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by

Michael Hermann Sukale

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FOUR STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By
Michael Hermann Sukale
May 1971

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

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

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

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

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ESSAY I

THE NOTIONS OF "AGGREGATE" AND COLLECTIVE CONNECTION" IN HUSSERL'S "PHYLOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC": A STUDY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

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Introduction

This essay is concerned with the question of how Husserl accounted in his "Philosophy of Arithmetic"[1] for the aspect of wholeness of aggregates which are defined as being any collection of objects. It will be shown that Husserl's notion of "collective connection" is the key concept to be considered. The question: what kind of "thing" is such a collective connection gets the answer: it is a meaning (Bedeutung). It may seem as if such an enterprise did not add substantilly to the already existing literature which addresses itself to the problems of Husserl's first book. However, my interests do not lie in a new explication of what is considered to be Husserl's main fault in his early work: his psychologism. I am much more interested in showing that if we bracket out this question of Husserl's psychologism then a) there remains still a large body of thought in the "Philosophy of Arithmetic" which form the basis of Husserl's more mature thought; b) there remains a certain problem which has nothing to do with Husserl's psychologism but which impairs his early analysis and is later removed. It is therefore my contention that it is not only the removal of psychologism which marks the transition from Husserl's early writings to his later writings. It seems to me that at least one other problem is being solved by Husserl on this way.

What this problem is, to which I am referring, will come out later in this essay. Presently it seems wise to make clear what we mean by

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[1] Philosophie der Arithmetik, Psychologische und Logische Untersuchungen, Halle 1891 (henceforth abbreviated as PA).

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psychologism and to what extent we can circumvent the problems connected with it in dealing with Husserl's "Philosophy of Arithmetic."

a) The Notion of Psychologism

Even though there exists an extensive literature on the notion of psychologism, it is not always clear what the psychologistic claim(s) is (are) supposed to be. For our discussion it will be sufficient to survey three major sources which deal with this claim. These sources are 1) a passage of Frege's review of Husserl's "Philosophy of Arithmetic," 2) Husserl's own formulation of the psychologistic claims in the first volume of his "Logical Investigations," and 3) Husserl's later formulations of psychologistic claims in his "Formal and Transcendental Logic."

Frege supplies the following criticism of Husserl's first book in his review:

> "Thus we have a blurring of the distinction between image and concept, between imagination and thought. Everything is transformed into something subjective. But just because the boundary between the subjective and the objective is obliterated, what is subjective acquires in its turn the appearance of objectivity."[2]

Frege thus distinguishes between objective things, to which belong concepts and thoughts, and subjective things which include images and imaginations. The difference between these two kinds of entities is that objective things are one and the same to every comprehending or apprehending mind, whereas subjective things are relative to a mind and thus, if appearing in different minds, are at most only

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2 Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952, p. 79.

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similar to each other. Frege calls this latter quality of subjective entities their privacy, whereas he calls the peculiar quality of objective things their objectivity. All this is made clear by the sentences which follow immediately the above quoted text.

The mistake of which Frege accuses Husserl is then three fold: he fails to make a distinction between what is objective and what is private, he converts objective things into private things and he treats private things as if they were objective. From this we may derive a definition of what "general psychologism" consists in:
(General Psychologism I): Psychologism consists in

(1) the failure to make a distinction between the objective which is independent of minds and remains numerically one and the same even when apprehended by different minds and the subjective (private) which is dependent on minds and remains numerically one and the same at most in one mind and never in more than one mind.

(2) transforming everything objective into something subjective.

(3) treating subjective things as if they were objective.

It seems clear that all three points are independent from each other. We may fail to make the distinction between the subjective and the objective without transforming the objective into the subjective and without treating the subjective as something objective. It is also possible to not fail to make the above distinction and yet to transform everything objective into something subjective and to treat it as if it were objective. Thus we establish the independence of (1) from (2) and (3). On the other hand, (2) and (3) are again independent from each other because it seems perfectly possible to transform

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everything objective into something subjective without treating subjective things as if they were objective as well as treating subjective things as if they were objective without transforming everything objective into something subjective.

The notion of psychologism as it is explained and attacked by Husserl in the first volume of his "Logical Investigations" is different from this Fregian notion. Husserl is especially interested in what he later calls "logical psychologism." He explains this notion by referring to the works of Mill, Lipps, Wundt, Sigwart and others. Husserl offers various formulations of which the following seem to be the essential ones:

(A) The essential theoretical foundations of logic lie in the field of psychology.

(B) Logic is a part of psychology insofar as it is a science and it is different from psychology insofar as it is the art of thinking.

(C) Logic is a branch of psychology.

(D) Logic is the physics of thought.

(E) The laws of logic are descriptive laws of the actual human thought process.

(F) Logical laws make assertions about psychic events.[3]

The formulations (D)-(F) seem to assert more or less the same,

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[3] These and similar formulations can be found in: Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vierte Auflage, Halle 1928, pp. 50-60. (B) is accredited to J.St.Mill, (D) is the direct translation of a passage of Lipps.

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namely that logical laws are empirical laws about the way humans actually think. A corollary of this is for example the following claim: (Corollary of D-F): The modus ponens rule is an empirical claim which asserts roughly:

> Whenever the proposition "A → B" is judged to be true and moreover the proposition "A" is judged to be true, then the proposition "B" will be judged to be true.

If we assume that psychology is the empirical science which investigates into the actual processes of psychic events and if we take thought processes as a subclass of these events - and both of these assumptions seem to be uncontroversial - then (C) is implied by either of the claims (D)-(F). For the same reason (A) is implied by (C)-(F) because it seems impossible to do logic without doing psychology if logic is but a branch of psychology.

Claim (B) is different from (C)-(F) and partly inconsistent with these. It implies that logic is prescriptive rather than descriptive. Hence logic is not a branch of psychology if we conceive of psychology as a descriptive science. But this view still entails (A) for the following reason: proponents of (B), as for example, Mill, think that logic is some kind of technology which tells you how to avoid errors in thinking and how best to think according to the prescribed rules. But in order to develop a strategy of proper thinking we have to know first how humans actually think. Hence psychological studies are not in themselves equivalent with logical studies but they provide the essential tools for the latter. This is why (B) implies (A) without

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being equivalent with or even being consistent with any one of the views (C)-(F).

It seems that we can extract two claims, one of which is the weakening of the other and both of which can be called psychologistic claims. We will call them "strong logical psychologism" and "weak logical psychologism" respectively. The weaker claim is implied by (B) and a reformulation of (A). The stronger claim is implied by (C)-(F).

(Strong logical psychologism): Psychological investigations of actual human thought processes are the necessary and sufficient conditions for logical investigations.

(Corollary): The analysis of logical laws is equivalent to the analysis of particular human thought processes.

(Weak logical psychologism): Psychological investigations of actual human thought processes are the necessary conditions for logical investigations.

(Corollary): The analysis of logical laws consists partly in the analysis of particular human thought processes.

It seems that Husserl attacked both kinds of psychologism in his first volume of his "Logical Investigations" by claiming that psychological investigations are neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for the analysis of logical laws. His argument consists mainly in the denial that logical laws are empirical laws about human nature. It has been pointed out by Føllesdal that this argument begs the question in that it presupposes that which it should prove. Føllesdal shows also, that Frege did not try to disprove logical psychologism

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because unlike Husserl he thought that even though a consistent logical psychologism was false it could not be proven to be false.[4]

Husserl has later distinguished between what we have called "general psychologism" and what we have called "logical psychologism." In his "Formal and Transcendental Logic" he speaks of "psychologism" and of "logical psychologism." He charges empiricism to have implied psychologism:

> "Empiricism which had become dominant was blind to the specific objectivity of all ideal constructions (Gebilde): everywhere does it transform these (constructions) into the current psychical actualities and habits."[5]

He calls this transformation also "psychologising" and holds that special or logical psychologism, which alone he had attacked in his "Logical Investigations," consists in psychologising the "irreal meaning constructions" (irreale Bedeutungs gebilde).

Obviously then Husserl held that logical psychologism implied some sort of general psychologism. It seems therefore worthwhile to inquire a little bit into the relationship between "general psychologism" and "logical psychologism."

If we assume first that Frege's distinction between the objective and the subjective is exhaustive and secondly that logical laws are objective and thirdly that psychology concerns itself only with subjective phenomena, then it seems clear that strong logical psychologism implies at least a weaker form of the second part of general

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4 Dagfinn Føllesdal, Husserl und Frege, Oslo 1958, expecially pp. 34-40 and 48-55.

5 Husserl, Formale und Transcendentale Logik, Halle 1929, p. 135ff.

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psychologism: something objective is turned into something subjective. Weak psychologism does not imply even this. Both types of logical psychologism do not logically imply the first point of general psychologism. But it might be a good explanation to say that because the logical psychologists belonged to that group of empiricists which thought that all so called objective things were in reality nothing but (subjective) data of the mind, they didn't think that this distinction between the objective and the subjective was a useful one. On the other hand: the second point of general psychologism does indeed imply strong logical psychologism as a special case under the above mentioned assumptions. The third point of general psychologism is of course violated by both strong and weak logical psychologism if we assume as Frege seems to do, that we cannot make objective claims about essentially private events. But this assumption can be seriously challenged on the grounds that certain thought-events of a person A can constitute very well objective data for a person B, (who is not identical with A). The point is that the dependence of an event, e, on some mind, m, does not make it necessarily impenetrable for objective claims about it. If we hold that "objective claims" can only be made about what Frege calls "objective things" (i.e. things which are independent of any mind) then both forms of psychologism are guilty of treating something subjective as if it were objective. But this would then be not peculiar to psychologism, it would be a general fact about psychology as a science.

In view of this it seems wise to drop Frege's characterisation of Husserl's early failures as constituting a good definition for general psychologism and to retain only the second part which is also empha-

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sized by Husserl in his "Formal and Transcendental Logic." And it will be also wise to weaken this point so as to allow psychologism to hold that some things are objective in the sense that they are independent of any mind. The reason why I want this is, that I feel that we should be able to make a distinction between psychologism and idealism. Idealism can in fact be said to transform everything which we would take to be independent of any mind into something which is dependent on some mind. We formulate then -

(General Psychologism II): Psychologism consists in transforming some objective things (i.e. things which are independent from any mind) into some subjective things (i.e. things which are dependent on the human mind).

After this we may profitably ask in what sense Husserl adhered to psychologism in his "Philosophy of Arithmetic" and whether or not we can circumvent the misgivings of this view.

It seems relatively safe to say that Husserl did indeed embrace psychologism in its weak form. The subtitle of the work ("Psychological and Logical Investigations") seems proof enough for this thesis. It is certainly true that Husserl did think that psychological investigations were necessary in order to analyse mathematical concepts. His "Habilitationsschrift" on which his "Philosophy of Arithmetic" was based did even bear the following title: "Concerning the Concept of Number, psychological analyses."

Does Husserl also adhere to the thesis of strong logical psychologism? It seems so, but an affirmative answer can not be given without some hesitation. It is true that Husserl speaks in the Introduction of the difficulties of the concepts of number, plurality and unity

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as being based on the peculiarities of the "psychological constitution" of these concepts, but this need not imply that an analysis of these peculiar features is sufficient for a complete analysis of these concepts. However, the suggestion that a psychological analysis might be sufficient after all comes from other passages where Husserl insists that the verbal exposition of these concepts should bring the reader (or hearer) into such a disposition that he is able to perform those "psychical processes, which are necessary for the construction of the concept."[6] On the same page he says also that it should have become clear that these concepts are based on elementary psychical data. But there is, of course, a difference between "being based on something" and "being the same as something."

But it is nevertheless certain that Husserl is guilty of making the notions of number, plurality, etc., dependent on some mind insofar as he places their foundation there. Hence we can conclude that Husserl adheres certainly to weak logical psychologism, that he might be even counted as a strong psychologistic thinker, and that he certainly is guilty of general psychologism II, if we assume that the concepts of number, plurality, etc. are objective in the required sense. It also does not seem that Husserl's "Philosophy of Arithmetic" could be rewritten in such a way that all this would be avoided without distorting it beyond recognition.

But Husserl seems to be guilty of more than that. It seems that sometimes he does indeed "blurr the distinction" between image and concept and thus falls prey to the first point of what we have called general psychologism I.

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[6] PA, p. 131.

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We will see for example that Husserl holds that the concrete phenomena on which the concept of plurality (and number) is founded, are aggregates, pluralities of definite objects.

But there is an immediate difficulty with respect to "aggregates" which we have to settle first. Is it in itself a concept which depends on consciousness or does it refer to an independent fact in the outside world? Husserl is ambiguous here. The first context in which he introduces that word seems to indicate clearly that the word 'aggregate' refers to something in the world, namely the concrete collection of objects, and not to a concept which would have to be a mind dependent entity of some sort. However, the German word 'Inbegriff' which Husserl uses has, unfortunately, the expression 'begriff' as a part and hence seems to refer to some special concept. In another context Husserl uses explicitly the phrase 'Begriff des Inbegriffs (der Vielheit)' and thus seems to refer to a concept.[7] A few sentences later, however, he speaks of the 'concrete Inbegriff' (concrete aggregate) in order to separate it from the concept. The conjecture seems therefore justified that he usually refers to the "concrete phenomenon" whenever he speaks of "aggregates" or "concrete aggregates" and that he refers to a concept only when he puts the phrase "the concept of" directly to the left of the word 'aggregate'.[8] An aggregate is then any collection of concrete objects whereby it does not matter whether these objects are themselves physical, psychical,

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[7] PA, p. 15.

[8] Husserl seems in fact to use the phrase 'conreter Inbegriff' instead of 'Inbegriff' only if he speaks about the concept of plurality shortly before or after - to make the contrast obvious. Hence we may safely conclude that for Husserl 'Inbegriff' and 'conreter Inbegriff' are synonmous. (See for example PA, pages 10, 11, 15).

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abstract, or concrete, as long as they are possible objects of representation (Vorstellungsobject). For example, 'a sensation, an angle, the moon and Italy' denotes an aggregate as well as does 'the Sun, the Moon, Earth and Mars'. But the condition that all these objects have to be objects of representation is, of course, exactly another slip from the "objective" (Italy, the Moon, etc.) into the "subjective" (the representation of Italy, the representation of the Moon, etc.) which is so severely criticized by Frege.

These slips occur all over the book, but I think that they can indeed be rectified without distorting the intention of the book beyond recognition. In our case, we may very well take Husserl to use the term 'aggregate' to refer to any collections of objects, whether represented in a human mind or not.

The general strategy of the present paper will then be twofold: Husserl's dependence on "psychologism" in its various forms will not be discussed. Instead this whole complex will be considered as providing the general background of our discussion, which affects all considerations of Husserl to an equal degree. Husserl's blurring of the distinction between the objective and the subjective on the other hand will be noted whenever it enters the discussion and an attempt will be made each time, to circumvent the difficulty by slightly altering the reference of thus infected terms or arguments.

b) Husserl's Problem Stated

The main concern of Husserl in his "Philosophy of Arithmetic" is to clarify the concepts "plurality" (Vielheit), "Unity" (Einheit)

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and "number" (Anzahl). It turns out, however, that he has to introduce two special notions to accomplish this task. These are the notions of "aggregate" (Inbegriff) and "collective connection" (collective Verbindung).[9]

Husserl holds that the concept of plurality, upon which the concept of number is based, is itself an abstraction. But from what? Husserl says quite clearly that a concept cannot be had without being founded on a concrete intuition.[10] It follows that if we represent to ourselves the general concept of plurality then we must have some concrete intuition. What then is it what we have to have before our mind? Husserl answers that there is no question that the concrete phenomena on which the concept of plurality (and number) is founded, are aggregates, pluralities of definite object.[11] These aggregates may be represented either in an authentic manner (eigentlich vorgestellt) or inauthentically, i.e. symbolically. This difference is a difference between direct perception and mediated perception. We may have an authentic representation of the appearance of a house if we really

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9 In the translation of the German notions I follow mainly Farber in his The Foundation of Phenomenology, with the exception that I translate "inbegriff" with "aggregate" instead of using Farber's "totality." "Aggregate," which is used by Pietersma in his article "Husserl and Frege," seems to be neutral enough as to allow for different interpretations.

10 "Kein Begriff kann gedacht werden ohne Fundirung in einer concreten Anschauung" (PA, p. 84).

11 "In Betreff der concreten Phaenomene, welche fuer die Abstraction der in Frage stehenden Begriffe die Grundlage bilden, besteht keinerlei Zweifel. Es sind Inbegriffe, Vielheiten bestimmter Objecte" (PA, p. 9).

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look at the house, whereas we may have a symbolic representation if somebody describes it to us.[12] Husserl restricts the inquiry at first to the authentically represented aggregates and the authentic concepts of plurality and number which derive from them. He holds that "symbolic formations" derive genetically from these authentic ones.

Let us then turn our attention to these "aggregates" which are the "foundations" upon which we have to build the abstraction which will eventually terminate in the concept of plurality and number. It turns out that we have to say more about this "foundation" than that it is such an aggregate because the "content" of the representations (being completely exchangeable for each other) cannot account for this peculiar abstraction. To put the same point in a "revised version of Husserl": that we abstract from the aggregates the concept of plurality cannot depend on the kinds of objects which happen to be members of a particular aggregate. Husserl writes:

> "It is not these particular contents which are the basis of the abstraction, but the concrete aggregates as wholes, in which they find themselves put together...However easy it might be to be overlooked: there is always something beyond the particular contents, which can be noticed and which is necessarily there in all cases in which we speak of an aggregate or of a plurality: the connection of the particular elements to a whole."[13]

---

[12] Here again Husserl fails to make a distinction which he is going to observe later in his work: the distinction between the house and its appearance. In the text referred to he speaks as if it were not the house but its appearance (aussere Erscheinung) which was represented (vorgestellt). It is exactly this view which he rejects in the fifth Logical Investigation. However, this does not hurt the distinction between authentic and symbolic representation which he tries to make here. (PA, p. 216).

[13] "Nicht jene Einzelinhalte sind ja die Unterlagen der Abstraction, sondern die concreten Inbegriffe als Ganze, in welchen sie zusammengefasst sich finden...Wie leicht man es auch uebersieht, so ist doch ueber die Einzelinhalte hinaus etwas da, was bemerkt werden kann und was in allen Faellen, wo wir von einem Inbegriff oder einer Vielheit sprechen, notwendig vorhanden ist:die Verbindung der einzelnen Elemente zu dem Ganzen" (AP, p. 13).

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This connection which characterizes the aggregate as the basis of the concept plurality is called "collective connection" by Husserl (collective Verbindung). It is only in the act of reflection on this collective connection that the concept of plurality emerges in the mind. The force of this remark will become clearer later. The main point to remember is that the "concrete phenomenon" on which the concept of plurality is based seems to be in fact the aggregate, but only insofar as it is a whole via a collective connection. This then is the reason why not any collection of objects would do for Husserl: we will see that the collective connection is a mental phenomenon in the sense in which Brentano takes it and not a physical one.[14]

If it is true that the concept of plurality is an abstraction which is founded on a concrete intuition and if this concrete intuition has a collective connection as its content then we seem to be forced to make clear what this latter notion means. So far it seems that it refers to the aspect of wholeness of aggregates. But what is this? It is this question to which Husserl turns his attention in the second and third chapter of his book.

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[14]Compare Brentano's Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Vol. I, Book 2, Chapter I, where he says: "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence (Inexistenz) of an object (Gegenstand), and what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case), or an immanent objectivity." This English version is due to D.B. Terrell's translation of parts of the above chapter and can be found in R.M. Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, Glencoe, Ill., 1960 (Free Press), p. 50.

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1. Husserl's refutation of five theories about the concepts "plurality" and "number"

The second chapter is concerned with refuting five theories about the unification of objects which is brought about in what Husserl calls collective connection. We will not deal at length with these theories and Husserl's refutation of it because we are mainly interested in his positive analysis which he gives in the third chapter. However, the second chapter promotes the understanding of his analysis and it seems to be justified to give a brief summary of it:

The main hypothesis of the first theory, which we may call T_1, is the following:

T_1: The unity of the representations of the aggregate consists in their belonging to one and the same consciousness. If we reflect upon this fact then the concepts of plurality and number emerge.[15]

Husserl refutes T_1 by the following argument:

If T_1 were true then there would be only one aggregate at any one time of our consciousness and this aggregate would include all the parts of our consciousness. However, it seems that we form aggregates according to our interests and we may transform an aggregate into another one by augmenting or reducing the aggregate by some parts without thereby dropping these parts from consciousness altogether. Hence there can be contents of consciousness which are not included in aggregates.

The positive result of Husserl's argument is the premise on which it rests, namely that we form aggregates according to interest.

[15] PA, p. 17f.

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Husserl writes:

> "It is important to emphasize that only those elements can be contents of an aggregate (i.e. of an authentic representation of plurality) of which we are conscious as those which are noticed for themselves; all other contents however, which are only noticed alongside, and which can either not at all be noticed for themselves (like the points of continua) or which are just now not noticed for themselves, all these contents cannot be the elements, out of which an aggregate constitutes itself."[16]

The second theory which Husserl refutes, as well as the third one, explains the unity of aggregates by referring to the time involved in representations.

T$_2$: The unity of the representations of an aggregate consists in that the aggregate comprises only simultaneously given contents. Plurality as an abstract concept means nothing but: simultaneous giveness of arbitrary contents. (PA, p. 19)

Husserl thinks that here an argument applies similar to the one which he used to refute the first theory. However, he gives a second reason against this theory. He remarks that it makes a difference whether contents are represented simultaneously or whether they are represented as simultaneous.[17]

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16 "Es ist wichtig hervorzuheben, dass einem Inbegriffe (einer eigentlichen Vielheitsvorstellung) nur solche Inhalte als Elemente angehoeren, deren wir uns als fuer sich bemerkt bewusst sind; alle anderen Inhalte aber, die nur als nebenbei bemerkt da sind, und die entweder ueberhaupt nicht fuer sich bemerkt werden koennen (wie die Punkte der Continua), oder bloss momentan nicht fuer sich bemerkt werden, alle diese koennen nicht die Elemente abgeben, aus denen ein Inbegriff sich constituiert." (PA, p. 18)

17 "...(es genuegt) hervorzuheben, dass Inhalte gleichzeitig vorstellen noch nicht heisst, Inhalte als gleichzeitige vorstellen" (PA, p. 19).

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The relevance of this reason is not at all clear, unless one speaks of some act of consciousness. A closer examination of the text reveals that Husserl has in fact again blurred the distinction between subjective representation and objective contents. T_2 is in fact differently cast by Husserl than in its statement. The exact wording of Husserl concerning T_2 is the following:

> "If an aggregate of contents is present to us, what else should we notice than this, that each content is there, simultaneously with each other one. The temporary coexistence of contents is indispensable for the representation of their plurality. Now it is true that each synthetic act of consciousness requires the coexistence of its parts; but whereas in other cases there are other particular relations or connections in addition to the one of simultaneity which unite the parts, it is the outstanding peculiarity of the representation of the aggregate, that it includes nothing else but the simultaneous contents." (PA, p. 19)[18]

It is obvious that Husserl shifts in this passage from the aggregate itself to its representation which is called an act of consciousness (Denkact). He seems to construct T_2 as saying that contents in order to be aggregates have to be represented as coexisting in time. And it is this claim which he refutes by the following example: In order to make the representation of a melody appear at all, the particular tones, which make up the melody, have to be represented simultaneously, but not as simultaneous. On the contrary, the tones appear to us as being related in a certain temporal succession. Husserl seems then to take the representation of a melody to be representation of an aggregate.

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[18] "Ist uns ein Inbegriff von Inhalten gegenwaertig, was sollten wir anders bemerken als dies, dass jeder Inhalt da ist, zugleich mit jedem anderen. Die zeitliche Coexistenz der Inhalte ist unerlaesslich fuer die Vorstellung ihrer Vielheit. Nun erfordert zwar ein jeder zusammengesetzte Denkact die Coexistenz seiner Theile; aber waehrend in anderen Faellen neben der Gleichzeitigkeit noch besondere Beziehungen oder Verbindungen vorhanden sind, welche die Theile einigen, so ist es eben die auszeichnende Eigentuemlichkeit bei der Vorstellung des Inbegriffs, dass sie nichts weiter enthaelt als die gleichzeitigen Inhalte."

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Husserl's conclusion with respect to T_2 is then the following:

Though it is trivially true that represented contents have to coexist in time to form an aggregate, it is not true that this coexistence in time is the basis for the abstraction of plurality. If it were, then the abstraction would have to consist of representing the contents as being simultaneously given. The latter claim, however, is absurd in view of the above counter-example.

The next theory, T_3, advances the contrary of T_2: not the simultaneity of contents but their succession in consciousness is the feature on which the abstraction of the concepts plurality and number are based:

T_3: All contents of consciousness are only given one at a time to consciousness and are hence always given in a temporal succession. Upon the reflection of this and only this relation of contents is the concept of plurality based. (PA, p. 21)

Husserl denies the first claim of this theory which assumes the narrowness of consciousness (Enge des Bewusstseins). It is possible to have more than one content of consciousness. Husserl then goes on to refute the main argument insofar as it is based on the first claim. If it were true that always only one content is present in consciousness, how could we ever notice even the simplest relation which presupposes the presence of two contents at least?

However, even if the first claim of T_3 is removed, it is still not true as long as it presupposes that the succession of contents in consciousness is the basis of abstraction. A thus modified theory would claim that we reflect upon the relation of temporal succession of contents (of which there might or might not be more than one given in

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consciousness), if we want to abstract the concept of plurality. Such a theory fails for the same reason for which T_2 fails: it would presuppose that a necessary and sufficient condition for the conceiving of plurality would be the conceiving of contents as successively given. Both parts of this claim are false. Necessity fails because it is possible to form an aggregate of successive contents of consciousness without representing these contents as successively given. This is the case when we group things together at which we look successively. Sufficiency fails also because we can notice the succession of strokes of a clock without forming an aggregate of any definite strokes:

> "It is of particular importance to notice - and this is a point which is usually overlooked - that even then, when we pay attention to the temporal succession of contents, it is by no means the case that definite pluralities are already accentuated. Only certain synthesizing psychic acts achieve this. To overlook them means precisely to leave that out of consideration which is the true and only source of the concept of plurality, as well as the concepts of numbers."[19]

Again and again Husserl shifts from concrete (objective) aggregates to their representation in the consciousness of some subject. But the reason for this shift becomes clearer in these discussions. He wants to discuss the following question: what is it which makes a concrete aggregate a whole? His answer seems to be that this is accomplished by some mental activity. But he casts this question often as: what is the distinctive feature of an aggregate which makes it an arbitrary

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19 "Von besonderer Wichtigkeit aber ist es, zu beachten - und dies ist ein Punkt, der in der Regel uebersehen wird - dass, selbst wo wir auf ein zeitliches Folgen von Inhalten merken, keineswegs schon bestimmte Vielheiten herausgehoben sind. Dies leisten erst gewisse zusammenfassende psychische Acte. Sie uebersehen heisst eben das ausser Acht lassen, was die wahre und alleinige Quelle des Begriffes der Vielheit, sowie der Zahlbegriffe bildet." (PA, p. 26)

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collection of objects. It is Husserl's oscillation between these two questions and his mistaken assumption that they are the same ones which makes the "Philosophy of Arithmetic" so difficult to read. However, the following passage is quite clear with respect to this distinction and will therefore be quoted in full:

> "If it were the only task to describe the phenomenon which is given when we represent a plurality, then we would have to mention the temporal modifications which the particular contents undergo, even though they are usually not specifically noticed. But even if we leave aside that the same holds for each composited whole, the distinction has generally to be made between the phenomenon as such and that for which it serves us or what it means to us; and accordingly also between the psychological description of a phenomenon and the indication of its meaning. The phenomenon is the basis for the meaning but not itself the meaning. If we represent an aggregate of objects A,B,C,D, then finally only D might be given as sensual representation with respect to the successive process, through which the whole is constituted, whereas the other contents might be given only as representations of phantasy in temporal and also otherwise content-wise modified form. On the other hand, if we progress from D towards A, then the phenomenon is a different one. The logical meaning neglects all these differences."[20]

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[20] "Wuerde essich blos darum handeln, das Phaenomen zu beschreiben, welches vorliegt, wenn wir eine Vielheit vorstellen, dann muessten wir gewiss der zeitlichen Modificationen, welche die einzelnen Inhalte erleiden, Erwaehnung thun, obgleich sie in der Regel nicht besonders beachtet werden. Aber abgesehen davon, dass ebendasselbe fuer jedes zusammengesetzte Ganze gilt, so muss doch ueberhaupt unterschieden werden zwischen dem Phaenomen als solchem und dem, wozu es uns dient oder was es uns bedeutet; und demgemaess auch zwischen der psychologischen Beschreibung einer Phaenomens und der Angabe seiner Bedeutung. Das Phaenomen ist die Grundlage fuer die Bedeutung, nicht aber sie selbst. Ist ein Inbegriff von Gegenstaenden A,B,C,D in unserer Vorstellung, dann wird, mit Ruecksicht auf den successiven Process, durch welchen das Ganze entsteht, schliesslich nur D als Empfindungsvorstellung gegeben sein, die uebrigen Inhalte aber bloss als Phantasievorstellungen in zeitlich und auch sonst inhaltlich modificirter Weise. Gehen wir umgekehrt von D aus gegen A hin, dann ist das Phaenomen ein anderes. Alle diese Unterschiede hebt die logische Bedeutung auf." (PA, p. 28) Husserl has himself drawn attention to this passage in Ideen I, page 304, footnote 1. This footnote reads: "Vergl. in dieser Hinsicht die "Philosophie der Arithmetik" S. 28f, wo schon zwischen "psychologischer Beschreibung eines Phaenomens" und der "Angabe seiner Bedeutung" unterschieden und von einem "logischen Inhalt" gegenueber dem psychologischen gesprochen wird."

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It seems clear from this passage that the wholeness of an aggregate which Husserl refers to by the phrase 'collective connection' is not an objective relation which belongs to the phenomenon itself but a meaning (Bedeutung) which belongs to certain acts of consciousness. A positive explication of the notion "collective connection" would have to bear this out.

The last two theories about collective connections do not add too much to Husserl's own discussion of this notion and can therefore be summarized very quickly.

T_4 : The unity of the representation of an aggregate is brought about by the spatial representation of objects. A reflection on these spatial relations yields the concepts of plurality and number.

This theory is refutable on the same grounds as T_2 and T_3: objects do not have to be conceived of as spatially related to each other in order to be eligible as members of aggregates. Moreover, Husserl charges Lange (which is a proponent of T_4) with the mistake of equivocating the act of connection (den Beziehungsact) with the result of this connection (den Beziehungsinhalt) (PA, p. 36) and he remarks in this connection:

> "We see that the synthesis of our concepts does not lie in the content but only in certain synthetic acts and that it can therefore only be noticed in the reflection on those." (PA, p. 41)[21]

A little later he adds:

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[21] "Man sieht, dass die Synthesis unserer Begriffe nicht im Inhalte, sondern nur in gewissen synthetischen Acten liegen und daher auch nur in Reflexion auf sie bemerkt werden kann."

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"The connecting consists only in that (the connecting) of an act itself and hence also the representation of the connection in the representation of the act." (PA, p. 43)[22]

T 5: We can speak of a plurality only with reference to objects which are different from each other. The concept of plurality emerges with the reflection on these differences.

The main argument is again that it makes a difference to notice two different contents and to notice them as different (PA, p. 56). Husserl concedes only that the contents have to be noticed each one for itself, but he denies that the contents have to be noticed as being different from each other.

"It is certain that we can always make particular contents the basis of distinctions; but it is no less certain that this is not what is meant in counting. To make distinctions on the one hand and to put together and to count on the other are completely different actions of the mind. Only one thing and not more is required, namely that the contents which are to be counted are separated ones (i.e. noticed for themselves), but not at all in the same sense that they are differentiated from each other." (PA, p. 62)[23]

2. The positive analysis of the two notions

The arguments of Husserl's second chapter of the "Philosophy of Arithmetic" already make it clear that collective connections cannot be any kind of relations which depend on the contents of the representations, like the difference or similarity relations. Husserl decides

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22 "Die Verbindung besteht naemlich einzig und allein in dem einigenden Acte selbst und somit auch die Vorstellung der Verbindung in der Vorstellung des Actes."

23 "Gewiss ist, dass wir die Einzelinhalte jederzeit zu Fundamenten von Unterscheidungen machen koennen; nicht minder gewiss ist es aber, dass diese nicht das beim Zaehlen Gemeinte sind. Unterscheiden auf der einen Seite und Zusammenfassen und zaehlen auf der anderen sind ganz verschiedene Geistestaetigkeiten. Nur das Eine und nicht mehr ist erfordert, dass die zu zaehlenden Inhalte ausgeschiedene (d.h. fuer sich bemerkte) seien, nicht aber in irgend einem Sinne von einander unterschiedene."

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that collective connections constitute a class of relations of their own and tries to characterise this class as a class of simple psychical relations. This has to be clarified.

Husserl draws first of all a distinction between primary and psychical relations. Primary relations are those which have the character of primary contents. Primary contents are in turn defined as what Brentano calls "physical phenomena."[24] These as well as any other relations are said to rest on "fundaments."[25] Such primary relations are complex phenomena which comprise part-phenomena (Teilphaenomene). Similarity is such a relation. The main point to remember is that primary relations are objective facts which are independent of any act of consciousness. But this does not imply that primary relations hold only between objects which are independent of consciousness. The "fundaments" on which such relations rest can be psychical phenomena as well, for example, the similarity-relation might well hold between acts.

Psychical relations on the other hand do not belong to the class of primary contents but belong to what Brentano has defined as "psychical phenomena."[26] The main characteristic of these relations is that they

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24 It is important to see that Brentano does not take objects as physical phenomena but what nowadays would be called sense-data. It seems clear that for Husserl primary contents are sense-data. But I believe that there as elsewhere we might interpret Husserl's "contents" as objects without changing the basis of the reasoning given. For Brentano's distinction see the reference given in footnote 14.

25 Today we would speak of "argument places" of the relation-predicate instead of "fundaments."

26 Psychical phenomena, according to Brentano, are acts which are directed either to physical objects or to physical phenomena, or to other psychical phenomena or to abstract entities. This was pointed out to me by Prof. Føllesdal.

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comprise their "fundaments" intentionally. Husserl writes:

> "If a unified psychical act directs itself towards a multitude of contents, then these contents are connected or related to each other with respect to this act." (PA, p. 73)[27]

The main difference between primary and psychical relations is, according to Husserl, that the primary relations belong to the same level as their fundaments (i.e. they belong to what is before our mind), whereas psychical relations belong to the act which is directed towards that which is before our minds: They are on different levels from their fundaments. Hence, if we want to represent the primary relations to ourselves, it is sufficient to look carefully at the objects of consciousness, whereas we have to look at an act of consciousness in order to get hold of psychical relations. (PA, p. 74)

The second distinction which Husserl draws is that between simple and complex relations. This distinction has nothing to do with the number of fundaments which a relation has. For example, there might be relations which have only two fundaments but are still complex (Husserl mentions the relation which holds between two end-points of a series), on the other hand, there are also relations which have more than two fundaments but are still simple. The example which Husserl brings up in this connection is the relation of sameness which holds between more than two sensual objects and which we are able to recognize without noticing the many two-place relations which hold between these objects. The "definition" which Husserl gives is the following one:

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27 "Richtet sich auf mehrere Inhalte ein einheitlicher psychischer Act, dann sind im Hinblick auf ihn die Inhalte verbunden oder auf einander bezogen."

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relations which are themselves composited out of relations are called complex reations, relations for which this does not hold, are called simple.[28]

Husserl then characterizes the collective connection as a simple psychic relation. He motivates this with the following argument. Each relation rests on its fundaments and is dependent on them in a certain way. However, all primary relations are limited with respect to the variability of their fundaments, i.e. the relation will break down for certain substitutions of one fundament for the other. The fundaments of collective connections, however, can be varied in their contents as much as we like without the result that the relation itself breaks down. And this is so because the relation is not a part of the phenomenon itself (of the contents) but is somewhat "external" to them (PA, p. 79). This then forces Husserl to say that collective connections are psychical relations.

> "An aggregate comes into being, if a unified interest and, together with and within it, a unified noticing accentuates and comprises different contents for itself. Hence, the collective connection can only be grasped via reflection on the psychical act through which the aggregate comes into being." (PA, p. 79)[29]

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[28] "Relationen, die selbst wieder aus Relationen zusammengesetzt sind, heissen zusammengesetzte; Relationen, bei denen dies nicht zutrifft, einfache." (PA, p. 76) It seems clear that this definition and the whole distinction which Husserl wants to draw is very fuzzy and completely worthless from a formal standpoint. But then this distinction seems to be less important than the former one which makes much more sense.

[29] "Ein Inbegriff entsteht, indem ein einheitliches Interesse und in und mit ihm zugleich ein einheitliches Bemerken verschiedene Inhalte fuer sich heraushebt und umfasst. Es kann also die collective Verbindung auch nur erfasst werden durch Reflexion auf den psychischen Act, durch welchen der Inbegriff zu Stande kommt."

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Unfortunately, Husserl conflates again the objective and the subjective in this passage. It seems as if Husserl wanted to say that the aggregate itself comes into being only in the act of putting objects together. If this were so then the aggregate itself would be something which is produced by consciousness instead of being any collection of objects which might be independent from any mind. Hence it seems safe to suppose that he uses the phrases "aggregate" and "collective connection" synonymously in this context.

The next passages (PA, p. 80) seem to be clearer in this respect. Here he says that the act comprises all members without grouping them into sub-groups. The picture which emerges is then the following one: in order to render an objective collection of objects as a whole, a unified act of consciousness is required which constitutes the relation of collective connection with these objects as its fundaments. We may leave undecided whether these "objects" are objects which are independent from consciousness or whether they are representations. Husserl himself would have opted for the latter at the time when he wrote the "Philosophy of Arithmetic."

It now becomes obvious that the "collective connection" which is the basis for the concept of plurality is the logical meaning of an act of consciousness which groups objects together.

It should now turn out that the concept of plurality arises from the reflection upon that act the meaning of which is the collective connection of objects. Husserl's subsequent discussion bears this out.

If what we have said is true, then the "collective connection" is not identical with the act of collectively connecting objects. In the process

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of collectively connecting objects we do not make the "collective connection" itself the object of an act. Only if we reflect on this primary act of collectively connecting objects do we get a representation of the collective connection itself. Husserl calls this representation an abstract one. Once we have this abstract representation, we can form the concept of plurality as a whole which comprises parts in merely collective form. (PA, p. 82)

Let us go back to Husserl's claim that no concept can be had without being founded on a concrete intuition.[30] The answer to the question: what is this intuition about? can now be given: we have to intuit a collective connection, which is the meaning of an act, in order to arrive at the concept of plurality. However, this is not enough. We have still to ask how exactly the concept of plurality is arrived at.

Our success in arriving at the concept of plurality will depend on the structure of this reflective act which has as its direct object the collective connection and as its indirect objects the "fundaments" of this connection. Husserl claims that the "fundaments" of the collective connection have to be presented in a special mode so that the concept of plurality is arrived at. He reminds the reader that the fundaments in question cannot be represented with respect to their special content. On the other hand, we must also not make the mistake of abstracting from them altogether because then nothing would be left of them. We have to represent these contents in such a manner that (a) they can be substituted

30 See footnote No. 10.

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for each other in any arbitrary way, and (b) that they do not vanish completely in their definiteness. Husserl feels that both requirements are met if we represent each of the fundaments of the collective connection as "just anything" (irgend Etwas) (PA, p. 85). Hence it belongs to the "meaning" of the second-level act of relfection which has the meaning of the act of collectively connecting objects as its object that the objects of this first-level act are represented as "mere somethings." Husserl writes himself:

> "Obviously the concept of Something owes its coming to be to the reflection of this psychical act of representation, which has precisely each definite object given to it." (PA, p. 86)[31]

It seems that this cocnept of "something" must already be available in order to grasp the concept plurality. The concept of plurality is constituted precisely then if an act of reflection takes an act of collectively connecting objects to mean the unification of definite "somethings."

3. A difficulty in the foregoing interpretation

We have interpreted Husserl as having made a distinction between unreflective first-level acts and reflective acts which would belong to second, third...n'th-level acts. However, this claim can be seriously challenged on the basis of Husserl's text. At least three passages seem to indicate that our so-called first-level-act is really a second-level-act and might even be an act of higher order.

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31 "Offenbar verdankt der Begriff des Etwas seine Entstehung der Reflexion auf den psychischen Act des Vorstellens, als dessen Inhalt eben jedes bestimmte Object gegeben ist."

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Husserl holds that for each of the "contents" being brought to our attention a special psychical act is needed.[32] The act of unifying different contents would then be an act of higher order and hence a second-level act. For example, if we have 5 marbles which we unify, then we need 5 separate acts to notice these marbles and one second-level act to unify them. However, this act of unification might even be a third-level act. This is the case when we group the marbles into two groups of two and one group of one and then unify them. Here we would need 5 first-level acts of noticing, two second-level acts of unification and a third-level act of unification.

The problem which arises is that it seems that the second-level acts are always reflective in that their objects are first-order acts or parts thereof. But if this is true, then the act which constitutes collective connections is already a reflective act and the act which constitutes the concept "plurality" is an act of the next highest order. This interpretation is substantiated by Husserl himself when he speaks about "aggregates of aggregates" (Inbegriffe von Inbegriffen).

> "As to the psychological foundations of these complicated formations one recognizes that we deal here with psychical acts of higher order, i.e. psychical acts which are themselves directed towards psychical acts and aim at the primary contents only via those. If we represent in one act a plurality of aggregates, then there is required a separate unifying act for the formation of each one of them in the above described manner; and if each of them is to be attended to in its unity with consciousness and at the same time unified with the others, then a psychical act of second order has to be directed towards these first-order acts - in which the particular unification of the sub-aggregates rest - and via these

[32] Later Husserl seems to restrict this condition to the mode of attention which he calls "actuality." Cf. Ideen, sections 35 and 92.

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> towards the primary contents....Indeed, if looked at closer, then we have to augment the number of levels by one, because even in the case of simple aggregates, i.e., such aggregates the elements of which are not further analyzed, unified contents, do we have second order acts, namely insofar as the single contents are accentuated by particular acts and are only unified by an act which comprises them all." (PA, pp. 99-100)[33]

This explication of Husserl's clashes with the many passages where Husserl seems to imply that the act of unifying objects is one act which does both: noticing the primary contents and connecting them.[34]

Husserl's inconsistency might be the outcome of two seemingly conflicting insights which he could not combine into a coherent picture. On the one hand, he saw that the act of collectively connecting objects was one unified whole. This led him to take it as some first-level act. On the other hand, he saw that the act had a complicated structure which involved other acts. But from the mistaken assumption that acts can

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[33] "Was die psychologische Grundlage dieser complicirten Bildungen anlangt, so erkennt man, dass hier psychische Acte hoeherer Ordnung vorliegen, d.h. psychische Acte, welche wieder auf psychische Acte gerichtet sind und erst durch Vermittlung dieser auf die primaeren Inhalte gehen. Stellen wir in einem Acte mehre Inbegriffe vor, dann ist fuer die Bildung jedes einzelnen ein einigender Act der oben beschriebenen Art erfordert; und soll jeder von ihnen in seiner Einheit mit Bewusstsein festgehalten und mit den anderen vereinigt gedacht werden, dann muss ein psychischer Act zweiter Ordnung auf jene Acte erster Ordnung - in welchen die besonderen Einigungen der Theilinbegriffe ruhen - und erst durch sie auf die primaeren Inhalte gerichtet sein....ja genauer besehen, sind diese Stufenzahlen noch um eine Einheit zu erhoehen, denn schon bei den einfachen Inbegriffen, d.h. solchen, deren Elemente nicht weiter analysierte einheitliche Inhalte sind, liegen Acte zweiter Ordnung vor, naemlich derart, dass die einzelnen Inhalte durch besondere Acte herausgehoben und dann erst durch einen gemeinsamen sie alle einigenden Act umfasst werden."

[34] Husserl says so explicitly in a passage on p. 79 (op. cit.), which has been already quoted (see footnote 23): "...ein einheitliches Interesse und in und mit ihm zugleich ein einheitliches Bemerken..." In another context, Husserl implies the same hypothesis when he says that we are able to notice separately and to synthesize in one act about 12 elements. (PA, p. 214)

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be connected to complex acts only by reflection he concluded that the act of collectively connecting objects had to be reflective. This difficulty can be resolved if we assume that there are complex non-reflecting acts which have acts as their parts. We can then distinguish between the order of complexity of acts and the order of reflection of acts. Any one act could then have the same or different degrees of complexity and reflection. It seems that Husserl did in fact arrive at this conclusion in his "Logical Investigations."

Using this explanation, we seem to have permission to stick to our first interpretation and to qualify it such that we speak of the act of collectively connecting objects (or "contents") as an act which has a second-order complexity and belongs to the first-order acts with respect to reflection.

4. Symbolic representations of plurality

So far we have dealt only with such aggregates which can be perceptually grasped at once. However, our capacities are limited as to the number of objects or "contents" which we can directly represent to ourselves. The question arises how we can form a collective connection with more than 10 or 12 elements. That we can do it is beyond question. That the process can not be the same as when we form a collective connection with 4 or 5 "fundaments" seems also to be beyond doubt because if it is correct that we need a special act of attention for each element, then we would have to perform thousands of such acts within almost no time to recognize the stars as a collection of objects.

The only way out of this dilemma is to declare that those collections are symbolically given. But if this is the case, then we have to

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ask how such a symbolic representation of objects comes about. To state the question precisely: How is it possible to represent a large collection of objects at one glance as falling under the concept of plurality when the number of objects looked at surpasses the limit of immediate apprehension of definite objects? (PA, p. 218). The first hypothesis: that we indeed perform as many first-order acts as there are elements, has already been proven to lead to an absurdity.

A second hypothesis might be, that we arbitrarily single out some manageable portion of the given collection and perform an act of collectively connecting the elements of it. After this, we stop the process and form a "surrogate representation" of the whole collection of elements which would emerge, if we were to continue the process of collectively connecting arbitrary elements of it.[35]

This second hypothesis will not do either. The reason is the following: Why do we take the first two or three processes of collectively connecting objects as indications of a larger process which could be completed, unless we have already the notion of the whole process which is to be intended? The fact that I select a certain group of elements and connect them does not indicate anything as to whether or not this group of elements is a sub-group of some larger collection. Hence, the emergence of the "surrogate representation" cannot be based on this fact alone.

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35 Husserl writes: "Die naechbesten Einzelobjecte, die sich uns aufdraengen, heben wir hervor und verknuepfen sie, brechen aber alsbald ab, indem wir die Surrogatvorstellung bilden: Gesamtheit von Objecten, welche der eben begonnene Process in seiner vollen Durchfuehrung zur successiven Einzelauffassung bringen wuerde." (PA, p. 224)

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The third hypothesis which is endorsed by Husserl, claims that there have to be indications in the representation of the sensual collection itself which are directly accessible and which make the character of plurality recognizable. Name and concept of plurality can then be conceived of as being associated with these indications which are directly given to the observer.[36]

But where exactly are these indications or marks located? They cannot belong to the particular elements because then we might be able to recognize a whole complex even if there were only one element given.[37] On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that particular elements assume new properties just because they happen to belong to a collection of elements.[38] We might say that these "marks" are properties of the particular binary relations which hold between pairs of elements of the collection. But this seems implausible for the same reasons which make it implausible that the particular elements should have these marks as properties. Finally, all relations taken together cannot exhibit this property because there are many more relations than elements and to scan all relations in a moment seems to be as impossible as to scan all elements at once.

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36 "Nur ein Ausweg ist hier denkbar: es muessen in der Anschauung der sinnlichen Menge unmittelbar zu erfassende Anzeichen liegen, an welchen der Mengencharakter erkannt werden kann, indem sie die Vollziehbarkeit der oben beschriebenen Processe indirect gewaehrleisten. Mit diesen Anzeichen koennte sich dann der Name und Begriff der Menge auch unmittelbar associiren." (PA, p. 225)

37 This argument is mine and not Husserl's.

38 This argument as well as the following one is Husserl's (PA, p. 225).

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Husserl's way out is to assume that some or all of the relations fuse and form what Husserl calls quasi-qualities of the collection which then serve as cues. The observer does not see particular elements or relations but these cues or "figural moments" which indicate that the figure seen can be decomposed into a multitude of elements. Not only relations are being fused but also the "contents" or elements themselves.[39] That we, in fact, see these figural moments in large aggregates is supported by commonly used phrases like "a column of soldiers," "a heap of apples," "a swarm of birds." Ths words 'column,' 'heap,' 'swarm' refer to different kinds of "figurative moments" which help to differentiate aggregates from each other. But all these words have in common that they carry a reference to some kind of aggregate.

Convincing as this analysis may seem to some interpreters, it leaves much to be desired. It seems that these "figural moments" or quasi-qualities belong to the "contents" and their relations themselves, hence they belong to what Husserl called earlier primary contents or physical phenomena. But if this is so, then why does he call these qualities quasi-qualities, and what exactly does this "fusion" of primary contents and relations refer to? According to Husserl's analysis, no special act is needed to grasp the figural moments of an aggregate; it belongs to the same level as the elements of it.

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39 These considerations are very similar to the views put forward by Ehrenfels, the founder of Gestalt-psychology. Husserl gives a reference to Ehrenfels (PA, p. 236, footnote) but claims to have written his book one year before Ehrenfels published his famous article "Ueber Gestaltqualitaeten" (1890), which is reasonable to claim, since PA is the outcome of Husserl's earlier habilitation dissertation.

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It seems as if it would be more plausible to say that the swarm-relation which holds between certain birds in certain situations belongs to Husserl's "psychical relations." If this were so, then an analysis of the "figural moments" of aggregates would become more interesting because the analysis of acts would be involved. But the analysis as it stands does not add much to Husserl's earlier discussions. In fact, the answer to his initial question: How come that we can form collective connections with more than 10 or 12 elements?, seems to get the unsatisfactory answer: Because aggregates with more than 10 or 12 elements have certain quasi-qualities which facilitate the process of collectively connecting the elements. The difference between the act of collectively connecting 3 birds and the act of collectively connecting 20 birds seems then to lie entirely in the object-side of the acts in question. However, Husserl had started by saying that this difference has something to do with the limitations of human consciousness. What one would expect after this is an analysis of how the human consciousness makes up for its deficiencies and not how the world makes up for them. What one would expect is that the act of collectively connecting many "contents" differs in structure from the act of collectively connecting few "contents" over and above the fact that one act deals with many objects, whereas the other act deals with few objects.

5. Summary

We tried to analyze what Husserl calls the authentic concept of plurality. Since Husserl holds that no concept can be thought without a concrete intuition on which it is based, we had to search for this basis with respect to the authentic concept of plurality. It turned

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out that the authentic representation of aggregates of objects is this basis. Henceforth our efforts were directed towards analyzing aggregates of objects. We saw that not the aggregate as such was important (in the objective sense of being an arbitrary collection of objects) but its aspect of wholeness which we baptized "collective connection." The next question was what kind of a relation this collective connection is. Husserl's refutation of five theories concerning this relation revealed that it had to do with the mind which represents aggregates to itself.

The positive analysis brought to the fore that this relation is a simple psychical one and that it is the meaning of an act which unifies objects without taking notice of their particular contents. Hence, the "collective connection" is a property of an act which is directed towards objects but the relation does not belong to these objects themselves. We tried to interpret this "property" as the meaning of the act. Only a second-level reflective act can have this meaning as its object and it is precisely when this reflective act takes the reflected act to mean the unification of "mere somethings" that the concept of plurality is constituted.

We then pointed out a difficulty with respect to the order of complexity involved in the act of collectively connecting objects. Husserl speaks sometimes as if it were a first-order act and seomtimes as if it were an act which may be of second to n'th order. We resolved the difficulty by distinguishing between the degree or level of complexity and the degree or level of reflection of acts.

Finally, we reviewed critically the eleventh chapter of Husserl's

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"Philosophy of Arithmetic" which deals with symbolic representations of large aggregates. We found that we are able to collectively connect large aggregates because of certain quasi-qualities (the "figural moments") which are given to us. However, we claimed that this account does not add much to Husserl's earlier analysis and that it is unsatisfactory.

Throughout the chapter we emphasized the fact that Husserl's "psychologism" did not play an essential role in our discussion.

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ESSAY II

SARTRE'S ATTACK ON HUSSERL'S NOTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO: AN EXAMINATION OF SARTRE'S "THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO"

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1. Introduction

Sartre's first major philosophical essay "La Transcendence de l'Ego"[1] has become the focus of several critical remarks in recent articles[2] since its translation into English. But apart from some criticisms which occurred in the wider framework of a discussion of existentialism versus phenomenology it has not yet become the subject of a more detailed philosophical study in spite of the fact that it is generally acknowledged that the validity of the claims which Sartre makes in this essay might very well undermine most of the work which Husserl undertook since 1905. The present essay tries to fill this gap by giving an account of Sartre's essay and by evaluating his claims in some detail. This section will provide a general introduction into the problem, while the next section will be devoted to a clearer presentation of Sartre's alleged proof that Husserl's "transcendental ego" is not transcendental at all but transcendent. The third section is concerned

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[1] Sartre, Jean-Paul, "La Transcendence de l'Ego, Esquisse d'une Description Phenomenologique," Recherches Philosophiques VI (1936), 85-123. Sylvie Le Bon has edited this essay anew, adding an introduction and notes of her own: Sartre, Jean Paul, La Transcendence de l'Ego, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris 1966; all references will be to this edition if the original French text is quoted. The English translation was done by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick and has appeared under the title Sartre, Jean-Paul, The Transcendence of the Ego, An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, Noonday Press, New York 1957; all references will be to this edition if the English translation is quoted.

[2] Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatric defend Sartre's view with some arguments of their own in their introduction to their translation of Sartre's essay. Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl's Phenomenology and Existentialism," The Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1960), pp. 62-74, is highly critical of Sartre's attempt without giving a detailed analysis; his essay has been reprinted in a slightly revised version as "Husserl's Phenomenology and Sartre's Existentialism" in Kockelmans, Joseph J., Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and its Interpretation, Doubleday, Garden City 1967, pp. 252-266. The article

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with Sartre's explanation of the fact that an ego is given in reflection. The fourth section will contrast Sartre's notion of consciousness with Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego.

Husserl had occupied himself with the discussion of the necessity of a "pure ego" for the first time in the beginning of his fifth "Logical Investigation"[3] notably in sections 2 to 8 and section 12b. Here Husserl discusses the notion of consciousness as if it comprised a multitude of "experiences" (Erlebnisse) and claims that the "phenomenological reduced I" is nothing but the unity of connections between the single experiences: "The phenomenologically reduced ego is therefore nothing particular, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity."[4] This "unity of connection" seems to be identical with that part of the "empirical I" which remains if we dissociate the empirical I from its body (Ichleib). However there are two difficulties which Husserl faces:

(a) The I of the cogito cannot be identified with the empirical I;[5]

(b) We cannot avoid reference to the "experiencing I" if we want to describe experiences reflectively.[6]

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by Maurice Natanson: "Phenomenology and Existentialism," The Modern Schoolman, 37 (1959), pp. 1-10, has also been reprinted in the above volume by Kockelman, pp. 338-348. This latter essay offers more detailed arguments against Sartre. D. Sinha, Studies in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1969, devoted two pages to the discussion of Sartre's thesis (pp. 84-85).

[3] Husserl, Edmund, Logical Investigations, Translated by J.N. Findlay, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1970, Vol. II, pp. 531-659.

[4] Op. cit., p. 541.

[5] Op. cit., p. 543.

[6] Op. cit., pp. 561-562.

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In order to avoid the assumption of a "pure ego" Husserl identifies the I of the cogito and the "experiencing I," with a certain "kernel" or inner part of the conceptual representation of the empirical I. It is important to see that at first Husserl does not identify the I of the cogito with a part of the empirical I itself but rather with a part of its conceptual representation.[7] The reason for this could be that both the cogito, and the description of experiences are themselves reflective experiences which have experiences as their intended objects. If this line of reasoning would be pursued one would probably have to distinguish between this kind of I and the "empirical I" itself. However in the very next sentence Husserl identifies this "kernel of our empirical ego-notion" with that part of the empirical I which is given with certainty. This equivocation between "empirical ego-notion" (which would denote a reflective experience) and "part of the empirical I" (which denotes the unity of connection of any kind of experiences) shows that Husserl did not (or did not want to) distinguish here between unreflecting and reflecting acts. Consequently he assumes that the I of the cogito is identical with a part of the empirical I and that the phenomenon of an I which perceives itself poses no conceptual problem. What happens here is that the "phenomenologically reduced ego" which Husserl calls also "phenomenal I" perceives either itself or the body to which it belongs or both.[8] A possible critique of this claim is

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[7] "In the judgment 'I am' self-evidence attaches to a certain central kernal of our empirical ego-notion which is not bounded by a perfectly clear concept." op. cit., pp. 543-549.

[8] Op. cit., p. 550.

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brushed off by Husserl with the remark that such a self-perception of the empirical I is common fact which poses no difficulties for the understanding.[9] One might well ask the question why Husserl resented the idea of a "pure I" as it was originally conceived both by Descartes and Kant and again by the neo-kantian philosophical movement which flourished in Germany at the time of the original publication of his "Logical Investigations." One good reason might be the fact that Natorp's "Introduction into Psychology according to the Critical Method,"[10] which Husserl discusses in this connection, contains some misleading formulations which must have arroused Husserl's suspicion. Natorp distinguishes in this work between the "contents of consciousness" and the "I" to which these contents are related. The sum of the relations between each individual content and the never changing I (the pure I) is called consciousness proper (Bewusstsein). Each single relation itself is called a relation of consciousness (Bewusstheit). A little later Natorp again makes it explicit that the I is totally different from the contents of consciousness in that it is conscious of them whereas the latter are not conscious of the former. The implication that it is the content of consciousness which the I is conscious of must indeed be scandalous for Husserl who explains again and again in the fifth investigation that the contents of consciousness are not eo ipso the objects of consciousness. These so called contents of

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[9] "Self-perception of the empirical ego is, however, a daily business, which involves no difficulty for understanding." op. cit., p. 551.

[10] Natorp, Paul, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. I refer only to the quotations of this work by Husserl on pages 548-551

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of consciousness do not appear to consciousness but are had by consciousness.[11] Husserl believes that not to distinguish this difference between appearance and experience involves a confusion between the "reellen Inhalt" of an act and its "intentionalen Inhalt."[12] The contents of consciousness are roughly the medium with the help of which consciousness grasps its "object" which is external to it. This does not mean that the contents of consciousness cannot become the objects of specially reflective acts of consciousness; but even when this is the case there will be new "contents of consciousness; of higher order as it were, which are not the object of consciousness.

The foregoing considerations are certainly good reasons for repudiating Natorp's specific conception of consciousness, but they are not compelling enough to force the rejection of the pure I as such. It is therefore difficult to see why Husserl reacts to these remarks of Natorp's in the way he does. Instead of revising the conception of the pure I in such a way that it conforms to his own notion of consciousness, Husserl feels compelled to completely reject the idea of a pure I. He claims that he "cannot find such a primitive I" as would be needed for the center of the relations within consciousness. The only thing which he can perceive, so Husserl claims, is the empirical I.

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[11]Most of the fifth investigation is devoted to the explication of this difference, but the following sentences make the thrust of Husserl's claim especially obvious: "The appearing of the thing (the experience) is not the thing which appears (that seems to stand before us in propria persona). As belonging to a conscious connection, the appearing of things is experienced by us, as belonging in the phenomenal world, things appear before us. The appearing of the things does not itself appear to us, we live through it." Op. cit., p. 538.

[12]Compre op. cit., p. 576.

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Yet his notion of "finding the I" or "perceiving it" is already very doubtful. It seems as if he were literally engaged in a search of the kind, in which we engage ourselves when we try to find some object in the room, say a book, because it is missing or because we do not know whether we have it at all. But neither Natorp nor any one else of the neo-Kantian school would have dreamt of "finding" the pure I in such a way. Husserl's "refutation" of the pure I simply misfires. It is therefore equally misleading - when Husserl adds in the second edition a footnote which says that in the meantime he has learned to find it (namely the pure I).[13]

Husserl saw later that some of the reasons for which he rejected Natorp's account of consciousness were unjustified. He must have felt that the difference between the I of the cogito and the empirical I is more radical than the difference between the empirical I and some part of it. At the same time he must have realized that one can construe the pure I in such a way that it is not necessarily conscious of the contents of consciousness. The solution to the problem which Husserl poses, namely that

(1) he wants to distinguish between the empirical I and the pure I, and

(2) he does not want the pure I to be conscious of the "contents of consciousness"

is indeed very simple: The "pure I" or the "transcendental ego" as Husserl calls it later is made that part of the "reellen Inhalt" of

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[13] Op. cit., p. 549.

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consciousness which grasps the intended object of consciousness (the "intentionalen Inhalt") through (or by means of) other parts of consciousness without having them as intended objects. Thus, this notion of the pure I, which Husserl develops for the first time in his "Ideas" saves Natorp's initial impetus without at the same time falling into his errors. It would therefore be false to say that Husserl has simply made Natorp's position his own.

Sartre seems to have not been aware of the difficulties of the position which Husserl had taken in his "Logical Investigations" even though Sartre must have read rather closely those sections which I have discussed. Instead he seems to cherish Husserl's standpoint as it is presented in these sections without reservation, in fact some of his arguments seem to be an exact copy of what Husserl had said in these sections.[14] He also does not seem to be aware of the fact that nevertheless his own exposition of the subject does not at all points coincide with the viewpoint of Husserl in his Logical Investigations, at least Sartre does not mention that there are such differences.

So far we have discussed only the compatibility of a pure I with the notion of consciousness as developed by Husserl. Distinct from this is the question of whether or not the pure I is necessary for phenomenological analysis. It is precisely at this point that Sartre's

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[14] Compare, for example, Sartre's claim that he cannot find an I in unreflected consciousness (Transcendence...., p. 46/47) with the same kind of remarks which Husserl makes (Logical Investigations, p. 376).

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discussion begins. His aim is to show not only that a transcendental ego or pure I is not necessary but also that what usually passes as the transcendental ego is really transcendent.

At the very start of his essay Sartre claims that he wants to show "that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world."[15] Starting with Kant's dictum that the "I think" must be able to accompany all our representations, Sartre asks three questions:

(1) Does the "I think" have to in fact accompany all representations?

(2) Given that a certain representation A is unaccompanied by the "I think" but then passes to some state in which it is accompanied by the "I think", does the representation remain basically unchanged or will its structure change?

(3) Is the "I" that we encounter in our consciousness a principle which unites the representations or does the unity of our representations make the "I" possible?[16]

Sartre eventually denies the first question, decides that A's structure changes in the issue of the second question, and ends up deciding in the third question, that the "I" is not the uniting principle of the representations.

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[15] Transcendence...,p. 31.

[16] Op. cit., p. 34.

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2. Sartre's main arguments against the transcendentality of the Ego

a) Sartre's proof that the transcendentality of the Ego is neither necessary nor desirable.

Sartre begins his detailed analysis with proving that the "formal presence" of the I in consciousness is neither necessary nor desirable. But what does Sartre mean by "formal presence"?

Sartre "concedes" to Kant, that the "I think" must be able to accompany all our representations.[17] A page later he identifies Kant's "transcendental I"[18] with "transcendental consciousness" and remarks that it "is nothing but the set of conditions which are necessary for the existence of an empirical consciousness."[19] Obviously then Sartre cannot mean by "formal presence of the I" the existence of this "set of conditions which are necessary for the existence of an empirical consciousness," since he does not try to refute the latter whereas he wants to disprove the former.

Sartre's meaning becomes clearer if we consider what he says right after his "concession to Kant": "But need we then conclude that an I in fact inhabits all our states of consciousness and actually effects the supreme synthesis of our experience?"[20] He disclaims the validity

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[17] Op. cit., p. 34. The original formulation of Kant can be found in his "Critique of Pure Reason."

[18] Throughout this essay "transcendental I" and "transcendental Ego" are used synonymously.

[19] Op. cit., p. 33.

[20] Op. cit., p. 32. In the original text Sartre asks whether the I "opere reellement la synthese supreme...", La Transcendence..., p. 13/14. It seems however that Sartre does not distinguish between "reell" and "real" as Husserl does, Sartre's choice of words notwithstanding. Husserl might very well say that the transcendental ego effects the syntheses "reell" but not "real."

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of such an inference and insists that such an inference would violate the Kantian view:

> "Consequently, to make into a reality the transcendental I, to make of it the inseparable companion of each of our "consciousness," is to pass on fact, not on validity, and to take a point of view radically different from that of Kant."[21]

But it is precisely this, the "making into a reality the conditions... for the possibility of experience,"[22] with which Sartre charges some neo-Kantians and Husserl. What Sartre refers to with the "theory of the formal presence of the I" is thus a view according to which the transcendental I is given in a somewhat different sense than that which we ordinarily use when we speak of certain conditions as being given. The passage in which Sartre charges Husserl with deviating from Kant is the following which will be quoted in full:

> "If we reject all the more or less forced interpretations of the I Think offered by the post-Kantians, and nevertheless wish to solve the problem of the existence in fact of the I in consciousness, we meet on our path the phenomenology of Husserl. Phenomenology is a scientific, not a critical, study of consciousness. Its essential way of proceeding is by intuition. Intuition, according to Husserl, puts us in the presence of the thing. We must recognize, therefore, that phenomenology is a science of fact, and that the problems it poses are problems of fact; which can be seen, moreover, from Husserl's designation of phenomenology as a descriptive science. Problems concerning the relations of the I to consciousness are therefore existential problems. Husserl, too, discovers the transcendental consciousness of Kant, and grasps it by the ἐποχή . But this consciousness is no longer a set of

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[21] Op. cit., p. 33. The original French text starts with "En consequence, realiser le je transcendental..." which again is ambiguous as to whether Sartre means that the I is made "reell" or "real." However, it seems safe to assume that Sartre does not take Husserl to speak of the transcendental ego as something which is "real" rather than "reell."

[22] Op. cit., p. 32/33.

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> logical conditions. It is a fact which is absolute. Nor is this transcendental consciousness a hypostatization of validity, an unconscious which floats between the real and the ideal. It is a real consciousness accessible to each of us as soon as the "reduction" is performed. And it is indeed this transcendental consciousness which constitutes our empirical consciousness, our consciousness "in the world," our consciousness with its psychic and psychophysical me."[23]

First of all it is by no means clear what Sartre means by "fact" in this context. Husserl insisted, contrary to Sartre's claim, that phenomenology is not a science of facts but a science of essences. Sartre acknowledges this in a footnote but remarks that "for the point of view we adopt, it amounts to the same."[24] But what Sartre means by "fact" is not the same thing as what Husserl means by the word. Husserl's application of the word "fact" is restricted to those "real" things in the world which have temporal and spatial coordinates and are usually the objects of various sciences of fact (Tatsachenwissenschaften); essences are not in space and time. For Sartre on the other hand, "facts" denote all those things which are claimed to be given to consciousness in that special sense which we have discussed above. According to this usage essences may very well be facts insofar as they are given to consciousness. And there is indeed no doubt that Husserl claimed that essences can be intuited, i.e. that they can be given in a primordial sense (originarer Weise).[25] On the other hand

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[23] Op. cit., p. 35/36.

[24] Op. cit., p. 113, footnote 3.

[25] Compare Husserl, Edmund, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Collier Books, New York, 1962, p. 49: "Thus essential insight is intuition, and if it is insight in the precise sense of the term, and not a mere, and possibly a vague, representation, it is a primordial dator Intuition, grasping the essence in its "bodily" selfhood." I have changed one word in this translation: where the original translation reads: "the pregnant sense of the term" I translated: "the precise

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it is problematical to say, as Sartre does, that "therefore" the problems concerning the relation of the I to consciousness are existential problems. Again it must be remarked that Sartre seems to use the word "existential" in a special sense. Usually we speak of existential problems only in connection with problems pertaining to the time-space-coordinates of things. If Sartre meant that, then surely he would be guilty of a non sequitor. On the other hand it is not constructive to merely call the problems pertaining to the relationship between the I and consciousness existential ones.

What Sartre might have meant with "an unconscious which floats between the real and the ideal" simply escapes my interpretive powers. Fortunately enough Sartre does not charge Husserl with holding this idea, so we do not have to worry about its possible interpretations.

Despite the divergence of terminology and the minor misgivings which we have discussed one can say that Sartre gives a fairly accurate rendition of Husserl's view according to which the transcendental consciousness is accessible in a special way to a special type of consciousness, the former being the ἐποχή and the latter being the phenomenological attitude.

That much then for Sartre's account of Husserl's position. His critique turns on what he takes to be Husserl's motivation for having introduced a transcendental ego: "It is ordinarily thought that the

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sense of the terms" which seems to render the German phrase "pragnanten Sinn" more truthfully into English. My interpretation of Sartre's usage of the word "fact" agrees with the one given by Sylvie Le Bon in her edition of Sartre's essay; see "La Transcendence..., p. 17, footnote 7.

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existence of a transcendental I may be justified by the need that consciousness has for unity and individuality."[26] Sartre does not subsequently attack the demand that consciousness must be able to be construed as unified and individuated, but he does attack the conviction that a transcendental I has to be introduced to satisfy this demand. It is true that Sartre would prove beyond a doubt that the transcendental I is not necessary if he could provide us with some other criterion. It is precisely this which he wants to advocate by claiming that it is really the object of consciousness which unifies consciousness.

> "Now, it is certain that phenomenology does not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualising I. Indeed, consciousness is defined by intentionality. By intentionality consciousness transcends itself. It unifies itself by escaping from itself. The unity of a thousand active consciousnesses by which I have added, do add, and shall add two and two to make four, is the transcendent object "two and two make four." Without the permanence of this eternal truth a real unity would be impossible to conceive... The object is transcendent to the consciousnesses which grasp it, and it is in the object that the unity of the consciousnesses is found."[27]

This passage makes clear that it is the "permanence" of the object which is the necessary and sufficient condition for the unity of consciousnesses. The following considerations have as their aim to challenge this claim of Sartre's: First, I will try to construct a counterexample to the claim that the "permanence" of the object effects the unity of those consciousnesses which have it as their intended object. The counterexample is indeed easy to find. Think of a child or not-so-well

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[26] Op. cit., p. 37.

[27] Op. cit., p. 39.

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educated grownup who believes consistently and over a period of time that two and two make five. We would surely ascribe unity to these consciousnesses even though we would say that a mistaken belief makes up this consciousness (or: unifies the actual consciousnesses). But which is the object which is necessary for uniting these consciousnesses? Could it be the eternal falsehood that two and two make five? This might seem plausible at first but can be soon led ad absurdum when we do not take abstract objects as examples. In what way can Pegasus, whom most philosophers agree does not exist, unite Mr. N's thinking of Pegasus which occurs consistently over a period of time?

Sartre might reply that the unifying objects of these examples are neither the falsehood "two and two make five" nor "Pegasus" but "the mistaken belief that two and two make five" and "Pegasus as hallucinated." But these latter objects are certainly not the intended objects of the consciousnesses which I construed in this example. It might very well be that these are the objects which unify the consciousnesses in question, but then these objects are very different from those which Sartre must have in mind. For Husserl a "mistaken belief" or a "hallucinated Pegasus" are certainly objects, albeit abstract ones, which can be analysed; but they would be visible only in processes of phenomenological reflection; and they would certainly not constitute the objects to which ordinary consciousnesses (the only ones here discussed) would "transcend." Hence I take it that I have shown that ther permanence of a common object is not necessary for several distinct consciousnesses to be united.

That the permanence of an object is not the sufficient condition

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for unifying consciousnesses can be shown by the following example. Let Mr. M and Mr. N both look at the same thing at the same time. In what sense should we say that these two consciousnesses are unified by the same object? A purist might reply that the objects of these two looks cannot be identical since both men have different perspectives resulting from their different positions in space. This is not a serious objection because we can have both men think or hallucinate the very same thing. If the purist replies to this that it is not possible for two different men to think of the same thing then we can charge him with taking exception to his own beliefs according to which it is the object which unifies consciousnesses. If it is impossible for two consciousnesses belonging to two different persons to have the same intended object then what can be the reason to assume that two consciousnesses within one person may have the same object. But if my opponent went to the extreme of saying that indeed two consciousnesses in one person cannot have the same object then a fortiori these two consciousnesses can either not be unified at all or some principle other than the unity of the object must be responsible for the unity of consciousness. I have hence forced my possible opponent into a dilemma: if he agrees that two persons might intend the same object then he would have to concede that in such a case the two consciousnesses are not united by the object or else he would have to retreat to a completely uninteresting sense of "unity of consciousnesses" according to which Cesar's adding two and two to make four is unified with my adding two and two to make four; if, on the other hand, he denies the possibility of two persons ever intending the same object then he has either already

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abandoned the hope that consciousnesses might be united regardless of whether they belong to one and the same or different persons or else he has to concede that it is not "in the object that the unity of the consciousnesses is found."

Sartre might argue that the above consideration confuse two kinds of "unities" to be found in consciousness, the second of which would be "unity within duration." All that the above arguments show is that this "unity within duration" is not necessarily and sufficiently effected by the intended object. Let me concede this. My question then is: what is the other kind of unity which Sartre has in mind when he says that it is effected by the intended object? If it is something else than this uninteresting kind of "unity" discussed earlier (according to which Cesar's and my adding two and two to make four are by definition "unified" because the intended object is the same) then some version of the above argument will probably still hold. As to the "unity within duration," Sartre seems to admit that it is not the intended object which effects this unity. He holds indeed that it is "consciousness which unifies itself, concretely, by a play of "transversal" intentionalities which are concrete and real retentions of past consciousnesses."[27] Sartre agrees here with Husserl's early "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins"[28] and holds, albeit mistakenly, that Husserl preserved this conception of "consciousness unifying itself in time" even in his "Cartesianische Medita-

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[27] Op. cit., p. 39.

[28] Husserl, Edmund, Zur Phanomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserliana Vol. X., Haag (Nirhoff), 1966.

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tionen."[29]

So far we have considered Sartre's specific arguments against the necessity of the transcendental I, showing their shortcomings. But to show that Sartre's reasons for denying the necessity of the existence of the transcendental ego are bad ones is not the same as showing that his claim is never even in principle justifiable. Some arguments of Strawson's are much more convincing in this respect.[30] The same is true, of course, regarding Sartre's next claim, namely that the transcendental I is undesirable. His belief might be correct, but his reasons for his belief are certainly not compelling, as will be shown now. After having "demonstrated" that it is consciousness itself which makes its own unity possible and actual thus rendering the transcendental I "superfluous," Sartre goes on to show that it would be a hindrance as well:

> "But, in addition, this superfluous I would be a hindrance. If it existed it would tear consciousness from itself; it would divide consciousness; it would slide into every consciousness like an opaque blade...Indeed, such an I is not the object (since by hypothesis the I is inner); nor is it an I of consciousness, since it is something for consciousness. It is not a translucent quality of consciousness, but would be in some way an inhabitant. In fact, however formal, however abstract one may suppose it to be, the I, with its personality, would be a sort of center of opacity. It would be to the concrete and psycho-physical me what a point is to three dimensions: it would be an infinitely contracted me."[31]

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[29] Sartre seems to be mistaken in this point. In both sections which Sartre might have in mind (sections 18 and 37) Husserl refers explicitly either to the cogito (which effects this synthesis) (section 18) or to the ego (which constitutes itself within the unity of a history (Geschichte).

[30] Strawson, P.F., Individuals, London 1959, Chapter III. Strawson holds that such a transcendental ego could never be individuated, because there could never be more than one transcendental ego in the universe which would render this concept useless for purposes of individuation.

[31] Transcendence..., p. 40 and 41. In the original French text the first sentence of the second paragraph reads as follows: "En effet, ce je n'est

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Why should the transcendental ego be a hindrance? Sartre gives no argument which would justify his claim that the transcendental ego would tear consciousness from itself. According to Husserl, whom Sartre seems to be attacking here, the transcendental ego belongs to the structure of transcendental consciousness, the existence of which Sartre "readily" acknowledges.[32] If, moreover, such a transcendental ego is conceived of as something which "would slide into every consciousness like an opaque blade..." then obviously it is conceived of like a thing which could be conceptually independent from consciousness. But this very issue is at question: Instead of proving that the transcendental ego can never be a structure of consciousness he merely assumes it. The petitio principi becomes even more obvious in the next sentence. Let us agree: The I is inner and not the object of consciousness. As Sartre says: "...nor is it an I of consciousness, since it is something for consciousness." What can it mean "to be something for consciousness"? Would it not imply that this which is for consciousness is an object for consciousness? But if this is part of what Sartre is saying here then his proof is completely worthless. What he seems to attempt is a reductio ad absurdum proof that the I is not inner. The first step, namely the introduction of the negation of the desired

ni l'objet (puisqu'il est interieur par hypothese) ni non plus de la conscience, puisqui'il est quelque chose pour la conscience..." (La Transcendence..., p. 24/25). I have accordingly supplied italics for the word "for" in the English text where these italics are not to be found.

32"For our part, we readily acknowledge the existence of a constituting consciousness. We find admirable all of Husserl's descriptions in which he shows transcendental consciousness constituting the world by imprisoning itself in empirical consciousness." Transcendence..., p. 36.

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conclusion, is made. But no contradiction is derived. Instead the desired conclusion itself is introduced. But for what reason? To show that its negation is false? That would not be legitimate technique to say the least. But maybe Sartre thinks that from the premise that the I is inner one can conclude that it is "in some way an inhabitant" of consciousness. But certainly this follows from the premise as much as "the first floor is an inhabitant of the house" follows from "the first floor is within (inner to) the house," namely not at all. We might readily admit that such an inhabitant of consciousness is indeed undesirable. What Sartre fails to show is that the transcendental ego as conceived of by Husserl is such an "inhabitant," thus I conclude that even though a transcendental ego might be both unnecessary and undesirable Sartre has not shown this to be the case.

(b) Sartre's proof that the Ego is the object of reflecting consciousnesses.

Sartre might have proceeded by claiming that there is no "I" anywhere. However that is not his aim. Instead he wishes to distinguish between two different types of consciousnesses, the unreflective and the reflective type, and then show that the I which appears in consciousness is really the object of a reflecting consciousness which grasps the I "through" an unreflecting consciousness. His system of arguments is so entangled that it seems wise to present it in a more formal fashion.

So far we have dealt with unreflective consciousness, but what about the situation where we reflect our own thoughts. Is there no I

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either? Sartre claims that here the I appears and he starts with this as a factual premise:

> "The fact that can serve for a start is...this one: each time we apprehend our thought, whether by an immediate intuition or by an intuition based on memory, we apprehend an I which is the I of the apprehended thought, and which is given, in addition, as transcending this thought and all other possible thoughts. If, for example, I want to remember a certain landscape perceived yesterday from the train, it is possible for me to bring back the memory of that landscape as such. But I can also recollect that I was seeing that landscape."[33]

Some sentences later Sartre makes an even stronger claim: not only is it possible that the I appears when I reflect on my consciousness, but "there is not one of my consciousnesses which I do not apprehend as provided with an I."[34] Hence the "I think" or "I am conscious of" or simply the Cogito does in fact emerge, and moreover its certitude is absolute. Still we should not forget that the cogito emerges only in a reflective operation; it arises as the transcendent object of the reflecting consciousness which is directed upon the reflected consciousness. It is crucial that the distinction is made here between the consciousness reflecting upon another consciousness which is called reflecting consciousness, and the consciousness which is the object of reflection and is called reflected consciousness.

Sartre's arguments can be represented by the following system of premises and conclusions.

Premise 1: Consciousness is intentional and never without an object toward which it is directed. (it's "intentional object")

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[33] Op. cit., p. 43.

[34] Op. cit., p. 44.

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Definition 1: A reflecting consciousness is a consciousness which has a consciousness as its object.

Definition 2: A reflected consciousness is a consciousness which is the object of some consciousness.

Definition 3: An unreflected consciousness is a consciousness which is not the object of the same consciousness.

Premise 2: No unreflected consciousness is its own object, neither partially nor wholly.

Premise 3: A consciousness which has some particular consciousness as its object is not itself an object of consciousness.

Conclusion 1: A reflecting consciousness is an unreflected consciousness. (Definition 1, Premise 3, Dfinition 3)

Conclusion 2: A reflecting consciousness is not its own object, neither partially nor wholly.
(Conclusion 1, Premise 2)

Premise 4: The Cogito is not a part of unreflected consciousness.

Premise 5: There is a Cogito given in reflecting consciousness.

Premise 6: The Cogito which is given in reflecting consciousness is either a part or an object of the reflecting consciousness in which it is given.

Conclusion 3: The Cogito which is given in reflecting consciousness is not a part of the reflecting consciousness itself.
(Conclusion 1, Premise 4: If the Cogito were a part of the reflecting consciousness, it would then be a part of an unreflected consciousness on the basis of Conclusion 1. This cannot be however because Premise 4

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holds.)

Conclusion 4: The Cogito which is given in reflecting consciousness is the object of the reflecting consciousness.
(Conclusion 3, Premise 6)

Some other interesting conclusions which follow are these:

Conclusion 5: If there exists a reflecting consciousness then there exists an unreflected consciousness.
(Premise 1, Definition 1: Since the converse does not hold there might be unreflected consciousness without reflecting consciousness)

Conclusion 6: Every unreflected consciousness which has a consciousness as its object is a reflecting consciousness.
(Definition 1)

Conclusion 7: A reflected consciousness is always the object of a reflecting consciousness.
(Definition 1, 2 and Conclusion 7; a further premise is however needed: Consciousness is either reflecting or reflected or unreflected)

Sartre takes Premise 1 as established by Husserl and he is certainly entitled to do so, since Husserl writes in his "Ideas": "It is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the precise sense of the term, and justifies us in describing the whole stream of experience as at once a stream of consciousness and unity of one consciousness."[35]

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[35]Husserl, Ideas, p. 222. I have again substituted "precise" for "pregnant"; that Sartre subscribes to this premise is obvious from the text which was quoted earlier in this essay, see footnote 27.

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The three Definitions 1, 2, 3 help to clarify what is meant by a reflecting, reflected and unreflected consciousness. Thus, Sartre calls an "unreflected consciousness" a "consciousness in the first degree"[36] whereas he calls the operation of reflection an "operation of the second degree."[37] That Sartre holds Premise 2 to be true can be gathered from the following text where he speaks of unreflected consciousness as being conscious of itself without positing itself as its own object. This "being conscious of itself" will be discussed more fully later; in our present context it is important that Sartre explicates the meaning of "non-positional":

> "We should add that this consciousness of consciousness...is not positional, which is to say that consciousness is not itself its own object. Its object is by nature outside of it...We shall call such a consciousness: consciousness in the first degree, or unreflected consciousness."[38]

The additional phrase in Premise 2: "neither partially nor as a whole" was added by me but can be said to be well in agreement with what Sartre means to say. Premise 3 is not argued for by Sartre, but since he takes Conclusion 1 for granted he must either hold some such principle or else acknowledge Conclusion 1 to be a premise. Now one might very well doubt this premise. Could it not be possible that we reflect upon a reflecting consciousness of ours which in turn has a (reflected) consciousness as its object? This doubt which we can cast on Premise 3 can of course be cast on Conclusion 1 which depends on Premise 3;

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[36] Transcendence, p. 41.

[37] Op. cit., p. 44.

[38] Op. cit., p. 40/41.

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the same doubt can be casted on Conclusion 1 if we prefer to take it as a premise. That Sartre holds Conclusion 1 to be true becomes apparent in the summary of his argument where he speaks of an "unreflected act of reflection."[39]

Conclusion 2 then follows obviously from Conclusion 1 and Premise 2.

Sartre's argument for premise 4 is introspective. He argues that every unreflected consciousness leaves some non-positional memory of itself. If we consult this memory in a non-positional way (which seems to be possible) then we will not find a cogito in it. He writes:

> "For example, I was absorbed just now in my reading. I am going to try to remember the circumstances of my reading, my attitude, the lines that I was reading...That consciousness in which I try to remember must not be posited as object of a reflection... There is no doubt about the result: while I was reading, there was consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but the I was not inhabiting this consciousness. It was only consciousness of the object and non-positional consciousness of itself."[40]

This sounds very much like Husserl's argument in the "Logical Investigations" where Husserl claims that whilst we are "living" within an act of perception or reading there is no I as point of reference. But, contrary to Sartre, Husserl speaks as if he meant that it is the

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[39] Op. cit., p. 53:"Third, the I never appears except on the occasion of a reflective act. In this case, the complex structure of consciousness is as follows: there is an unreflected act of reflection..." On page 45 Sartre says explicitly: "all reflecting consciousness is indeed, in itself unreflected, and a new act of the third degree is necessary in order to posit it." This makes apparent that each consciousness of the second, third...n'th degree is, when not reflected upon, also a consciousness of the first degree. Since Sartre's proof that the ego or cogito is an object of reflection does not require more than a consciousness of second degree, we could cut off consciousnesses of third...n'th degree.

[40] Op. cit., p. 46/47.

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representation of an I which is missing in such acts and not the I itself.[41] This argument could, if compelling, sway us to accept Sartre's idea that there is no I as a part of consciousness. In the last section we have shown that Sartre's theoretical reasons for his claim are not compelling, i.e. he has not proven to our satisfaction that the transcendental I is neither necessary nor desirable. Here however, Sartre seems to give us a compelling reason for his view: Using the phenomenological method we can show that there is no I in unreflected consciousness. But is this really sound phenomenology? The problem is whether there is anything like a non-positional memory in which the past act can be lived through again, without being altered. If this were possible, then this non-positional memory could be given the status of something which was given absolutely, in the sense of Husserl, i.e. we were in no position to doubt that it is as it shows itself. According to Husserl the range of the absolutely given is very narrow indeed with respect to memory. In order to expose Sartre's difficulty here we have to go into some of Husserl's ideas in more detail. Our concern here is with immanently directed acts. Husserl gives the following "definitions":

> "Under acts immanently directed, or, to put it more generally, under intentional experiences immanently related, we include those acts which are essentially so constituted that their intentional objects, when these exist at all, belong to the same stream of experience as themselves."[42]

Husserl gives himself the example of reflecting on some still

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[41] See footnote 14 for the reference.

[42] Ideas..., p. 112.

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lively conviction of ours: "I am convinced that x is the case." What is given absolutely in this act is my being convinced of x; but that x is the case is not given absolutely. We might say that everything after the "that"-clause is not given absolutely. This implies that if the "I-am-convinced-that"-clause is iterated to yield the sentence "I am convinced that I am convinced that x," then what is given absolutely in this act of reflection is again that I am convinced of something (namely of being convinced of x), but that I am convinced of x is not given absolutely. Husserl shows this with the iteration of remembering: "This type of real (reelen) "self-containedness"...is lacking...in the remembering of remembering. The remembered remembering of yesterday does not belong to the present remembering as a real constituent of its concrete unity."[43]

Husserl insists on the "absolute right of immanent retention, in respect of that which it brings in its flow to real primordial givenness," but he also speaks of the "relative right of immanent recollection, which extends just so far as the content of this memory, taken by itself, shows the genuine character of recollection."[44] What is given absolutely in such immanent recollection is not the recollected experience itself but the recollected experience as recollected; the experience itself is only given relatively.

We have then to distinguish between retentions which are given absolutely and recollections which are given relatively. Let us take

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[43] Op. cit., p. 112/113/

[44] Op. cit., p. 203.

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our previous example of "I remember (now) that I remembered (then)." This is a reflective act in which an act of reflection is directed upon an act of remembering (now) a remembering (then). What is retained and given absolutely in this act is the remembering (now); what is only relatively given is the recollection itself: the remembering (then).

With these conceptual tools we can return to Sartre and, for that matter to the earlier Husserl. The example given is that of remembering my act of reading of a moment ago. Let us rephrase this as "I remember a reading of mine." According to our previous analysis we can say that this is a case of an immanent remembering reflection as the "I am convinced of..." which could be called an immanent being-convinced-of reflection. What is given absolutely is the remembering a reading of mine or the reading of mine as remembered; what is relatively given is the recollection itself, namely the reading of mine simpliciter. Hence everything we assert about the reading of mine simpliciter will not carry the authority of absolute evidence. And to say that there is no "I" in this reading of mine would be quite open to criticism. Sartre is well aware of this difficulty and anticipates it. This is in effect the reason why he introduces the operation of non-positional remembering. Here is his exposition of it in detail:

> "For example, I was absorbed just now in my reading. I am going to try to remember the circumstances of my reading, my attitude, the lines that I was reading. I am thus going to revive not only these external details but a certain depth of unreflected consciousness, since the objects could only have been perceived by that consciousness and since they remain relative to it. That consciousness must not be posited as object of a reflection. On the contrary, I must direct my attention to the revived objects, but without losing sight of the unreflected consciousness, by joining in a sort of conspiracy with it and by drawing up an

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inventory of its content in a non-positional manner."[45]

It seems that Sartre wants to achieve the following by this operation of non-positional memory: what we called the "reading of mine simpliciter" is going to be turned from a recollection into a quasi-retention. This would then enable us to speak of it and its contents with the same authority as we can speak of the reading of mine as remembered. The "object" of this special reflection would not be the reading of mine but the lines read, i.e. the object of the reading of mine. The reading of mine is reenacted and would qualify as a retention. But I cannot agree with this. The reading of mine of a moment ago is gone forever. If I reenact it in my memory it is by this very operation modified. The reading of mine is not immediately retained but immediately retained via memory, and only the former finds Husserl's approval as being indubitable as to its existence and probably also to its constituent contents.[46]

Sartre seems to have anticipated even this objection since he tries to separate the "non-reflective memory of my reading" from the "reflective memory of my reading." He argues that whereas an "I" can be found in the latter no such thing can be found in the former. Moreover since theoretical reasons have shown that the "I" cannot be part of the internal structure of unreflected consciousness, we seem justified to conclude that indeed there is no I in unreflected consciousness and that therefore the "I" must be a special object of reflection.[47]

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[45] Transcendence, p. 46.

[46] Compare Ideas, p. 204.

[47] Transcendence, p. 48.

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But though Sartre might make this distinction he is not justified in using it. This so-called non-reflective or non-positional memory of my reading is given only in reflection. Let us remember that it was an act of reflection in the first place which tried to grasp the reading of mine. The way in which this reading was grasped was a non-positional one. But still this non-positional grasping of my reading is built upon (fundiert in) a reflective act. This reflective act is certainly of a special kind and modified by this non-positional grasping of my reading but, it is still there. If this is correct then the difference between what Sartre calls reflective memory and non-reflective memory is not that in the latter, reflection is altogether missing, but rather that it is modified. If no "I" appears in non-reflective memory and the I appears in reflective memory then it might as well be that the modification of reflection caused the I to disappear. In any way it would not be the I of reflection which needs explaining but rather the loss of the I in this peculiar modification of it. Both "evidences" would at least be on equal footing with respect to propositions concerning the absence or presence of the I in unreflected consciousness. Nor does it help to invoke the "theoretical considerations" which would give weight to the testimony of the unreflective memory, since we have disposed of them earlier in this essay.

It seems then that Premise 4 is unfounded. Since it is a crucial premise I will recapitulate briefly the steps with which I tried to cast strong doubts on Sartre's argument for this premise: (1) I showed that the reading of mine simpliciter is not eligible for the privileged status of being given absolutely. This I showed by

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discussing Husserl's distinction between immanent retention and immanent recollection. (2) I discussed Sartre's claim that we can grasp the reading of mine simpliciter by a special non-positional memory in such a way that it becomes a retention rather than a recollection. I argued that even such a re-enactment would modify the reading of mine simpliciter so that not it, but rather its modification would become a retention. (3) Finally, I showed that this non-positional memory would be a reflective act and that its difference from reflective memory is hence to be found not in its "non-reflectiveness" but rather in its "modified reflectiveness." The combination of these arguments seems to show that Sartre's argument for Premise 4 is ill-founded and not based on proper phenomenological method as devised by Husserl.

Sartre takes Premise 5 for granted and cites Descartes and Husserl as witnesses.[48] Premise 6 is not mentioned by Sartre though it seems necessary for the argument. This premise excludes the possibility that the cogito is neither a part of the reflecting consciousness nor its object. This seems to be a plausible assumption unless one wants to entertain the idea that there is a third place for the I.

Conclusion 3 to 7 follow from these premises, the most important of these being Conclusion 4. However, our discussion of Premises 1 to 6 has shown serious flaws in Sartre's reasoning, and therefore this conclusion cannot be trusted as sound. We may state then that Sartre has not proven that the ego or cogito is the object of reflecting consciousness.

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[48] Op. cit., p. 43.

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3. Sartre's characterisation of consciousness and his exposition of the constitution of the Ego.

So far I have concentrated my efforts on the foundations of Sartre's own theory of consciousness and I have shown that they are rather shaky. But this does not imply that Sartre's own theory is false or meaningless. I have only shown that his reasons for holding this kind of theory are not good ones. His theory is in fact rather appealing and I will try to give as fair a rendition of it as possible. In this section I will try to let this theory speak for itself and I will keep this exposition (1) as closely as possible to the original text and (2) quite free of interpretation. My own comments will be found in the next section. Here I will pretend to believe that the transcendental ego is neither necessary nor desirable and that the ego which appears in consciousness is really an object of reflection.

Sartre characterises the unreflected consciousness by its inwardness and incommunicability.[49] The property of inwardness accounts for the fact that it would not be possible to make unreflected consciousness the object of our study without modifying it. It would evade into ever deeper layers of consciousness. The incommunicability of consciousness seems to be its inability to make claims about itself.

These two characteristics of consciousness go together with a third one. Consciousness does not posit itself; it is not its own object. That it is conscious of itself does not imply that it knows itself other than as this inwardness. In fact if it would posit itself

[49] Op. cit., p. 40.

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as its own object then its character of being inward and incommunicable would be lost. Hence this third characteristic is but a corollary to the other two characteristics. Sartre says also that consciousness is aware of itself only in so far as it is aware of objects. Hence the character of being conscious of itself means nothing else than that consciousness is conscious of itself only if it is conscious of something which transcends it. Sartre sums this nicely up by saying:

> "...the type of existence of consciousness is to be consciousness of itself. And consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent object. All is therefore clear and lucid in consciousness: the object with its characteristic opacity is before consciousness, but consciousness is purely and simply consciousness of being consciousness of that object. This is the law of its existence."[50]

Sartre then goes on to say that consciousness is a non-substantial absolute. It is non-substantial because it does not posit itself and it is an absolute because it is consciousness of itself. Sartre seems to make a distinction between relative and absolute existents and existence and non-existence. Something is a relative existent when it is the object for something. The world for example is a relative existent because it is an object for consciousness. Consciousness however is not relative because it is not for anything, not even for itself. This feature of not being relative is called absolute by Sartre. Moreover consciousness is not existent at all if we mean by existence some property or characteristic which we usually ascribe to tables and rainbows. Conciousness as this absolute and non-existent thing is "all lightness, all translucence."[51] Objects however are opaque and existent.

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[50] Op. cit., p. 40.

[51] Op. cit., p. 42.

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We turn now to a preliminary characterisation of the I which emerges on the level of reflection. The result of Sartre's "argument" is, that if unreflected consciousness is unified at all then it must be its objects which unify it because there is no I which could perform that function. And since reflecting consciousness is unreflected consciousness, the same holds for it too. But this means that the I which was found by Descartes in the "I think" and which emerges in reflective thinking is not the I of this reflective thinking but neither is it the I of the reflected thinking. The I and the think are not on the same level. But what then is the I? It is not a part of the reflected consciousness; rather, it is given through it. Sartre writes:

> "...the I is not given as a concrete moment, a perishable structure of my actual consciousness. On the contrary it affirms its permanence beyond this consciousness...its type of existence comes much nearer to that of eternal truths than to that of consciousness."[52]

The I is a transcendent object of consciousness and shares, therefore, the characteristic of all transcendent objects; it is opaque and not quite penetrable. Therefore it is not a purely formal structure but rather like an infinitely contracted empirical me (which takes the place of Husserl's empirical ego in Sartre's system).[53] Sartre speaks of it as something which "appears veiled, indistinct through consciousness, like a pebble at the bottom of the water."[54] This is also the reason why Sartre thinks that the transcendent I has to

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[52] Op. cit., p. 50.

[53] Op. cit., p. 41 and 54.

[54] Op. cit., p. 52.

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> "fall before the stroke of phenomenological reduction. The cogito affirms too much. The certain content of the pseudo-"cogito" is not "I have consciousness of this chair," but "There is consciousness of this chair." This content is sufficient to constitute an infinite and absolute field of investigation for phenomenology."[55]

There are certain interesting consequences of Sartre's position. Usually we think that the I of consciousness is that force which has desires and supplies values for the objects of its desire. However, if on the unreflected level there is no "I", then there are simply unpersonal desires which become personalized only in the act of reflection. Since unreflected consciousness is impersonal, so is any desire. But then where does the value which an object might have come from? Sartre's answer is rather bold: the objects themselves have the qualities of being, for example, delightful or repulsive. Again the picture emerges that consciousness is spell-bound by its objects.

> "Everything happens as if we lived in a world whose objects, in addition to their qualities of warmth, odor, shape, etc., had the qualities of repulsive, attractive, delightful, useful, etc., and as if these qualities were forces having a certain power over us. In the case of reflection, and only in that case, affectivity is posited for itself, as desire, fear, etc. Only in the case of reflection can I think "I hate Peter," "I pity Paul," etc."[56]

A final example will make Sartre's position clear:

> "On the unreflected level I bring Peter help because Peter is "having to be helped." But if my state is suddenly transformed into a reflected state, there I am watching myself act, in the sense in which one says of someone that he listens to himself talk. It is no longer Peter who attracts me, it is my helpful consciousness which appears to me as having to be perpetuated."[57]

Hence there is a primary level of consciousness where we are pushed around, as it were, by objects. In fact we cannot even say that. Rather

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[55] Op. cit., p. 53/54.

[56] Op. cit., p. 58.

[57] Op. cit., p. 59.

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this primary level of unreflected consciousness is a level of impersonal events. The person is something which emerges only on the level of reflection. There is not even an empirical ego on the first level, and it turns out that both the empirical and the transcendental ego of Husserl are one and the same: a transcendent object of reflective thinking.

After this preliminary characterization of the I we turn to a discussion in which we contrast the primary level of unreflected consciousness with the secondary level of reflecting consciousness and we show how the ego is constituted on the reflective level. So far one might distinguish between two types of "worlds." Firstly, the world of unreflected consciousness which has no other consciousness as its object. If asked what there is in this world, we could say: "objects and conscious events in which objects are loved, hated, looked at, known, etc." But these events are impersonal; there is nobody who loves, hates, looks at, knows, etc. The second world is the world of reflecting thinking. This world is rather strange. First of all, in some respects if does not differ from the first world because reflecting consciousness is itself unreflected. Hence basically there are again objects and conscious events which are directed upon these objects. However the set of objects is not the same but larger: the old objects are still there (tables, friends, mathematical truths) and new objects are given: the conscious events of the first level; three kinds of "psychological" objects: states, actions and dispositions; and in addition to all that the ego. What are these new objects and how are they related to each other? The first-level-events are clear: there

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is a "knowing that 2 and 2 make four," a "consciousness of helping Peter," a "loving of John," etc. These events appear--so it seems--to the reflecting consciousness. They are in fact the only types of objects which reflecting consciousness can be certain about. They are momentous and they are exactly what they appear to be.[58] Sartre says: their being and appearing are identical. Things are different with states. "My love for Peter" or "my hatred of Peter" are states, and they appear to the reflective consciousness. These objects are not identical with the first-level-events; they appear through them. Let us suppose that just now I feel a violent repugnance for Peter. What is given to my reflective consciousness is a "consciousness of violent repugnance for Peter." Moreover I can be certain aout this. But this momentous experience of repugnance is itself not hatred, since hatred appears as being something which was in the past, is just now and will be in the future, in short, hatred is given to reflective consciousness not as momentous but as something permanent. Sartre writes:

> "Now my hatred appears to me at the same time as my experience of repugnance. But it appears through this experience. It is given precisely as not being limited to this experience. My hatred was given in and by each movement of disgust, of repugnance, and of anger, but at the same time it is not any of them. My hatred escapes from each of them by affirming its permanence...It effects by itself, moreover, a distinction between to be and to appear, since it gives itself as continuing to be even when I am absorbed in other occupations and no consciousness reveals it... Hatred, then, is a transcendent object...Hatred is credit for an infinity of angry or repulsed consciousnesses in the past and

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[58] Op. cit., p. 62. Hence these consciousnesses are given absolutely and it would be nonsensical to claim that we can be mistaken about them.

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> in the future. It is the transcendent unity of this infinity of consciousnesses."[59]

Hence whenever the reflective consciousness says: I hate Peter, then it asserts too much in terms of certainties. I cannot be mistaken about this present experience of repugnance, but I might be mistaken about my hatred of Peter. This is so because my hatred of Peter is a transcendent object of reflective consciousness whilst this experience of repugnance is an immanent object. To say that something is a state is to say that it is passive. Sartre does not give an argument for this. Sartre had said earlier that a relative existent is something which is an object for consciousness. Now he seems to argue that states are passive because they are relative. His argument however is not telling. He seems to think that to be an object of thought means to be passive. "A relative existence can only be passive, since the least activity would free it from the relative and would constitute it as absolute."[60] No reasons are given for this position.

Hatred, being passive, cannot be spontaneous. This experience of repugnance however, this particular consciousness, is given to reflection as spontaneous. This consciousness "appears to reflection as a spontaneous emanation from hatred."[61] The relevant passages seem to leave the question open whether or not Sartre thinks that there is a

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[59] Op. cit., p. 62/63.

[60] Op. cit., p. 66.

[61] Op. cit., p. 67.

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causal connection between states and spontaneous consciousnesses. He speaks of "magical bond"[62] but does not specify it.

The second kind of psychical objects are actions. Actions share with states the property of being the unity of an infinity of consciousnesses. But in addition to this an action is "also a concrete realization"; it "requires time to be accomplished."

> "It has articulations; it has moments. To these moments correspond concrete, active consciousnesses, and the reflection which is directed on the consciousnesses apprehends the total action in an intuition which exhibits it as the transcendent unity of the active consciousnesses."[63]

The idea behind this seems to be that an action is continuous in time whilst its appearances which are given to the reflective consciousness are discrete. Hence reflective consciousness asserts again too much if it speaks of actions.

Dispositions are intermediaries between actions and states. "When we have experienced hatred several times toward different persons, or tenacious resentments, or protracted anger, we unify these diverse manifestations by intending a psychic disposition for producing them." This disposition represents the substratum of states as the states represent the substratum of experiences. But the relation which holds between dispositions and states is not the one which holds between states and spontaneous consciousnesses. Whilst spontaneous consciousnesses emanate from states which are "objective passivities,"[64] dispositions are potentialities which are actualized in states. States

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[62] Op. cit., p. 68.

[63] Op. cit., p. 69.

[64] Op. cit., p. 71.

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are given as actualities even if no spontaneous consciousnesses emanate from them, but dispositions are given as potentialities only when there is no experience of the respective spontaneous consciousnesses.

The ego is the last object of the world of reflection. It appears to reflection as the unity of states, actions and dispositions. "The ego appears to reflection as a transcendent object effecting the permanent synthesis of the psychic."[65] The ego is

> "the infinite totality of states and of actions which is never reducible to an action or to a state. If we were to seek for unreflected consciousness an analogue of what the ego is for consciousness of the second degree, we rather believe that it would be necessary to think of the World, conceived as the infinite synthetic totality of all things."[66]

We can commit errors with respect to the ego just as we can commit errors with respect to any other transcendent object: "This transcendent totality participates in the questionable character of all transcendence."[67]

But how is the ego as constituted related to states and actions? It is neither emanation, nor actualization but creation. The ego is conceived of as creating ex nihilo actions, dispositions and states. "The ego is the creator of its states and sustains its qualities in existence by a sort of preserving spontaneity."[68] But how can the ego be

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[65] Op. cit., p. 71/72.

[66] Op. cit., p. 74.

[67] Op. cit., p. 75.

[68] Op. cit., p. 78. Qualities are the same as dispositions for Sartre. Whenever he speaks of the qualities of the ego he speaks of the ego's disposition.

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spontaneous if it is the object of reflection and hence, acdording to Sartre, passive? Sartre's answer is simple: this spontaneity of the ego is only a pseudo-spontaneity. The point is that unreflected consciousness (whether reflecting or not) is really that which is spontaneous. The ego as well as states and actions are constituted by reflecting consciousness. It seems that all these objects are like theoretical constructs, hypostatised entities which shall explain appearances. This does not seem quite right, however, because in the following passage Sartre speaks of the ego as an object which is apprehended and constituted:

> "...the ego is an object apprehended, but also an object constituted, by reflective consciousness. The ego is a virtual locus of unity, and consciousness constitutes it in a direction contrary to that actually taken by the production: really, consciousnesses are first; through these are constituted states; and then through the latter, the ego is constituted. But as the order is reversed by a consciousness which imprisons itself in the world in order to flee from itself, consciousnesses are given as emanating from states, and states are produced by the ego. It follows that consciousness projects its own spontaneity into the ego-object in order to confer on the ego the creative power which is absolutely necessary to it. But this spontaneity, represented and hypostatised in an object, becomes a degraded and bastard spontaneity..."[69]

Not only do we constitute our own ego and endow it with spontaneity, but we constitute other egos as well. There is a series of consciousnesses of talking. My reflective consciousness constitutes a somebody as the source of this talking. My consciousness endows the "ego" of the "other" with the spontaneity of producing utterances; I constitute a "magical object."

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[69] Op. cit., p. 80/81.

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> "We are thus surrounded by magical objects which retain, as it were, a memory of the spontaneity of consciousness, yet continue to be objects of the world. This is why man is always a sorcerer for man."[70]

The ego is not only endowed with activity (spontaneity) but also with "interiority." Earlier Sartre had said that unreflected consciousness is elusive in its character, and he called this characteristic its "inwardness," which appears whenever consciousness is aware of an object.[71] This "inwardness" is also expressed in Sartre's formula that consciousness is consciousness of itself. Interiority seems to point to the same fact: "Yet what do we mean by "interiority"? Simply that to be and to be aware of itself are one and the same thing for consciousness."[72] Sartre claims that first the interiority of the reflected consciousness and the one of the reflecting consciousness are the same ("the one fuses with that of the other"[73]), and secondly that this interiority is posited as an object by the reflecting consciousness and fused with the ego. The result is that the ego appears as a relative inwardness which is closed upon itself. The absolute, boundless inwardness of consciousness becomes thus relative "bastard" inwardness: "And this is just how the ego gives itself to reflection: as an interiority closed upon itself. It is inward for itself, not for consciousness."[74] This inwardness breaks down into two structures: intimacy and indistinctness. The intimacy is really the same as the "inwardness" about which we spoke earlier

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[70] Op. cit., p. 81/82.

[71] See above and footnotes 49 and 50 for references.

[72] Op. cit., p. 83.

[73] Op. cit., p. 84.

[74] Op. cit., p. 84.

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(namely the fact that consciousness is infinitely near to itself), the indistinctness seems to be the same as what we called incommunicability. Both these characteristics result in the ego or me not being known to us. Really it is consciousness which remains unknown because of its inwardness and incommunicability, but we assign this to description of the ego.

> "The me, as such, remains unknown to us. And this is easily understood....It is too much present for one to succeed in taking a truly external viewpoint on it. If we step back for vantage, the me accompanies us in this withdrawal. It is infinitely near, and I cannot circle around it."[75]

The ego then is the most complicated object of the world of reflection; it appears as the transcendent unity of the three other transcendent objects of reflection: states, actions, dispositions, yet while I can fasten my reflective gaze on states, dispositions, actions and concrete experiences (the immanent objects of reflection), this is not possible with respect to the ego, because of its bastard inwardness. As soon as I look at it as such it vanishes.

> "This is because in trying to apprehend the ego for itself and as a direct object of my consciousness, I fall back into the unreflected level, and the ego disappears along with the reflective act."[76]

So far it seems as if the ego were recognizable only on the level of reflection. The ego, so we have heard, does not exist on the first level. But is it true that there is no appearance of the I on the unreflected level at all? Sartre even admits that the appearance of an I on the unreflected level is certain. However, this I is the shadow

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[75] Op. cit., p. 86.

[76] Op. cit., p. 89.

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of the ego; it is an empty concept. "But the I, by falling from the reflective level to the unreflected level, does not simply empty itself. It degrades itself: it loses its intimacy."[77] If the I appears at the unreflected level, and it does, then it does so only as the "empty support" of actions which are realized. These actions are not the actions of the reflective level but rather qualities of the objects in the world. Actions on this primary level are

> "qualities of the world and not unities of consciousnesses... For example, the wood has to be broken into small pieces for the fire to catch. It has to: this is a quality of the wood and an objective relation of the wood to the fire which has to be lighted. Now I am breaking the wood, that is to say, the action is realized in the world, and the objective and empty support of this action is the I-concept."[78]

An application of Sartre's theory to one of the more pertinent philosophical problems will bring this short survey to a close. It concerns the problem of "other minds." This problem is sometimes put in the form of the following question: do statements about mental events which concern myself differ in their verifiability from statements about mental events which concern others? Sartre gives his answer: essentially there is no such difference, since my states like hatred or pain are objects which transcend my consciousness as well as the consciousness of anybody else. The same is true of states of other persons. Sartre writes:

> "...if Paul and Peter both speak of Peter 's love, for example, it is no longer true that the one speaks blindly and by analogy of that which the other apprehends in full. They speak of the same thing. Doubtless they apprehend it by different procedures, but these procedures may be equally intuitional. And Peter 's emotion

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[77] Op. cit., p. 90.

[78] Op. cit., p. 90.

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> is no more certain for Peter than for Paul. For both of them, it belongs to the category of objects which can be called into question."[79]

Maybe Sartre is a little bit too rash here, because it seems that Peter has more right to be sure about his emotion than Paul, but this is of course only a matter of degree and not an essential difference. It might very well be that the other knows me better than I do. But what holds for states also holds for the ego: Peter's self is not less open to public inspection than for his own inspection. However there is something radically impenetrable about Peter and that is his consciousness. "I cannot conceive Peter's consciousness without making an object of it (since I do not conceive it as being my consciousness). I cannot conceive it because I would have to think of it as pure interiority and as transcendence at the same time, which is impossible. A consciousness cannot conceive of a consciousness other than itself."[80]

4. Sartre's notion of consciousness as compared with Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego.

A proper evaluation of Sartre's position is difficult because Sartre uses highly metaphorical language to express his thought. In addition to this difficulty there is another one: Since Sartre seems to suggest a substitution of his own system for that of Husserl, a critique might be required to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of both systems before giving the reasons to choose one rather than the other. Since such a procedure would be too difficult in the framework of this essay, I will concentrate my remarks on some points where

[79] Op. cit., p. 95.

[80] Op. cit., p. 96.

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Sartre's position seems to lead to conclusions which are either unacceptable on the face of things or inconsistent with other parts of his system as stated and developed in his essay.

My first point is the following one: all the properties which Sartre ascribes to Husserl's transcendental ego are shifted to what he calls unreflected consciousness. There is just one property which is not transferred and I will try to show that this is unwarranted. I will try to prove that consciousness is opaque to the very same degrees as is the transcendental ego and that therefore both are the same with respect to all four properties discussed by Sartre.

The three properties which are being transferred from the transcendental ego, as Sartre conceives it, to what he calls unreflected consciousness are the ego's spontaneity, inwardness and incommunicability. The property which is dropped is that of "being opaque."

The spontaneity or freedom of consciousness seems to refer to its function of constituting things. That Sartre holds this view is quite obvious from the quotation given above where he says that it is through consciousnesses that the ego is constituted (via states) but that consciousness projects at the same time "its own spontaneity into the ego-object in order to confer on the ego the creative power which is absolutely necessary to it."[81]

It seems equally clear that Husserl conceived of the transcendental ego as that which constitutes everything else through consciousness.[82]

The inwardness and incommunicability of consciousness has already been

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[81] Op. cit., p. 81. For the whole quotation see footnote 69.

[82] Compare Husserl, Ideas, 57 which will be discussed in more detail below.

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discussed. It seems that Husserl's transcendental ego can be characterized in the same way.

The question of the "opaqueness" of the transcendental ego versus the "translucency" of consciousness is the major issue. Why does Sartre think that the transcendental ego is like "a pebble at the bottom of the water"?[83] His reason is that the "I" of the "I think" cannot be grasped with either apodictic or adequate evidence. Unfortunately, his argument is circular. It is true that if we could independently establish that the I can not be grasped, neither with apodictic nor with adequate evidence then this would give us a reason to believe that the ego is "opaque." But Sartre argues that the I is not adequately grasped because the I is an opaque reality. For this very reason alone Sartre's argument cannot be taken seriously. The following text makes this flaw quite obvious:

> "Well, it is only too certain that the I of the I Think is an object grasped with neither apodictic nor adequate evidence. The evidence is not apodictic, since by saying I we affirm far more than we know. It is not adequate, for the I is presented as an opaque reality whose content would have to be unfolded."[84]

But let us assess the validity of Sartre's claim independently of what appears to be a circular argument. We begin with a short characterization of adequate and apodictic evidence.

Something is given with adequate evidence if it is given in its completeness. All things with space-coordinates and/or time-coordinates can never be experienced with adequate evidence, hence they are only incompletely given.[85] Something is given with apodictic evidence when

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[83] Transcendence, p. 52.

[84] Op. cit., p. 51.

[85] Compare Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960, 5 and 6.

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we cannot conceive of it as non-existent. Husserl writes: "An apodictic evidence...is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it, rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as "objectless", empty."[86] Husserl admits that the ego is not given with adequate evidence. Speaking about transcendental self-experience he writes:

> "In such experience the ego is accessible to himself originaliter. But at any particular time this experience offers only a core that is experienced "with strict adequacy," namely the ego's living present (which the grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito, expresses); while beyond that, only an indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends, comprising what is strictly non-experienced but necessarily also-meant."[87]

The ego then is grasped with inadequate evidence because in grasping it we "mean more" than there is evidence for. It would be in this sense that we affirm too much. Sartre evidently misunderstood this. He says that the I is not given with apodictic evidence because we "affirm more than we know." He should have said that this is the reason why we do not grasp the I with adequacy.

This alone would certainly not make the transcendental ego "opaque," at least not any more than any other phenomenon. In order to see this we have to distinguish between two senses of "adequate evidence" which Husserl gives this term. There is first the sense in which all realities or things insofar as they have space-indices cannot be given with adequate

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[86] Op. cit., p. 15/16.

[87] Op. cit., p. 22/23.

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evidence because it belongs to their essence to be given in "perspective variations." A table can be seen by me from only one point of view at a time. But the very corporeality of the table makes for an infinity of such views. It is in this sense that the table can never be completely given to me at any one time. But Husserl makes a point of saying that this kind of indeterminacy means "the determinability of a rigorously prescribed mode."[88] He also speaks of the "determinable indeterminacy" which is nothing else but a "unified and continuous series of possible perceptions which, developed from any one of these, stretch out in an infinite number of directions in systematic strictly ordered ways..."[89]

The second sense of inadequate evidence is different from the first one in that it applies to things with temporal coordinates only. If I gaze reflectively at an experience of mine then this experience is given as going on in time. What I see if I reflect upon it is the experience as it is now. Only in retention can I be conscious of the past of the experience in question.[90]

The difference between these two kinds of inadequate evidences is drastic: if I want to perceive a thing with space-coordinates "more adequately" then I just alter my own spatial relationship towards it without altering the mode of consciousness with which I intended the object. There will be of course also a shift of time-indices. However in the second case where I want to "perceive" more adequately something

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[88]Husserl, Ideas, p. 125.

[89]Op. cit., p. 125.

[90]Compare op. cit., p. 127.

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which "flows through time" then it is not sufficient to vary my space-time-location: I have to remember it or anticipate it; in short I have to alter the mode of consciousness with which I intend the object.

Let me give an example of two possible series of consciousnesses which aim at a more adequate grasp of two "things": the book in front of me and my looking at the book in front of me. The first series would be something like this:

I look from point a and at time 1 at the book

I look from point b and at time 2 at the book

I look from point c and at time 3 at the book

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The second series would be very different in structure in that not only the indices a,b,c...and 1, 2, 3 ...would be changed:

I reflect (from point a and) at time 1 upon my looking...

I reflect (from point a and) at time 2 upon my looking...

I retrospectively remember (from point a and) at time 3 my looking...

Now it is this second kind of inadequate giveness from which the ego suffers. But this kind of inadequacy is certainly ascribable to almost all phenomena. If Sartre holds, as we know he does, that the "certain content of the pseudo-"Cogito" is not "I have consciousness of this chair," but "There is consciousness of this chair"..."[91] and if he

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[91] Transcendence, p. 53/54.

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means to make a distinction as to the adequacy of the givenness of the contents, then his argument is not telling, because both "contents" are inadequately given. The possible exception to this might be immanent retentions which were discussed above and do not seem to apply in this case.

If it is the first kind of "adequacy" which he has in mind (and his metaphor "pebble in the water" suggests this) then he must endow the I with space-coordinates. But this is certainly contrary to even his own intentions, because he states explicitly at one point that the ego is much more like an eternal truth which has no space-coordinates.[92] On the other hand he speaks of the ego as if it were of such a spatial character. He also speaks of states in the same manner; we have already quoted a text where he speaks of hatred as a transcendent object.[93] He continues in that text with the following sentences: "Hatred, then, is a transcendent object. Each Erlebnis reveals it as a whole, but at the same time the Erlebnis is a profile, a projection (an Abschattung)."[94]

Prima facia at least hatred is not a spatial object; neither is the transcendental I. To presuppose that it is spatial and then to build a case against it would be to burn a straw-man. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude either that Sartre had not meant to evoke the first kind of inadequate evidence in order to show that the I is not adequately given, or else we can disregard his argument altogether. On the other hand, if he wanted to build his case against the transcenden-

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[92] Op. cit., p. 50.

[93] See above and footnote 59.

[94] Op. cit., p. 63.

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tality of the I by claiming that ego-experiences are stricken with the second kind of "inadequacy" whereas ego-less experiences are not so stricken then he is simply wrong: all experiences are inadequately given in the second sense with the possible exception of immanent retentions.

Let me quickly summarize what I argued so far: Sartre claims that the transcendental ego is given neither with adequate nor with apodictic evidence. He also claims implicitly that this would be a good reason to accept the ego as "opaque." One might wonder what he means by "opaque." I suggested that it had something to do with the ego's not being adequately given whereas consciousnesses seem to be adequately given.

I then exemplified two senses of "adequately given" as they are used by Husserl. "Inadequacy No. 1" characterizes all spatial objects which can be given only through "perspective variations" (Abschattungen). It seems appropriate to call these objects to which "Inadequacy No. 1" applies "opaque." "Inadequacy No. 2" applies to all objects which have a duration in time and can be grasped in a more complete way if the mode of their givenness changes. Experiences of all sorts belong to this group. It seems inappropriate to call objects to which this "Inadequacy No. 2" applies "opaque."

My third step was to examine the two senses of "Inadequacy" which were ascribed by Sartre to the ego as compared to experiences where no ego functions. I argued that if he employed "Inadequacy No. 1" then he must conceive of the ego as a spatial entity, which seems to be in contradiction (1) to what he himself claims about the ego, (2) to what

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Husserl claims about the transcendental ego, and (3) to common sense. If, on the other hand, he employed "Inadequacy No. 2", then he cannot be justified on this basis in making a distinction between ego-consciousnesses and egoless consciousnesses because both would be in time and hence both would be equally suffering from "Inadequacy No. 2." I conclude from this that on the basis of the ego's inadequacy of givenness (which is conceded by Husserl in sense No. 2), one cannot conclude it to be any more "opaque" than consciousness itself.

Sartre might have been misled by two remarks of Husserl. One of them occurs in the Ideas where Husserl speaks about the peculiar transcendence of the pure ego:

> "If as residuum of the phenomenological suspension of the world and the empirical subjectivity that belongs to it there remains a pure Ego (a fundamentally different one, then, for each separate stream of experiences), a quite peculiar transcendence simultaneously presents itself--a non-constituted transcendence--a transcendence in immanence."[95]

What Husserl refers to by transcendence of the ego seems to be the very same elusiveness of which Sartre speaks with respect to consciousness. The fact is that the ego has exactly the function Sartre ascribes to consciousness: it constitutes everything else. If it in turn were constituted by something other than itself then we could very easily reach an infinite regress of constitutions. In order to avoid that, Husserl stops at the ego, claiming that it is not "constituted." Later he must have felt that this formulation was awkward: is the ego not constituted at all? and he added therefore the phrase "in a certain

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[95] Ideas, p. 157.

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sense" to the sentence which reads now like this:

> "...a quite peculiar transcendence presents itself--in a certain sense a non-constituted transcendence--a transcendence in immanence."[96]

Husserl's answer then is, that the ego constitutes itself but that this peculiar self-constitution is quite different from the kind of constitution the ego does with respect to things other than himself.

The second remark of Husserl which might have misled Sartre occurs in his "Cartesian Meditations" where he leaves the question open as to the possibility of the transcendental ego's being mistaken about itself:

> "How far can the transcendental ego be decieved about himself? And how far do those components extent that are absolutely indubitable, in spite of such possible deception?"[97]

This kind of dubitability of the ego is quite different, however, from the kind of dubitability which surrounds spatial objects and is the same that surrounds experiences generally, as we have seen above.

There reamins of course the problem of the ego's apodicticity. Is it true that it is unimaginable that the ego were not? Husserl answers affirmatively, and Sartre denies it with respect to unreflected consciousness. We have seen that Sartre's reasons for this denial are not convincing.[98] It is not at all clear whether Husserl has any more right

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[96]This change is indicated in the latest German edition of "Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phanomenologie Und Phanomenologischen Philosophie, Husserliana Vol. III, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1950, p. 138, lines 17-19. See also p. 477, line 3 for the critical annotation by Walter Biemel.

[97]Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 23.

[98]See section 2 above.

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to affirm the ego's existence as he does in the following passage:

> "...it is clear that the sense of the indubitability with which the ego becomes given by transcendental reduction actually conforms to the concept of apodicticity..."[99]

It seems that it is at least doubtful whether the ego cogito, ergo sum can guarantee that kind of necessity of the ego according to which its non-being would be inconceivable. Recent discussions of Descartes' dictum seem to deny this kind of necessity.[100] It is not possible and not even necessary to take up this discussion. It seems sufficient to remark that Husserl's position has no advantage over Sartre's position concerning the justification of his claims.

This brings me to the second point which I wish to raise. There seems to be a sense of "necessity" according to which certain assumptions might be necessitated in a philosophical system in order not to strain the intelligibility of other claims within this system. To evaluate the necessity of a claim in this sense is, of course, a very hard task because a convincing verdict should be based on a review of all the available evidence of the philosophical system in question. It seems, nevertheless, that this point is the central issue between Husserl and Sartre. Sartre claims that we can sufficiently describe and explain consciousness without the help of the transcendental ego, while Husserl seems to have felt the opposite.

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[99] Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 22.

[100] Recent essays on this problem are collected in: Doney, Willis (ed.), Descartes, Doubleday, Garden City 1967. The selection from Ayer and Hintikka's article emphasize the performative function of the cogito which as such does not guarantee its certainty or necessity but rather expresses the point that the sentences "I am not thinking" and "I do not exist" are self-stultifying.

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But which criterion should we use to decide which of the two systems is to be preferred over the other given that both systems explain the same kind of phenomena and given that both systems are internally consistent? Two criteria seem to be generally accepted: parsimony and plausability. But what shall we do when one system is more parsimoneous than the other at the expense of its plausibility? Shall we prefer it, or prefer rather the more plausible but less parsimoneous one? I do not wish to decide this question; however, I would like to make it apparent that such a decision is necessary in our case as Husserl is more plausible but less parsimoneous than is Sartre.

Husserl's primitive notions, being less parsimoneous than Sartre's, are comprised of the following: "transcendental ego," "consciousness" and "object." Sartre works with only two of these notions: "consciousness" and "object." Sartre's claims, however, seem to be by far the less plausible of the two.

The most obvious implausibility in his system is his claim that the ego seems to be spontaneous and productive, that it seems to be what constitutes everything else, whereas in reality this spontaneity and creativity which we usually ascribe to it belongs to consciousness; the ego, being constituted rather than constituting, can claim only a bastard-spontaneity.

Sartre is also drivento deny the force of first person-utterances if spoken by an unreflected consciousness. He admits that the "I does appear on the unreflected level."[101] It is usually thought that there is indeed a plausible difference between first-person-utterances and

[101] Transcendence..., p. 89.

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third-person-utterances. It is indeed this very peculiar force of first-person-utterances which has given recent writers considerable trouble.[102] Sartre has to hold that in this case the I "is quite simply an empty concept which is destined to remain empty."[103]

Maybe the oddest consequence of Sartre's position is the following one: value-predicates which are usually thought of as being supplied by the I when they are predicated of certain objects, belong now to the object itself. And desires which are usually ascribed to egos become impersonal.

All these implausibilities are avoided in Husserl's system at the cost of supplying the transcendental ego which in itself is not so implausible to assume, given the implausibilities mentioned. With this I come to the fourth point I wish to raise. This is the possibility that there is at least one problem Sartre can solve very easily which Husserl has had to labor upon quite a bit: The problem of other minds.

It is true that Husserl had considerable difficulties in showing that transcendental egos which belong to different streams of consciousnesses had access to each other. The difficulty lies in the fact that the transcendental ego has privileged access to itself but not to others. Husserl solves this problem by showing that intersubjectivity is a structure of the transcendental ego; in other words the transcendental

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[102] Most of the discussions of "private languages" and the "concept of a person" seem to depend on this point. Compare Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, New York 1953 and the collection of essays "Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations" which was edited by George Pitcher, Doubleday, Garden City 1964.

[103] Transcendence, p. 89.

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ego can conceive of himself only insofar as it can also conceive of other transcendental egos.[104] One might of course question whether or not this "solution" is a good one. But I am not concerned with this here. What I will show is that Sartre's simple-minded solution which seems offhand to be more plausible does in fact not solve the problem of other minds at all. Sartre's solution seems simple: since my ego as a transcendent object is as open to public inspection as Paul's equally transcendent ego, there is no question about "other minds," at least no more than there is a question about "my mind." Hence there is in fact no problem at all.[105] Now we already know, of course, that my ego and Paul's ego are not public objects in the same way as chairs and rainbows are. Moreover, if they are different then this must be due to their being constituted differently by different consciousnesses.

But let us now ask the following question: how do I know that Paul's ego is constituted by a consciousness different from that consciousness which constitutes my ego? Maybe there is just one consciousness which creates two egos as being different from each other. To decide this we would have to ask whether it is possible for one consciousness or one stream of consciousnesses to have access to consciousnesses which are by hypothesis different from itself. The "problem of other minds" has become the "problem of other consciousnesses." Here however Sartre's answer is straightforward: "A consciousness cannot conceive of a consciousness other than itself."[106]

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[104] Compare the fifth meditation in Cartesian Meditations, op. cit.

[105] See the end of Section 3 of this essay and footnotes 79 and 80 for references.

[106] Transcendence, p. 96.

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So then: We cannot conceive of other consciousnesses but we can conceive of other egos whereby their being "other" seems to consist in the fact that they were constituted by other consciousnesses. The only conclusion which I can draw from this is the following: Either it follows that we cannot conceive of other egos and a fortiori cannot inspect them or else we can conceive of other consciousnesses. In the first case Sartre would be in even deeper water than Husserl, who has been accused of solipsism since the appearance of his "Ideas"; in the second case Sartre owes us an answer to the question of how it is possible to conceive of other consciousnesses. This answer would then be a solution to the "problem of other minds" or at least would imply such a solution. In both cases we seem to be justified in claiming that Sartre does not solve the problem of other minds any better than Husserl, to say the least!

My fifth point is a conjecture as to one possible motivation for Husserl finding it necessary to introduce the transcendental ego and its undubitability. I think that he needed it in order to characterize the phenomenological sphere. It is important to see that this phenomenological sphere is characterized by its immanence. Husserl makes it very explicit that the following "norm" or "standard" has to be followed by the phenomenologist:

> "To claim nothing that we cannot make essentially transparent to ourselves by reference to Consciousness and on purely immanent lines."[107]

This refers us back to what Husserl means by the expression "immanence,"

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[107] Ideas, p. 160.

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because we know that it is a characteristic feature of experiences that they are perceivable on immanental lines and we know also that experiences comprise the phenomenological sphere of investigations. What Husserl means with "acts immanently directed" has been already discussed in section 2b, but I will quote the text again, enlarging it with the next sentence which Husserl added to make the point clearer:

> "Under acts immanently directed, or to put it more generally, under intentional experiences immanently related, we include those acts which are essentially so constituted that their intentional objects, when these exist at all, belong to the same stream of experience as themselves. We have an instance of this wherever an act is related to an act (a cogitatio to a cogitatio) of the same Ego, or likewise an act to a given sensible affect of the same Ego, and so forth."[108]

The point which I wish to make is this: in order to make clear what immanently directed acts are, we must already have the notion of "sameness of a stream of experiences." In Husserl's case this is effected by the notion of the transcendental ego: Experiences belong to one and the same stream of experiences if and only if they are constituted by the same transcendental ego. Husserl has clearly indicated that this is his thought in the second volume of "Ideas" which was published in 1952.[109] He says here that the pure ego is numerically one with respect to his stream of consciousness. Some paragraphs later he adds that this one, pure ego is constituted as unity with respect to the unity of the stream in question, meaning that it can

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[108] Ideas, p. 112.

[109] Husserl, Ideen zu Einer Reinen Phanomenologie und Phanomenologischen Philosophie, Volume II, Nijhoff, The Hague 1952, pp. 97-120.

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find itself as the identical one in the course of this stream.[110]

To recapitulate: in order to make the notion of "immanent directedness" intelligible, Husserl refers back to the notion of "one and the same stream of consciousness," and to in turn make this notion intelligible Husserl falls back on the notion of the transcendental or pure ego which effects this self-sameness of one stream of consciousness. If it is true that phenomenology depends on the notion of "immanent directedness" then a fortiori it will, according to Husserl, depend on the notion of the transcendental ego. It should therefore come as no surprise that Husserl is finally driven to accept the following with respect to transcendental phenomenology:

> "Apparently my (the philosopher's) transcendental ego is, and must be, not only its initial but its sole theme."[111]

It is true that this picture might frighten some philosophers (certainly Sartre) in spite of Husserl's admonition that as "beginning philosophers we must not let ourselves be frightened by such considerations."[112] What has Sartre to offer instead? Certainly he refers constantly to the unity of consciousness, but if he tries to ellucidate this concept he falls back on the notion of consciousness self-unification which seems to be effected by some kind of non-positional knowledge

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[110]"Das reine Ich ist, um es ausdrucklich zu betonen, ein numerisch einziges in Hinsicht auf "seinen" Bewusstseinsstrom" op. cit., p. 110, "Das eine reine Ich ist bonstituiert als Einheit mit Beziehung auf diese Stromeinheit, das sagt, es kann sich als identisches in seinem Verlauf finden," op. cit., p. 112.

[111]Cartesian Meditations, p. 30.

[112]Loc. cit.

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of itself. He himself has called this later the "pre-reflexive cogito."[113] It seems then that Sartre has not even gained parsimony over Husserl since he is burdened with the notion of the pre-reflexive cogito in addition to the notions of consciousness and object.

If these remarks are valid and if we consider again the criteria of parsimony and plausibility as being decisive in a choice between otherwise similar systems, then a choice between Husserl's and Sartre's phenomenology would largely involve a comparison between the implausibility of Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego and the implsusibility of the pre-reflexive cogito. Such a task would be a demanding one and it seems therefore wise to abstain from it within the framework of the present essay.

My last point concerns Sartre's major motivation for rejecting Husserl's transcendental ego. This motivation is not difficult to find. Sartre thinks that the ego lacks original spontaneity and he thinks further that consciousness, if it were intricately tied up with the ego, would be at best a restricted spontaneity. But since he wants to preserve the unrestricted spontaneity of consciousness he tries to sever consciousness from the ego. His reasoning seems clear enough. For him "the ego, being an object, is passive,"[114] hence not spontaneous.

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[113] Sartre, J.P. Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York, 1966.

[114] Transcendence, op. cit., p. 79.

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But that the ego is not spontaneous does not harm Sartre's system. Having made the ego transcendent, an object of consciousness, he has freed consciousness from the last restriction. Now he can assert that consciousness is mere spontaneity.

Most of the present essay was addressed to the question of whether Sartre's basic premise in this reasoning is justified. An attempt was made to show that Sartre's claim that the ego is an object of consciousness has not been proven. Moreover his principle, that everything which is an object is passive, is open to criticism. All this taken together seems to be reason engouh for rejecting Sartre's conclusion that consciousness is total spontaneity.

A further consideration, however, might result in an even more devastating criticism. Let it therefore be supposed that Sartre's analysis is correct and that the ego is indeed the object of (reflective) consciousness. The problem which arises is where to locate "freedom" in this system. Is consciousness free or is the ego free or are neither of them free? Sartre's later system, as described in Being and Nothingness,[115] has often been referred to as a "Philosophy of Freedom." If it is true that the Transcendence of the Ego laid the groundwork for this system then we should be able to locate "freedom" somewhere in it.

What freedom might mean for Sartre cannot be fully discussed here. But it seems that two conditions have to be fulfilled in order for an agent to "be free" and it seems that Sartre recognises both of these.

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[115] Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York, 1966.

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The first condition is that the agent has to be able to act at all while the second is that the agent should have some means of control over his action. It seems that these are the minimal conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to make an agent responsible for his acts.[116]

Let us now examine whether or not consciousness is free for Sartre. We know that consciousness, after being purged from the transcendental ego has become an impersonal spontaneity:

> "We may therefore formulate our thesis: transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo... There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators."[117]

But has consciousness also become free? Certainly, the first condition is fulfilled: consciousness is a tireless creation. But can consciousness control or direct this "tireless creation" in any way? If this were so then we could hold consciousness responsible for its creations. But this does not seem to be the case. Sartre calls this spontaneity of consciousness "monstrous" and comments: "consciousness is frightened by its own spontaneity because it senses this spontaneity as beyond freedom."[118]

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[116] Sartre's chapter on "Freedom" in Being and Nothingness (op. cit., pp. 559-711) indicates clearly that he subscribes not only to the first but also to the second condition, i.e. that to say "p acted freely" implies "p could have done otherwise" (op. cit., p. 585).

[117] Transcendence, pp. 98-99.

[118] Op. cit., p. 100.

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The important point here is that Sartre makes a distinction between "spontaneity" and "freedom." This "tireless creation" is monstrous just because it is beyond control, beyond restriction. "Freedom," however, seems to imply some sort of control: whoever is free must be able to choose between events; and it is only because of this possible choice that we can hold the agent responsible for his act. Consciousness has no choice, it is this tireless creation and it cannot control it. Hence it would be wrong to ascribe freedom to consciousness. Sartre makes this quite clear:

> "A phenomenological description of spontaneity would show, indeed, that spontaneity renders impossible any distinction between action and passion, or any conception of an autonomy of the will...it is an essential necessity that one not be able to distinguish between voluntary spontaneity and involuntary spontaneity."[119]

Consciousness itself is then not free, indeed it is "beyond freedom." Is the ego, then, perhaps free? But it appears immediately that the first condition is not fulfilled. In order to be free the ego should be able to have some spontaneity of action. We are told, however, that the ego is not spontaneous, that it is passive, an object which is only constituted by consciousness. The ego only appears to be spontaneous yet does not actually become it. Once again the passage in which Sartre states that consciousness confers on the ego its own spontaneity is quoted:

> "...consciousness projects its own spontaneity into the ego-object in order to confer on the ego the creative power which is absolutely necessary to it. But this spontaneity, represented and hypostatized in an object, becomes a degraded and bastard

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[119] Op. cit., p. 100-101.

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spontaneity...."[120]

Similarly, if one wishes to call the ego free then one confers on it only a degraded or bastard freedom. "Freedom" then does not belong to the description of consciousness and appears only as the attribute of an object of reflection, namely the ego. But it has, together with the ego, only a masking-function: "...perhaps the essential role of the ego is to make from consciousness its very spontaneity."[121] The ego is only a device for consciousness to hide itself from the fact that it is beyond freedom, a device which breaks sometimes down when

> "Consciousness, noting what could be called the fatality of its spontaneity, is suddenly anguished: it is this dread, absolute and without remedy, this fear of itself, which seems to us constitutive of pure consciousness..."[122]

From this it is only a short step to the acknowledgement that "all human activities are equivalent"[123] but a long one to a workable ethics -- a problem which has been recognized by both Sartre and his critics.

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[120] Op. cit., p. 81.

[121] Op. cit., p. 100.

[122] Op. cit., p. 102.

[123] Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 797.

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Essay III

"World" and "Epoché"
in
Husserl and Heidegger

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1. Introduction

It has often been noted that the basic difference between Husserl and Heidegger boils down to their different interpretation of the concept of "world." Desan, for example, believes that the world presented to Husserl the familiar epistemological problem of whether or not we are justified in believing in its existence. Heidegger and Sartre, on the other hand, take our being-in-the-world for granted and do not consider it worth questioning on the epistemological level.[1] Consequently, Husserl's method of "bracketing" our belief in the existence of the world by the transcendental-phenomenological reduction should prove to be either superfluous or obnoxious to Heidegger and Sartre. It is indeed true that Heidegger never mentions this reduction (which is sometimes called the "epoché" by Husserl) and that Husserl seems to have been agrieved by this fact.[2] But whereas Sartre criticises Husserl's epoché openly,[3] matters are not so easy in the case of Heidegger. In fact, Tugendhat has recently suggested that Heidegger did not need to discuss the epoché because his own writings were done from "within" this operation, i.e. because Heidegger performed this operation before he began

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[1] Desan, Wilford, The Tragic Finale, Revised Edition, Harper Torchbooks, New York 1960, p. 6.

[2] Compare Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement, Second Edition, Nijhoff, The Hague 1965, Vol. I, pp. 281-283.

[3] Compare the later sections of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press, New York 1957, and the earlier sections of his Being and Nothingness, Washington Square Press, New York 1966.

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to write.[4]

Tugendhat's suggestion is contrary to both Husserl's own opinion and to the opinions of most commentators. Yet I think that his contention is basically sound and in fact may even be consistent with the widely accepted view which is expressed by Desan. Both positions, however, require some modification. I therefore propose to study Husserl's notion of "world" in more detail than is usually done and then to go on to Heidegger's notion of this same concept. In Husserl's case I will concentrate my efforts on the works of the middle period, covering mainly his "Ideas" and his lectures on "Primary Philosophy, Part II;[5] concerning Heidegger the discussion will be limited to his "Being and Time."[6]

2. World and Experience in Husserl's "Ideas"

Husserl tries in his "Ideas" to establish phenomenology as a new science which has a definite field of its own. He claims that this new science "lies far removed from our ordinary thinking, and has not until our own day therefore shown an impulse to develop."[7] In order to show

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[4]Tugendhat, Ernst, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 1967, p. 263. Tugendhat even goes so far as to say that Husserl "enters the dimension of Heidegger's Being-in-the-world via the epoche." loc. cit.

[5]Husserl, Edmund, Ideen, Vol. I-III, Husserliana Vol. III-V, The Hague 1950-1952, and Erste Philosophie, Zweiter Teil, Husserliana, Vol. VIII, The Hague, 1959. Whenever possible I will refer to the English translation of the first volume of the Ideen: Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, Collier Books, New York 1962 (Henceforth abbreviated as "Ideas").

[6]Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper & Row, New York 1962.

[7]Ideas, p. 37.

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the conceptual implications of this new science and its peculiar objects, he contrasts the "phenomenological attitude" with what he calls "natural attitude" and the objects of phenomenology with the objects of the natural sciences. Supposedly, being in the phenomenological attitude, one gains knowledge of "phenomena" and thus attains phenomenological knowledge, whereas in the natural attitude one gains knowledge of "the world," thus attaining natural knowledge. Our problem is to determine what exactly Husserl refers to with the term "world," and also, to establish what it means to pass from trying to know the world to trying to know phenomena. However since our primary interest lies with the development of this notion of the world, we are in an unfortunate position concerning any guidance to be derived from Husserl. He is, after all, only interested in developing this new science and hence uses the development of the natural attitude only as a springboard for this task. It was only gradually and after he had published the "Ideas" that Husserl saw more fully the obstacles which one has to overcome in the transition from the natural to the phenomenological attitude. It will be argued in this paper that the very notion of "world" proved to be the most troublesome.

The notion of "world" does not define what natural knowledge is even if the opening sentences of 1 of the Ideas seem to suggest this:

> "Natural Knowledge begins with experience (Erfahrung) and remains within experience. Thus in that theoretical position which we call the "natural" standpoint, the total field of possible research is indicated by a single word: that is, the World."[8]

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[8] Op. cit., p. 45. It should be noted that the original German text speaks of "the total horizon of possible research" (Gesamthorizont) instead of

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In the very same section Husserl defines what "world" means in terms of experience. This is not very helpful, however, given the previous explication of what natural knowledge consists of:

> "The World is the totality of objects that can be known through experience (Erfahrung), known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct present (aktueller) experience."[9]

Everything depends, then, on Husserl's notion of "sciences of experience"; if we knew what the objects of these sciences were then we would probably know what "world" stands for, since we would already know that it stood for the totality of these objects. Husserl answers this question in the next paragraph where he asserts that

> "Sciences of experience are sciences of "fact". The acts of cognition which underlie our experiencing [Die Fundierenden Erkenntnisakte des Erfahrens] posit the Real in individual form, posit it as having spatio-temporal existence..."[10]

From this it seems safe to conclude that the term "world" covers the totality of spatio-temporal individuals, whereby these individuals are characterized as being accidental.[11] We will come back to this topic below when we will discuss whether or not the world itself can be accidental.

First of all it seems wise to explore further the objects which belong to the world. Spatio-temporal things are those which we can

"total field of possible research." Below it will be shown that there is a difference between these two notions in that the former might be thought of as belonging to experience itself whereas the latter is the combination of the objects of experience. In this context, however, Husserl seems not to have distinguished sharply between these notions.

[9] Op. cit., p. 46.

[10] Op. cit., p. 46.

[11] Op. cit., p. 47.

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perceive with our five senses. But are those objects which we can perceive the only objects in the world? It seems that the natural attitude does not only allow for perception, it allows also for valuation. The act of perceiving is not the only mode of consciousness which finds itself involved in the natural attitude. But since all acts of consciousness are definable in terms of their particular objects, one should expect other objects than spatio-tmporal things to belong to the world as long as acts of valuation or willing are different from acts of perceiving.

Husserl clearly admits that there are these other kinds of acts. He also admits their special objects: "...in the act of valuation we are turned towards values, in acts of joy to the enjoyed, in acts of love to the beloved, in acting to the action..."[12]

The odd consequence is that the world which is always the world of the natural attitude seems to be populated with entities the space-time character of which is at least highly doubtful. Actions may still be interpreted as events, and thus, as having space-time coordinates, but surely values cannot similarly be interpreted as having space-time coordinates.

Husserl, however, has a unique way in which he reduces these new objects to spatio-temporal things. He makes a distinction between the intentional object and the apprehended object of consciousness. The apprehended object is necessarily an intentional object but not vice versa. An intentional object of consciousness can turn into the appre-

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[12] Op. cit., p. 110.

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hended object if it comes into the focus of attention.[13] This entails the possibility that parts of the intentional object or a different object of an act might not be apprehended. On the other hand it is not possible that nothing is attended to in an act since it is the case that "in every act some mode of heeding (Achtsamkeit) holds sway."[14] From this it follows that whilst in every act there must be one apprehended object there may be additional intentional objects accompanying it.

This distinction is now employed to reduce problems pertaining to objects other than spatio-temporal things to problems of this latter sort. Husserl holds that the specialty of spatio-temporal things is that they cannot be merely an intentional object without being apprehended object as well, whereas tools, values, actions, etc., may be just intentional objects without being apprehended. But they may also become apprehended. Values, for example, may become apprehended by a special "objectifying" turn of thought. It is important to note, however, that this turn of thought is a modification of an act which has a thing as its apprehended object and a value as an intentional object.[15] We can thus conclude: For every act which has one of the non-spatio-temporal things as an object (intentional or apprehended) there exists an act which has a spatio-temporal thing as its apprehended object: the act with the non-spatio-temporal object is a modification one of the latter acts.

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[13] Op. cit., p. 110.

[14] Op. cit., p. 111. Similar remarks can be found in 92.

[15] Op. cit., p. 111.

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It remains undecided whether an act may have more than one object or whether it can have only one (possibly compound) object of which a part is spatio-temporal. The second alternative would be odd (why should the compound not be spatio-temporal if its part is?) and Husserl seems to opt for the first alternative anyway.[16] The main point to note is that should we perform an operation on all acts which have spatio-temporal things as their apprehended objects such that these acts would be "inhibited" or "bracketed," then their modifications would suffer from this operation as well. It is not difficult to guess which operation one might have in mind: it is, of course, the transcendental phenomenological reduction. But before this operation is discussed in more detail we will first quote in full a passage from the "Ideas" which encapsules most of what was said above and then discuss two difficulties, one connected with the type of acts discussed, the other with some exceptional objects of the world.

The passage referred to appears at the end of Section 37 of the "Ideas" and reads as follows:

> "In every act some mode of heeding (Achtsamkeit) holds sway. But wherever it is not the plain consciousness of a subject-matter, wherever some further "attitude towards" the subject-matter is grounded in such consciousness, subject-matter and full intentional object ("subject-matter" and "value," for instance), likewise heeding the object and mentally scrutinizing it, separate out the one from the other. But at the same time the possibility of a modification remains an essential property of these grounded acts, a modification whereby their full intentional objects become noticed, and in this sense "represented" objects, which now, from their side, become capable of serving as bases for explanations, relations,

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[16] He speaks of "objects (being) included in the unitary total objectivity", op. cit., p. 111.

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> conceptual renderings, and predications. Thanks to this objectification we find facing us in natural setting, and therefore as members of the natural world, not natural things merely, but values and practical objects of every kind, cities, streets with street-lighting arrangements, dwellings, furniture, works of art, books, tools and so forth."[17]

The first difficulty concerns a correction which Husserl put into the first sentence of this text after 1923. The sentence reads now: "In every act in the precise sense some mode of heeding holds sway."[18] This correction poses the problem whether or not there might be acts in which no mode of heeding holds sway and if so, what kind of objects would be intended in these acts. The main problem is whether or not these acts would be modifications of acts in the precise sense. If they are not modifications then their objects might not be easily reducible to "natural things" - in which case there might be objects of the world which would not necessarily be affected by the operation of "inhibiting" or "blocking" referred to above. Husserl speaks sometimes of "dim representations"[19] as if these could occur without there being also an act in the precise sense. But these cases can be relegated to states of consciousness where there is no "wakeful" ego. The wakeful ego is defined as an ego which undergoes a series of acts each of which has at least one apprehended object.[20] The problems pertaining to the "sleeping ego" could then be avoided by restricting the notion

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[17] Ideas, p. 111.

[18] Ideen I, p. 83; compare also p. 470 for the critical annotation. The whole sentence is still italisized but I italisized only the correction.

[19] Ideas, p. 106.

[20] Compare op. cit., p. 107.

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of world to cover only the intentional objects of those acts which the wakeful ego undergoes. The second difficulty is less easily overcome. There seem to be certain acts of the wakeful ego which are not modifications of acts which have "natural things" as their apprehended objects. These acts are "arithmetical acts" in which objects like numbers, fractions, etc., are dealt with. It seems impossible to "reduce" these acts to modifications of acts in which fractions and numbers, etc. are only intentional objects and some natural thing is apprehended. This seems to be the reason why Husserl says that the world of arithmetic is disconnected from the natural world,[21] whereas he seems to have no similar difficulties with the world of values, tools, etc. The problems are, of course, the same as with "dim representations" except that we cannot solve it by restricting our inquiry to the acts of the wakeful ego, since arithmetical acts seem to be wakeful acts par excellence. Husserl seems to have seen the full measure of the problem, as evidenced by his adding a long footnote and a separate written consideration to the original text.[22] But the solution seems to have remained the same: As long as the ego engages in arithmetical acts it is also presupposing the natural world, except that this world is now only a "background" which remains unconsidered. This suggests that the arithmetical attitude,

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[21] Op. cit., p. 94.

[22] Compare Ideen I, p. 61, 390 f. and 465 (for the critical annotation). Husserl seems to have even considered the possibility of deleting the second paragraph from 28 and placing it somewhere else in the text.

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not being a modification of the natural attitude, is still only possible as long as the natural attitude, albeit in the background, prevails. Should for some reason the natural attitude be suspended then arithmetical acts would be suspended as well, at least in their ordinary form. This solution seems generalisable for other "disconnected" worlds as well.

This solution is not a satisfactory one. What does it mean for the natural world to be in the background of the arithmetical world? It seems unlikely that Husserl intended that the mathematician performs always at least two separate acts, one of which would have an arithmetical object and the other a natural thing as apprehended object, since it seems safe to stipulate that only one act of apprehension should be possible at any given time. If two acts are possible then they should not be disconnected as the two acts referred to would be. If we conceive, on the other hand, of the natural world or some parts thereof as being only the intentional (but not apprehended) objects of a "dim representation" which is disconnected with the proper arithmetical act then we run into the problems which were discussed above. There we decided to exclude objects of "dim representations" from the natural world, a step which would prove fatal here, since it would contradict our hypothesis that it is precisely the natural world which appears as object of those "dim representations." But even if we would take this contradiction as a reason to abandon our earlier strategy and to include the objects of the sleeping ego in the natural world, we would still be faced with the oddity that the ego of arithmetical acts would have to be both wakeful and sleeping. The only alternative left is to treat the natural world, which is somehow present in the mathematician's

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mind, as an intended object similar to values which are intended objects if natural things are observed in the act of valuation. But there would be a difference which would destroy any similarity between the two cases. It always seems possible to look at natural things without having values in view whereas we are supposed to be unable to operate with numbers without having natural objects in view. This very difference would make it possible to affect the world of arithmetic by performing the operation of bracketing on the natural world. Odd as this solution seems to be, it stands obviously behind the aforementioned footnote of Husserl's where he says that the arithmetical world has its "sensual form" (sinnliche Gestalt) as printed, i.e. as objective assertions which are localised in the real world.[23]

Let us assume, for the sake of discussion, that Husserl's problems concerning non-spatio-temporal objects of the natural world are solved and that they are somehow "reducible" to the basic spatio-temporal objects in the aforementioned way. It then becomes understandable why Husserl insists that "the material world is not just any portion of the natural world, but its fundamental stratum to which all other real being is essentially related."[24] It is then likewise sensory perception which plays the role of primary experience (Urerfahrung) since its objects are material bodies.[25]

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[23] Op. cit., p. 61, Footnote 2.

[24] Ideas, p. 114.

[25] Loc cit. Husserl as many other philosophers is open to criticism at that point. Rainbows, odors and tones seem to lack precise spatial coordinates. But it does not seem worthwhile to quibble over this fact since one can construct "secondary" spatial coordinates like sections of the atmosphere, cheese and musical instruments.

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After these preliminary clarifications we have to discuss whether or not the notion of "world" covers only material things and those abstract entities which are reducible to the former. The main problem which we face is that even "natural things" are not independent but that they are correlates of consciousness, i.e. they are constituted by consciousness. Is then the world likewise constituted as some kind of very complex object of consciousness, i.e. as the conjunction of all other objects? We will argue that this is not the case and that it is therefore much more difficult to "bracket" the world than to bracket objects of the world.

The problems of constitution cannot be discussed within our present framework. Suffice it to say that Husserl does not believe in metaphysical realism, i.e. he does not believe that things could ever be something else than the correlates of consciousness:

> ".all real unities are "unities of meaning." Unities of meaning presuppose...a sense-giving consciousness..."[26]

Natural things as well as abstract entities, which belong to the natural world are then not independent "things-in-themselves" but "things-as-meant." The task which lies before us is to determine whether or not the world is a thing-as-meant as well. Likewise we have to ask whether or not a bracketing of any number of natural things would necessarily imply a bracketing of the world. The answer to both questions, so it turns out, is negative; the world is neither a thing-as-meant nor can its bracketing be the result of the bracketing of any number of objects of perception.

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[26] Op. cit., p. 152-153.

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Let us look more closely at the meaning of material objects as they are given to consciousness in order to make visible the fact that the world cannot be merely a conjunction of these objects but must be something more.

If we see an object, a chair for example, then we have more than only the chair as the object of our intention even though it may be the only object apprehended. The object chair always presupposes a background of other objects which are not seen yet intentional objects of our consciousness. But it is not quite clear whether the background is merely a combination of objects surrounding the object apprehended or whether it is also a meaning-structure of the perception-experience itself; Husserl seems to be undecided as to whether the background is just a peculiar object of experience or a part of the experience itself.[27]

But the background is not the only notion which is presupposed if we speak of thing-perception. There is also a certain horizon of determinable indeterminacy which surrounds the thing perceived. It belongs to the meaning (Sinn) of thing-perception that the thing perceived cannot be adequately given. The chair is seen from just one angle - but there

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[27] Compare op. cit., p. 106 where Husserl seems to assert both: "Every perception of a thing has such a zone of background intuitions...and this also is a "conscious experience," or more briefly a "consciousness of" all indeed that in point of fact lies in the co-perceived objective "background." We are not talking here of course of that which is to be found as an "objective" element in the objective space to which the background in question may belong..." I take these statements to be highly ambiguous. Compare also op. cit. p. 223.

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are infinitely many angles from which it could be seen. This very fact makes for the indeterminacy of thing-perception. But given any one angle we can develop a rule which, when followed by us, would lead us in a strictly ordered way from this one perspective to all other perspectives. This makes for the determinacy of this indeterminacy.[28]

It is quite clear that this aspect of thing-perception is what Husserl calls a reeller Bestandteil of experience (a "real" part of experience) and not an object of experience. The same is true of another horizon which Husserl discusses earlier in the book. This is the temporal horizon of thing-perception:

> "As it is with the world in its ordered being as a spatial present... so likewise is it with the world in respect to its ordered being in the succession of time. This world now present to me, and in every waking "now" obviously so, has its temporal horizon, infinite in both direction, its known and unknown, its intimately alive and its unalive past and future."[29]

Taking the background to be a horizon of thing-perception as well, we can say that the three horizons of background, space, and time are presuppositions of thing-perception. But this implies that these horizons are not the objects of thing-experience but belong to the (reelle) structure of consciousness itself which makes thing-experience possible.

The conceptual tools which we have thus developed will prove hëlpful

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[28] Op. cit., p. 124-125. Husserl's unnecessarily paradoxical talk of a "determinable indeterminacy" could be avoided if we speak instead of an algorithm which would lead us through an infinite series of perspectives. Compare also p. 122.

[29] Op. cit., p. 92. It does not matter that Husserl speaks only of three temporal horizons at other places in the book or, interchangeably, of a threefold horizon. Compare for example 82.

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in our discussion of Husserl's notion of "world." Our initial question can now be sharpened to read: Is the world the sum total of the objects of thing-experience (and other objects which are related to natural things) or is it the sum total of the horizons of thing-experience and, further, what sense would it make to "bracket" the world in the transcendental-phenomenological reduction in either of these two interpretations?

Husserl himself seems to have oscillated between the two interpretations, though most of the textual evidence seems to favor the first interpretation. This is especially obvious where he speaks of "natural world," "world of reality," "thing-world," etc.[30] There are only a few places in which Husserl opts for the second alternative;[31] but the following two quotations present the contrast nicely:

> "...the whole spatio-temporal world...is according to its own meaning mere intentional Being, a Being, therefore, which has the merely secondary, relative sense of a Being for a consciousness."[32]

> "...the whole being of the world consists in a certain "meaning" which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field from which the meaning is derived."[33]

Let us take up the first interpretation and decide how the world could be "bracketed" if this interpretation were correct. We are then to suppose that the world is a conjunction of infinitely many natural things and objects which are reducible to or derivable from them.

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[30] Compare op. cit., p. 94, 131, 134, 139 and the entry "world" in the "Analytical Index."

[31] Compare for example op. cit., p. 92, pp. 152-153.

[32] Op. cit., p. 139.

[33] Op. cit., p. 153.

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Let us now try to perform the operation of "bracketing" as Husserl suggests. We are supposed to attempt to doubt everything. How is that possible? First of all it is not clear what we are supposed to doubt, i.e., whether it is the objects being such and such rather than otherwise or the objects existence that is uncertain. Husserl seems to imply that it does not matter[34] but it does. Suppose we tried to doubt the existence of objects. Then we would imply that whatever corporeal thing we experience in the natural attitude might actually not exist. But does it not belong to the very meaning of experiencing something in the natural attitude that the things experienced are in space and time? It does not seem possible to doubt or to try to doubt the existence of the object experienced and at the same time to experience it. Husserl seems to imply that it is possible to remain in the natural attitude and yet to bracket it as if the "experience-of-the-thing-as-bracketed" were a modified experience which was founded (fundiert) or built upon experiencing simpliciter. What I am suggesting here is that to experience simpliciter (thus assuming the existence of the objects and any conjunction or disjunction thereof) is incompatible with the attempt to doubt the existence of these objects. It is impossible because it is a conceptual contradiction, and it remains this as long as we doubt, irregardless

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[34] Op. cit., p. 97.

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of how slight this negation may be.[35]

I do not think that the same criticism would hold if we interpreted the bracketing as an attempt to doubt that an object has such and such qualities. In other words it seems possible to believe that a given object does not have the qualities which we experience it to have as long as we hold that it has some quality.

The second objection which I want to raise applies to both cases alike. Assume that the world is indeed the sum total of all (corporeal) objects. It seems perfectly possible to doubt the existence of any one object which is experienced at a given time. It seems also possible to doubt the existence of all objects if one begins at time t_1 to doubt objects o_1 and ends at time t_n with doubting the existence of object o_n (assuming that there is a finite amount of objects and that we have enough time to perform this operation). But it does not follow that we could ever doubt at any one time all objects at once. Not only does this not logically follow

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[35] My analysis, if true, makes the following sentences of Husserl nonsensical: "We do not abandon the thesis [of the natural attitude] we have adopted, we make no change in our conviction... And yet the thesis undergoes a modification - whilst remaining in itself what it is, we set it as it were "out of action," we "disconnect it," "bracket it."" Op. cit., p. 98. Husserl himself says that "we cannot at once doubt and hold for certain one and the same quality of Being" (op. cit., p. 97) but rather he seems to think that he can evade this conclusion. It does not help to insist that the modification of an experience, even though it might not have occurred without the initial experience, need not be consistent with it, since Husserl implies that the natural attitude is not abandoned.

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but also we have good reasons for believing that this state of affairs is not likely to occur. It seems that in order to doubt the existence of any one thing we must be assuming the existence of others. To put it in other words: the very attitude of doubting the existence of something presupposes that the existence of other things is taken for granted. Hence it seems possible that at time t, the existence of objects o_2 and o_3 are presupposed in order to doubt the existence of o_1 and that at time t_2 the existence of objects o_1 and o_3 are presupposed in order to doubt the existence of o_2.[36] It is at least the case that as long as this possibility is not excluded by special arguments the thesis of the universal doubt has to be defended. Husserl merely assumes, along with Descartes, that something like a universal doubt is possible - except that he does not want to negate but only to "bracket." The logic, however, seems to be the same in both cases. A similar argument can be constructed for the case in which we are supposed to assume that all objects of experience do not have the qualities which we believe they have.

We may conclude that it is not easy to bracket the world if we conceive of it as the sum total of objects of consciousness insofar as they are reducible to natural things.

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[36] This criticism is not new. It has been advanced, for example, by Pierce. Compare Pierce, Charles Sanders, Collected Papers, Vol. V., Harvard University Press 1934, Section 264.

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Husserl seems to have felt this too. He writes at one point;

> "'The' world is as fact-world always there, at the most it is at odd points 'other' than I supposed, this or that under such names as 'illusion,' 'hallucination,' and the like, must be struck out of it, so to speak; but the 'it' remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there."[37]

There are further problems which we have to discuss in this connection. Husserl insists that the natural world is the correlate of consciousness[38] and specifically that things are things of experience, e.g. there are no things without being experiencable by thing-experience of whatever kind, and there is no thing-experience without a thing being experienced (whereby it does not seem to matter that the thing experienced might turn out to be "illusory"):

> "The genuine concept of thing-transcendence, which is the standard whereby all rational statements about transcendence are measured, cannot be extracted from any source other than the perception's own essential content, or the definitely articulated connections which we call evidential (Answeisenden) experience. The idea of this transcendence is thus the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this evidential experience."[39]

The question which one might ask is: How is it possible to bracket the world, here conceived as the intentional correlate of thing-experience, without bracketing thing-experience itself? Or, in other words: If the world is constituted by experience, i.e. if natural experience is

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[37] Ideas, op. cit., p. 96.

[38] Compare the title of section 47, op. cit., p. 133.

[39] Op. cit., p. 134.

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world-experience, how should it be that the experience can remain when the world is gone? But Husserl claims that this is possible. All he concedes is that the annihilation or nullifying of the world, i.e. the annihilation of its existence, would modify the Being of consciousness but would not affect "its own proper existence."[40]

3. Experience and Horizon in Husserl's "Primary Philosophy"

It seems wise at this point to consider the second interpretation of "world" as it was spelled out earlier. If the world is not the object of consciousness but an abstract entity which refers to the multiplicity of horizons of thing-experience then our criticism has to be reconsidered.

This is the point where we can leave the central core of Husserl's Ideas and pick up some loose ends which he left in this work but took up later in the second part of his lectures about "Primary Philosophy." These lectures mark clearly a transition from his middle period to his later period of writing. It is interesting to see how important the notions of "background" and "horizon of experience" become in the discussion of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, in short how the emphasis shifts from the objects of experience to the structure of experience itself and how difficult it is for Husserl to bracket

[40] Op. cit., p. 137.

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the horizons.

Husserl had already remarked in "Ideas" that the reflective gaze which one might turn towards experiences presupposes horizons of its own:

> "Thus an experience that has become the object of a personally directed glance, and so has the modus of the deliberately looked at, has its own horizon of experiences that are not deliberately viewed; that which is grasped in a mode of "attention," and grasped with increasing clearness as occasion arises, has a horizon of background inattention showing relative differences of clearness as obscurity, as well as of emphasis and lack of relief."[41]

The problem which arises is how the method of bracketing can be iterated on the reflective level where the intentional objects are no longer natural things but rather are experiences. If the experience of experiences has its own peculiar horizons, who guarantees us that looking at experiences is not also a possibility which remains within the natural attitude?

This brings up the question whether the performance of the "epoché" is indeed a shift from unreflective to reflective thinking. Husserl suggested this in his "Ideas"[42] but perhaps at a later time realized the difficulties involved. If a

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[41] Op. cit., p. 220. I have slightly changed the translation of Gibson. Where he translates "Horizont" by "fringe" I translate it by "horizon." Husserl refers here obviously to the "background" of experiences (compare loc. cit., footnote 12); but a little earlier he assumes that experiences do also have peculiar temporal horizons.

[42] Compare for example op. cit., section 77 where Husserl implies clearly that all reductions are special cases of reflection.

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reflective shift "turns our gaze" from the objects of the world to the experiences of our mind and if the presuppositions with which we look at experiences are very similar to those with which we look at natural things and objects, then the performance of the "epoché" cannot merely consist of the transition from unreflective to reflective thinking.

Rudolf Boehm, who edited Husserl's lectures on "Primary Philosophy" remarks in his introduction that Husserl is obviously concerned with developing a "second way to transcendental subjectivity."[43] The first way is the Cartesian way which Husserl followed in the "Ideas" and which we have criticized above. But this cartesian way is still very much in the foreground of the discussion. A whole lecture for example tries to prove that the sentence "The world is" is a contingent sentence.[44] The term "world" has obviously been restricted to objects of experience and Husserl's "proof" that the world can be "bracketed" proceeds on the same lines as his earlier work: the necessary inadequateness of objects of perception shows that all objects of experience might be different from what we thought they were. His principal error is again that he speaks of the world as a fact rather than as a presupposition of experience:

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[43] Erste Philosophie II, XXIII (henceforth this work will be abbreviated as EPII, all translations are mine).

[44] EPII, pp. 44-50.

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> "Each fact, and hence the factuality of the world (Welt-faktum) as well, is contingent as is generally conceded; this implies: if it is it has the possibility of being different than it is or being not at all."[45]

Husserl's transition to the second interpretation, however, announces itself in sentences like this one: "This whole structure of world-perception has, on the other hand, its absolute necessity..."[46] At another point Husserl concedes even that his procedure to criticise the object of experience without criticising this experience itself is naive[47] without following this thought to a definite conclusion.

Husserl's discussion of the horizons of perception lead to new results. He distinguishes between an "inner horizon" and an "outer horizon" and the visible and invisible parts of horizons thus making a cross classification of the following sort possible.[48]

The visible inner horizon of an object would contain the front side of the object as it is given in our visual field. The invisible inner horizon would contain the back side of the same object. The visible outer horizon would contain all the objects which surround the object which is in the focus of attention. These objects would have to be in the field of vision without necessarily being noticed. The invisible outer

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[45] EPII, 50.

[46] EPII, 52.

[47] EPII, 70-71.

[48] Compare EPII, 146ff.

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horizon would contain all other objects of the world which are presently not in the field of vision but once might become members of such a visual field.

Several remarks are in order. First, it seems that what Husserl calls "background" would seem to coincide with an object's visible outer horizon. Secondly, even though it seems as if "horizon" refers to collections of objects or to a part of an object, this is not what Husserl means. Rather a horizon is a meaning-content (Sinngehalt) which is implied when we perceive objects.[49] Thirdly, Husserl is still far from a canonical vocabulary in this matter. He speaks of all kinds of horizons and "worlds." But it seems that the "Umwelt" of which he speaks is synonymous with "background" which, in turn, has been reduced to the visible outer horizon. His terms are very much in flux; what is sometimes seen from the angle of intentional objects is at other times described in terms of horizons. At one point he speaks of an "horizon of consciousness" (Bewusstseinshorizont) which encompasses several surroundings (Umwelten).[50]

The more pressing problem, however, is how the epoché is supposed to be performed on experiences and their horizons. It cannot be that the epoché is performed by changing the

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[49] EPII, 147.

[50] EPII, 149. A little later in the text Husserl speaks of a "world-horizon" as an horizon of real and ideal surroundings; EPII, 151.

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subject of our inquiry as Husserl suggests in the "Ideas"; i.e. it is not enough to turn one's attention away from the apple perceived to the perceiving of the apple, since the horizons which made the apple a perceivable object might not have been changed thus making the experience looked at (namely the perceiving) a real occurrence rather than a phenomenon. This is the reason why Husserl has to insist that phenomenology is not just a branch of psychology. It is true that the "object" of inquiry is the same in both cases: Human experience with its horizons. But the attitude is different. This brings us to the conclusion that the performance of the epoché proceeds in two steps: First we have to turn from ordinary objects of consciousness like apples and chairs to experiences with their horizons. This step is the step from the unreflective to the reflective level of consciousness. Secondly we would have to alter the presuppositions with which we would normally inquire into objects. This step would be peculiar to the phenomenologist and would result in constituting the objects of consciousness as being irreal where they would normally be real. But it is precisely this second step for which Husserl connot give any clear algorithm. His attempts to effect the transition with the method of universally doubting the existence of everything fail because they cannot guarantee that the horizons which constituted the objects of consciousness as real occurrences do not recede into ever deeper layers of consciousness.

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Moreover we saw that if we take away all objects of consciousness consciousness itself is likely to disappear.

Husserl comes closest to a discussion of this problem when he discusses quasi-objects and the quasi-epoché.[51] Let us take as our object of inquiry the act of imagining a world of unicorns in which we act. Who is the object of such an act? It is a unicorn which, let us assume, runs toward me. But this unicorn is not real, neither are my actions in such a world. It is a peculiar feature of acts of imagination that the objects of those acts are seen in an "as-if-mode." This distinguishes imaginations from dreams. If I dream that a unicorn attacks me then I constitute, whilst dreaming, the unicorn as real. Husserl says that the objects of imaginations are quasi-objects.

How are we going to perform the epoché on such an act? We have to make the act of imagining our object, i.e. we have to reflect upon it. But in addition to this we have to perform a quasi-epoché on the objects of the imagination. This is effected in the following manner: We constitute for a moment the world of imagination as real. This will result in a shift of our horizons: what we took to be "mere imagination" suddenly becomes "real," the difference between the unicorn which was imagined and the unicorn which is now real

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[51] EPII, 111-119 (especially his lecture No. 44).

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must have been brought about by the typical reality-horizons, i.e. those horizons which make the objects of perception "realities in the outside world." We are then supposed to "bracket" this difference, that is we are required to somehow "forget" these reality-horizons. This is called the quasi-epoché. After this we have performed the complete epoché on the act of imagining.[52]

The generalization of this method seems to imply an ingenious device to bracket the horizons of normal perception and consequently would be equivalent to bracket the "world" in its second interpretation. Let us therefore rehearse the method:

Step One: Take an act which is such that its objects are constituted as not real (for example: act of imagining, wishing, etc.) as your object of reflection.

Step Two: Step for a moment "inside the act," i.e. perform it, but modify its structure such that everything which was wished for or imagined becomes "real." Notice the difference between that which is imagined, etc., and that which is real.

Step Three: Perform the following two operations at once: (1) reflect on the act, i.e. "step out of it" again, and (2) modify the act such that those "reelle" parts of it which constituted the objects of the act as real are

[52]Compare EPII, 119.

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"dropped" or "forgotten." This combined operation should leave you with the pure phenomenon "act of imagination, etc."

Unfortunately this method leaves much to be desired. First it would be only one act with respect to which the epoché would be performed. A generalization over all acts would probably run into similar difficulties as the attempt of generalizing the Cartesian doubt. Secondly, whilst ridding us from performing the reality-horizons it would not tell us with which other horizons we are left behind. Does the phenomenologist just refrain from performing certain acts of experiencing, thus leaving it open which other acts might be performed, or does he not rather perform certain definite acts. The above method would not give a positive analysis of the act of doing phenomenology.[53] Thirdly it is not clear how one could ever be sure that one really leaves the normal horizons of reality behind rather than taking them along in a modified fashion, in other words: to "drop" or "forget" these horizons seems to be a matter of good luck.

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[53]This criticism is not so telling as the first and third one because Husserl has never claimed that the performance of the epoché is a sufficient condition for doing phenomenology; all he claims is that it is necessary.

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4. World and epoché in Heidegger

The desired comparison of Husserl's notion of "world" with Heidegger's notion of "world" can now be aoomplished. It turns out that Heidegger was well aware of the two interpretations which the notion "world" could get and he chose the second interpretation for his own purposes.

Heidegger distinguishes at one point in "Being and Time" between four different interpretations of the notion world but he retains only two of them in his further elaborations. He writes:

> "This discussion of the word "world," and our frequent use of it have made it apparent that it is used in several ways...
>
> 1. "World" is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.
>
> 2. .....
>
> 3. "World" can be understood in another ontical sense - not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that 'wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'...
>
> 4. ...
>
> We shall reserve the expression "world" as a term for our third signification. If we should sometimes use it in the first of these senses, we shall mark this with single quotation marks."[54]

Heidegger's first interpretation coincides with our first

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[54] Being and Time, op. cit., p. 64-65 (the page-references refer to the original pages of "Sein und Zeit," as they appear on the margins of the translation).

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interpretation of Husserl's notion. That Heidegger leaves it aside indicates that Heidegger has already turned his philosophical gaze away from the objects of unreflective experiences and occupies himself from the start with the structure of experiences, i.e. with the horizons of it. His own notion of "world" for which he wants to reserve the expression "world" refers to that "wherein" Dasein lives. But that is precisely the experiences of Dasein. Husserl himself had said already in his "Logical Investigations" that experiences are lived through by us;[55] Heidegger just echoes this remark.

Tugendhat is then right in contending that Heidegger has already turned to the proper subject of phenomenology without going through Husserl's discussion of why it is important to separate the objects of experience from experience itself. But has Heidegger therefore performed the epoché? We learned above that the epoché consists really of two steps if we take the second interpretation of "world" seriously. Only the first step, the turning to experiences as proper objects of phenomenology, has been performed by Heidegger; the second step, namely the peculiar "forgetting" or "dropping" of certain horizons of experiences, is not done by Heidegger. And hence Desan is right as well, if we interpret him as saying that Sartre and Heidegger refuse to take the second step.

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[55] Logical Investigations, translated by J.N. Findlay, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York 1970, Vol. II, p. 538.

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Instead of "bracketing" the reality-horizons, Heidegger explores them. His discussions of Dasein's "Being-in-the-world" terminates in a discussion of the temporal horizons of experience. And it is his contention that it is constitutive of Dasein that it should have these horizons. Hence he believes that Dasein itself would be bracketed if these horizons were bracketed. In other words: he seems to hold that those reality-horizons which Husserl wants to bracket are essential for experience.

Heidegger's discussion of the provability of the external world bears this out. The provability of the external world is just the other side of the provability of the world's possibly not being. If we want to prove the external world then we begin with the premise that the world is not and try to show that this premise is absurd by a reductio argument. If we want to prove that the world might not be, then we begin with assuming that the world is necessarily and show by a reductio-argument that this premise is absurd. It seems then that Heidegger's discussion of the provability of the world would throw some light on his opinion concerning the possibility of the performance of the epoché.

Heidegger clearly says that the proof of an external world begins with burying "the 'external world' in nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it."[56] He charges any such attempt with presupposing "a subject which is proximally wordless or unsure of its world, and which must, at bottom, first assure itself of

[56] Being and Time, p. 206.

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a world."[57] For Heidegger this is obviously a mistake. Dasein is always in-the-world and with it "entities within-the-world have in each case already been disclosed."[58] In other words: as long as there is Dasein there are entities in the world because Dasein lives in experiences the horizons of which constitute things in the world. In a way then the sentence "The world is" is a conceptual truth as long as it refers to the horizons of Dasein's experiences.

We can apply this reasoning to Husserl's attempt to rid the phenomenologist from the reality-horizons. Husserl also tries to "bury the 'external world' in nullity 'epistomologically'" except that this is not his starting-point but his aim. Heidegger must reject this attempt for the same reason: the phenomenologically reduced ego would be worldless and this is a conceptual contradiction.

Thus both Desan and Tugendhat are right in their contention but the compatibility of their opinions stems from a failure to see the ambiguity of what Husserl means by the epoché: Desan interprets the epoché as "nullifying the world" and insists rightly that Heidegger is far from such a procedure; Tugendhat interprets the epoché as a turn towards experiences and their horizons and insists rightly that Heidegger's work is evidence of such a phenomenological turn; but both authors misfire if they

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[57] Loc. cit.

[58] Op. cit., p. 207.

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think that their interpretation does justice to Husserl's own notion of the epoché.

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Essay IV

Experience and Dasein: Retrieving Primary Ontology in Dewey and Heidegger

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1. Introduction

It is often thought that "pragmatic thinking" is peculiar to American thought whereas phenomenology and existentialism is typically "continental" in origin and content. In this paper I want to show that despite the differences, which I do not deny, there are striking similarities to be found in the works of Dewey, the pragmatist, and Heidegger, the phenomenological existentialist. The aim is to show the pragmatic element in Heidegger's works which has been overlooked so far. But it should also come out that Heidegger's preoccupation with fundamental ontology is somewhat mirrored in Dewey's attempt to retrieve primary experience. The "pragmatic element" enters the scene only after these problems have been exposed, thus showing, as I hope, that this parallelism between Heidegger and Dewey is not just a superficial one.

This paper will almost exclusively concentrate on a comparison of certain aspects of Heidegger's "Being and Time"[1] with aspects of Dewey's "Experience and Nature".[2] Both these works are considered to be the main works (or, in the case of Dewey, one of the main works) of the philosophers in question, and, moreover, were both written at approximately the same time.[3] A detailed analysis of both books is,

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[1]Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper and Row, New York 1962. This work will be abbreviated as SZ (Sein und Zeit), as is customary, and the pagenumbers will refer to the German edition as they appear on the margins on the English translation.

[2]Dewey, John, Experience and Nature, Second Edition, Dover Publications, New York 1958. This work will be abbreviated as EN.

[3]The first edition of Dewey's book appeared in 1925, Heidegger's book appeared in 1927, the second, revised edition of Dewey's book went into print in 1929.

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of course, out of place, because Heidegger's main concern in his second part, temporality, is touched upon only briefly by Dewey in his book and because Dewey's interests in the fine arts and in ethics are not shared by the early Heidegger. It will be sufficient to show that Dewey and Heidegger have had similar problems. The task is complicated by the fact that the vocabularies used by Dewey and Heidegger differ radically. But this might not be an impenetrable obstacle for the present inquiry if it is possible to achieve something like a translation from one terminology into the other and vice versa. The ultimate test for the correctness of a comparison of two philosophers cannot consist in the counting of similar and dissimilar words but in the plausibility of the results presented.

This paper has nearly nothing to build on in terms of previous efforts because there does not yet exist a comprehensive comparison between Dewey and Heidegger, at least not according to the writer's knowledge. It is necessary, therefore, to present many and detailed quotations in furthering the plausibility of the thesis advanced.

2. "Fundamental Ontology" and "Primary Experience"

The declared aim of SZ is the "exposition of the question of the meaning of being" but Heidegger makes it clear that his ultimate aim is the "construction" or "working out" of a general "ontology." The "question of the meaning of being" is but a necessary condition in order to construct a fundamental ontology because ontological inquiry, though more "primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences,....remains itself naive and opaque if in its researches

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into the Being of entities if fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general."[4]

But why and in what sense is the ontology which Heidegger wants to "construct" a fundamental one? In what sense should it differ from a traditional approach where the categories of being would be determined? Why should it be that "all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task"?[5] The answer seems to be that the conception of an ontology which works with categories is already the outcome of certain aspects of a primary ontology which can not work with categories. What Heidegger means by a fundamental ontology is not a system of well determined structures of entities: rather, it is the "ground" which makes such a construction possible. The question of Being aims "at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibilities of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibilities of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations."[6]

Ontologies in the traditional sense are secondary-level ontologies

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[4] SZ, 11.

[5] Loc. cit.

[6] Loc. cit.

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which are derived from a primary-level ontology, namely the fundamental ontology which is the condition of their possibility. But where are we to locate the primary-level ontology if forbidden to take "entities" or "substances" as our starting point? Since ontologies are creations of ourselves, since we are the origin of secondary-level ontologies, it must be the structure of our Being whose revelation is the primary task of fundamental ontology. Sciences - and, with it, their underlying ontologies - have "as ways in which man behaves...the manner of Being which this entity - man himself - possesses."[7] This entity is denoted by the term "Dasein" (There-being). The focus of interest of primary ontology is man and the ways in which he behaves. Certain elements in man's behavior (Verhalten) must account for the construction of (secondary) ontologies. A "Description" of the basic features of "Dasein" would then serve as some sort of "explanation" of the occurrence of secondary level ontologies, it might even reveal that these ontologies are inevitable or "necessary."

Summing up, we may say that the "construction" of a primary or fundamental ontology, hence the conceiving of the being of entities, cannot be objective in the sense that categories are created or found which can be used to describe the nature of entities which are located outside of human experience. Any such construction belongs to the secondary level of ontology and is indebted to certain features of one "entity" which we call "Dasein" and which is somehow the structure of man. Hence it follows that the "construction" of a primary ontology is

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[7] Loc. cit.

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the revelation of the structure of human experience in as much as it belongs to the basic structures of Dasein.

Let us now turn to Dewey's exposition of his aims as he advances them in the first chapter of "Experience and Nature." Dewey remarks that, to many, "the associating of the two words will seem like talking of a round square, so engrained is the notion of the separation of man and experience from nature."[8] According to such philosophers (whom Dewey subsequently criticises) experience is not only extraneous to the nature upon which it is superimposed, but it even "forms a veil or screen which shuts us off from nature."[9]

Dewey, on the other hand, clearly implies that a general ontology of nature, if constructed without the consideration of human experience, is led astray, though he avoids carefully even the term "ontology." Experience is for Dewey "not a veil that shuts man off from nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature. There is in the character of human experience....a growing progressive self-disclosure of nature itself."[10] The aim of Dewey's work is then to "discover some of these general features of experienced things and to interpret their significance for a philosophic theory of the universe in which we live."[11] But is this not the task of constructing a general ontology and of trying to fit it into a cosmological world-view? In what respect would Dewey depart from tradition? The point of

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[8] EN, 1a.

[9] Loc. cit.

[10] EN, X.

[11] EN, 2.

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departure lies in Dewey's employment of human experience: he does not want to discover general features of things, which could easily be termed categories; he wants to discover general features of experienced things; and he does not want to discuss the universe as such, but the universe in which we live.[12]

If our interpretation is correct, then it is the aim of Dewey to explore the structure of experience in order to reveal the structure of nature in a primary sense. "Nature," as it is revealed in the categorical systems of traditional ontology will then be seen as rooted in "nature" in its primary sense. But in so far as these secondary interpretations of nature belong to man's experience and are in a way his creations, we can call it "experience" as well, although "secondary" rather than primary. Dewey contrasts accordingly between "gross, macroscopic, crude subject-matters in primary experience and the refined, derived objects of reflection."[13] This indicates that we have two types of objects, namely "objects of primary and of secondary or reflective experience,"[14] or rather: "objects" which are situated on different ontological levels and belong to different modes of experience. The relationship, however, between these two levels seems to be obvious for Dewey: "That the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of the reflection which constructs

[12] If this interpretation is correct, then it would tie Dewey as well as Heidegger closer to Husserl. Objects cannot be detached from experience, they are objects of experience, thus, in Husserl's terminology, becoming the intentional objects of consciousness.

[13] EN, 3/4.

[14] EN, 4.

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the secondary objects is evident..."[15]

To put it into Heideggerian terms: Fundamental ontology is the necessary condition of the possibility of "ontology" in general. Dewey's approach differs in exactly the same way from traditional ontology as Heidegger's approach - only Dewey calls his approach an empirical one which is opposed to the "ordinary" philosophical approach. His approach undercuts the traditional one in the same way in which Heidegger's approach does: "The first and perhaps the greatest difference made in philosophy by adoption respectively of empirical or non-empirical method is, thus, the difference made in what is selected as original material."[16]

To sum up: Dewey as well as Heidegger want to undercut the traditional ontology which proceeds in terms of entities and categories by going back to the origins of ontology in general. This will be achieved by "constructing" some sort of a primary ontological basis which can serve as an "explanation" or as the "ground" of metaphysics (in so far as metaphysics is concerned with the "general features of things"). Moreover this basis is intimately tied up with certain aspects of man. These aspects are called "experience" by Dewey and "Dasein" by Heidegger. The structure of "Dasein" reveals the structure of "Being" in the same sense as the structure of "Experience" reveals the structure of "Nature." This is also the reason why Dewey can call his philosophy "naturalistic humanism" by taking "'experience' in its usual signification"[17] and why

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[15] EN, 4/5.

[16] EN, 10.

[17] EN. 1a.

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Heidegger can say that "fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein."[18]

3. Experience and Dasein

So far our analysis would prove to be a very superficial one unless it were supplemented by an analysis of the structure of the two foci of inquiry. If it turns out that the structure of Experience is similar to the structure of Dasein then we can expect further similarities as to the problems posed and solved by Dewey and Heidegger.

So much is clear already: Experience is not something "subjective" as opposed to "objective" nature. Experience seems to be "the method, and the only method, for getting at nature, penetrating its secrets.."[19] And again:

> "...experience, if scientific inquiry is justified, is no infinitesimally thin layer or foreground of nature, but...it penetrates into it, reaching down into its depths, and in such a way that its grasp is capable of expansion; it tunnels in all directions and in so doing brings to the surface things at first hidden - as miners pile high on the surface of the earth treasures brought from below."[20]

Experience then is the method by which nature is revealed. But who is it, who experiences nature? Who has the experience? The method is the method of whom? Dewey could only say what it is not. Experience does not belong to a "subject" who has it or uses it; the proper location of Experience is nature itself. But nevertheless, Experience as

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[18] SZ, 13.

[19] EN, 2a.

[20] EN, 2a/3a.

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a fact is tied up with man and hence "is a late comer in the history of our solar system and planet."[21] We must be careful, however, not to diminish the importance of Experience for nature by pointing to the fact that "experience as an existence is something that occurs only under highly specialized conditions."[22] The important fact is that

> "when experience does occur, no matter at what limited portion of time and space, it enters into possession of some portion of nature and in such a manner as to render other of its precincts accessible."[23]

Experience then is important for nature over and above the fact that it actually occurs, that it exists. Man seems to be the necessary condition for the existence of Experience; man makes Experience a fact; but man is not identical with Experience. Therefore, Dewey is justified in insisting that it is unimportant how tiny a part of nature Experience is in terms of timely existence. Because the mere fact that Experience does or does not occur, or occurs to a given extent, does not determine the structural features of Existence:

> "The fact that something is an occurrence does not decide what kind of an occurrence it is; that can be found out only by examination. To argue from an experience 'being an experience' to what it is of and about is warranted by no logic..."[24]

Experience has to do with the human organism but to no greater degree than with nature itself. It is the bridge between these two things, or rather, the combining structure, since the metaphor of a bridge suggests that two previously distinct "entities" or "processes"

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[21] EN, 3a.

[22] Loc. cit.

[23] EN, 3a.

[24] EN, 1.

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are "linked together." The following quotation makes this clear:

> "...experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature - stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object - the human organism - they are how things are experienced as well."[25]

This passage seems to leave the possibility open that Experience can be conceived of as non-human as well, that it does not need human beings to bring about experience. This at least is suggested by the phrase that things interacting in certain ways are experidnce. It then seems that if the linking is done in certain other ways - namely if the human organism is involved - then the how of experience is added to the what of experience. This interpretation lies at hand if one considers only the above quotation. However it seems an absurd interpretation if one considers the context in which this quotation occurs. For if Experience is possible without the human agent, why should Dewey take so much pain to show, that, even though human Experience is a late comer in nature, it is nevertheless important? If Experience would be possible without the human organism why should Dewey not be free to argue that Experience is not at all a late comer in the universe? But Dewey does admit that Experience is a late comer and hence binds it up with "life" at least, if not, as is more plausible, with human existence. In the light of these considerations one might interpret the text as follows: Things have to interact in certain ways in order to be experience, they have to be tied up with human existence somehow to be what is experienced at all. Moreover if the human organism,

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[25]EN, 4a.

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where Experience takes place, is explicitly brought into the focus of inquiry, then they are how they are experienced as well. To put it into a simpler formula: the "what" of Experience is intimately tied up with its "how." Or: The "what" and the "how" of Experience are equiprimordial.[26]

The soundness of this interpretation is proved by Dewey's own discussion of what Experience is. Let us quote the passage in full, since it is one of the major pieces of evidence that we have to show how close Dewey's conception of Experience comes to Heidegger's conception of Dasein:

> "We begin by noting that 'experience' is what James called a double-barrelled word. Like its congeners, life and history, it includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine - in short, processes of experiencing. 'Experience' denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold, that are observed, feared, longed for; it also denotes the one who plants and reaps, who works and rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magic or chemistry to aid him, who is downcast or triumphant. It is 'double-barrelled' in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalysed totality. 'Thing' and 'thought,' as James says in the same connection, are single-barrelled; they refer to products discriminated by reflection out of primary experience."[27]

If we take these remarks seriously, then the "empirical method," which according to Dewey is the true "philosophic method," must consist in revealing the Being of nature, or, as Dewey would say, the "nature

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[26]This reminds one again of Husserl who never speaks of objects simpliciter but only of objects in their mode of givenness ("in ihrer Gegebenheitsweise") thus tying the objects closely to the constituting consciousness.

[27]EN, 8. The italics of the next to last sentence were supplied by me.

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of nature"[28] via an analysis of Experience. And this is in fact what Dewey asserts:

> "...the very meaning and purport of empirical method is that things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed when they are experienced."[29]

So far we have shown the following general characteristics of Experience:

1) Experience is the method for getting at nature, but this method belongs to nobody else than nature itself. Hence Experience is the process by which nature reveals itself, to itself.

2) Experience is, in so far as it exists or occurs, Experience of man, or rather, "man experiencing." But even though its existence is a late comer in the universe, its importance is independent of this fact. What makes Experience vital for nature is not that it is at all, but the ways in which it is, i.e. the structure of Experience determines the structure of nature.

3) Experience is the structural whole which contains its what (nature) and its how (man) in an "unanalysed totality."

4) In so far as philosophical method aims at studying things it must reveal them as things experienced and hence lay bare the very structure of Experience itself.

Substituting "Dasein" for "Experience" and "Being" for "Nature," it seems that after some additional changes in terminology and style, Heidegger could have written these statements too. To verify this let us give a brief account of the general characteristics of "Dasein."

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[28] EN, 1a.

[29] EN, 2.

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Heidegger introduces the term "Dasein" to denote the entity "man"[30] but from there on almost never again speaks of "man" but sticks entirely to "Dasein" as the terminus technicus of his inquiry. This is no accident, since Heidegger wants to deal with Dasein as a structure which reveals Being rather than as a structure which reveals man. But Dasein is only possible as long as there is man. Hence comes this intimate connection of Dasein with man which is so strong, in fact, that one of its main characteristics is its "mineness":

> "Because Dasein has in each case mineness (jemeinigkeit), one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am,' 'you are.'"[31]

But nevertheless, the main characteristic of Dasein is that it understands Being and that this understanding makes it possible that entities other than Dasein are revealed in their Being:

> "Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it...Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being."[32]

Dasein is the key to Being and to "entities" other than man. This is true in a very radical sense for Heidegger: "Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), "is there" Being. When Dasein does not exist... it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not."[33] Dasein is, like Experience, intimately tied up with the actual

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[30] SZ, 11.

[31] SZ, 42.

[32] SZ, 12.

[33] SZ, 212.

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existence of man; but its importance for Being as such is determined by the fact that it seems to be the only "entity" where Being can be brought to light.

But if Being is dependent on Dasein, then it is dependent on the ways in which Dasein is, and "in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another."[34] Dasein is always already what it is in one way or another: "Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine."[35] This implies clearly that Being itself, in so far as its revelation is concerned, is dependent on the how of Dasein: It is a matter of how Dasein behaves which decides the what of Being. Even the very question whether there is a what of Being in general depends on how Dasein interprets itself in its Being. This is clearly expressed in the famous passage of SZ where Heidegger says that the "essence" of Dasein lies in its "existence." The essence of Dasein is of course its Being, but the "existence" of Dasein in which the Being of Dasein (and hence: Being in general) lies is nothing else than the "possible ways for it to be, and nor more than that."[36]

It is but a consequence of the foregoing analysis that

> "whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure..." and this is why "fundamental ontology...must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein."[37]

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[34] SZ, 42.

[35] Loc. cit.

[36] Loc. cit.

[37] SZ, 13.

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We have to reveal the structure of Dasein if we want to reveal the structure of Being in general.

Dasein is, in the very same manner as Experience, the unique possibility of Being revealing itself. In so far as Dasein is an actual occurrence it is tied up with the actual existence of man and depends on it. We have therefore to explore the how of Dasein in order to explore the what of Being. A philosophy which aims at studying entities other than Dasein has therefore to study the very structure of Dasein itself: it has to develop an existential analytic of Dasein.

4. Reconstruction and Retrieval

Both Experience and Dasein are structures whose elaboration undercuts traditional ontology. We know that traditional ontology is significant only in a derived sense. But be this as it may, it remains a fact that "traditional ontology" or "traditional philosophy" has dominated human thought ever since philosophical doctrines were created. Dewey deplored the fact that the structure of "primary experience" was never really explored and that instead secondary experiences had taken over in explaining the "nature" of nature and man. But this shows only that traditional philosophy is one of the foremost modes of Experience itself. Something in the structure of Experience must account for the fact that Experience interprets itself so easily in terms of "traditional philosophy." The same is true for Heidegger: Dasein is apt to interpret itself in terms of the philosophical tradition; it is inclined to fall "prey to the tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold."[38] But this proves only that traditional

[38] SZ, 21.

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philosophy is one important possibility of Dasein's self interpretation "belonging" to Dasein as one way of its Being which it can and very often does choose.

But if it is true that Experience and Dasein interpret themselves mostly in terms of secondary-level ontologies, and if this feature is a structural unit of the primary ontology which we want to discover, then it becomes an almost impossible task to unravel fundamental ontology or primary experience respectively. The point is that Experience or Dasein is already interpreted in terms of secondary level ontologies when we start to discover the underlying primary structure which is also already "given" in the same way as the basement of a house is "given" in its first or second floor: being almost always in the first or second floor, we might know that we are supported by the basement, but it might be extremely difficult to explore it if no easy staircase is at hand.

Philosophy consists then either of a reconstruction (Dewey) or a retrieval ("Wiederholung," Heidegger) of the "basement" of Dasein or Experience. To put it otherwise: Philosophy has to work backwards to find out the most basic struc tures of Experience or Dasein which are always present but which are forgotten because of their basic character. That this can be done at all, is of course also due to one possibility of human Experience or Dasein: Philosophy. An outstanding way of being or experiencing, it is one course which Dasein or Experience can take. Heidegger puts this point in the following way: "Existential interpretation can demand an existential analytic, if indeed we conceive of philosophical cognition as something possible and necessary."[39]

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[39] SZ, 16.

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Translated into our informal terminolgoy this means that, philosophical interpretation and investigation is the one structural element of Experience or Dasein which makes the revelation of the basic structures (to which it belongs as an element) possible at all.

That the outcome of this reconstruction will not be the basic structure itself, but a sort of "reflected basic structure" is clear if we recall that the what of experience or Dasein is influenced by the how of its having been brought about. The outcomes of philosophical inquiries are influenced by the paths these inquiries take and these paths are, in turn, heavily influenced by traditional conceptions of philosophy which serve at least as starting point that have to be overcome. A reconstruction of primary Experience can only reveal primary Experience in the light of secondary Experience; and the revelation of the basic features of Dasein will suffer from all the insufficiencies which a retrieval (Wiederholung) might have. Dewey makes this point quite clear:

> "We cannot achieve recovery of primitive naivete. But there is attainable a cultivated naivete of eye, ear and thought, one that can be acquired only through the discipline of severe thought."[40]

This has two important implications:

First, if traditional philosophical experience forms the real veil which shuts us off from a clear conception of the structure of Experience or Dasein, then one has to penetrate through it in order to reconstruct primary experience. Hence a critical evaluation of the philosophical tradition is necessary. Heidegger calls such an enterprise the "task of

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[40] EN, 40.

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destroying the history of ontology" and remarks:

> "Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence, it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand...Dasein no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own."[41]

This latter task was going to be achieved in Part Two of SZ, but it never appeared in print. The introductory sections to the whole work make it quite clear that "the destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way in which the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation."[42] Accordingly, it is Heidegger's aim to first give the analytic of Dasein and then to penetrate the philosophical tradition - which is also quite consistent with what we said about the necessity of "working backwards" in the analysis, for Heidegger wanted first to treat Kant, then Descartes and lastly Aristotle. This second part of SZ would have exemplified what Heidegger says about retrieval:

> "The retrieval is tradition made explicit, - that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been."[43]

Heidegger's destruction of the history of ontology is in its set up more "academic" than Dewey's "critique of prejudices"; Heidegger seems to envisage a clear-cut line between the possibility of a systematic development of the analysis of Dasein and the critical destruction of

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[41] SZ, 21.

[42] SZ, 23.

[43] SZ, 385. I took the liberty to deviate from the English translation and to translate it myself.

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the philosophical tradition. For Dewey, both tasks have to be carried out at once and he therefore develops the basic features of Experience at the same time that he criticizes philosophical traditions. His approach seems to be more faithful to the contention that philosophical tradition has so much spoiled primary experience that, whereas we seem to be confronted with "fresh material," it is already loaden with philosophical interpretations. But apart from this minor difference, Dewey agrees fully with Heidegger and endorses a "critical destruction" of philosophical thought of the past as a means to his ultimate task: the reconstruction of undistorted Experience.

> "There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means of philosophy, of life-experience. But this experience is already overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of past generations and by-gone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, due to sophisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh, naive empirical material...If we may for the moment call these materials prejudices...then philosophy is a critique of prejudices. These incorporated results of past reflection, welded into the genuine materials of first-hand experience, may become organs of enrichment if they are detected and reflected upon. If they are not detected, they often obfuscate and distort. Clarification and emancipation follow when they are detected and cast out; and one great object of philosophy is to accomplish this task." [44]

The second important implication of the philosophical reconstruction or retrieval of Experience of Dasein is the return to the ordinary experience of everyday life for the basic reference point of the inquiry. If the most refined experiences of philosophers are rather an obstacle for the inquiry, then "ordinary experience" presents itself as a possible

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[44] EN, 37.

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alternative, and, in fact, this candidate is reasonable enough in our context. A working backwards through the history of the most common interpretations of Experience or Dasein must be accompanied by a similar enterprise which consists of working through the most common and everyday-like characteristics of Experience or Dasein. In the same manner that the critical appraisal of philosophical history is supposed to reveal basic sources and structures of Experience and Dasein, so should critical analysis of every day behvaior. The most serious criticism of traditional philosophy, made by both Dewey and Heidegger, is that traditional philosophy not only neglected ordinary experience but in fact forgot it or passed over it.

> "The most serious indictment to be brought against non-empirical philosophies is that they have cast a cloud over the things of ordinary experience. They have discredited them at large...If what is written in these pages has no other result than creating and promoting a respect for concrete human experience and its potentialities, I shall be content."[45]

Indeed, Heidegger believes that it is because of the ordinariness of ordinary experience that it is always passed over; its very nearness makes it philosophically so remote:

> "And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked."[46]

Heidegger also shares Dewey's optimism about the philosophical outcome of such an analysis of ordinary, everyday experience:

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[45] EN, 38/39.

[46] SZ, 43.

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> "...the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness. Anything which, taken ontically, is in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics of an authentic Being of Dasein."[47]

Heidegger makes it clear that "everydayness" has nothing to do with primitiveness:

> "Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness, but is rather a mode of Dasein's Being, even when that Dasein is active in a highly developed and differentiated culture - and precisely then."[48]

But of course the behavior of "primitive" people is often very helpful for purposes of demonstration, just as is the "simple" behavior of civilized people, as in the case of the driving of a nail into the wall, etc. Dewey draws heavily on such material and very often presents detailed anthropological material; Heidegger, in turn, endorses this method in principle if not in practice when he asserts that

> "to orient the analysis of Dasein towards the 'life of primitive peoples' can have positive significance as a method because 'primitive phenomena' are often less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation on the part of the Dasein in question."[49]

Let us summarize: The general characteristics of Experience and Dasein are concealed by the prevailing interpretations of traditional philosophy, although these characteristics are "there" in a very basic manner. They are in fact, so much given to us in every day experience that they are either forgotten or at least "rectified," or distorted. The task of philosophy is to reconstruct or retrieve these basic

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[47] SZ, 44.

[48] SZ, 50.

[49] SZ, 51.

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features, and this may be brought about in two ways: 1) The philosophical tradition is "destroyed" in the course of a "critique of prejudice;" and 2) special attention is given to ordinary experience of everyday life. The outcome of such a research, however, in so far as it is a philosophical enterprise and hence already on the level of secondary experience, will not be a recovery of primitive naivete but rather the construction of a naivete of a higher order which, however, is the retrieval of the authentic or primordial naivete on this level.

5. The subject-object distinction of traditional philosophy

Philosophy "has the task of analytic dismemberment and synthetic reconstruction of experience"[50]. To do this it is important to see where the failures of traditional philosophy lie. In this section we shall survey briefly the issues of critique which Heidegger and Dewey have in common.

The most unwarranted presuppositions of traditional philosophy are the division between "subject" and "object" and the conception of "objects" as something independent from experience. The mistake of traditional philosophy is that physical objects are conceived as opposed to their "mental" representation. "Subject" and "object" have ontologically nothing to do with each other and one wonders why and how they are connected at all. Heidegger uses here a terminological distinction between "presence-at-hand" (Vorhandenheit) and "readiness-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit). "presence-at-hand" denotes the aspect of "objectivity" of things. Things which are present-at-hand" can be looked at in a

[50] EN, 40.

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disengaged mode of "scientific" inquiry; these things have a meaning and existence which is independent of their possible involvement with Dasein; they belong to the "objective reality" of the "world." Things which are ready-to-hand have other characteristics; they are not being "looked at" but enjoyed, handled, used, missed: They depend in their "Being" on the Dasein's involvement with the world and its things.

The failure of traditional philosophy lies in reversing the priority of these different aspects of things. Philosophers have always thought that things are primarily "present-at-hand" and only secondarily "ready-to-hand." But this is not true according to Dewey and Heidegger. Things are primarily ready-to-hand and only in special occasions can they acquire the attributes of "presence-at-hand." When this happens, then the things in question lose their character of being ready-to-hand: "The botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedge-row; the "source" which the geographer establishes for a river is not the "spring-head in the dale."[51]

Dewey writes in very much the same vein:

> "Human experience in the large, in its coarse and conspicuous features, has for one of its most striking features preoccupation with direct enjoyment, feasting and festivities; ornamentation, dance, song, dramatic pantomime, telling yarns and enacting stories. In comparison with intellectual and moral endeavor, this trait of experience has hardly received the attention from philosophers that it demands."[52]

What Dewey has in common with Heidegger here is not so much the types of mood which they describe (in fact they are very different: Heidegger prefers to describe the moods of boredom, fear and anxiety;

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[51] SZ, 70.

[52] EN, 78.

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Dewey prefers the moods of enjoyment, celebration, etc.) but that things are primarily things of human action. Dewey reproaches the Greek philosophers for having looked at things as spectators rather than as working people:

> "To the spectator, artistic objects are given; they need only to be envisaged; Greek reflection, carried on by a leisure class in the interest of liberalising leisure, was preeminently that of the spectator, not that of the participator in processes of production."[53]

Dewey and Heidegger take things as what they are for most of us:

> "The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind 'in the sails'."[54]

Thus Dasein and Experience are always already in-the-world before it can happen that the world becomes "objective" :

> "The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary datum must be seen as a whole...Being-in-the-world cannot be broken up into contents which may be pieced together.."[55]

The "Being-in" cannot be characterised as the kind of Being "which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard."[56] This interpretation would be guilty of the old philosphers' mistake to fix entities 'in' space and 'at' a location:

> "All entities whose Being 'in' one another can thus be described have the same kind of Being -- that of Being-present-at-hand - as Things occurring 'within' the world. Being-present-at-hand 'in' something which is likewise present-at-hand, and Being-present-at-hand-along-with (Mitvorhandensein) in the sense of a definite location relationship with something else which has the same kind of

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[53] EN, 91.

[54] SZ, 70.

[55] SZ, 53.

[56] SZ, 54.

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Being, are ontological characteristics which we call 'categorial'.."[57]

It is this view of the world which Dewey and Heidegger attack. It is not that they do not see any merits in it, but rather that it seems wrong to them to isolate this view and make it the fundamental one. The confusing problems which can arise out of taking entities as being located in the scientifically determined "space" and "time" are demonstrated by Dewey:

> "Practically all epistemological discussion depends upon a sudden and unavowed shift to and fro from the universe of having to the universe of discourse. At the outset, ordinary empirical affairs, chairs, tables, stones, stickes, etc. are called physical objects -- which is obviously a term of theoretical interpretation when it so applied, carrying within itself a complete metaphysical commitment. Then physical objects are defined as the objects of physics, which is, I suppose, the only correct mode of designation. But such objects are clearly very different things from the plants, lamps, chairs, thunder and lightning, rocks, etc. that were first called physical objects. So another transformation phantasmagoria in the tableau is staged. The original 'physical things,' ordinary empirical objects, not being the objects of physics, are not physical at all but mental. Then comes the grand dissolving climax in which objects of physics are shown as themselves hanging from empirical objects now dressed up as mental, and hence as themselves mental."[58]

What Dewey is complaining about here, is that ordinary empirical affairs are not seen at all as what they are, but that instead, a premature interpretation in terms of presence-at-hand (i.e. physical objects) is imposed on them. Thus the difference between physical objects and "things used" is explained away by ascribing the specific characteristics of the latter to the distorting effect of a human "mind," which emerges as a separate entity at the very moment at which "affairs" are interpreted as "physical objects" - for there "must" be a "perceiver"

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[57] Loc. cit.

[58] EN, 140-141.

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who stands in the ("subjective") relation of perception towards the object.

The whole point is that traditional philosophy starts with entities "in-themselves" and then discovers "relations" between those entities. A quotation from Hegel's "Logic" might make this clear:

> "Being is the simple empty immediateness which has its opposite in pure Naught...
>
> Determinate Being (Dasein!) is determined Being which has a relation to another -- hence to its non-being. Determinate Being is, consequently, a somewhat divided in itself: firstly, it is in-itself (i.e. potential); secondly, it is relation to others..."[59]

Is Heidegger's and Dewey's reversion of Hegel not obvious? Hegel considers relatedness in terms of "attraction" and "repulsion" of two or more "entities." He starts with the "Being-in-itself" as the immediate, undetermined, unrelational, which has not yet a telos-- it is not "for the sake of" something; it has no world to be in. It is only the second step of thought, so to speak, which reveals the fact that there are relations in terms of which the pure Being-in-itself becomes Being-for-itself and Being-for-others. Heidegger and Dewey reverse this order completely and accuse Hegel and other philosophers of having already passed over the fundamental move when they begin with their "first step." Primarily there is Being-in-the-world. In this structure entities are perfectly understood in terms of their relations, their multiple references, etc. But they are understood unthematically; they are ready-to-hand affairs in the modes of everyday's concern. It is

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[59] Hegel-Selections, edited by Loewenberg, Scribner New York 1929, p. 104-105. It is almost funny that Hegel uses the term "Dasein" for that which Heidegger calls presence-at-hand.

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only "afterwards" and in special situations that we cut out of the world the things which we call "physical objects" or "substances," etc. Looking at them now after this special step, we feel their inpenetrability, their "hardness," etc. In such a process an unthematical Being-for-and-with-others becomes a thematic Being-in-itself.

Here lies, by the way, the reason why Dewey and Heidegger make up their own terminology. They free themselves from a philosophical jargon which implies the reversion of the ontological order. It is not the case that Hegel's Being-for-itself or Being-for-others is Dewey's or Heidegger's starting point. If this were so, they could use Hegelian language and simply start with the analysis of Being-for-itself. The trouble is that Hegel's Being-for-itself is developd out of Being-in-itself and therefore carries with it the mistake which was made with the wrong starting point. Dewey and Heidegger develop, therefore, their terminology from scratch. Awkward as it seems at first: they derive their terminology essentially from everyday expressions. It is no accident that both refer over and over again to phrases in their "usual signification," whereby "usual" refers to the layman and not to the philosopher.

6. The function of tools in human action

There must be a reason, however, why things are apt to be seen as present-at-hand objects, and there must be something in human experience which allows us to see that "objects" are primarily "things had"; there must be some characteristic of human experience which explains both the traditional misconception of things and the possibility of Dewey's and Heidegger's reversal of the older ontologies.

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The answer lies in the teleological character of human action. Let us recall that things are primarily ready-to-hand; they are "handy"; they are "useful." The best that one can say about them, is that they are "tools" (Dewey) or "equipment" (Heidegger). "In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, serving, working, transportation, measurement."[60]

We have of course to be careful here. We do not cut something out of the world in which we live and give it the name "equipment" or "tool" in order to look at its "suchness." This procedure would aim at a definition of the "tool's substantiality," a procedure which would fall prey to the traditional mistakes. What we are seeking to get at is something else: the toolness of the tool or the equipment's equipmentality. The first thing to note, then, is that there is no such thing as a single equipment or tool. There belongs always a totality of equipments or tools to any one equipment or tool.

> "Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to' (etwas um-zu). A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to,' such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability."[61]

If this is true, then equipment should in a sense refer to other equipments, and these in turn should refer to more comprehensive structures, until finally the whole structure of the Being-in-the world is referred to.

This is true of Dewey's "tools" as well:

"A tool is a particular thing, but it is more than a particular

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[60] SZ, 68.

[61] Loc. cit.

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> thing, since it is a thing in which a connection, a sequential bond of nature is enbodied. It possesses an objective relation as its own defining property. Its perception as well as its actual use takes the mind to other things. The spear suggests the feast not directly but through the medium of other external things, such as the game and the hunt, to which the sight of the weapon transpofrts imagination. Man's bias towards himself easily leads him to think of a tool solely in relation to himself, to his hand and eyes, but its primary relationship is toward other external things, as the hammer to the nail, and the plow to the soil."[62]

Two specific examples will show that Dewey and Heidegger do not differ in their conception of the multiple references which special "signals" or "signs" exhibit. Both examples draw on the legal traffic regulations.

> "Motor cars are sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, whose position indicates the direction the vehicle will take at an intersection, for instance. The position of the arrow is controlled by the driver. This sign is an item of equipment which is ready-to-hand for the driver in his concern with driving, and not for him alone: those who are not travelling with him - and they in particular - also make use of it, either by giving way on the proper side or by stopping. This sign is ready-to-hand within the world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment...
>
> The sign is not authentically 'grasped' ("erfasst") if we just stare at it and identify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs. Even if we turn our glance in the direction which the arrow indicates, and look at something present-at-hand in the region indicated, even then the sign is not authentically encountered. Such a sign addresses itself to the circumspection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that the circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings into an explicit 'survey' whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This circumspective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment."[63]
>
> "A traffic policeman holds up his hand or blows a whistle. His act operates as a signal to direct movements. But it is more than an episodic stimulus. It embodies a rule of social action. Its

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[62] EN, 122/123.

[63] SZ, 78-79.

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> proximate meaning is its neary-by consequences in coordination of movements of persons and vehicles; its ulterior and permanent meaning -- essence -- is its consequence in the way of security of social movements...The essence embodied in the policeman's whistle is not an occult reality superimposed upon a sensuous or physical flux and imparting from it; a mysterious subsistence somehow housed within a psychical event. Its essence is the rule, comprehensive and persisting, the standardized habit, of social interaction, and for the sake of which the whistle is used...
>
> The ultimate meaning of the noise made by the traffic officer is the total consequent system of social behavior, in which indiciduals are subjected, by means of noise, to social coordination; its proximate meaning is a coordination of the movements of persons and vehicles in the neighborhood and directly affected."[64]

Signs, tools, equipments are built into systems of human action such that they become instrumental for the "aims" of these actions. The whistle aims at "social coordination" as well as does the "red arrow"; in both cases the ultimate aim is the same. Heidegger calls such aims "works," and Dewey speaks of "ends in view" which seems to be less dramatic terminology. There are hierarchies of these "ends in view" (which reminds one very much of Aristotle). Heidegger makes this especially clear:

> "The work to be produced, as the 'towards-which' of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. The shoe which is to be produced is for wearing (footgear) (Schuhzeug); the clock is manufactured for telling the time. The work which we chiefly encounter in our concernful dealings -- the work that is to be found when one is 'at work' on something -- has a usability which belongs to it essentially; in this usability it lets us encounter already the 'towards-which' for which it is usable."[65]

There lurks, however, an epistemological problem which is not easily dismissed. We dealt already with the fact that traditional philosophers treat objects as "objects known"; they emphasize the problems

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[64]EN, 190-191.

[65]Sz, 70.

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which arise if a subject stares at "objects" and they think that all relations within experience can be transformed into this epistemological relation. This assumption, however goes

> "contrary to the facts of what is primarily experienced. For things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized."[66]

This implies, however, that we cannot get at the Being of things had because as soon as we try to thematise the qualities which "things had" have, they are already "things cognized." The more things are had, the more they become entirely absorbed in the actions of human beings, and the more they are withdrawn from our sight. Heidegger sees this clearly when he writes:

> "Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply have knowledge about the hammer's character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment in a way which could not possibly be more suitable... the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is -- as equipment....
>
> The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw (zuruckzuziehen) in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically."[67]

The problem then is this: How do we get to know of things had or ready-to-hand at all if things "in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not because they are remote or behind some impenetrable veil of sensation of ideas, but because knowledge has no concern with

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[66] EN, 21.

[67] SZ, 69.

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them."[68]

It seems clear that the traditional mistake of taking things as objects known is more than just a deplorable deficiency in philosophical eyesight. We now have the systematic reason why "average everydayness" and "concrete human experience" have always been passed over. Rephrasing a quotation of Heidegger which was given above we may say: That which is ontically closest is epistemologically the farthest and not known at all; its epistemological signification is that it has to be constantly overloked in order to be what it is. But since we know that these primordial relationships exist, how and why do we know this?

The answer to this question is the same as the answer to the question: Why do we ever conceive of things as being "physical objects" in the sense of the sciences?

The answer is that man

> "finds himself living in an aleatory world; his existence involves, to put it baldly, a gamble. The world is a scene of risk; it is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable. Its dangers are irregular, inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their times and seasons."[69]

"The world is precarious and perilous."[70]

The psychological representation of this basic state of affairs is fear (Dewey) or anxiety (Heidegger):

> "Man fears because he exists in a fearful, an awful world." (EN, 42)[71]

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[68] EN, 86.

[69] EN, 41.

[70] EN, 42.

[71] Loc. cit.

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> "Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind (we call this possibility 'fearfulness' ("Furchtsamkeit"), has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something like the fearsome may come close."[72]

> "Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious."[73]

It is this characteristic of the world and of Dasein and Experience respectively which announces itself constantly, even in our daily dealing within-the-world, as, for example, in "unforseen" consequences of actions or in the experience that expectations are not fulfilled.

> "Everything that man achieves and possesses is got by actions that may involve him in other and obnoxious consequences in addition to those wanted and enjoyed."[74]

It is the "problematic situation" which makes the world as world conspicuous. The conscious sensation of fear is itself a derivative of the fundamental changes in everyday adjustments. Dewey illustrates the point in the fourth chapter of "Reconstruction in Philosophy" where he describes a situation nearly identical with those described by Heidegger:

> "As a conscious element, a sensation marks an interruption in a course of action previously entered upon...(sensations) are shocks of change, due to interruption of a prior adjustment. They are signals to redirections of action. Let me take a trivial illustration. The person who is taking notes has no sensation of the pressure of his pencil on the paper or on his hand as long as it functions properly. It operates merely as stimulus to ready and effective adjustment. The sensory activity incites automatically and unconsciously its proper motor response...If the pencil-point gets broken or too blunt and the habit of writing does not operate smoothly, there is a conscious shock: -- the feeling of something the matter, something gone wrong. This emotional change operates as a stimulus to a needed change in operation. One looks at his

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[72] SZ, 141.

[73] SZ, 187.

[74] EN, 43.

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pencil, sharpens it or takes another pencil from one's pocket...

> Sensations are not parts of any knowledge, good or bad, superior or inferior, imperfect or complete. They are rather provocations, incitements, challenges to an act of inquiry which is to terminate in knowledge...As interruptions, they raise the questions: What does this shock mean? What is happening? What is the matter? How is my relation to the environment disturbed?"[75]

In such situations the readiness-to-hand-character of the world and its tools or equipments break down and the lurking presence-at-hand of "physical objects" comes into sight. Heidegger describes three similar situations in which varying degrees of the breakdown are demonstrated:

(a) Let us imagine that a hammer which we wanted to use is broken; the head has fallen off of the handle.

> "When we concern ourselves with something, the entities which are not most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable....
>
> When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand...Pure presence-at hand announces itself..."[76]

(b) Let us imagine that the hammer is missing altogether.

> "Again, to miss something in this way amounts to coming across something un-ready-to-hand. When we notice what is un-ready-to-hand, that which is ready-to-hand enters the mode of obstrusiveness... It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand."[77]

(c) In order to catch the idea of Heidegger's third "problematic situation"

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[75] Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Mentor Books, New York 1950, pp. 88-90.

[76] SZ, 73.

[77] Loc. cit.

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one can imagine that one wants to drive to a certain place but finds a certain street which one has to pass somehow blocked.

> "Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else. With this obstinacy, the presence-at-hand of the ready-to hand makes itself known in a new way as the Being of that which still lies before us and calls for our attending to it."[78]

These considerations, however, have a surprising consequence. Is it not that the readiness-to-hand of something reveals its structure to the same extent as it becomes present-at-hand? Looking at a broken hammer we become aware of the fact that the hammer should be ready-to-hand. In order to see the force of this argument we might go a little bit beyond Heidegger's analysis. Imagine that the hammer can be repaired within a minute. There will hardly be time for the "world" to announce itself. But now imagine that the hammer is completely broken and that we have to look for a substitute. Suddenly we will reflect on how to use a hammer in order to find a suitable substitute. We become aware of the fact that the substitute has to be of a certain weight and that it has to be "handy" in a certain sense. Moreover, we think about the act of hammering itself and become very much aware of the peculiar readiness-to-hand which a hammer has to "possess" as "property" in order to fulfill its function. "Readiness-to-hand" as a definite feature of "something" is the product of this something's "dropping out" of the primordial readiness-to-hand and its becoming present-at-hand. The primordial readiness-to-hand of the hammering, the "primary experience" of this activity, formed a certain "unanalysed totality"

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[78] SZ, 74.

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in which "man" and "hammer" were completely absorbed. But as soon as the hammer becomes present-at-hand, its primordial readiness-to-hand also comes to the fore, but it does so ironically, in the mode of potentiality, since there simply no longer is this "unanalysed totality". Hence the very feature of the world in which we live, that which makes possible the grasping of "primary Experience" as well as the grasping of "physical objects" (namely the possibility of change) makes it inevitable that the readiness-to-hand of primary Experience can only be reconstructed.

To sum up: Dewey as well as Heidegger take human actions primarily as purposeful structures in which man, equipment, and ends-in-view are "unanalysed totalities." Equipment and tools are ready-to-hand in a primordial sense. They have the further characteristic that they implicitly refer to other tools and equipments and thus reveal more and more remote systems of ends-in-view or "works." Such primordial relationships, however, are rather had than seen, and it is therefore a problem as to how one can get hold of them at all. The answer to this question lies in the fact that the world is precarious, and that there exist ruptures in our everyday dealings with the world. These ruptures and irregularities represent themselves as a "shock," producing fear or anxiety in extra ordinary cases and uneasiness in milder cases within our everyday dealings. In such cases, a "thing had" or an "equipment" becomes at once present-at-hand or a "physical object," and reveals its primordial mode of readiness-to-hand in the secondary mode of reconstructured primary experience.

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7. Theory and Praxis: the divergence between Dewey and Heidegger

At this point there emerges a difference between Heidegger and Dewey which is of great importance for their presentations. Physical objects which are present-at-hand are the proper objects of science; they are the stuff with which the theoretically oriented mind occupies itself. The main characteristic of these objects is that they are 'intuited' or 'looked at' instead of being handled and used. We know, moreover, that these objects come into sight whenever something "goes wrong" with primary Experience. But the question might be asked: Why do "physical objects" rather than other things emerge out of "problematic situations"?

This question aims at an ontological genesis of theoretical behavior and science. We do not seek an answer in terms of why at such and such a particular place and time "science" emerged -- we want to know the reasons why science emerged at all:

> "When in the course of existential ontological analysis we ask how theoretical discovery 'arises' out of circumspective concern, this implies already that we are not making a problem of the ontical history and development of science, or of the factical occasions for it, or of its proximate goals. In seeking the ontological genesis of the theoretical attitude, we are asking which of those conditions implied in Dasein's state of Being are existentially necessary for the possibility of Dasein's existing in the way of scientific research."[79]

Dewey implicitly poses the same question which Heidegger verbalises. The real difference between the two philosophers lies in their answers: Dewey's is explicit, whereas Heidegger gives none at all. Heidegger's discussion of this question (which subsequently follows the quotation from above) is one of the most disappointing discussions in his whole

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[79]SZ, 356-357.

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book. Instead of saying why the theoretical attitude arises, he describes merely over and over again that this attitude arises. Furthermore he promises to reveal the necessary conditions for "Dasein's existing in the way of scientific research," but leaves this promise unfulfilled, for he says only that the scientific attitude rests upon the basis of everyday-circumspection without giving a reason why this is so.

This is the more astonishing when one considers how near to Dewey's answer he comes in characterizing scientific experience. It is interesting to note that paragraph 69b (with which we are occupied just now) is located in the middle of Heidegger's discussion of "temporality" -- one of the hardest sections of SZ. Yet the text reminds us very much of the earlier discussions of SZ about readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, which are quite easy to read. What is so puzzling about the section is that Heidegger has nothing new to say. Implicitly, however, he seems to suggest that "theory" is not so much different from "praxis." Heidegger seems to imply that "theory" is not opposed to "concern" but a kind of concern, though of a special sort:

> "In characterizing the change-over from the manipulating and using and so forth which are circumspective in a 'practical' way, to 'theoretical' exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern holds back from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the 'emergence' of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis... But this is by no means the way in which the 'theoretical' attitude of science is reached....Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer theory that the kind of circumspection which tarries and 'considers,' remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned." (SZ, 357/358).[80]

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[80] SZ, 357-358.

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Heidegger then goes on to remark that "just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight ("theory"), theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own."[81] This does not answer the question why and how "theory" is. It seems as if Heidegger himself does not know "where the ontological boundary between 'theoretical' and 'atheoretical' behavior really runs."[82]

Heidegger's short analysis of deliberation seems to be more promising in that he explicitly introduces the means-end-relationship:

> "...(The)...specific way of bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it circumspecitvely, we call "deliberating" (Ueberlegung). The scheme peculiar to this is the 'if-then'; if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be needed. Circumspective deliberation never merely 'affirms' that some entity is present-at-hand or has such and such properties."[83]

If this means that there is no "theorizing" for its own sake but that it is always supported by some sort of circumspective deliberation, then what makes it possible? The answer is unsatisfacory: theoretical, predicative understanding of something as something is grounded in the fact that we understand it already as something:

> "...if deliberation is to be able to operate in the scheme of the 'if-then', concern must already have 'surveyed' a context of involvements and have an understanding of it. That which is considered with an 'if' must already be understood as something or other. This does not require that the understanding of equipment be expressed in a predication. The schema 'something as something' has already been sketched out beforehand in the structure of one's prepredicative understanding."[84]

This is an almost full circle: to view something as something

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[82] Loc. cit.

[83] SZ, 359.

[84] Loc. cit.

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is the very characteristic of theoretical inquiry which views things as being present-at-hand, but we wanted to explain how this theoretical concern arises out of circumspective concern. Heidegger himself admits that the shift from readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand is a radical change-over:

> "Why is it that what we are talking about...shows itself differently when our way of talking is thus modified? Not because we are keeping our distance from manipulation, nor because we are just looking away (absehen) from the equipmental character of this entity, but rather because we are looking at (ansehen) the ready-to-hand thing which we encounter, and looking at it 'in a new way' as something present-at-hand. The understanding of Being by which our concernful dealings with entitues within-the-world have been guided has changed over."[85]

But if there is this difference between the practical and circumspective sight and the theoretical one, then it is clearly a petitio principi to explain the occurence or possibility of theory by the "theoretical aspect" of praxis. It will not help to suggest that the "as-structure is grounded ontologically in the temporality of understanding"[86] if no different temporal structures can be assigned to readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand.

All this suggests that for Heidegger theory and praxis are equiprimordial; they are not reducible to each other:

> "'Practical' behavior is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of 'sightless.' The way it differs from theoretical behavior does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behavior one observes, while in practical behavior one acts, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has its own kind of sight."[87]

The interesting point here is that Heidegger seems to explicitly

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[85] SZ, 361.

[86] SZ, 359.

[87] SZ, 69.

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deny that "theory" can be reduced to the fact that it is necessary for action which would not "remain blind." This comes more sharply into the open in a text where Heidegger briefly characterizes knowing as "Vernehmen" which has passive connotations in German and is therefore not quite translatable by "perception":

> "Looking at something in this way is at times (jeweils) a definite way of taking up a direction towards something..., of setting our sights towards what is present-at-hand...In this kind of 'dwelling' as a holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception (Vernehmen) of the present-at-hand is consummated."[88]

One can say then, that for Heidegger theorizing or knowing and acting are not reducible to each other but are equiprimordial modes of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Moreover, knowing is conceived of as passive, perceptive behavior towards entities which are discovered as present-at-hand. It is only a short step from this position to Heidegger's later claim that thought "lets Being be" and that it "accomplishes this letting (be)."[89]

Dewey could never have reached such conclusion because of the difference of his starting point in his answer to the question why "theory" emerges at all. His answer is clear cut and well known: It is for the sake of praxis that theory arises. "Theory" is the outcome of "intelligent behavior" which tries to reestablish the smoothness of everyday-dealings within the world once they are broken down. It is simply useful to view the broken hammer temporally as something present-at-hand in order to repair it. By doing this, one can isolate the "factors"

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[88] SZ, 61-62.

[89] Heidegger, Martin, Ueber den "Humanismus," in: Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Francke Verlag, Bern 1947, pp. 53-119, p. 54 and p. 11.

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which were responsible for the break-down, and try to find systematic connections in terms of "laws" in order to restore the previous unity. "Thought" is successful whenever it constructs stable patterns according to which the problematic situation can be controlled.

> "Empirically, all reflection sets out from the problematic and confused. Its aim is to clarify and ascertain. When thinking is successful, its career closes in transforming the disordered into the orderly, the mixed-up into the distinguished or placed, the unclear and ambiguous into the defined and unequivocal, the disconnected into the systematized."[90]

This is an almost exact transcription of Peirce's famous remark: "Thought in action has for its only possible motive the attainment of Thought at rest"[91]. Hence it is Dewey's opinion that "action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind" -- in certain "problematic situations". Theory is reducible to praxis for Dewey and not equiprimordial with it. Thinking in general and theorizing in particular render the precarious and perilous less dangerous by converting ready-to-hand tools and equipments into present-at-hand "objects." There objects are then linked together by "laws" which make things predictable and hence controllable.

This "instrumentalism" of Dewey is a powerful tool for explaining the fact that traditional philosophy always passed over primary Experience. Not only is everyday Experience so "near" to us that we lose sight of it, but it is also most helpful to lose sight of it in order to control the environment more efficiently. If one takes Dewey's

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[90] EN, 65/66.

[91] Peirce, Charles Sanders, Collected Papers, Vol. V, Harvard University Press 1934, section 396.

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assumption seriously that the world is a "scene of risk" -- that at any time something can go wrong -- then it becomes almost "natural" to think of the world in terms of "subjects" and "objects" because this view assigns "certainty" and "stability" to an otherwise precarious environment. Dewey even goes so far as to suggest that the preoccupation of classic philosophy with the "stable" and "necessary" indicates the amount of precariousness felt:

> "If classic philosophy says so much about unity and so little about unreconciled diversity, so much about the eternal and permanent, and so little about change (save as something to be resolved into combinations of the permanent), so much about necessity and so little about contingency, so much about the comprehending universal and so little about the recalcitrant particular, it may well be because the ambiguousness and ambivalence of reality are actually so pervasive."[92]

> "Our magical safeguard against the uncertain character of the world is to deny the existence of chance, to mumble universal and necessary law, the ubiquity of cause and effect, the uniformity of nature, universal progress, and the inherent rationality of the universe... Through science we have secured a degree of power of prediction and of control; through tools, machinery and an accompanying technique we have made the world more conformable to our needs, a more secure abode. We have heaped up riches and means of comfort between ourselves and the risks of the world."[93]

Dewey's instrumentalism suggest an active account of thinking and theorizing as against Heidegger's passive interpretation. Thinking is the adaptive response of human behavior to a "scene of risk." Many analyses of Dewey are overshadowed by this view. The problem of meaning, for example, is for him the problem of assigning stable characteristics to unstable events: "The striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human effort."[94] Language, in so far as it is spoken and written

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[93] EN, 44.

[94] EN, 50.

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concatenations of meanings, becomes of course the "tool of tools".[95] Language, however, has its primordial basis in communication and in so far as communication is analyzed as a feature of primary Experience, it does not at all differ from Heidegger's analysis of "understanding" and "language."

The difference between Heidegger and Dewey emerges only because of Dewey's additional interpretation of every secondary-level Experience as a tool to further primary-level Experience. For Heidegger, who abstains from such an additional interpretation, the features of secondary-level Experience can be constructed as being parallel to the characteristics of primary-level Experience. If, however, one abstracts from this difference between Dewey and Heidegger -- a difference which stems from Dewey's additional interpretation imposed upon the meaning of secondary ontologies -- then the analysis of many phenomena are virtually the same in the two men. To make this thesis plausible has been the sole aim of this essay.

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[95]EN, 186.

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