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AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION IN KARL MARX'S EARLY WRITINGS

by

David Edward Whiteside

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is the result of more than just a desire to fulfill the requirements for the Ph.D.. Rather, it has grown out of an immediate, personal concern to understand the phenomenon of alienation. In the years prior to the beginning of this work, I became aware of a growing spirit of disenchantment among my friends and within myself. Our times did, indeed, appear to be "out of joint."

Diagnosing our maladie as alienation, I then began to read about our affliction. A little investigation revealed that this was a very contagious state and made no exceptions for age, class, sex, occupation, or race. For example, Eric and Mary Josephson, in their Introduction to Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society, indicate that:

> Among the social groups who have been described as alienated in varying degree--are women, industrial workers, white-collar workers, migrant workers, artists, suicides, the mentally disturbed, addicts, the aged, the young generation as a whole, juvenile delinquents in particular, voters, non-voters, consumers, the audiences of mass media, sex deviants, victims of prejudice and discrimination, the prejudiced, bureaucrats, political radicals, the physically handicapped, immigrants, exiles, vagabonds, and recluses.1

Given such an epidemic, it seemed that alienation should have been considered normal. This view, however, was neither personally conforting, nor did it enable me

to ignore, such questions as: What was alienation? Who was alienated? and How do people come to be alienated?

In the course of my reading, I eventually came upon Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. I was impressed by the facts, first, that Marx was one of a few who attempted a systematic explanation of alienation and, more importantly, that he claimed that alienation could be eliminated by the establishment of communism. I was compelled to study more closely these early writings and to also investigate Marx's later works.

Thus, it was a concern to understand the phenomenon of alienation in our time, particularly as it affected myself and my friends, which led me initially to examine Marx's treatment of alienation in his early writings.

Aside, however, from what an examination of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts could contribute to our understanding of alienation, an investigation of this and other of Marx's early works soon acquired additional significance because of the response these works have provoked, first, in Eastern European countries and, later, in Western, non-Marxist countries, especially since their publication in English in 1932.

In both Marxist and non-Marxist societies, these early writings have created exciting but controversial attempts to reinterpret Marx's thought. These efforts stress Marx's humanism and, in particular, focus upon his desire to eliminate alienation. These new interpretations, or attempts to get at the "real Marx," also often center

around the issue of whether or not Marx abandons the concept of alienation in his later writings.

It needs to be noted that due to the official adherence of Eastern European countries to Marxism, these attempts at reinterpreting Marx are of a much more vital significance than in non-Marxist countries. This is especially so since these Neo-Marxists or Marxist-Humanists, as the authors of these attempts are called, have used Marx's early writings as a basis for challenging the status quo in their own and in Soviet society and for challenging the "official" version of Marxism as to its fidelity to Marx's vision of a "truly human" society.

Furthermore, the "discovery" of these early writings has stimulated several social philosophers to construct important, new social critiques of contemporary society which are based upon ideas contained, in particular, in Marx's treatment of alienation.

Now, much of Marx's explanation of alienation in these writings is very difficult to understand. Marx is often unclear and ambiguous. Given the intense and widespread interest in Marx's early writings, it would seem that there would exist several thorough, critical examinations of Marx's concept of alienation. Unfortunately, with the exception of one or two short essays, there are no such critical studies. Most authors have apparently relied upon our ability to intuitively understand Marx's very difficult explanation of alienation.

There do exist some excellent studies of Marx's historical development. In addition, there are excellent studies of such important concepts as historical materialism and Marx's view of human nature. To repeat, however, there are practically no critical studies of Marx's concept of alienation. Most authors merely quote or paraphrase what Marx says about alienation. Since Marx himself is unclear, not much is gained by these efforts. Attempts at reinterpreting Marx or efforts to use concepts contained in his presentation of alienation which proceed in such a fashion are bound to be of dubious merit.

What is needed is an analytic clarification of the concept of alienation. To give an analytic clarification of the concept of alienation requires the attempt to answer the following sort of questions: What does Marx mean by "alienation" (Entfremdung)? Does "alienation" have different meanings? What does Marx mean by such obscure terms as "objectification" (Vergegenständlichung), "externalization" (Entäusserung), and "species-being" (Gattungswesen)? What does Marx mean by "free, conscious activity" and "human needs?" What is the relationship of these concepts to alienation? What did Marx consider as the causes of alienation? Is Marx consistent in what he says? What are the assumptions and implications of what he says about alienation. Does a particular claim express a conceptual or empirical claim? Are Marx's claims plausible or not? And so forth.

The lack of such a critical approach to Marx's concept of alienation is a fault of both Marx's supporters as well as his critics. It is clear, however, that these questions must be asked before one can even begin to evaluate Marx's thought. In this dissertation, then, I shall attempt to give an analytic clarification of Marx's concept of alienation as it is presented in his early writings.

As suggested, such an attempt is of value for two principal reasons. First, such an investigation will contribute greatly to our understanding of Marx's thought in general. In particular, the relationship of the concept of alienation to Marx's philosophic system will become apparent. Secondly, getting clear about Marx's concept of alienation will enable us to better understand alienation as it exists today. We shall be able to see whether or not contemporary alienation has anything in common with the alienation which Marx describes. We shall be then, in a position to decide whether or not Marx's prescription of communism has anything to offer us as a means of ending alienation.

The limitations of this dissertation prevent a consideration of whether or not Marx abandons the concept of alienation in his later writings. Similarly, a full discussion of the relationship between Marx's concept of alienation and contemporary views of alienation lies beyond the scope of this dissertation, although a few comments on this issue will be offered. Rather, it is hoped that the analysis

given in this dissertation, by providing a clear picture of what Marx is claiming and an indication of the strengths and weaknesses of his claims, will allow discussions of these issues to proceed on a firm and sure foundation.

Finally, it needs to be noted that this dissertation will not be an intellectual history of Marx's development. Only where necessary for analyzing and clarifying Marx's thought have I indicated the influence of various ideas upon Marx.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Eric and Mary Josephson, Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 13.

CHAPTER I

LABOR, ONTOLOGY, AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Even if one disagrees with its contents, the unity of such a philosophical system as Plato's or Spinoza's is marvellous. For the student of such a system, however, the problem arises that in explaining one portion of the system, one must necessarily refer to the other parts. The thought of Marx constitutes a system just as integrated as Plato's or Spinoza's and, thus, produces this problem. To understand what Marx says about alienation, one must have some knowledge of his ontology, his theory of reality, and his anthropology, his view of man.

An examination of the significance of labor for Marx will reveal the general conception of man which underlies Marx's concept of alienation and, furthermore, will indicate the ontological position upon which this conception of man is based. This is so because the fact that men labor has, for Marx, ontological and anthropological significance.

Labor can be generally defined as the way men go about utilizing or appropriating nature in order to satisfy their needs. In Capital, Marx states that labor is:

> . . . a process going on between man and nature, a process in which man, through his own activity, initiates, regulates, and controls the material

> reactions between himself and nature. He confronts nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in form adapted to his own wants.1

What is meant by saying that labor has ontological significance is that Marx saw in the fact that men labor confirmation, on the one hand, of much of the doctrine of materialism and a corresponding indication of the inadequacy of Hegelian idealism, and, on the other hand, saw in labor a confirmation of part of Hegelian idealism and an indication of a corresponding defect of materialism.

At first a Hegelian, with the appearance of Feuerbach's works, Marx became a materialist. He accepted the position of the "primacy of matter over spirit," and, in particular, agreed with Feuerbach's argument that Hegel's philosophy was a reflection of and abstraction from the real, perceptible, sensuous, objective world. Marx, in the "Afterword to the Second German Edition" of Capital, explains his relation to Hegel by stating that "To Hegel, the life-process is the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which under the name of 'The Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.[2]

Hegel, then, according to Marx, considers the external, material world a "defect" and only traces the development

of the Absolute Idea through man's "mental productions" of art, religion, and philosophy, while neglecting man's relation to the objective world.[3] Hegel ignores man's development as seen in the product of men's hands, in industry.[4] The fact that men labor or engage in production, however, indicates the importance of the objective world. It indicates that man is part of the external, natural world which he must struggle with and utilize in order to survive, in order to satisfy his needs. Thus, for Marx, the fact that men labor supports materialism's emphasis upon the external, perceptible world and correspondingly indicated the inadequacy of idealism.[5]

On the other hand, however, the fact of labor confirmed an aspect of Hegel's philosophy which Marx thought was ignored by the materialism of the time, particularly Feuerbach's. Although materialism had duly indicated man's passivity as part of the natural world, materialism neglected man's activity in relation to the objective world. In this respect, Marx praises Hegel for grasping "the self-development of man as a process," a process in which man's nature is visible in his creations, his activity, his work.[6] Marx indicates, however, that because of Hegel's neglect of the external, objective world Hegel only grasps this process of self-creation abstractly or "one sidedly." In explaining this defect of materialism, Marx states:

> The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only in the form of the

> object or perception, but not as sensuous human activity, practice /Praxis/, not subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the active side was developed by idealism--but only abstractly since idealism naturally does not know actual, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants senuous objects actually different from thought objects: but he does not comprehend human activity itself as objective.7

Marx's point is that Feuerbach fails to realize that the world is not merely perceived by man and hence constant, but that the world is a product of man's activity, which is, thus, objective. Thus, in labor, we can see confirmation of idealism's awareness of man as an active, creative being, an aspect of man and reality which was ignored by materialism, and, at the same time, can see man's unity with the external, natural world, an aspect of man and reality which was ignored by Hegel's idealism.

As stated, in addition to having ontological significance, labor also has anthropological significance; that is, an examination of labor reveals much about man's nature.

On the individual level, Marx indicates that a person's nature is "determined" or "defined" by his labor. In The German Ideology, after pointing out that it is production of the means of subsistence which distinguishes man from animals, he states:

> This mode of production must not be viewed simply as reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of their activity, a definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode of life. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with what they produce, with what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions which determine their production.8

Because we shall later examine the nature of the relation between alienation and one's labor, it is important to discover exactly what sort of claims are being made in this quotation. The statements "As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, etc." could be interpreted as either referring to what characteristics of a person we think most relevant for describing who they are, or they could be interpreted as expressing an empirical correlation. That is, the first interpretation would be the claim that when we tell who a person is, the most significant characteristics are facts about the type of labor he performs, e.g. works in a coal mine, uses heavy equipment, works sixteen hours a day, has lung disease, etc.. On the other hand, the statements could be interpreted as claiming that engaging in a certain type of production will affect one differently than another type, that one's personality, one's mental and physical characteristics, and one's situation in life in general are formed by the type of labor one does. For example, by working in a coal mine one would be likely to have well-developed arm muscles, suffer from certain diseases, have little education, and live in a hovel. By being a banker, one would be likely to be well-fed, well-educated, well-dressed, and live in a comfortable home. Thus, these statements could be interpreted as referring to how we describe or classify people or to an empirical connection between one's labor and one's personality and mode of life in general.

The final statement, "The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions, etc." supports the interpretation that the previous statements are properly interpreted as expressing the empirical claim. This is so since it is clear in Capital, for example, that Marx believed there was an empirical connection between the material conditions of a society, natural resources, technology, skills of people, etc., and the mode of production, and that in order for the inference to be legitimate, Marx must have in mind an empirical correlation between production and the nature of individuals. More will be said about this empirical correlation with regard to alienation at a later point.

On a more general level, an examination of labor reveals much about man's nature itself. In at least three places, Marx indicates those features of man which distinguish him from animals, those features which are distinctively human. In the essay "Alienated Labor" (1844), Marx, still under the strong influence of Feuerbach, states:

> The animal is immediately one with its life activity, not distinct from it. The animal is its life activity. Man makes his life activity itself into an object of will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which he immediately identifies. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal.9

In The German Ideology, (1845, 46), Marx asserts:

> Man can be distinguished from the animal by consciousness, religion, or anything else you please. He begins to distinguish himself from the animal the moment he begins to produce his means of subsistence.[10]

Finally, in Capital, (1867), he indicates that:

> What distinguishes the most incompetent architect from the best of bees, is that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he constructs it in reality. . . . He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will.11

Thus, the means of distinction which Marx respectively mentions are conscious life activity, production of the means of subsistence, and production according to a method or plan. All of these distinctions, it should be noted, refer to man as an active being and, in particular, to his labor. Regardless of the adequacy of the distinctions and of whether or not they are equivalent, what is important for our purpose is the general conception of man which they suggest. It is a conception of man as an active being, as a being who consciously and purposively acts upon nature to satisfy his needs.[12]

This view of man, however, should not be interpreted as merely descriptive of how men in general or some men do or have acted. More importantly, this view of man comes to refer, for Marx, to man's capacities, his potential, and, most significantly, becomes the basis for Marx's ethics, his view of what men and society ought to be like. Thus, Marx's view of man contains the idea that man, at least collectively, has the capacity to consciously and purposively regulate "the world" to satisfy his needs, both animal and human. Indeed, the characteristics of consciousness and purposiveness, among others, form much

of Marx's definition of "man," much of his conception of man's essence. It is this notion which lies behind, for example, what can be called Marx's stipulative use of the term "human," as seen in such a claim that only in communism will there be human history. That is, unless history is is made consciously and purposively, it cannot be called human history. In addition, the identification of man's essence, humanity, with acting consciously and purposively to satisfy certain needs provides the transition to Marx's view of what men ought to be like. Nevertheless, as can be expected, to say that men are alienated has much to do with men not acting consciously and purposively in order to satisfy their needs.

With these prefatory remarks in mind, we are now in a position to more clearly understand the exact nature of an alienated relation or condition. We turn now to consider Marx's discussion of alienated labor in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Karl Marx, Capital, ed. F. Engels and trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (3 vols.; New York: International Publishers, 1967) I, p. 177.

[2]Ibid., p. 19.

[3]See Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. L. Easton and K. Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 336.

[4]Marx states that:

> . . . It is apparent how the history of industry, industry as objectively existing, is the open book of man's essential powers, the observably present human psychology, which has not been thus far grasped in its connection with man's essential nature but only in an external utilitarian way because in the perspective of alienation only the general existence of man--religion or history in its abstract-general character was grasped as the acutality of man's essential powers and his human generic action. We have before us the objectified essential powers of man in the form of sensuous, alien, useful objects--in the form of alienation--in ordinary material industry. . . . ("Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General," p. 310.)

[5]In the "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General," p. 325, Marx states:

> ((Immediately, man is a natural being. As a living natural being he is, in one aspect, endowed with the natural capacities and vital powers of an active natural being. These capacities exist in him as tendencies and capabilities, as drives. In another aspect as a natural, living, sentient and objective being man is a suffering, conditioned, and limited creature like an animal or plant. The objects of his drives, that is to say, exist outside him as independent, yet they are objects of his need, essential and indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his essential capacities. The fact that man is a corporeal, actual, sentient objective being with natural capacities means that he has actual sensuous objects for his nature as objects of his life--expression, or that he can only express his life in actual sensuous objects. To be objective,

> natural, sentient and at the same time have an object, nature, and sense outside oneself or be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third person is one and the same thing.)) Hunger is a natural need; it thus requires nature and an object outside itself to be satisfied and quieted. Hunger is the objective need of a body for an object existing outside itself, indispensable to its integration and the expression of its nature.

[6]Ibid., p. 321.

[7]Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. L. Easton and K. Guddat (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 400. Also see Marx's statement in The German Ideology that Feuerbach:

> . . . does not see that the world surrounding him is not something directly given and the same from all eternity but the product of industry and of the state of society in the sense that it is a historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceeding one, developing further its industry and commerce, and modifying its social order to changed needs. (Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. L. Easton and K. Guddat Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967) p. 417.)

[8]The German Ideology, p. 409.

[9]"Alienated Labor" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. L. Easton and K. Guddat (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1967), p. 294. See also the statements made in the following paragraph.

[10]p. 409.

[11]Vol. I, p. 178.

[12]In various places in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx distinguishes between animal needs and human needs. As we shall later see, animal needs include the need for food, drink, clothing, shelter, air, and sex. Human needs will be the need to express one's individuality and the need to care for others.

CHAPTER II

THE MEANING OF "ALIENATION": ALIENATED LABOR AND ITS ASPECTS

Marx's most complete and explicit presentation of the concept of alienation occurs throughout a group of writings dating from 1842-1847. The principal works among these writings are: On the Jewish Question, the "Introduction" to Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, the short essays "Money and Alienated Man" and "Free Human Production," the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, The Holy Family, the "Theses on Feuerbach," and The German Ideology. Of these, it is the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, written in Paris during the summer of 1844, which is the most important. In these manuscripts, Marx systematically discusses various aspects of alienated labor, its causes, and the means to eliminate it.

In this chapter, as a means of elucidating the concept of alienation, I shall focus upon the aspects (die Seite) of alienated labor which Marx distinguishes in these manuscripts. I shall consider in detail each of the aspects of alienated labor which Marx either explicitly or implicitly refers to. In particular, I shall ask of Marx's discussion of these aspects those questions, and others, which are required by an analytic clarification

and which were indicated in the Introduction. At the end of this chapter, I shall summarize the implications of the preceeding analysis for answering the question of what is the meaning of "alienation" in Marx's early writings.

In general, I wish to show that there is a great deal of unclarity and ambiguity in Marx's explanation of the concept of alienation and that because of this a simple, single definition of the concept which is faithful to all of Marx's uses of the concept cannot be given. In light of this, I shall not propose a definition of "alienation," but I shall offer, in the following chapter, a "characterization" of alienation from one's self as a more suitable means of elucidating Marx's concept of alienation.

Before entering into an examination of specific passages from the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, however, it is necessary to keep a few general cautionary remarks in mind. First, it needs to be remembered that as a youth, Marx wrote much verse and seriously considered poetry as his calling. Thus, there is a strong poetic quality to Marx's style in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. For example, Marx frequently juxtaposes similar sounding or appearing phrases to cleverly achieve a poetic effect.[1] Unfortunately, however, it often seems that clarity and precision have been sacrificed for this effect. In such cases, it seems that one can mistakenly try to squeeze too much lucidity from Marx's mode of expression. Secondly, it is important to remember that the

time span chosen as containing his early works, 1842-1847, was a period of great intellectual upheaval for Marx. In this time span, a double transition was made. First there was the major shift from being a Hegelian to the adoption of Feuerbach's materialism around 1840-1842. Shortly thereafter, around 1843-1845, Marx was to begin criticizing Feuerbach and working out his own philosophy. Thus, these early writings are transitional works, and it should be expected that they contain a certain amount of ambiguity and obscurity. Finally, and most importantly, it needs to be kept in mind that the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts were notes made by Marx during his studies of political economy. The manuscripts as we have them were not intended for publication. Hence, it is important to remember that these manuscripts were notes written by Marx to himself. It would be a great mistake and injustice to approach them as polished, complete, and authoritative.

Let us now examine the various aspects of alienated labor that Marx explicitly distinguishes and implicitly suggests in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.

In the essay "Alienated Labor" (Entfremdete Arbeit), in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx explicitly distinguishes four aspects of alienated labor. They are alienation from the object of labor, alienation from the activity of labor, alienation from one's species-being, and alienation from other men. Sometimes Marx refers to the alienation from the activity of labor as the alienation

from one's self, and sometimes refers to the alienation from the object as a more or less specific case of alienation from nature. In the essay "Private Property and Communism," from the same manuscripts, Marx also discusses at length alienation from one's senses, which I shall, thus, refer to as an aspect of alienated labor. In addition, I have considered alienation from one's needs as an aspect of alienated labor, although Marx nowhere explicitly distinguishes this as an aspect of alienated labor. Why I have chosen to consider alienation from one's needs as another aspect of alienated labor will be made clear when it is discussed.

As a means of analyzing and clarifying Marx's discussion of alienation, I would like to propose some distinctions which I have found helpful. These distinctions should not be regarded, however, as being extremely precise and rigid. Their value lies mainly in fostering a sensitivity to two questions: What exactly was constitutive of alienation for Marx? and What did Marx think were the causes of alienation?

To be specific, some contemporary scholars have proposed that it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between alienating conditions and alienation itself and that "alienation" be limited to refer to one's feelings or subjective experience. The point of the following distinctions is primarily to show that this cannot be done for Marx's explanation of the concept of alienation. In his discussions, Marx does not neatly isolate objective

features of one's situation as conditions or causes of alienation and subjective features as constitutive of alienation. Rather, the two are confusingly blended together, and this is one cause of the ambiguity in Marx's presentation of alienation. In addition, the distinctions will illustrate the different meanings of "alienation" for Marx.

The distinctions are: First, Marx uses "alienation" in a non-pejorative, non-evaluative sense, and also in a pejorative, evaluative sense.[2] The first sense, neutral in emotive connotation, occurs most obviously and usually when Marx is describing a primitive of undeveloped system of private property. For example, in "Money and Alienated Man," Marx refers to the reciprocal exchange or barter of goods as "the mutual externalization or alienation of private property."[3] This sense of "alienation" seems to be equivalent to our contemporary legal sense of the "transference of ownership." A typical example of our use of the term in this sense is seen in the statement "The Church was forced to alienate her holdings."

The second sense distinguished, the pejorative, evaluative sense, is used by Marx when he is describing a more developed or advanced system of private property.

In addition, when Marx uses the term "alienation" in this second sense and is describing the situation to which he is applying the term, he uses some expressions which refer to non-phenomenological features of the sit-

uation, some expressions which refer to phenomenological features, and some which could plausibly be interpreted as referring to both phenomenological and non-phenomenological features of the alienated situation. What is meant by claiming that Marx, in describing alienation, uses terms which refer to "phenomenological" features of the situation is that he refers to the individual's states of mind, his feelings, attitudes, etc., as he experiences them. What is meant by saying that Marx uses terms that refer to "non-phenomenological" characteristics of a situation is that the terms refer to features which could be judged or determined to exist independently of the alienated person's own experience. Crudely expressed, the same point is made by saying that in describing alienation some terms will refer to subjective aspects of the situation, some to objective aspects, and some to both. Because of Marx's use of the term "objectification," however, this latter mode of speaking will be avoided when the possibility of confusion is present.

Although the above distinction concerning phenomenological and non-phenomenological features will be used and illustrated in the subsequent analyses, a brief example might be valuable here. In describing or explaining alienation, Marx sometimes uses such phrases as "physically exhausted," "shortening of the life-span," "confronted by a hostile power," and "labor is external to the worker." "Physically exhausted" and "shortening of the life-span"

would be non-phenomenological features. These terms refer to characteristics of the situation which could be publicly verified. On the other hand, such a phrase as "the object confronts the worker as a hostile power" seems to make sense only if understood in a phenomenological sense, only if understood as referring to the worker's individual experience of the situation. Finally, such an expression as "labor is external to the worker" seems to have both phenomenological and non-phenomenological reference in that the object of labor is actually physically separate from the laborer and that the laborer does not experience a certain unity or identity with the object of labor.

Although the principal point of making these distinctions has been briefly indicated, a more detailed discussion of their value will be later given. The applicability of these distinctions will be more fully illustrated in the discussion of the following specific passages.

Alienation From the Object of Labor

In "Alienated Labor," Marx discusses alienated labor in the context of the claim that the science of political economy "conceals the alienation in the nature of labor."[4] The first aspect of alienated labor which Marx then considers is alienation from the object of labor. Consider the following passage, in which Marx explains this aspect of alienated labor. The statements are numbered to facilitate close examination of them. He states:

> (1) . . . the object which labor produces, its object, stands opposed to it as an alien thing, as a power independent of the producer. (2) The product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in a thing. (3) It is the objectification of labor. (4) The realization of labor appears as the diminution of the worker, the objectification as the loss of and subservience to the object, and the appropriation as alienation, as externalization.
>
> (5) So much does the realization of labor appear as diminution that the worker is diminshed to the point of starvation. (6) So much does the appropriation of the object appear as alienation that the more objects the worker produces, the fewer he can own and the more he falls under the domination of his product, of capital.
>
> (7) . . . the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object. (8) For it is clear according to this premise: The more the worker exerts himself, the more powerful becomes the alien objective world which he fashions against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, the less there is that belongs to him. (9) It is the same in religion. (10) The more man attributes to God, the less he retains in himself. (11) The worker puts his life into the object; then it no longer belongs to him but to the object. (12) The greater this activity, the poorer is the worker (um so gegenstandloser ist der Arbeiter). (13) What the product of his work is, he is not. (14) The greater this product is, the smaller he is himself. (15) The externalization of the worker in his product means not only that his work becomes an object, an external existence, but also that it exists outside him independently, alien, an autonomous power, opposed to him. (16) The life he has given to the object confront him as hostile and alien.5

Now, the terms "objectification" (Vergegenständlichung) and "externalization" (Entäusserung) occur throughout Marx's early writings, and we shall, thus, encounter them repeatedly. Their meaning is obscure and, hence, it is necessary to explain them. The term "objectification" refers to the process of the creation of a sensuous, perceptible object through labor, and, in particular, refers to the fact that the laborer's aim, skill, needs,

intelligence, etc. come to be embodied in the product, the object. Thus, the object of labor will reflect the personality of the laborer.[6] In this sense, Marx will speak of the laborer "objectifying himself" in his labor. As such, objectification is the materialised expression of that part of idealism which Marx praised Hegel for seeing, although abstractly--man's development being reflected in the products of his labor. Objectification in itself, then, is neither good nor bad. The conditions, however, under which the objectification of labor occurred in capitalist society and their effect upon the worker were to be condemned by Marx throughout his life.[7]

The term "externalization" is more complicated. On the one hand, Marx sometimes uses the term such that it is equivalent to "objectification." For example, when Marx, in discussing Hegel's Phenomenology of the Mind, speaks of the "externalization of self-consciousness," he is referring to the process of man's personality being reflected in an object of his creation, particularly an actual, physical object which is external to him.[8] Thus, "externalization" in this sense refers to the creation of an object which reflects man's nature, and the term could be used to describe the process of labor in general. That is, labor is a process of objectification and externalization, using the term in this sense.

In addition to this usage of "externalization," however, just as it was suggested that a pejorative and

non-pejorative sense of alienation can be seen in Marx's early writings, so can such a double sense of "externalization." That is, just as we saw that "alienation" sometimes merely refers to the transference of the ownership of property, so does "externalization." Furthermore, when Marx is using "externalization" in its pejorative sense, he also describes or explains externalization in terms which have phenomenological reference, terms which have non-phenomenological reference, and some terms which have both. In general, with the exception of the use of "externalization" as equivalent to "objectification," the terms "externalization" and "alienation" are synonymous. In fact, Marx frequently interchanges the two terms.

The above quotation on alienation from the object of labor indicates Marx's ambiguity and the poetic quality of his writing. It also is a good example of his "jumping back and forth" or "playing upon" the phenomenological and non-phenomenological features of the situation. It is clear that several of the statements cannot be understood in a literal sense.

In line (1) Marx seems to be referring primarily to how the laborer <u>experiences</u> his product--as an independent power. The worker, in effect, experiences the passive object as alive and active. This characteristic will also be seen in other of Marx's statements. "Alien" in lines (1) and (7) also seems to refer to the worker's experience of the object.

Lines (5) and (6) clearly refer to non-phenomenological facts, the worker starves and becomes poorer.

Statement (8) could be interpreted in various ways. First, it could refer to the fact that the more the laborer works, the more he comes to experience his situation as desparate and enslaved. Or, it could be interpreted as referring to the non-phenomenological fact that the more the laborer exerts himself, the wealthier becomes the capitalist and the more entrenched becomes the world of private property, which, thus, is all the more inimical to the worker. The last phrase in (6) suggests a similar point. Finally, one could view the statement as referring to both of these features of the situation.

In line (11) is first of all conveyed the fact that the worker's central activity, most of his life time, is spent in labor, in producing objects. Secondly, the idea is conveyed, through the phrase "it no longer belongs to him," that the worker is no longer alive as a result of his production. Indeed, this was frequently literally true as the high mortality rate of workers at that time testifies. Finally, the notion of the laborer experiencing the object as alive is continued with the point that the object "owns" the worker.

Statement (13) seems to be referring to the fact that whereas the product would be described as beautiful or well-made, the laborer is wretched and misshapen. In addition, statements (5), (6), (12) and (14) indicate

that the more the worker produces, the worse his situation becomes, that there is a causal connection between his labor and the worsening of his plight.

In statement (15) "externalization" is used in a sense equivalent to "objectification." Starting with this non-phenomenological observation, Marx then indicates, playing upon "external" and "outside," the phenomenological fact that the worker experiences the object as outside, independent, and alien.

In statement (16) there is a direct phenomenological reference. The theme of the passive object being experienced as alive and as acting against the worker is continued.

In the immediately following paragraphs, Marx explains that one of the respects in which the worker becomes a slave to his objects (line (4)) is that his physical existence depends upon his production of objects, as they are, via wages, his means of survival.[9] Given some of the other statements in the passages quoted above, however, it seems that Marx had in mind also the suggestion that the worker <u>experiences</u> himself as being enslaved, that this physical dependence upon the object has its phenomenological correlate. Similarly, the phrase "the loss of the object" in line (4) also seems to refer, on the one hand, to the non-phenomenological fact that the worker does not own the product of his labor, yet also suggests the phenomenological fact that the worker does not experinece a unity or identification with the object.

In conclusion, it can be seen that in explaining alienation from the object of labor, Marx refers to both phenomenological and non-phenomenological features of the worker's situation. Some of his expressions, e.g. "the object confronts him as hostile," "is an alien, independent power," etc., refer directly to the worker's experience. Other terms refer to non-phenomenological characteristics of his situation, e.g. "is diminished to the point of starvation," "the fewer he can own," etc.. Still others can be interpreted as referring to both types of features, e.g. "subservience to the object," "loss of the object," "the object exists outside him," etc..

Alienation From the Activity of Labor

The next aspect of alienated labor which Marx considers in "Alienated Labor" is alienation from the activity of labor. He states that "what constitutes the externalization of labor" is that:

> (1) First is the fact that labor is external to the laborer--that is, it is not a part of his nature--and that the worker does not affirm himself in his work but denies himself, feels miserable and unhappy, develops no free physical and mental energy but mortifies his fleash and ruins his mind. (2) The worker, therefore feels at ease only outside work, and during work he is outside himself. (3) He is at home when he is not working and when he is working he is not at home. (4) His work, therefore, is not voluntary, but coerced, forced labor. (5) It is not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy other needs. (6) Its alien character is obvious from the fact that as soon as no physical or other pressure exists, labor is avoided like the plague. (7) External labor, labor in which man is externalized, is labor of self-sacrifice, of penance. (8) Finally, the external nature of work for the worker appears in the

> fact that it is not his own but another person's, that in work he does not belong to himself but to someone else. (9) The activity of the worker is not his own spontaneous activity. (10) It belongs to another. (11) It is the loss of his own self.10

Marx's reference to phenomenological and non-phenomenological features is also very much present in this passage. The terms which have a direct phenomenological reference are "feels miserable and unhappy" and "feels at ease only outside work." Less obviously, the pun in line (3) on "at home" also refers to the worker's experience of his situation. The one expression which seems to have a specific non-phenomenological reference is "develops no free physical and mental energy but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind" in line (1).

Finally, those terms which could be interpreted as referring to both subjective and objective features are "coerced, forced labor" in line (4), "labor of self-sacrifice, of penance" in line (7), and "in work he does not belong to himself but someone else" in line (8). For example, to say that labor was "coerced, forced labor" could refer to the fact that the worker must force himself to labor. In this sense, the phrase emphasizes the worker's state of mind. This seems to me to be the principal sense that Marx intended. To say that the labor was "coerced" and "forced" could, however, also refer to the part played by the capitalist in getting the laborer to work. As reported in Capital, sometimes workers were locked up in the factories and not let out until a certain amount of labor was performed;

other times, the workers were often beaten or whipped to make them work. Interpreted this way, the phrase refers to an objective feature of the worker's condition. One could even plausibly argue that the labor is "forced" in the sense that no other options, short of starvation, are open to the worker.

Similarly, the phrase "in work he does not belong to himself but to someone else" could refer to the fact that the worker experiences himself as being controlled and enslaved, or, it could refer to the fact that while laboring he must do exactly what his capitalist boss tells him.

An analysis of such observations as "the worker does not affirm himself in his work" (line (1)) and "labor . . . is not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy other needs." brings us to the third aspect of alienated labor: alienation from one's species-being (Gattungswesen) or one's species-life (Gattungsleben).

Alienation From One's Species-Being

The concept of species-being is a very important concept in Marx's early writings and, although the term--as far as I know--only occurs in his early writings, it is a fundamental concept in Marx's entire system. Marx's discussion of alienation from one's species-being, however, is often very difficult to understand. Unfortunately, again, there has not been much attempt to clarify the concept, despite its importance. Thus, I shall consider

the concept in some detail. Even so, much of what Marx says will remain obscure.

In explaining this third aspect of alienated labor, Marx states:

> (1) In alienating (1) nature from man, and (2) man from himself, his own active function, his life activity, alienated labor also alienates the species from him; it makes species-life the means of individual life. (2) In the first place it alienates species-life and the individual life, and secondly it turns the latter in its abstraction into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form.
> (3) For labor, life activity, and productive life appear to man at first only as a means to satisfy a need, the need to maintain physical existence. (4) Productive life, however, is species-life. (5) It is life begetting life. (6) In the mode of life activity lies the entire character of a species, its species character; and free conscious activity is the species-character of man. (7) Life itself appears only as a means of life.
> (8) The animal is immediately one with its life activity, not distinct from it. (9) The animal is its life activity. (10) Man makes his life activity itself into an object of will and consciousness. (11) He has conscious life activity. (12) It is not a determination with which he immediately identifies. (13) Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal. (14) Only thereby is he a species-being. (15) Or rather, he is only a conscious being--that is, his own life is an object for him--since he is a species-being. (16) Only on that account is his activity free activity. (17) Alienated labor reverses the relationship in that man, since he is a conscious being makes his life activity, his essence, only a means for his existence.11

The most significant point made in these lines is Marx's identification of free, conscious activity as the species-character of man. Furthermore, it is clear that engaging in free, conscious activity can be more fully described as engaging in labor, one's life activity, as an end in itself rather than merely as a means for survival,

as is the case with the worker in bourgeois society. Lines (1), (2), (7) and (17) in particular make this latter point.

Let us consider line (2), a particularly obscure line. By "abstraction" Marx means "considering only one aspect of a whole." Thus, Marx criticizes Hegel's identification of man with self-consciousness as an abstraction since this identification ignores other aspects of man, such as his feelings, needs, senses and his interaction with the objective world.[12] There is, then, also the connotation here that Hegel is not dealing with the real concrete man. In alienated labor, one's life is said to be an abstraction because one is laboring only to satisfy his physical needs, e.g. for food, clothing, shelter, etc.. In this situation, one is ignoring--and here we must anticipate somewhat--one's need to express his personality in his life activity. To use Marx's own terms, he is satisfying only his "animal functions" but not his "human functions."[13] Thus, one's labor, one's life, is abstract or one-sided. Similarly, because of Marx's identification of species-life with life-activity, or labor, in line (6), and since the labor, the life-activity, is an abstraction, Marx can claim that species-life is an abstraction. Labor which should be an end in itself becomes only a means to survive in bourgeois society.

From these lines, and elsewhere, it is apparent that Marx is doing more than asserting that if one is to

live as a species-being, one's labor must be free, conscious activity. He is also stating that one ought to live as a species-being. The concept of species-being is also functioning here as a normative concept. To say, then, that men are alienated from their species-being means, in part, that they were not engaging in free conscious activity--as they ought to be.

Another way of expressing this point is to note that "Gattungswesen" can also be translated as "species-essence." Thus, in effect, Marx is claiming that by not engaging in free, conscious activity, man is not living according to his essence, he is not being "truly human." Again, the normative implications are obvious.

Given the above analysis, the concept of free, conscious activity takes on great importance, and thus the question "What did Marx mean by 'free, conscious activity'?" must be dealt with. It was indicated above that judging from what Marx says in the passage quoted that if one's labor were free, conscious activity, it would not be merely a means for survival but would be an end in itself.[14] This interpretation is supported by what Marx says elsewhere. These other statements also serve to illustrate more fully what Marx meant by "free, conscious activity." For example, in the essay "Money and Alienated Man," in tracing the development of labor, Marx critically indicates that a point is reached in wage labor at which ". . . it becomes entirely incidental and unessential whether the producer

immediately enjoys and needs his product and whether the activity, the action of labor itself, is his self-satisfaction and the realization of his natural dispositions and spiritual aims."[15] Similarly, in the essay "Free Human Production," Marx indicates what he obviously thinks would be the ideal relationship between man and his labor. Part of what he says is that:

> In my production I would have objectified my individuality and its particularity, and in the course of the activity, I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the object I would have experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power.[16]

Thus, we can say that at least the main identifying characteristics of free, conscious activity are that, first, the activity, the labor, not be performed merely as a means to satisfy one's physical needs but that the activity should be an expression of one's individuality and thus, secondly, should be performed for the satisfaction intrinsic to the activity.[17]

Before passing on to the fourth aspect of alienated labor, it is necessary to note that the sense in which Marx uses "species-being" and derivative expressions in "Alienated Labor" is a different sense in which the term is used in some of Marx's essays written before the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. The sense which the term has in those earlier writings, e.g. On the Jewish Question, is quite close to the sense of Feuerbach's term "the species," the source of Marx's concept of species-being.

For Feuerbach, man was distinguished from other animals by the fact that man is conscious not only of his individuality but also conscious of the species. Feuerbach thought that the species was infinite, that it, for example, contained all of those perfections which individuals desired but lacked.[18] Although Feuerbach is not very clear as to exactly what he means by "the species," the concept is the basis not only of his criticism of religion but also of his ethics. Feuerbach asserts that men can and ought to find fulfillment in the species, other men, through love. Thus, the notion of living as a species-being has, from Feuerbach's perspective, the distinctive ethical connotation of caring for other men.

In several of Marx's early writings, the concept of species-being has a sense equivalent to this. This is particularly evident in On the Jewish Question, written in 1843. In that remarkable essay, living as a species-being is contrasted to the life in which the individual is egoistic and only regards his private interest. In short, species-life, the life man ought to live, is identified as the life in which men treat others as ends in themselves and not solely as means to their own ends.[19]

Can an explanation be given for the transition from the sense of species-being as concern for others, and in particular treating them as ends rather than as means, to the sense of species-being as free, conscious activity? The essay "Free Human Production," written after On the

Jewish Question but before the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, is valuable to consider in this respect. In this essay, the two senses of the concept are combined.[20] In the essay Marx, among other things, desribes the process of exchange, barter, and labor in a simplified, phenomenological account of the primitive stages of the system of private property.[21] He criticizes the way men labor in the system of private property in that, first, they labor without sufficient regard for the needs of other men. At the end of the essay, Marx sketches what man's production should be like. The first characteristic he mentions is that discussed already--that man's labor ought to be free, conscious activity, that it be an expression of his individuality. The remaining ideal characteristics, however, indicate that to live as a species-being, one must also have concern for the needs of others when he labors. By "concern for the needs of others" more is meant, it should be noted, than mere calculation of the other's needs in order to better satisfy one's own. In that essay, Marx states:

> . . . (1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality and its particularity, and in the course of the activity I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the object I would have experienced the individual joy of knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power. (2) In your satisfaction and your use of my product I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my work satisfied a human need, that it objectified human nature, and that it created an object appropriate to the need of another human being. (3) I would have been the mediator between you and the species and you would have experienced me as a redintegration of your own nature and a necessary part of your self; I would have been affirmed in your

> thought as well as in your love. (4) In my individual life I would have directly created your life; in my individual activity I would have immediately confirmed and realized my true human and social nature.[22]

Thus, here we have both senses of the concept of species-being as parts of the ideal. On the one hand, there is the emphasis on the individual's expression of himself and his joy in his labor, and, on the other, the emphasis upon manifesting concern, even love, for the other in one's labor.

As an explanation of the incorporation of the idea of free, conscious activity into the original sense of species-being, we can say that since one of Marx's fundamental criticisms of Feuerbach, as indicated earlier, was that he did not appreciate the significance of man as an actor, in particular of man's labor, it was natural for him to attempt to make the ideal of living as a species-being include the initial element of concern for others as well as Marx's own realization of the significance of man's labor. As we shall see these two elements or components of species-being furnish much of the basis of Marx's ethical position.

Alienation From Other Men

The final aspect of alienated labor which Marx considers in "Alienated Labor" is alienation from other men, an aspect which follows nicely, given the sense of species-being as concern for others. Marx states:

> (1) A direct consequence of man's alienation from the product of his work, from his life activity, and from his species-existence, is the alienation of man from man. (2) When man confronts himself, he confronts other men. (3) What holds true of man's relationship to his work, to the product of his work, and to himself, also holds true of man's relationship to other men, to their labor, and the object of their labor.
>
> (4) In general, the statement that man is alienated from his species-existence means that one man is alienated from another just as each man is alienated from human nature.
>
> (5) The alienation of man, the relation of man to himself, is realized and expressed in the relation between man and other men.
>
> (6) Thus in the relation of alienated labor every man sees the others according to the standard and the relation in which he finds himself as a worker.23

Although these statements appear quite simple and provocative, they are also quite problematic. It is unclear what Marx meant by them.

Statement (2), considered by itself, could mean that one's conception of or attitude towards himself is formed by the opinion of others of himself, so that in considering himself, one is in effect confronting other people. On the other hand, Marx could mean by (2) that if one conceives of himself as being, for example, selfish or powerless, one will also view others as selfish or powerless.

Statement (3) seems to be an explanation of (2). It too is unclear, although it seems to support the latter meaning of (2) suggested above. I take statement (3) to contain two claims, the first of which is relatively clear, while the second is ambiguous. The first claim is that there is a connection between one's relation to his labor and his relation to others: that one's relationship to

his labor determines his relationship to others. If, say, one's labor is an agony or a torment, one will relate to others differently than if his labor were joyous and fulfilling. The second claim contained in (3) concerns the specification of this connection. If we make a distinction between how one considers others, how one views them, and how one actually behaves toward them, the second claim contained in (3) could be, first, that if in one's labor, one considers himself, feels himself, to be, for example, merely a means for the satisfaction of the private interests of the bourgeoisie, he will then consider or view others merely as a means to his own private ends. On the other hand, Marx could have intended by (3) the claim that one will behave towards others the same way that he is treated in his labor, especially by the bourgeoisie.

Why make this latter distinction? It seems worthwhile because one interpretation seems, on the surface, to be more plausible than the other. That is, it seems that there is more prima facie plausibility in the claim that one's behavior to others while not working will be similar to how one is treated while working. The hackneyed example of the man who is yelled at by his boss, who upon returning home yells at his wife comes to mind. On the other hand, the interpretation that if in one's labor, one feels himself to be powerless or a commodity, he will also view others as powerless or as commodities does not hold up so well. Powerless people frequently see others as powerful.

Statement (5) is similarly ambiguous. By it, Marx could have meant either of the two interpretations or claims indicated above.

Statement (6) is also unclear, particularly the phrase ". . . according to the standard and the relation in which he finds himself as a worker." Marx might have meant that the worker judges every man to see if he suffers the same poverty as he, the same torment as he. Interpreted in this manner, one surmises that the worker would quickly become antagonistic toward the bourgeoisie. Alternatively, (6) could be interpreted as either of the two claims discussed above, that one's conception of others will be the same as his conception of himself in labor, or how one behaves toward others will be similar to how one is treated as a laborer.

Of these possible claims, it seems to me that Marx had one of the latter alternatives in mind. That is, it seems that Marx was asserting that one will either behave toward others or view others in a manner similar to how he is treated while laboring. It is clear that the truth of these claims is an empirical question. In addition, the claims, regardless whether one or both was intended, are significant ones to make in that if true, they have great implications for the construction of a society. They suggest that if we wish to change the way men relate to each other, this can be done by changing their relationships to their labor. Often it seems that such an empirical

claim was a tacit premise in Marx's apparent belief that in communism, or true communism, men would relate differently to each other than in a bourgeoisie society.[24] If so, it would be of great importance to determine if the claim or claims are true. They may be false.

Interpreted as above, the claims made in these lines suggest that workers in the system of private property would be alienated from people generally, from other workers as well as other non-workers. Marx, however, nowhere in the early writings specifically discusses the alienation of workers from workers, although he does point out in The German Ideology that "Competition makes individuals, not only the bourgeoisie but still more the workers, mutually hostile. . . . "[25] Most of Marx's remarks about alienation from others concern the relationships that hold generally in bourgeois society or are about the alienation of the bourgeoisie from the worker.

Although the paradigm of alienation of man from man in the Marxist analysis of society would seem to be the alienation of the worker from the bourgeoisie, in the lines quoted above and in those immediately following, Marx only indirectly refers to the alienation of the worker from the bourgeoisie. He does so in giving an apparent further explanation of statement (5), an explanation which is problematic. Marx states:

> Let us consider the statement previously made, that the relationship of man to himself is objective and actual to him only through his relationship to other men. If man is related to the product of his

> labor, to his objectified labor as to an alien, hostile powerful object independent of him, he is so related that another alien, hostile, powerful man independent of him is the lord of this object. If he is unfree in relation to his own activity, he is related to it as bonded activity, activity under the domination, coercion, and yoke of another man.26

Here Marx seems to be explaining line (5) such that from the fact of the worker being alienated from the object of his labor, one can infer that there is someone who is responsible for that alienation and to whom the worker is related in a similar alienated fashion. Thus, Marx is suggesting that there is a causal connection between alienation from the non-worker, the capitalist, and alienation from the object. To refer back to (5), we could then say, to relate (5) to the above point, that "expressed" in (5) means something to the effect that alienation from the object is "symptomatic" of alienation from the bourgeoisie.

It has been pointed out, however, that the inference that because the worker is alienated from the object of his labor, therefore there is someone responsible for that alienation and from whom the worker is alienated is a weak inference. In his Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, Robert Tucker cites the same lines and then comments that Marx:

> . . . changes the 'as though' into an 'is.' Having said that the man experiences his own activity as activity in the service and under the domination of another, alien, hostile, powerful man, independent of him, he declares that there is such a man. He posits the actual existence of an alien, hostile, powerful man outside the worker to whom the worker and his activity belong. He identifies the other man as the capitalist, whom he proceeds to describe as the non-worker.27

Tucker's criticism, that from the fact that the worker experiences the object as alienated it does not follow that the non-worker is responsible for the alienation and related to the worker in a similar way, is clearly justified for the manner in which Marx presents the inference here.

Aside from the possibility of the capitalist being the cause, in some sense, of alienated labor, there seem to be two other possibilities. First, one could argue that alienation from one's labor is inherent in the worker's character, that regardless of the type of labor, the worker would always be alienated from it. Secondly, one could argue that alienation from one's labor is due to the nature of the labor or the conditions under which it is performed. The first possibility is patently absurd and one which Marx would obviously not agree with. He clearly thought that it was not necessary that all labor involve alienation. Thus, the possibility which Marx's inference overlooks is the fact that certain types of tasks or the conditions under which they are done is the cause of alienation from labor. For example, labor which requires strenuous, continued, and monotonous exertion could possibly produce alienation regardless as to whether or not it is freely chosen or forced upon one.

Marx, however, could reply that over and above the alienation caused by certain types of labor, the facts, first, that the worker must labor for the capitalist or perish and, secondly, given the desire of the capitalist

to "get gold from a turnip," causes the capitalist to force the worker to labor under abysmal conditions, for tortuous hours, with barely enough to survive. This results in the perverse degree of alienation which existed and, in this sense, the capitalist is the cause of alienation. He controls the conditions under which the worker must labor.

Tucker is indisputably correct in pointing out, however, that Marx's inference does not follow. The general issue which his remarks raise is, of course, that of the causes of alienation. As we shall see in a later chapter, Marx is never very clear about the causes of alienation, either for alienation from one's self or for the other, more specific aspects of alienated labor. In particular, he is not clear as to how private property is to be considered a cause of alienation. If alienated labor results from the nature of labor, e.g. a sharp division of labor within tasks,--as it is often presented--then it is clear that alienated labor could occur even if there were no capitalists, given the existence of the appropriate conditions of laboring.

Nevertheless, as is apparent in the above quotation by Marx, aside from the indirect observation that the worker is related to the capitalist as to an alien, hostile, powerful man, little is said to give us a clearer idea as to the nature of the alienation of man from man. Using, however, Marx's references, made elsewhere, to the relationships that hold generally between men in a bourgeois society and using particularly his references to the relationship

between the worker and the capitalist, we can derive some general characteristics of the alienation of man from man.

Some of these characteristics have already been anticipated in the discussion of the meaning of concept of species-being as concern for others. As we have seen, in On the Jewish Question, Marx criticizes bourgeois society for incorporating within it the view of man as egoistic, isolated, and as concerned only with his private ends. Elsewhere, Marx criticizes those relationships in which men view each other only as "instruments" or "commodities." In "Free Human Production," in describing the relationship of men to each other, when they begin to exchange their products in the system of private property, Marx states that:

> . . . Since our exchange is selfish on your side as well as mine and since every self-interest attempts to surpass that of another person, we necessarily attempt to defraud each other. . . .
> . . . . . .
> . . . I regard you as a means, an instrument for the production of this product . . . my goal. . . . our mutual value is the value of our mutual objects for us. Man himself, therefore, is valueless for us.28

Similarly, in "The Relationship of Private Property," Marx states:

> . . . the worker has the misfortune to be a living capital, a capital with needs, which forfeits . . . its livelihood every moment that it is not at work. As capital, the value of the worker varies according to supply and demand and his physical existence, his life, was and is considered as a supply of goods, similar to any other goods. The worker produces capital and capital produces him. Thus, he produces himself, and man as a worker, as a commodity, is the product of the whole process.29

On the basis of the above, a general, although still somewhat vague, conception of the alienation of man from man emerges. When men regard other men merely as means to their own self-interest and disregard the needs of other men, do not treat other men as ends in themselves, there exists the alienation of man from man.

Alienation From One's Senses

Marx does not indicate that alienation from one's senses is an aspect of alienated labor in the essay "Alienated Labor." It is in the Essay "Private Property and Communism" from the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts that Marx discusses the alienation of man's senses. In that essay, he asserts that there is a connection between the individual's consciousness and the nature of the society in which he lives. He states that "Though man is therefore a particular individual . . . he is equally the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society explicitly thought and experienced."[30] He goes on to point out one effect upon man's consciousness of the system of private property. He states:

> (1) Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is ours only if we have it, if it exists for us as capital or is immediately possessed by us, eaten, drunk, worn, lived in etc., in short, used; but private property grasps all these immediate forms of possession only as means of living. . . .
> (2) Hence all the physical and spiritual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of the all, the sense of having . . . (3) The overcoming of private property means therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and aptitudes, but it means

> this emancipation precisely because these senses and aptitudes have become human both subjectively and objectively. (4) The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object derived from and for man. . . . (5) Need or satisfaction have thus lost their egoistic nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use.
>
> (6) Similarly, the senses and satisfactions of other men have become my own appropriation. . . . 31

There are several important things to be noticed in the above lines. First, lines (1) and (3) suggest a definite causal connection between private property and alienation of the senses. This will be returned to later. Secondly, just as the terms "alienation" and "species-being" sometimes have a normative function, it is clear in these lines that "human" refers to an ideal, to man as he ought to be. What Marx means by "making the senses human" is making the senses consistent with man's essence, his Gattungswesen, his species-being. Thus, we can say it is man's essential nature to express his individuality in his labor and to care for others. To say that man's senses become human, then, means they become consistent with these ideal characteristics. Finally, in line (6) Marx in particular stresses the characteristic of concern for the needs of others.

Marx continues his discussion of alienation from one's senses by pointing out that:

> (7) It is obvious that the human eye appreciates differently from the crude, inhuman eye, the human ear differently from the crude ear, etc. (8) . . . from the subjective point of view, as music alone awakens man's musical sense and the most beautiful music has no meaning for the unmusical ear--is no object for it, because my object can only be the

> confirmation of one of my essential capacities and can therefore only be so for me insofar as my essential capacity exists explicitly as a subjective capacity, because the meaning of an object for me reaches only as far as my senses go . . . --for this reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the unsocial. (9) Only through the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature is the wealth of the subjective human sensibility either cultivated or created--a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short senses capable of human satisfaction, confirming themselves as essential human capacities. (10) For not only the five senses but also the so-called spiritual and moral senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense and the humanity of the senses come into being only through the existence of their object, through nature humanized. (11) The development of the five senses is a labor of the whole previous history of the world. . . . (12) For the starving man food does not exist in its human form but only in its abstract character as food. (13) It could be available in its crudest form and one could not say wherein the starving man's eating differs from that of animals. (14) The careladen, needy man has no mind for the most beautiful play. (15) The dealer in minerals sees only their market value but not their beauty and special nature.32

In these lines, Marx has clearly and explicitly entered the phenomenological realm. He is concerned with the differences between the alienated man's experience of the world and the unalienated man's experience of the world. Marx's discussion here, thus, supports the distinction made earlier between phenomenological and non-phenomenological features of man's alienation. Marx himself here in particular legitimizes the distinction by specifically considering man's subjective relation to the world.

It is clear that in addition to the characteristics of expression of one's individuality and concern for others, that in line (9) in particular Marx is putting forth an aesthetic ideal as a part of what it is to be human.

Perhaps, however, it is sensible not to regard the aesthetic element as a characteristic apart from the idea of expressing one's individuality, since when we think of one expressing their personality or individuality in their labor, it is hard not to do so in aesthetic terms. Indeed, we think of the artist or musician as the paradigm of living in such a fashion. Thus, we could say that in labor as it ought to be, man's relationship to the object of his labor would be similar to the relationship between the artist and his painting or the musician and his music. It is significant to note here that in "Alienated Labor," in indicating the differences between the labor of animals and man, Marx states that man, unlike other animals, "creates also according to the laws of beauty."[33] Nevertheless, regardless of the exact relationship between the various ideal characteristics of man's activity, it is clear that Marx thought that the unalienated or <u>human</u> man would have a sensitivity for aesthetic value, for beauty, which was lacking in the alienated man.

In lines (9) and (10), Marx seems to be claiming that the way to make man's senses human is to first humanize the world. Indeed, if this interpretation is correct, judging from line (9) this would be a necessary and sufficient condition for getting man to perceive the world in a human fashion. This is interesting in that whereas the notion of objectification, that the product of one's labor reflects one's personality, suggests a causal relation from

the laborer upon the world, here we have Marx proposing that by first humanizing the world, there will result the humanizing of man's experience of the world.[34]

This interpretation of lines (9) and (10) seems justified by lines (12), (13), and (14). In these lines, to be crude, Marx indicates that there is a connection between one's physical or emotional state and one's experience of the world. The lines, in addition, suggest that if we wish the starving man to experience food in a human fashion, if we wish to create an eye for beauty in the care-laden, needy man, then we must first eliminate their starvation and mitigate their cares.

The points expressed in these lines are quite significant. First, Marx clearly indicates that he believes that efforts to change people in certain ways (humanize them) will be fruitless unless one first changes the world in certain ways (humanizes it). Thus, it is not enough merely to criticise the existing state of affairs and to expect people to then change--as Bruno Bauer had done and as Marx himself once believed.[35] Nor is it sufficient to preach to people, to exhort them to change by appealing to noble principles, as was done by some of the Utopian Socialists, such as Robert Owen. Hence, these lines are implicitly a call to action, a call to make the world humane in order to make men "truly human." Also, Marx's point here, especially in lines (11) through (15), is similar to his claim in "Alienated Labor" that man only produces when he is free from physical need.[36] This and

the above remarks suggest that a prerequisite for having men who are "truly human" is a society in which one's physical needs are satisfied. Thus, the above lines are, first, of general significance in that they justify Marx's programme of radically reconstituting society--changing society is necessary to change the men in it. Secondly, these lines are significant on a particular level in that they suggest that a specific characteristic of this new society will be the satisfaction of one's physical needs. More, however, will be said later about this latter point.

An explanation of line (11) can be given on the basis of this interpretation if we assume that at this early stage of his development Marx believed that man's capacity for satisfying his physical needs increased throughout history with the development of industry. As the world becomes more humanized through increased satisfaction of man's physical needs or cares, his senses can and will become more humanized, more developed.

Two things should be noted in passing. First, that the claim that humanizing the world--specifically, that abolishing private property--will humanize man's senses is an early statement of the later basic Marxist tenet of the relationship between the mode of production and the nature of society. Secondly, if we recall the notion of objectification, we see that it suggests that one's personality, including how one senses the world, will determine the nature of the product of his labor. Combining the direction

of causal interaction suggested in the idea of objectification, from the laborer to the world, with the direction expressed in lines (9) and (10), from the world to the laborer, the result is a pattern of reciprocal interaction between man and the world. This is significant and worth remembering when one is considering the problems which are said to arise because of Marx's "economic determinism."

Finally, although a general explanation has been given above of what Marx meant by such a claim as "the human eye appreciates differently from the crude, inhuman eye" perhaps this point can be further clarified by indicating the premises for Marx's conclusion in line (8) that "the senses of social man differ from those of the unsocial." The premises of this conclusion seem to be, first, that objects have different meanings for the social man and the unsocial man, and, secondly, that as meaning differs, so do senses. Thus, the point of line (14) is that the minerals for the merchant only have the meaning of profit. An updated example of objects having different meanings for different people is illustrated by the situation in which one man viewing an area of land sees it as the future site of a profitable high-rise apartment building; another sees it as the possible site of low-income housing; or still another sees the land as a to-be-preserved area of natural beauty. In addition, one could extend the point made in line (14) to apply to how one perceives others. For example, one could experience other people as having needs to be

satisfied and view the other as the center, the goal towards which one's actions, feelings, thoughts converge. On the other hand, one could perceive others as transparent, if you will, whose needs are to be used to promote one's own needs. This is clearly the phenomenological side of alienation from other men and alienation from one's species-life as viewed as concern for others.

Alienation From One's Needs

Despite the fact that Marx does not explicitly refer to alienation from one's needs, it is necessary to consider what Marx says about needs for two reasons. First, as we shall see, the notion of satisfying one's needs is basic to Marx's conception of the unalienated or "truly human" person, and, hence, to understand the latter, we must have some clarity about the former. Secondly, it is important to consider Marx's remarks on needs because of the attempts by contemporary social philosophers, such as Herbert Marcuse, to utilize concepts similar, or so it is claimed, to those presented by Marx in his discussion of needs in order to give a subtle and controversial critique of advanced, industrial societies. Although an extended discussion of this latter point cannot be undertaken in this dissertation, some comments on this issue will be made in the Conclusion to this dissertation.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to fully understand what Marx says about needs. His remarks are usually unexplained and ambiguous. There are, however,

four important observations which can be made about his view of needs.

First, Marx qualifies "need" in many different ways. He distinguishes many different sorts or categories of needs. For example, he speaks of "animal needs," "physical needs," "human needs," "crude needs," "refined needs," and "real and potential needs."[37]

In his discussion of needs, Marx also refers to "depraved fancies," "unhealthy appetites," etc.. Yet, he does not attempt to distinguish needs from such other conative states as wants, desires, appetites, and fancies, and, hence, the distinction between needs and these other states is not clear. Marx uses these concepts interchangeably.

Thirdly, it is clear from his discussion in "Needs, Production, and Division of Labor" and from what he says elsewhere, that Marx thought, first, that man's needs changed, and, secondly, that one group's needs could be deliberately changed by another group.[38] For example, Marx speaks of money as "the real need created by the modern economy, and the only need which it creates."[39] He further observes that the capitalist "awakens unhealthy appetites" in his neighbor in order to obtain more money.[40] Similarly, Marx speaks of the growth of needs and the reduction of needs.[41]

Finally, just as the "truly human" man would have certain senses, would experience the world in a certain manner, it is clear that Marx thought that the "truly human" man, man as he ought to be, would also have certain

needs. That is, it is apparent that Marx is, in effect, suggesting that he ought to have certain needs. Thus, it can be said that men are alienated from their needs in the sense that they do not have the needs which are appropriate to being "truly human," to being as they ought to be. Let us explore this point in more detail.

The important distinction to consider for an explanation of what it means to say that one is alienated from his needs is that between animal and human needs. Again, Marx is ambiguous, but he appears to equate "animal needs" and "physical needs" and considers the need for food, clothing, shelter, and air as examples of such needs.

Marx's usage of "human needs" is much less clear. He often, however, uses this expression to refer to those needs the "truly human" man would have. This would be, in particular, the need to express one's individuality, especially in his labor. For example, in "Private Property and Communism," in sketching the ideal of what men ought to be like, he states that:

> It is apparent how the rich man and wide human need appear in place of economic wealth and poverty. The rich man is simultaneously one who needs a totality of human manifestations of life and in whom his own realization exists as inner necessity.42

Marx is here giving a "persuasive definition" of "rich man." The rich man, the desirable man, is not one who has a great deal of money, but one who needs a totality of manifestations of life, etc.. Elsewhere, in a later work, Marx refers to this need as the need for "the self-realization of the individual."

Another need which can also be considered a human need, in the sense that it is a characteristic of the "truly human" man, is the need to care for others. Marx does not explicitly identify this need as a human need, as he does the need for self-realization, yet, because it is so strongly presented as an attribute of being "truly human," it is justifiable to consider it a human need, given the above criterion of a human need.

As stated, Marx thought that man's needs changed and that one group's needs could be changed by another group. This is an important point in explaining the idea of alienation from one's needs. Aside from Marx's criticism that capitalist society did not allow men to adequately satisfy the needs they had, he also condemns capitalist society for "manipulating" men's needs. In particular, he condemns the fact that men's needs are reduced to a "primitive and abstract simplicity." Marx points out that "For the worker even the need for fresh air ceases to be a need."[43] A little later, he observes that in capitalist society, "It is not enough that man should lose his human needs; even animal needs disappear.[44]

On this basis, then, it seems that Marx did not believe that everyone had the need for self-realization or the need to care for others. This also appears to be confirmed by his remarks in his Introduction to "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law." There, Marx asserts that the "preconditions and birthplaces" for such "radical needs"

were lacking in Prussia of the 1840's, thus implying that Prussians of that time did not generally have such needs.[45]

Thus, to say that one is alienated from his needs means that one did not have certain needs which he ought to have, needs which are necessary to make one "truly human." These would include not only such needs as the need for food, shelter, clothing, etc. but, in particular, the need to express one's individuality and the need to care for others. In the following, I shall use "human needs" to refer specifically to these needs. It is evident that in so far as Marx's conception of the unalienated man is a moral conception, a conception of what men ought to be like, Marx is claiming that men ought to have these needs. More, however, will be said later about the notion of alienation from one's needs and the problems it raises.

Conclusion

Anyone who has taken the concept of alienation seriously sooner or later realizes that it is very difficult to get clear about the concept. Many problematic yet necessary questions immediately arise. For example: What sorts of things can one be alienated from? Who is alienated? How can people in widely varying situations be alienated? Can one be alienated and not know it? These questions, all of which are relevant for understanding the concept of alienation, cannot be considered, however, in this Conclusion.

What I shall do is to present those observations, based upon the preceeding analysis, which seem to me to be the most important for answering the question of what is the meaning of "alienation" in Marx's early writings.

In the preceeding, I have referred to various aspects of alienated labor. These aspects are alienation from the object of labor, the activity of labor, one's species-being, from others, from one's senses, and alienation from one's needs. If we refer to that which one is said to be alienated from as the focus of the alienation, it is apparent that not only different foci are here indicated, but, and even more importantly, different sorts of foci are indicated. The foci are, respectively, an object which is physically external to the alienated person, the activity of the person, an ideal, other persons, and "parts" of the individual's own personality or psyche. The question arises of how one can be said to be alienated in the same way from such different sorts of things. For example, let us suppose that to say that one is alienated from something means that one feels in a certain way toward that something, say hostile. Now on the basis of this definition, to say that one is alienated from others makes much sense. It would also seem to make sense to say one was alienated from one's activity and the object of his labor, given this meaning. It seems not to make much sense, however, to interpret alienation from one's species-being and from one's senses and needs in this way. To say that one is

alienated from one's species-being did not mean that one felt in some special way, here hostile, to something called "species-being." Rather, it meant for Marx that one's labor was not an expression of his individuality, was not free, conscious activity, and that in one's labor one did try to satisfy the needs of others. Thus, "alienation from one's species-being" referred to the fact that one was not living according to a norm, an ideal, that one was not living as he ought. Similarly with alienation from one's senses and one's needs. When Marx discusses these aspects, it is clear that he is not suggesting that one necessarily feels any particular way towards his senses or needs. His point is, again, that his senses and needs are not what they ought to be. Thus, the first general point I wish to make is that "alienation" is not used in the same way when the various aspects of alienation are discussed by Marx. Specifically, although it is appropriate to consider "alienation" as referring largely to certain feelings in the aspects of alienation from one's product of labor, one's activity, and others, it is inappropriate for alienation from one's species-being, one's senses, and one's needs. Rather, the normative sense of "alienation" is evidenced here in that "alienation" simply refers to the fact that man's labor, his senses, and his needs were not up to Marx's conception of what he thought they ought to be.

The second general point I wish to discuss concerns the general distinction made between phenomenological and

non-phenomenological features of an alienated situation. It was stated that part of the value of the distinction was that it would be helpful in answering the questions: What constitutes alienation? and What are the causes of alienation?

In connection with this, the distinctions must be viewed in the light of two proposals made or beliefs held on the part of some of those concerned with the meaning of "alienation." These proposals or beliefs are, first, that one can and should distinguish between the causes of alienation and alienation itself, and, secondly, that alienation should be defined in terms of one's feelings or one's subjective experience of something, be it person, object, activity, institution, etc..

In their Introduction to Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society, Eric and Mary Josephson emphatically, propose, for example, that one can and should distinguish between the causes of alienation and what is constitutive of alienation. They distinguish, to use their terms, alienating conditions or correlates from alienation itself. They claim that many writers have confused the phenomenon of alienation with alienating conditions, such as anomie, social isolation, or loneliness. They put forth a definition of "alienation" in terms primarily of feelings. They state that "It . . . seems appropriate to limit the term alienation to mean an individual's feelings or state of dissociation from self, from others, and the world at large.[46] In the

remainder of their Introduction, they briefly discuss some of the alienating conditions, or causes, of alienation in modern society. They mention the nature of man's labor, bureaucracy, the breakdown of the family, the development of technology, the modern state, etc. as examples of alienating conditions.

Unfortunately, the Josephsons do not explain why it is appropriate to limit "alienation" to feelings or states of dissociation, whatever they may be. They do not explain, for example, why it would be inappropriate to include in the definition reference to objective social conditions, such as poverty.

The questions "Can we distinguish between the causes of alienation and alienation itself?" and "Why should we?" are not specifically dealt with by most authors, although most assume we can and ought to make such a distinction. One can reasonably suppose that a practical justification for wishing to make this distinction stems from the desire to eliminate alienation, which at least requires that we know the causes of it. A reason for thinking that the distinction can be made might be the fact that alienation is often thought of along the lines of the medical model of a physical disease such as cancer or pneumonia. For such conditions, it is customary to make a relatively sharp distinction between the causes of the disease and the disease itself. Conceived of in this fashion, one would even then be naturally led to also perhaps speak of the symptoms of

alienation, as does Robert Tucker in Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Those who think of alienation in terms of neuroses and psychoses would also, it seems, be led to view alienation in this way, since the traditional psychoanalytic concepts of neuroses and psychoses are themselves derived from the medical model of a physical disease. I suspect, however, that upon close analysis even the traditional distinctions made between the causes of a physical disease, the disease itself, and the symptoms of the disease break down. Conceiving of alienation along these lines would thus be subject to the same problems that would arise in pressing such distinctions to the breaking point.

Nevertheless, the point of distinguishing between the causes of alienation and alienation itself ties in with the second point: that several authors have proposed that "alienation" be defined in terms of one's feelings or one's subjective experience of something. We have already seen that this is so for the Josephsons in Man Alone. In The Sane Society, Erich Fromm states that "By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. . . . He does not experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts."[47] Similarly, Karen Horney describes alienation as ". . . the remoteness of the neurotic from his own feelings, wishes, beliefs, and energies. It is the loss of the feeling of being an active, determining force in his life. It is the loss of feeling himself as an organic

whole.[48] And Arnold Kaufmann has suggested that it is various feelings of discontent which are constitutive of alienation.[49]

Viewing Marx's discussion of alienated labor, however, from the perspective of the proposals that, first, the causes of alienation can and should be distinguished from alienation itself and, secondly, that alienation--especially alienation from one's self--should be defined solely in terms of feelings is problematic. As we have seen, in explaining alienation, Marx refers to both non-phenomenological, or objective, and phenomenological, or subjective, features of a situation. If we assume that "alienation" is to be defined in terms of feelings, of phenomenological features, than it seems that we must conclude that the non-phenomenological features which Marx refers to must be either causes of alienation, symptoms of alienation, or extraneous to alienation, assuming we can distinguish between causes, symptoms, and alienation itself. Again, examples of the non-phenomenological features of alienated conditions which Marx refers to are physical exhaustion, starvation, poverty, ruining one's mind, shortening of the life-span, not owning the product of labor, etc..

Now, I have previously argued that if alienation is to be defined in terms of feelings, it is inappropriate to interpret alienation from one's species-being, from one's senses, and one's needs in this way. To be consistent

with this point, then, we must modify the above proposal such that it is that if one defines alienation from the activity of labor, from the object of labor, from others, and one's self in terms of feelings, then we must conclude that the objective features which Marx refers to are causes, symptoms, or extraneous. The specific sorts of feelings that one then might wish to define "alienation" in terms of might be feelings of estrangement, powerlessness, hostility, apathy, etc..

Certainly the proposal to define these aspects of alienation in terms of a feeling or feelings and to regard the objective features as causes, symptoms, or extraneous is plausible. It has a certain simplifying attraction. In addition, it allows us to then conclude that whoever had such feelings, regardless of his objective situation, would be alienated. This too is attractive for various reasons. Nevertheless, it seems clear that although this proposal has these merits and is helpful, unfortunately Marx is not so clear-cut in his discussions of alienation. Although in places Marx himself tries to distinguish between the causes of alienation, the results of alienation, and what he calls "expressions" (symptoms??) of alienation, he usually did not clearly and systematically distinguish between what was to count as a cause and what was to be constitutive of alienation. As we have seen, for example, in the passage quoted from "Alienated Labor" on page nineteen, where Marx specifically deals with the question of

what constitutes externalized or alienated labor, he refers to both objective and subjective features, not bothering to indicate their "role" in the concept of alienation. In addition, as we shall see in Chapter IV, Marx's views on the causes of alienation, even when he directly discusses the question, are also quite unclear. Thus, the proposal, while it has the attractions indicated, misrepresents Marx's discussion of alienation in his early writings. Often Marx speaks as though certain social conditions were to also be included in the definition of "alienation."

Furthermore, the facts that Marx apparently believed that men ought to have certain needs and thought that not all men had or would have such needs are also quite significant for determining when one can be said to be alienated. The implication of these facts is that it would be possible for one's needs to be satisfied and one could still be alienated, since one's needs were not those appropriate for the unalienated or "truly human" man. It is clearly possible, from what Marx says, for one to be content with his lot and still be alienated. Thus, accepting the above claims about needs, one cannot rely solely upon one's reports of his feelings or subjective experience as a criterion of whether or not one is alienated. Although such reports would provide relevant evidence, they cannot be accepted as conclusive.

From the preceeding, then, it should be evident that Marx's explanation of alienation is quite unclear. In

particular, for the reasons cited in this Conclusion, a simple, single definition of the concept of alienation which is faithful to the important uses of the term in the early writings cannot be given.

Thus, rather than attempting to give such a definition, I have thought it more profitable to characterize Marx's concept of alienation from one's self as a means of elucidating Marx's concept of alienation. This characterization consists of a formulation of those themes which repeatedly occur in Marx's treatment of alienation throughout his early writings. Let us now, then, proceed to Chapter III to see what these themes are.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For a typical example, see "Alienated Labor," p. 291.

[2]The same distinctions also hold for "externalization," as will be later indicated.

[3]"Money and Alienated Man" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 274.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., pp. 289-290. The italics are Marx's.

[6]See "Free Human Production" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Writings of the Young Marx on Philsophy and Society (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 278.

Presumably, by this Marx means, for example, that given similar articles, say two tables, made by different individuals, each table will reflect the amount of skill in woodworking; the worker's preferences for design, color, and shape; the intended use; etc. of each person.

[7]The concept of objectification is also present in Capital. Instead of using "objectification," however, Marx speaks of "crystallized labor time" and "materialized labor." See Capital, vol. I, pp. 180, 190, 195.

[8]See, for example, "Critique of Hegel's . . . ," pp. 323ff.

[9]Marx also states that he is a slave in the sense that as a worker he depends upon objects. That is, he could not be a laborer if he did not have objects to labor upon. See "Alienated Labor," p. 290.

[10]Ibid., p. 292.

[11]Ibid., pp. 294-295.

[12]See "Critique of Hegel's . . . ," pp. 322-323.

[13]"Alienated Labor," p. 292.

[14]Marx himself uses the phrase "end in itself" to express the proper relationship between man and his labor. See "Alienated Labor," p. 298.

[15]"Money and Alienated Man," p. 275.

[16]"Free Human Production" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 281.

[17]As an anticipation of the continuity between Marx's earlier and later works, one should consider Marx's claims that labor ought not to be merely the satisfaction of physical needs and that "man only genuinely produces free of physical need" in light of Marx's brief description of the higher stage of communism in the Critique of the Gotha Program.

[18]Marx's view of man--his capacities and what he ought to be--was greatly influenced by Feuerbach. This is so to a much greater extent than has been realized. Even as late as 1846, in The German Ideology, Marx's discussion of man's consciousness still carries a strong Feuerbachian influence. See p. 422.

[19]See On the Jewish Question, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967) p. 231, 237.

[20]One could interpret this as evidence that at this time Marx was already modifying Feuerbach's ideas into a position more to his liking.

[21]The account is written in the first person and in terms of the person's desires, feelings, and intentions. See pp. 278ff.

[22]p. 281.

[23]"Alienated Labor," pp. 295-296.

[24]Marx states:

> On the assumption that private property has been positively overcome we have seen how man produces man himself, and other men; how the object, the immediate activity of his individuality, is at the same time his own existence for other men, their existence, and their existence for him. Similarly, however, both the material of labor and man as subject are equally the result and beginning of the movement . . . . . Thus is the social character the general character of the whole movement; as society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him. ("Private Property and Communism" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 305.)

[25]The German Ideology, (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 58.

[26]"Alienated Labor," p. 297.

[27]Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 146.

[28]"Free Human Production," pp. 279, 280.

[29]"The Relationship of Private Property" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx's Concept of Man, ed. E. Fromm and trans. T. B. Bottomore (New York: Frederick Unger, 1966), p. 110. See also Marx's discussion of credit in "Money and Alienated Man," p. 270.

[30]"Private Property and Communism," p. 307. This is perhaps an early statement of Marx's doctrines of historical materialism or economic determinism. There is much similarity between these statements and those contained in The German Ideology, part I, and the "Theses on Feuerbach."

[31]Ibid., pp. 307, 308.

[32]Ibid., pp. 309, 310.

[33]p. 295.

[34]The question arises of whether or not Marx also thought it was necessary to first have men's senses humanized before the world could be humanized. If so, one wonders how he would break out of the circle which arises: The world must first be humanized to humanize men's senses, but in order to humanize the world, men's senses must be first humanized.

[35]See Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 89-123.

[36]p. 294.

[37]"Needs, Production, and Division of Labor" in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx's Concept of Man, ed. E. Fromm and trans. T. B. Bottomore (New York: Frederick Unger, 1966), pp. 140-148.

[38]See The German Ideology, Writings . . . ," p. 420.

[39]"Needs, . . . ," p. 141.

[40]Ibid., p. 142.

[41]Ibid.

[42]"Private Property and Communism," p. 312.

[43]"Needs, . . . ," p. 142.

[44]Ibid., p. 143.

[45]Writings of the Young Marx on Philsophy and Society, ed. and trans. L. Easton and K. Guddat (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 289.

One could choose here to make a distinction between having a need and experiencing or being aware that one has a need. The question could then be raised as to whether or not Marx was claiming that men have certain needs, especially the needs we have referred to as "human needs," but are not aware that they have them. Assuming that it makes sense to make such a distinction in the first place, the following facts must be considered in attempting to interpret Marx in this fashion. First, Marx does not explicitly make such a distinction. The notion of "ideology", however, does seem to allow for cases in which one may, for example, mistakenly perceive his own motivations, reasons, etc.. Secondly and most importantly, to claim that all men had such needs but are not aware of them, seems to violate, or runs the risk of violating, the Marxian position that men's natures change as society changes or as societies differ. In particular, Marx in several places explicitly asserts that man's needs change. The point, however, can be made--and it seems a strong one to me--that if we assume that the purpose of communism is to satisfy man's needs, then unless there is some constancy to man's needs, it seems that, given changing needs, communism may be or become irrelevant. Finally, there seem to arise formidable empirical problems with distinguishing those cases in which men have such needs but are not aware of them from those cases in which men do not have those needs to begin with.

[46]Man Alone . . . , p. 13.

[47]Quoted in Man Alone . . . , p. 56.

[48]Quoted in Man Alone . . . , p. 16.

[49]Indicated by comments made on papers submitted to him. See also his article "On Alieantion," Inquiry, vol. 7 (1964), p. 3. It should be noted, however, that the definition given in this article does allow for the inclusion of objective social conditions; yet, the definition refers primarily to feelings of discontent or loss of satisfaction.

CHAPTER III

A CHARACTERIZATION OF ALIENATION FROM ONE'S SELF

As a means of further explicating Marx's concept of alienation, in this chapter I shall formulate those themes which figure most prominently in Marx's various discussions of alienation. These themes will furnish us with a characterization of alienation from one's self. To be sure, the formulation of these themes will leave many important questions unanswered and will also create some new ones. Nevertheless, they are valuable for understanding Marx's concept of alienation in that they give a coherent and definite content to the concept. These themes should not be construed as characterizing "alienation" as it is used today. They refer to the alienated man whom Marx was concerned about in his early writings.

After first presenting and briefly explaining these themes, I shall indicate, proceeding in a backward fashion, that these themes are derived from Marx's first encounter with the notion of alienation--man's alienation from himself as expressed in religion. That is, it will be shown that Feuerbach's analysis of Christianity as an expression of man's self-alienation served as the model or conceptual

framework for Marx's analysis of alienated labor. The reasons for indicating this are, first, that Marx's use of Feuerbach's analysis as a model inevitably caused some of the ambiguities in Marx's discussion of alienated labor. Secondly, pointing out how these themes are present in Marx's first encounter with the notion of alienation will increase our understanding of his concept of alienation.

Perhaps the most important theme in Marx's discussions of alienation is the theme of powerlessness. Probably Marx's most frequent criticism of bourgeois society is that it renders man, at least the laborer, powerless; it forces man, the actor, to be a passive object. Not only did Marx refer to the laborer as feeling powerless, he also describes him as being powerless.

As it is used here, the term "powerless" is intended to refer to various aspects of the situation of the laborer in bourgeois society. First of all, as an example of powerlessness, is the laborer's lack of control over his immediate workplace. He had to produce what, how, when, and for so long as his capitalist boss wished. When the product was completed, the laborer then had no role in determining what happened to it. It was the concern over the worker's lack of control over these conditions of his work, due largely to the division of labor, which led Marx to repeatedly describe the worker as a machine.

The theme of powerlessness, however, had for Marx an applicability far beyond the scene of the worker's factory

or workplace. This deeper sense of powerlessness is contained in Marx's criticism of bourgeois society for turning the laborer into a commodity. In the essay "Wages," Marx asserts that:

> Demand necessarily governs the production of men just as it governs any other commodity.
> If the supply is much greater than the demand, then a portion of the workers sink down into beggary or starvation. The existence of the worker is therefore reduced to the state of existence of any other commodity. The worker has become like a commodity, and it is a piece of luck for him if he can bring himself into existence as a man. And the demand, upon which the life of the worker depends, depends upon the mood of the wealthy and the capitalists.1

Thus, for the worker, whether he can even labor, much less express his individuality in his labor, how he shall labor, and whether he shall even survive at all are controlled by the mechanism of the market. In The German Ideology, speaking about the relation of the workers to the bourgeoisie, Marx states that the latter "achieve an . . . independent existence" but that the workers " . . . find their conditions of existence predetermined, and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class. . . . "[2]

In a very basic sense and in much more than a political sense, then, Marx was concerned with self-determination. The goal of ending man's powerlessness, particularly in the above sense, was the basis of Marx's call to revolution and his committment to communism. For example, in The German Ideology, Marx points out that men have become more and more enslaved to the powers of the world-market and

that by revolution and the abolition of private property " . . . this power will be dissolved. . . . Men . . . will have control and conscious mastery of these powers, which . . . have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them."[3]

Finally, the term "powerless" is intended to refer to another general aspect of man's situation in bourgeois society. This aspect is contained in the notion of a fetish. The concept of a fetish is present in several of Marx's earliest writings, such as "The WoodTheft Laws," the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, and The German Ideology. As is well known, an important chapter in Capital is "The Fetishism of Commodities." Although the notion of a fetish will be explored more later, it is necessary to note here that the concept, borrowed from religion, refers to a person's being controlled or driven by his attachment to something. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx suggests several times that man in bourgeois society has money as a fetish. The image of money becoming a god to whom man bows down in slavish homage and its connection to powerlessness, will become even more significant in light of Chapter IV.[4]

Closely related to the theme of powerlessness is the theme of externality. When Marx is describing those forces or powers before whom man is powerless, or which render him powerless, he describes them as existing apart from man, existing in their own right, as "alive." Thus,

for example, in the aspect of alienation from the object of labor, the object takes on an independent, person-like existence. Similarly, in describing those economic conditions or forces which prevent the free development of individuals, Marx states that they had "an independent existence over against the separate individuals."[5] In addition, Marx's description of the power of money over man in bourgeois society illustrates the theme of externality, particularly the notion of money becoming a god. Money itself takes on the guise of a being, existing in his own right, demanding certain services. Thus, one gets the picture that alienated man lives in a reified and hypostatized world, a world in which forces, powers, and even man's own desires and feelings are experienced as having an independent, external, thing-like existence.

A third theme present in Marx's discussion of alienated labor is the theme of degradation. Marx not only refers to man feeling degraded, but also refers to man as being degraded. As we have seen, Marx uses the following such terms to describe the worker's condition: "misshapen," "distorted," "ugly," "mortification," "beast-like," "inhuman," "diminished," "feels miserable," "poor," "stunted," etc.. It is clear that the alienated laborer lacks all of those characteristics which Marx thought men should possess, those characteristics which were consistent with their human nature. In particular, the worker was degraded, first, in that his physical needs were not satisfied to

even a subsistence level and that, secondly, often the worker's needs had been reduced to the point where he did not experience such human needs as the need for self-realization, etc..

This brings us to the final theme which needs to be included in a characterization of alienation from one's self. This is the theme of man's potential for satisfying his needs and developing his abilities being unfulfilled. It is clear that Marx thought that men, at least collectively, had the capacity to satisfy both his animal and human needs. As we have seen, Marx criticized capitalist society for acting as a fetter upon the fulfillment of these needs. In addition, he condemns bourgeois society for making it such that the development of one's talents is dependent upon one's position in the social division of labor or upon how much money one possessed. Since the worker came out on the short end for both of these, and since his social position and the amount of money he had were static, except to decline, the result was that the worker's talents were never developed as they could or should be. More, however, will be said about this point in the next chapter.

While these themes are obviously related, they refer to distinct aspects of alienation from one's self. First, to state that the worker was degraded refers to, in the sense explained, the <u>level</u> to which his needs were satisfied, a sub-subsistence level, and to the <u>extent</u> to which his needs were human. The theme of non-fulfillment of potential

suggests that the level to which his need and abilities were fulfilled or the extent to which his needs were human, was nowhere near what it could or should be.

The theme of powerlessness is quite important in that it suggests that a situation in which man's needs were satisfied and abilities developed would not be sufficient in itself to qualify as an unalienated situation. It is also necessary to consider how this state was achieved. These goals must be gained through man's free actions. The situation in which men are enslaved but in which they are well-fed, clothed, and housed and in which their labor is satisfying would not be acceptable to Marx. Again, the theme of powerlessness refers to how these goals are to be gained. It needs to be noted, however, that although some attempts have been made to clarify Marx's notions of freedom and powerlessness, they are still unclear. Some comments on this issue will be made later.

Finally, the theme of externality suggests that not only is the alienated person governed by forces beyond his control, but he generally experiences himself as passive and controlled.

That these themes are central to Marx's discussions of alienated labor should be evident from the many passages already considered.

As indicated, these themes are also present in Marx's first encounter with alienation, Feuerbach's analysis of religion, specifically Christianity, as an expression of man's self-alienation.

Two important inferences follow from this. First, an examination of man's alienation as it is presented in this analysis of religion, an analysis which Marx accepted, should throw additional light on the question of the meaning of "alienation" for Marx. Secondly, it is reasonable to conclude that man's self-alienation as contained in Marx's analysis of religion, or alienation in its "holy form," would be a model for Marx's analysis of alienation its "earthly form," especially alienated labor.[6]

Thus, I would like to now show that the themes which are central to Marx's discussion of alienated labor are central to the view of religion held by Marx. It is because the themes are the same and because they are first present in Marx's analysis of man's alienation in religion that I have referred to this analysis of religion as the "model" for Marx's analysis of alienated labor.

As is well known, Marx's views on religion were decisively influenced by Ludwig Feuerbach, to whom Marx was indebted for the analysis of religion as a form of man's self-alienation. Although Marx was to later criticize Feuerbach in many respects, soon after The Essence of Christianity was published in 1841, Marx accepted Feuerbach's analysis of Christianity. In its fundamentals, he adhered to this analysis for the remainder of his life. Before illustrating that Marx's discussion of alienated labor has the same themes in common with this analysis of religion, I wish to first indicate, in some detail, what this analysis was.

At the beginning of The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach states the premises from which he derives his analysis of religion and his ethics. As stated before, he argues that religion has its basis in the essential difference between man and other animals. This essential difference is man's consciousness, particularly the fact that man is conscious of his species, of his "essential nature," and not merely of his individuality. Feuerbach explains that "Religion is identical with self-consciousness--with the consciousness which man has of his nature. But religion . . . is consciousness of the infinite; thus it is and can be nothing else than the consciousness which man has of his own--not finite and limited, but infinite nature."[7] Whereas the species was conceived of by Feuerbach as being infinite, perfect, and unlimited, he thought individuals to be finite, imperfect, and limited.[8]

This difference between the species and the individual gives rise to the idea of God. Feuerbach states that ". . . the sense of limitation is painful, and hence the individual frees himself from it by the contemplation of the perfect Being. . . . God is the idea of the species as an individual."[9] Thus, for Feuerbach, "God is a "projected image of human nature."[10] In a passage specifically suggesting the idea of man's self-alienation, he states:

> Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more correctly, to his own nature . . . but a relation to it viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather the human nature

> purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective--i.e. comtemplated and revered as another, a distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature.11

Belief in God, then, serves the function of satisfying man's wishes and aspirations. Feuerbach states:

> God is the existence corresponding to my wishes and feelings. . . . He is the just one, the good, who fulfills my wishes. Nature, this world, is an existence which contradicts my wishes, my feelings. Here it is not as it ought to be; this world passes away; but God is existence as it ought to be. . . . God is the power by which man realizes his eternal happiness.[12]

In a simple and straightforward sense, then, man is alienated from himself in religion because, as Feuerbach states elsewhere, "Religion . . . is the disuniting of man from himself."[13] In religion, man separates or alienates those characteristics which are his, his needs as well as his capacities, from himself, and projects them into an imaginary being, which is thus made in his own image.

This alienation of man from himself, however, has a much fuller content than this. As with alienated labor, this content can be given a more definite form by indicating those themes which are predominant in this analysis. These themes are the same as those found in Marx's discussion of alienated labor.

First, the theme of <u>externality</u> is easily seen. The idea of the species is projected as a being existing independently of man, as external to him. Those perfections which the species contains are combined together to make up the characteristics of a perfect individual who is then

experienced as existing apart from man. The idea of the species is thus reified or hypostatized. As Feuerbach puts it, "in religion man places his nature out of himself, regards his nature as a separate nature."[14]

Secondly, in this view of religion, we also see the important theme of powerlessness, of man being a passive object rather than an active subject. In reality, it is man who is active, and who creates God as the object of his consciousness; it is man who ". . . contemplates Him as an external being." Within the realm of religion, however, man becomes an object before the infinite subject. Thus, there is a double transformation. Man the subject, becomes an object, and God, the object, becomes the subject. In describing this transmutation of man, the subject, into an object, Feuerbach states:

> Man--this is the mystery of religion--projects his being into objectivity, and then makes himself an object to this projected image of himself converted into a subject; he thinks of himself, is an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of another being than himself. Thus here man is an object to God.15

Speaking generally, Feuerbach observes that "the characteristic principle or religion" is that "it changes that which is naturally active into the passive."[16] Elsewhere he indicates that "Man gives up his personality; but in return, God, the Almighty, infinite, unlimited being is a person."[17] Again, as stated before, man being powerless was the feature of alienation about which Marx was most concerned.

Following from the theme of man experiencing himself as powerless or as passive in religion is the third theme of man experiencing himself as degraded. According to this analysis, in Christianity man views himself as sinful, weak, etc., as containing all imperfections, while God is invested with all perfections. Feuerbach asserts that "To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing."[18] One could substitute here "the bourgeoisie" for "God" and "the laborer" for "man," and the result would be a statement very much in keeping with Marx's discussion of alienated labor in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.[19] In further describing God's elevation and man's resultant degradation, Feuerbach states:

> Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself. . . . God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal; man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.20

As a result of the illusion of religion, there occurs the fourth theme: man's potential for satisfying his needs and developing his talents is not realized. The world is not made as it ought to be; man's "sense of painful limitation" is not overcome. Just as the "holy form" of alienation prevents man's potential from being fulfilled, so does, as we have seen, alienated labor, one of the "earthly forms" of alienation.[21]

Thus, the fact that the same themes which are present in and central to Marx's analysis of religion as a form of

man's self-alienation suggests that Marx's analysis of man's labor was guided by his analysis of religion. Feuerbach's analysis of religion provided, then, a model or conceptual framework for Marx's perception of alienation as it existed in the real world. One suspects that the attempt to put the results of one sort of investigation, an analysis of the effect of capitalism on the worker, into the framework or form of a conpletely different sort of investigation, an analysis of man's religious projections, was a source of much of the ambiguity in Marx's presentation of alienation, although it was, at the same time, a source of Marx's penetrating and provocative insights into the nature of capitalist society.

Finally, the fact that these themes are common to both alienation in its "holy form" as well as its "earthly form" makes them quite important. A formulation of them contributes greatly to our understanding of what "alienation" meant for Marx.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Schriften Bis 1844: Erster Teil, Marx Engels Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968), pp. 471-472.

[2]The German Ideology (New York: International Pbulishers, 1947), p. 74.

[3]Ibid., p. 28.

[4]In "Money and Alienated Man," Marx states:

> The very relationship of things and the human dealings with them become an operation beyond and above man. Through this alien mediation man regards his will, his activity, and his relationships to others as a power independent of himself and of them--instead of man himself being the mediator for man. His slavery thus reaches a climax. It is clear that this mediator is the actual power over that which he mediates to me. His worship becomes an end in itself. (p. 266)

[5]International Publishers, p. 75.

[6]See "Toward the Critique of Hegel's . . . ," p. 251. The terms are Marx's.

[7]The Essence of Christianity, trans. G. Eliot (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 2.

[8]The meaning of such basic terms as "species" and "infinite" in Feuerbach's writings is not very clear. As indicated, "species" refers to man's "essential nature" and, hence, would refer to what is common to mankind. "Species" is also used, however, to refer to the class of men.

Feuerbach's use of "infinite" is strange. His point seems to be that the "species" is infinite in the sense that men collectively are omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, etc.. To illustrate this, Feuerbach states that while one individual may not know something, there will be others who do. Thus, the species is "omniscient." Similarly, a particular individual may not be able to do something, but either someone else will be able to do it or it could be done collectively. Hence, the species is "omnipotent." See The Essence of Christianity, pp. 155-159.

Aside from the strangeness of this mode of expression, Feuerbach's principal point is to emphasize that those capabilities which men have projected into an illusory "Heavenly Family" are actually capabilities of man himself.

[9]Ibid., p. 152.

[10]Ibid., p. 195.

[11] Ibid., p. 14.

[12] Ibid., p. 174.

[13] Ibid., p. 33.

[14] Ibid., p. 195.

[15] Ibid., p. 29.

[16] Ibid., p. 250.

[17] Ibid., p. 27.

[18] Ibid., p. 26.

[19] See p. 25, line (10).

[20] The Essence . . . , p. 33.

[21] Feuerbach also exerted a great deal of influence upon Marx's ethical views and especially upon his beliefs about how alienation could be overcome. Thus, just as Feuerbach states that only in community is there humanity, so Marx asserts in The German Ideology that "Only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. . . . " (p. 74)

CHAPTER IV

THE CAUSES OF ALIENATION

Nowhere in his early writings does Marx systematically discuss the causes of alienation. In order to formulate a general conception of what he thought the causes of alienation were, one must put bits and pieces of his views in the early writings together. The result is not very satisfying. Marx is frequently unclear and even appears at times to be making inconsistent claims. What one can glean from these writings suffers generally from a lack of specificity. Unfortunately, almost no attention has been given by scholars of Marx to the problem of systematizing and clarifying Marx's views on the causes of alienation.

Such an attempt is of value for at least two important reasons. It is clear that in the early writings communism is proposed by Marx as the means of ending man's alienation. Thus, a knowledge of the causes of alienation is indispensable for understanding why or how Marx thought communism would end alienation. Secondly, by seeing what Marx perceived the causes of alienation to be in Europe of the 1840's, we can use this knowledge as a foil to better understand our own situation and to decide whether or not

Marx's prescription of communism has much to offer us as a means of ending or lessening our own alienation.

There are several basic questions and problems arising from these questions which set the context for the following discussion.

First, does Marx assert that private property is a cause of alienation? If so, is Marx clear about in what sense private property can be said to be a cause of alienation? What are the implications of what Marx says about the relationship of private property to alienation?

These are extremely important questions given the traditional view of Marxism in which the abolition of private property is claimed to be the key to ending the major ills of society. From this perspective, one would expect Marx in the early writings to clearly identify private property as the cause of alienation. As we shall see, Marx does refer to private property as a cause of alienation, even as a necessary and sufficient condition, yet, there are fundamental ambiguities in his remarks on private property. In addition, there are several passages in which he claims that private property is the result of alienated labor rather than a cause of alienated labor. The implications of this latter point are quite important in that if private property is a result of alienation, then abolishing private property through the institution of communism will not end alienation. This is a conclusion which any self-respecting Marxist would find difficult to accept.

What other causes of alienation does Marx cite? Is

Marx clear about how these causes operate to produce alienation? What are the problematic implications of what Marx says about these causes of alienation?

In addition to private property, Marx explicitly identifies the division of labor (in two senses), wage-labor, money, excessive self-interest, and production for profit as causes of alienation of certain of its aspects. He also strongly suggests that the governance of the worker through social demands and the fluctuation of an economy based on private property are causes of alienation. Again we shall see that there is a great deal of unclarity in much of what Marx says about these causes. Furthermore, accepting some of these as causes of alienation again creates the significant problem that abolishing private property will not end alienation, and that alienation would probably exist in a communist as well as a capitalist society.

The final set of questions to be dealt with are: Can a plausible, coherent, and reasonably specific presentation of the causes of alienation as they are contained in the early writings be given? In particular, what did Marx think the relationship was between private property and the other causes of alienation to which he refers?

As stated, there are major difficulties with Marx's views aside from their frequent incompleteness and ambiguity. Two of Marx's claims, for example, must be rejected as false or highly misleading. For other claims, it is necessary to suggest certain connections which Marx seems

to assume but does not explain. After this "weeding out" and "resuscitation" process, however, a coherent and reasonably specific picture of the causes of alienation which is quite faithful to Marx's early writings can be given.

In general, then, it will be shown that with regard to Marx's views on the causes of alienation, things are much more complex and problematic than has been traditionally supposed by both Marxists and non-Marxists. In particular, one cannot be faithful to Marx's early writings and simply rely on the banal slogan of "Abolish private property!"

It will also, hopefully, be shown that some of these difficulties are not insuperable and that a reasonably coherent formulation of the causes of alienation as they are presented in the early writings can be given.

With regard to the organization of this chapter, I shall first consider the essays "Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man" as a means of introducing some of the major problems and significant points contained in Marx's account of the causes of alienation. Next, I shall examine individually all of the different features which Marx considered to be causes of alienation. Finally, I shall make some concluding remarks about the adequacy of Marx's account in general.

"Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man": The Origin and Development of Alienation

The essays "Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man" are deceptive in that in them Marx claims to be laying bare the presuppositions of political economy. It becomes quickly evident, however, that Marx is giving his own often highly imaginative account of the historical origin and development of alienation.

In each essay there is presented a similar temporal sequence of stages of development of an economic system. The result of this development is alienation to an ever greater degree. In both essays, this sequence begins with man's self interest or his desire to satisfy his needs. This causes him to produce. This labor, in turn, leads to overproduction, and the production of a surplus leads to exchange of the products of labor. Finally, exchange leads to the use of money and wage-labor. During this development, the division of labor becomes more and more acute. Throughout the whole process, man's relationship to his labor changes with the eventual result that the worker becomes alienated from his labor, himself, and from others.

There are several significant points contained in or suggested by these two essays.

First, the origin of alienation as presented in these essays is not based upon any outlandish or unreasonable interpretation of history. The assumptions which Marx makes about man's nature and the stages of economic development are quite plausible and, for the latter, for many cultures are probably historically accurate. One is in fact struck by the naturalness of the origin of alieantion. One begins with the reasonable assumption that man desires to satisfy his needs, and one then winds up with alienation in all of its aspects.

What is especially striking in this account is that there is no emphasis upon private property as the cause of alienation, nor are the owners of private property singled out as arch-villains. Using "private property" in the sense of the exclusive ownership of an object or thing, Marx even refers to private property quite positively. For example, in "Money and Alienated Man," he refers to the laborer in the initial stages of development of the economic system as an "exclusive possessor who maintains his personality and distinguishes himself from other men and relates himself to them through this exclusive possession. Private property is his personal existence, his distinguishing and hence essential existence."[1]

Now, it must be noted that Marx uses "private property" in at least two other quite distinct senses. The term sometimes refers to the economic system which results from this exclusive ownership, and, hence, the term also refers

to such features which make up this system as the division of labor, the use and fetish of money, wage-labor, etc.. In addition, the term is also used to refer to private ownership of the means of production. It is important to keep these distinction in mind, although Marx himself does not always clearly distinguish them.

From these essays, however, it is clear that it is not private property in the sense of the exclusive ownership of something, particularly the product of one's labor, which Marx found objectionable. Rather, it is those features which Marx cites as resulting from such ownership, such as the exchange of the products of labor, the division of labor, money, wages, etc.. It is these which are presented as the causes, the sufficient conditions, of alienation.

Accepting these features as sufficient conditions, either combined or separately, of alienation or aspects of alienation reveals the inadequacy of relying upon the traditional Marxist slogan of the abolition of private property as the cure for most of society's ills, in this case alienation. If exchange, wage-labor, the division of labor, money, etc. are taken as sufficient conditions of alienation, then because these are conditions which have held, at least in the past, for societies based entirely or partially on communal ownership, then alienation would have existed in these societies. More importantly, however, is the problem that these are features which seem to be essential to <u>any</u> modern society. Thus, even if private

property, in the sense of the exclusive possession of the product of one's labor or the sense of the private ownership of the instruments of production, were abolished, as long as these features existed, alienation would persist. If one takes seriously the idea of a modern society existing without these conditions, the problem is even more acute with regard to the abolition of money as the alternative of a system of credit and banking is condemned by Marx as being all the more odious and dehumanizing.[2] Given, then, the improbability of a society existing without some or all of these features, even communism would not eliminate the occurrence of alienation.

If one objects that it is only within a system of private property that these features will produce alienation, then it is far from clear why this is so. Furthermore, if this is so, then there must be some additional ingredient or factor present which causes this alienation to occur in a capitalist society with these features and not in a communist society with these same features. Nowhere, however, in the early writings does Marx give us a clue as to what this extra something is. He does not, for example, explain why the use of money or the division of labor would produce alienation in a capitalist society but would not in a communist society.

This same problem--whether or not the abolition of private property will eliminate alienation or certain of its aspects--also becomes evident if one closely examines

Marx's discussion in "Free Human Production" of how men become alienated from each other through the process of exchange. Although it is not easy to see, the implication of what Marx says here is that the abolition of private property will not necessarily end the alienation of man from man.

In this essay, Marx indicates that initially how much man needed determined the extent of his production. With exchange, however, man's motive for production changes. He no longer consumes his own product, but through exchange attempts to obtain the other's product. In this attempt, Marx asserts that deception and force will be resorted to and that the result will be the alienation of man from man.[3]

In several places, Marx identifies the crucial factor as the producer's relationship to his product. That is, he suggests that it is the producer's attitude toward the object of his own production which leads to the alienation of man from man. For example, he states that "Exchange can only set in motion and confirm the relationship which each of us has to his own product."[4] Elsewhere, he asserts that "You have no relationship to my object as a human being because I myself have no human relation to it."[5] Thus, the key factor is the producer having the proper relationship to his own product.

What this changed attitude is that occurs through exchange is not made very clear by Marx. Sometimes he characterizes the new relationship as producing for one's

self and not for others or as producing for a profit.[6] Now, it is quite unclear as to what Marx meant by producing for one's self, although it is somewhat less so for what he meant by producing for a profit. It is clear, however, that these are not necessarily the same things.

Disregarding Marx's ambiguity here, his principal points can be expressed as follows: First, with exchange, one's attitude toward the product of his labor changes from reasonable self-interest to excessive self-interest. Secondly, it is this excessive self-interest which leads to men being regarded as means and not as ends, which leads to the alienation from others. It is this attitude of excessive self-interest which exchange "sets in motion."

The objection that this excessive self-interest would not occur in a communist society, although it is one which Marx would probably have agreed with, unfortunately does not have much support in these essays. Marx identifies the worker's changed relationship to his product, what I have called excessive self-interest, as a or the (it is not clear which) sufficient condition of alienation from others, but nowhere does he explain how or why this change in relationship to the product occurs. He begins with the reasonable assumption that man desires to satisfy his needs but does not explain how this changes into excessive self-interest. Sometimes Marx speaks as though this attitude is a result of the exchange process, and sometimes he suggests that the change occurs before the exchange of products begins.

Either way, there are problems. If the change in attitude is due to exchange, then we are back where we were previously: Exchange would exist in a communist society, and Marx does not indicate why it would not lead to excessive self-interest in such a society. On the other hand, if the change in attitude is a result of the mere fact of exclusive ownership and exists prior to exchange, then Marx omits explaining the essential point of what aspect of the process of production and/or exclusive ownership causes the change from reasonable self-interest to excessive self-interest. It is certainly not obvious that exclusive ownership by itself necessarily leads to excessive self-interest and, hence, this needs much explanation.

A third possibility, that this excessive self-interest is inherent in man's nature is ruled out, first, by the indication that it does not exist prior to exchange, and, secondly, by the Marxist tenet that man's nature is due to the economic structure of society. That is, according to the traditional interpretation of Marx, man's nature is not constant but is continually changing as society changes.

Marx does not, then, adequately establish that private property, at least in the sense of exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor, is a necessary condition of this excessive self-interest, and, hence, of alienation from others. Thus, once again we have the problem that, at least on theoretical grounds, alienation or some of its aspects could occur in a communist society.

It was stated earlier that each of the causes of alienation to which Marx refers at some time or another would be individually discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. For two of these suggested causes, however, this will not be done because, depending upon how Marx's claims about these causes are interpreted, they are obviously false or turn out to be equivalent to causal connections which will be later discussed.

Marx asserts in these two essays that exchange leads to a change in the motive of labor and to wage-labor, which he then suggests are sufficient conditions of alienated labor.[7] Now, depending upon how these claims are meant, they are either plainly false or highly misleading. For example, it is clear that it could not be the mere payment of a wage which is a sufficient condition of alienated labor as it is evident that often people receive wages for labor that is the "self-satisfaction of their natural dispositions and spiritual aims." In light of this, the most plausible assumption is that Marx believed that it was the sort of labor which those who received a wage were performing which was alienating. Looked at in this way, it becomes the nature of the labor or the conditions under which one must labor which are seen as alienation, not the mere fact that a wage is being paid. The relationship between the nature of labor and alienated labor has already been briefly discussed, and it shall receive further attention when Marx's views on the connection between the division of labor and alienated labor are discussed.

This point concerning wages and alienation is significant in that one still hears Marxists referring to wage-labor as a cause of alienation. Again, for the reasons cited above, this is misleading. If one makes a distinction between exploitation and alienation, defining "exploitation" as "the extraction of surplus value from the laborer," then the payment of a wage, given the Marxist labor theory of value, can be said to be a cause of exploitation. But again, looked at in this way, it is still possible and, in fact, not infrequent that one is exploited while performing labor that is fulfilling.[8]

Similarly, Marx suggests that there occurs a change in the motive of laboring from the initial motive of the immediate need for the object produced and/or the motive of production for enjoyment, to the motive of production for profit.[9] The implication is that having a certain motive for laboring is a sufficient condition for alienated labor. Again, however, this is obviously not so. There is no necessary connection between the motive of labor and whether or not the labor is fulfilling. People often undertake a task with the aim, perhaps the only aim, of making money or a profit and still have the activity turn out to be satisfying. In addition, it might be noted that in the long run, the motive or purpose of labor has not changed. The final goal is still the satisfaction of needs, primarily physical needs. Furthermore, if Marx also meant to assert that prior to exchange men labored

because it was the "self-satisfaction of their natural dispositions and spiritual aims," then he is engaging in a naive, Romantic fantasy.

Now, there does seem to me to be a sense in which a certain motive, in this case acquisitiveness, can lead indirectly to alienated labor. This is a connection, however, which Marx does not make. What this causal connection is will be presented later, along with a discussion of in what sense money can be said to be a cause of alienation.

Marx's language often strongly suggests that he did have in mind such simple-minded and flagrantly weak claims as the motive of laboring and the payment of a wage being sufficient conditions of alienated labor. To repeat, however, because of the weakness of these claims, it seems best to construe them as highly misleading in that it is most plausible to consider the nature of labor as the cause of alienated labor.

The final significant point to be made has to do with understanding a passage in "Alienated Labor" which has proved quite difficult to explain for those concerned about Marx's views on the causes of alienation.

The accounts of the origin and development of alienation which are given in "Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man" begin with what I have referred to as man's self-interest, his desire to satisfy his needs and wants. It is this self-interest which leads man to produce. If we take the sense of "externalization" as objectification (Chapter II, p. 26), then we can say that it is man's

self-interest which causes him to externalize his labor. Similarly, if we use "externalize" and "alienate" in the sense of exchange (Chapter II, p.26), we can also say that it is man's need and want which causes him to externalize or alienate his private property to someone else. Thus, in this way, the process of externalization and alienation, at least in their non-pejorative senses, is tied to man's self-interest.[10]

The troublesome passage which this observation can be used to possibly shed some light on is one in which Marx explicitly raises the question of the cause of alienation. The manuscript, however, ends shortly afterwards, and Marx's comments in the passage are frustratingly elusive and vague. Thereafter, Marx never systematically nor very explicitly deals with this question. The problematic passage is:

> We have taken the alienation of labor and its externalization as a fact and analyzed this fact. How, we ask now, does it happen that man externalizes his labor, alienates it? How is this alienation rooted in the nature of human development? We have already achieved much in resolving the problem by transforming the question concerning the origin of private property into the question concerning the relationship of externalized labor to evolution of humanity. In talking about private property one believes he is dealing with something external to man. Talking of labor, one is immediately dealing with man himself. This new formulation of the problem already contains its solution.11

Using the observations made above, one can give an answer to the question raised by Marx--How is this alienation rooted in the nature of human development?--which is faithful to his accounts in these two essays and which

meets the criterion indicated in the latter part of the passage. Using "externalize" and "alienate" in the senses indicated above, the answer would be that it is man's self-interest or his desire to satisfy his needs which causes him to externalize and alienate his labor. This answer seems to fit Marx's criterion that with the answer to the question, one would be immediately dealing with man himself.

Now, although this is an answer which immediately deals with man himself, it is unfortunately not very satisfying. The senses of "externalization" and "alienation" being used are not the interesting senses, the pejorative senses, the alienation and externalization which we would desire to eliminate. If we are to assume that alienation, in its pejorative sense, develops out of alienation, in its non-pejorative senses, it is far from clear how this occurs and means that we must closely examine those features, the division of labor, the use of money, etc., which result from alienation and externalization in their non-pejorative senses in order to see how these features are connected to alienation.

At this point, then, it is necessary to turn our attention to those specific features of the economic system which Marx cites as causes of alienation.

Before doing so, however, let us briefly review some of the major problems and points revealed by an examination of the essays "Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man."

We have seen that in these essays, Marx presents similar accounts of the historical origin and development of alienation. The origin and development of alienation is linked to a temporal, apparently causal, sequence of stages of development of an economic system based upon the exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor. This sequence is roughly as follows: Man's desire to satisfy his needs gives rise to production. From this results overproduction and the exchange of the surplus. Next, there occurs production with the intent to exchange all of one's product and the resultant exchange system, particularly the use of money. Finally, there arises wage-labor. The division of labor is not presented as a definite stage but as a condition which becomes more and more developed as the economic system goes through the above changes. Throughout this process, man's alienation is presented as increasing to the point it had reached at the time of Marx's writing.

In these accounts, it does not appear that it is merely the exclusive ownership of the product of labor which is objectionable but the features of the economic system which Marx presents as resulting from such ownership, e.g. the division of labor, exchange, money, etc.. These essays suggest that it is these features which are the sufficient conditions, combined or separately, of alienation. This, then, creates the disturbing problem that the abolition of private property would not eliminate alienation as long as these conditions were present. Given the

apparent necessity for any modern economic system to have these features, alienation would seem to be an unavoidable condition for both communist and capitalist societies.

Furthermore, we have seen that Marx's claims that production for profit or for one's self and wage-labor are causes of alienation are either false or misleading.

Finally, after examining these essays, we are still faced with the problem of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of alienation. The emphasis in these essays is not on private property as a cause of alienation. This is surprising given the traditional Marxist identification of private property as the source of most of the evils of society. From these essays, in fact, it is not very clear at all in what sense private property can be said to be a cause of alienation, either in the sense of a necessary or sufficient condition.

There are, however, elsewhere in Marx's early writings some explicit references to private property as a cause of alienation. We must now examine some of these references, explore some of the problems they create, and then examine some of the other suggested causes of alienation.

Private Property

In the early writings, Marx sometimes speaks as though private property were a necessary condition of alienation. This is quite important as it would rule out, at least theoretically, the possibility of alienation occurring in

a communist society. In "Private Property and Communism," Marx states that "The positive overcoming of private property as the appropriation of human life is thus the positive overcoming of all alienation. . . . "[12] A little later in the same essay, he asserts that "The overcoming of private property means therefore the complete emancipation of all human senses and aptitudes."[13] Throughout part I of The German Ideology, Marx emphasizes the necessity of making the "instruments of production subservient to each individual and the property of all" in order to end man's alienation. He points out that men have become "more and more enslaved to a power alien to them" and that this power, the world market, will be eliminated with the abolition of private property.[14] Elsewhere, he states that "with the abolition of the basis of private property, with communistic regulation of production and hence with abolition of alienation between men and their own products, the power of supply and demand is completely dissolved and men regain control of exchange, production, and the mode of their mutual relationships."[15] Thus, in these passages, unlike "Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man," Marx is explicitly identifying private property as the cause of alienation. In particular, he presents private property as a necessary condition of alienation in these places in that it would not follow that the abolition of private property would eliminate alienation unless private property were a necessary condition.

There are, however, major difficulties with Marx's discussion of the relationship between private property and alienation. These difficulties arise primarily from Marx's ambiguity and vagueness. For example, Marx does not make very clear what he even means by "private property." I have already distinguished two senses of the term which can be found in the early writings, the exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor and the economic system based upon such ownership. In The German Ideology, Marx uses the term in still another sense, the private ownership of the instruments of production. Given this basic ambiguity, it is not surprising to find that Marx is not very specific about the exact relationship between private property and alienation. He, for example, does not explain very clearly why the abolition of private property is supposed to end alienation. This is especially problematic in that, as we have seen and shall further see, he often presents alienated labor as also being a result of such conditions as the division of labor, the use of money, etc., conditions which can exist independently of exclusive ownership of the product of labor or the private ownership of the instruments of production.

A passage in "Private Property and Communism" further reveals Marx's ambiguity as to what constitutes the abolition of private property. This passage also implies, in contradiction to what was just noted, that private property is not a necessary condition for the existence of alienation.

In this passage, Marx refers to communism as "the overcoming of private property." He goes on, however, to distinguish four different forms of communism. They are "crude communism;" communism which is "still of a political nature, democratic or despotic;" communism in which there is "the overcoming of the state;" and, finally, "Communism as positive overcoming of private property as human self-alienation, and thus as the actual appropriation of the human essence through and for man. . . ."[16] Marx indicates that for the first three forms, all of which, in some unspecified sense, are forms in which private property has been "overcome," there still exists alienation. Since private property does not exist and there still exists alienation, it is clearly not possible for private property to be a necessary condition for alienation.

It seems, however, that the most sensible stance to take with regard to the question of whether or not Marx considered private property to be a necessary condition of alienation is to merely acknowledge his conflicting claims and point out the fundamental ambiguity with the notion of private property.

In addition to these difficulties, several scholars of Marx have drawn attention to and emphasized the fact that there are passages in the early writings in which Marx, in apparent contradiction to the traditional view and to what he says elsewhere, explicitly indicates that private property is a result of alienated labor rather than a

cause. This has been particularly emphasized by Robert Tucker in his Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx and by Theodore Roszak in his The Making of a Counter Culture.[17]

It is important to deal with these passages for two reasons. First, because the claim that private property is a result of alienated labor is, or appears to be, a direct contradiction of the position which Marx takes elsewhere in the early writings, that private property is the cause of alienated labor. Secondly, it is important to discuss these passages because of what Tucker and Roszak claim are the implications of the claim that private property is a result of alienated labor. Both see as an implication an inconsistency with or weakness in the Marxist doctrine of historical materialism or economic determinism, the view that it is the way in which men go about satisfying their material needs which determines the nature of a society and the individuals in it. For example, Roszak argues that for Marx to speak of alienation existing prior to private property and "being rooted in the nature of human development" is quite "unMarxian" in that it suggests "that some primordial act of alienation has taken place in 'human development' which is not to be traced to the economic process."[18] Similarly, Tucker uses the claim that private property is a result of alienated labor to argue that man's alienation is not due to his social or economic institutions and, hence, cannot be eliminated by changing them. Thus, it also follows from Tucker's position that

communism would not necessarily end alienation and that it might be possible to eliminate alienation within a system of private property.

The passages which Tucker and Roszak cite as evidence for the view that private property is a result of alienated labor both come from the same final section of "Alienated Labor." The following are these passages plus additional relevant ones from this section. Roszak's remarks are based on the statement indicated by (1); Tucker's are based on the paragraph following (2):

> . . . The relation of the worker to labor produces the relation of the capitalist to labor, or whatever one wishes to call the lord of labor. (1) Private property is thus product, result, and necessary consequence of externalized labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> (2) We have obtained the concept of externalized labor (externalized life) from political economy as a result of the movement of private property. But the analysis of this idea shows that though private property appear to be the ground and cause of externalized labor, it is rather a consequence of externalized labor, just as gods are originally not the cause but the effect of an aberration of the human mind. Later this relationship reverses.
>
> Only at the final culmination of the development of private property does this, its secret, reappear--namely, that on the one hand it is the product of externalized labor and that secondly it is the means through which labor externalizes itself, the realization of this externalization.19

Now, credit must be given to Tucker and Roszak for forcing us to, first, notice Marx's claims that private property is a result of alienated labor and to, secondly, examine these troublesome passages. Nevertheless, their interpretation of these passages seems to me to be inadequate.

Both distort Marx's meaning and also do not understand his point.

Their interpretation is distorted because although it is clear from the passages that Marx does assert that private property is a result of alienated labor, he equally asserts that private property is a cause of alienated labor. Let us consider the passage Tucker cites, labelled (2) above. In the paragraph, an analogy is made between the relationship of belief in gods to aberrations or confusions of the human mind. The relationship between belief in gods and aberrations of the mind is presented as a causally reciprocal relationship. That is, aberrations of the mind produce belief in the gods, which then causes further confusions of the mind. The point of the analogy is that the same relationship holds between alienated labor and private property. Externalized labor causes private property, which then causes a further externalization of labor. Thus, private property is presented first as an effect and then as a cause of alienated labor. Both Tucker and Roszak point out only the first part of the relationship and ignore what seems obvious--the explicit indication that private property is both a cause and an effect of alienated labor.

Pointing this out, however, while it does justice to what is actually said in these passages, does not eliminate or solve the difficulty that if alienated or externalized labor exists prior to private property, then abolishing private property will not end alienation.

Now, again, credit must be given to Tucker and Roszak for drawing our attention to these difficult passages. Yet, I do not find their conclusions convincing.

It seems to me that the following considerations must be taken into account. First, Tucker and Roszak ignore the great amount of evidence, some of which has already been cited, for the claim that Marx considered private property a necessary condition of alienated labor. Secondly, viewing the passages in the context of the lines preceeding them, allows one to see that acceptance of the claim that private property is a necessary condition of alienated labor is not inconsistent with claiming that private property is a result of alienated labor.

In the preceeding lines, Marx has been explaining how alienation from one's self is reflected in one's relationship to others. He gives as an example how religious self-alienation is reflected in the relationship of laity to priest. Marx then asserts that man's alienation from himself is similarly reflected in a special relationship to others, specifically the relationship of the capitalist to the laborer. But this relationship, the "domination of the non-producer over production and over product," is another way of characterizing or defining the economic system of private property.

Taking this relationship as the perspective from which to view private property, we can see how externalized or alienated labor is both a cause and an effect of private

property. Remembering this and the two senses of alienated labor distinguished previously, the non-pejorative sense of the transference of ownership and the pejorative sense which includes all of the aspects of alienated labor discussed in Chapter II, it is easy to see how private property, the system in which the non-producer dominates the producer, maintains and is maintained by alienated labor. The selling of man's labor, alienated labor in the non-pejorative sense, and the type of labor resulting from this, alienated labor in its pejorative sense, both clearly maintain the relationship of the domination of the capitalist over the laborer. If men did not sell their labor and did not engage in the sort of labor available, alienated labor, then this relationship, the system of private property, could not exist. In this sense, private property is a <u>result</u> of alienated labor. On the other hand, this domination of the non-producer over the producer makes it such that one must sell his labor and engage in alienated labor. It is the wishes of the capitalist which determines where, when, how long, in what manner, and under what conditions the laborer must labor. Thus, this disparity of power contained in the system of private property, the domination of the cpaitalist over the laborer, is a <u>cause</u> of alienated labor in both its pejorative and non-pejorative sense. This notion of "mutual maintenance" fits in quite well with the idea of reciprocal causation evidenced in the paragraph emphasized by Tucker and in the subsequent lines cited.

Thus, in general, Tucker and Roszak err, first, in not pointing out or recognizing that the majority of evidence lies with the claim that Marx considered private property a cause of alienated labor, particularly in the sense of a necessary condition. Secondly, with regard to the specific passages they cite, it is clear that the passages indicate that private property is presented as both cause and effect of alienated labor and not as an effect only, as they interpret the passages. Finally, a close examination of the passages and the explanation given of how alienated labor and private property mutually maintain each other, reveals that these passages do not imply that man's alienation is "not to be traced to the economic process."

The Division of Labor

In several places in the early writings, Marx refers to the division of labor as a cause of alienation. Now, it must be noted that there are two general, distinct meanings of "division of labor." On the one hand, Marx uses the term to refer to the division of a job into more simple tasks with each laborer performing only one or a few specific tasks. The division of labor in this sense would refer, if we are to consider the task of making a coat, to the process in which one person would cut out the sleeves, another the back, one would sew on the sleeves, another the buttons, etc.. There is another sense of "division of labor" which Marx also often uses which refers

more or less to the class structure of society. In this sense, the division of labor refers to who does what tasks within society. Thus, in this sense, the division of labor would refer to having one group who sold their labor (workers); another who bought their labor (capitalists); another group who sold the products of labor (merchants) etc.. This latter task is equivalent, then, to the distribution of tasks or functions in the society. We can refer to the first sense as "the division of labor within the labor or job" and to the second as "the division of labor within society" or "the social division of labor." Making these distinctions should avoid some confusions. Making these distinctions should not suggest, however, that, first, there is no relationship between the types of division of labor--the latter has arisen out of the former--and, secondly, sometimes what Marx says refers to both types.

In particular, it is clear that Marx thought that both types of division of labor were alienating.

In The German Ideology, Marx frequently emphasizes that the social division of labor produces alienation. For example, he states:

> . . . the division of labor offers us the first example for the fact that man's own act becomes an alien power opposed to him and enslaving him instead of being controlled by him. . . . For as soon as labor is distributed, each person has a particular, exclusive area of activitiy which is imposed on him, and from which he cannot escape. . . . This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of our own products into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, and nullifying our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development so far. . . . 20

Marx then strongly suggests that in a communist society there would be no division of labor. He describes a communist society as one where:

> . . . nobody has an exclusive area of activity and each can train himself in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production, making it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I like, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critic.21

Similarly, somewhat later in The German Ideology, he states that with the division of labor, "social relationships" become an independent power, governing individuals and that this can be eliminated by "transcending the division of labor."[22]

When describing the alienation of the proletariat, Marx often compares the worker to a machine. It is clear that this transformation of the worker into a machine is a result of the division of labor within a particular job. In the essay "Wages," Marx states that "While the division of labor increases the productive power of labor, the wealth and splendor of society, it impoverishes the worker until he is like a machine."[23]

The connection of both types of division of labor to the various aspects of alienated labor or to the different themes which characterize alienation are not hard to see. The explanation of the relationship of the social division of labor to some of these aspects and themes might be presented as the following: Given the social division of

labor, men and women, primarily workers, are born into or become situated in performing certain tasks or roles, such as textile worker, coal miner, seamstress, etc. Not only is it virtually impossible to change one's position from worker to non-worker (capitalist), but it is almost as impossible for people to change occupations. Thus, their task or role in society, in a general and specific sense, is fixed. The worker comes to feel powerless--there is nothing he can do, given the structure and mode of operation of bourgeois society. Similarly, being in the particular category he is in, and here the general category of "worker" is of more significance than the specific occupation, his future is largely fixed for him. That is, various opportunities will not be accessible and the chances for satisfying his needs and developing his abilities will be largely determined by what category, what position, he finds himself in. Given the nature of society, it was safe to say that his potential would not be fulfilled. In addition, for most workers, not only would their potential not be realized, but the level to which their needs could be satisfied was minimal. Hence, from this perspective it is the fact of one's role or class in society determining one's opportunities for satisfying one's needs and the level to which these needs are satisfied which is a cause of alienation.

It might be noted that from this preliminary and often vague discussion of the division of labor will develop

Marx's later emphasis on classes and the injustice resulting from them. One's development becomes linked to one's class, and one's class was largely unchangeable.

The connection of the division of labor within a job to alienated labor is more obvious and, hence, does not need to be explained as much. Such a division of labor is the principal cause of feelings of misery, monotony, resentment, and unfulfillment with one's labor. The division of labor is, thus, the principal cause of alienation from the activity of labor and the object of labor, especially the phenomenological or feeling aspects.

The Mode of Operation of the Bourgeois Economy

There are two other conditions of an economy based upon private property which although not explicitly mentioned by Marx as alienating, also deserve to be considered as sufficient conditions of alienation. These are conditions which Marx seemed to think were part of the general mode of operation of a bourgeois economy: the governance of men by social demand and the fluctuation of the economy through cycles of prosperity and decline.

Marx indicates that the worker is like a commodity in a society based upon private property in that his existence is also governed by supply and demand.[24] He refers to the worker as being "determined" by "social needs which are an alien compulsion to which he submits out of egoistic need and distress--these social needs are merely a source

of providing the necessities of life for him, just as he is merely a slave for them."[25] What Marx means here is that a social need, such as the demand for shoes, is reflected in the demand for laborers in the shoe industry. The worker needs to labor in order to survive and is, thus, forced to go where the demand is, must enter the shoe industry.

Secondly, as early as 1844, Marx portrayed an economy based upon private property as going through cycles of prosperity and depression.[26] The effect of these cycles was to force more and more workers out of work and into the ranks of the starving and to instill in them a certain amount of fear and insecurity.

Both of these features of a bourgeois economy, the operation of social demand and the fluctuation of the economy are alienating in that, first, they render the worker powerless and, secondly, make it such that the needs of the worker, both physical and human, go unfulfilled. As Marx saw it, not only what sort of work the laborer would perform but whether or not he shall labor and survive at all was not under his control but depended upon "the mood of the wealthy and the capitalists."[27]

Money

In various places throughout the early writings, Marx also suggests that there exists a causal connection between money and alienation. Frequently his comments on money

are in a religious idiom. He often refers to money as being a god or a fetish in bourgeois society. In his commentary on Bruno Bauer's "The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free," Marx states that "Money is the general, self-sufficient value of everything. Hence, it has robbed the whole world, the human world as well as nature of its proper worth. Money is the alienated essence of man's labor and life, and this alienated essence dominates him as he worships it."[28] In "Money and Alienated Man," he asserts that "Through this alien mediation man regards his will, his activity, and his relationships to others as a power independent of himself and of them--instead of man himself being the mediator of man."[29]

Since what Marx says about money is, however, not very clear; since there are no good critical discussions of what he says about money; and since at least one widely read work, Tucker's Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, distorts Marx's views, it is necessary to explore in more detail Marx's criticism of money and especially its relationship to alienation.

One distinction which must first be made is between money itself, or the monetary system, and the desire or motive to accumulate money. I shall use the terms "greed," "acquisitiveness," or "practical egoism" (a term Marx sometimes uses) to refer to the desire to accumulate money. It is clear that there is no necessary connection between the use of money and acquisitiveness in so far as

the former could conceivably occur without the latter.

The important questions which must be raised about Marx's discussion on the basis of this distinction are, first, are Marx's criticisms against the use of money or acquisitiveness or both or neither, and, secondly, what did Marx think was the relationship between money and acquisitiveness--did he, in particular, believe that the former led inevitably to the latter?

Sometimes Marx blurs the distinctions made above. In some places he specifically criticizes acquisitiveness, and at other times, he seems to be criticizing the use of money itself.

With regard to the first question raised above, whether or not Marx criticizes money itself or acquisitiveness, it seems to me that Marx's criticisms are, in effect, against acquisitiveness and its consequences and not the use of money itself.

If this is so, however, we face the question of why Marx sometimes speaks as though it were the use of money which is objectionable? One possibility is that since the use of money is a necessary condition of the desire to accumulate money, it would be natural for Marx to think in terms of ending acquisitiveness by abolishing its necessary condition.[30] The problem with this approach is that the prescription to end the use of money in a modern society is one which is difficult to take seriously. Thus, one hesitates to impute this assumption to Marx. On the

other hand, to think of the use of money as itself inevitably leading to acquisitiveness is to make it such that all contemporary societies, be they capitalist or communist, and any in the reasonably foreseeable future would be afflicted with acquisitiveness. What seems to be the most plausible thing to do, at least from the traditional perspective, is to assume that Marx meant that it was the use of money in a system based on private property which is sufficient to produce acquisitiveness. In this way one could avoid the embarrassing conclusions of the necessity of abolishing money and/or the existence in a communist society in a feature which Marx did not think would occur, the feature of acquisitiveness. The price one must pay for this move, however, is to subject Marx once again to the charge of not clearly and adequately explaining what he meant in certain places. In particular, it is not made clear why money would be a cause of alienation in bourgeois society but not in a communist society.

Granted that Marx's objections are, however, primarily against acquisitiveness rather than the use of money, what are his specific criticisms and their relationship to alienation? A good starting point for this analysis is to consider what Marx means when he says that money is a fetish in bourgeois society. To say that money is a fetish for someone, we can take as largely meaning that given an indication of the values, in the sense of preferences or things desired, a hierarchy can be formed such that money

is ranked as the top value. This, to be sure, does not capture some of the connotations of "fetish"--in particular, the elements of compulsion and domination--but such an approach illustrates that the actions of the person will generally have as their ultimate aim the acquisition of money. In particular, in a situation where one must choose between realizing competing values, money will be the first choice.

Using this way of explaining a fetish, we can see how having money as a fetish or being motivated by acquisitiveness, would lead to various aspects of alienation.

Marx explicitly connects acquisitiveness to alienation from other men and to alienation from one's senses. He connects acquisitiveness to the alienation of man from man in that this desire to accumulate money, or having money as a fetish, leads to men beingtreated as a means for acquiring money rather than as ends in themselves. For example, in analyzing the credit relationship, Marx points out how with regard to the debtor "the substance of his living and his very existence represent for the rich man the reimbursement of his capital."[31] Thus, the fact that the bourgeoisie worshipped the god of money similarly led them to regard the proletariat as expendable commodities, as a means to increase their wealth. Acquisitiveness is presented as a cause of alienation from one's senses in that one does not see or experience the natural beauty in an object or how it could satisfy someone else's needs, but sees it merely as a source of money.

In addition to viewing the fetish of money as a cause of alienation from others and from one's senses, one can also hypothesize a possible connection between the fetish of money and alienated labor. Assuming that money is a fetish for someone, this would mean that expressing one's personality in one's labor would be valued less than the accumulation of money, given the interpretation of a fetish presented above. Thus, it seems that one would seek out those situations in which money was the principal payoff. In particular, given the choice between laboring to satisfy the human need to express one's individuality in one's labor and earning more money, one would choose the latter. Hence, this human need would be likely to go unfulfilled and perhaps even disappear or no longer be thought worthy of serious consideration. In this sense, one's motive for laboring could be said to be a cause of alienated labor.

One could even hypothesize a further connection in that given the fetish of money as a widespread phenomenon among workers, there would possibly be no or little demand for labor which allows one to express his individuality, and people would be content with relatively good-paying but alienating jobs. This connection between acquisitiveness and alienated labor does in fact seem to me to exist generally in the United States today. Marx does not, however, make this connection between the fetish of money and alienated labor, although it seems to me to be a plausible one. He does--to repeat--explicitly present acquisitiveness as a

cause of alienation of man from man and of man from his senses.

Aside from these important criticisms of acquisitiveness, Marx harshly criticizes money in his short but brilliant essay "Money." These criticisms are quite provocative but also quite elusive or difficult to grasp. Again, there are no critical discussions of this essay, as far as I know, and, thus, it is important to examine what Marx says in order to possibly gain a better understanding of the relationship between the fetish of money and alienation.

In "Money," Marx refers to money as "the alienated power of humanity" and attempts to explain how it leads to ". . . the transformation of all human and natural qualities into their opposites; the universal confusion and inversion of things. . . . "[32]

Marx's remarks can be distilled into two main criticisms. The first criticism is that this acquisitiveness leads to what could be called "social hypocrisy." The second is that it leads to injustice.

What does it mean to say that having money as a fetish leads to social hypocrisy? In this essay, one of Marx's most forceful points is that where money is a fetish, people are judged by and related to on the basis of an <u>inappropriate</u> standard--how much money they posses. For example, given a society afflicted with the fetish of money, Marx asserts that "That which exists for me through the medium of money, that which I can pay for . . . that <u>I am</u>. . . . My own

power is as great as the power of money. . . . What I am and can do is, therefore, not at all determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy the most beautiful women for myself."[33]

Granted the provocativeness of these comments, it is not obvious, however, what is wrong with this social hypocrisy or why money is an inappropriate standard on the basis of which to judge and relate to people. One wishes that Marx would have explained the basis of this criticism.

One answer to the question of what is wrong with using the standard of money in this way and which seems plausible is that allowing money to be the basis of our estimation of and reactions to others leads eventually to having our expectations, desires, and needs frustrated. For example, giving love in proportion to the other's money is inappropriate because it is self-defeating. What can satisfy love is only the other's individuality as expressed in his loving acts. Viewed in this way, Marx's criticism would be based upon certain empirical claims about what will satisfy various desires or needs.

The second criticism which can be found in "Money" is that the fetish of money leads to injustice. To be specific, how much money one has becomes the determinant of whether or not one can have his needs satisfied and abilities developed. Thus, Marx is critical of the fact that in his society, there were many whose needs, even physical needs, were not satisfied and whose abilities were not developed

because they lacked sufficient money. Not only was the trouble that the average worker possessed almost no money but that the future did not offer any opportunity for increasing his wealth. Rather, it was likely that the worker would lose what little he did have. At the same time, there were those whose every whim and caprice were satisfied merely because they had money, and there were men who had no ability for an activity but merely because they possessed money, they could attempt to develop one.[34]

When we ask what is wrong with this, the answer would seem to lie in an appeal to some sort of principle of justice and moral claims about what needs ought to be satisfied and abilities developed and/or what opportunities should exist for satisfying needs and developing abilities. It is not appropriate to enter into a discussion here of the nature and justification of such principles. It should be noted, however, that the general point which Marx is making in this second criticism seems to be an early statement of the famous tenet which is to govern the higher stage of communism as is described in The Critique of the Gotha Program: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[35]

The connection between money and alienation as presented in "Money" can be summarized as follows: Money is the "alienated power of humanity" in that one is judged and related to, is given "power," on the basis of how much money he has and not on the basis of his individuality. That is, the social estimation of the person and his ability to

satisfy his needs and to develop his talents is separated from what he is actually like as a person. Thus, if we speak in terms of the power to satisfy one's needs, this ability comes to depend not upon the person's unique and inherent capacities but is invested in money. Hence, the fetish of money leads to men being powerless and to not having their needs satisfied and abilities developed as they should. Just as with religious alienation, man's power, instead of residing within himself, becomes invested in something external, and as a result man becomes degraded, powerless, and enslaved.

The same points lie behind Marx's reference to money as an "alien mediation." His point here is that instead of one man responding to or treating another on the basis of their individuality, their needs and abilities, their relationship is based upon how much money the person has. This can be manifested in two ways. First, by treating the person as a means to satisfy one's acquisitiveness, or, secondly, by endowing the person with certain characteristics or a certain status or prestige which he does not actually have. In either case, money comes between the two persons with the final result being the ignoring of the other's real needs and abilities.

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to comment upon Robert Tucker's discussion of money and alienation in Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. In this widely read work, Tucker identifies the fetish of money,

or acquisitiveness, as the cause of alienated labor. In the chapter "Alienation and Money Worship," he asserts that "The compulsion that transforms free creative activity into alienated labor is the compulsion to amass wealth. Marx portrays it in his manuscripts as a maniacal obsession with the accumulation of capital, a veritable fanaticism of appropriation of the world of created things, a lust for money. He entitles it 'greed.'"[36]

What Tucker says, however, is faulty in several respects. First, nowhere does he attempt to explain how the "compulsion to amass wealth" is a cause of alienated labor. All he does is quote Marx, who is himself quite unclear on this point. As indicated earlier, a plausible connection can be made between the motive of acquisitiveness and alienated labor, but Tucker does not even attempt to give an explanation of such a connection. Secondly, and most importantly, Tucker ignores such features as the types of division of labor, the fluctuation of the economy, and governance by social demand as causes of alienated labor. To do so is to egregiously ignore much of what Marx says in the early writings. Furthermore, while overly emphasizing the motive of acquisitiveness as he does, Tucker does not bother to examine how much this motive is due to the economic system in which one lives but seems to assume that men's motives exist in vacuo. This is certainly a position which is possible to defend, but one which is also quite unMarxian and, hence, in a work on Marx would require extensive argumentation.

Finally, Tucker's presentation is faulty in that he misrepresents the nature of the proletariat as they are portrayed by Marx in the early writings. Marx does not describe the worker as being consumed by "a maniacal obsession with the accumulation of capital." It is true that Marx suggests that certain schools of political economy held forth the ideal of acquiring capital for the worker to emulate. It is also true that Marx refers to the worker producing because of "egoistic need." It is clear that Marx, however, does not mean "egoistic" in the highly pejorative sense in which Tucker would interpret the term. Rather the worker is egoistic or self-interested in the sense of desiring to have his needs satisfied. Those lines in which Marx explicitly connects the fetish of money to alienation from others and from one's senses clearly refer to the bourgeoisie and not to the workers.

Thus, the "lust for money" which Tucker emphasizes can be correctly imputed to the bourgeoisie as they are portrayed by Marx but not to the proletariat. It is more faithful to Marx's discussion to seek the causes of the worker's alienation from his labor in the division of labor, the fluctuation of the economy, the governance by social demand, and the <u>capitalist's</u> lust for money rather than in the non-existent lust for money of the proletariat.

To summarize the preceeding, Marx's criticisms of money are sometimes directed against the use of money itself and sometimes against acquisitiveness. There are

major problems with taking seriously the view that money itself produces alienation and this, plus what Marx says elsewhere, indicates that Marx's criticisms of money are to be understood to be directed toward acquisitiveness. An explanation of why Marx sometimes seems to be criticizing money itself is possible, although it means that Marx must be accused of a good bit of unclarity and still leaves some important questions unanswered.

Marx does explicitly connect acquisitiveness with alienation form others and from one's senses but does not make clear how acquisitiveness can lead to alienation from one's labor. Using an interpretation of the fetish of money as the top value in a hierarchy of values, a possible connection between acquisitiveness and alienated labor has been suggested. Although it is a connection which Marx does not make, it is one which seems to be operative in our society, and it explains one sense in which the motive of labor could lead to alienated labor.

We have also seen that Marx presents further criticisms of money in his little examined essay "Money." These criticisms are that the fetish of money leads to "social hypocrisy" and injustice. The underlying normative principles of these criticisms is not explained or justified by Marx in this essay. These criticisms point, however, to a further connection of acquisitiveness to alienation. Money is said to be an "alienated power" or "alien mediation" in that one's power and his resulting ability to satisfy his

needs come to be dependent not upon his needs and individual ability but upon how much money he has. Thus, the fetish of money leads, in the final analysis, to the unfulfillment of one's needs and the non-development of one's talents.

Finally, we have seen that Robert Tucker's identification of the proletariat's lust for money as the cause of alienated labor is faulty in several respects. Tucker does not explain how this causal connection occurs; ignores such important causes as the division of labor, the fluctuation of the economy, etc.; and misrepresents the nature of the proletariat as they are portrayed by Marx.

Concluding Remarks

We must now offer an overall assessment of Marx's account of the causes of alienation as they are presented in the early writings. In particular, we must consider the final question raised at the beginning of this chapter: Can a plausible, coherent, and reasonably specific account of the causes of alienation, as they are discussed in the early writings, be given?

One of the major problems with Marx's discussion arises from viewing his remarks in the context of the view that it is private property which is the cause of alienation. In particular, from this perspective, the abolition of private property is seen as a necessary condition for ending alienation, and the substitution of communal ownership for private ownership is seen as a sufficient condition for ending alienation.

As we have seen, however, there are fundamental ambiguities with Marx's discussion of private property. It is not very clear in the early writings, for example, what Marx had in mind when he refers to the abolition of private property as the means for ending alienation. In the essays "Free Human Production" and "Money and Alienated Man," the term usually refers to the exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor. Elsewhere, the term is used to refer to the private ownership of the instruments of production. In other places, it is clear that Marx uses the term to refer to the whole economic system which originated from the exclusive ownership of the product of labor. Even if we consider the first two senses of "private property," there is the problem of not knowing exactly what one is supposed to abolish if one is to follow Marx's prescription of abolishing private property.

Although it is the sense of the private ownership of the instruments of production which figures most prominently in the later writings and which is traditionally emphasized, one cannot just disregard the fact that in some of the early writings alienation is presented as resulting from private property in the sense of the exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor, even though this exclusive ownership is viewed positively by Marx in the initial stages of economic development.

Other major problems, which have already been mentioned, arise from the fact that besides speaking of private property

as a cause of alienation, Marx also refers to other causes of alienation or aspects of alienation. These are the division of labor, wage-labor, production for profit, the use of money, acquisitiveness, excessive self-interest, control by social demand, and the fluctuation of the economy. Now, the claims that the payment of a wage and having the motive of profit are sufficient conditions of alienated labor can be ignored since, as previously indicated, they are false or turn out to be equivalent to one of the other causal claims.

Accepting these other features as sufficient conditions of alienation (This is how they are presented by Marx.), implies that alienation or certain of its aspects would exist in a communist as well as a capitalist society, given the existence of these features. Indeed, some of these features, the division of labor within labor and the use of money, appear to be necessities for any modern society, be it capitalist or communist. For other of these features, acquisitiveness and excessive self-interest, there is nothing contained in the early writings to justify claiming that they would not occur in a communist society.[37] Thus, one extremely significant problem that arises from the identification of these features as causes of alienation is that it appears, on the basis of Marx's comments, that the abolition of private property (in either sense of the exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor or the private ownership of the instruments of production) would not

necessarily end alienation, and that alienation could exist in a communist society.

With regard to this same point, there is also the problem that Marx is not clear at all about the relationship of private property to these other causes of alienation. Marx seems to have thought that these other causes of alienation were inherent in an economic system based upon private property. He seems to have believed, in particular, that private property was a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurence of these other conditions. Assuming this, one can at least see why he apparently thought that the abolition of private property would end alienation, and why alienation could not occur in a communist society. Unfortunately, however, there is no discussion in the early writings as to how private property can be said to be a necessary condition of these other causal conditions. Marx's discussions of private property as a sufficient condition of these other conditions, although more specific, still suffers from a great amount of ambiguity.

These problems are particularly important today as apologists of capitalism argue, first, that these other causal features of alienation are not necessary for capitalism, and, secondly, argue that these features are not unique to capitalism but also exist in socialist societies. If both of these claims are true, capitalism would be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of these features and, hence, of alienation.

Marx's account of the origin and causes of alienation does, however, possess a considerable amount of coherence and a reasonably specific indication of what can be plausibly considered as sufficient conditions of alienation can be given.

Marx's identification of the sequence of stages of development of an economic system based, especially upon the exclusive ownership of the product of one's labor, although sketchy and over-simplified, is probably quite accurate for many societies.

After "weeding out" certain claims and attempting to "resuscitate" others, I would suggest the following as the Marxist account, based on the early writings, of the sufficient conditions of alienation: a rigid or sharp social division of labor, particularly a class structure; the division of labor within a job; the fluctuation of the economy; governance by social demand; the fetish of money; and excessive self-interest. In what sense these operate as sufficient conditions of alienation or some of its aspects has hopefully been made reasonably clear, or at least more clear than is the case with Marx's discussion, by the preceeding. This is not to deny, however, that there are still problems of clarity with this formulation. Yet, the conditions have been identified; they have been made somewhat specific; and tentative, plausible connections suggested. This account does give something relatively specific to grasp hold of such that it can be further

examined and, hopefully, the claims subjected to some sort of empirical testing.

As a final note, it must be said that those Marxists who throw out in a Pavlovian fashion the slogan of "Abolish private property!" as a panacea and those non-Marxists who airily dismiss Marx's views, commit a double disservice. First, both do an injustice to the man, Karl Marx. The former are not faithful to the complexity of thought of their own prophet, and, similarly, the latter do not see the richness of thought of a great and sensitive mind. Secondly, both do a disservice to the rest of mankind and themselves by not taking Marx's own thoughts seriously and, hence, by not acquiring some further insight into how man can become the noble being both they and Marx would have rejoiced to see man become.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Money and Alienated Man," pp. 272, 273.

[2]See "Money and Alienated Man," p. 269.

[3]See "Free Human Production," p. 279.

[4]Ibid., p. 278.

[5]Ibid., p. 278.

[6]Ibid., p. 278. See also "Money and Alienated Man," p. 275.

[7]"Money and Alienated Man," p. 275ff.

[8]As we shall later see, Marx did not think that labor which was "fulfilling" or which was the "self-realization of the individual" was necessarily fun or pleasureable.

[9]"Free Human Production," p. 278.

[10]See, for example, Ibid., pp. 277ff.

[11]"Alienated Labor," p. 275.

[12]"Private Property and Communism," p. 305.

[13]Ibid., p. 308.

[14]The German Ideology, Writings of the Young Marx . . . ," p. 429.

[15]Ibid., pp. 426-427.

[16]"Private Property and Communism," pp. 303-304.

[17]See Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1969), pp. 88-103. Also see Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, pp. 136ff.

[18]The Making Of . . . , p. 94.

[19]"Alienated Labor," pp. 297, 298.

[20]pp. 424, 425.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., p. 457.

[23]Schriften Bis 1844, p. 476.

[24]Ibid., pp. 471, 472.

[25]"Money and Alienated Man," pp. 275, 276.

[26]See "Wages," Schriften Bis 1844, pp. 471-481.

[27]Ibid., pp. 471, 472.

[28]"Commentary on Bruno Bauer's 'The Capacity of Present Day Jews and Christians to Become Free,'" Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. L. Easton and K. Guddat (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 248.

[29]p. 266.

[30]Although this may strike us as a strange idea, it was apparently seriously considered during Marx's time, for example, by the followers of Saint Simon. See "Money and Alienated Man," p. 269.

[31]"Money and Alienated Man," p. 269.

[32]"Money" in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx's Concept of Man, ed. E. Fromm and trans. T. B. Bottomore, p. 164.

[33]Ibid., p. 165.

[34]pp. 167ff.

[35]The Critique of the Gotha Program, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 325.

[36]Philosophy and . . . , pp. 136-137.

[37]It is clear that Marx thought that they would not occur in a communist society. Even for certain features which seem to be necessary for a modern society, Marx seems to have thought they would not exist in a communist society. This is apparently so, for example, for the division of labor. See the above quotation on p. 89 from The German Ideology.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It is now necessary to look back from a broader perspective to see what has been gained by the preceeding analysis. As a means of doing this, I shall first discuss the significance of the preceeding for defining the concept of alienation. Secondly, I shall explain the role or function of the concept in Marx's thought in general. Thirdly, I shall point out some of the implications of the analysis of the causes of alienation presented in Chapter IV. Finally, throughout this conclusion I shall indicate those problems with the concept of alienation which Marxist oriented social philosophers, especially those who base their efforts on the early writings, must attempt to resolve in order to have a coherent social philosophy. I shall not propose any solutions to these problems, although I shall comment on some possible sorts of solutions or responses to these problems. This should not be thought of as implying that I do not have my own opinions as to how these problems could be resolved. Rather, the limitations of this dissertation rule out such an attempt.

The following is a brief statement of the principal points to be emphasized in this conclusion. First, there is a great deal of unclarity in Marx's explanation of the concept of alienation. Because of this, a simple, single definition of the concept which is faithful to all of Marx's uses of the concept cannot be given. An understanding of the concept of alienation, however, is indispensable for understanding Marx's thought in general. The concept furnishes the normative or ethical basis for Marx's views. In particular, the concept implies a very definite conception of the authentic man, an ideal of what men ought to be like. No attempts, however, are made in the early writings at justifying this ideal, and this problem must be confronted by contemporary Marxist social philosophers. Finally, on the basis of the early writings, there are good reasons for doubting that the abolition of private property and the establishment of communism would be either a necessary or sufficient condition for eliminating certain aspects of alienation, and, hence, for producing men who are "truly human." Marxists, then, must also reopen the case of the relative merits of communism over capitalism with regard to the goal of eliminating alienation. Let us now briefly review the basis of these conclusions.

First let us consider some of the insights gained with regard to the problem of defining "alienation." We have seen that Marx uses "alienation" and "externalization" in both a non-pejorative, non-evaluative sense and in a

pejorative, evaluative sense. As we shall shortly see, this pejorative use of the term is significant in that it points to the function of the concept of alienation in Marx's thought in general.

In addition, it was also shown that if we consider the various aspects of alienation presented by Marx, we see that the sorts of things one is said to be alienated from are quite different. For some of these foci of alienation, such as the activity of labor, the object of labor, and other persons, "alienation" refers to the fact that the worker felt a certain way toward them. For other of these foci, such as one's species-being, one's senses, and one's needs, alienation does not involve one's feeling any particular way toward them, nor was this Marx's point in claiming that men were alienated from these sorts of things. Rather, for these aspects, "alienation" is being used normatively, to indicate that man's activities, his senses, and his needs were not as they ought to be. Thus, it is clear that "alienation" is used quite differently when Marx speaks of the various aspects of alienated labor.

Furthermore, for Marx's explanation of alienation, we saw that it is not possible to distinguish alienating conditions from alienation itself and to limit "alienation" to refer to one's feelings or subjective experience. Using the distinction between pejorative and non-pejorative uses of the term, it was shown that for the pejorative sense, the type of alienation one wishes to eliminate, Marx explains

alienation in both phenomenological and non-phenomenological terms. Some terms have a purely phenomenological or subjective reference; others, a purely non-phenomenological or objective reference; and other terms have both a phenomenological and non-phenomenological reference. Thus, Marx himself does not clearly separate subjective from objective features when discussing alienation, and, hence, one cannot in this way neatly distinguish alienating conditions from alienation itself.

Finally, in the discussion of human needs, it was suggested that there is some slight evidence for arguing that Marx would have agreed that one cannot take as a sufficient condition for being unalienated that one is content or satisfied with his lot.

On the basis of these claims, then, it can be concluded that a simple and straightforward, single definition of "alienation" which covers all of the ways in which the term is used in the early writings cannot be given.

Thus, those authors who attempt to give such definitions are bound to omit certain important elements contained in Marx's concept of alienation. In addition, the point that one cannot rely solely upon a subjective criterion of alienation implies that such studies as Robert Blauner's Alienation and Freedom, in which one examines worker's reports on their feelings are of limited significance. Although such reports would be relevant in deciding whether one was unalienated, or to what degree, they could not be

taken as conclusive--assuming that one accepts the above point.

For all of these reasons, I have not attempted to give a definition of "alienation" but have tried to "characterize" Marx's concept of alienation by concentrating on alienation from one's self. This characterization centers around several themes which pervade Marx's discussion of alienation throughout his early writings. These themes refer primarily to features of the worker's situation in bourgeois society and are features which Marx clearly condemns. They are man's being powerless; his experiencing of himself as being governed by external forces; his being degraded, especially in the sense that his physical needs were not satisfied even to a minimal level; and the theme of not having fulfilled his potential for satisfying his needs and developing his talents.

We have further seen that these same themes are present in Marx's analysis of religion as an expression of man's self-alienation and that, hence, this analysis of religion served as the <u>model</u> for Marx's analysis of alienated labor.

It is important to note, then, that the concept of alienation functions both descriptively and normatively in the early writings. Not only does Marx use the term to refer to subjective and objective aspects of certain conditions and actions or style of life, he also uses "alienation" to confer disapproval or condemnation upon

these conditions, actions, or style of life. To say that the worker is alienated from his labor would function descriptively by referring to such facts as the worker feeling discontented and enslaved; to his poverty; to his lack of control over the conditions of work; etc.. To say that one was alienated from others would refer, in its descriptive function, to the fact that one treated others primarily as a means to promote one's own ends, rather than treating them as ends in themselves. The term has a similar descriptive function for the other aspects of alieantion also. Yet, the concept also functions normatively in these cases in that it is clear that these conditions or ways of living are disapproved of by Marx. They are not as they ought to be.

The importance of the normative function of the concept of alienation cannot be overemphasized. It is significant for several reasons. In general, it indicates the role of the concept in Marx's thought--to provide the ethical basis of his theory and, in particular, to provide the ethical justification of communism.

The concept of alienation, upon investigation, yields a very definite ideal or moral conception of what men ought to be like. As we saw in Chapter I, common to Marx's statements on what distinguishes man from animals is the view that man is capable of acting consciously and purposively to satisfy his needs. As suggested, this view becomes incorporated into Marx's conception of what man ought to be. Thus, we can say, first, that a necessary

condition for being a "truly human" man is that one rationally direct his or her activities in order to satisfy one's needs. But this in itself is not enough. One of the most prominent criticism that Marx makes of capitalist society is that it makes men powerless; it subjects them to forces over which they have no or little control. Thus, the "truly human" must be a self-determined man. He must actually be free to direct his own life, and he must experience himself as a free being.

On the basis of these characteristics, we can say that the authentic man is self-interested--in the sense that he is concerned about satisfying his needs. Yet, he is not self-interested in the sense that he uses others, to the detriment of their needs, to satisfy his own needs. The authentic man will not only be motivated by physical needs, but he will also have certain human needs. The human needs which are most evident in the early writings are the need for the expression of one's individuality, particularly in one's labor, and the need to treat others as ends rather than as means. As we have seen, Marx thought that in neglecting or not having such needs, one was not "truly human." Finally, such a person will not be driven by the desire to accumulate wealth.

In laboring and generally in his relationship to the world, the authentic man will be governed by a sense of beauty. In his labor, he will create according to a standard of beauty, and he will be sensitive to the beauty

of his surroundings. In particular, when he looks at objects he will not see them in terms of their monetary worth. His labor, at the same time, will be an expression of his individuality, an activity which gives him satisfaction and fulfillment; it will satisfy the needs of others; and will be done according to a standard of beauty. His physical needs will be satisfied, and he will labor freely and joyfully for the pleasure intrinsic to the activity itself.[1]

Given these requirements, the stereotypical model of a community of artists or craftsmen has been suggested as most clearly illustrating this ideal. The products of labor of such artists and craftsmen would express their individuality; they would be laboring according to an aesthetic standard; and the product of their labor would, presumably, be pleasing to the other artists or craftsmen in the community.[2]

Another important characteristic of the "truly human" man which is related to the ideal of the "self-realization of the individual" is that of fully developing one's talents or abilities. This ideal furnished the basis of Marx's denunciations of both types of division of labor as making men "one-sided." Marx especially criticized the division of labor within manufacturing because it forced men to develop simple physical skills while preventing the development of any sort of intellectual activity. He describes such men as "crippled monstrosities." This ideal of

developing both mind and body is evident throughout Marx's early works, particularly in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. For example, in "Wages," he asserts that the workers must be "able to be employed mentally and enjoy mental activities."[3] As we have already seen, in The German Ideology, Marx states that in a communist society "nobody has an exclusive area of activity and each can train himself in any branch he wishes."[4]

This ideal of the "truly human" man is of further significance in that it implies a certain vision of society. This ideal of society is not, however, systematically presented in the early writings, nor, for that matter, in Marx's subsequent works. I shall indicate only those features which are directly implied by the conception of the "truly human" man sketched above and which are suggested in the early writings. The basic characteristics of this ideal were to remain largely unchanged throughout Marx's life.

First, it is clear that Marx sets as a prerequisite for being able to treat others as ends and for engaging in labor that is the "self-satisfaction and the realization of (one's) natural dispositions and spiritual aims," the satisfaction of such physical needs as the need for food, clothing, shelter, etc.. It should be noted that this requirement rules out any interpretation of Marx which proposes a return to some sort of primitive or peasant economy. The satisfaction of these needs necessitates that

this society be based upon an advanced industrial economy.

Secondly, in this society there would be no rigid social division of labor nor a sharp division of labor within tasks. One's labor would allow for the development of both mental and physical abilities. The satisfaction of one's needs and the development of one's talents would not be dependent upon one's position in the social division of labor nor upon how much money one possessed. In this society there would not be the unjust situation of allowing one group of people's needs, physical or human, to go unfulfilled and talents undeveloped while another group utilizes the resources of society to indulge their whims and caprices and tries to develop non-existent talents.

Furthermore, the economic and political institutions of the society must be rationally controlled in order to satisfy man's needs. There could be, for example, no fluctuations of the economy which cause men to live in insecurity and to cause an ever increasing number to sink into poverty. There could, in particular, be no political institutions which promote the needs of one group at the expense of another. Finally, in this ideal society, there must be an end to those institutions which cause self-interest and acquisitiveness.

Such, then, is Marx's conception of the unalienated man and the society in which this being would live and flourish. To be sure, there are some difficulties with these ideals. The ideal of society, in particular, suffers

from a lack of precision and even seems to contain certain contradictory elements. A discussion of these deficiencies cannot be gone into here, although some of these problems will be commented on shortly.

An awareness of the normative function of the concept of alienation, then, is of fundamental significance in understanding Marx's thought. The concept provides the normative standard by which Marx measures and condemns capitalism and on the basis of which he prescribes and advocates the establishment of communism. The justification of communism, as it is presented in the early writings, is that it will produce men who are "truly human," men who are as they ought to be. The content of this ideal is provided by taking the opposite of those conditions or that style of life, both in phenomenological and non-phenomenological terms, which are referred to by "alienation."[5]

Finally, the normative function of the concept of alienation is significant in light of the pretensions of Marxists that theirs is a value-free science or, as Marx put it, "Communists preach no morality."[6] It is not relevant here to go into the traditional justifications for this claim, but suffice it to say that from the preceeding, it is obvious that there is a very definite <u>moral</u> conception of what man ought to be like contained in the early writings. It is clear that in advocating the overthrow of capitalism and the instituting of communism, that Marx and Marxists are committing themselves to the belief that such a new society would be morally superior to the old.

In the early writings, as in the later writings, one does not find Marx using such obvious ethical predicates as "right" and "wrong" and "good" and "bad." The ethical basis or ideal of what men should be is concealed by such prima facie value-free expressions such as "truly human," "human nature," "man's species-being," etc.. As stated by Eugene Kamenka in his Marxism and Ethics, however, "To say that man in his present state is not 'truly human' is not to make a logical point but to make a moral one, to set up moral criteria of humanity that do not follow from the mere use or meaning of the word 'man.'"[7] To repeat, the specific content of this moral criterion of humanity is gotten by taking the opposite of those subjective and objective conditions and aspects of a style of life which Marx refers to as "alienated." Thus, not only even but especially do Communists "preach morality"--although in a somewhat disguised form.

This brings us to one of the major gaps which exists not only in Marx's thought but also in Marxist social philosophy in general--the lack of a justification for Marx's conception of the authentic man. That is, in the early writings there are no reasons given as to why we should accept this conception of what men ought to be like.

For example, consider the sorts of activities which Marx apparently considered one would engage in if he were allowed to satisfy his human needs, in particular, the need for the "self-realization of his individuality."

The style of life depicted is, interestingly enough, that of a bourgeois intellectual. In criticizing political economy, Marx states that, for the worker, the principal thesis of political economy is:

> . . . the renunciation of life and of human needs. The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc. the more you will be able to save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt--your capital. The less you are, the less you express your life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life. . . . 8

It is noteworthy that most of the activities cited here are ones characteristic of the life-style of an upper middle-class intellectual, e.g. buying books, going to the theatre, theorizing, singing, painting, and fencing. Marx's own class origins seem to be clearly reflected in this choice of activities as expressions of human needs. At any rate, the main point of the passage is to commend a style of life centering around activity and the expression of one's personality through a variety of interests and abilities.

The same problem exists on the level of needs in that in the early writings there is no attempt made to justify the belief that the "truly human" man ought to have those human needs referred to by Marx rather than other sorts of needs.

As Kamenka ably illustrates in Marxism and Ethics, this is a defficiency which Marxists since Marx's time have not seriously attempted to resolve.[9] Until such a justifi-

cation is given, however, one must consider the Marxist critique of capitalism and prescription of communism incomplete. Such an attempt at providing a justification for these normative claims must, in particular, be made by those contemporary social philosophers, such as Herbert Marcuse and Robert P. Wolff, who utilize concepts similar to that of human needs as a basis for their criticisms of advanced industrial societies. This is one of the most important and necessary tasks which confront these men in their role as philosophers.[10]

Although it is not possible to here even suggest such a justification of this conception of what men ought to be like, I would like to briefly comment on the two possible sorts of justification which one could plausibly attribute to Marx. The first sort of justification would consist of interpreting Marx as grounding his conception of the unalienated man in some sort of intuitive or natural law morality. This would be, then, an a priori sort of justification. The principal reason against taking this approach is Marx's firm commitment to empiricism, to avoid anything that smacks of metaphysics. Sidney Hook for this reason refers to such an interpretation as "a piece of obscurantist legerdemain."[11] Before hastily dismissing this view, however, it should be noted that Kamenka's analysis of the ethical basis of Marx's thought just prior to the writing of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts suggests that Marx's ethics did in fact at this time, have a natural

law or *a priori* basis.[12] Marxists today, however, would certainly attempt to avoid giving an *a priori* foundation to Marx's conception of the authentic man. Instead, in their desire to be "scientific," they would probably turn to the other possible sort of justification.

This second justification is one that accords well with Marx's desire to be empirical, to ground things in matters of fact rather than speculation. Thus, the conception of what man ought to be like is justified on the grounds that living up to this ideal will make men happier--in the long run if not the short.

If, however, we consider this justification on the level of needs, it could be objected that there is no difference in happiness produced as long as the needs one has are satisfied, regardless as to whether these are Marx's human needs or not. A reply to this objection, on the other hand, might be in terms of Mill's distinction between qualities of pleasure. That is, Marxists could argue that the satisfaction of human needs produces a higher type or quality of happiness than the satisfaction of other needs, especially those needs men presently have. This reply, however, opens one up to all the well-known difficulties which plague Mill's distinction. In particular, there is the risk of winding up in the precarious position of elitism, with claiming that one group of people knows what will make others truly happy.

Before leaving the general issue of the normative aspects of the concept of alienation, it should be noticed

that the fact that this account of alienation, or at least alienation from one's self, does not take man's existing needs and wants as a starting point may be viewed as distinguishing a Marxist critique of society from a critique given from the perspective of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, at least Bentham's version, would judge society on the basis of whether or not it was satisfying man's existing needs and wants. From the Marxist view, these needs and wants may not be as they ought to be, and, hence, deserve to be changed. With regard to this point, Kamenka asserts that:

> . . . utilitarianism takes the desires and expectations of man at any given moment as ultimate; Marx's morality seeks to transform and 'enrich' his wants, to increase his expectations, to prevent him from finding 'happiness' by tailoring his demands to his satisfactions, by learning to like what he gets. Utilitarianism works within a given social and political system and criticises it only where it fails to satisfy demands expressed within the system; Marxian humanism is prepared to transcend the system, to criticise the system itself for the wants and demands it creates.13

Antoher problem with Marx's explanation of alienation is the ambiguity of Marx's notion of freedom. Some comments have already been made on the issue of in what sense Marx thought men were powerless, yet given the importance of this concept in Marx's treatment of alienation, the concept of freedom must be made much clearer than it is.

Although, again, a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a few comments are in order. It is clear that by "free" Marx cannot mean that one's ideas and actions are independent of one's surroundings

or condition in life. If this is what is meant by "freedom," then, given Marx's determinism, no one would be free, and, hence, to this extent, alienation would be a permanent condition. In addition, the fact that one cannot accept one's feelings as a guarantee of being unalienated implies that Marx cannot rely solely upon a subjective criterion of freedom.

It is apparent that Marx meant to include the notion of political liberty in his concept of freedom, yet his view of freedom is a much broader and richer notion than this. In accordance with Marx's Enlightment conception of man, the free man would also be one who did not bow down to to authority and uncritically submit to tradition, but he would be guided by his own critical rationality. He would not, for example, be subject to such an illusion as Christianity. In addition, in several places Marx suggests that the free man would not be subject to "natural necessity." That is, his life would not be devoted to and consumed by the attempt to satisfy his physical needs. Thus, the free man would have these needs satisfied and would be able to spend his time satisfying such human needs as the need for self-realization.

Despite the fact, however, that one can say this much about Marx's concept of freedom, Marxist social philosophers must, first, endeavor to make the notion much more precise than it is in Marx's early writings. Secondly, they must confront the issue as to whether or not Marx's concept of freedom is consistent with his committment to determinism.

We must finally consider the implications and significance of the analysis of Marx's treatment of the causes of alienation which was given in Chapter IV.

The principal significance of this analysis is that on the basis of it, it is difficult to justify the belief that communism is the means and the only means whereby "truly human" men can be created. That is, as a result of this analysis, serious doubts can be raised, on theoretical grounds, about the traditional Marxist contention that the establishment of communism is both a necessary and sufficient condition for ending alienation and producing "truly human" men.

As we have seen, a close examination of Marx's early writings shows that despite the fact that Marx in several places speaks as though abolishing private property is sufficient to end alienation, what he says elsewhere casts doubt upon this assertion. There are two principal reasons for claiming this. First, his brief but explicit indication in "Private Property and Communism" that there are different possible types of societies in which there is no private property but in which alienation still exists, clearly indicates that the abolition of private property is not sufficient in itself to end alienation or certain of its aspects. Secondly, and consistent with these observations of Marx's, Marx also presents other conditions or instiutions besides private property as sufficient conditions of alienation or its aspects. Thus, even

if private property were eliminated, as long as these features existed, alienation would exist.

Clearly, then, it is not sufficient--if we are to go by the early writings--for Marxists to rely solely on the abolition of private property as a panacea for alienation. To be faithful to these writings, Marxists should have a much more radical and thoroughgoing programme than they traditionally have had.

Besides implying that abolishing private property is not sufficient to end alienation, the identification of these other features as causes of alienation creates another difficulty for the traditional view that communism is the means whereby alienation can and will be eliminated. This difficulty, as has been suggested, is that it seems that some of these other sufficient conditions will be necessary to any communist society which could exist now or in the near future. This is especially so for such conditions as the division of labor within tasks and the use of money. In fact, for the division of labor, this point is brought into even sharper focus if one remembers that in the sketch of the ideal society envisioned by Marx, a necessary feature was the satisfaction of the populace's physical needs. Such a requirement could only be met by a highly developed economy. This sort of economy, however, would seem to bring with it a considerable degree of division of labor and, to this extent, alienation. The reply to this objection that advancing technology holds out the

promise of reducing this sort of division of labor is a good one, although it has the double-edge of suggesting that such a reduction in the division of labor could also occur in a capitalist society. This brings us, however, to the point where the view that communism is the only means whereby alienation can be eliminated must be questioned.

It is not infrequent to find apologists of capitalism agreeing that, indeed, Marx was justified in criticising the bourgeois society of his time. They will even often agree that many of the conditions which Marx condemns are, to be sure, sufficient conditions of alienation. The ploy here, however, is to then continue with the observation of how things have changed since Marx's time and how they can further change within a capitalist structure. Thus, in effect, it is argued that those other specific conditions which Marx considered as sufficient conditions are not inherent in capitalism, and, hence, the claim that communism is necessary to end alienation is vigorously denied.

There are several conditions which Marx considered, either explicitly or implicitly, as causes of alienation or its aspects which defenders of capitalism argue have been greatly mitigated since Marx's time and which are possible to largely eliminate in the forseeable future within a capitalist structure. For example, a frequently mentioned change is the great improvement in the conditions of labor. Not only has there occurred such things as the shortening of the work day and the end of child labor, but the worker generally has much more control over other

conditions of labor, such as the payment of wages, installation of safety features, safeguards against arbitrary dismissal, etc.. In addition, as a study done by Robert Blauner indicates, the degree to which a sharp division of labor exists in American industry varies considerably with only a small minority of blue-collar workers laboring under conditions which even remotely resemble those Marx condemned. Blauner's work also provides concrete evidence that increasing technology can greatly decrease the present division of labor for many industries, thus further freeing the worker from the machine.

Secondly, it is argued that with the development of Keynesian economic theory and techniques, a capitalist economy is no longer as subject to cycles of boom and bust as previously, and that such fluctuations as do exist can be, at least theoretically, further reduced.

Finally, to name just one more example, defenders of capitalism argue that a great deal of progress has been made toward the goal of the satisfaction of the physical needs of the general populace and that soon, such poverty as does exist will also have disappeared--and all will have occurred within a system based on private property.

Now, obviously these claims raise many complex issues and deserve much debate. An analysis of these claims, however, cannot be entered into here. The important general point to consider is that it cannot be denied that conditions have improved in many ways since Marx's time and that this

gives a certain annoying amount of credibility and impetus to the claim that the establishment of communism is not necessary to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, certain aspects of alienation.

Thus, on the basis of the above, another of the important tasks which Marxist social philosophers must undertake is that of showing, first, why those features which are cited as causes of alienation within capitalism will either not occur in communism or, if they do occur, will not produce alienation. Secondly, what also needs to be shown, given the fact that many conditions which Marx criticized have already improved within bourgeois society, is why communism is to be preferred to capitalism. There needs to be an effort by Marxists to answer, for example, the question of whether or not there are certain causes of alienation which capitalism cannot eliminate--perhaps self-interest and acquisitiveness--which communism can. An example of a fruitful direction this task might take is an examination of the Yugoslav experiment with worker's councils as a promising means of giving the workers a measure of control over their labor which seems to be impossible to achieve within a system based on private ownership of the means of production.

This problem of justifying the relative merits of the two economic systems is even more difficult given the fact that there seem to be causes of alienation, taking the themes mentioned as characteristic of self-alienation,

which exist today in certain socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, which were not emphasized or anticipated in Marx's early writings. For example, the centralized planning instituted in the Soviet Union to establish rational control over the economy certainly makes the worker as subject to the control of "social demand" as his counterpart in capitalist society. Similarly, a repressive and bureaucratic state has greatly restricted the people's "self-determination" and ability to express their individuality in their activities. Furthermore, as Milovan Djilas indicates in The New Class there exists in the Soviet Union a pernicious social division of labor which enables the state officials and bureaucrats to satisfy their needs to a much higher level than the general populace and at the expense of the populace. The source of the control of this "new class", according to Djilas, is not ownership of the means of production but the "administrative monopoly" they hold.[14]

Now, to be fair, some of these conditions are said by Marxists to be temporary and explained as either necessary for the transition to the truly socialist state or as a part of a response to the threats against the survival of the Soviet Union by capitalist countries. Nevertheless, the problem still remains, even if we accept the legitimacy of these arguments, of demonstrating those advantages which communism has, at least in the long run if not the short, in eliminating alienation which capitalism does not and cannot have. Thus, in light of the above, Marxist social

theorists must once more confront the problem of justifying communism as the best or only way of producing a "truly human" society.

My own opinion in this matter is that what Marxists should do is to concede that capitalism has done much and can do a great deal more toward eliminating such apparent causes of alienation as the worker's lack of control over the conditions of labor, the fluctuations of the economy, etc.. One direction which I would, in particular, pursue is that suggested by the Marxist view of the state as representing the interests of the class in power. Thus, in criticising capitalist society, I would emphasize the effect of powerful economic interests, made possible by private ownership of the means of production, on the political and social institutions. I would stress the notion of how various aspects of society are <u>controlled</u> in order to promote these economic interests. Thus, the point would not be whether or not things have improved, but, first, whether or not they have improved as quickly, efficiently, and as justly as they could have. Most important of all, I would pursue the point of <u>who</u> has controlled the direction in which things have changed. I would try to see who benefited and how. Such an attempt would require, first, identifying these economic interests; secondly, showing their effect upon social and political policy; and thirdly, would involve indicating the various means, often quite subtle, by which this control is exercised.

To conclude, then, at the beginning of this dissertation, it was indicated that there has been a great interest in the early writings of Marx since their publication in English. In particular, many contemporary social philosophers and critics have attempted to incorporate Marx's ideas on alienation into a coherent social philosophy. It was pointed out, however, that most of the efforts inspired by Marx's early works, especially the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, merely quote or paraphrase Marx without bothering to closely examine what he has said.

This approach is unfortunate in that it does not separate the chaff from the wheat--the clear from the ambiguous and the plausible from the implausible--in the early writings. Such efforts are bound to be constructed on shaky foundations. In addition, given the importance of Marx's claims, it is outrageous that the authors of these efforts have not taken Marx's views on alienation more seriously than they have. But perhaps these attempts are most lamentable in that they do little to contribute to our understanding of Marx and of the phenomenon of alienation.

Thus, it was propsed that what was needed was an analytic clarification of Marx's treatment of alienation. Such a clarification I have attempted to give in this dissertation.

I have shown that much that Marx says about alienation, with regard to its nature and causes, is vague and ambiguous. In addition, certain important claims were seen to be un-

explained, others were seen to be implausible, and others were shown to be based on unexamined assumptions. Not only have these weakness been indicated, but I have considered ways in which some of these difficulties might be overcome, while also pointing out the problems with these rescuing attempts. I have also attempted to explain certain obscure concepts which were basic to understanding Marx's thought. Furthermore, where relevant for understanding certain of Marx's views, I have tried to place his thought in the proper historical context. Finally, in this conclusion, I have attempted to place the preceeding analysis in a broader perspective by, first, summarizing and emphasizing the principal insights which were gained and, secondly, by indicating the significance and problematic implications of these points.

As suggested in the Introduction it is hoped that this analysis of Marx's concept of alienation as it is presented in the early writings will now serve as a sound starting point for, first, a consideration of whether or not Marx abandons the concept of alienation in his later works. My own opinion is that the concept is very much evident throughout Marx's works. Similarly, this dissertation should enable us to now clearly assess the relationship between Marx's concept of alienation and contemporary views of alienation. We shall then be in a position to decide whether or not Marx's remedy for alienation offers us a means for ending our own alienation. Again, my own opinion is that it does.

As a final word, it could be fairly said that the general tenor or thrust of this dissertation has been to point out the difficulties and problems with Marx's treatment of alienation. This seems to me, however, a task which is not to be denigrated or avoided. On the contrary, it is only through such a process that one can come to understand, assess, and appreciate Marx's thought. In addition, in so far as such stirring of the waters provokes those who have uncritically attached themselves to Marx's presentation of alienation to reexamine the soundness of his and their position, I shall be pleased to have played the honorable role of a gadfly.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This should not be taken as suggesting that fulfilling labor will always be fun or pleasureable. In a passage in the Grundrisse in which Marx criticizes Adam Smith's view of labor as a "curse," he admits that to say that labor is "the self-realization of the individual" does not mean that "it becomes mere fun, mere amusement." He observes that "Truly free labor, e.g. composition, is damned serious at the same time, it is the most intensive exertion." (Quoted in E. Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism (Frederick Praeger: New York, 1962), p. 149.)

[2]Eugene Kamenka's chapter on "Ethics and the 'Truly Human' Society" in The Ethical Foundations of Marxism contains a discussion of the inadequacies of this model. See pp. 113f.

[3]Marx Engels Werke, Schriften Bis 1844, p. 479.

[4]The German Ideology in Writings of the Young Marx, p. 425.

This ideal also persists in Capital. See Capital, vol. I, trans. by S. Moore and E. Aveling (International Publishers: New York, 1967), pp. 232, 264, 339, 360, 484, 487, 592, 645.

[5]The failure to see that the concept of alienation contains a very definite moral conception of what men ought to be like has led one well-known critic, Sidney Hook, astray. In his new introduction to From Hegel to Marx, Hook argues that ". . . the notion of human alienation--except for the sociological meaning it has in Capital--is actually foreign to Marx's conception of man." (p. 6). The basis of Hook's critcisms is that in order for Marx to speak of self-alienation, he must presuppose an ideal or standard of what man should be. Although not explicitly stated, Hook's first criticism is that there is no such ideal in Marx's early writings. His second criticism is that the attempt to propose such an ideal cannot be justified as it is inconsistent with Marx's conception of man's nature as continually changing. It is clear from the preceeding that Hook's first criticism is erroneous. There is a very definite conception of what man ought to be like contained in the early writings. Hook's second criticism, however, is more serious. Some comments on the problem of justifying Marx's conception of the "truly human" man will be made shortly. See Hook's From Hegel to Marx (The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1968), pp. 3-9.

[6]Quoted in Eugene Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics (Macmillan: London, 1969), p. 5.

[7]p. 25.

[8]"Needs, Production, and Division of Labor," p. 144.

[9]See pp. 44-67 in particular.

[10]The categories which Marcuse uses are "true needs" and "false needs." For Wolff, it is "real needs" and "felt needs." Since one is speaking of needs here, it might be thought that it is an empirical issue to decide what one's human or true or real needs are. In actuality, the issue is a normative one. This mode of expression is a subtle way of presenting one's conception of how people ought to live. Treating these concepts as referring to an empirical matter conveniently serves to excuse those who use them from justifying their moral committments. It allows them to "get off the hook."

[11]From Hegel to Marx, p. 7.

[12]The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, pp. 32-36.

[13]Marxism and Ethics, p. 22.

[14]Milovan Djilas, The New Class (Frederick Praeger: New York, 1968), p. 39.

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