspects of Kohlberg's stage theory (Rest, 1976; Rest et al, 1978). Rest's work came to attention relatively late in this investigation but was of considerable influence in the examination of the data and the formulation of early moral levels. Kohlberg views the studies of Rest and his colleagues as providing an alternative but acceptable and complementary methodological position to Kohlberg's own. In addition (and perhaps not so acceptingly) Kohlberg acknowledges that there are divergences in theory between his own "Harvard" position and Rest's "Minnesota" position, in relation to the nature of stages in moral development. Kohlberg takes a strict Piagetian stage model whereas the notion of stages in Rest's model is looser (Kohlberg, 1979; Rest, 1979). The discussion of stage models is taken further in the following chapter. At this point it is sufficient to notice that the use of the term "cognitive-development", to describe the orientation of this investigation of moral development, should not be taken to confine it rigidly to the theoretical model of Kohlberg and his colleagues at Harvard Centre for Moral Education.

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Methodological Difficulties of Research with Young Children

The relative lack of research attention to preschool age groups is understandable in the light of methodological problems in obtaining data of how young children make and justify moral choices. It is difficult to explore the reasoning of three- and four-year-old children in response to the traditional hypothetical dilemmas in interview situations, and the reasons behind their choice of overt actions in natural environments. It was recognized that techniques must be developed further to overcome the research problems associated with the relatively low levels of verbal fluency, attention span, and general cognitive functioning in preschool children. The influence of an observer on preschool children's spontaneous conduct was another problem to be overcome at the time of the data collection for this investigation.

The methodological problems must be tackled since we cannot build an adequate body of knowledge about early moral development from the evidence of the responses of low scorers or less "mature" subjects in populations of older children. Recent important work, which helps to fill some of the gaps in knowledge of the early stages of moral development, has come from Damon's study of the early development of positive justice, Hoffman's account of the early development of empathy, role-taking, guilt, and altruistic motives, and Selman's later work on social perspective-taking in childhood (Damon, 1975; 1977; Hoffman, 1976; Selman, 1975; 1976). Reports of these studies were not avail-

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able until after the data collection phase of the present investigation but contributed greatly in the understanding of the data. There is still a great need for further investigation with children below school age, and, in particular, for systematic observations, of how these younger children actually behave and reason spontaneously in naturally-occurring moral dilemmas, i.e. social conflict situations involving the concept of justice for their moral resolution.

Observations of the moral behaviour and reasoning of children in natural environments, and completely free from motivation or manipulation by the researcher, are extremely rare in cognitive development research. In this area the present investigation as planned was expected to be valuable in helping to fill a basic gap, i.e. accurate observation and description. Since natural observations, by definition, do not allow for experimental manipulation aimed at the control of variables, it was recognized that it would be highly desirable to employ a battery of different types of observation methods so that this strategy would lead to a cancelling out of some of the random effects.

It will be seen in the following chapter that the problem area covering the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour is one of major concern to many of the critics of Kohlbergian theory. Critics justifiably point out that there is not sufficient hard data to support Kohlberg's claim that a correlation has been demonstrated to exist between higher stages of moral judgment and higher levels of moral behaviour. It is not

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only at the early childhood level that there is a great gap in research knowledge about how the patterns of relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour are ordered; the gap in empirical knowledge of this relationship exists across the field as a whole. Until successful efforts are made to explore this area in cognitive-development research, critics will continue to argue, with validity, that the cognitive-development theory rests on an unstable foundation insofar as it claims to be a theory of moral development rather than merely a theory of moral judgments.

The investigation of moral judgment and of moral behaviour as distinct categories of study, involves describing aggregates of information in some kind of integrated system, i.e. one system for reasoning and one for behaviour. When we then attempt to relate these two separate systems together into some structured aggregate of the observations of moral behaviour of an individual person or a class of persons observed, we must move to an even more complex level of theoretical structuring and networks of relationship.

The two separate tasks of ordering observations of reasoning, and of behaviour, will already have involved combining discrete bits of information into a relational system which is perceived by the external observer (not necessarily by the subject) and imposed on the information. In such a case the researcher imposes her own structure on what has been observed, assuming that the imposed structure somehow reflects or matches something

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of the internal structure of the subject's thinking which the observer can never observe directly. On the one hand, the imposed structure will always be arbitrary in that it is merely one of an infinite number of ways in which the data could be ordered by the researcher or theorist. On the other hand the structuring will be objective insofar as it does reflect logical patterns which are inherent in the data. Empirical testing and replication studies will be needed to support a claim that there is an acceptable level of tolerance of the fit between the externally imposed structure and the data. However, there will be inevitably, at the same time, an essential subjectivity in the observer bias towards a certain framework of structure and the bias of this research is cognitive-developmental.

There is an obvious logical danger in taking a structure devised primarily to fit moral judgments and applying it to overt behaviour. There is a further danger of stretching the structure inappropriately by then attempting to use it to describe the greater level of complexity of relationships involved when one views moral reasoning and moral behaviour as one system of moral development. However, as Bateson has pointed out, one way of discovering the potential and the limitations of a theory, i.e., its thresholds or boundaries, is by flexing them to the fullest at certain points and, if they do break, trying to understand where and how they break (Bateson, 1980). That is what I have attempted in relation to the existing cognitive-development theory of morality.

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Since the problem of the relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour cannot be ignored simply because it does not readily lend itself, at this stage, to tight research design, an attempt was made in this investigation to work out a methodology which was both imaginative and disciplined. On the one hand, the aim was to avoid the collection of natural observations which could not be used above the level of supplying mere anecdotal insights; on the other hand, the aim was to avoid the pitfall of obscuring fresh information by imposing too rigorous a methodology too soon in the present state of knowledge about early moral development. To this end, preliminary trials took place of a variety of research strategies and combinations of methods of data collection.

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THE SITUATION IN PRESCHOOLS.

Scope of Preliminary Investigations

Preliminary investigations were carried out over a period of three years (1973-1975) firstly to discover what was actually happening in local preschools in relation to the facilitation of moral development within a preschool setting, and secondly to refine the methodology for the main body of the research. As there was no substantial body of research with preschool children within the cognitive-development theory of morality, the preliminary studies were extensive. They ranged over a wide area of moral development in the preschool years, exploring theoretical issues and trying different techniques of data collection and analysis related to these issues.

Table I depicts the scope of the preliminary work. Two hundred teachers were involved in group discussions led by the writer, during this period. An additional thirteen preschool teachers took part in open-ended individual interviews involving more than one session with the main researcher. Thirteen preschool groups were visited with a total number of 325 children; various kinds of observation and recording of spontaneous behaviour in natural settings were carried out during these visits to preschools. These records were later analysed and methods evaluated by the researcher with a group of five graduate

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TABLE I

Scope of Preliminary Investigations

Interviews	Recording		Total No. of Children Interviewed.
	Audio-visual	Audio	
Moral Concepts	-	25	25
Moral Dilemmas	2	48	50
Piagetian stories	8	-	8
Total	10	73	83

No. of preschool groups visited	13
No. of children observed in spontaneous social peer interaction	325
No. of preschool teachers interviewed individually	13
No. of preschool teachers in group discussions	200
Total	213

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students; as a result, some methods were modified and re-tried. In addition to the natural observations, eighty-three individual interviews with preschool children were carried out and recorded by nine interviewers. Ten of these interviews were recorded on audio-visual tape and the remainder on audiotape only. The interviews were transcribed and analysed in terms of content, toys or equipment used, probing techniques, recording techniques, skill of interviewers in eliciting relevant responses, length of interviews, ease of analysis and reliability of scoring, etc. Again some techniques were ruled out as insights developed, others were refined and re-tried. Slowly there emerged techniques deemed most appropriate and useful for the major investigation, as shown later in this chapter.

The effort to avoid premature solidification of any part during the preliminary investigation led to a back and forth interplay between the parts of the study. For example, observations of children in spontaneous play situations preceded moral interviews with children and suggested some of the content for the probing questions used during these interviews. In a complementary fashion, as a result of the first set of interviews, fresh questions arose as to how children actually do behave in natural preschool settings, e.g. what was the content of their moral conflicts; what words did they use to express moral concepts? This led to further observations to seek answers to these questions, and what was learned from the second set of observations was used to frame the questions that were asked of children in the next set of interviews. This kind of reciprocal

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influence between interviews and observations added significantly to the richness of the data.

Social Development Umbrella

Neither moral development nor moral education was differentiated by the majority of preschool teachers from the broader area of social development. All thirteen teachers individually interviewed, and many in group discussions, spontaneously revealed some confusion related to moral development and education. They were unsure about their own teaching role, their authority, and the match with parental expectations, in relation to values and moral education. Furthermore, none showed evidence of understanding stages of moral development. Twelve of the thirteen could not articulate their problems when asked to be more specific, since they were unable to frame adequate concepts of moral values, moral education or moral development. They expressed their problems in terms of how to choose appropriate social objectives for children and, in particular, from the negative stance of how to avoid teaching "my own middle class standards". Ten of the thirteen teachers referred spontaneously to their responsibility as a teacher to avoid such teaching of middle class standards when asked to give their views on moral education in preschools. Teachers in group discussions revealed similar problems, often defining moral education solely in terms of sex education.

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For example:

A:"Do you think a preschool teacher should be concerned with moral education?"

B:"Definitely not; sex education should be done in the home at that age."

A:"Do you think that moral education is necessarily about sex?"

B:"Well, what else would it be about?"

C:"Oh yes, table manners . . . maybe?"

No articulated planning for moral development or moral education, as such, was observed or discovered in any of the thirteen preschools visited. Neither was there much evidence of it in group discussions involving two hundred teachers, except in four or five cases where preschool teachers in the Catholic school system claimed they had a reasonable program of early moral education, which rested on a religious base. However, even those teachers did not have a specific set of objectives for moral development written into their program-planning notebooks. Not one of the two hundred and thirteen teachers referred to any kind of systematic written planning for moral development.

Teachers valued highly in preschool children the learning of consideration of others. In their response to a questionnaire (See Appendix I) asking them to state three moral values they would most wish to foster, approximately half of the responses fell into the broad category of consideration of others, e.g.

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"respect and concern for the rights of others"; "do unto others"; "not hurting others"; "accepting 'different' children"; "tolerance for the individual". The majority of teachers reported, in discussion following the completion of the questionnaire, that parents valued highly in preschool education that children "learn to get along with others", and that this was generally what teachers meant by the more formal wording of the objective "to show consideration for others". Teachers thought and planned for the development of consideration for others under the title of "social development". No more than ten of over two hundred teachers spontaneously used the term "socialization", and "social knowledge" was not used by any teachers in the discussions. No teacher used the terms "moral", "justice", or "fairness" until after they were introduced by the researcher. Rather, the teachers referred to "social skills", such as "learning to share", which could be more specifically related to observable behaviour.

Many teachers said they did not like the term "moral" and did not think it appropriate to be used in preschool education because of connotations of "imposing middle class values on children and families", or, "bringing in my own value judgments". There was wide-spread feeling expressed that values and value judgments are non-rational and undesirable in teacher behaviour and that teachers should try to avoid them. Value judgments appeared to be given the status of mere beliefs and opinions which could not be substantiated in any logical or empirical fashion; the phrase, "a value judgment", was frequently preceded

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by a qualifier, such as "merely", "just" or "only". On the other hand, there was almost unanimous agreement in teachers' discussions that knowledge of social development, gained through the study of psychology, could provide teachers with a body of objective "facts" which were both necessary and sufficient to form the basis of a set of educational objectives in relation to social development. Twelve of the thirteen teachers interviewed stated the view that this specifying of social objectives for preschool children, objectively based on "the facts" of child development, was part of their professional task. When they had trouble in choosing social objectives for the children, as all did at times, they put the problem down to their own lack of sufficient knowledge of psychological facts.

Conflicts within the Eclectic Approach by Teachers

The use of the term "social development" rather than "socialization", which has been mentioned above, might appear to indicate that the teachers generally had some kind of "developmental" orientation to early childhood education. This was expected in the light of knowledge of the orientation of the teachers' college in which the majority of the teachers had received their pre-service training. However, the confusions noticed earlier in teachers' thinking about the necessary relationship between values and objectives, were deepened by other problems arising from the relationship between psychological theory and educational practice.

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The thirteen teachers interviewed all articulated the broad aims of their preschool programs within a general cognitive-developmental framework, e.g. "to facilitate the stages of development". Furthermore, the actual teaching behaviours observed were generally congruent with the cognitive-development approach, i.e. teachers focused on stimulating self-directed discovery and problem-solving in the intellectual sphere. However, within the sphere of social development, teachers appeared to plan from a different theoretical base which was a loose Learning Theory orientation. Teachers identified specific behavioural objectives for each individual child and, in their written plans, noted that they would seek to model and reinforce desired behaviours. However, the reinforcement was seldom specified and was not clearly carried out in practice. Teacher reinforcements appeared to be spasmodic and not very effective, base lines of behaviour had not been established, and frequency counts were not made.

The teachers generally were spending a considerable amount of time writing plans for social learning within a framework which was, at least to some extent, inconsistent with their broadly stated educational philosophy and with their actual teacher behaviours. They were all frustrated by their awareness of inconsistencies but unable to sort out how these arose and hence unable to resolve them. Their problem appeared to be linked to the general pressures for accountability in education. The cognitive-development approach, which appeared to be their general base of philosophy and action, does not provide clear

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educational guidelines for assessment of children's learning, particularly short-term assessments. The teachers felt accountable to show that they were teaching, and that children were learning, yet cognitive-development stages were too broad to provide a useful measure for accountability in the preschool situation and, in any case, cognitive-development theory did not, at that time, provide the kind of model of the stage approach to social development which Damon (1977) and Selman (1980) later presented. So the teachers appeared to be planning (and to a lesser extent attempting to assess) within one framework, and teaching within another.

There were many difficulties observed in the efforts of teachers to carry out their eclectic approach to preschool education but the problems were particularly apparent in relation to moral aspects of social development, e.g. showing respect for the rights and needs of other children. It was difficult for the teachers to reduce the moral aspects of social development to a list of specific observable objectives. Aspects of social development which were not easily observed and measured were omitted in favour of those which could be specified as skills and recorded as having been overtly displayed. Ten of the thirteen teachers stated that they worked in this way, reducing the area of educational concern in their written program notes, yet trying to broaden it again in their actual behaviour in the classroom. The researcher found only one of more than two hundred teachers who claimed to have brought together all the objectives she wished to include under social development and to have examined the set as

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a whole to identify any components which might be missing and which she considered were important in relation to the overall aims of her educational program. A further problem identified by many teachers was that, even if a teacher took a written set of social objectives which included only those which could be stated behaviourally, the set was too large; it was not manageable in relation to detailed observation, planning, teaching and assessment for each individual child in the preschool program.

Teachers in discussion rejected tight schedules of reinforcement of desired social and moral behaviour on the grounds that conditioning and indoctrination were not in accordance with their educational philosophy. Yet the teachers did not have at their command adequate alternative teaching strategies which they could use to achieve specific objectives. "Learning to share" was a common example of an objective in the category of social development which caused problems in practice due to confusion on the part of teachers. Teachers in group discussions identified sharing as a basic social "skill". Preschool children were expected to learn to share both physical materials and the attention of the teacher. Sharing behaviour appeared to be considered the predominant way in which preschool children could be expected to show achievement of the more abstract learning objective of "consideration for others". The most popular preschool curriculum manual, which over eighty per cent of teachers said they referred to at least "sometimes" (Melbourne Kindergarten Teachers'College, 1974), gave a similar emphasis to sharing and indicated modelling and reinforcement as the main teaching strat-

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egies. Many of the teachers expressed feelings that they did not want simply to condition children into sharing; they wanted children to want to share. There was little initial understanding of the complexity of the notion of sharing but it led, later, to great interest in discussion of such problems as: what things should a child in preschool share and not share and how do children come to understand the distinction; how do you judge what is a fair time for a "turn" and is it always the same length of time?

In spite of the written emphasis on modelling and reinforcement as teaching strategies, observations in the preschool groups revealed that the most common teacher behaviour in regard to sharing was verbal admonitions to a child to share, given after incidents of conflict arose. Children were frequently observed to revert to their previous (non-sharing) behaviour as soon as the teacher moved away from the situation. Some particular children (generally one or two in each preschool group) were also observed frequently to glance to see if the teacher was watching before grabbing an object that was being used by another child. Children who frequently adopted this strategy appeared to be very skilled in its use to gain their own ends without detection by the teacher. When a teacher observed an incident of "grabbing" she was often confused in her handling of it and many teachers expressed dissatisfaction with their own behavior, in their later discussions. They felt that it was necessary for a teacher to know who had a "right" to the grabbed object so that she could direct the children what to do, but that this was often difficult

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for a teacher to know because she had not observed prior behaviour. Teachers were aware that they often started unsatisfactory discussion with children about "who had it first" and then walked away to let the children settle it.

An example will illustrate a common type of incident over possession and sharing:

> Bill and John are working at a table with small interlocking blocks, wheels, etc. in front of them. Bill takes a wheel he wants from John's pile. John snatches it. Their struggle brings the teacher.
>
> John: "He took mine."
> Teacher to Bill: "You must ask before you take John's blocks."
> Bill: "I did ask. He wouldn't give it to me."
> Teacher to John: "John, Bill needs some. Can you share yours with Bill?"
>
> John pushes half his set of parts over to Bill. The teacher goes away. Less than one minute later, John gets up and walks away from the table, leaving his half-completed task.

It appeared to the observer that John responded mainly to the perceived authority of the teacher. When she asked if he could share some blocks with Bill he did not act in any way which demonstrated his awareness of a choice to be made. His action suggested that he saw the teacher's question as a direction to be obeyed. He did not present his own point of view that he, also, needed that wheel in order to complete his own model. Through such observation, and discussion, it was recognized that helping children to learn to share is a more complicated process than was recognized in the planning and behaviour of many thoughtful teachers.

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As a result of observation of what was actually happening in the field of preschool education, during the preliminary investigations, it had become plain that there were two distinct but related problems. The first problem was that the teachers did not have a clear enough understanding of the available knowledge about moral development to guide their professional practice; the second problem was that theoretical models of moral development had not been constructed to a stage where they could provide preschool teachers or curriculum planners with sufficiently clear guidelines for the educational tasks teachers were attempting.

Kuhn has stated the importance of an approach which includes two distinct but related concerns: a better articulation of theory of moral development and the better application of that theory. She argued that the significance of educational applications of developmental theory depends, in a number of important ways, on a fuller development and articulation of the theory, and that in turn it is in attempts at application that the weakness and further requirements in the theory are most clearly exposed (Kuhn, 1978). In discussing the claim of Kohlberg and Mayer (1972), that educational implications can be drawn exclusively from developmental stage theory, Kuhn ably stated the problem which existed then, and still is not fully resolved:

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> "the stage sequences on which the argument is based are still so abstract, so vague, and so incompletely defined that it is not at all clear what they entail as structures of thought in a broad, general sense that cuts across a wide range of concrete situations. And these are exactly the terms in which educators would require the stage to be defined . . . The task is therefore to discover how Piagetian or Kohlbergian stage structures manifest themselves in the reasoning that individuals employ in a multitude of everyday situations both inside and outside of school. Again, we have very little knowledge in this regard, and again, both theory and application are in need of it in order to advance". (Kuhn (1978, p. x).

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In any research in behavioural sciences, ethical considerations are primary. In the area of moral development, they have great importance because of the praise/blame criterion that is often attached to moral functioning. The theoretical basis of this research study explicitly ruled out any justification for attempting to apply measures of moral reasoning and behaviour to the moral worth of an individual. In the cognitive-development theory of morality, it is a fundamental assumption that each person is of equal moral value.

This study is concerned with the development of moral reasoning and moral behaviour; it is not concerned with evaluation of individuals in terms of their hypothetical moral worth to society. Since it is possible that educational implications may be drawn from the investigation, and that these would entail consideration of the standing of an individual in terms of the

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stages of his or her reasoning and behaviour, it is important that this point be underlined. Furthermore, no deception was employed in any techniques used to gather information. In any study of the development of fair consideration of the rights, needs and desires of all persons, all persons involved, including young children, must be treated with equal respect.

OBSERVATION OF TEACHER BEHAVIOUR

During the preliminary studies it was also possible to observe the natural behaviour of teachers in response to peer conflicts among children. Five types of response were observed, with a tendency for a particular teacher to have a preferred strategy or combination of strategies.

1. Ignoring the conflict. Teachers who preferred the strategy of non-intervention expressed justifications on the basis of it being good for children to learn to settle their own disputes, and of conflicts being settled more quickly if the teacher did not intervene.

2. Evoking a rule. e.g. "We don't throw sand." This type of response was frequently combined with that of removing from the group a child who continued to transgress after being reminded of the rule. This combined strategy was employed by all teachers observed (including the non-interveners) whenever physical safety was involved. The double combination was seldom used otherwise,

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e.g. children might be reminded of a rule about sharing but not removed from the situation when they continued to demand sole possession of objects.

3. Directing a solution. e.g. "John, you can ride the bike three times round the track, then it will be Pierre's turn." This strategy was described by teachers as modelling a solution which it was hoped children would remember and apply to similar problems.

4. Distracting one of the participants. e.g. "Well, Naomi's using that now; would you like to help me get out the water trolley?" Teachers expressed justifications on the grounds of keeping the group running smoothly and, also, modelling desirable behaviour.

5. Preventing conflict by anticipation and action. e.g. providing another doll's pram when two children were beginning to get in each other's way with their use of one pram; moving closer to children when voices began to get tense. Many teachers felt it was an important part of their role to be alert to social conflict and prevent it developing, and were extremely skilled in the use of this strategy. When peer conflict did erupt, these teachers used strategy 4, distracting, and to a lesser extent, strategy 3, directing.

In many cases, direct physical aggression and threats of

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aggression, either verbal or physical, were successful ways for children to manipulate the behaviour of peers in the preschools observed. In one preschool where the teacher consciously ignored conflict, physical aggression was observed three times in one hour and conficts were settled each time by the children on a "might is right" basis which reflected Kohlberg's lowest stage of moral judgment. In other preschools where teachers employed different strategies when they noticed conflicts, the incidents of conflict not observed by the teacher were predominantly resolved on the same basis of might is right. In all groups there were one or more children who were observed to use physical attacks or threats of attack on others in all cases of conflict. Other children gave in to the regular aggressors, left the situation or, less frequently, called on the teacher to intervene. When the teacher intervened, the physically aggressive child often ran away from the conflict situation as the teacher came up, and was seldom brought back to discuss it.

The overall impression was that, partly as a result of teacher-behaviour, the children were learning by reinforcement that physical power, and authority, are the basis on which issues of moral right and wrong are settled, and that social conflict should be avoided. Observation and discussion suggested that an overwhelming concern of teachers in cases of social conflict was that the conflict be settled speedily so that the smooth functioning of the group could continue, e.g. "so that the children can get on with their learning". The potential value of a conflict situation as a moral teaching and learning opportunity

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was little recognized. Even when a teacher articulated one of her educational objectives as "that children learn to share", a peer conflict was discussed by her in terms of a prior failure to learn rather than as an immediate opportunity for learning.

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MORAL INTERVIEW TRIALS

The method of obtaining data through the use of semi-structured interviews and hypothetical dilemmas was also explored in the preliminary studies. Hypothetical dilemmas were the main tool that had been used in cognitive-development research on moral development. The use of hypothetical dilemmas would enable the researcher to pre-select the issues to be probed with all subjects, in a way in which spontaneous conflict incidents would not. The advantage of observing spontaneous incidents, on the other hand, was that they were more open to the obtaining of new information in exploratory study. It was desired to combine natural observation with data obtained from interviews, to get both perspectives.

It was resolved to use two examples of child behaviour that had been frequently observed involving sharing, to form the content of two Kohlbergian-type story dilemmas, i.e. taking turns on a swing and sharing a set of objects which could be divided (building blocks) but which was made up of an odd number. Probing questions would revolve around the notion of a fair solution and the reasoning behind a child's judgment. A child's response to both dilemmas would be considered together to discover the highest level of moral reasoning used. The third category provided the content for a Piagetian-type dilemma about the

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accidental interruption of another child's play. This was to be considered as a separate interview which would be used specifically to examine children's use of the factor of intentionality in making judgments about fair/not fair.

There were also trials of a fourth approach to the eliciting of data in interview situations: the moral concept interviews explored ways of using a direct questioning approach to obtaining information on how children thought about the words: right, wrong, good, bad, naughty, sharing, fair. The child was required to provide his or her own content instead of having been given a framework in an initial story. The purposes were both to explore the usefulness of different techniques to stimulate children's responses and to find out which concepts yielded the richest data. A variety of techniques was employed.

Dilemma Interviews

Fifty children were given hypothetical moral dilemma interviews of the Kohlbergian type, lasting approximately 10 to 20 minutes, using a variety of dilemma stories and of supplementary materials. The method was gradually refined in relation to content and materials.

In order to elicit a child's highest level of moral reasoning, it was found necessary that the story content meet the following conditions:

i. that the dilemmas be meaningful to the child, i.e. that

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the incidents be capable of being related by the child to his or her real-life experience and that the problem be capable of being grasped intellectually by preoperational thinkers;

ii. that the dilemmas be complex enough to be capable of stimulating a range of solutions which could involve each child's highest level of moral reasoning;

iii. that the content be of sufficient interest to motivate the child to respond to probing questions.

Materials that were gradually evolved for the story dilemmas met the following conditions:

i. they focused the child's attention on the dilemma and did not stimulate ideas outside the story content;

ii. they could be actively but quietly handled by the child;

iii. they increased in interest to the child from the first to the third dilemma so as to revive waning attention.

The level of activity that the child could apply to the material associated with each dilemma increased in order of presentation, as the child's need for motor activity increased in relation to the time he or she was kept sitting at the interview table. The materials finally found most useful can be seen in Figures 1-3, Chapter 3.

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The video-taping of some interviews during the pilot studies proved most useful for the selection of the interviewers in the main investigation. Four interviewers were video-taped in action. All were qualified and experienced teachers of young children.

The audio-visual tapes allowed the researcher to observe non-verbal as well as verbal interactions between interviewers and children and revealed differences in the strategies and abilities of the adults to establish rapport and sustain motivation in a way which had not been revealed by transcribed audio-taped protocols. When "don't know" responses occurred on video-tape, it was often possible to see visual evidence of the interviewer's behaviour which could be expected to have contributed to the child's negative response at least as much as the child's own lack of knowledge, e.g. the adult unconsciously drawing herself up into a dominating bodily posture, leaning over the child and invading his personal space, in an effort to elicit a response. The differences observed through examination of the video-tapes

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confirmed the thinking that the assumption was too readily made in research with young children that one person interviewing a child might be expected to obtain much the same data as another, given the same amount of practice with the material.

There was now seen to be great advantage in using the one best interviewer available for all the interviews in the main investigation. It appeared that this would yield the highest levels of reliability and validity in relation to obtaining the highest levels of reasoning of subjects.

The video-taping of interviews revealed an area of problems in research in moral reasoning of young children, which could form the basis of a separate study at a later date, namely a study of the non-verbal interactions between interviewers and preschool children related to the quantity and quality of the children's verbal responses. This does not apply only to research in moral reasoning but equally to any research with young children which involves them in verbally responding to an interviewer. Much remains to be understood about interviewer-subject rapport.

Piagetian Interviews

The preliminary studies included the use of two Piagetian stories with eight children from three-and-a-half to five-and-a-half-years. The stories used initially were about the broken teacups and the tear in clothing (Piaget, 1968 [1932]). The

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purpose of including trials with the Piagetian material was to see whether preschool children understood the content of the stories and the questioning. These stories had been used successfully in many research studies with children. It was desired to explore some of the elements which made them successful research tools, so that any insights could be used in the construction of the dilemma stories for this study. It was not intended to use the Piagetian stories themselves in the main investigation.

The Piagetian stories were readily understood by even the youngest three-year-olds and elicited thoughtful responses. It was found helpful to give the child three small toy figures to represent the two main characters and a mother, in each pair of stories. The toy figures were a useful concrete reference in checking responses. E.g. "This boy, did he break the cups on purpose or was it an accident? Which one will the mother say is the naughtiest boy?" The toy figures helped the researcher gain greater clarity of answer with young children than mere verbal references would have done to "the first boy" and "the second boy", or "Johnny" and "Robert". Also the figures provided a focus for visual and motor attention in the child's handling of them. They were interesting enough to bring back attention to the story when the children let their gaze wander around the room, or when they wanted something to fidget with in their hands, yet the toy figures were not so interesting in themselves that they stimulated children to other kinds of play with them when children were simultaneously being given the story content

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to relate to the toys. (In the concept interviews described later, where the interviewer was not supplying a story, the use of dolls was finally judged not profitable).

None of the children displayed anxiety over the use of the term "naughty" during the Piagetian stories, such as described in discussing the concept interviews. Although the children in the concept interviews had not been given a reference to themselves in association with the word, "naughty", some had responded with anxiety as if the association were implied. The Piagetian stories had an explicit reference to other chldren who were named rather than to self, which may have allayed anxiety and encouraged response.

Four children judged the naughtiness of the act on the size of consequences, as would be expected by Piagetian theory. Two children judged firmly on intentionality and rejected size of consequences. These children displayed consistency in the basis on which they judged both stories. The seventh child used contradictory judgments, judging on both intentionality then on size of consequences. The eighth child judged the first story on consequences and the second on intention. Although the Piagetian stories had been included in the pilot studies simply to gain insights into the method, rather than to measure the responses of individual children, the results were of interest because of the number of children who took intention into account. It was decided that it would be useful to explore the issue of intention versus size of consequences further in the main investigation.

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This could be done through a story based on the third of the three types of naturally-arising conflict situations that had been observed to take place in preschools - interruption of another child's play.

It had been demonstrated that story dilemmas requiring moral judgments, of interest to preschool children, and capable of yielding their thoughtful responses for later analysis, could be constructed. The Piagetian interviews suggested some advantages in the use of "other person" references with young children when referring to negative behaviour. It should be noted that the other persons, i.e. the children in the story content, and the doll representatives of them, were sufficiently familiar for the child to identify them as peers. The child characters should be such as to allow the possibility of the subject identifying or not identifying with them, as he or she chooses.

Two main child characters in each story, with one adult character, seemed to be a good guide to the level of complexity that could be understood by preschool children.

It had been found that the length of interviews, using stories, could be up to twenty minutes at any one sitting, if some related material were available which the three- to five-year olds could handle, without being distracted from verbally responding, and if the interviewer was skilled in relating to children of this age.

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Two or three story dilemmas could be handled in the time available. It had been found that children's interest revived with the introduction of a new story, so three shorter stories seemed preferable to one or two longer stories.

The toy material should be very simple and should relate directly to the story, helping to focus attention on the dilemma. It should not be capable of producing noise which would interfere with the audio-taping.

Concept Interviews

The concept interviews probed children's understanding of a range of words with moral connotations by asking children what the words meant. Right, wrong, good, bad, naughty, sharing, and fair were the concepts explored using the techniques described below.

Direct verbal questions and verbal responses: children were asked: "What does - - - mean? Tell me about something that's - - -. Why is that - - - ? How do you know that's - - - ? How did you learn that?"

Verbal questions and responses were also stimulated by toy objects. Toy objects were included to help overcome hesitancies in children's verbal responses, through the addition of another form of symbolic functioning, viz. pretence play. After the questions, "What does - - - mean? Tell me something that's - -

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-," children were invited to use the toys to "Show me something that's - - -." The further questions as above then followed.

The toys were also found to be useful to help motivate children to enter the interview situation, and to retain their interest while there, e.g. "Miss X has some new toys next door. She needs people to help make up stories about them. Who would like to see them next?"

The collection of toys contained miniature figures representing male and female adults; boys, girls and unisex children; babies; and common household furniture items, such as beds, chairs, etc. In the first trials the children were invited to select from the toys as they desired on entering the interview situation and to play freely for a few minutes. This was found to be too distracting and time-consuming. Some children spent half an hour happily playing with the toys in their own way and refusing to be distracted by the interviewer's questions. In the next trials, the toys were introduced in the middle of the interview but similar problems occurred. The toys were also noisy and interfered with the audio-tape recording of the interviews. The selection was gradually reduced in subsequent trials, until children were given one (unisex) figure only, with the statement, "Here's a boy/girl rather like you. Show me something that's - - -; make him/her do something that's - - -." Probing for reasons behind judgments then followed as before. The single figure was deemed not to add usefully to the purpose of the interview. It gave children something to be active with

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but did not focus their attention sufficiently on the task, e.g. they could spend a long time discussing irrelevant features, such as the clothes on the doll. This technique was therefore abandoned.

Verbal questions and responses were also stimulated by pictures and drawings. In some trials children were invited to "draw a picture about someone doing something naughty/good/fair" and questioned about their picture. They enjoyed the drawing but many were at the stage of graphic representation where they did not draw action or have any interest in projecting action onto their graphic representation of a person, e.g. "That's my brother." "What's he doing?" "Nothing. Now I'll draw you a picture of my sister." In other trials, children were simply shown a drawing of a child of the same sex as themselves and told, "Here's a boy/girl who's about your age. I'm going to make a story-book about him/her and I need your help. In this story he/she has to do something naughty. Tell me what he/she can do that's naughty. Why is that naughty?" Children quickly lost interest when presented with a simple picture in which the character was not engaged in an activity.

The trials of different techniques for concept interviews led to a number of conclusions in relation to the further investigation. Firstly, the method was potentially useful for the exploration of a child's definition of a moral term in his or her own way. Secondly, the lack of a given story-content, which was

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an essential element in this technique, made the situation more abstract and less interesting to young children. It was therefore necessary for the interviewer to show great skill in eliciting information speedily. Attention wandered after two or three minutes. Thirdly, the use of various types of materials, such as toys and drawings, to stimulate and sustain children's interest in the problem, more often than not led to children using the materials to divert their attention from the problem of verbally expressing their understanding of concepts. Such materials might be useful to illustrate specific stories in the dilemma interviews but were a distraction in the concept interviews.

Children's responses to the concepts explored in moral concept interviews revealed the complexity involved in the choice of terms to be explored.

Right and wrong were frequently associated with non-moral usage, e.g. "That picture's wrong; I'm bigger than that." "My brother gets his sums right." These terms were therefore discarded from the future exploration in concept interviews.

Good was frequently used as a label relating to the self, with little further expansion, e.g.

Q. "What does good mean?"

A. "I'm a good boy."

Q. "Tell me something you do that's good."

A. "My mummy says I'm a good boy.";

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Q. "When does she say that?"

A. "All the time she says it."

Q. "What do you do that makes her say you're good?"

A. "I be good, that's all."

Descriptions of positive action associated with the word "good" were often related to helping mother and, to a lesser extent, father or a younger sibling, e.g. "He could help his mother with the dishes, that's good." The data from good was low in peer reference.

Children sometimes related the word "good" to its non-moral meaning of something pleasant and desirable, e.g.

Q. "What does good mean?"

PAUSE.

"Tell me something that's good."

A. "Ice cream, that's good."

Bad was often used by children for the same descriptions they had given for "good" but with the addition of a negative, e.g. not helping his mother with the dishes. If bad was posed before good, children frequently reversed the procedure, presenting forbidden action as bad, e.g. "touching his daddy's record player," and adding a negative to make the same situation become an example of good. This suggested that, as might be expected, the order of presentation of words might strongly influence responses. Yet there were suggestions that other factors besides the order of presentation might be operating. Some children

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appeared always to use a baseline of positive good to define either good or bad in any order of presentation and one child only (who was later described by his teacher as very aggressive with peers) always began from the position of a positive bad and defined good as not-bad, e.g. "not hitting".

There were interesting questions raised by the above type of response which it would be profitable to research further in the future, but it was finally decided not to pursue the exploration of the concepts "good" and "bad" within the present study, due to another factor. To be asked by a strange adult to talk about bad actions was found to be disturbing to some children in the interview situation. "Naughty" frequently produced the same type of anxious reaction, e.g. "I'm not a naughty boy." "I'm never bad." "I don't know anything naughty; can I go now?"

"Naughty" and "bad" were therefore excluded for both ethical and practical reasons.

Sharing and fair were terms associated mainly with peers, in contrast to the words: right, wrong, good, bad and naughty which were seldom associated with incidents outside the family situation, even though the interviews were taking place within a pre-school environment. A few responses related being fair to sharing with siblings. Not one response related to a child sharing with adults. The concept of fair is logically related to the concept of justice, which is the central concept in the cognitive-development theory of moral development. Sharing may be

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subsumed under fair.

There appeared to be relationships between word order and motivation. Children gave most attention to the first word they were asked to talk about and motivation dropped with each subsequent word, as was revealed by diminished length of response.

It was decided that one moral concept only should be explored in the major investigation by direct questioning, and that this should be the concept of fair. Fairness would also be the focus of the dilemma stories, so comparisons could be made between a child's responses in both situations, i.e. with and without contextual story information supplied by the researcher. It was also decided that the direct questioning without story clues should be presented first, before story dilemmas were introduced, so as to control influence on the child's content by the interviewer's story.

Apart from the fact that "fairness" was shown to be a logical choice for the concept to be explored, this was an important choice to make in a study of moral development and education. Earlier in this report we noted that teachers were struggling with a somewhat superficial understanding of sharing as merely a learned social skill. We have seen that sharing behaviour is more complicated than many teachers think it to be. It should be seen as a moral issue because of the importance of finally recognizing that the rights, needs and desires of others must be given equal consideration to one's own.

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PROBLEM AREAS

The preliminary studies led to the decision that the main investigation would attempt to describe steps or levels in the development of reasoning and behaviour related to fairness, i.e. what number and type of criteria do preschool children use to judge whether something is fair or not fair in hypothetical cases; and what relationship, if any, exists between the children's hypothetical judgments and their behaviour in spontaneous real-life events. The four main problem areas which emerged, and which were of central concern, were now specified as follows:

Problem Area 1. Moral Judgments and Reasoning in Preschool Children

1.1 Do the data support a cognitive-development stage model of morality, insofar as a discernible sequence of levels can be demonstrated in children who, by their age, would be expected to be operating below Kohlberg's Stage 1? Is there evidence of invariant sequences, fluctuation, or of movement in a backward direction?

1.2 How are changes in moral reasoning incorporated? Can we throw any light on whether there is a gradual or a sudden

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replacement of lower modes of reasoning by higher modes? Do the lower modes drop out, become integrated into higher modes, or remain in use as alternative ways of thinking about moral problems?

1.3 What amount of change takes place in a six-month period in this age group?

Problem Area 2. Moral Behaviour in Preschool Children

2.1 Can a sequential stage model be constructed from the data gained from naturalistic observation of behaviour? Is there evidence of progression, fluctuation, or movement in a backward direction?

Problem Area 3. Relationships Between Levels of Moral Reasoning and Levels of Moral Behaviour

3.1 Is there any discernible relationship between a child's highest level of moral reasoning as judged in hypothetical moral dilemma interviews and his or her behaviour in spontaneously-arising moral conflict situations with peers? What is the nature of the relationship (if any) with regard to correspondence between levels of behaviour?

3.2 Does the evidence fit the assumption that a particular level of moral reasoning is a necessary condition for a particular level of moral behaviour?

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3.3 Does peer interaction seem to be an important variable? Do high social-participators and low social-participators in spontaneous play situations, display differences on measures of moral reasoning and behaviour?

Problem Area 4. Measuring Moral Reasoning and Behaviour in a Preschool Environment

4.1 Can the hypothetical moral dilemma interview be used effectively as a method for gathering information about the moral reasoning of young children: can the content have meaning; can the method elicit what appears to be the young child's highest mode of judgment; can the results be scored reliably?

4.2 Can natural observation of children's behaviour in spontaneously-occurring moral conflict situations in an on-going preschool program provide useful data from which to judge children's levels of moral development?

4.3 Can scoring methods be devised which will enable researchers to assess moral reasoning and moral behaviour on the same type of scale?

Stimulating Moral Development Within a Preschool Program

This additional problem area was identified. It was decided that moral education in a preschool environment should be viewed

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as a separate part of the investigation. Questions in this area include: What are the essential characteristics of an effective program of moral education in a preschool? Can the aims and procedures be integrated with the existing aims and procedures of the total preschool program? Can preschool teachers implement a program of moral education - can they learn to recognize developmental levels of thinking and behaviour, formulate and carry out teaching procedures to stimulate change, and assess results? What additional knowledge and skills, if any, do preschool teachers need for the task of stimulating moral development?

The moral education program in which these issues were explored is reported in Chapter 5.

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CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

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The review of research on moral development, reported in this chapter, extends beyond what was available at the time of the design of the main investigation in 1975, and the gathering of the data in 1976. Publication dates after 1975 indicate material that, although not available at the design stage of the study, did subsequently contribute in a significant way to the analysis of data and the interpretation of the findings.

In 1976 Lickona brought together a contemporary collection of papers from many different perspectives on moral development and research (Lickona, 1976). This is considered by the writer to have reflected a significant turning point for many practitioners in the moral research field. The change was in the direction of a more holistic approach to the study of moral development with the recognition that no single theoretical model, of those then available, could adequately cope with all the complexities of the field. The breadth of Lickona's selection of papers, and his report of the state of the field in his preface, signposted the new movement. This trend towards finding overlapping patterns in research from different theoretical approaches was reinforced by Damon's (1978) editing of a collection of papers on new directions in moral development studies.

Damon's volume, like Lickona's earlier book, demonstrated the bringing together of different perspectives. It reflected multiple perspective-taking not only in the choice of papers as a set but also in the broad outlook of many individual contributors. It is interesting to notice that this trend of researchers

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in moral development has occurred following ever-increasing importance given by them to the child's growing ability to take multiple perspectives in a situation of moral dilemma - to see a moral problem from more than one viewpoint and to make some cohesive picture of the sum of the parts. (The issue of perspective-taking in moral development is further discussed later in this chapter). It would appear that on this issue, at least, moral development theorists may be practising what they preach.

It is also possible that the increasing interest of educators in moral education, and their practical findings that no one theoretical framework in moral development could alone provide an adequate basis for a program of moral education, has influenced researchers towards greater valuing of the contributions of different approaches to the study of moral development. (Hersh et al, 1977; 1979; 1980). Whatever the reasons behind changes such as these in moral theory and research, the general importance of these changes and their influence on this writer (in the period between the design of this particular investigation in 1975 and the collection, analysis and interpretation of data which concluded in 1981) makes it necessary for the review of literature to consider material that was published during this period.

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MEANING OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

To define moral development and study it, we must first define what it means to be moral and what it is to act morally.

No Ethical Neutrality

We cannot approach the definition of morality, and hence the study of moral development (and moral education) from a philosophically neutral stance. The way we define morality will partly determine the line of empirical inquiry: what is studied and how it is studied. At the same time, the theoretical framework which is adopted for the empirical study will partly determine the definition of morality associated with it. There is a reciprocal interaction between the philosophical and empirical stances.

To take the position that moral principles are relative leads to a search for culturally-varied content and action, the evidence for which, when found, will in turn support the philosophical stance of moral relativity. On the other hand, the opposing philosophical position, of the existence of moral absolutes (such as the principle of justice) leads to search for culturally-invariant criteria for assessing moral development, the

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evidence for which, in turn, will support an absolutist stance. Even if a researcher pays due scientific regard to his or her position as an objective observer and reporter of what is the case, subjective value choices coming from outside the research enterprise itself will have influenced prior determination of the enterprise. This appears to be particularly so in moral development research - the philosophical meaning we give to life unavoidably influences the way we resolve or transcend the polarities that form the basic issues in current theory and research, e.g. analysis of structure versus content of morality; eliciting of reasoning versus description of natural behaviour; focus on learning hierarchies or developmental stages, etc.

Notwithstanding the problems of overlap in the empirical-philosophical relationship, Popper (1972) argued strongly that many of the facts of science are invariant under the transformation from one theoretical position to another. Popper's claim reminds researchers exploring the area of moral development that the empirical facts of moral development do not depend entirely on a particular theoretical or philosophical framework. The recognition that some empirical facts cross the boundaries of "schools" of moral development, is increasingly taken into account in the literature from about 1976. The work of Aronfreed (1968; 1976) and Hoffman (1960; 1976) show a movement from a relatively narrow social-learning approach to one that can encompass facts from other theoretical frameworks such as cognitive-developmental. In a similar type of movement, Kohlberg gives far greater emphasis to sociological or environmental

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factors in 1978 than he gave in 1968 (Kohlberg, 1968; 1973; 1978). There are still different emphases among theories in the moral area with respect to, for example, immediate environmental influences as opposed to innate developmental sequences, but few theorists would now question the basic facts of situational-specific influences on the one hand or of some kinds of age-related abilities on the other.

Dimensions of Morality

Persons and groups vary in the extent to which they differentiate between fundamental moral principles, such as respect for life; legal rules, such as property rights; social conventions, such as table manners and sexual mores; and religious commandments. The fact that persons disagree with some or all of the particular couplings of example to category, which have been used above, supports the argument that there is lack of general agreement about the boundaries between the area of moral development and other areas of social understanding or belief.

A somewhat similar sort of overlap of different areas, within the broad social-development category, was demonstrated to be present in the minds of preschool teachers, by their use of a social-development umbrella, as discussed in Chapter 1. The teachers had been found to be vague or confused about exactly what they included under social development. However, the predominant kind of statement from teachers certainly indicated a

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widespread belief that moral development could be, and was, excluded altogether from their professional responsibilities: e.g. "We don't really deal with moral development; we're not a church kindergarten even though we use a church hall." "Moral development is the parents' responsibility." Theorists in moral development have recognized the problem and have tried to distinguish the morality components in social development, and to understand better their development. As patterns of moral development have become better understood, it has become increasingly possible to see how components of moral development can be related back into the network of other components in the wider area of social development, without losing sight of the moral strand in the network. Damon (1977) in his study of the social world of the child, demonstrated how a framework of cognitive-development theory can provide a comprehensive way to approach this task.

Damon analyses and synthesises current knowledge of four main components of social development: positive justice, authority, conventions, and friendships. He weaves the child's developing understanding of morality as justice in with the other three components where they partially overlap, whilst also indicating certain concepts and processes which seem to be unique to any one component or sub-group of components. Damon's work provides an excellent foundation for further theory building about the structure of relationships between social and moral components of development (Damon, 1977).

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Among the diversity of possible approaches to the study of moral development, that which was most prevalent until the middle of the 'seventies reflected a somewhat simple and fragmented division of morality into three dimensions:

- the behavioural dimension which is concerned with how a person learns to act in ways deemed to be moral;
- the affective dimension which is concerned with the feelings associated with social obligation and action, particularly guilt and empathy;
- the reasoning dimension which is concerned with the structure and content of moral judgment.

Research on moral development paid some lip service to recognition that these three dimensions of morality overlap; nevertheless, various empirical approaches have focused on one dimension only, to the relative neglect of the others.

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FOCUS ON BEHAVIOUR

Throughout the whole area of moral research there is little disagreement with the notion that any concept of "moral maturity", whatever else it means, does imply that a mature person may be expected to act in ways that demonstrate a greater degree of responsibility for the welfare of others than a person who is at a lower stage of moral development. Furthermore, it implies that the greater degree of responsibility will be demonstrated, to some extent at least, in overt behaviour.

It is obvious to any rational observer that, though overtly they may not be recognized as moral dilemmas, moral dilemmas do confront ordinary persons in our society; e.g. the necessity for many persons to make decisions on issues such as contraception, abortion, genetic engineering, aggressive competitiveness in business or sport, military conscription, etc. Moral dilemmas are also inherent in a more humble form in many social relationships, e.g. the dilemma of weighing personal vulnerability versus altruistic behaviour when going to the aid of others in need or distress, particularly when it is obviously against one's own self-interest. Moral development must eventually be measured against behaviour in the everyday social world. None of the major theorists dispute this point although some, notably Kohlberg,

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accept it as an assumption and then fail to show that morality is in fact measured significantly on this behavioural dimension. The approach of many researchers and theorists, on the other hand, has been to focus on the behavioural efficacy of the socialization process and largely ignore other aspects of morality. In the approach which focuses on behaviour, understanding of moral reasoning and affect is important only insofar as they can be shown to influence behaviour. In a behaviourist framework, morality is seen to lie in the behaviour itself, as measured in its adherence to social norms.

Moral Character Inquiry

The focus on the study of behaviour in moral research was the dominant mode of moral research in the first half of this century. The large-scale studies of Hartshorne et al (1928; 1929; 1930) attempted to explore moral character directly through behavioural situations providing specific temptations for cheating, lying, stealing, etc. Hartshorne's results were interpreted as giving only weak support to the notion of a general moral character, and as demonstrating that moral behaviours (even within one area of behaviour, e.g. honesty, or self-control) were highly situation-specific. Furthermore, membership in the institutions of socialization, such as church groups and Boy Scouts, appeared to have little value in relation to the prediction of moral behaviour. How a person would behave in a given situation was influenced most strongly by factors within that specific situation. The complexity of the analysis of all the

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factors influencing moral behaviour in a specific situation was too great to be satisfactorily resolved using the techniques available at that time. Burton (1963), using multi-variate methods of analysis on the original Hartshorne data, found evidence of a greater degree of generality of moral character than was revealed in the original analysis. However, there were marked individual differences on the factor of consistency-inconsistency in behaviour. Reviewing his own and other studies, Burton (1976) suggested that there is some slight degree of generality in moral conduct but high specificity. He suggested that individual differences on this dimension may be due to social learning about the relationship between conduct and consequences. The present-day ecological movement in psychological research is working towards the design of research models which may enable researchers to grapple better, in the future, with such complex relationships between factors of moral conduct, situational factors, and prior social learning (Gibbs, 1979; Petrinovich, 1979).

Psycho-biological Approach to Moral Behaviour

Eysenk continues to view socialization and morality from a narrow behaviourist and biological perspective. Eysenk described moral behaviour as that "which at first sight at least goes counter to the interests of the person concerned" (Eysenk, 1976, p. 108).

His definition was arrived at by comparing moral behaviour

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with "natural" behaviour. Natural behaviour, in Eysenk's terms, is selfish and aggressive behaviour. He claimed that it is demonstrated by young children, without need of teaching, and is reinforced through immediate satisfaction.

The main problem in this psycho-biological approach is to explain why persons do not always act immorally or amorally, i.e. why persons behave "unnaturally" by performing prosocial or altruistic actions. Some behaviourists explain prosocial acts by appeal to the force of law, but this is rejected by Eysenk as an explanation, in favour of the notion of conscience. Conscience is equated by Eysenk with learned inhibitions of socially undesirable behaviour, acquired through conditioning. Conditioning of anxiety is said to be brought about through fear of punishment, and facilitated by the labelling of actions as bad, evil or naughty (Eysenk, 1976, p.109). Morality is thus equated with socially conditioned behaviour which results in the non-violation of social rules and norms. The basis of morality is external to the individual, residing in the wider social environment. Eysenk proposed a genetic interpretation of anti-social behaviour whereby he explains the failure of socialization partly in terms of a biological factor of "low cortical arousal". The low arousal factor results in poor conditionability, leading to the persistence of undesirable behaviour. He also maintains that impulsivity and sensation-seeking behaviour are, at least in part, motivated by similar low levels of cortical arousal. The combination of sensation-seeking and poor conditionability is viewed by Eysenk as providing an important biological factor which, inter-

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acting with environmental factors, produces criminal behaviour (Eysenk, 1976, p. 123).

Eysenk's work draws attention to the possibility of specific genetic influences on moral behaviour. Genetic and other types of biological influence have been largely ignored in the literature on moral development, apart from the assumption that a particular level of cognitive ability is a necessary condition for a related level of social perspective-taking or moral judgment (Selman, 1971). This gap is not tackled in the present investigation but is recognized as an important gap in the literature.

Reinforcement

Behaviourist theories of learning applied to the investigation of social behaviour have, in their simplest forms, demonstrated the effects on social conduct of reward and punishment (Eysenk, 1976). While explanations based on simple reinforcement models are not adequate to account for the complexity of all moral conduct, the effects of direct reinforcement on both reasoning and action have perhaps been too lightly passed over in later moral development research. Further attention should be paid to reinforcement in view of the fact that, in Kohlberg's Stage 1, moral judgments are viewed as structured (1) by the person's perception of the overt consequences of action (right is what is rewarded, wrong is what is punished), and (2) by the perceived power of authority figures to administer direct physical rewards and punishments (Kohlberg, 1976). The mechanisms of re-

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inforcement operating in the young child's environment obviously need further research attention in cognitive-developmental descriptions of early moral development.

It is theoretically probable, but as yet unexplored in the literature, that the type and schedule of reinforcement that the young child experiences, and the degree of match between this factor and the child's level of moral judgment, may be a significant factor in early moral development. A child who has just moved into Kohlberg's Stage 1 may be expected to achieve gains in the consolidation of Stage 1 thinking as a result of the consistent application of external rewards by an authority figure, whereas a child who is demonstrating transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2 may be hindered by the same type of reward and helped by more of an emphasis on the reciprocal nature of the exchange of favours between two peers (see Table 2 - Kohlberg's Six Moral Stages). Reinforcement is discussed more fully in Chapter 5.

Internalized Control of Behaviour

The bulk of research within the broad framework of social-learning theory extended beyond the simple conditioning model of behaviourism to explore relationships between desirable behaviour and a variety of antecedent and situational factors thought to influence the internalized control of behaviour (Aronfreed, 1968; 1969; Bandura, 1969; 1972; Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Bandura & Walters, 1963; Hoffman, 1979). In social-learning theory, self-reinforcement is recognized as an important motivational

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Kohlberg's Six Moral Stages*

Level and Stage	Content of Stage: What is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	Social Perspective of Stage
LEVEL 1 - PRECONVENTIONAL Stage 1 - Heteronomous Morality	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	*Egocentric point of view.* Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's: doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own
Stage 2 - Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange.	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests too.	*Concrete individualist perspective.* Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
LEVEL II - CONVENTIONAL Stage 3 - Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity.	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behaviour.	*Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals.* Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.
Stage 4 - Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it", or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations. (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text).	*Differentiates societal points of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.* Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
LEVEL III - POST-CONVENTIONAL, or PRINCIPLED. Stage 5 - Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social conract. Some nonrelative values and rights like *life* and *liberty*, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of over-all utility "the greatest good for the greatest number".	*Prior to society perspective.* Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Stage 6 - Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	*Perspective of a moral point of view* from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

* Kohlberg, 1976, pp.34-35.

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factor in behavioural control. Again there would appear to be significant links yet to be explored, between the notion of self-reinforcement in the social-learning appraoch to moral behaviour, and the notion of the "good boy - good girl" orientation of Kohlberg's Stage 3 of moral judgment.

In the social-learning approach, the early interest in child-rearing practices has continued, leading to the exploration of parental disciplinary techniques and children's identification with and imitation of parental and adult models. Within social-learning theory, the concept of "imitation" came to be preferred to the psycho-analytic concept of "internalization", since imitation could be directly observed (Hoffman, 1960; 1963; Sears et al, 1957).

There was also considerable experimental research on resistance to temptation and on aggressive behaviour and prosocial behaviour; both have been related to the behaviour and perceived status and power of both adult and peer models. The affective components of empathy and guilt also came to be recognized by social-learning theorists as playing an important role in socialization. The studies are well reviewed by Hoffman (1970; 1979) who made in his summary the following points which are highly relevant to the study of moral development in young children.

1. Correlations exist between types of discipline and moral indices such as resistance to temptation and feelings of guilt. These correlations suggest that moral internaliza-

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tion is fostered by frequent parental use of inductive techniques (which stress the consequences of the child's behaviour on others) coupled with frequent parental expression of affection;

2. A theoretical explanation can be given of the relationship between types of discipline and moral internalization. It includes the following: the power-assertive and love-withdrawing properties in most disciplinary techniques provide the motive-arousal component for the child's initial attention to the adult; empathy and guilt arousal may influence the child both cognitively and affectively in the direction of the desired behaviour; inductive disciplinary techniques probably achieve the best balance between too little arousal and too much arousal; conductive elements of inductive discipline and their associated feelings of guilt and empathy are retained and eventually internalized by the child through the process of being encoded in memory;

3. The effects of adult modelling are complex. In terms of simple observable action, it has been shown repeatedly that an adult model who yields to temptation is readily imitated by children, whereas one who resists temptation is less likely to be imitated. However, exposure of a child to an adult model who is seen to judge behaviour on the basis of intention rather than consequences is likely to lead to increased and lasting understanding by the child of consid-

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eration of intention in judging behaviour;

4. The influence of peers is complex. Research in the social-learning tradition indicates that peer influence increases and parental influence decreases with age but the direction of peer influence (towards pro-social or anti-social behaviour) is dependent on the relationship of a number of factors, including the complementary influence of adults, and it is difficult to generalize from the evidence. Hoffman concluded that peer influence may work in contrary directions: to provide the experiences of role-taking which Piaget (1968 [1932]) and Kohlberg (1969) viewed as central to the development of morality, and/or to weaken rather than strengthen prior socialization. (Hoffman, 1979, pp. 958-960).

Kohlberg, like Piaget, saw role-taking opportunities as a function of the quantity and quality of peer group interaction but both have generally tended to accept without question that all role-taking opportunities function in the service of moral development. Hoffman, on the other hand, sometimes appears to be leaving open the possibility that role-taking (as well as other forms of peer influence) may sometimes work in the opposite direction (Hoffman, 1979, p. 960). It is difficult to decide whether Hoffman is actually going so far as to raise the point in relation to role-playing but it is certainly an interesting one which is worthy of further attention. Insofar as role-playing involves imitation of the behaviour of another person (rather

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than simply cognitive understanding) and insofar as imitation is an important factor in social learning, then role-playing the behaviour of a poor peer model may be dysfunctional in moral development.

Hoffman claimed that many of the findings from earlier correlation studies in the social-learning framework were confirmed by later empirical research. The theory appears able to provide a theoretical explanation of the internalized control of behaviour which is capable of wide empirical investigation (Hoffman, 1979). In this aspect it is superior to the psycho-analytic (Freudian) theory of moral development which is briefly reviewed in the following section.

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FOCUS ON AFFECT

Psycho-analytic Theory

Although psycho-analytic theory is not in the mainstream of current moral development research, an important contribution of the theory has been to draw attention to influences on moral development and action which suggest that moral development is not quite such a rational process as cognitive-developmental theorists assume, and not as simple and objectively observable as a behaviourist approach would assume.

Freud (1961 [1930]) viewed civilized justice as the goal of socialization, reflected in behaviour in which basic impulses (particularly of sexuality and aggression) are finally brought under control. The development of impulse control was seen as rooted in early identification with parents. A child's moral development was viewed as involving learning to sacrifice immediate gratification of id impulses in exchange for feelings of security tied to the approval of and identification with omnipotent parents and the resultant internalization of their moral rules and standards of behaviour. This resolution of conflict over basic needs through internalization, was seen as providing the basis for the child's own ego ideal and superego, i.e. the development of moral standards and conscience. In this theory

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guilt results when impulses, which have been repressed in the process of internalization, enter consciousness.

Freud placed heavy emphasis on early identification and internalization as providing the largely unconscious roots of morality. These continue to influence adult morality through the dimension of irrational feelings rather than rational thought. More attention has since been paid to the rational function of the ego in moral development and we will return to the concept of ego later in this chapter.

There are several methodological problems involved in any attempt to test the psycho-analytic theory of moral development. In contrast to social-learning theory with its foci on observable behaviour and on reinforcement contingencies which are relatively easy to control in an experimental situation, it is very hard to see how psychoanalytic theory could ever be refuted since it is a closed system which contains within itself "self-evident" truths which cannot be challenged from within the theory, nor be empirically demonstrated. However, the psycho-analytic approach has certainly made a major contribution to the understanding of moral development through bringing attention to bear on the influence of affective factors such as empathy, guilt and ego development.

Empathy

It is within the social-learning approach to morality that

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the concept of empathy has received greatest empirical attention. Although definitions of empathy vary, they broadly focus on a sense of what others are feeling, which may or may not be combined with cognitive awareness of how one's behaviour affects others. Mischel & Mischel (1976) suggested that adults who commit evil seem to be more deficient in empathy and compassion, i.e. emotional responses, than in moral reasoning. Hoffman (1976; 1979) reviewed studies of empathy as a motivational factor in pro-social behaviour. Hoffman has made a beginning on something much needed in the field - a charting of stages of development of early feelings of empathy, and of empathic response, which he viewed as having both affective and cognitive components.

In summarizing the research of himself and others, Hoffman (1979, p. 962) pointed out that while empathic distress may motivate helping behaviour towards others, it cannot be assumed to operate always in this direction. Hoffman's explanation of how feelings of empathy motivate behaviour is in terms of distress arousal brought about by the perception of distress in others. The level of distress in the subject is viewed as dropping following helping behaviour but continuing if there is no attempt to help, therefore to help is viewed as satisfying behaviour. However, as Hoffman has suggested, too great a level of arousal of empathy may be so distressing as to result in a turning away of attention from the victim. Hence, empathy may lead away from moral action. Hoffman pointed out that helping behaviour is also related to the extent to which the observer of distress

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perceives the victim to be similar to the observer. Empathy is clearly a complex issue with many more dimensions than is grasped within any one theory of moral development to date.

Within cognitive-development theory, empathy has been viewed primarily from a cognitive perspective where it is seen as forming part of the wider concept of social perspective-taking (role-taking) ability (Kohlberg, 1969; 1976) as discussed later. The cognitive approach appears to have ignored the emotional component of empathy or to have assumed that the emotional component is secondary to the cognitive. It may be useful to employ the notion of a distinction between "hot cognition" and "cold cognition" (Wittrock, 1977) to express what is lacking in the cognitive-development view of empathy. By not making any differentiation between "hot" and "cold" cognition, cognitive-developmental theorists have not had the conceptual tool to take due account of the factor of "warmth" in their concept of empathy. They have taken account of the development of the child's understanding that others may have a different point of view from one's own, but have largely ignored the developmental sequence of feelings of empathy. A variety of social experience, particularly peer conflict, and the development of cognitive understanding of the consequences of actions, are the main factors leading to empathic behaviour, in Kohlberg's theory of moral development, as they were in Piaget's.

Kuhmerker (1973; 1975) drew attention to the neglect of the study of early empathy in moral development theory, suggesting

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that empathy provided one way to study moral development in early childhood (before the acquisition of Kohlberg's Stage 1 moral-cognitive level). Kuhmerker (1975) commented that empathy in early childhood is a difficult topic to study since empathic response may be so swift, elusive and subjective that it is difficult to capture with research tools and impossible to capture in laboratory situations. She suggested that to study empathy we need to look not only at distress situations but also at joy, humour and dramatic play. Distress is, of course, easier to focus on in naturalistic research with preschool children since it generally provides clearer auditory and visual pointers, i.e. screams and fights.

A search of the literature confirms that there is a particular neglect of the study of what may be called the "shared delight" dimension of empathy. The following example from the pilot investigations is typical of such events in a preschool:

> Bert had made a complex tent house in the preschool playground. He sits in the sun in the doorway of the structure and calls urgently for the teacher to "come and see what I've made." The teacher indicates that she is busy and will come in a minute. Jan has been watching Bert since he called.
>
> Jan prances up to Bert, smiling, and catches his attention. She puts her hands on her hips and hops all round the tent house, surveying it. She stands in front of Bert again, opening her eyes widely while she draws in her breath and lifts her shoulders. Bert grins at her. Jan skips off.

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The observer interpreted the above as Jan expressing to Bert that she feels his delight in his achievement and shares it for a minute. It is possible (even probable) that Jan's empathy is even deeper - that she recognizes a wish of Bert's to share his delight and to do so immediately. We cannot tell this with certainty from the record. There is a need for much more study of young children's responses of joy, delight, and wonder, whether empathic or solitary, and the relation of these to moral development.

Borke (1971; 1973) investigated some aspects of empathy in young children from three to six years of age. In Borke's studies, empathy was defined as, in its most advanced stages, "the ability to perceive the world from the perspective of the other" (Borke, 1973, p. 102). At the early childhood level, Borke viewed empathy as manifested in an awareness that other people have feelings which are different from one's own.

Borke's 1973 study included young children from two cultural groups: American and Chinese. The children were asked to indicate, by the choice of stylized faces depicting happy, afraid, sad and angry, how another child might feel in story situations. Borke found in both studies that, by three years, the ability to differentiate between happy and unhappy reactions was well developed in children, and that the children could also recognize social situations associated with these reactions. Findings from the 1973 cross-cultural study indicated that recognition of fear in others was achieved by five years of age, with some

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variation associated with both cultural and social class factors. Sadness and anger did not show a consistent pattern of increase with age between three and five years. Anger was often confused with sadness. Social class and cultural differences in the children's perceptin of fear, sadness and anger were interpreted by Borke as supporting the notion of social learning as an important variable in the early development of empathy.

On the basis of her research with children below six years of age, Borke rejected the notion of Piaget, Kohlberg and others that young children are primarily egocentric and unable to take another person's perspective. However, it is not altogether clear from Borke's research reports that the subjects were displaying awareness that other people have feelings that are different from their own. Rather, at least some of the subjects may have been simply displaying awareness that other people have feelings which the subjects postulated to be similar to their own in similar situations. Such an awareness would represent an earlier stage of empathy and social perspective taking (Selman, 1975). However, such an interpretation would not weaken Borke's claim that the development of empathy is a continuous process which proceeds through a series of stages closely related to cognitive development but also and importantly related to social adaptation.

Borke's definition of mature empathy, in terms of the ability to perceive the perspective of another person, is in line with the increasing emphasis of cognitive-development theory on

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stages of social perspective-taking as a basic process in the attainment of higher stages of moral development, rather than empathy per se being a basic process.

Guilt

The concept of guilt has not received as much research attention as that of empathy in recent years. Its definition and its importance in moral development is not clear. Aronfreed (1976) argued that guilt is a necessary and central factor in the motivation of moral behaviour. Aronfreed viewed guilt as the attachment of feelings of anxiety to cognition, thus motivating activity through the relief of such feelings.

Hoffman's perspective on moral development is somewhat similar to Aronfreed's insofar as both make an attempt to synthesize aspects of the social-learning and the cognitive-development theories of moral development. However, Hoffman's view of guilt in morality is very different from Aronfreed's being specifically related to the cognitive understanding of causal relationships rather than to the emotional factor of anxiety.

Hoffman (1979, p. 965) suggested that a mature moral orientation (in U.S. society) would be based minimally on anxiety and predominantly on other affective and cognitive processes. He viewed guilt primarily in terms of cognitive awareness of one's causal effect on another person's distress. Furthermore, he suggested that there may be developmental stages of guilt which

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roughly correspond to stages of empathy. The relationship between guilt and empathy is viewed by Hoffman primarily as one in which empathy may function to intensify the arousal of guilt and hence the making of causal connections between one's own behaviour and the distress of others. In Hoffman's view, as in Aronfreed's, the result of guilt is usually an action towards the victim. However, in some cases the action may be re-directed towards another person or, when no action is seen to be possible, the result may be the prolongation of feelings of guilt (Hoffman, 1976; 1979).

Researchers working within a strict cognitive-development theory have paid little attention to the concept of guilt, although Alston (1971) and Peters (1969; 1970) have drawn attention to the absence of consideration of affective and habitual variables such as guilt, in the theory. These and other writers have suggested that guilt feelings, and the motivation to avoid them, may operate as a (missing) link between moral judgment and action.

Ego Development

Rest (1979) discussed constraints on moral development, in Piagetian terms, as coming from two main sources: internal and external. The external source of constraints on moral development lies in environmental challenges. If there is no conflict or disequilibrium between the child's cognitive stage and the socio-moral challenges in his or her environment, then there will

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be no need for change and hence no development. The internal source of constraints lies in the cognitive capacity of the individual, and the ego capacity. It is the clear dual emphasis on the cognitive-ego capacities which characterizes Rest's conceptualization.

The cognitive element is viewed by Rest as involving particularly the capacity to switch social perspectives and to integrate multiple perspectives into an understanding of social relationships. In this stance Rest is in line with the main cognitive-development theorists on moral development. The ego element, on the other hand, provides an important complementary process which is particularly concerned with the strength of the individual to make and resist changes. If either the cognitive or the ego element is lacking, Rest suggests that early stage modes are likely to persist even when the child's experience proves them to be inadequate; children will assimilate the experience to fit their existing stage thinking rather than accommodate or extend their moral thinking to a higher stage level. Rest has taken the concept of ego strength and put it in a central position in developmental theory. The concept of ego strength therefore needs to be explored further in relation to moral stage change. It may be an important early precursor to moral development, of particular importance for preschool teachers; at this stage we do not know. Rest has suggested that although ego strength may be an important variable in the interaction between moral reasoning levels and moral behaviour, it is, strictly speaking, amoral. Ego strength is amoral since it is a

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feature of the execution of plans into action, whether the plans be moral or not. Nevertheless, in the area of moral education, where further understanding of the relationship between abstract levels of moral judgment and actual behaviour is vital, Rest argued strongly that ego strength (and social-learning factors) must be considered further (Rest, 1979).

Podd (1972) examined adolescent relationships in between their achievement of ego-identity in Erikson's (1963) stages of psycho-social development and their level of moral judgment according to Kohlberg's theory. Podd found some positive correlations between the achievement of ego identity and the Post-conventional level of moral judgment, although many questions remain unanswered by the research since many subjects demonstrated the achievement of ego identity without the achievement of the Post-conventional level of moral reasoning. Podd interpreted the results as supporting the conclusion that moral ideology is a factor in ego-identity formation.

Podd's (1972) work, although it raises more questions than it answers, may be interpreted as suggesting that it would be profitable to look for any similar relationships between Erikson's earlier stages of psycho-social development, viz. trust, autonomy and initiative, and Kohlbergian-type stage of moral development in preschool children. Ciaccio (1971), in a small study of Erikson's theory of epigenesis, with a sample of five- to eleven-year-old boys, found that Erikson's Stage 2 crisis, viz. autonomy versus shame and doubt, presented the most con-

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flict in subjects. He suggested that autonomy may be the focal psychosocial crisis of Erikson's first five ego stages. Ciaccio did not investigate any relationships with moral development. However, his findings, if confirmed by further research, would suggest it to be useful to look at the achievement of Erikson's Stage 2 of ego development in relation to the early Kohlbergian stages of moral development, and between this ego stage and Hoffman's (1979) stage sequences in the development of guilt and empathy. Such work may prove to be profitable in filling in some of the gaps in our knowledge of relationships between early moral development and early ego development. It is not taken further in the present investigation but brought to the attention of others interested in early moral development.

Kohlberg (1969; 1976) has expressed the view that there are probably relationships between ego development and moral development, and that Loevinger's (1976) work on ego development may indicate a useful direction for further work in this area. However, Colby (1978) has since argued that the assumption of loose parallels between ego development and moral development indicates an ambiguity in the understanding of the structure-function aspects of moral stage development. Colby (1978) reported from Harvard that the refinement of Kohlberg's theory importantly involved the separation of structural development in morality from a person's functional level of ego development (as well as maintaining the previous separation of structure from content). Structure reflects the form of thinking, function reflects the purpose thinking is serving, and content reflects what the think-

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ing concentrates on. Colby argued that Erikson's model of ego development is a functional rather than a structural model. Her argument rests on the grounds that Erikson's model defines ego stages by their functions in ordering experience more adequately - a sequence of socio-cultural tasks related to personality. She argued that Erikson's ego stages do not define new structures by which old functions are carried out. Colby used Podd's (1972) findings to rule out the claim of a strict parallel between Kohlberg's moral judgment stages and Erikson's ego stages.

Ego strength may not be an essential factor in studies of moral development. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that in the understanding of moral education, and its relationship to moral behaviour, ego strength is an important factor.

Affect as a Bridge between Moral Reasoning and Moral Behaviour

As we have seen in this review, study of the place of feelings in moral development is viewed as a possible bridge between social-learning theory of morality and cognitive-development theory, as well as a possible bridge between moral reasoning and moral action (Aronfreed, 1976; Hoffman, 1976). However, there is still a great deal of confusion which may be regarded as part of the more general debate on the distinction between cognition and affect in psychology, and the primacy of one over the other. Lazarus (1980) argued that affect and cognition are normally fused in action and that it is counter-productive to see them as

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merely interactive, whilst Zajonc (1980) viewed affect and cognition as partly independent systems which can influence each other in a variety of ways. In research on moral development, there is a growing feeling that affective motivational factors (which may be at least partly non-rational) need to be given more attention if we are to understand the links between abstract moral reasoning stages in hypothetical situations, real-life behaviour, and moral education (Hoffman, 1976, 1979; Lickona, 1976; Maschette, 1977).

If affective factors are to be used to supply some of the links, there is a need to define more specifically the major affective components in moral development, the mechanisms by which they operate to provide the supposed links and their relationship to moral reasoning on the one hand and moral action on the other. It is necessary to explore further the extent to which a person actually uses the highest moral reasoning levels he or she has demonstrated in hypothetical dilemmas, in the control of his or her day-to-day behaviour, and to relate the person's real-life level of use of moral reasoning to measures of empathy, guilt and ego strength. In preparation for this kind of research at a later period, the present investigation will attempt to measure young children's highest moral judgment levels and highest moral behaviour levels, and to explore some of their relationships.

Affective and cognitive factors may relate differentially at different stages of development, e.g. before and after the

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attainment of operational thinking structures. We do not know whether this is so for it appears to be another unexplored area.

The neglect of consideration of affect in cognitive-development theory may be partly the result of the relative neglect of rsearch at the earliest levels of moral development within this theoretical approach, i.e. the dearth of research within cognitive-development theory, on the preoperational child. Once attention is turned to the child below the usual age of attainment of operational thought structures, factors other than pure cognitive factors may be expected to assume greater prominence in research studies.

There is also a clear need to define more precisely how environmental factors operate to influence the early development of such factors in morality as empathy, guilt, non-violence, trust and co-operation. By trying to recognize all these major gaps in the research literature, it is not intended that the present study will fill them all. Rather, the purpose is to keep the long-term objectives in mind at the early stage of exploration and description.

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FOCUS ON MORAL REASONING

Piaget's Two-stage Theory

Piaget (1968 [1932]) was concerned with the epistemology of the morality rather than moral behaviour as such. In the pursuit of this concern he formulated a cognitive theory of moral development in which moral knowledge is viewed as resulting from the interaction between the child's structure of thought and the child's social experience. These two elements of interaction - the child's level of thinking structure and the experiences he or she encounters in the social environment, determine both the present potential and the present constraints of his or her moral functioning. For Piaget, the moral knowledge of a person (like all knowledge) is viewed as residing neither in the person nor in the environment; it must be actively constructed anew as each individual strives to make sense of his or her social world.

Piaget demonstrated two stages in the child's construction of moral knowledge, representing a movement from moral realism to moral autonomy. The first stage is one of unilateral respect for the power of authority, in which moral rules are understood as external absolutes, and right and wrong are judged by the size

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of the physical consequences of obedience or disobedience rather than by a consideration of the intentions of the actor. The second stage is one of mutual respect for others, in which rules are understood as relative and based on group consensus, and moral judgments of actions include consideration of the actor's intention.

The environmental side of the interaction necessary for the attainment of the second, mature stage of moral development, was viewed by Piaget primarily in terms of peer group experience. The influence of adults, and of specific moral training or instruction, were not considered to be significant factors in the developmental change, although exposure to adult authority outside the home, with different standards and values, was assumed to work in the direction of the change. The process of moral development was assumed to operate through cognitive disequilibrium resulting mainly from the interaction between role-taking experiences amongst peers (particularly in social conflict situations) and the natural development of the child's general cognitive structures. Piaget's work on moral development still exerts a powerful influence on the theoretical field.

The intention-consequences variable described by Piaget, as part of his two-stage theory of morality, led to many research studies. This topic of study probably represents the area of moral development where preschool children were least neglected by researchers since it lends itself easily to replication-type

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studies (Gruen et al, 1979; Keasey, 1977; Lyons-Ruth, 1978). However, such studies produced conflicting results.

Rotenberg (1980) reviewed the research on various factors influencing children's use of intention and consequence in moral judgments. Rotenberg also conducted research to test his own hypothesis that young children do not use all the information given to them to arrive at their moral judgments, due to a "reflective" variable. Rotenberg argued that children use a limited research strategy which is highly vulnerable in respect to the complexity and explicitness of the information to which they are expected to attend. Rotenberg's research evidence provided support for his hypothesis that young children's use of intention and/or consequences information is limited by their research strategy, and that no simple variable, such as recency of information, nor of presentation, or self-directed as opposed to other-directed situations, can result in reliable prediction of whether they will judge by intention, consequences or both.

Rotenberg's notion of limited research strategy provides some explanation of the conflicting findings from the multitude of research studies on intention-consequences which follows Piaget's original research. It suggests that young children will be capable of considering the intention of the actor if the information they are given is clear, concise and adequate, and matched to their cognitive processing level. This has possible implications to be explored further, in relation to the development of social perspective-taking abilities in young children.

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Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development

Beginning in the early 1950's and continuing to the present, Kohlberg worked to formulate a theory of moral development which extends and deepens Piaget's original conception but retains the constructivist approach to morality. In the formulation of his theory, Kohlberg drew also upon Dewey, McDougall, Mead and especially J.M. Badwin (Kohlberg, 1979, p. viii). Kohlberg's work includes longitudinal study of some of his original subjects from childhood (approximately 8 years of age and above) to adulthood. His theory presents six stages of moral development (now perhaps five stages [Kohlberg, 1978]) combining in pairs to form three levels - Preconventional, Conventional, and Post-conventional or Principled Morality. (See Table 2, p. 65).

Kohlberg's main technique has been to present subjects with stories containing hypothetical moral dilemmas and to probe their answers to the dilemma situations. In semi-structured clinical interviews, he and others in the cognitive-development approach have studied the way in which individuals understand the moral dilemma, and the reasoning they use to resolve the conflict and make moral judgments. A subject's level of moral development is assessed through the way in which that person structures the reasoning underlying his or her moral judgment, rather than through the content of the given judgment.

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Kohlberg's cognitive-development theory of moral development is based on this specific separation of structure from content. Kohlberg has recently changed his emphasis a little in acknowledging that, in the process of moral education as distinct from the study of moral development, he previously has not given sufficient attention to the content of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1978). Kohlberg's theory of moral development remains a theory of moral structuring. The developmental theory is concerned with the way in which children structure and restructure their concepts of morality, in qualitatively different ways, through a succession of hierarchical stages, in a unilateral direction towards the mature understanding of the principle of justice (Kohlberg, 1976). The present scoring method, structural issue scoring, attempts to resolve some of the earlier structure-content confusion by redefining even more precisely the structural elements of each stage (Colby, 1978).

Kohlberg argued that children's moral thinking is different from that of adults (and different at age-related stages within childhood) but that it has its own logical structure as the child seriously and actively grapples with moral philosophy. Each successive stage represents increasingly adequate conceptions of fairness (justice) which include the expansion of role-taking (social perspective-taking) skills deemed necessary to understand the point of view of others in a moral conflict. The highest stage, the Post-conventional level of principled justice, requires that a person takes the role of all participants and takes

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account of all their claims (Kohlberg, 1968; 1969). Social perspective-taking (role-taking) is discussed further later in this chapter. Kohlberg's concept of justice as morality was philosophically founded on Kant's categorical imperative - that one should act only on a maxim that one can will to become a general law, and on the Platonic concept of justice as the highest ground. It was also influenced by Rawl's (1972) theory of justice involving role-taking. Furthermore, Kohlberg claimed that it has been empirically demonstrated that justice represents the highest stage of moral development and that therefore his theory rests on firm ground both philosophically and psychologically. Kohlberg's stance is that the principle of justice represents a universal highest stage in moral development, and provides an ultimate standard by which all laws, rules and moral conventions can be judged (Kohlberg 1973).

Criticisms and Modifications

The adequacy of the concept of justice (or any one overriding principle) as the single core of morality, and other aspects of Kohlberg's theory, have been widely disputed and defended from both philosophical and psychological perspectives. Important philosophical challenges have come from Alston, 1971; Crittenden, 1978, 1979; Peters, 1969; 1970; 1971; 1978; and Sullivan, 1977. Simpson (1974) presented a strong challenge to the validity of the cross-cultural evidence for the Kohlbergian claim of universal stages, and for justice as a universal principle, on a number of grounds including the limited number of

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cross-cultural studies on which the evidence was based. Kurtines and Greif (1974) argued that a review of the research literature demonstrated severe conceptual and methodological problems related to Kohlberg's theory. The reliability and validity of the scoring instrument was questioned on the grounds that the same sample was used to derive scoring rules and to estimate the correlations. Kuhn (1976) reviewed the evidence for the sequentiality of Kohlberg's early stages of moral development. Broughton (1978), replying to the critique by Kurtines and Greif, argued that they seriously underestimated the empirical support for invariant stage sequence, and that the basic misunderstanding of the critique rested on the common and mistaken attempt to reduce structural development in cognition to static psychometric traits, thus confusing developmental theories with measuring instruments.

Kohlberg has consistently claimed, in reply to criticisms of his theory, that concepts of external validity, such as the prediction of behaviour, are not appropriate for testing the validity of a developmental stage construct. Kohlberg (1978) admitted the problems of reliability and validity in assessing stages through clinical interview data, and the importance of developing standard and reliable methods of assessment of moral development. He directed attention to the work of Colby (1978) who, working within the Kohlbergian school, has been addressing herself to this problem. Colby has carried out the latest revision of the

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scoring manual and claims to have refined the scoring instrument through increased differentiation between the structure and content of moral judgments. It is claimed that Colby's work further supports the claim of invariant stage sequence (Colby, 1978).

Rest (1976; 1979) and Rest et al (1978) attacked the methodological problems from a different approach, constructing an assessment tool, the Defining Issues Test (DIT), which is capable of objective scoring based on the way subjects rate and rank the importance of twelve issues in making decisions about what ought to be done in hypothetical dilemmas. Rest's modifications of theory and practice do not assume stage sequence in the strict Kohlbergian sense, as is discussed later in this chapter. However, Rest's (1979) review of hundreds of correlations of the DIT with other psychological measures did, he claimed, support the following conclusions which are in line with Kohlberg's theory: moral judgment is not reducible to I.Q. but is a distinct aspect of intellectual development which has a moderate correlation to I.Q.; age trends in moral stage development reflect age trends in capacity to reason morally in new ways rather than merely age trends in preference for certain forms of moral thinking; moral judgment is not reducible simply to the application of verbal skills to moral content (as argued by Mischel & Mischel, 1976); form is related to content but is not reducible to content; and moral judgment is an important variable in moral action (although other factors play an important part as mediating or complicating variables between moral judgment and action).

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Description of Kohlberg's Stages

Kohlberg (1979) described his original dissertation as an exploratory assessment method which showed sufficient consensus between raters and between dilemmas to lead to the first main phase of theory building, which delineated the broad outlines of stages of moral development. He decided that the second phase of theory construction needed to be methodological, focusing on the construction of valid and reliable interview scoring procedures of moral judgment development. Kohlberg envisages that the third phase in theory building is now opening up and will entail a return to some of the theoretical problems unsolved in phase one.

The continual evolution of the theory in its current second phase, involving what Colby (1978, p. 101) called purification of the stage construct through the further separation out of content and other extraneous issues in scoring, presents difficulties in any attempt at an overview of the stages for the purposes of the present investigation. The reviewer is inevitably lagging behind further refinement of stage descriptions. However, the problem is somewhat lessened in that the focus of the present investigation is on early moral development which has traditionally received less attention and therefore fewer changes in the theory. The major changes in stage descriptions have focused on the higher levels, particularly in the formulation of a new stage 4, and in the dropping of stage 6 (Kohlberg, 1978; 1979).

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There is also a move towards the identification of sub-stages A and B, within each stage (Colby, 1978).

Within the constraints of this type of change in an evolving theory, Table 2, p. 65 (from Kohlberg, 1976, pp. 34-35) provides a descriptive summary of stages, containing as it does in its last column the emphasis on level of social-perspective and role-taking which Colby (1978, p. 92) confirmed is now given heavy reliance in the Kohlbergian method of defining moral structure. Stage 6 is retained in the table, following the 1976 original; it is not yet clear how the dropping of stage 6 may influence a further redefinition of stage 5, although Kohlberg (1978) suggested that the former stage 6 may represent a higher sub-stage of stage 5. For a fuller description of stages the reader is referred to Kohlberg (1969; 1973; 1976).

As can be seen in Table 2, Kohlberg grouped the six moral stages into three levels of two stages each. The second stage at each level represents a more organized form of the general perspective of the level (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 33). Colby (1978) reported work on further refinement which divides each of the stages into two sub-stages, of which the second sub-stage represents a more advanced structuring of the same type of moral thinking as the first sub-stage.

The Preconventional level represents moral thinking at stages where the thinker has not yet come to understand and internally uphold societal rules and expectations; they are seen

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as external to the self. At the Conventional level, the person has identified with or internalized the rules and expectations of society and so conforms to and upholds them just because they are society's rules. At the Post-conventional or Principled level of morality, the person understands and basically accepts society's rules but has differentiated between commitment to self-chosen principles, and the rules and expectations of others. At the Post-conventional level, acceptance of rules is based on having formulated and accepted the general moral principles underlying the rules. Where there is conflict between the Post-conventional thinker's principles and the specific rules of society, the person judges by principle rather than social convention or rule (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 33). Attainment of the Conventional level of moral thinking by the adults in a society is assumed to be necessary for the preservation and stability of society; the attainment of the Post-conventional level is assumed necessary for evolution and change in society to proceed in a democratic fashion (Gilligan, 1980; Rest, 1980).

Concept of Stages and Stage Progression

Kohlberg's theory of moral development rests upon a tight structural concept of a "stage", similar to Piaget's use of the term. Stages do not simply represent quantitative differences in amounts of knowledge. Like Piaget's cognitive stages, Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment are claimed to describe a universal invariant sequence of qualitatively different ways of structuring moral reasoning and hence of conceptualizing what is just

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and fair action. The stage descriptions attempt to separate the structure from the content of moral thought, and to base assessment on the structure of reasoning underlying moral judgments rather than on the content of the judgments themselves. Thus two subjects, who give contrary judgments about whether a person ought or ought not perform a certain action, may be classified at the same moral stage, e.g. Stage 1, if they are both displaying the same level of cognitive structuring by justifying their conflicting judgments simply in terms of the reward and punishment which they perceive as likely to follow for the actor. On the other hand, subjects may display the same content in their judgments, e.g. "Heinz should steal the drug", yet be assessed to be at different moral judgment stages due to differences in the way they structure the argument supporting their judgments.

Kohlberg's theory, like Piaget's general cognitive theory, asserts that each higher stage of moral judgment is attained by the restructuring of the reasoning of the stage below. A higher stage is claimed to be "better" not only because it reflects the natural sequence of developmental progression but because the process continually re-integrates earlier achievements in ways which enable the person to understand moral problems which he or she could not comprehend at earlier stages, and to arrive at more comprehensive and adequate solutions (Hunt, 1961; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1968 [1932]).

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The focusing of attention, in moral education, on the stimulation of development to the next highest stage, has resulted from the theoretical formulation and empirical evidence of the process of transition from one moral stage to the next. Turiel (1966; 1973) and Blatt (1975) found that change is more likely to occur when subjects are exposed to reasoning one stage ahead of their usual stage of moral judgment than when they are exposed to higher levels than plus one, and to lower levels. Reasoning at stages lower than their own was rejected by subjects; reasoning at levels more than one stage ahead of their own was not understood and was ignored; reasoning matched to one stage ahead was accepted as superior to their own and generally led to upward movement of about one third of a stage. The assumption is that the plus one stage reasoning stimulates structural reintegration of moral thinking.

Berkowitz et al (1980) have experimentally investigated and further refined the stimulation of moral stage progress, through examining more closely the relation of stage disparity to development effect. Berkowitz claimed that the optimal disparity condition to produce change in moral development is reasoning only one third of a stage ahead of the person's usual stage, rather than one full stage ahead. The smaller disparity condition had not been previously investigated. Even though the gain by subjects had been noticed to be about one third of a stage in previous studies, the stimulation had been expressed in full stage terms. The present investigation is in line with Berkowitz's approach, i.e. exploring smaller steps than whole Kohlbergian stages.

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Kohlberg consistently claimed that movement through moral judgment stages had been demonstrated to be age-related although the age trends represent only rough approximations (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 32). As has been stated (p. 92) Rest's review supported the claim of age progression through developmental levels, although with some modification of stage theory which will be discussed later. The movement is slow and research results are inconclusive but it appears to take between two to five years to cover one full stage (Rest et al, 1978; Rest, 1979).

Transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2 seldom occurs before eight or nine years of age. Kohlberg claimed that many adolescent and adult criminal offenders are still operating at the Preconventional Level of the first two moral stages. The Conventional Level appears not to be reached by the majority of subjects before adolescence (13-15 years) and remains the level of most adults in the USA and other societies. It is only a minority of adults who proceed to the Post-conventional Level; this level is not usually reached before twenty years of age and often not until later (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 33). So, although we may speak of age-related developmental stages, we are referring to periods or blocks of years, not a specific year, in relation to Kohlberg's stages.

Kohlberg gave passing attention to the possible effects of fixation at early stages, suggesting that there may be a critical age (around fifteen years) at which, if transition has not occurred from Preconventional to Conventional moral levels, it will be

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more difficult and less likely to be achieved later (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). This aspect of moral development has not been researched in depth. We do not know whether there are sensitive periods in the preschool years.

Rest, reviewing the age trends demonstrated in a large number of studies, suggested that moral development appears to be more related to education than to age per se. The majority of persons do not develop further after the cessation of formal education, and higher moral levels in college students appear to be related not only to age and level of education but also to the area of study the students are pursuing. Doctoral students in the areas of moral philosophy and political science showed higher scores on the Defining Issues Test than any other group including doctoral students in other faculties (Rest, 1979, p. 247). Any implications for moral development and education of preschool children are not clear at this stage, except insofar as Rest's data on the influence of education do suggest that teacher-preparation courses and in-service courses for preschool teachers, on moral development, may influence change.

A search of the literature suggests that cognitive-developmental theorists of moral development have overlooked the possibility that the importance of optimal match or optimal disparity, in the process of transition from one developmental stage to the next, does not rule out that other kinds of relationship between earlier and later stages (not necessarily adjacent stages) may exist and may be of importance in determining whether

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moral development eventually proceeds to the Post-conventional level. Researchers in the cognitive-development framework appear to have become unnecessarily bound into a lock-step approach to moral development and education which concentrates attention only on the influence of stages adjacent to each other. The nature of the stages as following an invariant sequence, and as each being built upon the re-organization of the achievement of the stage immediately below, does not necessarily rule out the existence of important relationships between non-adjacent stages. Whether these exist or not we do not know but it is not out of line with our knowledge of child development in other areas of development to suppose it possible that they do. Piaget's concept of decalage in his theory of general cognitive development may be briefly explored here to illustrate the line of thinking.

The concept of horizontal decalage (Piaget, 1950) involves the application of stage-related structures of reasoning across a variety of conceptual areas by a person at a particular cognitive stage. Piaget's concept of decalage appears to suggest that the degree of horizontal spread of reasoning at any specific stage level, may contribute to the strength of the vertical stage structure. In other words, a wide base provides stability for a vertical structure. When one thinks in this way in the area of moral development, it appears reasonable to suppose that the breadth of social experiences, to which specific moral stage reasoning can be and is applied at early levels of moral development, may be a factor in determining whether the vertical structure of moral development has a foundation stable enough to sup-

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port the continual re-integrations necessary to reach the Post-conventional level of moral reasoning. We do not know whether this is so because the question has not been previously posed and has not been investigated. To attempt to investigate it empirically would require a much greater prior understanding of the first stages of moral development than we have at present in a theory which has relatively neglected the study of early moral development. However, it remains an important question.

Investigation of the possible effects of horizontal decalage on moral development would also require that, whilst attempting to differentiate between structure and content in the theoretical formulation and empirical testing of structural stages of moral reasoning, cognitive-development theorists also pay attention to content, at least insofar as content reveals the breadth of context to which the structures can be and are applied by an individual. Insofar as generality of structural organization is accepted as one of the criteria for determining whether a given change in behaviour is developmental or not (Kuhn, 1974), content must be considered alongside structure in any comprehensive theory of moral development.

The focus of cognitive-development research on the moral development of older subjects has also left unexplored the question of what similarities and what differences might actually exist in the conditions which foster stage transition at various ages. In structural developmental psychology, stage transition in the upward direction is theoretically understood as resulting

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from the dual processes of assimilating a new experience into existing cognitive structures and accommodating to the unfamiliar aspects in the new experience by modifying and extending the existing structures (Hunt, 1961; Piaget, 1968 [1932]). This explanation of stage transition is basic to the cognitive-development theory of morality (Kohlberg, 1973). However, it is a further step to examine under what conditions the balance of assimilation and accommodation necessary to produce progressive change is best achieved at different ages. Does the optimal amount of disparity to produce stage change at the Preconventional level match the findings of Berkowitz et al (1980) whose subjects were at the Conventional level of moral development?

There is as yet insufficient empirical evidence on which to base an assumption that the optimal disparity will be the same size at both the Preconventional and the Conventional levels, since we have no sound basis on which to assume that moral stages represent quantitatively identical units. Further work is needed to explore the existence and nature of smaller developmental steps within the relatively gross measure of the Kohlbergian Stage 1. Only then will we be in a position to begin to develop programs of early moral education based on understanding of the type and optimal level of stimulation necessary to produce developmental transition to higher moral levels. The work of Damon (1975a; 1977) and Selman (1976; 1980), on stages of social understanding in young children, included aspects of moral development and delineated some smaller steps within and below Kohlberg's Preconventional level. This work will be described later.

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Rest has raised other questions yet to be investigated about the nature of moral stages and stage transitions, which also open up the possibility that the answers may be partly dependent on age. Further investigation is needed before we can say whether or not there are stages of most rapid growth and, if so, how these are related to such factors as year of birth (cohort factor), ego strength, and cognitive capacities such as the ability to take multiple perspectives, as well as to age per se (Rest et al, 1978).

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Rest's Modified Stage Model

Rest modified the Kohlbergian concept of invariant stage sequence (which he called the "simple" stage model) in the development of moral judgment (Rest et al, 1978; Rest,1980). Rest conceptualized a six stage theory of moral development based on Kohlberg's theory but attempting to describe what Rest called the progressive transformation of thinking about possibilities and conditions of co-operation, i.e. justice or fairness. Rest's stages are reproduced in Table 3, p. 106. The stages are not claimed to be strict stages in the Piagetian sense but to represent different "levels" which need not necessarily meet all the criteria for true stages - such as invariant sequence. Rest claimed that they represent levels of conceptual systems of fairness, i.e. how the individual thinks about what is fair.

Rest claimed that fairness is the key concept in moral judgment development and that fairness is conceptualized in different ways at each level of development. The developmental progress through Rest's moral levels is governed by the clarity and comprehensiveness with which the person views the possibilities and conditions of fair co-operation in social situations (Rest, 1980, p. 534). The structure of the concept of fairness at each level is determined by the person's appreciation of how a balance is achieved between the burdens and the benefits of social co-operation in a problem situation. Extremely simple levels of co-operation are postulated by Rest to correspond with extremely

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simple concepts of fairness (Rest, 1980, p. 581). Rest appears to identify fairness as the mature form of co-operation; however this is not clear and it may be that Rest intends co-operation to be seen as the mature form of fairness. This conceptualization of moral development in terms of dual concepts of fairness and co-operation is claimed by Rest to provide a possible link between the study of a subject's moral judgment levels (through the child's concept of fairness) and the corresponding study of the subject's moral behaviour (through the child's displayed level of co-operative activity). The conception of a reason-action link has partly been taken into account in the present investigation (in which the data collection took place well before Rest's 1979 and 1980 publications) by the inclusion of a measure of social co-operation in spontaneous play. In addition, the present investigation attempts to find other links between reasoning and behaviour focusing on fairness.

As has been stated earlier in this chapter, Rest, in a large scale review of studies using the Defining Issues Test of moral judgment (Rest et al, 1978; Rest, 1979) found that longitudinal, sequential and cross sectional types of studies all produced evidence to support Kohlberg's general model of moral development, including change in upward direction through moral stages over time. The scope of Rest's review, and his clarity of analysis and synthesis of the various findings, provides a most impressive body of support for much of Kohlberg's framework. However, Rest strongly argued the need for a more complex conception of stage

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TABLE 3

Rest's Stages of Moral Judgment *

Stage	Co-ordination of expectations about actions (how rules are known and shared)	Schemes of balancing interests (how equilibrium is achieved)	Central concept for determining moral rights and responsibilities
Stage 1	The caretaker makes known certain demands on the child's behaviour.	The child does not share in making rules, but understands that obedience will bring freedom from punishment.	The morality of obedience: "Do what you're told".
Stage 2	Although each person is understood to have his own interests, an exchange of favors might be mutually decided.	If each party sees something to gain in an exchange, then both want to reciprocate.	The morality of instrumental egoism and simple exchange: "Let's make a deal."
Stage 3	Through reciprocal role taking individuals attain a mutual understanding about each other and the ongoing pattern of their interactions.	Friendship relationships establish a stabilized and enduring scheme of co-operation. Each party anticipates the feelings, needs, and wants of the other and acts in the other's welfare.	The morality of interpersonal concordance: "Be considerate, nice, and kind, and you'll get along with people."
Stage 4	All members of society know what is expected of them through public institutionalized law.	Unless a societywide system of co-operation is established and stabilized, no individual can really make plans. Each person should follow the law and do his particular job, anticipating that other people will also fulfill their responsibilities.	The morality of law and duty to the social order: "Everyone in society is obligated and protected by the law."
Stage 5	Formal procedures are institutionalized for making laws, which one anticipates rational people would accept.	Law-making procedures are devised so that they reflect the general will of the people, at the same time ensuring certain basic rights to all. With each person having a say in the decision process, each will see that his interests are maximized while at the same time having a basis for making claims on other people.	The morality of societal consensus: "You are obligated by whatever arrangements are agreed to by due process procedures."
Stage 6	The logical requirements of nonarbitrary co-operation among rational, equal, and impartial people are taken as ideal criteria for social organization which one anticipates rational people would accept.	A scheme of co-operation that negates or neutralizes all arbitrary distribution of rights and responsibilities is the most equilibrated, for such system is maximizing the simultaneous benefit to each member so that any deviation from these rules would give advantage to some members at the expense of others.	The morality of nonarbitrary social co-operation: "How rational and impartial people would organize co-operation is moral."

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sequentiality than Kohlberg's in order to take account of the evidence of short-term stage reversals in subjects, inconsistencies in judgments, and similar manifestations of difficulties in fitting responses into a tight notion of stage sequence. This need to modify the cognitive-development concept of moral stages, without toppling Kohlberg's complete theory, is convincingly argued and a solution is presented.

Rest (1976; 1979) presented a method of stage assessment which takes account of the possible use by a person of a range of moral reasoning organization at any given time. The range displayed in a particular situation may extend over many levels, even, at times, including all levels. Kohlberg's theory postulated a dominant stage and some spread to immediately adjacent stages. Rest suggested that the particular structures of moral reasoning called into play may depend on the difficulty of the task for the subject, testing conditions, the response mode required, and other factors. Therefore, although changes in a person's moral judgment are predominantly in the upward direction over time, as postulated by Kohlberg, such changes do not necessarily proceed in a constant lock-step fashion. Rather, Rest claimed, there is a shifting distribution whereby there is, over two to four years, an increase in the number of responses representative of higher stage levels and a concurrent decrease in responses representative of lower stage levels. The probability of a certain type of response increases with age, peaks, then declines. Each stage represents a pure type but an individual at any one time will have a probability of displaying character-

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istics of all stage types. The probability is potentially specifiable (Rest, 1976, p. 209) and this gives Rest's theory a much tighter construction than other forms of cognitive-development theory using Kohlberg's stage model. Kohlberg allowed that Rest's stage model is an alternative to his own, in moral development theory building (Kohlberg, 1979).

Rest also discussed the necessity to explore the degree of logical connectedness of concepts which a subject has achieved. By this Rest meant whether persons see for themselves the links between their various moral concepts, through possession of an organized system of moral thinking rather than possession of isolated concepts. Rest suggested that it may be that organizing one's moral concepts into a cohesive system is a kind of development in its own right, and we ought not to assume that persons, particularly young children, have unified systems of moral stage structures (rather than simply levels) unless there is evidence of a logical connectedness between their moral concepts (Rest, 1979, p. 253). This raises, once again, the need for more research at the early childhood level, and illustrates the stimulation of Rest's thinking.

Transitional Stages and Stage Oscillation

There is a problem in explaining how transition takes place between stages in any developmental theory which postulates development as a relatively steady on-going process yet adheres to a stage model in the strict Piagetian sense. If stages are

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viewed as qualitatively discrete in structure, how does the "leap" take place between two adjoining stages?

As has been discussed, Rest (1979) used a modified stage model (which represented movement in parabolic curves) to explain a developmental movement by a subject in an upward direction, over time, which nevertheless could range across many stages at any given time. Kohlberg, adhering to a strict stage model, attempted to resolve the paradox of smooth stage transition by employment of the concept of transitional stages or substages to provide links between the "pure" stages (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kohlberg, 1976). At the present point in theory construction a further modification in stage construction has been used (Kohlberg, 1978). Each Kohlbergian stage is now presented as containing substages A and B; B represents a consolidation and more stable equilibration of the socio-moral perspective exhibited first in A. At substage B, the reasoning at the A level becomes general, reciprocal and reversible, thus opening the way to further movement, to the A level of the next highest stage (Colby, 1978).

This redefinition of the stage construct, in terms of what Kohlberg refers to as a "bootstrapping" process, goes some of the way to filling the gaps in the Kohlbergian explanation of stage transition. However, in the light of the evidence that present programs of moral education typically result in changes upwards of only one third of a Kohlberg stage (Rest, 1979), further theoretical clarification of stage transition is desirable.

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Researchers and teachers alike want to be able to see what is happening, when children move or don't move, in steps smaller than the half-stage step provided by the new Kohlbergian A-B model. This is one of the major problems to which the present study addresses itself at the early childhood level.

Selman (1980) made a clear distinction between transitional stages and stage oscillation, which seems of potential usefulness in understanding moral conduct. The distinction is lost within the Rest stage model. Selman claimed that the concept of transitional stages refers to "forms of thinking, understanding and valuing that are midway between two articulated stages, such that certain elements of the earlier stage appear to be rejected but certain reconstructions characteristic of the later stage are not yet observed to be formed" (Selman, 1980, p. 298). On the other hand, the concept of oscillation between stages refers to incidents where an individual is assumed to have the capacity to understand higher stage reasoning but does not use it.

Selman claimed that the concept of oscillation, as distinct from stage transition, is useful in that it provides a means to explain the conditions under which a person will actually choose or not choose the higher stage reasoning of which he or she is capable. This distinction is of potential usefulness in the practical situation of moral education in the preschool setting; presumably, various teacher-intervention strategies will differ in effectiveness depending on whether a particular child displaying a low level of fairness behaviour has not yet formed the cog-

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nitive structures necessary to function at a higher level or, on the other hand, has the higher understanding but is not acting in accordance with it under a particular set of conditions. In the first case of moral stage transition the most effective strategies in early moral education would probably be those which expose the child to reasoning at the next highest stage; whereas, in the second case, of stage oscillation, the most effective strategy would be more likely to draw the child's attention to discrepancies between his or her moral judgments and his or her moral behaviour, and, at the same time, to attempt to produce changes in environmental conditions so that these conditions act to strengthen the child's correspondence between reasoning and action.

The highest recorded level of moral reasoning and of moral behaviour was used as the main measurement for the data collection in the present investigation in 1976, in an attempt to tap this type of discrepancy which Selman clarified in his concept of stage oscillation. Just how Rest or Selman would see Selman's notion of stage oscillation in relation to Rest's notion of a potential usage of the full range of stages by a subject at one time, is not known. The two positions are not wholly contradictory.

Assessment of Moral Level

Rest (1979, p. 69) strongly argued the need of researchers to gather enough data so that it is possible to arrive at a

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general picture of the moral construct which is not overly influenced by factors specific to one situation. He used a crisp simile to point out that the attempt to assess a complex moral construct through a single bit of information is like attempting to assess I.Q. on one vocabulary item. Rest also discussed the need for standardization of test stimuli, administration, and scoring, which is well recognized by all. However, Rest takes a step forward by claiming that such standardization is now possible to a far greater extent through use of a test instrument of the Defining Issues type rather than the use of clinical interview techniques.

Rest (1979) noted Damon's (1977) claim that the clinical interview provides a better method for assessing the developmental character of a subject's thinking but Rest argued that this method has not been shown to be superior and has, in fact, been shown to have important deficiencies. However, Rest allowed that the probing interview technique is indispensable in the exploratory stage of moral research, to provide the type of information from which to discover and describe the structural organization of moral thinking, and from which to derive the scoring categories and the taxonomy of responses. Standardization is the next step, Rest argued, as researchers (with older subjects) move on to the next and different task of providing ways to assess accurately where a subject stands on a developmental scale (Rest, 1979, pp. 69-70).

Rest paid little attention to the fact that his Defining

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Issues Test is not suitable for use with preschool children or those at the junior primary school level; he certainly does not claim it to be suitable at these levels. Furthermore, research in early moral development is still at the exploratory stage where Rest stated that the probing interview technique is indispensable. Notwithstanding the usefulness of the clinical interview with preschool children, additional data collection methods are required. Rest (1979, p. 256) argued the necessity and the validity of using a variety of methods for collecting information on which to base the assessment of moral development. He argued that, if moral judgment is an important variable in human functioning, then one should expect many different manifestations of it.

Rest (1979, p. 259) also pointed out, as others have done, the need for research designs that move from the exploration of subjective internal responses to the exploration of real life issues in the study of moral development. However, he also noted the complexity and difficulty of the real life approach, as evidenced by the paucity of naturalistic studies across the whole field of psychology. Naturalistic techniques of data gathering will be used in the present study to explore how children actually behave in real life moral conflicts within the preschool environment, and to compare their behaviour with their highest levels of moral reasoning in the clinical interviews.

The choice of a highest-level score is important in this study. The problem of how to arrive at a single score of moral

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judgment level has a variety of solutions within cognitive-development research. The method of assessment of moral judgment in the Defining Issues Test used by Rest (1979) uses a multiple choice format. The basic assumption behind the adoption of this format is that persons at different moral levels perceive moral dilemmas differently, and therefore will choose different statements as representative of the critical issues which must be considered in arriving at fair judgments in a moral dilemma. A score on the Defining Issues Test is thus based on a subject's rating and ranking of the twelve prescribed choices, on a pencil and paper test. This method provides ease of objective scoring, which makes possible the analysis and synthesis of results from many different research studies using this method. However, it can now be seen why the Defining Issues Test is not suitable with preschool children. The task demanded is beyond the cognitive ability of preoperational children; it requires that a subject comprehend and hold in mind five points on the rating scale for each exercise and then select and rank four out of the twelve prescribed multiple-choice issues, on each of six moral problems (Rest, 1979).

The Kohlbergian method of semi-structured interviews is undoubtedly more suitable for use with young children. On the other hand, the Kohlbgerian method of assigning stage scores to the subject is far more complex to use, and open to great problems of reliability across scores. The score derived from the interview material can be variously expressed (Kohlberg, 1973).

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A subject may be assigned to one moral stage on the basis of a predominant usage of thinking at that stage level (fifty per cent or more of responses falling into the particular stage), or, on the basis of assigning each response to the stage it represents and deriving a mean stage from all responses. The second method has the advantage of taking account of all the responses given by a subject. A third method of obtaining a Kohlbergian stage score is to use the highest stage of moral thinking displayed by the subject (rather than the mean stage) and to express that score as a Highest-Stage Score. The Highest-Stage Score provides a different type of information from other stage scores, and it has particular interest to researchers interested in relations between reasoning and behaviour. Kohlberg has argued that moral education should be directed at stimulating a child to use his or her highest level of moral reasoning in the solution of real-life moral problems, and in stimulating a child to act in accordance with the highest level of reasoning of which he or she is capable (Kohlberg, 1970). Thus, information on a subject's highest level of moral judgment response is of particular relevance in research which is studying correspondence between moral reasoning and moral behaviour.

Distributive Justice Stages in Young Children

Damon (1975a; 1977) investigated the conceptions of positive justice in children from four to ten years of age. He found only a weak relationship at this age level between children's stage of moral judgment in response to hypothetical dilemmas,

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and their everyday behaviour related to sharing and fair distribution of rewards. He suggested that theoretical and practical social knowledge may exist as two distinct abilities. Children's actual engagement on real-life situations which have direct consequences for them is a far more powerful stimulator of moral questioning than stories or even films dealing with hypothetical situations (Damon, 1975b, pp. 8-9). These findings are in line with a basic assumption in Piagetian theory of cognitive development that, in the early stages of development, thought grows out of action (Piaget, 1950; 1951). There is a clear danger in assuming that a particular technique, e.g. the use of hypothetical dilemmas, which has been shown to be successful in stimulating stage development in older subjects, will produce the same results when applied to younger children.

It should be noted that even though real-life situations may stimulate moral questioning more than hypothetical dilemma techniques with young children, one cannot assume (in the absence of further evidence) that the real-life situations will be processed at a higher stage level than the hypothetical situations. Damon claimed only that the real-life situations stimulated more questioning. Hypothetical dilemmas may be answered in terms of what others ought ideally to do, what the subject's experience suggests that others would in fact do, what the subject thinks he or she ought to do or would be expected by others to do, or what the subject feels he or she would in fact do (Straughan, 1975). It is extremely difficult to tell from the literature the level at which subjects are responding and it appears that an

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individual may fluctuate, even within one response. The responses of a child in answer to questions about real-life situations may contain the same mix of meanings and they would be just as difficult to sort out, due to verbal limitations, restricted cognitive structuring and situation-specific factors. It is indeed a complex issue.

Damon's work enabled him to delineate the early development of levels of positive justice, which included a Stage 0 below Stage 1 and also described two substages within each stage (Table 4, p. 118). His research attention to young children, as young as four and five years, enabled him to reveal an age shift in reasoning about distributive justice within these years. The younger children gave justifications which simply reiterated their prior choice of action whereas the older children attempted to justify their prior choice on an objective basis. The same type of shift in criteria for justification will be explored, in this investigation, in relation to children's thinking about fairness (See Chapter 5).

Positive justice, involving concepts of fairness over the equitable distribution of valued resources, was properly viewed by Damon (1977) as only one aspect of social-moral thought, which is not necessarily the most influential aspect in determining a child's actual behaviour. Turiel's (1978) ingeniously simple research, on the young child's ability to differentiate between rules based only on social convention and rules having moral force, provided evidence on another dimension of morality.

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TABLE 4

Damon's Descriptions of Early Positive Justice Levels*

Level O-A:	Positive justice choices derive from S's wish that an act occur. Reasons simply assert the choices rather than attempting to justify them (that is, I should get it because I want to have it).
Level O-B:	Choices still reflect S's desires but are now justified on the basis of external, observable realities such as size, sex, or other physical characteristics of persons (that is, We should get the most because we're girls). Such justifications, however, are invoked in a fluctuating, a posteriori manner, and are self-serving in the end.
Level 1-A:	Positive justice choices derive from notions of strict equality in actions (that is, that everyone should get the same). Justifications are consistent with this principle but are unilateral and inflexible.
Level 1-B:	Positive justice choices derive from a notion of reciprocity in actions: that persons should be paid back in kind for doing good or bad things. Notions of merit and deserving emerge. Justifications are unilateral and inflexible.
Level 2-A:	A moral relativity develops out of the understanding that different persons can have different, yet equally valid, justifications for their claims to justice. The claims of persons with special needs (that is, the poor) are weighed heavily. Choices attempt quantitative compromises between competing claims (e.g. He should get the most, but she should get some too).
Level 2-B:	S co-ordinates considerations of equality and reciprocity, so that S's positive justice choices take into account the claims of various persons and the demands of the specific situation. Choices are firm and clearcut, yet justifications reflect the recognition that all persons should be given their due (though in many situations, this does not mean equal treatment).

* Damon, 1977, p.75.

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Damon takes up this and two other important aspects of social-moral thought to provide four main dimensions, viz. positive justice. social convention, authority as a basis for complying with demands by others, and friendship. There is claimed to be clear evidence of developmental progression in each of these aspects: justice, convention, authority and friendship, although evidence of regressive changes in the positive justice domain has resulted in Damon speaking in terms of levels rather than pure stages (Damon, 1977). So, using a different approach from that of Rest (1979), Damon (1977) also found that the evidence at this time does not quite fit into the Piagetian and Kohlbergian strict stage model of moral development.

Damon (1977) looked for and found some structural regularities in the four domains of social knowledge. He identified the general cognitive-development processes of classification and compensation (reciprocity) as general organizing structures which operate in all areas of social knowledge (as in all other areas of cognitive development). He claimed some empirical support that classification (ordering through some form of grouping) and compensation (restoring equilibrium to a situation which has become unbalanced) are fundamental necessary structures for social functioning although he did not claim that classification and compensation alone provide sufficient structures to allow complete understanding of the whole area of social knowledge (Damon, 1977, p. 284). Social perspective-taking is the third structure which Damon found to be common across all areas of social knowledge; however, this social perspective-taking structure was

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seen by Damon to include features which he did not claim to be common across all other areas of knowledge outside the social realm. (The perspective-taking component of moral development is discussed further in the following section of this chapter). In addition to perspective-taking, Damon speculated that there are probably other organizing principles unique to the area of social knowledge, and possibly others with even narrower specificity, i.e. restricted to certain areas only of social knowledge.

Damon (1977) concluded that the three main developmental structures - perspective-taking, classification and compensation - interact in a very complex way in the child's construction of his or her social knowledge. They are necessary but not sufficient conditions for social knowledge to develop. For example, a certain level of ability in compensation is necessary for a certain level of justice but it is not sufficient, for justice involves more than compensation. Furthermore, Damon argued that if a child displays a certain level of logical reasoning in his social relationships, he will not necessarily display a parallel level of logical reasoning on a specific Piagetian task. He argued that a child might demonstrate a high level of classification in his social relationships but may not necessarily be able to apply this level of classification logic to a Piagetian logico-mathematical task; the child may, for example, have a block against mathematics. Damon argued that one cannot measure a general cognitive structure, e.g. classification or compensation, on a cognitive task, and predict accurately from that where the child will be in some social area such as moral development.

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In spite of the fact that the relationships are more subtle than has been previously thought, Damon claimed that the structures do exist and do allow some predictions of levels of functioning from one area to another. This is in accord with the claims of Kohlberg (1973) and Selman (1976). Damon (1977) clearly argued that there is no justification for the assumption that one can measure different aspects of social knowledge - justice, friendship, authority, or rules, and add them all together to obtain a valid global score on social development. Damon's analysis reveals that each area of social knowledge has its own concepts and organizing principles which are to some extent unique to the area. This is important in relation to the present investigation in view of the global umbrella of "social development" which the majority of teachers have been found to be using in planning objectives. Having made absolutely clear that there is an absence of simple correspondence, Damon turned again to the evidence which suggests that relationships do exist in development across different areas of social knowledge and do have some prediction value. However, it is as well to keep in mind that "moral development" in early childhood may prove to be a very mixed bag of capabilities.

Damon concluded that there is fragmentation and there is consistency in every aspect of children's knowledge. The child's level of knowledge in one social domain may predict approximately his level of knowledge in another; particularly in domains that share similar social concerns. However, the prediction can only be very broad at this stage of our knowledge.

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There is also some evidence of weak consistency between children's social knowledge and their real-life conduct. However, Damon warned that here again the relationship is complex.

If the cognitive-development theory of morality is to grow as a strong and valid developmental theory, it must explore more thoroughly the explanatory power of the two fundamental concepts in developmental theory, classification and compensation, when they are applied to the area of moral development. An attempt will be made in the present investigation to view the data from the point of view of these two structures. To date, the third structure, perspective-taking, is the structure which has received the bulk of attention in moral development research.

Social Perspective-taking

Social perspective-taking is broadly defined as the ability to see oneself in relation to society (Kohlberg, 1976, p. 38). The ability to take the role of another person and view the situation from the other's point of view has long been regarded as an important part of moral development (Flavell et al, 1968; Kohlberg, 1968; 1976; Mead, 1934; Selman, 1971; 1975; 1976; 1980).

Kurdek (1978), in a review of the literature relating perspective-taking to moral judgment, argued that the relationships should be conceptualized in terms of a distinct yet common coordinating cognitive activity, rather than as one where perspective-taking is seen as part of the cognitive basis for children's

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development, as conceptualized by Kohlberg (1969). This appears to be a reflection of the problem of viewing perspective-taking as a basic cognitive structure which we have seen Damon grappling with. Kurdek pointed out the difficulties in any review of the literature on perspective-taking and moral development, since there has been such an unsatisfactory global approach to both constructs. The broad brush approach has led to the implied assumption that one measure of perspective-taking, or one measure of moral development, is as valid as another. Perspective-taking tasks reviewed in the literature by Kurdek vary widely in terms of the type of perspective-taking (cognitive, affective or perceptual) used in different studies from which comparisons have been attempted.

In terms of sheer numbers of research studies, the main cognitive-development approach to the relationship between perspective-taking and moral judgment is contrary to that suggested by Kurdek (1978). It has followed Piaget's (1968 [1932]) view of the relationship. To Piaget, understanding of the existence of alternative viewpoints, and the ability to put oneself in another person's position, were major cognitive prerequisites to the development of moral reasoning. Similarly, Kohlberg viewed perspective-taking (role-taking) ability as the primary ability through which the child learns to integrate the discrepancies between his own moral perception and the action of others (Kohlberg, 1969, pp. 398-399). Flavell et al (1968) also viewed social role-taking from a rather restricted cognitive perspective, as a part of the general cognitive ability to see situa-

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tions from multiple perspectives. He defined role-taking as the ability to understand the interaction between oneself and another person from the perspective of the other.

Hoffman (1963; 1970; 1976; 1979) has consistently drawn attention to the need to understand the affective element in moral development, which involves recognizing and responding to the feelings as well as to the cognitive viewpoint of the other person. Hoffman's structuring of moral development suggested that early empathy (well before three years of age) may be the developmental precursor to social perspective-taking. Somewhat in contrast to Hoffman, Selman conceptualized social perspective-taking as a process which underlies the development of stages of moral reasoning. Selman viewed the ability to understand the reciprocal nature of interpersonal relationships as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the development of parallel levels of moral reasoning and empathic judgments (Selman, 1971; 1975); Table 5, p. 126, shows the patterns of relationships.

More than any other worker in the area, Selman gave emphasis to the predictive component in role-taking which involves perception of what the other person is likely to <u>do</u> in a given situation. In Selman's definition of role-taking, the predictive element leads on to the understanding of how one's own actions will affect what the other person is likely to do to one, and this understanding, in turn, affects one's response to the other, and so on (Selman, 1976). Selman's study of the structure of social perspective-taking takes account of the complex, cyclical

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nature of social interaction to a far greater extent than others. Selman (Table 5, p. 126) described developmental levels of social perspective-taking, which he claimed to be theoretically and empirically linked with Kohlberg's model of moral judgment stages. The theoretical assumption is that the child structures his or her understanding of how people do act, think and feel towards each other, and that moral reasoning depends, in part, on the level attained in this kind of perspective-taking because Kohlberg's stages refer to the development of progressively more adequate reasoning about how persons should act and feel towards each other (Selman, 1980, p.36).

Selman (1975) was careful to point out that the relationship between social perspective-taking and moral reasoning does not give any guarantee that a child with a high level of perspective-taking will automatically apply this understanding so as to reach a higher level of either empathic or moral judgment. Rather, the assumption is that, unless the child has attained the necessary level of perspective-taking ability, he or she cannot attain the parallel level of social-moral behaviour. Whether or not the child actually employs his or her highest level of perspective-taking in moral judgment situations is a further question in Selman's view, relating back to our earlier discussion of stage oscillation. Selman stressed the need for further research, not only to understand better the mechanisms of social perspective-taking but also to understand the mechanisms that will enable a child to use his or her underlying social perspective-taking ability for the positive understanding rather than the detriment

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TABLE 5

Selman's Parallel Structured Relations between Social Role-Taking and Moral Judgment Stages*

Social Role-Taking Stage	Moral Judgment Stage
Stage 0 - Egocentric Viewpoint (Age Range 3-6)[1]	Stage 0 - Premoral Stage
Child has a sense of differentiation of self and other but fails to distinguish between the social perspective (thoughts, feelings) of other and self. Child can label other's overt feelings but does not see the cause and effect relation of reasons to social actions.	Judgments of right and wrong are based on good or bad consequences and not on intentions. Moral choices derive from the subject's wishes that good things happen to self. Child's reasons for his choices simply assert the choices, rather than attempting to justify them.
Stage 1 - Social-Informational Role Taking (Age Range 6-8)	Stage 1 - Punishment and Obedience Orientation
Child is aware that other has a social perspective based on other's own reasoning, which may or may not be similar to child's. However, child tends to focus on one perspective rather than co-ordinating viewpoints.	Child focuses on one perspective, that of the authority or the powerful. However, child understands that good actions are based on good intentions. Beginning sense of fairness as equality of acts.
Stage 2 - Self-Reflective Role Taking (Age Range 8-10)	Stage 2 - Instrumental Orientation
Child is conscious that each individual is aware of the other's perspective and that this awareness influences self and other's view of each other. Putting self in other's place is a way of judging his intentions, purposes, and actions. Child can form a co-ordinated chain of perspectives, but cannot yet abstract from this process to the level of simultaneous mutuality.	Moral reciprocity is conceived as the equal exchange of the intent of two persons in relation to one another. If someone has a mean intention toward self, it is right for self to act in kind. Right defined as what is valued by self.
Stage 3 - Mutual Role Taking (Age Range 10-12)	Stage 3 - Orientaton to Maintaining Mutual Expectation
Child realizes that both self and other can view each other mutually and simultaneously as subjects. Child can step outside the two-person dyad and view the interaction from a third-person perspective.	Right is defined as the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have other do unto you. Child considers all points of view and reflects on each person's motives in an effort to reach agreement among all participants.
Stage 4 - Social and Conventional System Role-Taking (Age Range 12-15+)	Stage 4 - Orientation to Society's Perspective
Person realizes mutual perspective-taking does not always lead to complete understanding. Social conventions are seen as necessary because they are understood by all members of the group (the generalized other) regardless of their position, role, or experience.	Right is defined in terms of the perspective of the generalized other or the majority. Person considers consequences of actions for the group or society. Orientation to maintenance of social morality and social order.

1. Age ranges for all stages represent only an average approximation

*Selman, 1976, p.299.

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of other persons (Selman, 1975; 1980). This aspect of morality is discussed further in this chapter under the section on reasoning and action.

Selman stressed the uniquely social nature and origins of social thought, and in so doing, within a cognitive-development orientation, provided a valuable counter-balance to the tendency of cognitive-developmentalists to ignore the person-to-person nature of moral interaction (Selman, 1980, pp. 299-300). He expressed concern that the concept of social understanding not be reduced merely to a function of abstract logical structures. Selman's analysis of stages of social perspective-taking therefore attempts always to co-ordinate two dimensions of a perspective-taking stage, viz. the depth of self-reflective understanding, and the breadth of other-reflective or interpersonal understanding. It is the latter dimension which is often neglected by others.

Saltzstein (1976) in a review of research stressed the importance of opportunities for children to become involved in role-taking, as well as in decision-making and other 'structural' processes, rather than for children to be subjected to authoritarian child-rearing practices and rigid conformity to rules. Some occasional use of parental power assertion appeared to be related to the development of consideration for others, but conformity, according to Saltzstein's summary of research, is related to indiscriminate parental authoritarianism. All these points are in line with Hoffman's summary of child-rearing prac-

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tices conducive to moral development (pp. 66-68, this chapter). However, Saltzstein uses the notion of perspective-taking ability to provide further suggestions related to child-rearing practices.

Saltzstein (1980) pointed out it is unlikely that parental techniques will have the same effect on all ages and in all situations, so he advised parents to be the most rational and least coercive as possible, yet firm. Explicit directions about moral reparation, and even indoctrination, are deemed useful at certain (unspecified) ages. He also drew attention to the fact that causal factors should not be assumed to run one way only; we don't know the extent to which associations between parental discipline and children's moral development may have been shaped by the behaviour of the child. Saltzstein (ibid, p.150), referring to Selman's work on perspective-taking, suggested that associations between children's moral development and inductive methods of discipline by their parents may be due to the way inductive techniques encourage the child's perspective-taking, i.e., consideration of the consequences of his or her actions from the point of view of another person. Saltzstein concluded that, notwithstanding the probable usefulness of indoctrination and instruction at certain times, the generation of certain kinds of conflict (between perspectives) is necessary for moral development. Saltzstein saw it as a parent's function to generate such conflict; the present investigation demonstrates that, under certain conditions of training in ways of handling spontaneous conflict, children can make rich use of these situations between

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themselves.

Kuhn (1972) in a study using children from kindergarten (which is equivalent to Australian Preparatory Class level) through to Grade 6, found that no child who did not show perspective-taking ability, at least at the level of attributing intention to another person, achieved Kohlberg's Stage 2 moral judgment level. The ability to attribute intention to another child would appear to be an aspect of perspective-taking which could be researched further with preschool children and compared to other measures of moral development.

Rotenberg's (1980) findings, on limited research strategies of young children, suggest that a child who does not show perspective-taking ability, at the level of attributing intention to another child, may be helped to do so by a parent or teacher who draws the child's attention to the intention information in the situation. Similarly, Ianotti's (1978) research study on training in role-taking suggests that dramatic play in preschools and other forms of role-playing, both spontaneous and structured by teachers, should provide stimulus to the development of perspective-taking in the young child. Australian preschool programs have traditionally placed strong educational value on spontaneous socio-dramatic play.

Kohlberg's stage sequence of moral development places great importance on higher levels of perspective-taking in relation to higher levels of moral judgment. (Table 2, p.65). However, Kohlberg's theory does not appear yet to have taken sufficient

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account of evidence which questions the Piagetian assumption of the gross egocentrism of the young child (Borke, 1971; 1973; Donaldson, 1978). The lack of attention to the preschool child, which is characteristic of the cognitive-development research on morality, leads once more to unresolved, and largely unrecognized, problems in the conceptualization of Kohlberg's early stages of moral development, on which the later stage development is based. In a theory which has basic assumptions that each higher stage emerges as a result of reintegration of the achievements of the previous stage, and that the young child is essentially egocentric, the problems resulting from lack of sufficient research attention to moral development in early childhood threaten the stability of the whole theory, and its assumptions about perspective-taking.

Iannotti's (1978) research study of role-taking related to empathy, altruism and aggression, in six- to nine-year-old boys, applied two different types of role-taking training, viz. (1) taking the pespective of one character in a story, and (2) taking different perspectives by switching roles at intervals. Iannotti hypothesized that role-taking training could provide practice for children who had already developed role-taking capacities and, furthermore, should present cognitive challenge leading to further development of cognitive processes in other children who had not developed role-taking skills. Iannotti's findings showed a significant increase in role-taking performance following both types of training compared to a control group. Altruism was also significantly increased in the six-year-old

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boys as a result of role-taking training; however, there was no significant effect on empathy or aggression. Iannotti's study presents a simple model for further research.

It may be argued that Iannotti's definition of role-taking represents a simpler process which may be better described as role-playing. "Role playing is the acting out of an assigned personal or social situation for a brief period of time by two or more individuals who have been assigned specific roles" (Kerlinger, 1964, p. 533). It is interesting to note in passing that Kerlinger stated that role-playing held great promise as an experimental method and as an observation measurement tool for behavioural research in psychology and education, since it combined the advantages of controlled behavioural observation with the power of projective methods. Surprisingly, today as in 1964, its research use has been extremely limited.

Social perspective-taking involves viewing a social situation from multiple perspectives. In its mature form it involves the understanding that one's own point of view is merely one of the elements in a set, to be considered alongside other perspectives. The term role-taking may be used as synonymous with social perspective-taking, or, in a narrower sense, used simply as meaning to view the situation, including oneself, as the other person does. The narrower definition of role-taking is very similar to some definitions of empathy discussed earlier in this chapter. The extension of role-taking ability, to the point where one can take the perspective of each participant in turn

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and integrate these perspectives into an overall view, results in the attainment of mature social perspective-taking.

Justice, as the core of morality, involves giving equal respect to each perspective in the process of arriving at moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1976; Rawls, 1972; Selman, 1980). Social perspective-taking is becoming the preferred term in the literature to express the ability to take multiple social perspectives and the concept is seen as including role-taking. The relationship between the concepts of perspective-taking and empathy are less clear overall, as has been discussed previously; within the cognitive-development theory of morality, social perspective-taking is viewed as the basic underlying process (Kohlberg, 1976; Selman 1975).

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PEER INTERACTION

Fundamental to Piaget's (1968 [1932]) early theory of moral development was Piaget's claim that egalitarian peer interaction is the major influence on the stimulation of the child to take the perspective of others. Nucci and Turiel's (1976) research findings, on the justice concepts of children three to five years of age, offer some support to Piaget's claim that peer interaction is an important factor in the development of moral concepts, even in children below the age at which Piaget viewed these interactions. In the Nucci and Turiel study, the responses of children, who were in regular peer groups, indicated that they had learned to distinguish with accuracy (83% agreement between children and adults) rules of social convention versus moral rules. The research findings of Much and Shweder (1978) on the understanding of rules, with five- to six-year-old children, gave further support to the claim that young children can differentiate between various types of rules (although Much and Shweder attribute this to the mastery of language).

Lickona (1976) provided a review of the literature on the question of a link between degree of social interaction with peers and level of moral reasoning. Lickona concluded that research has provided contradictory findings which are difficult to compare in view of the use of a variety of measures of social participation and measures of moral reasoning. There appeared

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to be little research in this area which used direct behavioural measures of social interaction, such as counting the frequency and type of interactions in a natural setting, and comparing the data with measures of moral reasoning. It had yet to be demonstrated that peer interaction per se is a necessary condition for moral development. As has been mentioned in this chapter Hoffman (1979, p. 960) proposed that peer interaction might also serve to weaken, as well as to strengthen, socialization.

It would appear that the most significant factor in peer interaction, which links to moral development, may be the egalitarian nature of many peer interactions in contrast to the power differential which is present in many adult-child interactions (Damon, 1977; Hoffman, 1960; 1963; 1979; Lickona, 1976; Piaget, 1968 (1932); Selman, 1980). If this is the case, and we cannot yet say for sure, then exposure of the child to egalitarian elements in relationships with persons of any age may be expected to foster moral development and may be a significant aspect of moral education, e.g. teachers and parents involving children in democratic decision making processes. However, the degree of real equality of the young child with adults is limited by the child's immaturity and consequent assumption of ultimate responsibility by the parent or teacher. Furthermore, moral development in early childhood may require that the child respect the greater authority of the adult (Kohlberg, 1978). The integrity between these two elements of equality and authority, at various stages of moral development, requires further research.

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In exploring social participation of preschool children aged two to four-and-a-half years, in a group environment, Parten (1932) analysed the peer interaction of individual children under a set of six categories: unoccupied play, solitary play, outdoor play, parallel play, associative play, co-operative play. Other research studies since have used some or all of Parten's categories in observing the social participation of preschool, and Parten's finding, that social participation increases with age in preschool children, has been generally supported (Barnes, 1971; Moore et al, 1974; Rubin et al, 1976; Shure, 1963).

It is intended that a modified form of Parten's categories will be used in the present investigation, to provide a measure of social interaction with peers which will be related to measures of moral development. In interpreting the data it will be necessary to keep in mind several qualifications about Parten's stages arising from other research studies. Rubin et al (1976) suggested that parallel play may be a lower socio-cognitive level than solitary play. Those children who play alongside others in parallel play may desire the company of the others but not be able to take the point of view of others (social perspective) sufficiently to enable them to play in a co-operative manner. There is another major qualification to keep in mind when using Parten's categories. It is that the observed play, i.e. whether solitary or parallel, may be in part a function of the size of the play area. Parten's categories of play described parallel play as playing <u>near</u> another child with similar play materials. In large areas, such as the block area in contrast to

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the home area, a child may be playing with similar material, e.g. building blocks and small cars, and yet not be near another child. Similarly, in the doll's corner or home area, nearness of participants may be a function of the smaller size of the home area (Shure, 1963). To overcome this difficulty observers may be instructed to pay attention to other factors, such as communication, non-verbal as well as verbal, rather than primarily to mere physical distance, in order to decide whether play is solitary or parallel.

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SEX DIFFERENCES

This is another area where the theoretical and research literature reveals contradictions and very little emerges as clearcut. Psychoanalytic theory suggested that the resolution of the Oedipal conflict, which calls for different shifts in identification with the mother between girls and boys, results in differences in developmental possibilities for the two sexes. Freud (1974, original publication 1925) states:

> I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in man (p. 24).

Freud went on to perpetuate the stereotyped view of the difference in terms of a deficit - women are viewed as having less sense of justice than men, they are less ready to submit to the reality of life's pressing needs, less impersonal and less able to be objective. However, Windmiller et al (1980) claimed that recent work with the psychoanalytic framework shows that these differences do not necessarily include sex differences in moral capacity.

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Research based on cognitive development theories of moral development has generally claimed that there are no significant sex differences (Rest, 1979, p. 250). However, Gilligan (1977; 1980) has disputed that claim on the basis of her work with women. Gilligan presented a very strong challenge to the basic assumption of the universality of Kohlberg's stage theory - that the principle of justice as equality is the highest expression of moral judgment level. Gilligan pointed out that Kohlberg's theory is largely derived from studies of males and she claimed that it is biased towards typically male values in western societies - individual freedom, justice and rights; women's morality relationships, on the other hand, emphasise responsibility and care for others and non-violence (Gilligan, 1980, p.499). These value stances of women have been viewed in cognitive-development research as impediments to the full moral development of women to the Post-conventional level of morality. Gilligan argued that this represents a male bias and an error in the theory, and that the adoption of care and non-violence as moral principles can represent the attainment of mature (Post-conventional) moral development.

Gilligan (1980) suggested that the downgrading of responses based on concern for the welfare of others, in Kohlberg's theory, may be tied to a critical failure of western societies to value relationships of responsibility and care, and may contribute to breakdowns of those societies. There are some possible links between Gilligan's view and the social-learning approach. Hoffman (1977) suggested that at the highest levels of moral develop-

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ment, principles of justice, and of care, should converge. It may be that Gilligan's differences can be traced back to the influence of early socialization. Maccoby (1980) provides a very comprehensive chapter on sex differences in social development from a social-learning orientation.

Gilligan presents a powerful argument that justice proceeds from the ethic of equality - that everyone should be treated the same, and care proceeds from the ethic of non-violence - that no one should be hurt; both inequality and violence are destructive to everyone involved (Gilligan, 1980, p. 516). These ideas are more fully developed in a later publication (Gilligan, 1982). Studies of the moral development and education of preschool children should obviously pay attention to the development of the concepts of care and non-violence towards others, in conjunction with the concept of justice or fairness.

There is some additional support for Gilligan's claim of a different sequence of moral development in females, in Borke's (1973) study of the development of empathy in children three to six years of age. (Other aspects of this study have been discussed in this chapter under Empathy). Borke found that, in both American and Chinese children, girls were more accurate than boys in perceiving social situations associated with the emotions: happy, afraid, sad, and angry. Borke interpreted this difference to be due to social learning.

Hoffman also gave some emphasis to social learning factors

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in relation to sex differences in moral development. In his review of studies of the influence of various socialization factors on internalized control of behaviour, Hoffman (1979) suggested that research evidence of greater moral internalization and more humanistic moral values in females than in males may be partly explained by evidence of different socialization techniques and content applied to girls in contrast to boys, in the United States society. Girls traditionally have been socialized by inductive techniques and with emphasis on being responsive to the needs of others. In contrast, the socialization of boys included, increasingly with age, emphasis on traits and skills instrumental to occupational success, which often conflict with prior concern for the welfare of others.

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ROLE OF LANGUAGE

The evidence on the role of language in early moral development, and the influence of verbal ability, is confusing. We will look briefly at examples of the research evidence available.

Hogan et al (1978) presented a socio-analytical theory of moral development which they claimed contradicts the rational approach of cognitive-developmental theory. In Hogan's theory, moral development is tied to evolutionary problems of survival and social behaviour is viewed as largely determined by unconscious needs for attention, predictability and status. Hogan et al claimed that the first phase of moral development is rule attunement and specified language learning is the most crucial element in rule attunement. They argued that language learning (and other aspects of the early socialization process) depends heavily on authoritative parental practices. Parents, they pointed out, do not negotiate with children about verbal naming; they tell the young child what something is called. Similarly, it is claimed, rules and limit-setting depend on authoritativeness in adults. In this theory, language learning is an important factor in early moral development, and moral development is not a separate concept in itself but merely part of the total social-

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ization process.

Aronfreed claimed that verbalization by adults, particularly when related to intentions, led to more effective internalized control than overt action and punishment in the absence of "a moderate amount of verbalization of standards to the child" (Aronfreed, 1976, p. 63). Much and Shweder (1978) also claimed that language played a major role in transmitting behavioural standards (rules) to kindergarten (five- to six-year-old) children. Lewis (1963) summarized studies showing the importance of language in ethical development.

Mischel and Mischel (1976) argued the importance of language in morality, from another approach. They claimed that a large part of what cognitive-developmentalists assume to be structural changes in moral stages may, in fact, simply be changes in verbal style. The argument does seem to be couched in terms that suggest it has more relevance to older persons, rather than preschool children. Mischel and Mischel point out that verbal evocation of moral principles, e.g. justice, is frequently associated with the justification of atrocities in behaviour.

Rest (1979) countered the argument of Mischel and Mischel, that verbal sophistication may be wrongly taken to reflect higher structural levels in morality, by attempting to differentiate between verbal fluency and the ability to construct an argument that satisfies the logic of each moral stage. Rest argued that Mischel and Mischel failed to distinguish between structure and

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content. He pointed out that moral assessment, in the cognitive-development method, is not based simply on the subject's use of content terms, such as justice, but on the logical structuring of thought which the subject reveals behind the content (Rest, 1979, p. 159).

To support this claim, Rest presented evidence from many studies which used his Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral development, showing strong evidence that, on general aptitude tests, the DIT is no more highly correlated with verbal subtests than it is with nonverbal subtests (Rest, 1979). On this and other evidence (including the results of invitations to subjects to try to falsify their responses above and below their stage of moral reasoning) Rest concluded that differences in verbal ability were not a significant factor in results gained from the DIT method of assessing moral judgment levels. It should be noted that Rest's data came mostly from adolescents and adults, and did not include any preschool children. One cannot therefore assume that verbal skills do not play any significant part in the moral stage development of young children.

Difficulties in controlling the verbal skill factor, and in interpreting the reasoning of young children, based on their lower levels of verbal response, have probably been a contributing factor in the extent to which cognitive-development theorists in the moral area have neglected research studies of young children. It is possible that the role of language may be particularly important in early rule-related aspects of moral

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development. We do not have sufficient evidence to judge. Also, its importance has previously been suggested in relation to the development of perspective-taking, particularly in the giving of verbal help to a young child to distinguish the salient features of a situation, such as the intention of another actor.

It is self-evident that justice or fairness must be constructed or imagined (imaged); it cannot be directly seen. The concept of fairness must be increasingly affected by language and linguistic forms, at least by Piaget's stage of preconceptual thinking (say, approximately two years). Jer ison's originality in conceiving language as a supersensory system is worthy of attention by cognitive-developmentalists. Jer ison argued that the evolution of language as another sensory modality originally contributed to our capacity to image, rather than to communicate in the sense of directing the action of another (Jer ison, 1977). This intriguing perspective on language, which is ably argued by Jer ison, bears some relation to Bruner's notion of language as a primary tool for thought and is not contrary to Piaget's notion of the primacy, in time, of the development of the representation of action before the development of language (Bruner, 1966; Piaget, 1951). Therefore it will not be surprising if we find, in the observations in the present investigation, that verbalizations, associated with spontaneous moral behaviour concerning fairness, are very important in helping us to understand the data. Care will need to be given to establish that there is some initial general level of verbal ability in the subjects.

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NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION

It is surprising that little attention has apparently been given to the role of non-verbal communication in moral development. Non-verbal messages from parents are obviously a major medium for communciating rules and social expectations to children below two years of age in our culture, e.g. the crawling baby who touches the electric power-point is consistently withdrawn by the mother who shakes her head and may tap the child's hand. This may be explained by Eysenck's (1976) simple model of conditioning and, as such, would be dismissed by cognitive developmentalists as below the level of true moral stage development. Incidents of early non-verbal display of empathy from baby to mother or from toddler to toddler, common to any who work with young children, may also be dismissed by cognitive-development theorists. It is more difficult to justify dismissing the lack of attention to the frequent non-verbal behaviours, in any group of three to four-year-old children, which accompany peer interactions and seem to display early social perspective-taking processes. The following observation provides one example:

> John is playing with blocks. Luigi moves over near John and watches John's face. John ignores Luigi. Luigi moves closer. John turns his back on Luigi. Luigi continues to stand watching. John raises a block

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> in his hand and makes a mildly threatening gesture to Luigi. Luigi moves back a few paces and continues to watch John. John looks at Luigi for the first time. Luigi smiles at John. John, without smiling, pushes two blocks towards Luigi. Luigi advances and tentatively puts a hand on one block. John watches him, not smiling or threatening. Luigi very slowly adds the block to John's building, watching John's face. John appears to take no notice. Luigi adds another block. John appears to pay no attention. Up to this point there has been no verbal communication. Luigi then says, "Get you some more." John smiles. Luigi fetches an armful of blocks and dumps them near John. John says, "You can sit here" Indicating a seat in his block construction. They build and play together with further talk.

An analysis of this incident will clearly demonstrate an awareness and testing of the intentions of each actor by the other child, i.e. some ability to take the perspective of the other, depending on non-verbal clues and probably, in this case, also drawing on previous experience of each other. Any observation of a group of three-year-old children for an hour or so is likely to reveal similar incidents. Moral development is already going on spontaneously in preschool environments, and non-verbal communication (as well as verbal) may play an important part in it. However, spontaneous incidents do not always work in the direction of stimulating moral development, as the following example reveals:

> Brett is swinging on the swing.

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> Gary comes up to him and grabs the ropes, stopping the swing. Brett says, "Aw, leave me alone." Gary waves a clenched fist at Brett. Brett looks for the teacher who is out of earshot though visible. Gary then looks at the teacher who does not appear to be noticing the incident. Gary rocks the swing violently, saying "Get off." Brett calls, "Teacher." Gary stops rocking and looks around at the teacher who glances across and then turns away. Gary punches Brett. Brett gets off and goes away in the direction of the teacher. Gary watches Brett. The teacher is not watching Brett. Brett changes direction and goes into the sandpit. Gary gets on the swing.

Analysis of this incident in terms of Kohlberg's stage 1 of moral development suggests that the event was not profitable in relation to either child's moral development, and was probably detrimental. Aggression was seen to be rewarded. Understanding of the intention of each other (from both verbal and non-verbal messages) did not help either child to cope with the situation in a morally mature way.

Preschool teachers need help in handling such situations if maximum gains are to result from preschool education in promoting, rather than hindering, children's moral development. Nelson Le Gall oversimplified the research findings when she stated, in relation to preschool children, that "morality is determined by what adults around them permit and do not permit" (Nelson Le Gall, 1980, p. 81). However, there is a message for preschool teachers emphasised in Nelson Le Gall's overstatement:

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teachers play a vital role in early moral development, by omission as well as commission. Their communications, non-verbal as well as verbal, are "heard" by children, processed in relation to social situations, and used to influence action. Truly, a non-message by an adult in this type of communication system, can act as a strong message of approval.

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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MORAL REASONING AND BEHAVIOUR

Choice of Concepts

One difficulty within this problem area is the choice of concepts one is going to attempt to relate. Moral behaviour, moral conduct, moral action are confusing terms. They are here taken to mean the same type of event, i.e. to be interchangeable terms (as is the common way they appear to be used in the literature). However, behaviour will be the preferred term in this report, on the grounds that it is the most widely used to cover both conduct and action. That is, it is chosen on the grounds that it is widest in meaning, not on any claim that it is clearest in meaning. The task of analysis and clarification of meaning between all these behaviour terms needs a study of its own.

The difficulties of definition are confounded when one then tries to establish the relation between moral behaviour and moral reasoning or judgment.

To what extent do judgment and behaviour overlap? Moral reasoning may not necessarily lead to moral judgment but judgment (at least overtly pronounced judgment) inevitably contains some behaviour, and moral behaviour (in order to be considered moral

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at all, at least by cognitive-development theorists) inevitably contains some basic level of moral judgment. Indeed Damon (1977; 1978) argued that the issue is wrongly conceived in terms of judgment-behaviour, and is more properly seen as hypothetical versus real-life. Here we must, of necessity, go back for a moment to some further consideration of the role of language.

If, as Damon argued, the issue is better conceptualized as one of hypothetical versus real-life moral dilemmas, rather than as moral judgment versus behaviour, then there is the possibility arising from the findings of split-level brain research (Gazzaniga, 1977) that a child may be explicitly specialized in one rather than in another form of grasping moral problems. Although the left and right hemispheres of the brain are no longer thought to be exclusively lateralized to verbal and visual spatial areas respectively, Gazzaniga, on the basis of a great deal of work in this field, does suggest the interesting possibility that "it may well follow that a particular child might be able to solve a problem using verbal symbols with greater ease than using visual-spatial ones, while another child might be better off solving the same problem using visual-spatial relations." (Gazzaniga, 1977, p. 95). I suggest that there may be (but do not know whether there is or not) a link at the early childhood level, between verbal fluency and the solving of hypothetical rather than real-life problems. There would, of course, be a much stronger case for the possible existence of such a link, in research which poses hypothetical dilemmas purely in verbal form without the visual-spatial to a preconceptual

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child in real-life events, and can be partially made available in hypothetical dilemma interview situations through the use of graphics and toys.

This possibility, as yet needing research, if found to have validity in the moral development area, would certainly open up some new ways to approach old problems. Kohlberg, following Piaget, consistently emphasizes and values the verbal aspects of cognitive functioning. Piaget's earlier stages of cognitive development, which depend for their reasoning on concrete perceptions (particularly visual-spatial perceptions), are transformed into the ability to think hypothetically at Piaget's highest stage of formal operational thought. There is heavy emphasis on the use of language as a symbolic system which increasingly acts as the main tool of thought (Piaget, 1950). Similarly in Kohlberg's highest moral level - Post-conventional or Principled morality (Stages 5 and 6) - a high degree of language skill is an essential component, since the thinker must be able to state verbally a principle; and, further, reason that the principle has universal rather than situation-specific status in solving a moral dilemma. This involves using language at least at the level of sophistication required to handle hypothetical questions at the "if-then" level.

Rest (1979) argued that the evidence, from over a hundred studies using Rest's Defining Issues Test of moral judgment, supports Kohlberg's claim that verbal skill is no more important

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a factor than other measures of general intelligence. However, it must be pointed out here, as elsewhere, that Rest's Defining Issues Test is admitted to be unsuitable for young children, one of the reasons being that it is too verbally sophisticated to be understood by them. Whatever skills and relations may be shown by Rest's DIT studies to be relevant to the moral development of adult subjects, they will still need to be tested for young children, before we could be sure that the components of moral development function in exactly the same way at the early childhood level.

It is quite reasonable (although as yet completely untested as far as I have been able to ascertain) to suggest that preschool children may function at a higher level when they have actual three-dimensional visual-spatial referents - as they have in a real-life territorial dispute in the preschool 'home corner' (dramatic play with dolls, etc.) in contrast to their level of functioning in response to hypothetical story dilemmas, with or without graphics and toys as suggested above. This could be so, even leaving aside the matter of the greater motivation of preschool children when involved in real-life disputes. Here we are concerned with the possibility of different patterns in predominant or favoured modes of functioning, possibly related to age factors and/or individual differences in peers which may be due to genetic or environmental influences, or to the interaction of both, or simply to the nature of the task.

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One of the few studies that touch upon these questions in moral research is that of Peterson & McNamee (1977) who studied moral reasoning and role-taking in real-life versus hypothetical situations, with four- to five-year-old children. Findings indicated that the children displayed higher levels of role-taking (i.e. the behavioural dimension) with real objects in contrast to pictures, whereas their moral reasoning (the verbal dimension) was higher in the hypothetical situations in contrast to the real-life situations. Much more research is necessary before we will have a clear picture of this important area.

There is little more that one can do at this stage than raise, but leave open, some of the intriguing possibilities referred to above. Since the judgment-action processes are independently complex, and an even higher order of complexity is required to treat both together, it will take a much greater body of research, designed specifically to investigate that area, before we will be able to say much with certainty. However, since the issues of judgment-behaviour, and hypothetical versus real-life knowledge seem to be so central, we will, in the present investigation, attempt to provide some further descriptions at the early childhood level, and to tease out some more of the strands.

Difficulties of Control and Prediction

Within Kohlberg's theory of moral stages, it is probable that there is a certain unpredictability, i.e. a random element in which any particular moral judgment response is going to fall

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within the range of responses which is theoretically predictable, in part, from the mean of the subject's previous responses. Kohlberg does not pay much attention to predictability, certainly not in statistical terms, since he has argued that statistics have little relevance in the analysis of developmental stages (Kohlberg, 1979). However, within Kohlberg's theory, it is predictable from the theory that the overall dominant stage of moral judgment used by any subject will not be lower than on previous occasions. The boundaries of the predominant stage usage are fixed by the universal nature of stage progression, i.e., by invariant direction in sequence. However, within the stage boundaries that operate for an individual at any one time, there is a range of possible responses crossing several adjacent stages. Within this range, it is possible that variability of response, i.e. the point in the range on which any response falls, may be controlled by a variety of factors which have not yet received attention in Kohlbergian theory.

When we come to the question of predictability of moral behaviour rather than judgment, the cognitive-development position is just as insubstantial. The roots of predicability of the stage system as a whole are claimed to lie in genetic determinants which are common to the species, i.e. universal invariant moral stage sequence. The roots of the unpredictability of any specific response, within the predictable stage range of the particular individual at a particular time, lie in the interaction of the individual's particular internal stresses and strengths, and the environmental pressures and support to which he or she is

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subjected at that time.

Thus the primary constraint is viewed in Kohlbergian theory as internal; it is the species-specific internal genetic pattern of moral development. However, within the confines of this pattern, the individual choice of a particular moral judgment response cannot be predicted at any level of usefulness. Actual behaviour in real-life moral conflicts is even less predictable, even though it is also externally constrained by the principle of adaptation. For example, a measure of peer reinforcement (environmental pressure) may increase predictability by allowing the researcher to determine whether the response is adaptive or non-adaptive to the actor; however, the complexity of the interaction between the variety of internal pressures operating in the individual at any time, is great. The desire to be considered nice, the desire for possession of an object, fatigue, teacher approval or disapproval, peer group scorn or approval, friendship presence - all or any of these may be operating at any one time, and would seem to make prediction of behaviour possible only at a very broad level at best. It is theoretically possible that, given a knowledge of the moral judgment stage of an individual, and a set of environment influences, one could predict in a very general fashion how the person might respond to some given change in the environment, such as a new reinforcement schedule.

However, the difficulty of predicting behaviour in real-life situations from knowledge of abstract moral judgment level, lies not only in difficulties associated with correlating the required

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range of variables to be analysed but also in collecting the data in ways which do not affect its validity in the comparison exercise. Insofar as one seeks to control environmental pressures, e.g. by placing the child in a laboratory or semi-structured interview situation, predictability in that environment is higher. But to attempt to predict, on the basis of responses obtained under controlled environmental conditions, responses that will occur in the natural environment, is to ignore the essential nature of the interaction process in real-life prediction. What one can measure about moral behaviour in contrived laboratory situations depends upon the control of variables which are not necessarily controlled in natural environments and may, in fact, interact in complex ways.

Simlarly, insofar as the researcher seeks to control the other side of the interaction, viz. the internal pressures on the individual, by presenting the child in an interview situation with a hypothetical dilemma couched in third person terms, predictability of response is higher but only for similar structured situations. Furthermore, as has been previously pointed out in this chapter, there are many confounding factors in using hypothetical dilemmas, such as the extent to which the subject identifies with any dilemma character, whether the response is intended by the subject to indicate what the subject thinks the character will do, what the subject thinks the character ought to do, and whether the subject understands the type of dilemma he is being asked to resolve and has had previous experience with similar conflicts. It is extremely difficult to interpret which

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of these factors apply, particularly in interviews with young children, and perhaps because natural responses are a mixture of them.

Insofar as the researcher does control the internal variables in the individual in the hypothetical story interview situation, the same paradox remains as was present in the consideration of control of external environmental factors, viz. that the more successful the control is, the less valid are the data for predicting how the subject will behave in spontaneous real-life situations, since the experimental design has controlled out of the experiment many aspects of one side of the individual-environment interaction. Again, what one can predict from the data gathered in this situation is at most, and very generally, the stage range in the larger pattern of stage sequence into which the individual's behaviour can be expected to fall, i.e. a probability model such as that of Rest's (1976, 1979) stage model.

Difficulties of control and prediction in moral development research, can also be viewed from the perspective of naturalistic versus experimental methods. Lytton (1973), in reporting his research study on social characteristics in two-year-old boys related to parent-child interaction, described the problems of three methods used for data collection: naturalistic observation, interview-ratings, and experimental manipulation. In his discussion, Lytton contrasted the relative ease of achieving good reliability in experimental settings, with the difficulties of

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achieving reliability in naturalistic observation. He concluded, nevertheless, that the important issue is which measure provides theoretically more meaningful results.

In the present study, naturalistic observation will be used alongside clinical-type interviews, in an attempt to collect a set of data which provides a balance of reliability and validity. In addition, a variety of methods of naturalistic observation will be employed in the service of the same balance. These methods will involve time-sampling - regular spot-checks of behaviour; critical events sampling - closing in on moral dilemma events as they occur, and full session observation of individuals so that not only can an individual's moral behaviour be observed but also the way in which the moral behaviour is embedded in the wider picture of the individual's total behaviour. The greatest influence on the adoption of naturalistic methods for this investigation was Barker and Wright's famous Mid-West study (1951-1955). Achievement of the same kind of authenticity that seems to come through in the descriptions of behaviour in the work of Barker and Wright, was a very important aim of the present investigation from its early design stages in the mid-seventies. Brandt (1972) argued that, despite the greater number of uncontrolled variables, naturalistic investigation should be able to match laboratory research in quality (if not surpass it) due to validity and closeness of research data to ultimate performance.

Selman (1980) pointed out the difficulty of any researcher

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in the area of developmental psychology, who must attempt to combine a description of a child which has validity from a developmental perspective and a description which captures the child in the real-world, whose natural behaviour seldom displays the neat orderliness implied by stage models. Selman described his own research as less in the direction of demonstrating the validity of the developmental stage model and more towards using the developmental stage model to provide a framework for understanding observed behaviour. Selman argued that we do not yet have, in developmental research, the tools which would enable us to focus clearly on both the behavioural and conceptual dimensions of moral interaction at the same time, in natural settings. The researcher who wishes to integrate developmental and educational techniques to work with and learn from children can, Selman suggested, use stage theory retrospectively to order the data observed in natural settings. Selman expressed the conviction that better understanding of children's development can be achieved in research designs which allow children a chance both to express and to act on their values. Such an approach has been adopted in the present project.

As has been argued so far in this chapter, the problems in attempting to predict moral behaviour from moral reasoning level are not simply a matter of better research design. They are also rooted in the nature of human development wherein behavioural responses are both determined and random at different levels of specificity (Bateson, 1980). It is not surprising, therefore, that conflicting claims relating to correspondence between

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moral reasoning and moral behaviour have been made in the research literature (Hoffman, 1979; Hogan et al, 1978; Kohlberg, 1971; Kurtines & Greif, 1974). Blasi (1980) critically reviewed fifty studies and considered that there was statistical support to the notion that moral reasoning and moral action are related. However, there is certainly still a great deal to be discovered about the network of strands in the relationship so, before leaving the issue, we will attempt to summarise briefly the positions of the main contributors to the issue.

Kohlberg's Claim of Relationship Between Moral Judgment and Behaviour

Kohlberg definitely claimed some evidence of a positive relationship between stage of moral reasoning and moral behaviour but not a direct correspondence (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 461). The structure of reasoning, Kohlberg stated, is conceptualized as related to content but not reducible to content. That is, Kohlberg assumes that the way a person thinks about a moral problem will have some influence on the way he or she acts. Kohlberg made a general claim that persons at higher levels of moral development not only reason better, but they act in accordance with their judgments. "Experiments demonstrate that principled persons act more honestly and live up to their beliefs . . . more so than do people or children at lower stages" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 414). The relationship is said by Kohlberg to be less consistent at lower stages of moral judgment.

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Kohlberg also argued from a logical perspective that reasoning and behaviour are linked because moral thought is a prerequisite for moral actions, i.e., a person must have moral reasoning to support behaviour if the behaviour is to be judged to be moral behaviour. Kohlberg claimed evidence of relationships between moral judgment level and cheating behaviour and concluded that the Conventional level of moral judgment, Stages 3 and 4 (maintaining social order), is a guarantee of behaviour in keeping with social conformity to external authority (but not of conformity to internal moral norms in the absence of external constraints). Attainment of Post-conventional moral judgment, he claimed, is a prerequisite to consistent moral action in the absence of social pressures to conformity. Kohlberg suggested that repetitive severe stealing or bullying are possible indicators of immaturity in children as young as eight years. Less consistent cheating is not considered a sign of Preconventional stage, but consistent non-cheating behaviour is a sign of Conventional moral stage. The reverse is true for delinquency: non-delinquency is not predictive of Conventional level but delinquency is a sign of Preconventional moral level (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 457-460). It is hard to disagree with Kohlberg's interpretations of the Judgment-Action relationship without being able to examine his data in more detail than is provided.

In terms of attempting to close the gap between moral judgment and action in moral education programs, Kohlberg has suggested focusing on the child's action and challenging the action in terms of the child's (not the teacher's) highest moral judgment

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level (Kohlberg, 1970; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972; Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971; Kohlberg et al, 1975). Again, this is logical in terms of the theory as it stands.

Selman's View of the Possible Relationship Between Moral Reasoning and Behaviour

Selman (1980, p. 311) stated that the functional question was whether it is valid to think of a child's "cognition-in-action" as representing a relatively stable stage, or whether situational factors result in so much oscillation that the stage construct is not useful when we are considering cognition and action from an interrelated perspective. Selman concluded that social-cognitive maturity can, with some validity, be represented by developmental stages; that one may conceptualize interpersonal functioning as an interaction between the individual's cognitive stage and the individual's ability to function at his or her highest stage under a range of circumstances; and that the demands of the social situation - the environmental conditions - which promote or inhibit an individual from functioning at his or her most competent level in a particular situation, are a crucial topic for further study. His position on judgment-action or reasoning-behaviour therefore comes down as being strongly interactionist - with the interactions being a major area for future research in moral development.

Rest's List of Mediating Variables Between Moral Judgment and Action

Rest argued that the relationship between moral judgment and moral action is not a simple linear one and is indeed very com-

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plex (Rest, 1979). Moral judgment stage partly determines action since it partly determines how different individuals will perceive the same situation and the range of alternative actions they will be able to consider. However, "moral judgment as a psychological variable has a limited role in the explanation of moral action - it may be a star role but it is only one player in a large cast" (Rest, 1979, p. 170).

Rest concluded from the evidence of many studies using his Defining Issues Test that moral judgment levels correlate with experimental behavioural measures of co-operation, cheating, conformity, and sharing, and with naturalistic measures of behaviour such as delinquency and ratings of school behaviour. The studies did not include preschool children. Rest claimed (1980) that research showed that:

1. moral judgment development is significantly related to behaviour;
2. other variables besides moral judgment are also involved in the relationship;
3. these other variables modify the role of moral judgment.

Rest concluded from his large scale review of research (Rest, 1979, pp. 170-179) that mediating variables which can complicate the relationship between judgment and action probably include the following:

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1. differences in individual sensitivity in initially detecting moral issues during social interaction: if a person is not aware of a moral dilemma then that person's moral concepts are not called into action;
2. differences in the role of reflective thought in organizing behaviour: one cannot assume that conscious reflective thought (as evidenced in interview responses) determines moral behaviour. Rest recalled Piaget's (1968 [1932]) distinction between the "reflective conscious" plane and the "operative" plane of mental life. Piaget argued that thought grows out of action and children's actual behaviour in competitive games was more advanced than their verbalized reflective thinking about co-operation. On the other hand, one might find that, in some situations, the moral behaviour level demonstrated in real-life situations is lower than the level of moral judgment revealed in response to hypothetical dilemmas, due to other conflicting factors such as self-interest in the real-life situations. Damon (1977) identified self-interest as one of the variables which appeared to modify the influence on a child's abstract reasoning level about distributive justice, in practice;
3. superficial information about reflective thought: e.g. answers in interview situations may be influenced by what the subject believes the researcher wants, or by lack of sufficient information about such things as consequences;

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4. deliberate misinformation about reflective thought: a subject may deliberately misrepresent his or her own thinking in the interview;

5. breakdown in cognitive processing: in real-life situations, a person may be under such distress, and pressure for a quick response, as interferes with his or her rational assessment of the situation, leading to behaviour which falls short of intended performance;

6. differences in ego strength: two persons may have the same comprehension and intention but one may fail to carry through the action due to differences in endurance or "ego strength" as a self-regulatory mechanism. The low ego strength person is assumed to be more influenced by situational pressures and distractions. Rest argued that although ego strength may be a critical factor for the performance of a moral action (as distinguished from a moral judgment level) ego strength is, strictly speaking, amoral, being a feature of executing plans whatever the plans may be. (See also the earlier discussion in this chapter under ego);

7. interplay of moral values with other values: moral values represent only one kind of value - so may not be the only operative values called into play. In fact, they may be short-circuited. Values compete, e.g. self-interest, success, ambition, loyalty. Moral judgment tests do not compare the strength of the moral values of a subject with his or her other values.

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Rest claimed that whilst his list of possible mediating variables shows the complexity of the judgment-behaviour relationship, it also indicates a basis for predicting the conditions under which the relationship between moral judgment-action should be higher, e.g. when subjects are sensitive to the dilemma, not under pressure, distress, etc. Rest (1979) concluded with the opinion that, given all the complicating variables, it is surprising that studies have found significant correlations between moral judgment and behaviour. Rest (1980) further concluded the need for more research to work out how the subject's framework of thinking at each moral stage is likely to interact with other variables in a problem situation to dispose the subject towards action.

Gilligan's Focus on the Interrelatedness of Responsibility and Care

Gilligan's (1977, 1980) perception of differences between the moral development of men and women must also be taken into account in attempting to achieve greater understanding of the relationship between abstract moral reasoning and behaviour. As has been discussed previously in this chapter, under Sex Differences, Gilligan (1977) concluded from her research that the moral development of women, in contrast to men, focused more on moral sensitivity as shown in greater awareness of and response to the suffering of others.

Gilligan argued for the expansion of stage theories of mor-

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ality, to give them a firm root in action: the making of meaningful social relationships in real life. An adequate theory of morality (and moral education) she said, must reflect, in both reasoning and action, the interdependence of persons on each other and the tie between the principle of responsibility for the welfare of the other, and behaviour which demonstrates care in action (Gilligan, 1980, p. 517). This implies that moral judgment based on abstract principles, e.g. responsibility for others, must be more firmly linked to moral behaviour, e.g. caring behaviour, if the theory of moral development is not to remain lop-sided.

Kuhmerker's Stage Gap Measure Between Moral Reasoning and Behaviour

Kuhmerker (1976) suggested the potential usefulness of research into the stage gaps which may exist between a person's level of reasoning about hypothetical moral dilemmas and the person's behaviour in real-life moral conflict situations. She suggested that such research could possibly provide a measure of anxiety and inability to handle stress, derived from the number of stages between the person's theory and practice. Such research does not appear to have been undertaken; on the basis of the analysis by Rest (1979) and others on mediating variables between judgment and action, it seems unlikely that the relationship would provide such a clear measure as Kuhmerker appeared to suggest. However, it is an interesting area for further investigation. To look at the relationship between hypothetical

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moral judgment and actual moral behaviour in this way, with pre-school children, would necessitate finer discrimination of sub-stages or steps in early moral development than are presently available.

Moral Education and the Reasoning-Behaviour Relationship

As Kohlberg (1978) has now come to recognize (as a result of his own involvement in moral education) psychological theories of moral development can contribute little of practical usefulness to moral education unless researchers address much more attention to moral action. Hersh has consistently pointed out the importance of relationships between moral reasoning and actual behaviour in programs aimed at moral education. The theoretical foundations of many of the most widely used programs of moral education are unstable, and will remain so until moral development theory and research can provide better understanding of the reason-action link (Hersh, 1977; Hersh et al, 1979; Hersh et al, 1980).

Need for Underlying Principles Applicable to the Development of Both Moral Reasoning and Moral Behaviour

What is needed in the theory of moral development is a theoretical framework which relates theoretical issues under a relatively stable set of principles applicable to all major issues in moral development. The theory at present contains a fragmented collection of constructs, and arguments about contra-

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dictory claims (sometimes deduced from the same empirical evidence) wander about and are difficult to weigh because of the lack of a higher level of over-riding principles. The problem of comparing and weighing different claims is, of course, confounded where claims arise from different types of experimental data. Furthermore, it is apparent from the research reports (though not always clearly specified) that the controls in different research projects, which may appear on the surface to be similar, may contain significant differences in potentially important aspects. This represents a particular danger in early childhood studies; as an example, young children, in two different studies being compared, may be responding to a familiar adult (teacher) in one study and to an unfamiliar adult (researcher) in the other.

The provision of a framework of principles of moral development has been recognized by Kohlberg (1979) as the next step in the building of an adequate research paradigm for the study of moral development. What has not been sufficiently recognized is that it is desirable that the emerging paradigm be couched as far as possible in the constructs of the general theory of cognitive development (although there will, of course, be specific constructs and concepts applicable to the specific area of morality). As has been shown in this chapter, Damon (1977) stands out as a researcher who has given serious attention to explanations of social and moral development which employ basic cognitive development constructs: viz. the processes of classification and compensation.

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Furthermore, since the central concept of general cognitive-development theory is that development is a result of the interaction between organism and environment, the cognitive-development theory of moral development must give equal weight to both sides of the organism-environment interaction. In the early stages, the theory and research was concerned more with the internal development of moral reasoning within the individual organism and very little with the effect of environmental influences. A better balance is imperative. The rapid growth of moral education programs calls for further theoretical attention to the environmental side of the interaction, which appears to be particularly relevant to the understanding of the conditions under which a subject's highest moral reasoning is likely to be carried across into real-life action.

It will have been seen that the problems identified in the introductory chapter have been further clarified and emphasized in this review of available information and reports of studies and theories. They have offered leads in the analysis of the data which was collected for the present investigation.

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CHAPTER THREE

DESIGN OF INVESTIGATION

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PURPOSE

The main purpose of the data collection was to provide material which could be analysed to add to existing knowledge about the developmental progression of preschool children in the moral area. The main purpose was not to provide scores for individual children on their moral development. Nor was it appropriate to state hypotheses to be tested nor propositions to be examined. The design was developed in order to attempt to delineate finer levels in the development of moral reasoning, and to attempt to reveal some of the relationships between levels of moral reasoning about what is "fair", and behaviour in situations involving a need for "fair" interaction between peers.

It has been noted in Chapter 1 that the moral concept of "justice" was to be expressed in terms appropriate to children as "fairness"; the research design developed this concept and followed the procedures developed during the preliminary investigations. The methods of data collection planned for March/April and again for October/November in the year of the main data gathering would therefore include both semi-structured individual interviews to probe moral reasoning, and non-intrusive observations of behaviour as it occurred in the preschool environment.

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THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT

The setting in which the study took place was a preschool centre with a special commitment to child study and the provision of resources to aid research.

The extra resources of relevance to the present study were: observation booths to all classrooms; a quiet interview room near the classrooms; two qualified teachers working in each classroom instead of the usual preschool staffing pattern in Victoria of one teacher and one unqualified assistant; and time available for staff development activities and co-operation of staff in research projects.

The centre operated three preschool groups with separate classrooms and playgrounds. Facilities and equipment used by children were at the superior end of the standard range. The goals and methods of the preschool education program at the centre were consistent with a broad cognitive-development framework.

The centre was the main preschool demonstration centre in the State, providing observation and seminar services for pre-service and in-service teachers; as such, it aimed to present a program demonstrating both a standard of excellence and realistic expectations for teachers working in less ideal environments.

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The preschool program for the groups to be used in the study operated on an attendance pattern common to many other centres: each child attended five mornings per week for two and a half hours per session. The observation facilities were freely available to the researcher.

In the year preceding the research investigation, the project was discussed first with the director of the centre who gained the approval of the Education Committee of the centre. The director then arranged for a meeting with teachers in which the researcher presented an overview of the proposed project. Particular attention was given to exploration of the potential effect of the project on the children and on the operation of the general program of preschool education in the centre, and to clarification of the part teachers would play in the project. The project as planned was accepted for commencement at the beginning of the following year.

The director of the preschool centre undertook to acquaint parents with the general nature of the project viewed as part of the total educational work of the centre, and the researcher undertook to meet with parents at the end of the project and discuss the work. Parents were not otherwise involved in the project but knew the days on which their children were being observed. Appendix 2 sets out the consent details.

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SUBJECTS

Table 6 shows numbers and age range of subjects. The subjects were all of the children enrolled in Group 1 and Group 2 in the year of study, with the exception of those in the following categories:

1. children whose English language development was judged by their teachers to be below the level where they could be expected to comprehend the interview material by March. Six children were in this category, five for whom English was a second language and one child with severe deafness;

2. children who were not present during the two main data collections, e.g. children who had not commenced attendance by the end of February or were absent for substantial periods in March, October or November - eleven children.

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TABLE 6

Number and Age Range of Subjects

	Group 1	Group 2
Total Number of children in group	24	20
Number of Subjects		
Male	7	5
Female	7	9
Total	14	14
Age Range of Subjects: (years and months)		
March	4.1-4.8	3.4-4.4
November	4.9-5.4	4.0-5.0

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Nine subjects had attended preschool in the previous year; the other subjects were experiencing their first year of preschool education. The number of children who returned for a second year of preschool was higher than the expected number based on the pattern of previous years, due to some local reasons for later school entry. This change in the expected pattern produced changes in the planned composition of the preschool groups. It had been expected that both groups would include a few children with previous experience of preschool and that the age range across the two groups would be comparable. However, as a result of the large return of children from the previous year, teachers realized that the previous experience of these children in the preschool program, and the high age range of these children, would necessitate changes in the educational program offered to them. It was therefore decided that these children would be placed together in Group 1, alongside others of comparable age from the new intake of children, and that Group 2 would be formed as a younger age group. The difference in age range of the two groups thus occurred by chance but could be found to provide additional insights.

The educational and occupational level of parents of subjects was high in both groups, 20 of the 27 fathers and 18 of the 27 mothers having tertiary qualifications. The effect of socioeconomic status was not a factor of investigation in this study, but the high level of parental education and occupation needs to be kept in mind in any attempt to generalize results from this study.

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GENERAL PLAN AND PROCEDURES

The plan of investigation was to work intensively with two classrooms of children in one preschool setting for one year. At the request of the teachers the program commenced in March, to allow for the gradual enrolment of children throughout February, and concluded in November, so that the December preparation for the Christmas festival and the winding-down of the preschool year would not be disturbed by the investigation.

A variety of methods was to be employed to observe and record the moral reasoning and behaviour of the children in relation to their understanding of the concept of fairness. The methods were of two main types: semi-structured interviews, and non-obtrusive observations of behaviour during the ordinary activities of the preschool sessions. These methods were chosen to supply data which would relate, as closely as possible, to the natural behaviour of the children. The relative looseness of control of variables inherent in these methods was to be partly counter-balanced by the use of a variety of approaches to data collection within each main method.

Data collected at the beginning of the preschool year (March/April) were to be compared to that obtained at the end of the year (October/November). There would thus be at least six months between these two collections, a period which the literature suggested would be sufficiently long for some changes to

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occur. In addition to the April and November recordings, the preschool would be visited regularly throughout the preschool year for seminar discussions with teachers and informal observation of children.

The highest levels of moral reasoning and behaviour (rather than the mean levels) were chosen as the chief measures throughout the study on two main grounds already discussed in the review of the literature: that congruence between the highest level of reasoning of which a person is capable and that person's moral behaviour, is an important aspect of moral development and education; and that measures which take a person's preferred or mean level of moral stage functioning hide some of the finer discriminations of developmental progression which this investigation was attempting to examine.

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MORAL REASONING INTERVIEWS

Kohlbergian-type Dilemmas

The interviews included two hypothetical dilemmas of the Kohlbergian type, based on commonly observed incidents in pre-school environments, in which children would be asked to make a moral choice involving a fair solution and then justify their choice as fair. The aim would be to obtain the child's highest level of reasoning.

The first dilemma would allow for the possibility of a choice based on concurrent co-operative sharing of one desired object. The second dilemma would involve an object with which two children could not play in the same way at the same time, i.e. it would pose the additional problem of a fair way to decide who should have first turn. It was expected that the second dilemma would be more difficult for the children to reason about; it was possible that it would result in higher level reasoning to overcome the problem. The possibility of this result was built into the pair of dilemmas to take account of the problem associated with inferring a person's highest level of reasoning from a given dilemma; that if the solution does not call for higher level reasoning it may not be used. One cannot make an inference that something is not there simply because it is not displayed; one must set the situation to give maximum stimulation to the display. On the other hand, to motivate children to

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produce their best efforts in the interview situation, it is necessary that they do not feel that the questions are too difficult for them to cope with. They should be able to cope at some level at which they themselves are satisfied with their own success. The pair of dilemmas, together, was expected to give a balance between some success to all children, and the stimulation of the higher challenge to those children who could respond to it when pressed.

Piagetian-type Dilemma

The interview situation would also include a third dilemma about fairness, involving a Piagetian-type choice between consideration of the intention versus the size of physical consequences, and also the consideration of restitution. This particular dilemma predetermined the child's concentration on just three of the criteria of moral judgment: intention of the actor, physical consequences, and restitution (Piaget, 1929). Kohlberg's work had considerably extended the range of issues considered in the exploration of the development of moral thinking in children and the present study was not to be bound within Piaget's earlier framework. However, the importance of the three Piagetian issues was suggested by the relative weight of concentration on them in the research literature on children's moral development (although some of the choice of these issues might be attributable to the relative ease with which this type of data can be scored).

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Work during the pilot studies had shown this researcher that many of the children from three and a half years were firm in their statements that the intended purpose of the actor was to be considered above the size of the consequences. This was unexpected in terms of Piaget's theory. Furthermore, intention, consequences and restitution were three potential elements of the total set of criteria to be considered in the attainment of fair judgment and behaviour. They were elements the presence of which it would be relatively easy for a teacher to ascertain, and take into consideration in any moral education program.

It was therefore decided that a third dilemma probing these issues would be included in the interview situation, and separate measures of intention versus size of consequences, and restitution, would be obtained from this material.

Figures 1-3 show the materials used with the three dilemma stories. (pp.195-200).

Abstract Concept of Fairness

The interview situation would also be used to explore the child's concept of fairness as expressed in response to direct requests to describe what is meant by Fair and Not Fair without the aid of stimulus stories or materials. This part of the interview would normally be conducted before the presentation of the dilemma stories and materials, so that a subject would be given no clues on how to frame an answer. It was expected that

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this more abstract question would be more difficult; children might display differences in the content and structure of reasoning here, compared with that in response to the dilemma stories, which could provide further insights into the development of moral thinking. Another important difference between the Concept of Fairness interview and the dilemma stories would be that the dilemma stories would be presented as third-person situations whereas the Concept of Fairness interview would include direct questions about the subject's own behavior.

Sequence of Levels

It was intended that the data from the interviews would be used to revise the sequence of levels of moral reasoning about fairness. It was intended that this sequence would delineate levels of moral reasoning within or below Kohlberg's Stage 1 of moral judgment. Also it was expected that there would be some correspondence between the new levels of moral reasoning about fairness and Damon's Early Levels of Distributive Justice (Table 4). It was further intended to attempt to relate the new levels of moral reasoning about fairness to levels of moral action observed in the present investigation.

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ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING

Motivation and Timing of Interviews

It was planned that all of the above (the abstract concept of fairness and the three dilemmas) would be probed in the one interview situation, which was expected to last between fifteen and twenty minutes. It had been found in the pilot studies that the interest of most children could be motivated and sustained by the experienced interviewer, using the proposed format and materials for this length of time. The motivation of subjects throughout the interview was essential to the research design because the child's highest level of reasoning was to be inferred from the data.

Theoretically, it was not necessary that the various sections of the interview material be covered in the one interview session. However, there were two practical reasons why the one interview was desirable. The first reason was to produce a minimum disruption to the normal preschool program through the withdrawal and return of children, individually, from the classroom to the interview room. The withdrawal was to be done by the interviewer entering the classroom, being introduced by the teacher to the child, having the necessary few minutes of time to make the child feel comfortable about going with her, and then leaving the classroom with the child. Although the teachers had explained to the group as a whole what was going to happen, there would be inevitably some disruption each time the interviewers

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entered the classroom, so it was desirable to keep the entrances to a minimum.

The second reason why it was decided to try, generally, to cover all the interview material in one session per child (to be repeated at the end of the year) was one of time economy - to enable the collection of the first interview to be completed before the moral education program commenced, i.e. before the end of March. For purposes of reliability in this study, it had been decided to use the one most skilled interviewer for all interviews. Also, it had been recognized, on the basis of the pilot studies, that fatigue in children would affect the eliciting of their highest levels of response and it was therefore not valid to interview children who were showing any signs of tiredness (which usually happened in the second half of the morning).

These factors combined to make it necessary to proceed at a brisk pace through the interview material at the times available, attempting generally to cover all the material in one session, so that the one interviewer could complete the task according to schedule. However, there was sufficient flexibility, theoretically and pragmatically, for the interviewer to take extra time with a child in one session, or alternatively to terminate a session with any child who was tired, distressed or bored, and continue in a fresh session on another day. Such flexibility was an important element in the research design. In interviewing preschool children one must always be prepared for an unwillingness to continue, or a loss of attention. In practice, three

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interviews, with different children, were interrupted and continued later.

In the following instructions to the interviewer the instructions are similar to those that have applied to individual testing over sixty years. In 1919 Terman commenced his chapter on general instructions for administration of the Binet-Simon intelligence scale with notes on securing attention and effort: "to insure this it will be necessary to consider somewhat in detail a number of factors which influence effort, such as degree of quiet, the nature of surroundings, presence or absence of others, means of gaining the child's confidence, the avoidance of embarrassment, fatigue, etc." (Terman, 1919, p. 122). Terman pointed out that training and instruction of testers in these matters must be supported by certain personality factors in the testor, such as "the tact which comes of intuition and cannot be taught", and the ability to "scent the situation and adapt his method to it" (ibid. p. 125-6). The same attention to rapport and detail which Terman emphasized in his instructions is necessary today, especially when we are attempting to measure a child's best effort.

General Instructions to the Interviewer

The awareness and skill of the interviewer in probing to bring out the highest level of reasoning, without losing the

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child's co-operation and without communicating dissatisfaction with the answers so far given, is a critical factor.

The sequence and wording of the main questions in the Concept of Fairness interview, as supplied on the interviewers' guide, should be followed as closely as possible. However, the content and spacing of probing questions, to clarify answers or reveal further information, is left to your judgment; the examples given will provide some guides. Similarly, in the three dilemma interviews, the story content, the use of the visual materials, and the main line of questioning as set out in the guides, should be followed as closely as possible, but the content, depth, and timing of your additional probing questions is up to you.

It is not expected that every statement in every interview will be scoreable. The best we can do is to keep the "fluff" down to a minimum because it is time-wasting, but not to be so restrictive as to lose rapport or lose important leads which could have been followed up with further questioning. Perhaps the greatest danger for the interviewer to guard against is biasing the data by giving the subject clues to the sort of answers she expects or to her valuing of certain kinds of answers. Where a child's statement may have been contaminated in this way, the statement will not be scored.

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Concept of Fairness Interview

Rationale: To ascertain the content and structure of subjects' thinking about the meaning of Fair and Not Fair in response to direct questioning about the concepts and about their own behaviour.

Description: Each child was asked:

What does it mean to be fair?

Tell me of someone who was fair to you; what did he/she do that was fair? Why was that fair?

Tell me of something you have done that is fair; why was that fair?

What does it mean to be not fair?

Tell me of someone who was not fair to you; why was that not fair?

Tell me of something you have done that was not fair; why was that not fair?

Administration: The concept of fairness interview was administered individually to all subjects in March/April and again in October/November.

The interview took approximately three minutes.

Interviews were recorded on audiotape and transcribed into typed form.

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Scoring: Each subject was given a score on the Moral Reasoning Levels of Fairness, ranging from 0 to 7, representing his or her highest level of response, for the pretest and post-test.

Appendix 5 contains a record of a Concept of Fairness interview.

Kohlbergian-type Dilemmas (Dilemmas 1 and 2)

Rationale: To ascertain the content and structure of subjects' reasoning about fairness in response to open-ended story dilemmas involving a conflict of interests between third persons.

Description:

Dilemma 1: Each child was told a story about two children engaged in building with blocks in a preschool playroom. The first part of the conflict was over two blocks of a type both wanted to use. The child was asked to decide what would be a fair thing to do, to justify why his or her choice was fair, and to explain whether both participants would see it as fair and why. Alternative solutions were invited. A third block was then introduced and similar probing questions were asked with the addition of questions about whether and why it would make any difference if the children were friends, and what the teacher might say and do if she appeared.

A visual and partly manipulative aid was used, consisting of a picture of two unisex children standing beside two block buildings with a block shelf in the background. Three identical cut-

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out blocks, of a shape not already depicted in the buildings nor on the shelves, were given to the subject - first two blocks, then later the third. The cut-out blocks were of dimensions which enabled one or more of them to be placed so as to span the two separate buildings, i.e. simultaneous sharing was a possible solution for the subject to arrive at without prompting by the interviewer. A separate cut-out figure of a teacher was supplied. Figure 1 shows the material.

Dilemma 2: A toy swing and two flexible toy figures were given to the child for a few seconds of free play: during this period it was emphasized that only one person was allowed on the swing at one time. The interviewer then took the toys and demonstrated the story she told of two children both wanting a swing and arriving at the swing at the same moment. The subject was given back the toys and asked how to solve the problem in a way fair to both. The subject was questioned about whether and why a proferred solution was fair to both children. Alternative solutions were invited and similarly probed. Questions of friendship, and relative size of children, were introduced and answers probed. The subject was reminded, if necessary, that only one child was allowed to be swinging at any one time; i.e. a solution involving simultaneous sharing of the object was not possible as it had been in Dilemma 1; the solution of one chld pushing whilst the other child swung was potentially present but the story said that both wanted to swing. A teacher figure was then introduced and the subject was asked what solution the teacher would offer as a fair solution and how that solution could be justified. Figure 2

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shows the material.

Administration: The two dilemmas were administered individually to all subjects in the pretest and post-test periods. Approximately five minutes was spent on each dilemma. Autiotape records were later transcribed into typed form.

Scoring: Each subject was given a score for each dilemma (Dilemma 1 and 2) ranging from 0 to 7, on the Moral Reasoning Levels of Fairness, representing his or her highest level of response, for the pretest and post-test.

Appendix 5 contains a record of a subject's responses.

Piagetian-type Dilemma (Dilemma 3)

Rationale: To ascertain subjects' reasoning about intention versus size, physical consequences, and restitution, in their judgments of fairness.

Description: Each child was asked to listen to two stories and be ready to help answer questions about them afterwards.

The first story: Kit builds a house with blocks in the preschool playground; Pat trips over and accidentally knocks the house down. Pat didn't mean to knock Kit's house down. Pat was being careful but fell against it. The house is all knocked down, all messed up.

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The second story: Another time Kit builds a house in the playground. Lyn comes over to Kit's house when Lyn knows Kit isn't looking and knocks a board off the roof and throws it down on the ground. Lyn pulls down a bit of Kit's house on purpose.

A booklet was presented with each story; each booklet contained two pages with one picture per page. The first picture in each book was identical, depicting Kit in a cubby house made of 13 large outdoor blocks similar to those used in the preschool. In the first booklet, the second picture showed Pat tripping over and all the blocks falling out of place; in the second book, the second picture showed Lyn holding one block which had been removed from the roof of the structure. There was now no roof on the structure but the remaining 12 blocks were still in place. The figures in the pictures, and the names, were intentionally capable of being interpreted as either male or female by the subject. The interviewer adopted the sex of characters which the child used.

Using the two booklets open to show the two pictures in each, the subject was asked to retell the two stories. The interviewer made certain, before proceeding further that the subject understood that, in the first story, <u>all</u> the blocks were knocked down <u>accidentally</u> and, in the second story, a <u>little</u> bit of Kit's house - one block - was knocked down on <u>purpose</u>.

The subject was then asked, with the aid of the pictures: Who was most unfair - Pat who knocked over all of Kit's house

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accidentally without meaning to (this one who is tripping and knocking it all down) or Lyn who knocked down just a little bit on purpose (this one who has knocked that block off the roof when Kit isn't looking). Who was most unfair? Why was that more unfair than what this one did?

Probing continued, to ascertain whether the subject always answered in terms of intention, or consequences, or wavered between both.

The subject was then asked whether it would make any difference to the fairness if the person/s designated by the subject as having been unfair now offered to make Kit's house right again - if he/she fixed it so that it was the same as in the first picture. Justifications for answers were probed. The subject was invited to think of anything else the offender might do to make things fair. Figure 3 shows the material.

Administration: Dilemma 3 was administered to all subjects individually, in the pretest and post-test periods, immediately following the first two dilemmas. Dilemma 3 took approximately five minutes to administer. Audiotaped records were later transcribed into typed form.

Scoring: In relation to Dilemma 3, each subject was scored, for both pretest and post-test, on:

i. Restitution. If the subject agreed, whether spontaneously or as a result of questioning by the interviewer, that

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restoring the house to its former condition would make a positive difference to the fairness of the situation, restitution was scored with a "yes". If the subject said that he or she did not know whether this would make any difference, or said that it would not, restitution was scored with a "no".

ii. Intention versus consequences.

One of three possible scores was assigned:

I. (Intention) for a positive affirmation in the face of probing that the child who knocked down one block on purpose was the most unfair;

C. (Consequences) for a positive affirmation that the child who produced the most damage accidentally was the most unfair;

W. (Wavering) for children who wavered between I. and C. types of judgment, without ever finally affirming one judgment over the other.

Appendix 5 contains a record of a subject's response.

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Figure 1. Moral reasoning interview, Dilemma 1: Indoor blocks

The girl is deciding how the two children in the picture should share one block which is left over after equal distribution. A co-operative solution is possible since the cut-out block is of a size that can straddle the space between both buildings. After the girl has justified her choice, the cut-out figure of the teacher will be brought forward. The girl will be asked what solution the teacher would suggest, and why.

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Figure 2. Moral reasoning interview, Dilemma 1: Swing

The interviewer took two dolls and made them arrive at the swing simultaneously. The girl has chosen one doll to swing first and has attempted to justify this choice. Now the interviewer brings in the adult (teacher) doll and the girl is being questioned.

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Figure 3. Moral reasoning, Dilemma 3: Outdoor Blocks

In the storybook that the teacher holds, one child deliberately removes a block from another child's building. In the second storybook, one child trips and accidently knocks down a large part of another's building. The girl is retelling the two stories. She will then be encouraged to reason about intentions, consequences and restitution.

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OBSERVATIONS OF NATURAL BEHAVIOUR

Focus on Conflict

The other main method of data collection was to be a variety of observations of children's natural social behaviour in the preschool environment. The variety of observations was planned to counterbalance some of the disadvantages of the relatively unstructured nature of naturalistic observations. Particular attention would be paid to behaviour in situations of overt moral conflict between peers where it was one of the normal expectations of the teachers in the preschool that children would attempt to resolve the conflict in a fair manner.

The focusing of observational measures on overt conflict situations would restrict from view the behaviour of children in some moral dilemma situations which did not result in observable conflict, e.g. those cases where "fair" action by participants (or other behaviour such as "altruistic" or "submissive" actions) averted a conflict before it was apparent to the research observers. Two of the planned methods of observation (Time-sampling, and Full-morning Observations of Selected Children) were therefore structured to include attention to non-conflict behaviour. The social behaviour of particular relevance in this investigation would be in those events where some conflict of interest and desires between participants might be inferred but the problem was resolved without direct conflict being expressed.

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Notwithstanding recognition of the need to investigate prosocial behaviour more fully, in the study of early moral development, the focus of the present investigation was to be on direct moral conflict situations.

Time-sampling of Behaviour

A measure of social interaction was to be obtained for each child at the commencement of the study through rapid time-sampling of behaviour over the first three to four weeks. During the first indoor play period for each group in each preschool session, a continuous cycle of five-second observations of each child in turn would be made and recorded on a structured data sheet (see Appendix 6.3); resulting in 100 observations per child over the period. The aim was to reveal the pattern of solo, parallel and co-operative play of each child, so that levels of social interaction could be compared to levels of moral reasoning and behaviour.

It was found that it took approximately seven minutes per round to make a record of each subject; a new round was then commenced immediately. Approximately seven rounds were completed at each session. The procedure was repeated each day until at least 100 records had been obtained for each subject. Because of spasmodic absences of individual children, this necessitated approximately 145 rounds over four weeks. The first 100 pretest and 100 post-test records for each subject were analysed.

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Instructions to observers stated descriptions of solo, parallel and co-operative play.

Solo: During the interval of observation, the child shows no evidence of interaction with another child beyond mere looking at the other without any sign of particular interest, or smile, or frown, or talk, and no body contact beyond accidental touching.

Parallel: The child either gives or accepts a social response of any kind to or from a peer, e.g. smiles, frowns, makes body contact purposefully, addresses, listens to, watches with obvious interest what the other is doing, shows own work to another. The social interaction may be negative, e.g. snatches, says, "You're silly." Children playing near each other with similar equipment or activity but without a sustained, shared, common theme, are deemed to be interacting on the parallel level if they demonstrate any of the above responses. If one child is imitating the behaviour of another, it is deemed Parallel activity even if the other child shows little interest in the imitator or reacts negatively.

Co-operative: The child plus at least one other is engaged in the same general activity with a common shared interchange of ideas or actions to which each gives some recognition of acting in common.

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Critical Events Observations

Both groups were to be observed in free play at selected times during the pretest and post-test periods, and descriptions of every incident of social conflict were to be recorded on audio-tape by the research observer as they occurred. The observer would scan the group continuously, watching and listening for incidents which might develop into conflicts, and recording descriptions of those events even if they subsequently proved not to result in the expected conflict. The complete record would be transcribed later into typed form for analysis. (An example is given in Appendix 6.2).

Reliability checks would be made by a second observer with particular attention to the problem of whether some critical events were being missed because they occurred at the same time as the one being recorded.

It was expected that the data from the observation of critical events would provide an accurate account of the frequency and type of conflict events. It was also expected that this data would provide information which could be used for the revision of a sequence of levels of moral behaviour which would correspond with sequences of moral reasoning about fairness, formulated on the basis of Kohlberg's and Damon's moral sequences but refined by the use of the data from the moral reasoning interviews. If a developmental sequence of levels of moral behaviour could be formulated from the data, which would stand up

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to later empirical testing, this would provide one of the missing tools necessary for the further investigation of the relationships between moral reasoning and behaviour. Further knowledge of these relationships between moral thinking and behaviour is a necessary adjunct to any program of moral education in early childhood.

Rationale: i. To ascertain the content and structure of each subjects' behaviour in spontaneous moral conflict situations.

ii. To ascertain the type and frequency of moral conflict situations which arise naturally between children in the preschool environment.

Description: Group 1 and Group 2 were observed for one hour per session (indoor play period) over four consecutive mornings, pretest and post-test.

The observer verbally described each incident of moral conflict which arose, on to audio-tape, from which a typed transcript was later made.

Instructions to recorders:

The degree of completeness of the information about critical events involves placing each event in a context which includes the events leading into the situation, and the follow-through and consequences.

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Scan the group continuously and record, on audio-tape, a running record of every social conflict event which occurs in the hour of observation. Include names of all persons involved, including onlookers, and their verbal and non-verbal behaviour. The time span of your recording should correspond approximately to the length of the incident.

If more than one conflict event happens simultaneously, record the first observed and add, later, as much information as possible about the other, noting that it is a post hoc record and stating when the event actually took place.

When the data are analysed, not all events may be deemed to be moral conflicts involving consideration of fairness, and so all may not be used in analysis, but do not be concerned with this at the time of observation - simply record all social conflict between peers.

Scoring: Critical events of moral conflict were identified on each transcript according to the operational definition of moral conflict. For each moral conflict event, each subject involved was then assigned a score which represented his or her highest level of behaviour in that event, based on the Moral Behaviour Levels of Fairness.

For each subject a single score was then derived, for pre-test and then another for post-test, representing his or her

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highest level of behaviour observed across each series of four sessions of observation.

Relations between critical events observations and time-sampling observations: Whereas the time-sampling method would focus on each individual child at regular intervals and would miss any critical events occurring between other children at the time, the critical events method would scan the behaviour of all children and focus on each conflict event as it arose anywhere in the group, describing the behaviour of all children involved but not recording anything about the behaviour of children who did not engage in conflicts. The two methods together, therefore, were expected to give a more complete picture of behaviour than either could separately.

Full-morning Observations

To add further to the understanding of fair behaviour, there were to be some detailed records of the behaviour of a few selected children, describing each child's social behaviour throughout a complete preschool session ($2\frac{1}{2}$ hours) in April and again in November. (Extracts are given in Appendix 6.1).

Running records were to be taken by audio-tape and later transcribed for analysis. The children selected for the detailed observations of behaviour were to be the male and the female who were ranked highest and the male and the female who were ranked lowest, as a result of an analysis of social participation

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patterns revealed in time-sampling data for Group 1. The detailed observations of the high and low social participators would include full descriptions of both conflict behaviour and social behaviour not involving conflict, for each selected child.

Rationale: To ascertain the social behaviour of some subjects throughout a total preschool session of two and a half hours, to provide opportunities for insights which might not emerge in the shorter one hour observations.

To record in relation to these selected subjects all social interactions including co-operation and helping behaviour not observed in other methods of data collection, to gain insights into the relationship of an individual's behaviour in moral conflict situations with his or her behaviour in situations involving concepts of fairness, which do not arise out of or lead to overt conflict.

To provide data to examine further the relationship between levels of fair reasoning and behaviour, and overall high or low social participation in a peer group.

Description: Four subjects were selected from Group 1 on the basis of data from the pretest Time-sampling of Social Interactions: the male and female with the highest scores on co-operative play and the male and female with the lowest score on co-operative play.

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Each of the four subjects was observed for one full session, pretest and post-test, and a continuous running record was taken on audio-tape describing the subject's social behaviour. The tapes were later transcribed into typed form.

Instructions to Observer: Observe the subject continuously and describe his or her actions and, wherever possible, any verbal exchanges with others.

Scoring: The protocols were scored on the Moral Behaviour Levels of Fairness in conflict situations, in the same way as the critical events data for all subjects. In addition, the same scoring system was used to score non-conflict events where the subject demonstrated that he or she took into account the needs and desires of a peer, i.e. spontaneous consideration of others.

By analysis of these records it was hoped to gain insights into possible relationships between the behaviour of preschool children in conflict and non-conflict situations, particularly those situations involving the concept of fairness, i.e. sharing objects or taking turns. The set of levels of moral behaviour formulated from the critical events data would be applied to full-morning data to see whether the same levels might also be useful in differentiating levels of fair interaction where there was no conflict.

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Teachers' Diaries

An additional source of information, which might be used to help in the delineation of levels of moral development, was the anecdotal records of incidents of moral conflict amongst children in Group 1, which teachers were to be asked to compile for use in the staff-development seminars. These records were expected to add two extra dimensions to the data. Firstly, they were to be compiled by the teachers themselves and would include the teachers' perceptions of their behaviour as they interacted with the children during peer conflict. Secondly, they were to extend across the period of six months between the taking of the pretest and post-test measures described above, during which time no data would be collected by the researchers. It was thought possible that the diary entries might reveal some of the smaller steps in moral development which might otherwise be missed. (Examples are given in Appendix 4).

SCORING PROCEDURES

Identification of the following was removed from the protocols before scoring: name, sex, age, Group 1 or Group 2, pretest or post-test.

All protocols were scored by two persons. The chief investigator was available for consultation with the scorers to clarify any points about the measuring instruments.

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The interviewer did not take part in any scoring.

Scores were assigned on the highest level of reasoning or behaviour evidenced in the protocols.

Practice

Practice in scoring of reasoning interviews was carried out on the protocols of the eleven children who had been removed from the list of subjects because they had been absent from either of pretest or post-test.

Practice in scoring records of behaviour obtained from the observation of critical events was carried out on spare protocols not used as data, e.g. records of critical events between the pretest and post-test periods, and records of mornings in which there were gaps in the information due to faults on the audio-tape recording equipment. Ten such protocols were used.

During the practice period, scorers scored the protocols separately then discussed results together. Where there were differences, they sought further clarification of the levels and the reasoning behind the assigning of a response to a particular level, from the chief investigator. This discussion led to some modification and expansion of descriptions of the sequence of levels. The two scorers then reached consensus on the assignment of a level in the cases where there had been differences. Instructions to scorers were that, in cases of doubt, any bias

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should be towards a conservative judgment, i.e. to a lower level score. This instruction was based on the expectation of the investigation that subjects would show progressive changes towards higher levels, therefore it was desirable that any bias in scoring should work against, not towards, the confirmation of the expectation.

The practice runs continued until scorers felt confident in the clarity of the modified description of levels and their own ability to score protocols.

Scoring of Moral Reasoning Data

Scorers then proceeded independently to score each of the three moral reasoning interview segments (omitting Dilemma 3, the Piaget-type dilemma) for each subject, pretest and post-test. This resulted in 168 separate scores, of which there was found to be agreement between scorers on 138, and fluctuation on 30, i.e. 82 per cent agreement. The fluctuations were predominantly between Levels 3 and 4 - fairness equated with the sharing of some versus fairness equated with strict equality of shares. Examination of the relevant protocols by the two scorers and the chief investigator together, indicated that discrepancies in scoring between these two levels could be overcome by the application of the general instruction mentioned above: to err on the side of the lower score in cases of doubt. In cases of doubt a Level 3 rather than a Level 4 score was to be assigned except where both scorers agreed, after re-examination of the

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protocol, that there was clear evidence that a subject reasoned that fairness involved strict equality for all.

The other main area of disagreement between scorers evolved around Level 5 where friendship was introduced as a criterion which modified the notion of fairness as strict equality for all. Examination of the relevant protocols revealed that one scorer had assigned responses to Level 5 on the basis of any reference to friendship, without restricting to Level 5 those cases where the subject clearly modified the notion of strict equality by differentiating its application between the classes of friends and others. As a result of the discovery of this confusion, the description of Level 5 was reworded more clearly in the statement of levels, and extra examples added.

The two scorers then reached consensus on the scores which had been discrepant.

Few difficulties were found in scoring the Piagetian-type Dilemma 3, which was scored not on the levels of fairness but on whether the subject judged in terms of intentionality versus size of consequences, and whether or not restitution was regarded by the subject to be a relevant factor in fairness judgments. In the five cases where differences in scoring occurred, the problem was due to scarcity of information in the protocol (probably resulting from subjects losing motivation at this last stage of the interview situation). In these five cases in a total of 55 protocols, consensus between scorers was reached by discussion in

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three cases and two protocols were considered too inconclusive and no score assigned. There was no pretest protocol for one other subject.

Scoring of Critical Events and Full-morning Observations

These protocols were scored using the same procedures as for the reasoning interviews. Seventy-eight per cent agreement was achieved between scorers in the first round. The description of levels of fairness behaviour was further clarified and modified where the need was indicated by difficulties in assigning levels. Differences in scores were then resolved in the same manner as with the reasoning data, by consensus between scorers.

PROPOSED ANALYSIS

It was proposed to analyse separately the data obtained from each of the interview methods and observational methods, then to examine patterns of moral reasoning across the interview data and patterns of moral behaviour across the observational data. Finally an attempt would be made to relate the data about reasoning and behaviour. It was recognized that the analysis of interview data would involve some considertions of the overt behaviour of subjects, e.g. in moving dolls to show which figure should have first turn, and, conversely, that the analysis of observations of behaviour would involve consideration of a subject's reasoning during an event as expresed verbally. This

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overlapping between reasoning and behavioural measures was accepted as reflecting the nature of development, particularly in the early years. An artificial dichotomy, between verbal reasoning and overt behaviour, produced by tight experimental controls, would have been likely to be detrimental to the obtaining of the type of data required to increase understanding of how moral reasoning and moral behaviour are inter-related in early development.

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CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

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OUTLINE OF CHAPTER

The cognitive-development approach claims that development is discontinuous, i.e., it changes radically from one structured stage to the next. So in analysing data in this investigation, one cannot assume that this is continuous data; to treat it statistically may be to obscure the data. To interpret this data one needs to focus on a structural analysis.

This chapter presents first a full description of the developmental sequence arrived at in this investigation, to show the growth of children's reasoning and behaviour in relation to the central moral concept of fairness. This description of development is seen as the major contribution of this thesis which may have wider value in the field of moral development. It serves at this stage as both a description of the way development proceeds and as a measuring tool by which to plot the development of young children in this area.

The current version of the developmental sequence, presented here, was used as the instrument for scoring the moral reasoning and moral behaviour reported later in this chapter. Earlier work began by constructing a pair of sequences which would enable one to see correspondences between levels of moral reasoning and levels of behaviour. As the work progressed it reached a stage where the two could be brought together into the same instrument.

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Following the developmental sequence, data are presented on the scores of the children involved in this investigation.

DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENTAL LEVELS OF REASONING AND BEHAVIOUR RELATED TO THE MORAL CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS

PRE MORAL

LEVEL 0: NO USE OF FAIR OR NOT FAIR

Level 0 represents, in this scheme, all reasoning and behaviour below the first use of simple labels such as good and bad. It is subject to further investigation to delineate finer developmental discriminations. The structures presently included under Level 0 may be differentiated, at a later date, to include Level 1, Level 2, etc. When completed, the scheme will encompass the precursors of moral development from birth to the present Level 1.

Structure

Classification: The concepts Fair and Not Fair are not used by the child to classify persons or behaviour nor are the terms Fair and Not Fair responded to.

Compensation: Reciprocity is not employed beyond the level of giving or giving-in to another to serve self's own desires, e.g.

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to initiate or maintain a pleasurable activity. Compensation merely involves giving back something to avoid disapproval or punishment. This is not compensation in the sense of restoring a situation to a level of fair interaction, but merely to restore the self's equilibrium.

Examples of Responses to Questioning

WHAT DOES FAIR MEAN?

I don't know.

I used to know but I've forgotten.

WHAT SHOULD THEY DO TO BE FAIR?

That boy should have it. WHY? I don't know.

If there is no response at all, the protocol is scored at this level, with the understanding that an absence of response may be the result of a lack of sufficient rapport having been established between questioner and child, as may a "don't know" answer. Sensitive probing is always required.

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflict Situations

At this level, the child grabs, takes, or claims what self desires, if possible. The child may give back or desist if the other child protests, but does so without evidence of consideration of the other as a subject who also has rights and desires which self should take into account. The child may relinquish a

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grabbed object if a teacher or authority figure approaches, or to escape from being hurt by another child, but does not ask the other child to let him or her have it beyond the level of saying, "But I want it". In situations where the self's possession is taken by another child, the self may relinquish the claim passively, may hold-on or fight to retain, may cry, yell, or call for adult attention. In all cases, at this level, the child does so without justifying his or her claim to the other person, e.g. there is no attempt to reason with the other or to divert the other's attack with a compensatory object. Behaviour with peers is simply at the level of, "I want this; I don't want this."

FIRST JUSTIFICATIONS

At the next two levels the first moral justifications appear. They are classifications at a very simple level which consists merely of attaching labels of approval or disapproval to individual persons and/or behaviour. At Level 1, reasons given for the attaching of moral labels relate only to the child's desires; at Level 2, the child realizes that a different kind of justification is socially expected, and adds this on, as necessary.

LEVEL 1: FAIR RELATED TO OWN DESIRES

Structure

Classification: The child is still viewing self as the only true subject; others are still predominantly viewed as objects subser-

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vient to the gaining of the self's desires. Fair and Not Fair are not often used spontaneously, the simpler labels: Bad, Naughty, Good, being employed. However, the child does now respond to questions about Fairness. It is usually easier, at first, for self to relate negative rather than positive moral labels to others, i.e. the moral classification is of those who hinder self's desires, e.g. bad, naughty or not fair, and those others who don't hinder but may not necessarily help. Fair and Not Fair may be confused in use. Since self does not hinder self, and since others are not regarded as subjects with their own right to be respected as persons like self, the child seldom gives a negative moral label to self unless this has been strongly modelled and reinforced by adults.

There is no justification given for the attribution of moral labels, which extend beyond the action of the other person in relation to self's desires, e.g. "She's not fair. WHY? She wouldn't give me any toys." "She's fair to me. HOW? She gives me things I want."

Compensation: Any compensation behaviour with another child is instrumental to the gaining of self's desires. Reciprocity is understood still at a level below true mutual exchanges, i.e. well below the level of reciprocal sharing. The child expects to be given what self desires, and gives to others to satisfy self's wishes. However, the child begins to show more recognition in behaviour that prior possession of an object by another places some inhibition on self's claim, e.g. a child may look to see if

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he or she is observed before grabbing something, or may ask the other child for it.

Examples of Responses to Questioning

"My gran is fair. WHAT DOES SHE DO THAT IS FAIR? She gives us lollies."

WHAT DOES FAIR MEAN? Ben wouldn't give me any blocks.

WAS THAT FAIR OF BEN? Yes. WAS BEN FAIR OR NOT FAIR WHEN HE WOULDN'T GIVE YOU ANY BLOCKS? Not fair. WHY WAS THAT NOT FAIR? I just told you; he wouldn't give me any, that's why."

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflict Situations

The child may grab, hit, etc., to obtain or retain possession of an object, as at the previous level, but there is evidence of more calculation of the effect of self's action on the other child and of whether the incident is being observed by authority. Paradoxically, this calculating behaviour represents a higher level of understanding of Fairness than the Level 0 indifference, in that it goes some way towards seeing the other child as a person whom the self's behaviour influences. Such recognition is a necessary basis for any development of fair reciprocity and compensation. Verbal attack, or verbal threats when holding on to one's own claim, or non-verbal threatening, similarly indicate Level 1 (or higher), rather than Level 0, for the same reason.

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LEVEL 2: FIRST AD HOC JUSTIFICATIONS ADDED TO OWN DESIRES

Structure

Classification: Classification by moral labelling continues. The criteria for labelling are still self's desires but other reasons are now given, especially in cases of self's claim for self, and for self's preferences for some person's claims over another person's. The extra justifications are produced especially when the child is pressed for reasons, i.e. after the claim or choice has been made rather than before. The child is recognizing that it is socially expected that a person should give reasons for using Fair or Not Fair claims, beyond the mere statement of personal desires. The reasons given by the child in justifications at this level are fluctuating and may be contradictory. The content of the reasons given may be socially influenced, e.g., size, relative age, and sex, are frequently used.

It is still easier for the child to give incidents of the behaviour of others which he or she considers Not Fair rather than Fair. In describing the self, it continues to be so that a negative moral classification is seldom used. The self avoids accepting a Not Fair label by justifying his or her behaviour as above, after the event; it is probably in regard to self that the first justifying reasons are used.

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Compensation: The concept of sharing, as a universal moral expectation involving reciprocal interaction, is not understood although the word may be used to justify self's own claim to something. What now takes place is rather separate isolated behaviours which may involve some exchange but are always aimed to be to the advantage of self. Fair is sometimes described as "having more of", and Not Fair as "not having any". At this level the approval of authority (particularly teachers and parents) is importantly desired, and sometimes this approval is accepted as compensation for self giving up a claim or a part of something. Similarly, as the child values play activities which involve others, some compensatory actions become necessary to maintain the game. Taking turns may be stressed but the reciprocity involved is predominantly at the level of obeying a rule of authority to avoid disapproval, and maintaining play interaction with others.

Examples of Responses to Questioning

The boy should go first. WHY WOULD IT BE FAIR FOR THE BOY TO GO FIRST? Boys are bigger.

That one should have it. WHY IS THAT A FAIR THING TO DO?

The mother would say, "Let the baby have it."

I was fair to Kathie. WHAT DID YOU DO? I give her things when she wants them. WHY IS THAT FAIR? Cause we were playing.

The one with the red jumper can go first. WHY IS THAT FAIR? Cause the swing is red.

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Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflict Situations

The child now gives reasons when challenged, to justify his or her claims. The reasons go beyond simply proclaiming the child's own desire but are still instrumental to the child's gaining his or her own desire, rather than objective weighing of the claims of two persons. The self's desire comes first, the justifications merely being used to give weight or approval to the child's self-serving ends and not involving strictly moral criteria. A child with well developed cognitive and verbal skills may use them in such a way that he or she sounds as if the justifications used are in the interests of the other person rather than self. E.g. "Look I have to be the driver cause you might hurt yourself up here." Conversely, a child may give-in, unfairly to the self, when another child is more verbally skilled at producing semi-relevant criteria of justification. A child may let another have first turn so as to keep a social activity going, or because a significant adult is watching.

FIRST MORAL CRITERION

At the next two levels, focus is shifting from labelling of persons and behaviour in a way which is merely instrumental to the child's own desires, to classifying their behaviour from a more stable reference notion, viz. involving sharing.

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LEVEL 3: SHARING EQUATED WITH EACH HAVING SOME

Structure

Classification: First recognition of a general principle on which moral classification of behaviour is based, i.e. that people should share; that it is not fair not to share. Sharing is understood as each having some, not as entailing strict equality. Fair and Not Fair are understood to be moral classifications based on sharing, and not being willing to share. There still may be some confusion in abstract definition of Fair and Not Fair but there is a confident ability to define sharing, e.g. "sharing means you've all got to have some." The child uses the expectation that others should share to strengthen his or her own claims and choices. Furthermore, the child may employ earlier justifications to rationalize the self's own self-serving behaviour; however, he or she does now accept that the self's behaviour should appear to be sharing behaviour, and rejects the notion that he or she is never Not Fair. At this level the notion of fairness, as involving sharing behaviour, will usually arise spontaneously when the child is questioned, i.e. he or she will introduce the word Sharing, in explanation of what Fairness means.

Compensation: The concept of sharing as all having "some" involves compensating those who haven't yet received a share by giving them some or by justifying why they cannot have some. The amount given is often just a token amount. It is reciprocity at the level of a social expectation. It is not equally balanced recip-

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rocity. The child claims compensation for the self, i.e. a share for the self to compensate for the self not having any. This may be seen as an early form of retribution. He or she may call on adults to back claims that others should share with the self, or may threaten others that he or she will tell adults if the other does not share. The threat here carries the weight of adult disapproval, not simply implying that the adult will make the child share. There appears to be some threat of thus publicly identifying the non-sharing child as "bad". When such a threat is used against the self in the preschool environment, the child at this level complies by giving at least a token share. The child also employs the concept of sharing when judging third person situations in which the self is not involved. To decide problems associated with sharing, e.g. who should have the biggest share, or who should have first turn, the child uses the preference criteria from previous levels, e.g. the biggest person, the baby, the person wearing red, or suggests that an adult decides. In judging the behaviour of the self with other children, the child acknowledges sharing as a general principle. He or she still sees it as Fair for self to have the advantage, that is, to have more, although this may be waived, as previously, to gain other rewards for self, such as the continued companionship of another child.

Examples of Responses to Questioning

"It's not fair cause he's got none. IF SHE GIVES HIM ONE LOLLY AND KEEPS THREE FOR HERSELF, IS THAT FAIR? Yes. WHY? Cause then he'll have some."

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"Fair is that they both have a turn. She has a swing, then she gets off and she has a swing. WHY IS IT FAIR THAT SHE GOES FIRST? Cause she got there first. WHAT IF THEY BOTH GOT THERE TOGETHER? I don't know. HOW COULD THEY DECIDE? Ask the teacher."

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflicts

Children often respond to challenge by peers in the preschool that they should share something by accepting the necessity and acting in accordance. They may give only a token share, and may argue, but they usually give some, even in some situations where an adult might consider it an unreasonable expectation. When a child at this level does not comply with a request to share, he or she justifies self's action, e.g. "There are more on the shelf, get your own"; "Wait a minute, can't you, I haven't finished yet".

LEVEL 4: EQUAL SHARING

Structure

Classification: Sharing is now the prime moral concept in social peer interactions in the preschool and, at this level, fair sharing is inflexibly equal sharing. The child verbalizes the principle that everyone should have the same and be treated the same. Persons and events are classified as Fair or Not Fair according to the strictness with which equal sharing is accomplished in a situ-

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ation. It is a rigid classificatory system, confidently expressed verbally.

Compensation: Sharing is recognized as a reciprocal activity. Reciprocity comes into its own. The child tries to act, or at least appear to act, in the interest of equality and expects others to make reciprocal actions. Compensation emerges as an important concept to balanceout inequality, e.g. "He has to wait so he should get longer with it when he gets it." He or she may compensate in other ways, e.g. by acknowledging the self's own unfairness and saying "sorry".

Examples of Responses to Questioning

"It's not fair cause he's got three and she's got two. HOW CAN YOU MAKE IT FAIR? You can't".

"They should take one each and put the other back on the shelf."

"They should both hop on the swing together. BUT THE TEACHER SAYS ONLY ONE PERSON AT A TIME, SO WHAT CAN THEY DO TO BE FAIR? They could built another swing. NO, THEY CAN'T DO THAT. They could go somewhere else to play. AND NOT HAVE A SWING AT ALL? Yes, that's the only way to be fair."

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflicts

The child tries to balance his or her behaviour so that it appears to meet the demands of equality. He or she may give up an object, or a turn, if challenged about equality of sharing, to restore the balance. Also, both children may give up an unshar-

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able prized object. Words become an important tool in real-life situations, to compensate verbally for actions which are done and can't be undone. Words appear to be used to attempt to restore equilibrium.

FIRST MODIFIERS

In the next two levels, the classifications of Fair/Not Fair become more complex in structure, involving relationships between criteria used for justification, which modify the principle of fairness as universal equality.

The principle that all persons should be treated the same was strongly argued as the meaning of what it is to be fair, at Level 4. It was stated as an absolute moral imperative: this is the way all persons, including the self, ought to be treated and, reciprocally, this is the rule the self ought to put into practice in behaviour towards others. Paradoxically, the child arrives at a beautifully simple statement by which to guide all his or her moral interactions with others, and then finds that, however hard he or she tries, it is extremely difficult, and often impossible, to put it into action in behaviour, except in very simple situations. It is as if the child has grasped the essential nature of morality, as equal respect for all persons, by approximately four years of age, and then spends many years working out how to apply it in action.

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LEVEL 5: STRICT EQUALITY MODIFIED BY CLAIMS OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Structure

Classification: Sharing continues as a basic moral criterion but the child recognizes that to classify things as Fair and Not Fair involves that one also consider other factors alongside equal shares of strict turns. At this level he or she employs one additional factor which is usually the personal relationship between participants, notably friendship but sometimes a sibling relationship. It is considered fair to give friends preferential treatment over others. The reasoning of the child considers each criterion in turn and cannot co-ordinate them. E.g. Everyone should get the same, that's fair. WHAT IF THIS ONE IS YOUR FRIEND AND THIS ONE ISN'T? He (friend) should get more. DOES BEING FAIR MEAN THAT EVERYONE SHOULD GET THE SAME? Yeah. IS IT FAIR TO GIVE YOUR FRIENDS MORE? Yeah, 'cause he's my friend. IS THAT FAIR TO THE OTHER ONE? No. IF YOU DIDN'T GIVE YOUR FRIEND MORE, WOULD THAT BE FAIR OR NOT FAIR? Not fair. WHAT COULD YOU DO TO MAKE IT FAIR THEN? Give him (friend) more.

Compensation: The reciprocity between friends is strongly emphasised. The self can admit when he or she is not behaving with strict reciprocity with a friend and usually either compensates or breaks the friendship. Friendships are fluctuating since the child considers that breaking the friendship relation verbally, on

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the spot, weakens the claim the other has of reciprocity, thus resolving the dilemma.

Where the self classifies the situation in the first place as one where the notion of equal sharing is not relevant, e.g. "He's not my friend", he or she may refuse to share at all, especially if no adult is present. The characteristic which distinguishes nonsharing behaviour at this level, from behaviour at Level 2 or Level 3, is that the child justifies the behaviour by a reference to the situation as one in which the relations between participants are such as to over-ride the moral principle of equality, e.g. "He's not my friend. He doesn't share with me and I don't have to give him any."

Level 5 may seem like a regression from the stability of Level 4 where the notion of strict equality was viewed as the essence of fairness. Rigid equality can now be over-ridden by mere personal preference, e.g. friendship. However, at Level 5 the child is reaching towards the understanding that morality is embedded in on-going relationships between persons rather than an external rule. It is the beginning of the understanding that each person must construct morality anew within his or her human interactions, rather than take something that already exists "out there" and apply it.

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Examples of Responses to Questioning

She didn't share with me so she is not my friend any more. She's not my friend so I don't have to share with her. IS THAT FAIR? Yes ... no. WOULD SHE THINK IT WAS FAIR? No ... Yes. WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE TO DO TO MAKE IT FAIR TO BOTH OF YOU? Give her the same as I've got. WOULD IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IF YOU WERE FRIENDS? Yes. WHY? Then we would be happy to share. AND IF YOU WERE NOT FRIENDS? Then I wouldn't give her any. They should both have a turn together. ONLY ONE PERSON IS ALLOWED ON AT A TIME, SO WHAT CAN THEY DO TO BE FAIR TO BOTH? They can't. WHAT CAN YOU DO TO BE FAIR? I'll make this one bigger - see, he has big legs now. WILL THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE TO WHAT'S FAIR? Yes, the little one can go first. WHY IS THAT FAIR? Cause she can't push as hard. IS THAT FAIR TO THE BIG ONE? He wouldn't care; he'd let her; I let my little sister go first. (Here it is the sibling relationship, rather than friendship, which is brought in to resolve the dilemma).

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflicts

Friends are given preference over non-friends in fair distribution, and preference is claimed back from friends. Between friends, however, strict equality holds. Friendships may be verbally broken (and remade within half an hour or less) to justify the self not giving or as a result of not having been given to. When observed and challenged by a teacher, friends may admit the claims of non-friends to equality in the preschool situation but still modify their action in line with the above when adults move

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away. They may resolve the situation by giving all to non-friends and moving away together so as not to have to "share" with non-friends.

The criterion of special need is just beginning to emerge as another legitimate claim for preference, by which a child may spontaneously modify his or her own claim to equality. That is, the child may voluntarily surrender some of his or her claim to a much younger child and be able to justify why this is being fair by describing a protective kind of relationship between bigger and smaller children. This may be related to a child's relationship with a younger sibling. The emphasis at this level is on personal relationships rather than on abstract special need of another.

LEVEL 6: SEVERAL MODIFIERS USED

Structure

Classification: The child now uses more than one modifying criterion on fairness as equal sharing in a particular situation. He or she cannot co-ordinate his or her reasoning to resolve contradictions; the criteria are still introduced one at a time. The classification of persons and behaviour as Fair and Not Fair has moved a long way from the simple clear structure it had at Level 4. The set of criteria being considered as modifiers tends to change from one situation to another. The typical pattern of interview responses is one in which each justification is attached to the previous probing question and logically pairs with it, but

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there are no links in the chain between each of these pairs so that the whole falls apart.

Compensation: The child works towards an ideal equilibrium of equal sharing and tries to compensate for inequality by bringing in another criterion. When an additional criterion results in a fresh disequilibrium, the child introduces yet another criterion, and so on. At this level he or she still seems to be searching for the one "right" criterion which will result in the restoration of absolute fairness to all.

Examples of Responses to Questioning

Everyone should have the same. WHAT IF THIS ONE IS JUST A LITTLE GIRL? She can have a bit more cause she can't run as fast. IS THAT FAIR TO THE OTHER ONE? No. HOW CAN YOU MAKE IT FAIR? Cause he got there first. IS THAT FAIR TO THE LITTLE ONE WHO CAN'T RUN AS FAST? No. HOW CAN YOU MAKE IT FAIR TO BOTH? I don't know. They could ask the teacher. WHAT WOULD THE TEACHER SAY? She'd say ... I think she might say, "It's time for milk and fruit now." WOULD THAT BE FAIR? Yes. HOW? They'd have to go inside.

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflicts

Arguments over what is fair often proceed by each child introducing one criterion at a time, to support his or her perspective, which is then countered by the other child introducing another criterion. The resolution comes when, for example, one or

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both tire of the verbal interaction and settle for a solution based on the last criterion presented, or appeal to a teacher for a decision, or part company, or resort to physical solutions.

MORAL RELATIVITY

The next two levels demonstrate the realization that fairness is relative to different perspectives and that to be fair in practice is to attempt to reach a compromise that is considered "fairest" to all concerned.

LEVEL 7: FAIREST TO ALL, BY SELF'S JUDGMENT

Structure

Classification: The notion of the solution which seems fairest in the circumstances is distinguished from the notion of Fair and Not Fair as absolutes. It is still absolutely Not Fair not to be willing to consider claims to sharing but the complexity of deciding what constitutes fair sharing is now accepted as part of the nature of social interaction. To be fair within a preschool social situation is now recognized as entailing the solution of a problem through trial and error and compromise rather than the application of one right answer which already exists. The child at Level 7 tries for internal consistency within any particular situation, i.e. he or she tries to resolve contradictory claims by co-ordinating the criteria he or she sees as relevant to the

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fair resolution of that situation. At this level the child achieves this internal consistency from his or her own perspective. The fairest solution is the one which satisfies the greatest number of the criteria he or she sees as needing to be considered. These typically include: equality; personal relationships; prior events (prior equality, prior possession); and, perhaps, special needs.

Insofar as a relatively stable set of criteria begins to form the basis of his or her reasoning from one situation to another, there is a hint of the hierarchy which will be achieved at later levels. At Level 7 the immature hierarchical structure consists of a certain set of important criteria to which others may be added, depending on unique aspects of the particular circumstances. Even more important for the structuring at later levels is the fact that although sharing is no longer considered a simple matter of equal portions, equality is still the pivotal point around which fairness revolves, foreshadowing the later position of justice as the peak of the moral hierarchy at Kohlberg's principled stage.

Compensation: The fairest solution is that which will restore equilibrium in social interaction. Compensations are weighed one against the other in a trial and error fashion in each situation but part of the attainment at this level is that this is done in a way which tries to keep the whole operation and the overall balance in mind at any point. Thus this level involves the Piagetian conservation process.

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Examples of Responses to Questioning

WOULD THAT BE FAIR TO EVERYONE? Well, I think it is about the fairest thing to do. WOULD THE OTHERS THINK IT IS FAIR? I don't know. WHAT IF THEY DIDN'T THINK IT FAIR? Then we wouldn't play together.

HOW DO YOU DECIDE WHO HAS FIRST TURN? The one that waits can have longer. BUT SUPPOSE THEY BOTH WANT TO GO FIRST; WHAT'S FAIR? Well, it's not really fair but it doesn't matter. I'd let him go first. DOES IT MATTER IF HE DOESN'T LET YOU HAVE LONGER THEN? Yes. WHAT COULD YOU DO TO MAKE IT FAIR? We could race to see who goes first. WHAT IF YOU WON? Then I'd have a little turn first. AND THEN? And then he could have longer. WHAT IF HE WON? He could go first but he'd have to give me longer when it came to my turn. WOULD HE? Yes ... No.

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflicts

The child now argues in a way which relates more than one of his or her criteria to another. He or she listens to others and he or she may accept contributions from another person but finds it hard to incorporate them into the self's total argument if they are discrepant with the self's point of view. On the other hand, the child often acts with righteous indignation if his or her efforts to reach a fair compromise are not accepted by others. Partly for this reason, adults may often be seen to be unfair and the child's reaction to such apparent injustice may be very emotional.

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LEVEL 8: FAIREST TO ALL BY COMPROMISE

Structure

Classification: What is added to Level 7 reasoning is greater consideration of the criteria others put forward as needing to be considered in a particular situation to reach a fair solution. Fairness involves a compromise between the child's perspective and that of others, as well as the compromise between competing criteria within the child's own perspective. It is not yet seen to involve consensus but there is a foreshadowing of the understanding that sharing (still the central concept) may involve give and take in relation to solutions for moral conflicts.

Compensation: As at Level 7, with more consideration of the other's point of view about fair compensation and reciprocity. There is some evidence that a Time factor is becoming important, e.g. "OK, I had it yesterday, your turn first." Earlier, time was viewed more from the point of view of one's own desires, e.g. "It's not fair; you always go first."

Examples of Responses to Questioning:

WHAT IF THE OTHERS DON'T THINK IT FAIR? They might say "No, I've got a better idea." WOULD THAT BE FAIR? It might.

HOW COULD TWO PEOPLE SHARE THREE BLOCKS TO BE FAIR? They could build together, or this one could say he doesn't want them now, he'll have them later, or he can find some other interesting ones.

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WOULD THAT BE FAIR? It would be if they were both happy."

Behaviour in Real-life Moral Conflicts

There is much more give and take apparent. If one child's solution is not acceptable to the group the child may offer a different solution or may accept another child's solution which is not as advantageous to the self but is acceptable to the other participants. There is more shrugging off of minor disadvantages to the self, apparently for the sake of continuing pleasant social interaction.

This is the end of the present description. Table 7 provides a summary. The levels are assumed to extend beyond this point and some aspects of such extension are discussed in Chapter 5.

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TABLE 7

Brief Description of Milne's Levels of Reasoning and Behaviour Related to the Moral Concept of Fairness

PRE MORAL	
LEVEL 0	No use of FAIR or NOT FAIR
FIRST JUSTIFICATIONS	
LEVEL 1	FAIR related to own desires. Classification: others are FAIR or NOT FAIR according to how they give to self. Compensation: instrumental to the gaining of own desires.
LEVEL 2	Ad hoc justifications are added to own desires. Classification: first made as at Level 1, then justifications added. Compensation: exchanges aimed to the advantage of self but may include consideration of adult approval as a form of compensation for material loss. Likewise, the continuation of play may be used to compensate for some other loss.
FIRST MORAL CRITERION	
LEVEL 3	Sharing equated with each having some. Classification: FAIR or NOT FAIR involves sharing as basic factor. Compensation: those with none should be given "some" (often just a token) or should be given a reason why they can't be given some.
LEVEL 4	Equal sharing. Classification: FAIR means absolute equality. Compensation: exchanges more truly reciprocal, even involving both giving up something which cannot be shared equally.
FIRST MODIFIERS	
LEVEL 5	Strict equality modified by claims of personal relationships. Classification: persons in the class of friends are entitled to preference. Also, to a lesser extent, others such as siblings, babies are favoured. Compensation: verbally breaking the relationship of friendship breaks the claim of preference, so can be used to justify not sharing with a person either before or after the act.
LEVEL 6	Several modifiers used. Classification: the set of criteria used as modifiers tends to change according to the situation. They are not co-ordinated so that contradictions abound in the reasoning. Compensation: the child still seems searching for one "true" criterion which will result in the restoration of absolute fairness to all.
MORAL RELATIVITY	
LEVEL 7	Fairest to all, by self's judgment. Classification: relative fairness is distinguished from FAIR and NOT FAIR, as that which satisfies the greatest number of self's criteria. Compensation: restoring conditional equality.
LEVEL 8	Fairest to all, by compromise. Classification: the criteria of others given added weight. Compensation: greater equilibrium. Time gains importance as a factor.

THE LEVELS ARE ASSUMED TO EXTEND BEYOND THIS POINT.

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SUBJECT DATA

We now turn from the description of the main measuring instrument, the developmental sequence, to present the results obtained when this instrument was one of those applied to the records of children's reasoning in semi-structured interviews and their behaviour in natural play situations in the preschool environment.

Measures of Moral Reasoning, Moral Behaviour and Social Interaction

Data showing children's levels of development are presented in Tables 8 and 9. The scores are presented fully, with most of the information on the one table (Table 8). This type of presentation was selected so as to enable the reader to study the information as a whole, seeing developmental trends rather than merely isolated scores on fragmented components. Thus the reader can take a holistic perspective both horizontally across the various measures for one child, and vertically down the various subjects' scores on a measure.

The key to Table 8, which follows the table, provides a brief description of the methods of data collection represented by the column headings (and described fully in Chapter 3). The discussion of these results takes place in Chapter 5.

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TABLE 8

Scores of Subjects on Measures of Moral Reasoning, Moral Behaviour and Social Interaction

Subject	Sex	Age	Moral Reasoning Levels						Moral Behaviour Levels		Social Interaction					
			Pretest			Post-test			Pretest	Post-test	Pretest			Post-test		
n = 28			Concept of Fairness	Dilemma 1	Dilemma 2	Concept of Fairness	Dilemma 1	Dilemma 2			Solo	Parallel	Co-operative	Solo	Parallel	Co-operative
Be	M	4.8	3	4	4	6	5	5	2	1	22	16	62	28	4	68
Am	M	4.7	1	3	3	4	5	4	-	1	not present			43	3	54
Kn	F	4.7	3	3	2	3	4	4	0	1	28	32	40	30	13	57
Si	M	4.7	1	1	1	3	4	4	1	3	60	25	15	53	5	42
De	F	4.6	4	4	5	4	5	5	1	3	52	9	39	52	9	39
Ed	M	4.6	0	4	4	2	4	4	-	-	43	20	37	26	7	67
Jo	M	4.6	3	4	3	4	4	5	2	-	43	23	34	50	4	34
Li	F	4.6	1	4	4	6	6	7	3	4	20	7	73	28	3	69
Lo	F	4.6	1	3	3	2	4	4	-	-	54	15	31	47	12	41
Do	M	4.5	1	1	1	2	4	3	-	1	26	25	49	29	1	70
Ka	F	4.5	1	2	3	3	4	5	-	-	26	22	53	35	11	54
Me	F	4.4	1	3	2	3	3	3	1	1	66	10	24	50	15	35
Ey	F	4.4	4	4	3	4	4	4	1	-	38	20	42	27	5	68
My	F	4.3	1	1	1	3	4	5	-	1	31	22	47	15	2	83
Ky	F	4.2	3	4	3	3	5	4	-	3	23	26	54	28	1	71
At	M	4.1	1	3	0	3	4	5	-	3	not present			43	3	54
Ei	F	4.1	3	4	4	2	4	3	-	0	39	17	44	24	0	76
Ja	M	4.1	1	4	4	1	4	4	1	3	38	29	33	29	2	69
Fr	F	4.0	0	0	0	1	3	3	-	-	39	30	31	16	2	82
Hh	M	3.11	1	4	4	2	4	3	1	3	24	19	57	34	3	53
Ce	F	3.10	3	3	3	2	4	4	-	-	49	16	35	68	0	32
De	F	3.10	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	-	54	18	28	65	3	32
Mn	F	3.10	1	2	1	1	4	4	1	0	65	24	11	47	2	51
Nb	F	3.10	3	4	4	3	4	4	0	-	28	8	69	36	4	60
Mk	M	3.9	1	2	2	2	4	4	1	0	not present			43	2	55
Bb	F	3.7	1	4	4	3	4	4	0	-	23	8	69	36	4	60
Ra	F	3.7	1	4	3	3	4	4	1	-	26	23	51	29	28	43
Ea	F	3.4	4	4	5	4	5	4	-	-	76	17	5	65	10	25

See p.244 for KEY TO TABLE 8

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KEY TO TABLE 8

Age is given in years and months at time of pretest. Note that children were 8 months older at post-test.

MORAL REASONING LEVELS

Obtained from semi-structured interviews.

All scores relate to Milne's levels of moral reasoning and behaviour; see Table 7, p.241.

Concept of Fairness: direct questioning about meaning of FAIR and NOT FAIR. See p. 188 for description and Appendix 5.1 for record of a child's responses.

Dilemma 1 and Dilemma 2: Kohlbergian-type stories involving sharing and taking turns. See pp. 189-191 for description and Appendices 5.2 and 5.3 for records.

MORAL BEHAVIOUR LEVELS

Obtained from observations of behaviour during spontaneous peer conflict in the natural preschool environment.

All scores relate to Milne's levels of moral reasoning and behaviour; see Table 7, p. 241.

A score of 0 represents Level 0 on the Milne scale whereas a

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dash indicates that the child was present during observation periods but was not observed to be involved in any peer conflicts.

See pp.204-206 for description of method for Critical Events and Appendix 6.2 for records.

SOCIAL INTERACTION

Obtained from time-sampling of behaviour in a free-play setting. See p. 203 for definitions of solo, parallel and co-operative play. Scores refer to number of incidents of each type during 100 observations per child. Appendix 6.3 contains a time-sampling form.

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Dilemma 3: Intention and Restitution

Dilemma 3 was a Piagetian-type story followed by probing questions to ascertain children's reasoning about fairness in terms of consideration of size of consequences versus intention of actor, and restitution. It is described on pp. 191-194.

Appendix 5.4 contains a record of a Dilemma 3 interview.

Table 9 shows the results which will be discussed in the next chapter. The first column for both pretest and post-test contains one of three possible scores, assigned as follows:

I. (Intention) for a positive affirmation in the face of probing that the child who knocked down one block on purpose was the most unfair;

C. (Consequences) for a positive affirmation that the child who produced the most physical damage, accidentally, was the most unfair;

W (Wavering) for children who wavered between I. and C. types of judgment, without ever finally affirming one judgment over the other.

The second columns indicate the subject's stance on restitution. If the subject agreed, whether spontaneously or as a result of questioning by the interviewer, that restoring the house to its former condition would make a positive difference to the fairness of the situation, restitution was scored "yes". If the subject

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said he or she did not know whether this would make any difference, or said that it would not, restitution was scored "no".

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TABLE 9

Intention and Restitution: Responses to Dilemma 3

Subjects	Pretest		Post-test	
	Criterion of Judgment		Criterion of Judgment	
n = 28	Consequence or Wavering or Intention	Restitution	Consequence or Wavering or Intention	Restitution
Be	W	Yes	I	Yes
Am	I	Yes	I	Yes
Kn	W	Yes	I	Yes
Si	W	Yes	I	Yes
De	W	No	I	Yes
Ed	W	No	W	Yes
Jo	C	No	C	Yes
Li	W	Yes	W	Yes
Lo	I	Yes	I	Yes
Do	W	No	I	Yes
Ka	W	No	C	Yes
Me	C	Yes	I	Yes
Ey	C	Yes	I	Yes
My	W	Yes	W	Yes
Ky	I	Yes	I	Yes
At	I	Yes	C	Yes
Ei	W	Yes	C	Yes
Ja	W	No	I	Yes
Fr	W	No	I	Yes
Hh	I	Yes	C	Yes
Cc	W	No	I	Yes
Dc	W	No	I	Yes
Mw	C	Yes	I	Yes
Nb	I	Yes	I	Yes
Mk	I	No	W	Yes
Bb	I	Yes	I	Yes
Ra	W	Yes	I	Yes
Ea	W	Yes	C	Yes
	Consequences 4 Wavering 16 Intention 8	Yes 18 No 10	Consequences 6 Wavering 4 Intention 18	Yes 28 No 0
TOTALS	28	28	28	28

Table 9 continues over page

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TABLE 9

Intention and Restitution: Responses to Dilemma 3

(continued)

Analysis of movement towards judging in terms of Intention, from pretest to post-test.

Criteria of Judgment		Number of Subjects n = 28	
Remained on:	Consequences	1	
	Wavering	3	
	Intention	5	
			9
Moved forward:	from Consequences to Wavering	0	
	from Wavering to Intention	10	
	from Consequences to Intention	3	
			13
Moved backward:	from Wavering to Consequences	3	
	from Intention to Wavering	1	
	from Intention to Consequences	2	
			6
		TOTAL	28

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Actions Giving Rise to Peer Conflicts

The extensive records of the peer conflicts which arose naturally in the preschool environment provided material for looking briefly at a very basic question: what behaviour seems to set off conflict in such a setting? This question was not one of great importance in the present investigation. However, preliminary reading had suggested that there was surprisingly little known in this area. Consequently, Table 10 was compiled to present some data from the protocols.

Thirty-four one-hour observations taken in the two preschool groups of approximately 22 children each were analysed. Females predominated over males by approximately 2:1. The age range was 3 years 4 months to 4 years 8 months at the time of the first observation and 4 years 0 months to 5 years 4 months at the time of the last. Accounts of each spontaneous conflict had been recorded on audio tape and transcribed. They were analysed and found to fit the categories in Table 10.

The total number of conflict events observed during the 34 one-hour observations was 174, with a mean of five and a range of from three to seven per session.

Each conflict event was assigned to one category only, on the basis of the first action observed to indicate peer conflict, since the interest here is in the issues giving rise to conflict

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rather than to all the behaviours during a conflict.

The data are discussed in Chapter 5.

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TABLE 10

Actions Giving Rise to Peer Conflicts in Preschool

ACTION		FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INCIDENTS
1. Noxious action against another person's body, e.g., poke.		70
2. Interference with activity of another or object another was using, e.g., snatch		49
3. Noxious action against another's self-image, e.g., point and make derogatory remark.		38
4. Encroachment on space of another e.g., enter cubby house.		9
5. Refusal to share objects which could be shared:		
5.1 by taking turns	1	
5.2 by division	0	
5.3 only by co-operative activity	3	4
6. Refusal to sharing persons, i.e., playmates with another		4
TOTAL NUMBER OF CONFLICT INCIDENTS		174

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CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

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Looking back to the material in the previous chapter one can see that, in one sense, what has been attempted is to examine transition in moral development, through a number of lenses. A small sample has been taken and used to explore what moral sub-stage movement, i.e. transition, looks like. Of course, we are looking here at only one age group, in one environment and focusing on only one moral concept. However, from this sample of transition we can raise questions and give some tentative answers for later empirical examination.

This chapter is divided into two main parts. Following the format of the previous chapter it looks first at the developmental sequence and than at the scores.

DISCUSSION OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL SEQUENCE

In this section first we look more closely at three developmental issues which came into prominence during the construction and application of the levels of reasoning and behaviour related to the moral concept of fairness. Further understanding was developed on these issues and it is believed that this new knowledge may have useful application in early moral education. The issues are:

- development wrongly perceived as regression;
- foreshadowing of development;
- verbal compensation.

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We then look at some of the relationships between the new sequence of levels of moral development and those of Kohlberg, and Damon, whose earlier work contributed greatly to the solution of problems encountered in this study. This is linked to a comment on the numbering of levels in the Milne sequence.

There is then discussion of the main structural elements in the new sequence, viz., classification, compensation and equilibration. This is a crucial section of the thesis in relation to the development of theory.

Finally, before we move on to examination of scores in the second half of this chapter, there is a short discussion on a largely unexplored issue: positive and negative definitions of Fair and Not Fair.

Development Wrongly Perceived as Regression

Level 1 behaviour is sometimes seen by adults as more of a nuisance than Level 0 behaviour and, superficially, it may easily appear to be less advanced. The typical Level 1 behaviour, of calculation by a child of what he or she might get away with, e.g. the calculating look to see where the teacher is before grabbing something from another, and even the behaviour of verbally or nonverbally threatening another child to gain the other's possession, is an advance on Level 0 functioning where the self does not show even this low level of awareness that the desires of

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others must be taken into account. Understanding by care-givers that the child's emerging behaviour represents a gain and not a regression, may facilitate the child's transition through this level and may also make the transition time easier for the adults.

At Level 5 the child attempts to take account of more than one criterion when making judgments about sharing and, as a consequence, both thinking and behaviour may fluctuate much more than at the previous level in sharing situations and may be seen as less objective, therefore less fair. Understanding of the structure of Level 5 development, as set out, makes it apparent that this wavering represents a developmental gain. The child is not abandoning the notion of equal shares, rather he or she is gaining in knowledge about the complexity of the concept of justice.

False perception of regression may also occur as teachers view a child at Level 5 as he or she alters the (Level 4) criterion by which fair sharing was judged, viz., strict equality. This kind of swing across from a simple to a more complex perspective is discussed later in this chapter under equilibration.

Foreshadowing of Development

At Level 3 one can see, in the structure of the level, an example of a type of foreshadowing of later development. This kind of foreshadowing was also seen again and again in the observations of real-life behaviour. Yet this early foreshadowing of later structures has not been given attention in the literature.

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At Level 3, children show a first recognition of the principle that justice involves equity. They say, "You must share." In one sense they are simply repeating a rule. Yet they also display a level of generalization of the rule in their spontaneous behaviour as well as their reasoning, which at least points in the direction of raising it beyond a rule to a basic principle of social interaction. Thus, between approximately four and five years of age we can see children beginning to construct a moral principle which will not emerge as a full-grown principle of justice before another twenty years (if then) when they reach Kohlberg's stage of principled morality.

It should not surprise us that the development takes so long since it is complex. What was surprising, and exciting, was to see so clearly with the help of the new instrument of developmental levels to uncover structure, the roots of such development at the preschool age, and to see it reflected in both reasoning and behaviour, in hypothetical and spontaneous moral dilemmas.

Again, at Level 5 one can see the process of foreshadowing later development. At Level 5 the child begins to understand, at least on the action plane, that he or she must construct morality for the self rather than judge morally against a static and simple rule. Also, at Level 7, the development of a hierarchy of principles, as at Kohlberg's Stage 6, is foreshadowed as the child begins to understand the need for, and practise some hierarchical arrangement of, the criteria by which he or she judges something to be Fair or Not Fair.

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The research literature has given attention to the influence on a person of exposure to and stimulation at the adjacent higher stage of moral development. There is a largely untapped and fascinating area of study in looking further at the structural and other relationships between non-adjacent Kohlbergian stages.

One of the major areas of implication for teaching in early childhood relates to the question of accountability and assessment in a developmentally oriented preschool. This issue rises regularly in this thesis - how to demonstrate that long-term development is actually being facilitated. The research evidence about transition between adjacent stages of Kohlberg's theory of moral development has, rightly and usefully, focused educational attention on exposure of children to moral reasoning at a step above their present level. At the same time, however, it is possible (we do not know) that their exposure to levels higher than their present level is not by any means wasted but simply does not show up as immediate gains. This may extend wider than the moral realm of a cognitive-development perspective.

Verbal Compensation

At Level 4, one of the interesting factors to come into prominence is the use of words to compensate for unfair action, e.g. "sorry; never mind". In the type of foreshadowing of later development which has been discussed earlier, toddlers of less than eighteen months of age have been observed to begin to use words in this way, or a non-verbal equivalent of such words such

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as a pat on another's head. However, it seems to be at Level 4, around four to five years of age, that words come into sharp focus as possible tools of compensatory action to restore social equilibrium.

It appeared from our observations of three- to four-year-olds that smiles and conciliatory expressions and posture were more important at this earlier age and that there were big differences in the skill of individual children in both the areas of giving and of interpreting these non-verbal behaviours. Language did not seem as important in the three year old group as in the four year old group where it was sharply in focus.

At Level 4 the usefulness of language as a tool for restoring social equilibrium did not seem to depend on complex language usage. One word such as "sorry" appeared to serve as well or maybe better than a long verbal output. It was at Level 6 and later that language appeared to come into its own as a tool of barter for the exchange of both goods to share and moral intentions.

These comments are offered tentatively since in the present investigation, as a result of the review of literature, language was not taken into account in measurement beyond the simple control of removing from the list of subjects any children who teachers considered to be functioning below a certain level in the use of the English language (see Chapter 3). It is possible that the audio tapes of moral dilemma interviews collected for the present investigation may provide a rich source of material for

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the future study of some aspects of language in moral development. From the focus of this present thesis the main point to watch is the growing importance of language as a tool of compensation and equilibration at Level 4.

Relationships of Milne Sequence with Damon and Kohlberg

The logical structural correspondence of the Milne sequence with Damon's (1977) levels of positive justice is not exact but is close. (See Table 11). Every second step may be matched to a consecutive step in the Damon sequence which has been empirically tested. The levels formulated in this study provide extra levels of discrimination in comparison to Damon levels, thus enabling the finer investigation of the development of moral reasoning (and behaviour) in the early years.

In comparison with the Kohlberg stage structure, the present levels provide seven discriminations below the attainment of Kohlberg's Stage 2. They show some of the characteristics of Kohlberg's moral stages, e.g. progression with age, and re-organization and integration of learning from previous levels. The structuring of moral reasoning matches with Kohlberg's stages when both are dealing with the same level.

Invariance and universality are both open to further investgation. The aim has been to describe sub-sectional steps based on data from observation and interview, and logically based on cognitive-development theory.

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TABLE 11

Relationship of Milne's Levels of Fairness to Damon's Levels of Positive Justice

Milne's level of fairness	Damon's (1977) levels of positive justice*
0	0A
1 2	0B
3 4	IA (Kohlberg's Stage 1)
5 6	1B
7 8	2A (Kohlberg's Stage 2)

* For a description of Damon's levels refer to Table 4.

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Damon (1977) delineated four aspects of social knowledge - positive justice, authority, friendship and social regulation. In the present study, the concept of fairness is taken as the central early childhood expression of positive justice. At various levels in the development of the concept of fairness, the other three main social concepts - authority, social regulation and friendship - seem to form the focus of thinking by which a child establishes the main criterion to be considered in arriving at judgments of fair behaviour. This is a slightly different perspective from that taken by Damon.

In the present investigation, each concept appears to emerge into prominence in turn, and to dominate the child's reasoning about fairness for a period, before being replaced in the foreground of thinking by the next concept. Thus, fairness is at Level 2 equated with the notion of sharing due to the authority of adults, e.g. "The teacher says you've got to share." It then becomes a social expectation in its own right at Level 3, e.g. "Everyone's got to have some. WHY? Cause that's fair." This, in turn, is replaced by Level 5 functioning in which the criterion of friendship modifies the notion that fairness involves strict equality, e.g. "He's my friend so it's fair that he gets more."

It appears to the present writer that what is happening is a separate practising of each criterion (authority, social expect-

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ation, friendship) as it emerges which, for a time, overshadows and perhaps even contradicts the reasoning and behaviour which was practised at the previous level. This concentration on one criterion at a time is characteristic of the pre-operational child's general cognitive functioning in all areas (Piaget, 1951). What is of particular interest in the present study is evidence of the pattern across the sequence of levels which demonstrates how something learned at one level can appear to be lost at the next level, but re-emerges at the next level again, or higher, within a more complex structure of integration.

It is necessary to say a further word about the concept of friendship as a criterion of moral judgment, as it appears in the sequence.

The criterion of friendship, which becomes the focus at Level 5, should not be seen as at the same level as the friendship concept in Kohlberg's Stage 3. In Kohlberg's Stage 3, friendship implies a stable and enduring commitment to co-operation in which each acts in the other's welfare. The Milne Level 5 foreshadows this but is not yet at that level. At Level 5, friendship is instrumental to the self's own equilibrium and involves, primarily, making a deal to share or to give preference over others in sharing.

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Numbering of Levels

The first integer, 1, comes at the first identified justification of action, since moral justification is the basis of morality in the cognitive-development theory of morality. Discrepancies between Milne, and Damon (1977), Selman (1975) and Kohlberg (1963) in the numbering of the levels are not of great theoretical importance at this stage of research.

The numbering in this study is based on pragmatic reasons of identifying the place of a level in the sequence of finer discriminations which one is trying to discover within the larger stage sequences based on Kohlberg's stages. As such, the present numbering is tentative and subject to change in two ways. Within its own level of classification, there may be as yet undiscovered gaps in the scale which necessitate the inclusion of another step between two present levels. This would necessitate changing the numbers above the inclusion. Similarly, there may be a redundancy of levels so that two may need to be collapsed into one, thus also requiring renumbering to preserve the usefulness of the present number scale as a working tool.

In a more important way, the numbering employed here must, at some stage, be altered if my levels are to be subsumed under a broader classification such as Kohlberg's stages. If they indeed represent, as is the assumption, finer levels of discrimination within Kohlberg's framework of stages, then there is a clear need at some time to perform an appropriate renumbering which

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demonstrates the relationship.

It is considered premature to undertake this task at the present stage of investigation. Table 10 shows the approximate match which seems to fit at the present time; it is a tentative mapping of the present work onto the territory of established theory in the light of explorations to date.

Classification and Compensation

The Milne description of sequence also follows Damon (1977) in taking the two main cognitive-development processes of classification and compensation as the main structural elements. It thus meets the requirement which the writer believes to be important at this stage of the theory, that the cognitive-development theory of moral development should be grounded in general cognitive-development constructs. The justification a child gives for behaviour is viewed as the expression of how he or she employs these processes of classification and compensation in his or her reasoning.

A child's first moral justifications are clearly seen to arise out of his or her action which preceded them, i.e., they are added to the completed action (or description of hypothetical action) rather than coming before and determining the action (see Levels 1 and 2). This would seem to offer some further support to the Piagetian principle that action precedes thought (Piaget, 1951).

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Equilibration

Equilibration is the process underlying classification and compensation yet it is a concept seldom discussed in moral development theory, although Selman (1975) gave us useful tools with which to do so in his self-other scale of social perspective- taking. In the sequence presented in this thesis, equilibration is at first related only to the satisfaction of the self's desires (Levels 1 and 2). The later widening of social perspective gradually encompasses the notion that self equilibration is related to social group equilibration, i.e. "no man is an island entire to himself". Through many trials a child gradually sees that the self must make compromises which take into account the desires of other individuals. This position is reached at the top of the present sequence, i.e. Level 8, although this level is not by any means supposed to represent the end point of moral development.

The realization that the desires of others must be taken into account is at first based on that being the only way the self's own best level of equilibration can be achieved, i.e. others are seen as instrumental to self. Erikson's (1963) stages of ego development show how gradually, through lifelong development, the self identifies with others, and, at the final stage (which is not reached by all) with the class of mankind. At this high stage the self's equilibration is eventually recognized as so inextricably tied to others that the self-other distinction becomes transcended. Although the study of equilibration in the moral development of preschool children leaves off a long way before that point, it

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is only by briefly tracing the full cycle that we can see how the early levels relate to the others in a structural way.

Equilibration is also a useful concept to use in the further understanding of the spiral effect in qualitative and quantitative changes in the criteria for moral choices.

It has been previously mentioned how a child appears to over focus at first on each new criterion as he or she brings it into moral judgments (from Level 3 through to Level 8). The child appears to practise with each criterion in turn, separately and intently. This focus on the one criterion gradually reveals to the child that it will not adequately solve his or her conflicts over fair behaviour in everyday social situations with peers.

It is probable that this real-life practice with other "live" children is of far greater importance in helping the young child to see the unsatisfactory aspects of any position than are any more formal methods of moral education using hypothetical dilemmas.

It appears that a child then swings from use of a single criterion to use of more than one criterion, the set being derived from the achievements of previous levels, through assimilation and accommodation. When the child's reasoning and behaviour at this next level, with multiple criteria, still proves to be inadequate to cope with fairness situations, the child swings across again to

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focus on a fresh single criterion, and so on.

Cognitive-development theory has demonstrated that two of the characteristics of the thinking of young children are the limitations in ability to consider a number of aspects of a situation at the one time, and to form logically coherent structures of classification (Piaget, 1951). Levels of moral reasoning and behaviour may be expected to reflect these characteristics. One would expect a sequence of developmental levels to show a quantitative increase in the number of criteria which can be considered at any one time and a qualitative increase of logical coherence in the set of criteria which are considered at any one time.

The complementary relationship between qualitative and quantatitive aspects of development may result in a more complex pattern of moral development than can be reflected in the simple linear stage-sequence type of model often used in the literature. A spiral type may be a more useful model. Successive cyclical swings between increase and decrease of number of criteria considered in making a moral judgment are discernable in the present data and may be inversely related to increases and decreases in the internal structure and consistency in the set of criteria being used at any level of development. Furthermore, the increased capacity to deal with a number of different aspects of a moral dilemma situation may, at some levels of development, result in a paradoxical decrease in the number that are actually used in arriving at a moral judgment, due to the increasing operational ability to survey all possible criteria of consideration and

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selectively focus on those of greatest moral relevance, and logical relationship to each other, thus discarding clutter.

Discussion of this aspect of moral development was not revealed in a search of the literature but has arisen out of attempts to construct and apply the new sequence. Theoretical support for this approach may be obtained from Bruner (1971) where it is argued that the limited capacity of the human intellect for dealing with information at any one moment, is one of the most pervasive constraints on the exercise of that intellect. The intellect is easily overwhelmed by clutter, therefore it must develop strategies for selective reduction of complexity.

The swings at each level, between focusing on one criterion and back to the assimilation of the new criterion into the existing set of criteria, are depicted in Figure 4. The levels depicted in the centre (1, 3, 5, 7) in which there is an attempt to adapt the new in terms of the pre-practised existing criteria, can be viewed in Piagetian terms as levels of relative equilibrium. Level 4, on the left side of the figure represents, in contrast, a level of necessary over-balance in the search for what fairness is all about. Characteristically, pre-operational children are looking for one right solution and, when they seem to find one which might fit, they ignore, for a time, the limitations and contradictions inherent in their choice. The levels on the right (2, 6) represent the opposite swing where children forego the high level of internal consistency for the sake of taking into account a greater number of criteria of judgment.

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FIGURE 4.

A pattern of relationship between qualitative and quantitative aspects of the number and consistency of criteria considered in fairness judgments in early moral development.



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Thus, the pattern appears to be of successive cyclical swings in which increases and decreases in the number of criteria considered in the making of fairness judgments occur with corresponding but inversely related increases and decreases in the internal logical order within the set of criteria being used at any one time. The pattern requires empirical testing; it is only suggested, not claimed, within the present investigation, since it is derived from the data and therefore cannot be validated by use of the same data.

From Levels 1 to 2 there is an increase in the number of criteria which are used in justifying choices as fair or not fair. The increase in quantity, at Level 2, results in a clutter of criteria without internal consistency, i.e. a decrease in the quality of coherence in the system. At this level, the selected criteria are related, one at a time, to the moral problem and not to each other. The result may be a series of contradictory judgments by an individual in relation to the one problem, with no mental structuring yet available to the child by which he or she can resolve these contradictions. Since such contradictions exist in the judgments of an individual, it is obviously extremely difficult for contradictions between individuals at this level to be resolved logically. The internal structure is not yet strong enough for the task.

At the following Levels, 3 and 4, we see a qualitative change in moral reasoning akin to Bruner's (1971) strategies for selective restriction of complexity. The children seem to grasp some

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notion of moral relevance of criteria and use this to reduce the unmanageable clutter of the non-relevant or semi-relevant criteria of Level 2 judgments to a focus on one criterion only - sharing. At Level 3, sharing is loosely defined and has within itself a clutter of interpretations but equilibration is achieved. At Level 4, the movement towards reduction of complexity is carried further in that sharing itself is simplified to equate with strictly equal sharing, thus swinging over to the Low Criteria /High Consistency end of the structure.

Sharing, as expressed at Level 4, represents a higher level of moral reasoning than at Level 3, although it may appear to be a regression because it narrows the concept. (See also earlier discussion on wrongly perceived regression). It represents a higher level because it reintegrates the achievement of Level 3 (the notion of fairness as the sharing of "some") to overcome Level 3 problems about how much of "some" is a "fair share", and problems about how the different perspectives of different individuals, in regard to the amount which constitutes a fair share, may be resolved. The attainment of the notion of strict equality in sharing thus represents a higher level attainment which, at the same time, results in an over-simplified strategy of moral decision-making which introduces fresh problems and complexity. Strictly equal sharing between all participants in a fairness dilemma does not take account of prior inequalities, special needs, and other criteria.

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As children struggle to apply the simple notion of equal sharing in their interactions with peers in the preschool environment, the injustice of solutions which do not take account of other criteria is made apparent to them. The realization seems to come about firstly in situations where a child is aware that he or she personally holds a strong claim to the consideration of some of these other criteria and that it would be disadvantageous to the self were they ignored, e.g., in cases where, from his or her own perspective, he or she can see that equal distribution of length of "turns" with an object at the present moment does not take into account the self's own prior long wait to use the object. The sheer number of persons in a preschool group seems to force children into many dilemma situations where the simple notion of strict equality seems necessary but is found to be unworkable.

For children already operating at Level 4, the complexities inherent in dealing with fairness dilemmas on the basis of strict equality, within a preschool group of approximately 25 peers, is probably a stimulation to transition to the next level of functioning. The fact that the use of this one criterion, alone, does not work in practice, points the way to the more difficult task of relating several criteria together. However, in relation to children presently functioning at Level 3 (or below), the complexities inherent in large peer-group situations may not be conducive to the attainment of Level 4 and much more attention to smaller groupings may be advisable. At the moment we do not know enough about how peer group size inter-relates with factors which

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facilitate moral development in young children. The pattern of change which is apparent in the sequence formulated from the data of this investigation suggests that manning, i.e. size of social groups, is a concept that would repay further investigation in the study of early moral development.

The difficulties that arise in attempts to equate fairness with rigid equality of shares for all persons, lead children to the next transition. At Levels 5 and 6, sharing remains a central notion of fairness but children recognize that other criteria are also relevant to fair solutions. At Level 5, children attempt to overcome the pragmatic difficulties involved in putting equal sharing into practice in social encounters, by restricting the moral imperative behind it to situations involving special human relationships of friendship. It is possible that other significant human relationships, e.g. sibling and mother-child relationships are also used. These were not observed in the preschool environment but there are hints in the interview data that they may be employed in the same way as friendship, at this level, to delineate a special class of moral events. If this is so, the criterion is "significant relationships", of which the class "friendship relationships" constitutes one member. The friendship criterion is used to define and limit the set of peers to whom the criterion of strict equality must morally be applied, thus achieving equilibration, again at Level 5.

At Level 5 there is a rigid moral obligation to share equally with friends. Where their own behaviour is contrary to this rule,

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children may resolve the contradiction by temporarily disclaiming the friendship. Sharing between those not in a close friendship relationship is recognized as expected by teachers but, in these situations, sharing is again broadly interpreted as at Level 3, i.e. "some" must be given. However, at Level 5, sharing is only one criterion used in "non-friends" situations. Other criteria may be added to that of general sharing, particularly in situations where non-consideration of other criteria, such as special need or prior possession, would be to self's disadvantage.

At Level 6, the movement continues towards the consideration of more criteria in the solution of any particular fairness conflict and moves to the High Criteria/Low Consistency side of the structure. It is no longer taken for granted that strict equality of the moment should be the only criterion used in fairness decisions between friends. What criteria are considered fluctuate from situation to situation, although sharing and friendship are usually elements in the set. The other elements used will vary from one time to another (as at Level 2) but now show a logical relevance to the context of the moral dilemma (which was not so at Level 2). The increase in the number of criteria used at Level 6 results in a concomitant decrease in the amount of internal order within the set. So, at Level 7 we see that the movement swings back the other way towards attaining a greater degree of internal order, produced partly by reducing the number of elements in the set, i.e. reducing the clutter of criteria to be considered in any one situation by beginning to differentiate a set of the most common criteria of moral relevance to be considered in all similar types of situations.

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It would be expected that Level 8 would continue the movement towards that end of the continuum high in internal ordering, and so on, to arrival, eventually, at a level with a stable set of moral criteria of judgment ordered in a stable heirarchy of relationships, e.g. Kohlberg's Stage 6 where justice is the overriding principle within an ordered set. But Level 8 is as far as the pattern can be explored with the data in the present study.

One aspect which Figure 4 cannot show because it is dealing with only a few levels near the base of the spiral, is the possible narrowing of the swings to each end of the qualitative-quantitative structural base as the spiral moves upwards through progressive levels of moral development.

Figure 5 depicts three spiral systems. Spiral 1 represents a system which progresses vertically through horizontal movements of approximately equal width, as in Figure 4, but with the addition of hypothetical higher levels (dotted lines). Spiral 2 represents a system in which the vertical progression is similar but the horizontal swings narrow as they move upwards.

Spiral 2, in Figure 5, demonstrates the type of narrowing of swings of which the present data contains a slight indication. Point x on Spiral 2 represents a fulcrum, the achievement of a stable set of ordered criteria which potentially could be employed in all moral judgments (Kohlberg's Stage 6). There is just a

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FIGURE 5.

Alternative representations of Qualitative - Quantitative Spirals.



Low = Low Number of Criteria or High Internal Consistency
High = High Number of Criteria or Low Internal Consistency
x = Hypothetical Level in Moral Development Sequence

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suggestion of this narrowing of swing in the present data, and the formulation of levels deduced from the data, which is revealed by comparing the horizontal position of Level 2 with Level 6, and Level 4 with Level 8, in Figure 4. At Level 2, the string of criteria a child may use to justify his or her choice of what is fair is potentially endless because any criterion is only loosely related, logically, to the choice that the child has already made on the basis of his or her own desires, i.e. any criterion is morally only semi-relevant at most. For example, with continued probing by an interviewer, a child may produce something like the following string of justifications: "He should have it because he's bigger ... he's got the same coloured jumper ... boys should go first ... his arms are longer ... he wants it more ... he's stronger ... he will cry ..." The justifications go on, changing the criteria, until the child gets tired of the exercise. On the other hand, at Level 6 the potential set of criteria employed in judging a fairness problem is limited by a stricter application of the notion of moral relevance; the achievements of Levels 3, 4 and 5 have provided an awareness of some distinction between moral relevance and nonrelevance of criteria, centering on sharing. Thus Level 6 does not swing as far out as Level 2. A similar relationship would be expected between Level 4 and Level 8. Level 8 is inferred to be further away from the Low Criteria end of the baseline than Level 4, because Level 8 must logically use more than one criterion whereas Level 4 has one only.

There is no data in the present investigation which was finally classified as representing a level of reasoning or be-

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haviour beyond Level 7, therefore the description of Level 8 is only loosely formulated and must be regarded as more tentative than the others. However, the pattern of the total system logically suggests that Level 8 may be expected to move towards the Low Criteria/High Consistency end of the structural line, as shown on Figure 5, Spiral 2, and that it would not move as close to the Low Criteria/High Consistency end as Level 4. There is, thus, some suggestion that the horizontal swings will narrow in relation to the Low-High points on the qualitative-quantitative base, as they move in the direction of higher levels.

Figure 5, Spiral 3, explores the notion that the vertical dimensions of the movements cannot be inferred from present knowledge to be similar over time between each level, as they are depicted in Spirals 1 and 2. Spiral 3 represents a system horizontally similar to Spiral 2 but vertically dissimilar in that Spiral 3 is intended to represent a system wherein transition from one level of moral development to the next level takes progressively longer as the spiral moves upwards. Spiral 3 represents only one possible pattern, amongst many, which could reflect the time dimension of level or stage transition. The literature has as yet given little attention to this element in relation to a theory of life-span moral development. It is introduced in Figure 5 simply to point out that, in the area of early moral development, very little is known about the temporal pattern between transitions and that it should not be inferred from Figure 4, that the even spacing of early levels of fairness represents even periods of time. The evidence in this investigation supports the claim of cognitive

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-development theory of moral development for a progressive sequence of development. However, the evidence does not at present allow generalized age claims related to each level, nor specific time sequence claims between levels. What it does do is to suggest that, until further research is done in the temporal area, our restriction of knowledge must result in a lack of precision in the evaluation of any program of early moral education, and a limitation on the help available to teachers in identifying any children who may benefit from special attention in a preschool moral education program.

Positive and Negative Definitions : Fair and Not Fair

Scoring on the levels as presently described makes no discrimination between a child who can define only Not Fair and another who can define both Fair and Not Fair.

Both of the following sets of responses are scored at Level 3 in the present study:

Child 1. WHAT DOES FAIR MEAN? Don't know. WHAT DOES NOT FAIR MEAN? Someone hasn't got none.
Child 2. WHAT DOES FAIR MEAN? Everyone has got to share. WHAT DOES NOT FAIR MEAN? Not having some.

Similarly, at Level 4, the same lack of discrimination in scoring occurs between the following two types of response:

Child 1. FAIR? Dont' know. NOT FAIR? Not having the same.
Child 2. FAIR? Everyone has the same. NOT FAIR? Someone has more than someone.

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Further work on the clarification of levels should explore these differences. The present data suggests that the negative perspective as demonstrated in the ability to describe the meaning of Not Fair, may come before the ability to define Fair. However, the small size of the sample, and the lack of sufficient controls in relation to this factor, make this a tentative hypothesis.

The practice of defining Fair in negative terms may be related to the egocentrism of a young child which is revealed in the earlier levels of fairness, where Fair is first of all understood as what the self wants to happen. It may follow that a child's growing awareness of the concept of fair is more easily focused on those instances where personal desires are thwarted, i.e. where he or she most easily sees injustice as taking place. Not Fair may thus be a more salient aspect of a social situation than Fair.

A parallel approach to the explanation of the phenomenon is through the development of the classification process in general - which is first of all in terms of differences. Classification depends on seeing differences between objects or events; similarities have no meaning unless they are set within a context in which there are differences. The moral concept of Not Fair is essentially concerned with differences, i.e. lack of equality. Therefore it might be expected that children would discriminate more easily the situations in which difference is apparent to them, and find it easier to apply a moral label of Not Fair to these instances, before they can generalize the attributes of Fair interactions.

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Some further indication that the issue may be significant comes from the relative length of children's responses. The relative ease in describing Not Fair in comparison to Fair, at Levels 3 and 4, is shown by the greater flow of words with fewer pauses in response to Not Fair compared to Fair, as evidenced on the audiotapes.

The present data cannot be used to give more than a suggestion of an area for further investigation since the order of presentation of variables relating to Fair/Not Fair was not controlled: Fair was presented first in every interview. It is possible that a warm-up effect may have been operating, even though careful attention was paid to the establishment of rapport before the commencement of any interview recording.

A similar, but slightly different, issue emerged in the pilot studies, related to whether Good was defined in terms of "Not Bad" (see Chapter 1).

This concludes the discussion of the sequence of levels of moral reasoning and behaviour and some issues surrounding it. The measurement instrument itself now awaits validation through further research.

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DISCUSSION OF SCORES

In the second part of the chapter we look at the main data sheet Table 8, and also Table 9 and Table 10, in the previous chapter, to identify some of the patterns that emerge in the scores and to discuss some of the issues that were raised in Chapter 1, in the light of this data.

Given all the possible sources of confounding factors, particularly the exposure of some subjects to a moral education program, and the non-standardized state of the measurement in this study, any statements arising from interpretation of the data must be tentative. It must be remembered that, as in the case of Kohlberg's original stage formulation, the measurement tool - the sequence of levels - was partly formulated out of the subjects' responses as well as being used to score those same responses. Furthermore, the total number of subjects (28) is too small to suppose that effects will be randomised.

We do attempt to apply some quantitative measures in this study of moral development. However, the quantification of the data is at the level which is considered appropriate to the task, in line with the descriptive and exploratory nature of the investigation at this stage of knowledge. To assign numerical value to many of the variables is inappropriate in view of the prior tasks still needing to be done, to define more precisely the variables themselves. Quantification and statistical analysis, at too early

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a stage, can hinder the perception of the need for work at a more basic level of understanding. This is not contradictory to awareness that, for further progress in the field of the study of moral development in early childhood, more sophisticated quantification is a necessary step in the near future. It is hoped that the descriptive work in this study will contribute to the possibility of design of research in the area, which can more rigorously meet the need for quantifiable data.

The problem areas singled out for investigation in Chapter 1 will now be discussed in the light of the data.

Moral Reasoning

The present data are consistent with Kohlberg's stage theory insofar as a sequence of levels of moral reasoning can be seen, and the direction of movement, as judged by the highest levels observed for each child on each measure at pretest post-test, is upwards. (See Table 8, Moral Reasoning Levels). Every movement except for Ei and Ea was upward. Every child except Ei displayed some movement upward (although some children stood still on some measures). This is a very clear result.

Strictly speaking, in cognitive-development stage theory, one case of movement that was contrary to the predicted direction and could not be accounted for, would seriously damage that part of the theory. Ei moved backwards one level from 3 to 2 on the Concept of Fairness and from 4 to 3 on Dilemma 2. Since Ei's move-

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ment is across adjacent levels, it may be that it indicates that the child was in a transitional stage. One must also remember that the scores represent the highest level reached in each interview rather than the most commonly used level in each case. It is always possible, in dealing with highest level scores, that the skilled probing which brings out this level in one interview is not quite as skilled in the next interview. However, Ei is still at the lowest level, Level 0, on the measure of spontaneous moral behaviour at the time of the post-test (having not been observed to be in any peer conflict event during the pretest period). Also, Ei moved backwards on Dilemma 3, from a Wavering to a Consequences position, being amongst the six only children who moved backwards on this measure. (See Table 9). This kind of movement might again indicate a transition state.

In the case of Hh and Ea, the backward direction (on Dilemma 2) was from Level 4 to Level 3, and from Level 5 to Level 4, respectively. (See Table 8). Hh also moved backwards on Dilemma 3 (Table 9) from Wavering to Consequences; she was not observed to be involved in any peer conflicts so did not have a score for moral behaviour (Table 8).

Reviewing the results on moral reasoning levels (Table 8) one sees that the unexpected backwards movement is most pronounced on Dilemma 2 and involves Levels 3, 4 and 5. It may be that this is pointing to Level 4 as a source of difficulty in scoring and that this level needs to be clarified or modified. On the other hand, we are speaking of only 3 of 28 cases. Overall, the data is

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strong in showing unidirectional movement.

During the design of this study, it was thought that Dilemma 2, involving taking turns on a swing, might call for a higher level of reasoning than Dilemma 1, involving co-operative play with blocks. (See Chapter 3, p. 180). The results (Table 8) do not show this to be so. The protocols of interviews suggest that the interviewer was able to stimulate highest level thinking on all measures of reasoning.

It was further thought that the Concept of Fairness part of the interview might be more difficult for children because it was more abstract. (See Chapter 3, p. 183). It was expected that children might display differences in their reasoning here compared to that displayed in the dilemmas. There is some suggestion in the data (Table 8) that the Concept of Fairness questions were more difficult, resulting in lower scores. The effect is not as pronounced in the post-test. The order of presentation was not systematically varied (due to motivational factors discussed in Chapter 3) and the Concept of Fairness was always attempted first, so the 'warm-up' effect may have affected results.

The results from Dilemma 3, the Piagetian-type dilemma also, on the whole, are consistent with cognitive-development theory on the issue of forward movement, although there is some contradictory evidence. Table 9 contains an analysis of movement which shows that the majority, 22 children, either remained where they were or moved forward. The six cases where the movement was back-

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ward might be accounted for by the fact that Dilemma 3 was given last in the interview situation. The shorter replies of many children to this part of the interview probing suggest that they were getting tired.

The outstanding result was on the Restitution issue (Table 9). In the pretest, ten of the 28 children said that helping to put things right again would not make any difference to the fairness of the situation whereas, in the post-test, all the children said that it would. This result probably reflects one of the social expectations of the preschool.

The observations of natural behaviour showed that teachers frequently modelled to children the judging of behaviour on the basis of intention as well as consequences, and the expectation that restitution would be made in appropriate situations. The data on Dilemma 3 are therefore consistent with the assumption that such adult modelling is likely to lead to increased use of intention and restitution by children.

Turning now to the extent of change over the six months period, rather than the direction, we see (Table 8) that every child except Ei moved at least one step; many moved two or three steps and Li, who was the only child to reach Level 7 in any part of the study, also moved from Level 1 to Level 6, i.e., five steps, in another part. It is not possible to say how much this movement was influenced by different variables such as age, the preschool program in general, and the moral education program.

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One can discern in Table 8 a change between pretest and post-test in the direction of the attainment of some consideration of sharing (Level 3 and Level 4). In the post-test, every child except Dc attained Level 3 or above on two of three measures on moral reasoning. It is reasonable to suppose that the attainment and use of these two sharing levels may be a crucial hurdle in moral development during the preschool years, and may appropriately form a primary goal of any program of moral education in a preschool setting. More research is needed.

Moral Behaviour

The sequence of levels in moral behaviour was formulated separately and then merged with the levels of moral reasoning to form one instrument. The direction of movement was again upwards between pretest and post-test for six children, two children moved in the other direction, and one stayed still. (See Table 8).

There is only one score, i.e., a pretest or a post-test score, for many children since they were scored only if involved in moral conflict situations during the observations of critical events. There is no measure of moral behaviour in ordinary social interactions where quarrels were not apparent.

The amount of change that took place is difficult to interpret for the reasons discussed above. It does not exceed two levels but there is no systematic record of what level most children reached in spontaneous sharing which did not start with any

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conflict. As stated earlier, there is no reason to support that the intervals between levels are of equal size. We cannot assume that the time taken to move from one level to another is generally the same either for one child across different levels or for all children. The full-morning observations of four children only, which included the peers with whom they were involved, suggested that the level of moral reasoning and behaviour of some children was several levels higher in situations involving sharing where there was no overt conflict. This might logically be expected.

Relationships Between Moral Reasoning and Behaviour

The fact that it was found that the one measuring tool could be constructed and used with reliable results to measure both reasoning and behaviour suggests structural correspondences between children's hypothetical moral reasoning and their natural behaviour in peer conflicts involving fairness. This is consistent with Kohlberg's claims of a relationship between moral judgment and behaviour.

One can compare the reasoning and behaviour profiles of Li (highest) and Dc (lowest) and Si (in between) and see the correspondence between hypothetical reasoning and natural behaviour. (See Tables 8 and 9).

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Child Li

Li, who had the outstanding high profile for moral reasoning levels at the post-test (Levels 6, 7) also reached the highest level in the sample of moral behaviour (Level 4). Furthermore, she had the highest score for spontaneous co-operative peer interaction in play, on the pretest, and one of the highest on the post-test.

Li judged restitution to be important in the Piagetian-type dilemma, at both pretest and post-test. She was scored as wavering between Intention and Consequences in making a moral judgment in Dilemma 3 but the transcript shows that her wavering between criteria was of a different type to the others. The other children (rightly) scored as Wavering were choosing first one criteria, then another, e.g. "He's the unfairest because he knocked them all down. WHAT ABOUT THIS ONE WHO KNOCKED JUST ONE? He's the unfairest. WHY? 'Cause he did it on purpose. WHICH ONE WAS THE MOST UNFAIR? Him (points to first choice)."

Li, on the other hand, was trying to take account of both criteria together, e.g., "I think it's her. SHE KNOCKED ONE OFF ON PURPOSE. Yes. THIS OTHER ONE KNOCKED THEM ALL OFF, ACCIDENTLY. Yes. I think it's her ... no ... they both are. WHY? Because this one knocked a little bit on purpose and this one knocked a lot but didn't mean to. They both are unfair. THEY WERE BOTH UNFAIR YOU SAY, WHICH ONE WAS THE MOST UNFAIR? They both were. YOU'RE SURE? Yes, they both were."

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Li was the only child to reason in this way.

Child Dc

The Moral Reasoning pretest scores for Dc were 0, 0, 0, i.e. all at the lowest level (Level 0). His post-test scores were 0, 0, 3, making him the only child to obtain a Level 0 score on any post-test moral reasoning measure.

Dc also scored at Level 0 on the pretest moral behaviour in spontaneous situations. Unfortunately, in the post-test period he was not observed to have been involved in any of the moral conflict events so we do not have a score for him. However, this lack of a score tells its own story when viewed alongside his Social Interaction scores.

Dc's scores on social interaction, as measured by the amount of Solo, Parallel and Co-operative Play, show a high level of solo play, very little parallel play and a low level of co-operative play, in comparison with peers. (See Table 8).

We can therefore interpret the absence of a score on the Moral Behaviour measure as showing that Dc was not involved in the critical events, i.e. peer conflict, because he probably chose to play alone to a high degree. If he had had no score on the conflict events (Moral Behaviour), together with a high score for spontaneous co-operative interaction with peers, then the interpretation might have been that he functioned at a high level in moral behaviour.

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But this was not the case with Dc; reading across his scores, and interpreting them as a network of information, the picture is very clear. One needs to notice that he did make some gains: on Dilemma 2 his score rose to Level 3 on the post-test, and on Dilemma 3 he progressed from a Wavering position to one where he judged in terms of Intention, and from a "no" to a "yes" in the consideration of restitution. (See Table 9).

Child Si

A different pattern of correspondence between levels of moral reasoning and behaviour can be seen in the case of Si. Si scored low on both reasoning (Level 1, 1, 1) and behaviour (Level 1) in the pretest. In the post-test scores one can see (Table 8) that he made a respectable gain and a similar-sized gain in both areas (Levels 3, 4, 4, on Reasoning and Level 3 on Behaviour). Over the same period, Si retained a comparatively high score on solo play but shifted markedly in increasing his co-operative play score. The increase comes about through his previous parallel level of play being developed into more co-operative interaction with peers. On Dilemma 3 (Table 9) Si was already considering restitution at the pretest and retained that, while he moved from Wavering to the consideration of Intention over Consequences.

So, here again, much useful information about a child's moral development over a half-year period has been obtained from raw score data.

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The assumption has been made in Kohlberg's theory that a particular level of moral reasoning is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for a particular level of moral behaviour. We will now look at this aspect of the relationship between reason and action in the light of the present data.

The data are consistent with this assumption since no child has a score for spontaneous behaviour that is higher than his reasoning score. However, in view of the gaps that have already been discussed in the data for spontaneous behaviour, it would be going too far to say that the data supports this assumption.

The review of literature revealed that the relationship between reasoning and behaviour is influenced not only by hypothetical versus real-life factors but also by first-person versus third-person factors.

When some of the children perceived themselves as suffering disadvantage from their own reasoning, they displayed strong motivation to change that reasoning. When they were reasoning about third person situations they dealt with contradictions, or injustices to one party, by a kind of shrug which seemed to say, "Well, that's just the way things are." When challenged about the fairness of their choices they typically fell back on an acceptance of their own limitations of reasoning, e.g. "I don't know"; "That's all I know about

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that; tell me another story." However, when children were talking about themselves and relating incidents in which they had been personally involved, they appeared to mentally stretch themselves to attempt to overcome any disequilibrium between their reasoning and a sense of the rightness of their reasoning, e.g., "Well, that would be fair but it's not really fair to me ... I think ... no ... well, it's not really fair. HOW IS IT NOT FAIR? Well, it's a little bit fair and a little bit not fair. TELL ME MORE. It's fair to him but it's not fair to me. HOW COULD YOU MAKE IT FAIR TO BOTH? You could ... I'm thinking ... you could ... I know, but I've forgotten. THINK SOME MORE. You could ask your mother."

The child above appears to be foreshadowing a move to a higher level of moral reasoning. He is not satisfied with his own solution - it is "fair" yet it does not feel right to him, so he puts real effort into reaching a solution that will allow him to transcend the contradiction. He does not quite reach the new level but he appears to feel that it exists. When he says, "I know but I've forgotten", in this context, he seems to be expressing difficulty over verbally formulating his ideas, rather than to be referring to an earlier (lower) level of thinking. When he says, "You could ask your mother" he may be falling back to a simpler level of morality as obedience to authority but it seems just as likely, in the context, that he is expressing something of the characteristic that Turiel (1973) found in the moral stage

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transition of older subjects, viz., that the next highest stage of moral reasoning can be comprehended and affirmed by subjects as superior moral reasoning, even when it cannot yet be expressed clearly by the subjects.

In some cases a child's highest level of reasoning, in real-life situations, leads him or her to reasoning which is unsatisfactory to the self, e.g., the child "knows" he or she ought to share but strongly desires not to. One possibility then is for the child to regress, in the short-term, to the use of a lower level of reasoning which matches the action which he or she either has just performed or very strongly desires to perform. This might be viewed as regression in the service of equilibrium between action and reason. Just how frequently this occurs we cannot say from the data. Equilibrium may operate in many ways: to raise or lower reason or to raise or lower behaviour. It may be that the priority of reasoning or acting exerts the greatest influence on which way the balance goes. For example:

> Bill is angry with his mother. He kicks Peter as he passes then says, "He was looking at me" as justification for the kicking (low level reasoning follows low action).
>
> On another occasion, previously, the teacher had talked to three boys, including Bill, about the need to respect the work of others and take care in the block building space indoors.
>
> Bill makes a large exciting building which begins

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to threaten to fall on the "ship" being constructed near him. The shipbuilders repeat the teacher's reasoning, "You have to build yours so's our's OK". Bill replies, "You have to not knock mine too". "OK". Bill then carefully takes a couple of blocks off the top and spreads them out at the base.

Teacher's Comment:
Action higher than Bill's usual level follows his use of reasoning higher than usual.

Finally, in looking at relationships between reason and behaviour, one can see on Table 8 that high and low social participation rates do appear to be linked to differences on the moral reasoning and behaviour levels, particularly in relation to the extremes, i.e. the very high scorers across all levels and the very low scorers. (See previous discussion on the scores of Li and Dc).

The link between high levels of co-operative play and high levels of fairness offers some support for Rest's (1980) conceptualization of a link between levels of fairness and levels of co-operation.

The problem area of the relationships between moral reasoning and moral behaviour is a crucial area in moral education and needs more research.

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Measuring Methods and Instruments

The hypothetical moral dilemma interview was effective as a method of gathering information about the moral reasoning of young children. The content was made meaningful by taking it from frequently observed real-life events.

The method did appear to elicit children's highest modes of judgment as judged by the fact that no higher levels were obtained for individuals from the observations of spontaneous reasoning.

Reliability between scorers was high (see Chapter 3).

Evidence that the interview material was of interest was demonstrated at the beginning of the second round of interviews. Protocols show that the response of children to the repeat of the stories and to the equipment was good, e.g. "I remember this." Protocols also show that the remembrance did not result in the same answers being given pretest and posttest.

The sequence of levels used for scoring was found to be just as useful and reliable in scoring incidents of real-life behaviour as it was in scoring hypothetical dilemma responses.

The use of a battery of measures, as presented in Table 8, did enable useful profiles of individual children to be compiled.

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The usefulness of the natural method of observation was supported by the richness of data. The preschool is a natural setting for the children who attend. It was found that the observations of spontaneous social interactions could be made in a non-intrusive manner, even on the occasions when the observer could also be observed by the children, i.e. in the playground. A researcher can act in a manner that is very similar to that of other adults to whom the preschool children are accustomed, e.g. teachers taking notes as part of their normal teaching role.

Table 10 is an example of basic descriptive data which could only be gathered by a natural method. Table 10 throws some light on the question, "What kind of moral problems do children actually encounter in their ordinary real-life experience?" We have little knowledge of this very basic question. The 54 categories chosen after examining the data covered all the observed incidents of social conflict. There were no incidents which were difficult to fit into the above scheme. It is important to notice that the data relates only to the preschool experience, not the home experience, of these children, and only to conflicts with peers, not with adults.

The first category, noxious actions against another person's body, accounts for approximately forty per cent of the conflicts observed, and interference with the activity of another child and noxious action against another person's self image account for approximately twenty-two per cent of the

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total incidents. It is possible that behaviour giving rise to an incident was not observed, e.g. child A might make a quiet derogatory remark about child B's painting and child B might respond by punching child A. The observer might notice the incident only at the time of the physical action.

The very low number of incidents of conflicts arising from refusal to share may be related to the emphasis on sharing that was being given in this preschool at the time data were collected.

The Moral Education Program, the final problem area identified at the end of Chapter 1, is described in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER SIX

MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAM

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The moral education program is to be reported more fully in a publication that will be directed particularly to teachers. Here, some account will be given to lead to the presentation and discussion of the model formulated for making use of spontaneous peer conflicts, as they arise in a preschool setting, to further the moral development of the children. The moral education program was envisaged as part of the total educational curriculum of the preschool.

RATIONALE

The rationale of the program was to engage with teachers in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of a model of preschool moral education based on the cognitive-development theory of moral development, and to explore the questions:

i. can a model of moral education be formulated which focuses, as its main method, on exposure of participants to cognitive challenge within real-life peer-conflict situations as these naturally occur (rather than discussion of hypothetical or third person events)?

ii. will in-service training enable preschool teachers to become effective in planning, implementing and evaluating such a moral education program?

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iii. can a cognitive-development model of moral education be implemented within the existing aims and structure of a traditional preschool program without any major changes to those aims and structure? In this context, a traditional preschool program refers to a broadly based developmental approach in which the aims show a concern with holistic development, individual differences, rational autonomy, and child-centred methods.

iv. can such a model of preschool moral education not only focus on the development of moral reasoning but also on the development of strong links between such reasoning and behaviour? Can it provide opportunities to stimulate children to act according to their own highest level of moral judgment?

The moral education program had a two-pronged structure:

i. the researcher's work with teachers in the regular in-service teachers' seminars;

ii. the teachers' daily work with children, of which recordings were made in the teachers' diaries and which formed the main basis of discussion in the teachers' seminars.

Observations carried out by the researcher, to provide data for other parts of the total investigation, were not introduced into discussion in the teachers' seminars.

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TEACHERS' SEMINARS

Purposes

To provide regular opportunities for teachers, the director of the preschool centre, and the chief researcher to:

i. gain additional knowledge of theories of moral development and research findings;

ii. establish goals in moral education: both broad goals that would apply to all children in the group and specific goals for individuals;

iii. derive broad plans and specific teaching strategies that might be expected to lead to the achievement of the goals;

iv. assess the implementation of the plan and the results in an on-going fashion. Through discussion of the recordings in the teachers' diaries, to assess the match between intentions and how children and teachers were actually behaving in the classroom, and to plan any modifications deemed necessary.

Format

Ten sessions of two hours' duration took place during the period of the project.

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All participants attended all sessions.

The first seminar involved a theoretical study of moral development. Reference material was provided and left for private study.

In the following eight sessions, theoretical issues were clarified by the researcher as the need arose out of discussion. The main focus was on the planning and evaluation of teaching strategies, and the evaluation of the progress of children and teachers on the basis of the diary entries.

The final session involved an evaluation by teachers of what had been the gains from the program, what modifications needed to be made, and what would be carried over into the work with a new group of children in the following year.

The general pattern in the teachers' seminars was for each teacher to read all her diary entries from the two or three weeks since the previous seminar and then to select particular entries or points for group discussion.

There was a link in both theory and practice between the method of teaching used by the researcher with teachers and that used by the teachers with children. The method in both cases was of cognitive challenge matched to include thinking one step above that at which a person was presently operating in a real-life event; the exploration, through thinking, of more than one solu-

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tion to a problem; the making of a decision on how to act; the carrying out of the decision; and the examination of consequences.

The articulation, in the teachers' seminars, of the similarity in the method of teaching and learning used with both children and teachers, was of help to teachers in developing their skills with the method; teachers were experiencing the method subjectively, as learners, over the same period in which they were implementing it with children. A teacher would present an entry from her own teacher's diary of a naturally-arising peer conflict in which she had intervened. Discussion of the entry would include two perspectives:

i. behaviour of children: what was revealed about the moral thinking and behaviour of each child involved? How did this match with previous entries for a particular child? Was there evidence of development, of regression, or of persistent areas of difficulty? What implications followed for encouraging the moral development of particular children and of the group as a whole?

ii. behaviour of the teacher: what was revealed in relation to the development of skills in encouraging children's moral development? What alternatives might be tried?

TEACHING STRATEGIES

Teachers in the moral education program did not think of

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education as something that occurred at a set time, in a set place, or when they used special material. The program was, from the beginning, based on the assumption that the best approach to moral education in early childhood was to use the natural dilemmas that arise in the preschool. The way of working within those naturally occurring situations was carefully articulated, by researcher and teachers, as the program proceeded but the methods were incorporated incidently into the program as situations arose spontaneously, often with some follow-up planned after the event.

The main continuing objective for teachers was to promote the opportunities, occurring in spontaneously-arising peer conflict situations, for exposure of a child to moral reasoning about justice/fairness which would include relevant factors in the situation which the child was not (unaided) taking into account. The approach was to take the naturally occurring conflict in social interaction and add a specific learning dimension to the children's spontaneous activities. The first and most radical step for many of the teachers was to value the quarrelling and fights of young children as, potentially, a very strong motivation for learning. Children in the program were given a very clear message that inherent in the valuing of conflict was the expectation that they should attempt to meet the needs of others as well as their own needs. Conflict was valued not in its own right but insofar as it could be used for the development of all parties. The use of real-life conflict, as it happened, helped provide the affect which must be engaged if moral action

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is to be linked to moral judgment.

It will be remembered that there emerged from the pilot studies a strong impression that teachers themselves did not understand well the concept of conflict as a facilitating factor in developmental theory. The teaching program was, therefore, designed as a dual exercise with children and teachers, to exploit the potential of conflict of ideas and action and to facilitate change in both children and teachers.

There was no attempt on the part of teachers to assign each child to a particular level or stage of moral reasoning and to attempt then to expose him or her systematically to the next highest stage reasoning. Rather, a teacher intervened to promote discussion of each particular conflict as it occurred, to encourage children to explore the situation, including the exploration of more than one proposed solution, from the perspective of each participant. In so doing, the teacher tried to take notice of whether or not each participant appeared to be exposed to reasoning that was, broadly speaking, above his or her present level of functioning in that specific situation. If this stimulus was not supplied by other children (either participants or bystanders) then the teacher contributed reasoning at the required level. Such exposure was, therefore, related to the level at which the child was reasoning at that time and place, rather than matched to a pre-assigned score for the child.

Diary entries reveal a gradual change in the teachers' beha-

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viour. As the moral education program progressed, they contributed more to structuring the process of finding resolutions, rather than to the direct quick provision of solutions. A teacher's role in peer conflicts increasingly emerged, in the teachers' seminars, as that of leading the children through the steps in the process of reaching a fair resolution: reminding children that they needed to hear each participant's perspective on a problem situation; showing acceptance that different perspectives could result in contradictory accounts; encouraging the presentation and exploration of alternative solutions; and summarising the proferred solutions to help participants weigh them and choose one.

The researcher's discussions with teachers and her observations of their behaviour (with their permission) resulted in the emergence of a model for working on spontaneous conflicts about fairness with children of four and five years of age in a preschool environment, with the aim of facilitating the development of moral reasoning and behaviour. This model reflects the emphasis on the teaching and learning of steps in the process of arriving at just solutions rather than the giving of right rules of morality. It has been used with hundreds of teachers in workshop seminars. The model is presented in the form in which it is now used with teachers.

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TEACHING-LEARNING MODEL

This model provides steps in the process of dealing with naturally-arising social conflict between children 4-5 years of age, in a preschool environment, to facilitate the development of moral reasoning and behaviour.

1. Identification and Acceptance of Conflict Situation

1.1 Halt any physical or verbal aggression or physical struggle for possession.

1.2 Recognize and accept the conflict situation and call for deliberation by all participants.

Defuse any guilt of children about being involved in conflict by an attitude that some conflict is a natural part of social interaction and learning how to deal fairly in conflict situations is valuable and interesting learning.

Examples: There seems to be a problem here; let's sort it out. Don't run away, Bill, we need your thinking too.

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2. Description of Incident

2.1 Obtain a description of the incident from the perspective of each participant, including feelings and intentions, and lead-in events. Express value of each perspective as a contribution to the total description, even when contradictory.

2.2 Support by showing respect and empathy for each participant, e.g. by touch, and, if necessary, by helping participant with his or her verbal expression. In cases where a participant is unable to express his or her own point of view, the teacher may encourage a bystander (a child who has watched the incident but is not involved) to do so, or may do so herself.

2.3 Encourage each to listen to other's description in turn, without interruption and contradiction. Avoid the impression that there is one true description from one perspective only.

2.4 Summarize the sequence of events described, including the feelings and intentions.

Example: You tell us first, Bill, how do you see what happened here ... Yes. Now we'll all listen to John. Bill sees it this way ... and John sees it this way.

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3. Exploration of Range of Alternatives

3.1 Encourage participants to think of more than one tentative solution without judging the proposals at this stage.

Example: Let's all think of some ways to handle this.

3.2 Help participants verbally express alternatives, in turn, whilst others listen, and acknowledge each contribution.

Example: John has suggested that you might ...; now we'll listen to Bill's ideas.

3.3 Provide opportunities for further contributions from participants and observers.

Example: Yes, we've thought about doing ... and ... Does anyone have another idea?

If participants do not express alternatives, the teacher may invite bystanders to do so.

Example: Let's ask Jane if she can think of anything.

If no alternatives are offered, the teacher may offer some of her own ideas. She should always seek more than one idea so that her suggestions are not accepted

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too readily on the basis of her authority, thus foreclosing the reasoning process. She may prompt the children with clues, to stimulate them to see other possibilities for themselves, rather than give her own alternatives.

Example: What about the basket; perhaps that could be moved; how?

The teacher's responsibility is to see that, in the set of alternatives presented, there is at least one which involves a cognitive challenge stretching the child's thinking.

4. Reasoning about Alternatives

4.1 Recall set of alternatives offered. Summarize them as several main options. At first, two alternatives may be as many as children can consider together; later three.

4.2 Encourage participants and observers to reason about alternatives, using the concept of fair. Recognize each child's contribution. Stretch their reasoning to a higher level by questioning which brings out contradictions. Avoid giving the impression that there is only one fair solution.

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4.3 Encourage children to think of physical and emotional consequences, drawing on their past experiences.

Example: Would that be fair to Bill ... to John? You think not; in what way is it fair and not fair? That's an interesting thought. What if ... happened; would that make it fairer? Why?

5. Choice of Action

5.1 Seek a decision from participants; ask for mutual choice on the action to be taken in the light of the previous reasoning. Do not seek an absolute solution based on the notion of the existence of one right answer to the problem; rather, seek a choice of one of several possible fair solutions.

Example: O.K. Now you two decide what you both want to do.

5.2 Accept agreed-upon solution if reached by consensus of participants. Even if it would not be her preferred decision the teacher should accept it, unless she judges it detrimental to the further development of any participant. If detrimental, or if participants cannot reach a decision, go back to step 3 - Exploration of Alternatives.

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Example: Are you sure that's fair enough to John? He needs a turn to be leader sometimes. Can you think of another way that will give him a go, too?

5.3 Obtain from each participant ratification of the decision, and reinforce the act of mutual decision making.

Example: Is that O.K. with you? Do you think that's about the fairest for you both? You've done good thinking.

6. Carrying-out of Action

6.1 Encourage children to observe consequences.

Example: Now you can see how it works out.

6.2 Expect participants to act in accordance with the decision. If necessary, hold child to his decision and uphold the agreed-upon action. If dissatisfaction is expressed after a trial, expect participants to go back to Exploration of Alternatives, with or without help from teacher.

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6.3 Reinforce carrying-out of action, immediately, if judged appropriate, with smile, comment or display of interest. Such extrinsic reward is not always necessary especially when the action is seen to bring satisfaction to the participants.

7. Follow-up

Facilitate further reasoning and empathy, if judged appropriate, by a variety of follow-up methods later, including one or more of the following:
puppet-plays, role-playing, stories, discussion, and recalling the incident when a similar one arises.
Such follow-up work may focus on some of the following: further practice with this type of problem in a less emotionally-charged atmosphere; seeing relationships between different moral problems; practising verbal skills of assertion, request, etc.; reasoning and feeling from the perspective of one's antagonist by taking his or her role; taking two perspectives on one incident (as when a child has a puppet participant in each hand, or when he or she plays first one role then the other); examining consequences from different decisions (as when a conflict-situation is played out several times with variations).

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Notes on the Model

1. Similar strategy for children or adults:

The main steps in the strategy for dealing with moral-conflict situations are the same for the children as for the teacher who intervenes. Hence, a process is being learned whereby children can eventually solve their own conflicts with peers, without adult help.

Example from teacher's diary:

Two boys are arguing about blocks and the teacher moves near.

Bob: This is a boy's problem; we don't need you.

Teacher: Can you settle it fairly for both?

Both children: Yeah, go away, we can manage.

Teacher: O.K., that's good.

The same strategy can also be employed in many adult-child conflicts.

2. Knowledge of development:

A teaching using this strategy needs some knowledge of moral development in children. However, the teacher does not need to be able to identify a particular child as being at a particular stage of moral development, in order to facilitate development by the use of this model. The teacher exposes all participants to cognitive challenge at the step of Reasoning about Alternatives, confronting them with thinking

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at a higher level to the thinking they are displaying in this particular situation.

3. Sequencing:

A teacher using this strategy needs to understand the logical sequences of steps. However, in the natural situation, elements within steps may follow a different sequence according to the transactions which take place. The sequence of the main steps is considered important and should not be altered. Children may at first find it difficult to separate Exploration of Range of Alternatives from Reasoning about Alternatives. The teacher is advised to work towards the differentiation of these two steps so as to encourage confidence and breadth in seeking alternatives and to discourage too-hasty settlement on one solution.

Example: We'll come to that in a minute, Jane, but first let's get some other ideas. Then we can work out which seems fairest.

4. Support:

If a child has difficulty staying in the discussion situation through feelings of guilt or threat, or lack of confidence, the physical support of the teacher through touch is often effective. Likewise, a friendly arm around each of the two antagonists will often help them to remain face-to-face.

Figure 6 summarizes the steps in the model.

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FIGURE 6

Model of strategy for dealing with naturally-arising moral conflict situations.



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WORKING WITH THE MODEL

Scoring

It is worth repeating that to implement this approach to moral education in a preschool setting, it was not necessary at any time for teachers to assign moral scores to children. Detailed assessment of children was deliberately not undertaken in this part of the total research project to avoid contamination of data from other parts. Furthermore, one of the important questions to be considered was whether teachers could learn to use a cognitive-developmental approach to moral education without learning to score children's responses in a strict Kohlbergian manner which involves a great deal of training.

It was necessary that teachers understood the sequence of stages of moral development, and that they developed through field practice the skill to use the content of any particular moral conflict on the spot, to encourage or construct challenges at the next step (rather than strict 'stage') for each participant.

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Teachers' Diaries

The following illustration is from a teacher's diary.

Two children are fighting over a basketful of small blocks.

Teacher: There seems to be a problem here.

Adrian: I want it (on my side of the table).

James: I had it first. I put it in the middle and I let him share it.

Adrian: I want it.

Teacher: James is willing to let you share it.

Adrian: I want it here, I can't reach there.

Teacher: Would that be fair, Adrian, if you had it always at your side?

Adrian: Yes.

Teacher: Would it be fair to James if you always had it on your side, then he couldn't reach it? Is that fair?

Adrian: No.

Teacher: Can you think of anything else you could do that would be fair to you both?

Adrian: No.

Teacher: Think hard.

James: He could come round this side of the table and I'll move up.

Teacher: That's a good suggestion. Then you could both reach. What do you choose, Adrian - basket in the

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middle, or you bring your chair around here?

Adrian moves his chair without saying anything.

Teacher: Now you can both reach, it's fair to you both and everyone's happy. Good thinking!

The above example, which occurred halfway through the program (after three months) demonstrates some weaknesses still in the teacher's mastery of an ability teachers saw to be important but found difficult, i.e., the ability to hold back their own suggestions to avoid racing in with teacher-solutions and so to avoid short-circuiting the children's own moral problem solving. Diary recordings revealed very clearly that once the teacher offered a suggestion it was very difficult to get alternatives from the children. The teacher's solution would be accepted as the 'right' answer.

Evidence to suggest that the moral education program was fulfilling its aim of helping children to learn the process of arriving at fair solutions is also recorded in the teachers' diaries. The diary entries show an increasingly greater participation by the children themselves, over the time of the program, in the putting forward of alternative solutions and the weighing of them to reach a fair solution. This occurs concurrently with an increase on the part of the teachers in their ability to withhold their own suggestions until after they have tried to draw out suggestions from the children. In cases where children seemed to be ignoring important aspects of a situation, teachers

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developed increased skill in getting children to consider these aspects by questioning them rather than by teachers making direct proposals about solutions. An October entry describes a situation very like a July entry, where one child hits another because the second child keeps leaving the play. In July, the teacher gets the first child to agree that his action is not fair and suggests to the second child that he tell the other that he is intending to come back. In October, the teacher gives no direct solutions in this type of situation, but stimulates the two children to propose and discuss four different things that could be said or done if the problem recurs.

Another incident recorded three months after the moral education program began, was taken by teachers as exciting evidence that the new emphasis on teaching children the process of solving moral conflicts, rather than on supplying them with a solution, was producing results.

> Two children are arguing about blocks in a joint building and the teacher moves near.
>
> Teacher: You seem to have a problem here. What happened?
>
> Both: This is a boy's problem; we don't need you.
>
> Teacher: Can you settle it fairly or not?
>
> Both: Yeah, go away, we can manage.
>
> Teacher: O.K. That's good.
>
> Teacher comes back later and finds both boys are working on separate buildings.
>
> Teacher: I see you settled your problem this way.

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James: Yes, he was too rough so I told him he'd have to work alone.

Teacher: Was that fair to you, Bob?

Bob: Yeah, I was too rough for him.

In the teachers' seminars, any diary incident was explored from more than one perspective, alternative ways of behaving in the situation were discussed, and the possible consequences for children's moral learning were explored. Teachers were their own best critics in this type of situation. They saw value in the method which involved making their own records on the spot, then coming back to review these recordings a week or so later, with colleagues, from a more objective perspective.

Teachers' diaries were private; teachers were invited to reveal in seminars only those incidents they wished to share with their colleagues. At the completion of the project, the teachers decided to give the diaries, containing a total of 104 entries, to the researcher for use in describing the project and for further possible use in the education of other teachers in the moral education of preschool children. In addition to the immediate record of conflict situations, the diaries contain notes added by the teachers during seminars, which suggest alternative behaviours for themselves and further points to be noted by observation of the children who featured in the incidents. See Appendix 4 for extracts from teachers' diaries.

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Not every incident that occurred was recorded by teachers. Sometimes other events had priority in the teacher's work. However, as the worth of the technique became apparent, the number of entries increased.

The method of teachers' diary recordings proved valuable for teachers to see not only their own development but that of individual children. For example, at one seminar there was discussion by teachers over Jules, who was frequently involved in conflicts through grabbing what he wanted. Teachers expressed doubt that this child was making any gains in moral development. When a teacher entered a conflict situation in which he was involved with another child, Jules typically tried to run and hide, returning after the teacher's departure to grab again. In accordance with the strategies adopted by teachers in the moral education program, it was being firmly expected that Jules stay in the situation when the problem was being discussed. Jules stayed reluctantly, turned his back on other persons present and did not appear to listen to them. Several diary entries made three weeks previous to the seminar discussion were presented for examination. There did appear to be some evidence of a slight gain in his level of behaviour in that he sometimes tried to justify his behaviour instead of just running away, but the justifications were simply at the level of his own desire, i.e. "I want it". The teachers' seminar proceeded with consideration of later entries recording the behaviour of other children. In one conflict in which Jules was not involved, he was a bystander, watching what was going on.

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The second conflict was very similar in structure to one in which Jules had been involved two weeks previously, although the object in dispute was different. When the teacher asked for different ideas about how the conflict might be fairly resolved, the participants in the dispute were slow in replying. Then Jules, as bystander, said, "They could do this." The suggestion made by Jules was identical to a suggestion made to him by the teacher in the conflict situation two weeks previously in which he had been involved but in which he did not appear to be willing to listen to any talk about fair solutions. The wording of Jules' contribution was so similar to the teacher's previous contribution that it seemed probable he had remembered it and been able to apply it in a fresh situation. The situation in which he applied it was not one in which he was physically or emotionally involved and it seemed a reasonable interpretation that this more objective perspective made it easier for him to apply his learning.

Discussion of these diary entries provided strong encouragement to the teachers in their new ways of working towards the moral development of children. It was hoped that a future diary record might show Jules reasoning at the same level, and behaving in accordance with his reasoning, in a situation where he was directly involved in a moral dilemma. Such an entry was not obtained. However, analysis of the data from the research interviews and critical events observations (which were not discussed with teachers) revealed that Jules made substantial gains between pretest and post-test; his highest level of reasoning about fairness moved from Level 1 (own desires) to Level 4 (equal share).

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It is not possible to assign these gains to the effect of the moral education program. However, teachers' responses were unanimous in accrediting the moral education program with gains in teachers' own recognition and understanding of steps in the moral development of individual children such as had been revealed by discussing the diary entries above, which they would not otherwise have been able to recognize. They also recognized gains in their own knowledge and skills which they considered useful in helping them to stimulate and reinforce a progression of such steps in preschool children.

Role of Bystander

The incident reported above, of a child's reasoning when he was a bystander in a moral conflict, made teachers and researchers alike more aware of the potential for learning that was often present in a bystander's position. It had been noted in the pilot studies that non-involved onlookers, in situations where "Might is Right" prevailed, were probably receiving vicarious reinforcement of this low level of moral reasoning and behaviour. The positive contribution of bystanders was now given more attention. Teaching strategies in the present moral education program gradually moved towards not only accepting for consideration the contribution of bystanders but actually encouraging them to contribute their thinking. It was felt that this not only gave bystanders an opportunity for further exercise of their own moral reasoning, in situations where they could possibly be more objective than in their own conflicts because they were less emotionally involved,

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but it also gave participants in the conflict an opportunity to listen to, and consider, alternatives brought forward by their peer observers, thus increasing participants' perspectives on the conflict situation and its possible fair resolution. Peers could often provide the cognitive challenge to the next highest level of reasoning. As bystanders contributed more, teachers were able to offer less in terms of suggesting solutions, thus avoiding the problem of children adopting the teachers' ideas without thinking for themselves.

Blame-guilt Orientation

The naturally-occurring moral conflict situations provided high emotional involvement for participants. The affective dimension was involved not only as a motivational factor but also in terms of attitude learning. It was noticed that many children originally approached social conflict situations with a strong "blame-guilt" orientation. This was revealed through focus on establishing blame rather than on attempting to find a solution. Furthermore, it was found to be not unusual for a child to back out of a situation in a way unfair to himself or herself, seemingly with associations of guilt at having been involved in social conflict. Teachers' records show that most children gradually learnt to approach these situations from a different orientation, which viewed conflict of interests as an interesting and important part of social life. That attitude change appeared to be a first step in defusing the blame-guilt orientation and providing a more neutral setting in which they could bring their highest moral

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reasoning into play.

Puppet Play

In contrast to the naturally-occuring conflict situations, the teachers presented role-playing situations involving the use of finger-puppets. These provided opportunities to play over natural conflict situations. In puppet play the original participants had the opportunity to reconsider the situation from a less emotionally involved position and sometimes were able to take the perspective of one of the other players in a puppet situation, in a way they could not do when the other perspective seemed opposed to their own urgent needs or desires in the real-life situation. The puppet situation thus provided opportunities for the taking of a more objective, rational stance. It had, of course, the disadvantage that there was not as strongly evident a link between moral reasoning and the carrying over of this reasoning into the children's own actions. By using both situations (naturally-occurring and simulated) and by repeating the natural conflicts in the simulated situation, an attempt was made to gain the strengths of both methods. The same type of conflict which had been observed to rise naturally, could be repeated many times (with or without slight variations of content) in the puppet situation. It was found to be not difficult to keep the interest of the children (even when the content remained the same) by, for example, slight variation in the characters (using different puppets). Thus the repeated puppet situation allowed both for reinforcement of learning through practice and for the taking of different perspectives

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by the original participators in the original conflict situation.

Puppet play (or other simulation) also provided an opportunity to finish naturally-occurring conflict situations which may have been left unfinished or not completely explored, due to the teacher having been busy elsewhere, pressure of time, tiredness of children, etc. Furthermore, it provided an opportunity for teachers to introduce aspects of the fairness concept, which had not yet arisen naturally, which teachers wished to raise for teaching purposes and/or for exploration of the children's reasoning. In summary, the puppet play was found to be particularly useful to facilitate further exploration of:

i) unresolved conflicts;

ii) commonly occurring conflicts;

iii) conflicts where one child (or more) was having difficulty in accepting his or her own feelings or in accepting the resolution of the group.

The content of the puppet plays was taken from the preschool group's real-life conflicts, although this was not stated to the children, and names of characters were changed. The stories were therefore one step removed from reality but they were firmly grounded in the experiences of these children. Using small finger puppets, the teacher told a story to a group of three or four children to the point where two or more characters were involved in a conflict. The teacher then posed the problem of what to do to be fair. She gave different puppet characters to different children, in turn, so that a variety of choices was presented

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and each choice weighed.

The children participating in puppet-plays could role-play the various solutions, exploring them without having to reach a solution. There were no unpleasant consequences or loss of self-esteem to a child if his or her solution was not adopted by others and, in fact, a child might himself or herself propose two or more different finishes to the story. Using puppets in this way it appeared as if the pre-operational children could look down on the whole operation of a peer conflict more easily than in the real-life situation. It seemed to be enabling them, to some extent, to practice the cognitive process of reversibility, to see what might happen when they did one thing or another, and to begin to reflect on the relationships between the action of one puppet and another.

This technique is particularly appropriate for allowing children to transform the "shape" of a moral conflict situation, then to go back to the original state and transform it in a different way and some children were highly motivated and engrossed in this activity. In it they are able to combine Bruner's (1966) enactive and iconic modes of representing experience and it may be that there is a particular pleasure in doing so at the preschool age, for this is also the essence of their own spontaneous dramatic play at this age. That is, the children participating in the play are using the puppets to represent other children (iconic representation) on whom they then act themselves as they move the puppets around (enactive representation) and in

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reasoning about it all they also use Bruner's third mode, the symbolic mode, for representing experience. All of this may be going on in the space of only five minutes which was the average length of one puppet play in this project!

Reversibility

Just as children in the puppet play situations could be seen as facilitating the development of cognitive reversibility, so too did the whole strategy of working with children which is represented by Figure 6 appear to stimulate this process. As is generally known through Piagetian theory, the preschool child has difficulty grasping that something, once transformed, can be brought back to its original state. The teaching-learning model presented in this chapter allows one to keep going back to an original state, via the loop, to explore alternatives for action. For example:

> The teacher came over to two children who were fighting over a sandpit bucket. Both claimed the right to possess it on the grounds that he or she had "had it first". So, in the first run through the model, the alternatives the children put up were based on their own claims for sole possession. No consensus on action could emerge from this position. The teacher said, "Well, this is interesting. We can't get anywhere there, can we? Tell you what, let's go back and try to think of some other things you two might do. Now, here's the situation. (She repeats the description of the

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incident). Can you think of ways that would be fairer to both of you?"

Con said, "We could put it away". Teacher: "That's a new idea, what else? You both come up with your best thinking and then you'll have lots of good ideas to choose from."

Encouragement of this kind of looping back may be a very important part of strategies to stimulate moral development in early childhood. It is very often ignored as teachers rush to "resolve" a conflict. The importance of time for learning is discussed later in this chapter.

Multiple Perspective-taking

The encouragement of children to take more than one perspective is strong at two steps in the model. At step 2, the participants describe what happened from their own point of view, and very quickly learn that, when another child gives a different version, this does not necessarily mean that the other child is either lying or attacking the first version. Bystanders too can provide another perspective which is often more all-embracing. The children are learning that events have many facets and this complexity can be of great interest in itself. They often show their interest, or humour, when this point is grasped by them.

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For example:

Jody: You took mine.

Sue: I didn't.

Jody: You did.

Sue: I didn't.

Teacher: Here's a fine to-do! Let's sit down and talk. First, let's listen to Jody, then we'll listen to Sue. Everyone has a chance to talk without interruptions."

Jody: Well, I left my pram there and she came and took it.

Teacher: Did you see her take it? Did you say anything?

Jody: No, she just had it, that's all.

Teacher: Right. Now you, Sue, tell us what happened from your point of view.

Sue: No one was using it.

Jody: I was using it.

Teacher: This is Sue's turn to tell us how she saw things.

Sue: That's all.

Paul: (a bystander) Jody was way over there.

Jody: I was going shopping, silly. (Changing to a high artificial adult voice). I was in the shop and this lady (Sue) came up and saw my pram and thought nobody was using it. She didn't know I was in the shop, did you dear?"

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Reinforcement

Throughout the observations of children and teachers, the concept of reinforcement kept coming to mind as a concept to which cognitive developmentalists need to pay more attention in efforts to understand the links between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. Although the cognitive-development theory focuses on structure rather than content in moral development,it became obvious during this study that it is not possible to teach a young child about fairness outside some content of fair and not fair behaviour. The pre-operational child has to be dealing with concrete events and actual behaviour.

Bateson (1980) has pointed out the power of giving and holding reinforcements as a device that can point up the responses of the learner for the learner's own enlightenment. Although the expression of the importance of content presents difficulties within a structural theory, the problem is far more than simply an abstract semantic exercise and is reflected in the two related practical problems of teacher behaviour which emerged clearly during the pilot studies. Teachers working within a developmental framework did not comprehend the full importance of the giving or withholding of reinforcement in terms of its basic usefulness as pointing to examples of behaviour which were fair or not fair. At the same time as teachers were failing to provide positive feedback on moral behaviour during a helpful fair action, many children appeared to be gaining feedback from the class of past unjust actions which they had "got away with" themselves or seen others succeed with.

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The weight of the negative effects of the practice of unfair action made teacher intervention, when it did occur, appear ineffective. It was too slight in comparison with the negative effects in the environment. Teachers then used the perceived ineffectiveness of their intervention behaviour to justify nonintervention in the next incident. Thus, in the next instance, injustice was reinforced further to add more weight to the learning of injustice at preschool. Clearly, any moral education program had to break this cycle.

The teaching model had built into it, at the first step, a very strong injunction to stop any physical or verbal aggression. The acceptance of the conflict situation was not an acceptance of aggressive behaviour. It was an acceptance that conflict occurs naturally in social interaction and it was tied to a firm expectation that the persons involved would work at resolving the conflict in a just manner.

The teaching model required a pause, which may be expressed as an inhibition of action between stimulus and response. Within this pause there was introduced a new component to be considered, i.e. the justice/fairness of the chosen action. It is difficult for a young child to inhibit action. The success of early childhood moral education may depend on some aspects of the moral component becoming related to different possible actions in such a way that the more just actions, e.g. helping behaviours, carry a positive preference weighting and the unjust actions, e.g. use of violence, carry a negative weighting. More attention must be

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paid in cognitive-developmental research to both the inhibition process for unjust behaviour and the positive performance of just behaviour.

The above can be expressed in behaviourist terms using the concept of reinforcement, or in social learning terms as involving attitudinal learning and modelling.

Rules

Another important concept with which we had to come to grips was that of rules. An action which carries in the mind of the child a rule status, would appear to carry additional weight in making a link between moral judgment and moral behaviour. Teachers tended to be ambivalent about the rule-enforcing part of their role.

At the beginning of the project, teachers felt an awareness of the problems and the confusions which might arise in a moral education program that stimulated four-year-old children to question and challenge the rules and the decisions of their care-giving adults. Respect for adults, respect for rules which must be obeyed (particularly safety rules), and the security feelings of children which are dependent on children's feelings of order, predictability, and protectedness within the preschool group, were felt to be important factors to be preserved.

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It was soon found that discussion between children and teacher, even including challenge and argument by children about a teacher's point of view, did not present a problem in terms of the teacher's authority. It was readily apparent to the children at preschool that the teacher was more experienced and had more responsibility in handling moral issues. In fact, soon some teachers were feeling that the problem went in the opposite direction: that children retained "too much" respect for teachers' contributions and it was considered a red-letter achievement when one teacher recorded in her journal an incident in which the children said to her, "We don't need you, we can settle this ourselves."

What children had learned was not inert knowledge of absolute rigid moral rules: rather, they had begun to learn how to go about making moral decisions, what criteria to consider, how to weigh solutions, and, most of all, they were seen to be gaining confidence in their own knowledge in an appropriate situation, i.e. a situation not too complex to be handled at the children's level of development.

The teacher's authority remained as a resource which the children called on, and as something inherent in her responsibility for the welfare of the whole group of children. "We don't need adults", said Bruce crossly as the teacher came up to see why one child was being physically pushed on the climbing frame. "I think you do, here," said the teacher firmly, "because this is not a safe thing to do and we have a rule about it which you have to

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remember."

The teachers in the project came to view the authority of the teacher as being less of a rule-making authority and more of an upholding of the principle of justice, i.e. respect for each person. However, there must still be clear recognition of the need (in stage theory) for young children to proceed towards the stage of respect for the rules of society. The problem is to help children grow to respect rules in such a way that they will not then remain fixated at that stage of moral development but will be able to move on to higher levels of respect for universal principles (which rules may sometimes contravene).

There is need to do more work to clarify the role of rules in early moral education. Behaviorist and social learning theories may be able to provide helpful insights and tools. According to cognitive-development theory, persons must proceed through the stage of strict upholding of rules for their own sake and, since preschool children are moving up towards this stage, teachers need a lot more help from the theory in understanding what is involved in successful stage transition into, through, then out of this position.

Stage Transition

With the model of moral education presented in this chapter, we are still at the stage of exploring an area which has received very little attention in the literature, viz. the kind of modell-

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ing and hence reinforcement appropriate to each stage level to facilitate movement of the child to the next stage. For example, to facilitate movement from Kohlberg's Stage 1 to Stage 2 it would appear desirable to apply teacher-strategies which focus on hedonistic (Stage 2) rewards, e.g. "It feels good to do this kind of co-operative action because, as you see, it is associated with others then doing the same for you." On the other hand, in facilitating movement from Stage 2 to Stage 3, teacher-strategies should focus away from hedonistic reward to the Stage 3 attitudes of attaching value to the earning of the nice boy/girl label of approval; e.g. "That was a hard thing to do; good boy." The weighting to be attached to the same type of behaviour, at each stage, is thus different. The complexity (and fascination) of this area awaits further research but is obviously of great potential importance in moral education and must not continue to be ignored within the cognitive-development theory.

The functioning of any stage model of moral education in such a way that will lead to development, and not to either fixation or chaos, may be viewed as the achievement of balance between stability and change in each child's development.

The moral teaching of young children involves influencing spontaneous behaviour in highly charged social interaction situations, such as conflicts over possession of a desired object, whilst, at the same time, leaving the new behaviours flexible enough to be modified and reintegrated at the next level of development. One crucial factor of importance that emerged from obser-

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vations, in avoiding either rigidity or chaos, appears to be the number of choices of which the child is made aware.

Weighing Alternatives

The moral education program carried out in this investigation revealed insights to the researcher and to the teachers involved about the pragmatic importance of having at least two alternatives of behaviour for positive consideration at Step 4 in the model. One possible action only does not involve moral reasoning or moral decision-making on the child's part. Furthermore, if the one only is the teacher's choice then the children tend to follow it without question, due to the authority of the teacher. When the teacher is seen to be valuing and considering two actions, both of which have some validity, then he or she is modelling a basic premise of moral education - that moral dilemmas involve reasoning from different perspectives. Three alternatives may be even better in some ways but may be too many for some children to handle at the beginning of the preschool year.

Within this type of moral education program great care should be taken to avoid putting young children into an insecure position of extreme relativity where "anything goes". At the very basic level young children need physical protection from others and perhaps psychological protection from the strength of their own desires. Furthermore, a moral education program must face the extreme relativity problem inherent in a position of non-indoctrination and the present model does this by a clear indication

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that some actions are considered unjust, e.g. violence to other persons, and will not be tolerated in the preschool environment. At the preschool level one cannot fully argue philosophically why this is so. Therefore, a set of problems surrounds the general acceptance, within the cognitive-development approach to moral education, that we are not trying to teach children the one right answer to each moral dilemma but to teach (amongst other things) the methodology of moral inquiry.

It is not clear just what is meant by teaching young children to explore and weigh alternatives as a part of this methodology. Are all alternatives to be considered to be potentially of equal value? What criteria are children to use to weigh them? Kohlberg's stage theory cannot provide, for the questions, answers which are of practical value to teachers since Kohlberg's stages are too broad. Within the moral education program described here, no complete answer emerged to this set of problems. However, I believe that the scale of steps in moral development which was formulated later during this research project, may help in discovering some answers about criteria of choice, on the basis of the criteria which the children used naturally. This will be developed further in a later publication.

Time for Development

Teachers working on the moral development of young children need a respect for time; time in which a child can build up an accumulation of experiences which are going to be involved in the

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major reorganizational process of stage change. Although we conceive of development as continuous, nevertheless any stage theory is assuming a certain discontinuity of change, in the sense of elapsed time between one major stage change and the next. There is very little found in the literature of cognitive- development theory which discusses this essential discontinuity in the perception of development as it is viewed from a stage perspective, and which links this with problems of evaluation of individual progress or of group progress from an educator's point of view. Yet the pilot study showed this long-term lack of understanding of the necessary perspective on change as the root of much confusion. Teachers felt that they should be able to record the same kind of immediate results as can be measured when dealing with the child's acquisition of isolated skills or bits of information.

Moral education can not usefully be planned on a simple model of instruction - child action - corrective feedback - achievement of desired result. Nothing that has been said about the usefulness of some concepts from behaviourism should be taken to indicate that this simple model is supported in this dissertation. There may be areas in moral education in which a fairly simple instructional model has a place, e.g. in the teaching of rules. However, even here it would pose problems of later fixation, raised elsewhere in this chapter. Certainly, the simple instruction model is far too simplistic a model by which to view many of the fundamental tasks in moral education. Moral learning takes time to develop in separate increments at successive moments. We have to understand the micro nature of the process even though

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we cannot spell out all the steps, and we must help develop in teachers sensitivity to the slow complex nature of developmental change.

It is useful to reflect on the earlier illustration in this chapter from the teacher's diary entry about Jules. In very gross steps we can delineate these recorded changes in his development:

1. would not stay in moral conflict situation when adult came up. Ran away. Expressions of guilt.

2. stayed protestingly when teacher insisted verbally and lightly put her arm around him. But turned head aside. Did not speak and appeared not to be listening.

3. stayed and made some justification for his actions at the lowest level of egocentric desire.

4. as a bystander watching a similar peer conflict as at (2) above, reproduced verbally the teacher's suggestion and reasoning from the previous situation.

The above example demonstrates the ongoing nature of the learning and the difficulties of demonstrating the steps of developmentally significant learning by conventional methods of measurement which simply indicate that a child either can or can-

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not produce the "correct" response. The conditions under which a child can (and cannot) produce a "correct" response, i.e. a description of the context, is of vital significance in understanding and evaluating any moral education program as a whole. In another type of moral education program based on different goals and on direct methods of verbal instruction, it is possible that Jules could have learned more quickly to give a correct verbal response to a question about the rightness or wrongness of an action, without there being included in reports on the success of the program any consideration of the need for measures of the degree to which he could and did apply this information in real-life situations.

To apply the learning to a fresh situation must have involved Jules in an operation of great complexity which included:

1. perceiving the situation in terms of the relationships between his own needs and desires, the action of the other children, the attitudes of the others, whether it was a fairness issue or not, etc.;

2. remembering previous situations, judging some to be similar, generalizing from these experiences to the new experience, etc.;

3. looking ahead to the possible consequences of alternative actions, etc.

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The complexity of this accumulative process takes us far beyond a simple feedback model. Teachers gained from exploring such complex patterns, not in terms of being able to or wanting to intervene in all the steps, but in gaining insights into the injustice of adult behaviour which expects a child to learn too quickly from his mistakes, e.g. "I reasoned with him a couple of times but it didn't work."

Teachers and other adults may understand the complexities of learning in relation to cognitive or physical knowledge, and be patient with much trial and error behaviour, need for practice, and slow development, yet find it hard to tolerate the same pace of progress in the moral realm. The realm of moral relationships is more abstract than the realm of physical objects and so might be expected to be harder for children to master. Discussion with teachers in the moral education project suggested that there is often more guilt present in the care-giving adult when a child in her care behaves "badly", than when he makes intellectual or physical mistakes. The child's moral behaviour affects the self-esteem of the adult. The mere bringing of this into awareness by the teachers themselves, in the project, seemed to result almost immediately in the shrugging off of much of this unwanted guilt. One of the marked results in the moral education project was the self-reported rise in the teachers' own morale as they came to understand better the inherent time element in the nature of moral development and subsequently altered their own expectations and their evaluation methods.

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One evaluation measure which came to be recognized as extremely useful was the discussion, by self and peers, of the quality of a teacher's interaction in a moral conflict situation between children. Such discussion was usually based on a teacher's own diary record which she chose for discussion. Early childhood education has traditionally focused on observation of individual children and has not given much attention to observation of teacher behaviours.

Whilst it was not always possible to see a child's progress in the time elapsed between in-service seminars, it was possible to see whether or not teacher-behaviours that had been empirically demonstrated to influence moral development, i.e. cognitive challenges, were actually taking place in the classroom. The teachers taking part in the project came to the conclusion that such a teacher-centred segment of the project was not opposed to their child-centred approach to early education. What the teacher-centred segment did was to observe in detail a part of the total teacher-child interaction: that part which one can examine from the inside at any moment - one's own behaviour. This aspect of in-service education for teachers seems to have been rather neglected in the area of moral education.

CONCLUSION

The moral education program convinced all the teachers involved that it is possible to teach preschool children to handle

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fairness issues, i.e. to develop morally, within the pattern of the ordinary developmentally oriented preschool curriculum. It is possible to do this, not so much by providing "correct" rules, nor by starting from hypothetical dilemmas for discussion, but by making the children aware of the nature of their own natural problems and exploring from there, observing the results that come from real-life action. The complexity of this type of exploration, even with just one value - fairness, was one of the significant insights gained by teachers.

The method of working with teachers in much the same way as they were working with the children, i.e. cognitive challenge and exposure to the next highest level of reasoning, and expectation of a link between both reasoning and action, proved successful. Eight to ten two-hour seminar workshops proved sufficient to give teachers time to develop in this area to the point where they were observed to have a basic competence in stimulating the moral development of the children in their charge.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

TASKS AHEAD

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This chapter concludes the study by briefly considering some tasks ahead for teachers and some for researchers in the area of moral development in early childhood.

TASKS AHEAD FOR TEACHERS

One of the results of the construction of the early developmental levels of moral reasoning and behaviour reported in this study, is that an observer (particularly an educator) may be helped by them to see the very real and positive achievements that are there in the moral development of young children. Pre-operational children can be viewed negatively as children who cannot yet conserve and who have many restrictions on the way they can reason, or positively as children who are developing exciting new capacities to organize their experience, reason about their actions, and make moral choices.

The initial discussions with teachers, reported in Chapter 1, revealed a frequent tendency to view children's development in terms of deficits. The following diary report from a teacher, following a series of in-service workshops on moral development, shows an encouraging change from the negative mode, resulting from an increase in her understanding of the moral development of young children.

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> "I have in the past been intensely irritated by the fairly common behaviour of some children in the group each year who will follow me about to complain 'That's not fair' all the time, every time something happens to them that they don't like. I used to regard this as whining and pretend not to hear it. I don't know whether I'm right but now I'm taking it as a sign of interest in the idea of fairness and I'm trying to work from there on that child's interest.
>
> Yesterday Leonie who's 4.2, complained because it wasn't fair to make her stop and wash her hands. (Perhaps it wasn't. I didn't think of that!). I said, 'All right, you're really interested in what's fair, so you work out how to put this fruit around the tables so that everyone gets a fair share.' Leonie put one plateful on each table (didn't count the pieces on each plate) and put one plate back in the kitchen. I said, 'Why did you put that plate in the kitchen?' She said, 'We've got too many, the mothers can have that'. I can now see that this way of equal sharing (one to one correspondence between plates and tables) and disposing of the remainder so that it didn't interfere with her strict equality, shows quite a level of achievement. Sometime I might suggest that she divides up the spare plateful, but it doesn't seem so urgent now."

This is a very perceptive report by a teacher who is also a graduate student. She has moved away from the deficit stance of teaching to fill in the child's "gaps", to a stance of appreciating the child's present level of functioning and using that as a base from which to encourage exploration. It is a subtle distinction. This teacher made use of Leonie's level of interest in fairness by giving her a task that enabled her to use it in another way. This represented horizontal broadening of experience rather than a press for acceleration of vertical progress.

In-service education for early childhood teachers in the realm of moral development should include an appreciation that children must construct and validate each level of moral develop-

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ment for themselves. This takes time and freedom from pressure. The teacher's task it not to validate that level as "right" but to help children to grow into it in their own way and then to help them discover contradictions in it which will eventually lead them on to the next level.

It follows then that at each level of moral development there is a contradiction in the task of the teacher. On the one hand the teacher must affirm children's moral reasoning as a worthwhile achievement, to encourage children to complete their construction of that level of reasoning. Only when they have worked through this will chldren be ready to move on and be able to integrate the achievements at the next level. On the other hand, the teacher must set the environmental conditions in the preschool that will eventually lead to children's dissatisfaction with their thinking at one level and re-integration of it into the next level.

Even at the preschool level the teacher's task in moral education is only partly done when she has helped children to become "socialized", i.e. to learn some formal rules and to act in accordance with them, e.g. "Wait for a turn; don't bite or hit other children." There is another part of the task which is of far greater significance: to help children to develop insights appropriate to their level of understanding, into the way they treat other persons, the way they like to be treated by others, and the relationships between these two.

In one sense, this seems to presuppose a level of cognitive

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development which is beyond preschool children, i.e. the ability to reflect on their own thinking and action. However, this ability does not simply emerge at some older age: it can be seen developing, albeit in an unsophisticated way, in the following common examples:

> when a baby repeatedly turns her head and smiles at a stranger who smiles back;
> when a two-year-old boy in a playgroup goes up to a smaller toddler who is crying and leads her back to her mother;
> and when one four-year-old at kindergarten says to another, 'I let you have some of mine so you have to let me have some of yours.'

The task of preschool teachers is to recognize that these simple actions are signs of moral development which teachers can pursue.

TASKS AHEAD FOR RESEARCHERS

The study of young children in the home environment with parents and the study of the youngest from the first weeks of life suggest themselves as important areas to consider.

The exclusion of parents from the present investigation is

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not because they are considered unimportant influences on a young child's moral development but because their influence is too important simply to be taken into account in passing, in a study of this size. The literature shows many more studies of parental influence than of the influence of teachers on early moral education. Teachers (and child care workers) are also important, alongside parents, and have been neglected in the study of early moral development.

Development prior to three years of age is also of obvious significance, particularly in a stage theory approach which posits that each higher developmental stage reintegrates the characteristics of the stage below.

Within the body of the text there is reference to the need to observe moral behaviour when it is working well and is less visible, and not only when it is erupting into critical conflict. For example, we need to know more about behaviour in relationships which seem to have a preponderance of responses involving mutual equitable consideration of the needs and desires of both participants, behaviours in which opposing or complementary needs and desires between two children do not lead to conflict behaviour, nor to the simple avoidance of the problem, but to an enlarged context of mutually satisfying actions.

There is a need for more descriptive studies of young children's behaviour in the moral realm. Little is known with exact-

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itude about the relationships between content and context of children's conflicts and their helping behaviours. Little is known about how the child-child and child-adult interactions which go on in a preschool or child care environment differ from those in a home, or between one home and another or one centre and another.

We need more of this type of descriptive data to help us see which research hypotheses are significant in relation to the real-life development in young children. What are the critical influences on a young child's level of moral reasoning and behaviour in particular types of real-life situations? What maximises the probability of use of his or her own highest level of functioning?

The relationship between ego strength and moral development was identified in Chapter 2 as an area largely unexplored in research with young children. The natural observations of children's social interactions over the year of this study, and the discussions with teachers, strengthen the conviction that this represents a rewarding and important area for further study.

Another problem area for further research is concerned with maximising the reliability and validity of research data which involves questioning young children. It may be remembered from Chapter 1 of this study that the video-taping of some interviews led to the identification of some non-verbal differences between interviewer behaviour with young children which seemed to relate

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to the frequency of "Don't know" answers from the subjects. Further research should investigate the non-verbal interactions between interviewers and preschool children, related to the quality and quantity of the children's verbal responses.

It is fascinating that sex differences in moral development may be present even at this early age. Although the data are inadequate, our impression is that the direction of reasoning of girls and boys may show the kind of differences discussed by Gilligan (1982) in adult subjects, that is, females at preschool may be, on the whole, more concerned about responsibility for the welfare of others than are boys. It may be possible, with a slightly different research design, to show early sex differences in children's reasoning and behaviour related to the concept of fairness.

It is to be hoped that other researchers will undertake studies to validate the sequence of levels of moral reasoning and behaviour which has been developed in this study.

The future of this field of early moral development beckons other researchers, and, I would argue, particularly those that come into it with a developed practical understanding of the thought and behaviour of preschool children. The field is fraught with extraordinary potential as is shown by the many questions raised in this study.

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APPENDIX I

MORAL VALUES QUESTIONNAIRE

Please do not discuss your choice, prior to the return of the questionnaire.

1. You are not asked to identify yourself in this questionnaire, but simply to tick the one category which best describes your present position -

Parent _____

Preschool teacher _____

Student, Course & Year,

e.g. Dip.Teach. 3 _____

Preschool aide or assistant _____

Preschool adviser or supervisor _____

Lecturer in Early Childhood Education _____

2. Will you please list below, the two or three moral values which you would most wish to foster in four and five year old children. In doing so, be guided by your own usual interpretation of the terms 'moral', 'values', etc.

(i)_____

_____

(ii)_____

_____

(iii)_____

_____

Thank you,

Rosemary Milne.

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APPENDIX 2

CONSENT DETAILS - MAIN INVESTIGATION

1. DIRECTOR'S INTEREST
   Person to person.

   Approach to director of preschool centre, leaving typed description of project - aims, methods, time schedules, ethical commitments, etc.

2. GOVERNING BODY'S CONSENT
   Director's approach to the governing body of the centre for permission for project to proceed if other teachers and parents willing. Consent given.

3. TEACHERS' CONSENT
   First approach by director of centre, then researcher invited to discuss project with staff. Commitments to project made by both teachers and researcher.

4. PARENTS' CONSENT
   Director of centre explained project at parents' meeting as a study of children's social interaction with their peers, in a preschool setting, with particular attention to their spontaneous conflicts. Unanimous consent.

   Special approval sought from parents for children to wear name tags for 2-3 weeks and thus to be identifiable by name to researchers (but not in publication, where aliases would be used). Unanimous consent.

5. CHILDREN'S CONSENT
   The teacher in charge of each group explained the project to children thus:
   (a) that these adults, whom she knew, were interested in children's play and would be observing them from time to time this year;
   (b) that children would be asked to wear name tags at pre-school for several weeks but if this bothered anyone then that person could just tell the teacher that he or she did not want to wear one, at any time;
   (c) that the children would be invited by the teacher to go to the small story room, one at a time, to help the researchers with stories about children playing in a preschool.

6. Researcher committed to a meeting with parents and a meeting with teachers at the end of the project, to communicate general findings in a manner which might be expected to lead to an increase in the understanding of young children's thinking and behaviour by the parents and teachers. These commitments were honoured at due time.

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APPENDIX 3

FAMILIARIZATION PROCEDURES

There were three persons engaged in the collection of data, all experienced preschool teachers who were at ease with young children and the environment. Teachers explained to children that the research workers were amongst the many visitors who would come to the preschool because they were interested in its work.

The observations of indoor behaviour were made from the observation booths where researchers were not visible from the classroom. Observations of behaviour outdoors were made by researchers moving amongst the children and recording on audiotape but being as non-obtrusive as possible, e.g. not coming any nearer than was necessary to hear what children were saying, glancing away from children who appeared conscious of being observed, not initiating conversation with children and referring children to the teacher when they tried to engage the researcher in conversation.

One research worker collected all the interview data. She entered the classrooms and was introduced to the children by name. The children were told that she had some special stories to try out and that they would be invited in turn to help her in the interview room. Children were familiarized by their teachers with the interview room prior to the collection of data, e.g. by having a story time with their teacher in the room. It was a small pleasant environment for quiet activities. A teacher made the first contact between interviewer and child each time a child was taken from the classroom. The interviewer accompanied each child on the return to the classroom. Most children were happy to go with the interviewer; the children who displayed a little apprehension were interviewed on another day in a quiet corner of their familiar classroom.

For the first two to three weeks of the project, all children wore a large name tag on their back during the first half of each preschool session. This enabled them to be identified with the necessary rapidity and accuracy during the time-sampling observations, which were the first observations recorded. By the end of this period, the two research observers could quickly identify every childfor future observations throughout the year. Teachers had some initial doubts about this procedure but agreed to give it a trial. It did not seem to bother the children so was continued as planned for several weeks. Sometimes one or two children did not want to wear a tag but the numbers were always so small that these could be identified without a tag.

These procedures resulted in the researchers quickly coming to identify all the children whilst the children themselves had interaction with only one of the researchers - the interviewer.

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APPENDIX 4

TEACHERS' DIARIES : EXTRACTS

Extract 4.1

Donald, holding one end of the trolley, screamed for teacher to come. Maurice was pulling the other end of the trolley. When teacher arrived both children still pulled vigorously. Teacher told both to stop tugging at the trolley, and asked what the matter was.

Maurice: I want the trolley.

Donald: I'm using it.

Both began to tug at the trolley again. Teacher told both to stop pulling.

Teacher: Who had it first?

Donald and Maurice: I did.

Maurice: It was just here.

Donald: I was getting some blocks first.

Both pulled the trolley.

Teacher: Well, Donald, you get your load, then Maurice you can use the trolley.

Both children accepted the teacher's decision.

Teacher's Comments:

"Who had it first?" - Not fruitful question. I gave children all the answers. Didn't stimulate children to reason and explore and choose.

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APPENDIX 4 (continued)

Extract 4.2

Teacher was sitting near the three children, who were building outdoors. Douglas kept putting blocks one way and Si kept removing them. Teacher interrupted this procedure after five minutes as Douglas was shouting at Si.

Teacher: What's the trouble here?

Si: He puts them there - I want them here.

Douglas gestured and said: No, here.

Teacher: Well, you seem to be getting nowhere, Si and Douglas - how could you work it out?

Si: We could put them all here (where he originally wanted them).

Douglas: No, here.

Donald: Si could put some blocks here and Douglas could put some over there.

Both Si and Douglas looked at Donald blankly.

Teacher: Well, that seems fair to me, what do you think? (to both Si and Douglas).

Si: No - I want them all here.

Teacher: Well, would that be fair?

No response from Si.

Douglas: Noooo!

Teacher: Why not?

Donald: 'Cos Douglas wants his there.

Teacher: Well, what are you going to do about it to make it fair for both?

Donald: Si, you put yours here - go on. Douglas - you build there.

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APPENDIX 4

Extract 4.2 (contd.)

Teacher: I think that's probably the best solution too, Donald, seeing you all want to play together.

They then built as Donald suggested.

Teacher's Comments

Notice how Donald, the bystander, took on an authority role. Although the other two children didn't contribute much I think they were made to stop and think - to see (without me saying much at all) that their own "solutions" weren't workable. So they were ready to accept Donald's solution at the end, even though they wouldn't listen to him before this. Next time try to get Si and Douglas reasoning more actively.

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APPENDIX 4

Extract 4.3

Peter, James, Neil and others building with outdoor blocks - large complex structures.

Teacher noticed Peter threatening Neil with a raised block.

Teacher (restraining Peter): What's happening here?

Peter: Neil's blocks are going to knock down our building. He won't move.

Neil: I was here first.

Teacher: There are good ways and bad ways to do something about this; let's find a good way. First of all, Peter, you put down that block. Now, show us what's the problem, boys.

Peter explained. Both Neil's building (a ship) and the one Peter and James were working on (a large house) were beginning to encroach on the same space. Because there were a lot of children playing about them, there wasn't much room.

Neil: I was here first.

Teacher: OK Neil. We recognize that you need more room for the prow of your boat. And James and Peter have started this wall along here and they don't want it knocked over. Any ideas how you can be fair about both?

Neil: No.

Luch (bystander): They could both stop and pack away.

Teacher: Any other ideas?

Linda (bystander): Neil could turn his boat out this way.

Neil: There's no room and it would break.

Teacher: Let's collect some more ideas first; then they can choose the fairest. What about you Peter; what do you think could be a fair solution?

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APPENDIX 4

Extract 4.3 (contd.)

Peter: James and I could help Neil so it wouldn't break.

Teacher: Yes ... anything else ... could you turn yours about - would that be one idea?

James: No ... see ... it'd bang into the wall.

Teacher: Any other ideas? What have we got then? Pack away, or help Neil turn his blocks out this way. What do you feel about that, Neil? Is it fair? You said you were here first. Is it fair if you move over a bit?

Neil: All right. But Peter and James have to help.

Peter: Come on James.

Teacher: Let's all help Neil. And be very careful because I think we do have some fine buildings here.

Teacher's Comments

This is from memory because I was too busy to write it up until lunchtime. I want to record it fairly fully because I think I'm really getting into the method here. First of all I stopped the physical violence while accepting that conflicts do occur. Then we got a description of the problem from Peter, although not much from Neil's point of view. Then we got some way on the next step of setting up some alternatives without judging them at this stage. And finally, the kids chose and carried out their decision. What would I have done if Neil hadn't wanted to move? Gone back to collecting some other alternatives. How much weight do you give to "I was here first"? Is it that we adults teach kids that this is more important than it is?

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APPENDIX 5

RECORD OF MORAL REASONING INTERVIEW

Subject: Li.

Age: 5 years 2 months

Sex: F

Post-test

5.1 Concept of Fairness

WHAT DOES BEING FAIR MEAN?

Being fair ... I think it means ... that ... if you do something wrong, and they say, "it's not fair", that you've got something that I haven't got then ...

AND WHAT WOULD BE FAIR?

Well if the girl said, "that's another one", and the boy said, "it's a different colour".

IS THAT WHAT BEING FAIR MEANS?

Being fair, they have two and two.

WELL, YOU TELL ME OF SOMEONE WHO WAS FAIR TO YOU.

Fair to me. When I haven't got a blanket, I get one from the shed.

NOW WHO WOULD BE FAIR TO YOU WHEN YOU DID THAT? (PAUSE)

YOU TELL ME OF SOMEONE WHO IS BEING FAIR TO YOU?

If they gave me a blanket I would give one to them. And I'd give a cushion to them too.

IS THAT SOMETHING YOU'D DO WHEN YOU'RE FAIR? WHY IS THAT FAIR?

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APPENDIX 5

5.1 (contd.)

I think cause they have two cushions and I have two cushions and they have two blankets and I have two blankets.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE NOT FAIR?

If you haven't got what they want, and their mother says they can't get what they want, the mother has to buy what they got. And they in the shop, and they say 'Could I have that' and the mother say 'No', then they'll have to get what they told.

IS THAT WHAT NOT FAIR MEANS? WHO WOULD BE NOT FAIR?

Indistinguishable response.

THE CHILD WHO WAS ASKING THE MOTHER? IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING?

To buy all those things.

WELL, YOU TELL ME OF SOMEONE WHO WAS NOT FAIR TO YOU.

Um ... I think ... somebody if I didn't have no things, a blanket or a cushion, and they say go and get one from the shed, and they said not more left, and I walked around with no blanket.

WHEN WERE YOU NOT FAIR TO SOMEONE?

I don't know. I really don't know.

LET'S HAVE A STORY.

5.2 DILEMMA 1

JAN AND LESLIE ARE BUILDING WITH BLOCKS IN KINDERGARTEN. JAN IS MAKING A TALL PART. SHE PUTS ALL THE CURVED BLOCKS TO MAKE A TOWER. THERE ARE ONLY TWO CURVED BLOCKS ON THE SHELF.

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APPENDIX 5

5.2 (contd.)

AND JAN HAS USED THEM BOTH. LESLIE LOOKS AT JAN'S TOWER AND SHE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A TOWER TOO. LESLIE WANTS SOME CURVED BLOCKS TO PUT ON HER TOWER AND JAN HAS USED ALL THE CURVED BLOCKS ON HER BUILDING. THERE ARE NO MORE CURVED BLOCKS LEFT. WHAT SHOULD THEY DO?

The girl can take the one on top off and give it to her.

YOU SHOW ME. YOU THINK JAN COULD GIVE ONE TO LESLIE?

And then they'd have one each.

HOW DOES THAT MAKE IT FAIR?

Cause they have one each.

IS IT FAIR TO EXPECT JAN TO TAKE ONE OFF AND GIVE IT TO LESLIE?

Take one off there.

YOU THINK IT IS. NOW SUPPOSING THERE ARE THREE BLOCKS ON JAN'S BUILDING WHAT IS FAIR NOW?

She's got three and she's got none.

YES, NOW WHAT WOULD BE FAIR?

If she has one she has two.

SHOW ME.

You can take another off.

YOU'VE GIVEN ONE TO LESLIE AND JAN HAS TWO. WHAT WILL YOU DO WITH THE ONE YOU'VE TAKEN OFF?

They could put this building together and this one could be in the middle and they could share the building.

I SEE, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THEY COULD DO?

They could, if there was another one of these, have two each.

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APPENDIX 5

5.2 (contd.)

ANYTHING ELSE THEY COULD DO?

I think if there was three to go on him and three to go on him.

THEY CAN'T GET ANY MORE BLOCKS, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THEY COULD DO WITH THE THREE BLOCKS?

What I said before: they could join the building together.

WOULD IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IF THEY WERE FRIENDS?

Yes. WHAT DIFFERENCE?

They would say 'You can join my building together if you like'.

IF THE TEACHER CAME ALONG, CAN SHE HELP JAN AND LESLIE TO BE FAIR, IF SHE SAW IT LIKE THAT?

She would say take that one off.

WHAT WOULD SHE DO WITH THE ONE SHE SAID TO TAKE OFF?

She would put it on the block shelf.

AND SHE WOULD LEAVE JAN AND LESLIE WITH ONE EACH?

Yes. If she (first doll) took it it wouldn't be fair and if he (second doll) took it it wouldn't be fair.

SO THERE IT STAYS.

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APPENDIX 5

5.3 DILEMMA 2

ONLY ONE PERSON IS ALLOWED ON THE SWING AT A TIME. LEE AND ALEX HAVE A SWING AT THEIR KINDERGARTEN. THERE IS ONLY ONE SWING AND THERE IS NOBODY ON THE SWING. LEE AND ALEX BOTH DECIDE TO HAVE A SWING, THEY BOTH RUN UP TO THE SWING, GET THERE TOGETHER, AND SAY TOGETHER, 'I WANT A SWING, I WANT A SWING'. NOW, WHAT IS THE FAIR THING TO DO?

I think they can go on together cause it's enough big.

BUT THERE IS ONLY ONE PERSON ALLOWED ON THE SWING AT A TIME. SO WHAT CAN THEY DO?

If he (first doll) goes first, he (second doll) can have a long turn; and if he goes first, he can have a long turn.

HOW WILL THEY CHOOSE WHO HAS THE FIRST TURN?

Um ... he (first doll) can have a little turn then he goes off and he (second doll) can have a turn. When he gets off he can start playing again and then they can make up friends and then they say the biggest can go first.

WELL, YOU KNOW IN THE BEGINNING, WHEN SOMEONE HOPPED ON FIRST, SUPPOSING SHE OR HE HAD ALREADY HAD LOTS OF TURNS AT KINDERGARTEN THAT MORNING. WOULD THAT BE FAIR?

I think it won't if he had all the turns and his mum comes and he's still on it then ... (i.e. at the end of the morning).

WELL HOW DID THEY DECIDE WHO HAS THE FIRST TURN? I'M NOT QUITE SURE HOW THEY DECIDE?

I think he (first doll) gets on standing up and then he gets off and then he starts play for a long long time and then he

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APPENDIX 5

5.3 (contd.)

(second doll) gets on and he plays for a long long time then their Mum comes and they leave the swing.

OH I SEE.

And another day they be friends.

IF THEY ARE TAKING IT IN TURNS LIKE THIS, HOW DO THEY KNOW HOW LONG? FOR EACH TURN?

Each turn ... oh they can play together. He (first doll) says 'You can go on first and I'll go on second'. When they're friends they can say that. But when this (second doll) one's friends he (second doll) comes over and says, 'You can go first' and he (first doll) says 'No', and then he (second doll) says 'Come on', and then he (first doll) goes on first and he (second doll) can go on second.

FRIENDS MAKE A DIFFERENCE DON'T THEY?

Or when they come another day they can leave the swing all alone so the girls can go on there cause they've had all day on the swing.

SUPPOSING WE GO BACK TO WHERE THEY'RE STANDING LIKE THIS AND THEY'RE BOTH WANTING IT JUST AT THIS MINUTE, AND THE TEACHER COMES ALONG. WHAT WOULD SHE SAY?

She can say 'One at a time has to go on' 'You have to wait'

NOW HOW DOES SHE CHOOSE THE FIRST ONE?

She will say the biggest goes first, and the smallest goes on second.

IS THAT FAIR? DO YOU THINK THE TEACHER IS BEING FAIR?

Yes.

HOW LONG DO YOU THINK SHE WOULD LET THEM GO?

About a hundred times each.

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APPENDIX 5

5.4 DILEMMA 3

KIT BUILDS A HOUSE IN THE PLAYGROUND AND PAT TRIPS OVER AND ACCIDENTLY KNOCKS THE HOUSE DOWN. PAT DIDN'T MEAN TO KNOCK KIT'S HOUSE DOWN. SHE WAS BEING CAREFUL BUT SHE FELL OVER IT AND IT'S ALL KNOCKED DOWN ALL MESSED UP. ANOTHER TIME KIT BUILDS A HOUSE AND LYN COMES OVER TO KIT'S HOUSE AND WHEN KIT ISN'T LOOKING LYN TAKES A BOARD OFF THE ROOF AND THROWS IT DOWN ON THE GROUND. SHE PULLS A LITTLE BIT OF KIT'S HOUSE DOWN ON PURPOSE.

NOW WHAT HAPPENED WHEN PAT CAME ALONG?

Pat ...

SHE TRIPPED AND WHAT DID SHE DO?

She broke the house.

DID SHE MEAN TO? No. NO, SHE DID IT BY ACCIDENT.

WHAT HAPPENED WITH LYN?

Lyn came over with a block and took a block off and half of it fell down.

DID SHE MEAN TO? Yes. YES, SHE DID IT ON PURPOSE. NOW, WHO WAS UNFAIR, THE ONE WHO KNOCKED ALL OF THE HOUSE DOWN ACCIDENTLY, OR THE ONE WHO KNOCKED PART OF IT ON PURPOSE?

She didn't mean it and she did.

WELL, WHO WAS UNFAIR? THE ONE WHO DID MEAN TO OR THE ONE WHO DIDN'T MEAN TO?

This one was unfair.(Consequences).

THIS ONE KNOCKED THE WHOLE HOUSE DOWN BY ACCIDENT AND THIS ONE KNOCKED PART DOWN ON PURPOSE?

I think she was unfair.(Consequences).

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APPENDIX 5

5.4 (contd.)

WHAT DID SHE DO THAT WASN'T FAIR?

I think ... um ... I don't know.

LISTEN TO THE QUESTION AGAIN. WHO WAS UNFAIR, THE ONE WHO KNOCKED THE HOUSE DOWN ACCIDENTALLY, ALL OF IT OR THE ONE WHO KNOCKED PART OF IT DOWN ON PURPOSE?

I think this one would be. (Intention).

WHY WAS SHE UNFAIR?

Cause probably he was jealous.

THE ONE WHO KNOCKED A LITTLE BIT DOWN ON PURPOSE YOU'VE CHOSEN. YOU THINK PROBABLY HE WAS JEALOUS? DID HE DO IT ON PURPOSE OR ACCIDENTALLY?

He did it on purpose.

WHY WAS HE MORE UNFAIR?

I think this one was unfair. (Consequences). I don't know which one was unfair.

YOU THINK THE ONE WHO KNOCKED IT ALL DOWN WAS UNFAIR. ALL RIGHT WAS HE MORE UNFAIR THAN THIS ONE WHO KNOCKED A LITTLE BIT ON PURPOSE?

He was a little bit unfair (Intention), and he was a lot unfair (Consequences).

YOU SAID THAT THE ONE WHO KNOCKED IT ALL DOWN WAS A LOT UNFAIR AND THE ONE WHO KNOCKED A LITTLE BIT DOWN ON PURPOSE WAS A LITTLE BIT UNFAIR?

ALL RIGHT, THEY'VE KNOCKED IT OVER, WHAT'S THE FAIR THING TO DO NOW?

I think they could all live in the house.

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APPENDIX 5

5.4 (contd.)

WELL, SHE'S KNOCKED IT ALL DOWN WHAT'S THE FAIR THING TO DO NOW?

Just to build it up again.

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE SHE COULD DO?

They could both build it up.

WOULD IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IF THEY WERE FRIENDS?

If they were friends ... if this one was a friend well she would have to help, and if this one wasn't a friend he would still have to help do it all.

WHO WOULD SAY THAT?

I think the teacher would say that.

HE DID KNOCK IT DOWN DIDN'T HE? I THINK YOU'RE A BIT TIRED AREN'T YOU? YOU'VE BEEN HELPING SO MUCH. THANK YOU.

END OF TAPE.

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APPENDIX 6

RECORDS OF OBSERVATIONS OF NATURAL BEHAVIOUR

6.1 Full-morning Observation

In this type of observation a running record (pretest and post-test) was taken of the behaviour of selected children from the time the child entered the preschool until he or she left to go home at lunchtime. The following gives two short extracts from the much larger record of the one morning with child Si, representing the two occasions on this morning when Si was involved in any kind of peer conflict.

DAISY is walking around the circle of cable reels saying, "Funny old painters, funny old painters". DON got his brush and flicked it at her laughing and SI then flicked his brush at her. DAISY ran off behind the tree to get away from them. SI ran towards her but two boys came in (JULIAN and MAURICE), so SI came back to the cable reels. They are now laughing and walking around looking. DAISY keeps saying, "Funny old painters, funny old painters". SI flicked and seemed to get her so with that he called to DON a few feet away, "I got her". DAISY ran off to the doll's house and SI followed her flicking her with water all the time. She went inside and he stood outside flicking paint at her. He walked back to the cable reels; the girls came from the doll's house and are still chanting, "Funny old painters". SI is still taking a few steps forward and flicking the girls with water. Now DON

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APPENDIX 6

6.1 (contd.)

has come down and he is running after DAISY with his paint brush. SI is running after, gingerly, trying not to spill the water. He has gone around the cubby-house, tripped and fallen. He has leaves and sand all over his clothes but as well he's lost his paint brush. He has walked back without seeing it; he has thrown the bucket at TIMOTHY. His hands are covered in sand and he walks towards the bathroom.

(The record continues through the morning. Somewhat later than the above it continues ...)

The play seems now to have become less purposeful. SI sticks a large piece of paper over his work and then he takes the paste and brush back to the shelf and puts the scissors away. He comes back to the table and gets his model and closes it in a certain way, then he looks at it, runs back to the cupboard, brings the paste pot over once more, sticks down something on the inside of his model and puts the paste pot away again. But before he gets to the cupboard he comes runing back again, there seems to be something else he wants to do. LUCY comes up and goes to take his paste pot; she says something to him and he holds on to the pot. LUCY, realizing that SI wants it, goes over to another pot and says to another child, "Are you using that?" SI watches all of this and keeps his hand held tightly on the paste pot. Then he goes back to sticking some of the things more securely on his model. He lifts his model very carefully and carries it over to the cupboard where the finished models are left to dry.

RECORD CONTINUES.

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APPENDIX 6

6.2 Critical Events : Peer Conflicts

In this type of observation the group of children was kept under surveillance for one hour during indoor play for any events involving peer conflict, which were then recorded. Following are the four critical events recorded in one such observation period.

Date : 25th March.

Time: 10.30-11.30 a.m.

No. of children in group: 25.

EVENT 1

DAPHNE is at the clay table with three other children. One of the girls starts to pummel the clay with a plastic tool in her hand. DAPHNE says to her in a loud authoritative voice, "You have to put your spade down". The child obeys and pummels the clay with her hand. DAPHNE then turns to TIMOTHY who is on the other side of her and tells her in a bossy manner "You have to do it this way". TIMOTHY obeys quite happily. DAPHNE then reaches over and takes all the clay that is left in the centre of the table and puts it on her pile. Nobody objects to this. DAPHNE leans over and takes some more clay from DON when he isn't looking. She does this again when DON is looking; she takes clay from his pile and puts it on hers. DON smiles and leans over his clay protecting it. DAPHNE leans over her pile but continues to try to grab from DON. DON hits DAPHNE lightly on the head. DAPHNE throws clay at DON. DON throws clay back. There

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APPENDIX 6

6.2 (contd.)

is now clay spreading quite some distance over the room. DON now takes some clay from DAPHNE'S pile and throws it at her and GEORGE also joins. This is still going on with half smiles, half serious looks. DAPHNE retreats by standing up taking off her apron and leaving the clay table. The other boy, who is now identified as GEORGE, runs round, picks up DAPHNE'S huge pile of clay and pushes it over to join it to his pile. He picks up every scrap of clay around her side and puts it on his pile. He is not doing anything creative with this large pile of clay, simply slapping it and looking possessive about it.

EVENT 2

DON is building with TED very near to BOB and SAM. He is playing with a toy figure and it comes within 6 inches of theirs. SAM turns around and says, "Don't you dare come near ours". DON retreats but makes his figure walk in a funny fashion about a foot away from their building. SAM accepts this and he bends down and touches DON quite gently on the face, and says, "Don't you dare come near us", in a much less aggressive way.

EVENT 3

BOB and SAM are building together. BOB makes his seat on the boat taller than SAM'S and says "Then you are small enough and I can see over your head". SAM wants to make his seat

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APPENDIX 6

6.2 (contd.)

higher so he adds some more blocks. BOB objects but SAM says "I'll get you another one for yours and then yours can be taller". BOB says "Okay" and then they do this. BOB very quickly builds up his so that it is twice as thick as SAM'S seat, as well as higher. SAM measures his against BOB'S by moving it nearer and looking at them both critically and apparently thinks it is right when his is still one block lower. SAM'S seat is in the front which is why BEN sees over his head.

BOB calls out when DON comes near his block building. BOB says, "Don't you come near mucking up our game, don't you". He picks up a block and uses it as a gun and pouts and pretends to fire the gun at DON. SAM goes up to DON and says "Don't, you'll knock it down". DON turns around and grins at SAM and they smile at each other. DON moves around again and SAM says "You'll knock it down" and DORIAN says "Sorry, sorry". BOB continues to stand in the background 'firing' at DON. DON and SAM ignore BOB and go back to their respective buildings.

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APPENDIX 6

6.3 Time-sampling Form: Social Interaction

Date: _____ Recorder: _____

Run No: _____

Time Commenced: _____

Time Completed: _____

CHILD	ACTIVITY	INTERACTION Solo, Parallel or Cooperative	COMMENTS
Ce			
Dc			
Do			
El			
Ey			
Ea			
Fr			
Hh			
Ja			
Mk			

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