72-4141

LEE, Changsoo, 1931-
THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN MINORITY IN JAPAN.

University of Maryland, Ph.D., 1971
Political Science, international law and relations

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THE POLITICS OF THE KOREAN MINORITY IN JAPAN

by

Changsoo Lee

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
1971

APPROVAL SHEET

Title of Thesis: The Politics of the Korean Minority in Japan

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Doctor of Philosophy, 1971

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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: The Politics of the Korean Minority in Japan

Changsoo Lee, Doctor of Philosophy, 1971

Thesis directed by: Professor Theodore McNelly

Whenever a society includes a group of people who manifest characteristics which differ from the majority of that society, a minority problem seems to be an inevitable outcome. Especially in a society where a vast majority of the people consider themselves being ethnically organized as a homogeneous national state, the presence of a national minority tends to create even more of an acute problem. It appears that Japan with its Korean minority falls under this category. Perhaps, the notable difference between the status of the Korean minority in Japan and major minority groups in other countries is that the Korean minority in Japan is legally regarded as alien, as is not the case in other countries.

The underlying assumption in this study is that the group is the basic unit of society. However, this study is not concerned with testing the validity of the group theory. Because the Korean minority group does not seem to fit neatly into the nature of "group" conceived by many group

theorists. In the first place, the Koreans in Japan are neither legitimate members of that society nor are they endowed with the right of political participation, which would enable them to process their demands and support in the Japanese political system.

However, this study has found that the Japanese people in general seem to show little temperment to accommodate the presence of the Korean minority in the Japanese society. Two persistent patterns of the Japanese government policy loom large: one is to reduce the number of Koreans through repatriation and the other is to compell Koreans to conform and assimilate into the Japanese norms. As to the latter policy, the Mindan members are more amenable to it, while the Chōsōren has shown firm determination to safeguard its own ethnic identity and culture. Since the Mindan has offered neither a cohesive ideological force nor a strong leadership to tie its members together, they are likely to turn to their immediate surroundings for adaptation to secure a feeling of attachment and of belonging to a majority.

Whereas the Chōsōren has demonstrated its capability of offering a monolithic answer to the problems of cohesion and unity to protect its interest but chiefly through complete and firm control of its members. The Chōsōren has often used effective technique of combining legal with illegal work, legal with illegal organizations to secure

their rights and to protect their interests in close collaboration with the Japanese Communist Party and Socialists.

PREFACE

Whenever a society includes a group of people who manifest characteristics which differ from the majority of that society, a minority problem seems to be an inevitable outcome. The examples are legion: the Negroes in the United States, the Jews in Europe, the Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Especially in a society where a vast majority of the people consider themselves to be ethnically organized as a homogeneous national state, the presence of a national minority tends to create even more acute problems. It appears that Japan with its Korean minority falls under this category.

During the closing years of World War II, there were approximately two million Koreans in Japan. The present six hundred thousand Koreans are largely the remnants, including descendants, of the conscripted labor forces mobilized by Japan. They have firmly established their domicile ever since. A recent demographic analysis seems to indicate that many of the Koreans are now a second generation. However, a considerable number of them live on a bare subsistence level and are mainly concentrated in the Korean ghettos, being socially alienated from the mainstream of the affluent Japanese society. The poverty-stricken Korean ghettos, often found in the populated

metropolitan areas, are generally viewed by many Japanese as a seedbed of all sorts of social evils, for the rate of crime and unemployment is very high among them.

The presence of the two Koreas has presented a complicated diplomatic dilemma for Japan. The South and the North each insists that it alone represents the legal government of all Korea, hence each claims itself as the sole spokesman for the Koreans in Japan. Consequently, the Koreans' allegiance is divided between the two sovereign entities and the question of nationality for the Koreans has become a perplexing legal problem. Although their legal status is specified in the agreement accompanied by the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty of 1965, a majority of Koreans are not overly enthusiastic, charging that the laws are not primarily designed to protect their rights of permanent domicile, but for facilitating the process of deportation.

There are two major organizations, Mindan and Chōsōren, opposed ideologically as are their respective home governments, allegedly representing Koreans' interests in Japan. Especially the Chōsōren is a highly disciplined left-wing organization mainly financed by the North Korean regime, as well as maintaining close ties with the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialists. Each organization has its own followers and programs maintaining its own educational system, cooperatives, credit unions and other voluntary associations to articulate their interests. The two organizations have often clashed with each other, frequently

leading to bloodshed, for hegemony over Koreans in Japan.

Since the end of the War, the Japanese government policy has generally been twofold: either a complete assimilation by naturalization or repatriation. The former deals with so complicated legal procedures that only few Koreans are qualified to it. Consequently, the latter policy appears to be more conspicuous than the former. The Repatriation Agreement of 1959, signed between North Korea and Japan was a manifestation of this policy. Since then, about one hundred thousand Koreans have been repatriated to North Korea. On the other hand, South Korea did not seem to have formulated until 1965, any substantive policy to extend diplomatic protection to its own nationals in Japan.

Even today the future of the Koreans in Japan is still uncertain. The traditional Japanese dislike for Koreans remains very strong, and their presence is not wholeheartedly welcomed by the host country. Nevertheless the six hundred thousand Koreans in Japan are firmly determined to stay by establishing permanent domicile there. The voices of Koreans in Japan are neither reflected in the Japanese political system, nor provided for adequately in the two Koreas.

Regarding the existing literature on the subject matter, two books are worth noting here. These are written by historians under the same title: <u>The Korean Minority in</u>

Japan, one by Edward W. Wagner and the other by Richard H. Mitchell. Wagner's study is a pioneering work published in 1951, in a form of monograph covering the Korean problem from the period of 1904 to 1950. Whereas Mitchell's work published in 1967, seems to be an attempt to substantiate Wagner's work and to bring the study up to date. However, Mitchell's effort falls short, adding little more than what Wagner had already offered. One may note in Mitchell's book that only 68 pages are devoted to the postwar era out of his entire 168-page work with emphasis on the historical development of the Korean minority in Japan. Nevertheless, both Wagner and Mitchell's works inspired me to look into the matter from the political perspective especially after the postwar era.

This study is focused on Koreans' political process in Japan as well as the kinds of structures, which perform interest articulation and methods and channels through which their demands are aggregated. The topic is studied through the examination of the two rival organizations and their relationships with the Japanese political system and with their home governments. It is hoped that this study has accomplished at least two things: (1) to present a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the political activities of Koreans in Japan, and (2) to draw some tentative propositions on the present and future prospects of the Korean minority group in Japan.

An underlying assumption in this study is that the group is the basic unit of society. The concept of "group" which has special relevance to this study derived largely from Arthur Bentley and David Trumen.[1] As Bentley puts it, "the society itself is nothing other than complex of groups that compose it."[2] The total fabric of a social system can be best understood as a sort of "mosaic of groups" constantly interacting with each other. What makes a social system run, he says, is the process of group struggle through which various groups seek to realize or maximize their interests. Since groups are organized in terms of interest to participate in the group struggle, goal attainment is the motivating force of the whole process.

At the outset, it should be made clear that this study is not concerned with testing the accuracy or validity of the group theory. Rather, viewing the Korean minority group in Japan as a unit of analysis, it is merely intended to rely on the concept of "group" because of its immediate convenience as an analytical tool and as a broad frame of reference in undertaking this study. Especially the usefulness of this approach seems to lie in the group theorists' concern with questions of technique and tactics of influence to maximize its goals. And numerous other

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[1]Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). David H. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

[2]Bentley, op.cit., p. 222.

concepts dealing with group strength, the intensity of concern with a given interest and issue as well as leadership and the use of propaganda may be beneficial as a guide to collecting data and research for this study.

However, one major reservation in the utilization of the group theory in its entirety for this study lies with the notion of "group" on the definitional ground, because none of its exponents seems to have been able to agree on the precise nature of "group." Even if they do, the Korean minority group does not seem to fit neatly into the nature of "group" conceived by many group theorists.[3] In the first place, the Koreans in Japan are neither legitimate members of that society nor are they endowed with the right of political participation, which would enable them to engage in "group struggle" to influence the process of government. Legally their status in Japan is that of alien, and the legitimate means to channel their demands and supports within the Japanese political system is non-existent. Nevertheless, the activities of the Korean residents through the two rival organizations are, perhaps, no less negligible elements than that of any other interest groups in the Japanese political system.

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[3]See Roy C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics 23 (February, 1961), Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitation of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations," Journal of Politics, 22 (February, 1960).

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance and encouragement which has been received in the preparation of this study. Especially I am deeply indebted to Professor Theodore McNelly who provided guidance and counseling over and beyond his duty as the Chairman of the Dissertation Committee. His penetrating criticism and tireless editing have immeasurably improved the style of this dissertation. Also I am grateful to Professors Horace V. Harrison, Chun-tu Hsueh, Marlene Mayo and James H. Wolfe, the members of the Dissertation Committee, who have given me valuable advice and encouragement. Special thanks are extended to Dr. Cho Sung Yoon and Mr. Song Sung Kyu, both in the Far Eastern Law Division; and Messrs. K. P. Yang, Korean Section; Andrew Kuroda, Japanese Section, all in the Library of Congress, who assisted me in locating valuable research materials in the various stages of this study. I also express my appreciation to Mrs. Virginia Morse who typed the manuscript. Lastly, my heartfelt thanks to Young-Ai, my wife, without whose patience and moral support this study would not have been possible, and to whom this study is affectionately dedicated.

Whatever merit this study may possess is due to the persons mentioned and all other scholars whose works have been drawn upon. For errors of fact and judgment, however, I alone bear responsibility.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
PREFACE		ii
	PART I. SCAP AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM	
I.	THE EARLY PHASE OF KOREAN REPATRIATION	2
II.	THE DIVISION OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY	12
III.	THE ERA OF UNREST AND THE POLITICAL REPRESSION	41
	PART II. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AS INTEREST GROUPS	
IV.	DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS	87
V.	CHŌSŌREN AND MINDAN	105
	PART III. ISSUES AND INTERACTIONS	
VI.	REPATRIATION TO NORTH KOREA	127
VII.	KOREAN EDUCATION AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF THE CHŌSEN UNIVERSITY	164
VIII.	THE ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION TREATY AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN	215
IX.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	249
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY		260

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure		Page
1.	Korean Repatriation from Japan	7
2.	Anti-Crime Poster.	48
3.	Age Group Distribution	90
4.	Comparison of Age Group Distribution Between Japanese and Koreans in Japan as of 1964 . .	91
5.	The Evolution of Korean Organizations in Japan	107
6.	Organizational Chart -- Central Organs	109
7.	Periodicals Published Under the Control of the Chōsōren	121
8.	Chōsōren's Organizations in Japan.	114

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1.	Korean Repatriation from Japan: September to December, 1945	4
2.	Alien Registration by Nationality as of June, 1948	56
3.	Comparative Numbers of Schools, Teachers, and Students	59
4.	The Korean Population in Japan by Region, as of March, 1967	88
5.	The Location of Birth for Koreans in Japan	89
6.	The Age Distribution of Koreans in Japan as of April 1, 1969	92
7.	Birth and Death Rate of Koreans in Japan	93
8.	Naturalized Koreans in Japan	94
9.	Japanese Likes and Dislikes of other nationals	97
10.	Classification by Profession as of April, 1964	100
11.	The Number of Welfare Recipients Among Koreans in Japan	101
12.	Welfare Expenditure for Koreans in Japan	104
13.	Number of Japanese Fishing Boats and their Crewmen Seized (As of August 20, 1961)	131
14.	The Number of Deportees	135
15.	The Birth Origin of the Koreans in Japan (as of 1954)	157
16.	The Number of the Repatriates from 1959-67	158
17.	Numbers of Schools, Students and Teachers	171

Table		Page
18.	The Increase of Schools, Students, and Teachers as of April, 1948	173
19.	The Number of Schools, Students and Teachers	179
20.	The number of Schools and Enrollment in Comparison with The Chōsōren and the Mindan (as of June 30, 1969)	185
21.	The Remittance of the Korean Education Aid Funds from the DPRK (as of June, 1968) . .	189
22.	The Expenditures for Korean Education in Japan by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. . .	190
23.	Size of the Demonstrations Against the ROK-Japan Treaty, period covering from February 9 to December 18, 1965.	240
24.	Size of the Demonstrations Against the ROK-Japan Treaty from October 5 to December 11, 1965.	241
25.	Nationwide Demonstrations Staged under the Left-Wing United Front	242
26.	Demonstrations in Tokyo Staged Under the Left-Wing United Front	243

PART I. SCAP AND THE KOREAN PROBLEM

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY PHASE OF KOREAN REPATRIATION

When the termination of World War II was broadcast over the radio by the Japanese Emperor, the heartbeat of a tremulous Japan appeared to have almost stopped for a moment. It was an incredible but humiliating experience for the Japanese people who had never witnessed a defeat, to learn of the surrender to the despised kichiku beiei [barbarous Anglo-Americans]. For Koreans, however, it was a moment of great joy. For them, the surrender of Japan meant the liberation of their homeland from the shackles of Japanese colonialism and freedom to regain their national identity.

When the radio announcement was over, the heart of almost every Korean in Japan was set upon returning home to Korea. The Koreans were filled with joy and hope that a better life would be forthcoming in their homeland. During the last year of the War, there were about two million Koreans in Japan,[1] and most of them were anxious to start a

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[1]The figure submitted by the Korean Resident Association in Japan to the Military Government in Korea showed that there were about 2.4 million Koreans in Japan when the War ended. See William J. Gane, Repatriation: From 25 September 1945 to 31 December 1945 (Seoul: United States Military Government in Korea, 1947 [?]), p. 14.

new life in their homeland. "The spontaneous mass exodus" to Korea began in the middle of August, 1945. Hakata, Senzaki, and other ports of embarkation were swamped with homebound Koreans, with whatever belongings they could carry. They were free to leave Japan whenever they could find passage across the strait. All types of sea-going fishing vessels were employed in transporting the Koreans to their homeland and the Japanese troops and civilians back to Japan. This uncontrolled mass migration created chaos, as the facilities to accommodate the incoming and outgoing throng at the war-torn embarkation areas were inadequate. The Koreans who were unable to arrange their own repatriation were indignant and protested to the Japanese authorities for the lack of assistance. As a result of these protests, a meeting was held at the Ministry of Transportation and Communication on August 22, 1945, and an official repatriation operation was launched despite the limited means of transportation available.[2]

In this initial phase of the repatriation, Japanese naval and merchant vessels were mobilized to transport the repatriates. However, beginning in November, 1945, several additional reception centers were opened and more U.S. Navy

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[2]At this meeting, the Japanese officials appeared to be more concerned with how to bring home the Japanese citizens from Korea, Manchuria and elsewhere. See Morita Yoshio, Chōsen shūsen no kiroku: Beiso ryōgun no shinchū to Nihonjin no hikiage [The Record of Ending the War in Korea: The Advancement of the US-Soviet Union Troops and the Japanese Repatriation] (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1965), p. 130.

vessels were assigned to the operation.[3] The Japanese Ministry of Welfare was responsible for the entire repatriation operation including the expenses. All unauthorized repatriation was forbidden.[4] Table 1 indicates that during the four-month period, from September to December, 1945, approximately 640,000 Koreans returned home through official channels.

TABLE 1

KOREAN REPATRIATION FROM JAPAN FROM SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1945

Month	Number
September, 1945	109,752
October, 1945	144,641
November, 1945	184,431
December, 1945	200,327

Source: Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō, 1955.

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[3]Somewhat brief policies were outlined in SCAPIN (SCAP Instruction)-148, AG 091 "Policies Governing Repatriation of Japanese Nationals in Conquered Territory," October 16, 1945. Additional reception centers for outgoing repatriates were to include Maizuru, Shimonoseki, Senzaki, Kagoshima, Kure, Hakata, Moji and Hakodate. See SCAPIN-142, AG 370.05 "Reception Centers in Japan for Processing Repatriates," October 15, 1945. However, more comprehensive and detailed instructions may be found in SCAPIN-224, AG 370.5 "Repatriation of Non-Japanese from Japan," November 1, 1945, in Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Directives (Tokyo: SCAP Headquarters). This is one of the many volumes compiled by SCAP concerning SCAPIN directives issued to the Japanese Imperial Government. Hereafter cited as Directives.

[4]Ibid., SCAPIN-154, AG 370.05 "Repatriation Reception Center," November 8, 1945.

In early 1946, as the repatriation process became more orderly and efficient with better organization and facilities, the number of the Korean repatriates sharply declined. Several factors contributed to discouraging the Koreans' returning home. One was the restriction imposed by SCAP in fixing the amount of property each Korean was allowed to take with him. For the purpose of "control over exports and imports of gold, silver, security and financial instrument," SCAP issued a directive that no repatriate was permitted to take more than ¥1000 or object of the equivalent value.[5] With that amount, one could scarcely buy more than a few cartons of cigarettes in Korea. The excess of the said amount of money or valued items were supposed to be taken up with receipt by the Japanese authorities pending further directions from SCAP.

There were also baggage restrictions, such as: clothing, possessions "of value only to the owner," and goods "limited to the amount each person can carry at one time."[6] The baggage allowance was modified later by permitting personal effects of up to 250 pounds per person.[7] Also,

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[5]For further detail, see ibid., SCAPIN-44, AG 091.3 "Control over Exports and Imports of Gold, Silver, Security and Financial Instrument," September 22, 1945, and SCAPIN-127, AG 091.31 "Supplemental Instructions Relating to Import and Export Controls," October 12, 1945. These financial restrictions were incorporated in SCAPIN-224, AG 370.5 issued on November 1, 1945.

[6]Ibid., SCAPIN-882, AG 370.05, Annex VI, "Repatriation," March 16, 1946.

[7]Ibid., SCAPIN-882/1, AG 370.5 "Repatriation," March 27, 1946.

the amendment was added to the financial regulations in January, 1946, for the Koreans to take their postal savings, bank passbooks, and other financial papers including "checks, drafts and certificates of deposits drawn on and issued by financial institutions in Japan and payable in Japan."[8] Such a relaxation was actually insignificant because all the financial transactions between Korea and Japan were suspended for an indefinite period. These restrictions on carrying out their meager savings and belongings from Japan played a vital role for many Koreans to give second thoughts about returning home. Furthermore, the stories and rumors told by incoming Japanese repatriates from Korea were disheartening. There were reports of riots, strikes, epidemic diseases, floods and famine. Not a single description of the situation in Korea was favorable for the Koreans returning home. They gradually began to realize that the hope of a better life in their homeland was an unrealistic expectation. Perhaps, they would have to anticipate worse conditions than what their life had been in Japan. Substantiating the reports, many Koreans who had been repatriated were saying that they wanted to come back to Japan. It must have been too difficult for them to adjust to life in Korea by returning home empty-handed. To prevent the re-entry of these Korean repatriates, SCAP issued a directive to the Imperial

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[8] Ibid., SCAPIN-532; AG 091.714 "Supplementary Instructions Relating to Import and Export Controls," January 2, 1946.

Figure 1
Koreans Repatriated from Japan



Source: SCAP, Non-Military Activities in Japan, Summation, January-August, 1946.
Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō, 195

Japanese government not to accept the returnees.[9] Nevertheless, illegal Korean re-entry into Japan created a serious problem. By August, 1946, more than 13,000 Koreans were captured by the authorities.[10]

With the sharp decline of the Korean repatriation, it had become clear by February that many Koreans were less interested in immediate repatriation. To determine the number of Koreans who wished to return, SCAP directed the Japanese government to have all Koreans registered by March 18, 1946. The Japanese government was also instructed to inform the Koreans that both those who wished to remain in Japan, and those who desired to be repatriated must register; failure to register would result in forfeiture of repatriation privileges at the expense of the Japanese government.[11] As a result, out of 646,932 registered by March 18, 1946, 514,035 Koreans expressed their desire for repatriation. On the basis of this figure, the Japanese government was instructed

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[9] Ibid., SCAPIN-882, AG 370.05 "Repatriation," Annex I, March 16, 1946.

[10] Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan, No. 11 (August, 1946), p. 226. Hereafter will be cited as Summation. According to Wagner, not all of the Koreans who wanted to return to Japan were to establish residence, but some wanted to recover property left in Japan, and some wanted to enroll in school, and others were to visit relatives; see Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan: 1904-1950 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 49.

[11] Ibid., SCAPIN-746, AG 053 "Registration of Koreans, Chinese, Ryukyuans and Formosans," February 17, 1946. Wagner, op.cit., p. 46.

to formulate a repatriation program to transport 4,000 persons a day from late April until September 30, 1945, to complete the operation.[12] To encourage more repatriation, SCAP liberalized the baggage and property restrictions, but the number of the Korean repatriates continued to decrease.

The original repatriation plan which was scheduled to be terminated by September, 1946, was extended twice in the hope that more Koreans would return home. But when the official repatriation program closed on December 15, 1946, only 72,000 had returned to Korea since the registration began, and the rest of the Koreans remaining in Japan forfeited their repatriation privileges.[13]

Though the socio-economic conditions in Japan were little better than in Korea, and surrounded by hostile and prejudicial circumstances, Koreans preferred to remain in Japan. The period soon after the surrender was marked with the most complete breakdown of political, and socio-economic order ever known in modern Japan. It took several weeks for SCAP to establish authority over the defeated nation, although the first directive went out on September, 1945.

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[12]For the complete repatriation plan, see ibid., SCAPIN-927, AG 370.05 "Repatriation," May 7, 1946, and SCAPIN-927/2, Annex III, June 30, 1946.

[13]Although official repatriation program was terminated on December, 1946, it resumed again January, 1947, in small number by the demand of Koreans and continued until just before the outbreak of the Korean War. See Wagner, op.cit., pp. 47-50, and Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō [The Korean Movement in Japan] (Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955), pp. 42-43.

Most industries were either destroyed or closed down. Millions of demilitarized Japanese servicemen and repatriates were returning to the crowded homeland from abroad. Not only did this create a vast degree of unemployment but it also caused critical shortages of food and housing. The price of goods skyrocketed, which led to an insurmountable inflation of the postwar Japanese economy.

Racial relations between the Japanese and the Koreans have seldom been cordial ones. There have always been latent racial tensions between them. Anticipating a sudden deterioration of the Japanese-Korean relations in the face of surrender, the chief of the Police Bureau in the Home Affairs Ministry on August 14, ordered all police stations in Japan to take utmost precautionary measures to eliminate possible racial tension.[14] A few suggestions in the order were: to provide adequate protection for Koreans' life and property, giving them a sense of security, thereby persuading them to stay on the job until further notice; and to try to keep the conscripted laborers apart from other Japanese laborers in each plant to prevent them from what in "word and deed" would tend to spur racial friction.[15]

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[14]Naimushō, Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu [Home Affairs Ministry, the Special Higher Police Bureau], Nendobetsu Chōsenjin chiihō ihan genkyō shirabe sonota [Yearly Statistics of Violations of Peace Preservation Law by Koreans: 1944-45], Japanese Army and Navy Archives Series, 1868-1945; Microfilm R1510. (R222 F93357), pp. 93676-93677.

[15]Ibid.

Obviously, the Japanese authorities must have feared that some Japanese fanatics who opposed the surrender might attempt to use the Koreans as a scapegoat for the defeat. Rumors persisted that Koreans had helped the "barbarous Anglo-Americans" win the war.[16] The incident after the Kantō Earthquake in 1923 was sufficient to explain what the authorities were trying to avert; several thousand innocent Koreans were massacred by Japanese fanatics who stirred up racial hatred. They charged that the Koreans took advantage of the confusion after the quake, looting and burning Japanese property, in retaliation for the Japanese domination over Korea.[17]

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[16]United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale (Washington, D.C., June, 1947), p. 250, and Wagner, op.cit., pp. 38-39.

[17]For the most authentic accounts and source materials including the Japanese government documents concerning the Korean massacre during the Earthquake, see Kang Dŏk-san and Kŭm Byŏng-tong, eds., Kantō taishinsai to Chōsenjin [The Kantō Earthquake and the Koreans], Gendaishi Shiryō Series, Vol. VI (Tokyo: Mimizu Shobō, 1963), and Wagner, op.cit., p. 16. See also, E. Herbert Norman, "Mass Hysteria in Japan," Far Eastern Survey, No. 3 (March 18, 1945), pp. 69-70.

CHAPTER II

THE DIVISION OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY

The Shift to the Left: Chōren

The future status of the Koreans in Japan after the surrender was so precarious that a few mindful Koreans felt the need for an organization which could provide certain guidance to the Koreans. The result was the creation of a Committee for the Korean Community Affairs on August 18, 1945, in Suginami-ku, Tokyo.[1] The primary purposes were to minimize possible racial uneasiness, to negotiate with the Japanese authorities or SCAP for the repatriation arrangements, and to promote well-being of the Koreans in Japan.[2] Many other small groups mushroomed for similar purposes, but they finally joined together and formed the Korean Association in Japan on September 10, 1945.

Around this time, the situation in Korea was changing rapidly. The Russian troops had already marched into P'yŏngyang by August 22, and the Governor General of Korea had abdicated. It appeared that the independence of

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[1] Im Hun, "Zainihon Chōsenjin Renmei to sono tainichi taido" [Chōren and its posture toward Japan], Minshu Chōsen, No. 4 (April, 1946), 16-17.

[2] Ibid., p. 17.

Korea was imminent. In order to maintain a close coordination with the homeland authority, some Koreans in Japan felt a need for a nationally based organization which would represent all Koreans in Japan. A preparatory committee was set up under the auspices of the Korean Association in Japan with the leadership shared by Cho Dŭk-sŏng, once a Christian minister, Kwŏn Il, a pro-Japanese official, and Kim Chŏng-hong, who had briefly associated with the Korean Communist movement. None of them seemed to have attempted to color themselves with political ideaology, yet each one had a unique background and reputation which enabled them to appeal to practically all factions of the Korean populace in Japan. The campaign to organize local chapters became widespread. Soon the leaders managed to assemble about 5,000 delegates from all over Japan to open a national meeting in Hibiya public hall on October 15, 1945. The proposal to found the Zainihon Chōsenjin Renmei or Chōren [The Korean Resident League in Japan] was unanimously adopted at the meeting. When the Chōren was founded, it was designed to be a non-political organization and a collective representative body of the Koreans to provide general counseling and to protect the interests of Koreans in Japan. In the spirit of these ends, the Chōren collaborated very closely with the Japanese authorities and later with SCAP. So, the presence of the Chōren for the first few critical months was largely credited with and admired for their endeavors to moderate the uneasy racial tension and

to help implement the orderly repatriation program.[3] The Chōren, however, did not long allow itself to remain merely as a social service organization. It could hardly resist being sucked into the vortex of revolutionary agitation along with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Several events may have led to this transformation.

As early as September, the "Political Prisoner Release League" organized by the left wing Koreans, attempted on various occasions to negotiate with the Prime Minister, Prince Higashikuni, to secure the release of the prisoners. During the early period, the Japanese government was reluctant to admit the existence of political prisoners. However, this became public when a few American and French journalists were able to visit Tokyo Fuchū prison and reported the conditions of the solitary confinement block where the Communist leaders were being held incommunicado.[4] Following a SCAP directive in October, 1945, all political prisoners were set free.[5]

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[3]Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō [The Korean Movement in Japan] (Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955), pp. 45-46. And also Fuse Tatsuji, et al., "Dantai kiseirei no inbō o tsuku" [Expose the Plot Behind the Organization Control Law], Minshu Chōsen, No. 5 (May, 1950), 37-38.

[4]Roger Swearingen and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 88.

[5]Directives, SCAPIN-93, "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties," October 4, 1945.

One of these political prisoners was Kim Ch'ŏn-hae (Kin Ten-kai in Japanese), who had been imprisoned for 17 years for alleged Communist activities.[6] When he walked out of the Tokyo Fuchū prison on October 10, together with Tokuda Kyūichi, Shiga Yosahi and thirteen other Japanese Communist leaders, a throng was waiting to greet him. According to an eye witness account, a crowd of several hundred, mostly Koreans, waving red flags with "flaming enthusiasm" was there to meet them. The League was also there with its members. But, most noteworthy was the fact that only "twenty or thirty" Japanese were there to greet their communist leaders.[7] It was again the Koreans who played a leading role, when a welcoming rally was held afterward at Hikō Kaikan hall.[8]

The first public statement representing all the just-released prisoners was prepared by Tokuda Kyūichi and Shiga Yoshio. They hailed the Allied Powers as a force "liberating the world from fascism and militarism," and declared that it

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[6]Concerning his alleged activities during the prewar period, see Kim Ch'ŏn-hae, Okchung sip'onyŏn [The 17 Years in Prison] (Tokyo: Minshu Chōsensha, 1946), and Kim Chŏng-myŏng, comp., Chōsen dokuritsu undō: Kyōsanshugi undō hen [The Korean Independence Movement: The Communist Movement], Vols. VI and V (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1966 and 1967).

[7]Nakanishi Inosuke, "Nihon tennōsei no datō to tōyō minzoku no minshu dōmei: Chōsenjin Renmei he no yōsei" [The Overthrow of the Emperor Systems and a Democratic League for Asian Races: An Appeal to the Chōren], Minshu Chōsen, No. 7 (July, 1946), 24-25.

[8]Ibid., p. 25.

would be a new era for the "democratic revolution" in Japan by "overthrowing the Emperor system," thereby creating a "People's Republic."[9] They also set forth the future Party line.[10] During the next few weeks, they devoted their entire efiorts to planning for the reconstruction of the Party and to recruiting Party members. Soon they organized the "JCP Reconstruction Committee," and Kim Ch'ŏn-hae, a Committee member, was credited with reshaping the nature of the Korean political activities in Japan.[11]

In the eyes of many Koreans Kim Ch'ŏn-hae, whose credentials were his seventeen-year imprisonment for the cause of Korean liberation, was an undisputed national leader among the Koreans in Japan. He wasted no time in exploiting this advantage. When the Korean delegates from all over Japan were assembled at Hibiya public hall to organize the Chōren on October 15, 1945, the audience was thrilled and overwhelmed by his speech. Although it was not an active official position, he was then installed as a "supreme adviser" of the Chōren. Since he was a leading

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[9]The statement was later published in a complete form under the title: "Jimnin ni utafu" [An Appeal to the People], in Akahata, October 20, 1945.

[10]"Tōsō no atarashi hōshin ni tsuite - Shinjōsei wa wareware ni nanio yōkyū shite iruka" [On the New Line of Struggle -- What the New Situation Demands of Us], ibid.

[11]Koyama Hirotake, Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō shi [A History of the Postwar Japanese Communist Party] (Tokyo: Hōgashoten, 1966), pp. 13-15, and Yaginuma Masaji, Nihon Kyōsantō undō shi [A History of the Japanese Communist Party Movement] (Tokyo: Keibunkaku, 1953), pp. 2-3.

member of the JCP Central Executive Committee and also with the Chōren, his interlocking position was a crucial factor in diverting the Chōren to be a JCP's peripheral organization. It is worth noting that, when the JCP leaders were released from prison, the JCP as an organization was structurally non-existent. Its only adherents were less than three hundred hard-core members, all of whom were held in prison.[12] The role played by Kim Ch'ŏn-hae in utilizing the Chōren's organization and financial resources to support the JCP was by no means a negligible contribution in the postwar JCP reorganization period.[13]

The complete control of the Chōren by the Left came with the expulsion of those who refused to take the radical shift in its policy. The left-wing Koreans charged that the Chōren's leadership was saturated with pro-Japanese elements. The latter group were branded as "traitors" and "war criminals," as they had actively collaborated with the "Japanese fascists and militarists" in their war efforts.

The activities of the Chōren from its inception were very extensive, covering almost all spheres in which Koreans had any interests. Its services included not only an

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[12] Koyama Hirotake, op.cit., p. 12.

[13] Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., pp. 259-260, and Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan: 1904-1950 (New York: Institution of Pacific Relations, 1951), pp. 54-55. Robert A. Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 72, and see Kwŏn Il, Sokoku he no nengan [My Desire to the Fatherland] (Tokyo: Matsuzawa Shoten, 1959), pp. 24-25.

education program to de-Japanize Koreans, but also welfare programs for the needy. To carry on these many programs, the Chōren was blessed with a variety of funds at its disposal from unexpected sources. First, the Chōren was able to secure donations from the Korean repatriates of their belongings that they could not carry with them because of the baggage restrictions imposed by SCAP. Included in these were bank savings, war bonds and other negotiable financial documents. Secondly, other funds were derived from power of attorney relegated by repatriates to the Chōren, to claim on their behalf, the back pay, compensations, and other benefits which the former employers were unable to pay before repatriation. Thirdly, the other source was from the reimbursement paid by the Japanese government to the Chōren on behalf of those repatriated at their own expense.[14]

In the early period of the occupation, the Japanese government was uncertain as to the scope of legal jurisdiction over the Koreans in Japan as a result of the ambivalent nature of SCAP directives. SCAP, in the absence of any specific

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[14]SCAP issued a directive dated December 9, 1945, that all the cost of the repatriations should be borne by the Japanese government. It made further clarification on January 31, 1946, that reimbursement should be made retroactive to October 15, 1945, to those who paid their own train fares to the embarkation areas. The legal claims were made by the Chōren with a proper power of attorney. See Wagner, op.cit., p. 53, and Directives, SCAPIN-295, AG 370.5 "Repatriation of Non-Japanese from Japan," November 17, 1945; SCAPIN-410, AG 370.05 "Supplies, Transportation and Facilities for Repatriates," December 9, 1945; and SCAPIN-685, AG 555.1 "Railway Fares Charges to Koreans," January 31, 1946.

guidance from Washington, simply assumed that all Koreans would eventually be repatriated to their homeland. Hence, SCAP did not bother to establish any agency to deal with Korean affairs; rather the matter was left up to the Japanese authorities to handle.

Meanwhile, the prevailing attitude among the Koreans at the time was that they were "liberated" nationals, whereas the Japanese were conquered nations subject to the Allied Powers. The notion of "liberated" nationals was apparently derived from the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to General Douglas MacArthur that Koreans were to be treated as "liberated nationals," if military security was not concerned. But they were to be treated as "enemy" nationals "in case of necessity," since they had been Japanese subjects.[15] However, a lack of any further clarification as to when the Koreans should be treated as "liberated" or "enemy" nationals seemed to have caused both Koreans and Japanese authorities to misconstrue the extent of legal jurisdiction. The Koreans believed, therefore, that they should not be treated equally as defeated nationals, but they were entitled to different treatment than the defeated Japanese. Such a mistaken notion led the Koreans to outlawry, and the tendency

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[15]See "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Occupation and Control of Japan," J.C.S. 1380/8, November 3, 1945, Report of Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, September, 1945, to September, 1948, Vol. II (Grosse Pointe, Mich: Scholarly Press, 1968), p. 432.

frequently to claim preposterous legal rights in Japan. In some isolated incidents, Koreans even refused to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Japanese authorities.[16] The arrogant attitude displayed by these "liberated" people, with their deep contempt for the Japanese as defeated nationals, added fuel to the already heated anti-Korean sentiment among many Japanese.

Even after the War, the Japanese policy was rarely conciliatory in dealing with the Korean problems in Japan. Rather, the Japanese authority was reluctant and negligent in providing necessary services that the Koreans were fully entitled to. In many instances, the Japanese authority circumvented or evaded "the spirit" of the SCAP directives.[17] SCAP also noted that the Japanese authority often purposely delayed the payment of soldiers of Korean descent, while Japanese soldiers were paid promptly.[18] In one case, a strongly worded SCAP directive was needed to secure the release of a Korean political prisoner being kept in

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[16]For example, on January 3, 1946, when a Korean was jailed by the Japanese police for an unknown reason, a group of some 80 Koreans armed themselves with clubs and pistols, stormed the police station and forcibly obtained the release of the Korean. See Summation, No. 4 (January, 1946), p. 34.

[17]Summation, No. 4 (January, 1946), p. 37, and Wagner, op.cit., pp. 59-60. The necessary services include: such as prompt payment of wages and other compensations including food rations and housings for Koreans.

[18]Directives, SCAPIN-113, AG 240 "Payment of Bonus to Japanese Soldiers of Korean Descent," October 9, 1945.

Abashiri prison in Hokkaido.[19] The Japanese government, distorting the spirit of SCAP, commuted the sentence of some Korean criminals as a condition of repatriation, and deported them against their will.[20] Under the pretext of implementing the SCAP directive to curtail illegal re-entry of the Koreans into Japan, the police surveillance over Koreans intensified, and they were often subjected to "unreasonable search and seizure."[21] With an increasing number of Koreans wishing to remain rather than be repatriated, their means of livelihood in Japan became a critical problem. The chance of employment for the Koreans was very slim in the war-torn country where the unemployment rate was high even among Japanese. Even those Koreans who held jobs were thrown out from their positions in favor of Japanese. Many Koreans became street-vendors and engaged more often in illegal transactions. Such a situation prompted the SCAP authority to bring this to the attention of the Japanese government, but it was to no avail.[22]

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[19] Ibid., SCAPIN-1181, AG 014.33 "Release from Prison and Repatriation of Korean Nationals," September 10, 1946.

[20] Wagner, op.cit., p. 60.

[21] Directives, SCAPIN-563, AG 091 "Control of Population Movements" January 8, 1946, and SCAPIN 1735-A, "Suppression of Illegal Entry into Japan," July 16, 1946.

[22] SCAP directed the Japanese government that "Koreans, Formosans and Chinese nationals who elect to remain in Japan rather than to accept repatriation will be guaranteed the same rights, privileges and opportunities in employment as are extended to the Japanese nationals in comparable circumstances." See, ibid., SCAPIN-360, AG 230.14 "Employment Policies" November 28, 1945.

Under these conditions of despair, hunger and confusion, the first organized mass rally sponsored by the Chōren took place at Hibiya Park on December 28, 1945. Several thousand Koreans gathered to express grievances and demands to the Japanese authorities. Their demands were:

1. A full assurance by the Japanese government to guarantee the protection of Koreans' property and personal safety in Japan;
2. Prompt payment of back wages and allowances for conscripted laborers, including death and disability benefits;
3. Prosecution of the responsible officials concerning the Korean massacre during the Kantō Earthquake, and proper compensation to those who suffered injuries;
4. Dismemberment of the Kōseikai and transfer of its property to the Chōren's use;
5. Permission to take over the office of the Governor-General of Chōsen in Tokyo to be used by Chōren;
6. An increase of food rations.[23]

After the rally, they demonstrated in front of the Home Affairs Ministry and a few Korean representatives managed to get into the building to present their demands. Almost all of the demands were met after a long persistent talk with Home Affairs Minister Horikiri Zenjirō.[24] As far as the Chōren was concerned, the rally was successful in displaying the Chōren's strength to negotiate directly with the Japanese authority. Although Korean suffrage in Japan was suspended soon after

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[23]Kim Tu-yong, "Nihon ni okeru Chōsenjin mondai," [The Korean Problems in Japan], Zen-ei, No. 1 (February, 1946), 15-16.

[24]Ibid., p. 16.

the War,[25] the door was wide open for the Chōren to plunge into Japanese politics.

Despite the fact that the Koreans were no longer considered to hold legal rights of political participation, the rationale for the Koreans to get involved with Japanese politics was expounded by Kim Tu-yong, a leading Korean Communist in Japan. In the first postwar issue of Zen-ei, the JCP's theoretical journal, he outlined future tasks for political action. He noted four specific issues concerning Koreans in Japan: (1) repatriation; (2) racial prejudice; (3) the attempt by the Japanese government to disrupt a formation of a united front; and (4) the need to take political actions.[26] He reasoned that the early "spontaneous mass exodus" was an ample illustration of the Koreans' desire to escape from the miserable life in Japan. This desire was also prompted by the fear of retaliation by Japanese for the brutal treatment of the Japanese in Korea after the War. Nevertheless, despite these reasons for desiring immediate repatriation, what Koreans failed to realize was, he stated, that "our homeland is not yet ready to accommodate us, nor

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[25]The suffrage for Koreans in Japan was suspended by the Law No. 42, amendment to the Election Law for the House of Representatives, on December 17, 1945, which prohibited any Koreans to participate in Japan's first postwar election held on April 10, 1946. Kanpō, Extra Issue, December 17, 1945, p. 1. However, the extent of SCAP's involvement in suspending the Koreans' suffrage is unclear.

[26]Kim Tu-yong, op.cit., pp. 16-19.

are conditions favorable for our return home." Until the time comes, Kim Tu-yong advised the Koreans to remain in Japan. A majority of frictions and disputes between Japanese and Koreans were aroused by racism, or perhaps, due to a lack of understanding between the two peoples. This bias was skillfully exploited by the "Japanese imperialists" to keep the two peoples apart, thereby deliberately frustrating the Koreans' effort to cooperate with the "Japanese mass" to bring about a "democratic revolution" in Japan. The December 27 demonstration may have appeared a success in expressing the Koreans' grievances and demands. But "we must be aware," he argued, "that the fundamental problems of our life in Japan could hardly be expected to improve in this manner." The Japanese policy -- "go home, if you don't like it" attitude -- would never be changed under the present Imperial system. "As we elect to remain in Japan, deprived of suffrage, and in all other adverse conditions, our life and safety can never be assured only by our struggle alone." Rather, he urged that the Koreans form a united front with the Japanese proletariat for the common goal of achieving a "democratic revolution" and establishing a "People's Republic" in Japan. The urgent task of the Chōren is to build a mass base among the Koreans in Japan and "to participate together with the Japanese proletariat in the struggle for the liberation of people."[27]

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[27] Ibid., p. 18.

Also, a similar call for political action appeared in the Chōren's monthly journal, Minshu Chōsen, under the title of: "The Chōren and its Posture Toward Japan."[28] Im Hun, representing the Chōren's viewpoint, declared that "we think, the resurgence of the reactionary fascists in Japan no longer remains the concern of only Japanese people." "The matter is of grave concern for everyone," as the remnants of the imperial fascists threatened to endanger "the liberty and world peace" that had just been won by the Allied Powers. "We hold a joint responsibility to overthrow the reactionary forces which stand against a democratic revolution in Japan."[29]

An almost identical inflammatory theme was echoed by the JCP, calling for the Koreans to join in "the struggle for people's liberation." It appeared in one of the seven series of JCP's "People's Liberation" pamphlet in March, 1946, titled: To Korean Brethren.[30] The pamphlet contained a lengthy presentation of how zaibatsu and "military fascists" had mercilessly exploited the Korean workers to meet their own selfish ends. The imperialistic venture and colonization of Korea was challenged vigorously by the JCP. The JCP not

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[28] Im Hun, op.cit., pp. 16-20.

[29] Ibid., p. 20.

[30] The pamphlet titled: Chōsen no kyōdai shokun he [To Korean Brethren] (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōsanto Shuppanbu, 1946) was suppressed by the SCAP censorship and has never been made public. However, the confiscated pamphlet in the form of a gally proof is in the possession of the East Asian Collection, University of Maryland Library.

only had championed the principle of racial equality but also advocated "the liberation of Korea" from the yoke of the "Japanese imperialists." Now that the war was ended, the JCP's pamphlet asked "what is the Japanese government still doing to you?"[31] In addition to the long years of exploitation of the Korean workers, not only did the postwar Japanese government deprive the Koreans of suffrage in Japan, but it was also reluctant to allow even a subsistent level of living for the Koreans in Japan. The Japanese government was constantly slandering the Chōren's efforts on behalf of the Koreans and deliberately undermining SCAP's image of Koreans, so that SCAP refused to recognize the Chōren as the sole representative body of the Koreans in Japan.[32]

The Japanese officials may have appeared to listen to the Koreans' grievances and demands, as was shown in the December 27 demonstration. However, this was merely an expedient face-saving device, the pamphlet said. The system itself was the bottleneck; so long as the Emperor system persisted, a better life for the Koreans could never be obtained. The Emperor system was the common enemy; through this medium "the Japanese imperialists" persistently suppressed and exploited both the Korean workers and the Japanese people. To bring about a better society for all, "we, with the Korean Communist comrades, the gallant champion of

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[31] Ibid., p. 38.

[32] Ibid., p. 44.

liberations," had fought together well against the common enemy. The pamphlet noted, "it must be remembered that the JCP was then the only ally of the Korean people. The JCP stands for the same goals, as it has been in the past, and will remain so in the future."[33] "The JCP sincerely hope that all of you will participate in the Democratic Liberation Front under the JCP's banner and cooperate in the task of overthrowing the Emperor system to establish a People's Republic."[34]

The JCP and the Chōren stepped up their campaign by calling for action. The response to the JCP-Kim's call had a profound impact upon the majority of the Koreans in Japan, especially those who felt a sense of deprivation and frustration, compounded by the situation they faced by remaining in the country where their presence was not welcomed. The wide-spread anti-Korean sentiment of the Japanese seemed to have reinforced the JCP's appeal in making the Koreans more receptive to the call to action. This anti-Korean feeling was openly rekindled by Japanese officials and the mass media. Their charges were directed at the black-market activities, smuggling and illegal re-entry into Japan. Tokyo Mainichi, on July 13, 1946, in an editorial, openly expressed the Japanese dislike of the Koreans. Similar cries were heard

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[33] Ibid., p. 45.

[34] Ibid.

from all quarters and reached "slanderous proportion."[35] Shikuma Saburō, a Progressive Party member in the House of Representatives from Hokkaido, made the most inflammatory statement concerning the Koreans. In his speech in the House plenary meeting, on August 17, 1946, he blamed Koreans and Formosans for the entire black-market operation and the "unspeakable violence" which endangered every aspect of the Japanese economic and social life. Consequently, he charged, "one-third of the new yen, amounting to over fifty billion yen, might be in their hands" through these illegal transactions. He continued:

> Gentlemen, these acts, committed until by those Koreans and Formosans, which we can hardly bear to watch, make us, who have gone through all ordeals of the defeat, feel as if our blood flows from the wrong way.[36]

This speech prompted the Chōren to protest vigorously, not only to the Speaker of the House, Yamazaki Takeshi, but also to the Progressive Party, demanding an apology and the expulsion of Shiikuma Saburō from the house.[37] Surrounded by unfriendly cries, it was a logical corollary for the Koreans to become receptive to the JCP's call for action.

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[35]Wagner, op.cit., pp. 60-61, and David Conde, "The Korean Minority in Japan," Far Eastern Survey, XVI (February 26, 1946), p. 42.

[36]A full text of his speech translated into English is in, Japan, House of Representatives, Proceedings: the 90th Session of the Imperial Diet, No. 30, August 19, 1946, pp. 4-5. A typographical error is found in the text. "Kashii" Saburō should be read as Shiikuma Saburō. See also Conde, op.cit., pp. 42-43, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 61.

[37]See Chōren's official statement concerning Shiikuma Saburō's remark, Kokusai Shimbun, September 30, and October 1, 1946.

Reaction to the Shift: Mindan

While the Chōren gradually moved to the left, the presence of dissidents to the Chōren's policy was no longer tolerated by its leaders. Many of the dissidents were either expelled or voluntarily withdrew from the organization. The major contention raised by the dissidents was that the "democratic revolution" and the "overthrow of the Emperor system" were not proper concern for the Koreans in Japan. Rather, they said that the Chōren's emphasis should be placed on the promotion of Korean welfare in Japan and on the establishment of a Korean government at home.[38]

To encounter the Chōren's left wing movement, some young dissidents from the Chōren and other anti-Communist groups united on November 16, 1945, to form a rival organization called Chōsen Kenkoku Sokushin Seinen Dōmei or Kensei [The Youth League to Expedite the Foundation of Korea]. The Chōren, which had once boasted of being the sole representative body of all Koreans in Japan, subsequently began to lose its stature. This lessened their power to promote and protect their interests in Japan. Only a few months after the Chōren was officially activated, this fatal division among the Koreans in Japan was about to be crystalized. Since the Kensei was organized somewhat in haste mostly by young people in reaction to the Chōren, the membership was limited to those under the age of thirty, while those over

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[38] Kwŏn Il, op.cit., pp. 26-27.

thirty were admitted as supporting members. Thus, Kensei soon became a right-wing youth organization, concentrating their main effort on the destruction of the Chōren activities. Physical violence and terror between members of the two rival organizations became a daily occurrence. This led both the moderate members of the Kensei, and some disgruntled Chōren members to create yet another separate Korean organization, Shinchōsen Kensetsu Dōmei, or Kendō [The League for the Establishment of a New Korea].

Meanwhile, Pak Yŏl, who had been in jail for twenty-three years as a political prisoner, was belatedly released from Akita prison on December 27, 1945. Pak Yŏl, deeply influenced by the Japanese anarchist Ōsugi Sakae, had organized Kokutō Kai [The Black-Wave Society] in 1922, to lead a Korean anarchist movement in Japan. Later he had been arrested on the charge of plotting to assassinate Prince Hirohito, and had received a life sentence.[39] The day he was finally set free, a huge welcoming rally was held at Hibiya public hall, sponsored by the Chōren. Acclaimed as a great hero, Pak Yŏl was much more widely known among Koreans than Kim Ch'ŏn-hae, due to the publicity he had received during his trial in the early days. Apparently, Pak Yŏl believed that the Koreans in Japan would invite him to head their

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[39] For further detailed study on Pak Yŏl's legal case, see Morinaga Eisaburō, "Pak Yŏl, Kaneko Fumiko jiken" [Pak Yŏl and Kaneko Fumiko case], Hōritsu Jihō, Vol. 35, No. 3 (March, 1963), 57-63, and ibid., No. 4 (April, 1963), 60-67.

only organization, the Chōren. Because he thought himself most qualified, by virtue of his twenty-three years in prison, he assumed to claim the leadership of the Koreans in Japan.[40] It is interesting to note that the longer the term of a political prisoner, the more prestige he seemed to enjoy as a leader. Hence, the standard of judgment for leadership among the Koreans was the length of one's prison term.

However, Pak Yŏl soon realized that, contrary to his expectation, the Chōren's leadership was already firmly in the hands of Kim Ch'ŏn-hae's group. Furthermore, no sign was clearly visible as to a means to swing the leadership in favor of him. His sense of disappointment was well exploited by some anti-Communists and by other moderate elements from the Kensei, by their asking Pak Yŏl to form another Korean organization under the banner of anti-Communism and to rival against the Chōren. Thus, Shinchōsen Kensetsu Dōmei or Kendō [The League for the Establishment of a New Korea] was born on January 2, 1946. Three Korean organizations then existed, all declaring the same purposes in the name of the Koreans' interest in Japan. However, they were ideologically opposed, right-wing versus left-wing, the Kendō and the Kensei, on one hand, and the Chōren, on the other.

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[40]Chŏng Chŏl, Mindan (Tokyo: Yōyōsha, 1967), pp. 35-37, and Pak Hi-Chŏl, "Taikanminkoku Kyoryū Mindan ron" [A Discourse on the Korean Resident Association in Japan], Mishu Chōsen, No. 7 (July, 1950), 65-67, and Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., p. 51. Chang Hyŏk-chu, "Chōsenjin no naimaku" [The Inside Story of Koreans], Shinchō, No. 12 (December, 1949), 108-109.

In addition to the ideological divisions between the Koreans in Japan, another divisive force was working against them. The rapidly changing international situation, that is, the separate Soviet Union and American occupations of Korea, and the failure of the two opposing powers to negotiate upon a definite plan for the future of Korea affecting the formation of the Korean government. To resolve the difficulty, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow, in December, 1945. They reached an agreement, in which China joined afterward, whereby a Russo-American Joint Commission would be set up, and a four-power trusteeship of Korea would be implemented for a period of up to five years.[41] When the news of the Moscow Agreement reached Korea, the reaction was polarization. The right-wing Koreans denounced the agreement on the basis that trusteeship was too similar to the Japanese rule from which they had just emerged. Instead, they demanded "unconditional" and "immediate" independence of Korea.

The left-wing group, on the other hand, hailed the agreement as the true embodiment of a cooperative spirit among the victorious Allied Powers.[42] They argued that the pro-Japanese elements traitors and fascists who had

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[41]For a complete text on the Moscow Agreement, see the U.S. State Department, Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers December 16-26, 1945 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 14-16.

[42]Wŏn Yong-dŏk, "Shintakutōji to minzoku tōitsu sensen" [The Trusteeship and National Unification Front], Minshu Chōsen, No. 4 (April, 1946), 5-6.

collaborated actively as the "running dogs" of the Japanese imperialists, were still prevalent everywhere. The true objective of the Moscow Agreement was, they stated, to eradicate all the "poisonous" remnants of the Japanese imperialistic heritage and its systems which were deeply rooted in the Korean society. The Korean national culture and economic growth had been seriously impaired and retarded by these elements. "We must reconstruct our homeland." To these ends, the Four-Power agreement promised to provide not only technical assistance, but also education for the development of a true democracy in Korea.[43] Those who opposed the trusteeship were the remaining fascists and traitors who tried to disrupt the creation of the National Unification Front by engineering dissension between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Korean question.[44]

The dispute surrounding the Moscow Agreement was also wide-spread in the Korean community in Japan. On February 28, 1946, the Chōren promptly called an emergency meeting to determine its position concerning the Moscow Agreement. After two days of fierce debate and physical violence to subjugate the opponents, the Chōren unanimously passed a resolution to support the Moscow Agreement.[45] The Kendō and the Kensei declared opposition to the Agreement. The division between the two opposing groups became intensified when

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[43] Ibid., pp. 7-9.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 28-32.

the Soviet-American Joint Commission was dissolved. Moscow issued a statement through Izvesta accusing the American delegates of supporting the opposition of the trusteeship which constituted a violation of the spirit of the Moscow Agreement.[46] However, the underlying reason for the failure was the clash of opposing powers: the Soviet Union was determined to create a Korean government favorable to its interests and so was the United States. The dissolution of the Joint Commission made it clear that the division of South and North Korea was irreparable. So also was the rift of the Korean community in Japan.

Nevertheless, the Chōren dominated the Korean community until it was forced to disband by order of the Japanese government in September, 1949, on the ground of its being a terrorist organization.[47] Even on a limited scale, the Chōren had been able to institute education and welfare programs for the Koreans. Meanwhile, the Kendō and the Kensei were more politically oriented groups, endorsing anti-Communism but devoid of any substantial program to gain the support of the Koreans in Japan. To cope with the problems, Yi Kang-hun and Kim Chŏn-chu were sent to Korea to study the situation back home and to make suggestions to Pak Yŏl in

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[46] The New York Times, May 16, 1946.

[47] According to the Japanese police record, the Chōren's membership at the time of dissolution was estimated at 350,000 while Kendō was 7,000 and Kensei was about 20,000 during the peak period. See Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., p. 69, 111, and 115. However, the Chōren claimed to have a membership of 614,198 during October, 1947, with 48 local headquarters throughout prefectures. See Chōren Chūō Jihō, October 17, 1947.

April, 1946. They ruled out the feasibility of returning to Korea, due to the deteriorating social and economic conditions at home. Instead, they proposed the formation of an autonomous organization under the banner of anti-Communism with massive programs to help and protect the livelihood of the Koreans in Japan.[48] Subsequently the Kendō dissolved to form a new organization called Chōsen Kyōryū Mindan or Mindan [The Korean Resident Association in Japan] on October 3, 1946. Pak Yŏl was acclaimed unanimously to be the head of the new Mindan which had 13 local headquarters throughout Japan. Then, the Mindan declared in unequivocal terms that "it will not be a political organization; neither does it intend to affiliate with, nor support on an ideological basis, any political institution in the homeland or abroad." Also it outlined the Mindan's aims: "to help secure legitimate professions, food and housing" for the needy Koreans.[49] A few days later, the Mindan issued another statement addressed to the Japanese people under the title of an "Appeal to the Japanese People" asking for deep understanding and close cooperation to achieve its goals. It stated:

> We, Korean compatriots, have risen up for the founding of a new nation. Although we have been obliged to you so long, we have risen, not as Japanese subjects but as your most friendly Korean nationals. In retrospect, our two races have been deeply entangled with a

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[48] Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., p. 34.

[49] For a complete text of the Mindan Declaration, Kokusai Shimbun, October 12, 1946.

> cause-and-effect relationship. Because of it, there have been many unpleasant incidents after the war. We deeply regret it.
>
> We do not intend to demand anything from those of you who are suffering from the bitter misery of defeat. Rather, we should like to ask you to correct your misconceptions, wrongfully molded by the militarists and imperialists, concerning the Koreans, foreigners, and your outlook on the universe. In other words, please abandon the notion that Japan and its people are the center of the whole universe. . . .
>
> If you had been in our shoes for thirty-six years, you would feel the same way. We fall into sadness when we take a look at our dilapidated homeland. When the Japanese people were contemptuous of us, ill-treated us, repressed us and persecuted us, we hardly know how many times we clenched our teeth and shed our tears. . . .
>
> The Japanese people not only took our farmland away from us, but forced us to drift from the native land, being deprived of economic means. Subsequently, as you have seen several million laborers were thrown into the Japanese labor market. . . .
>
> Despite many other things which made us hold ill feelings [against Japan], now we are obliged not to return home [but to live here] for a variety of reasons.
>
> [Let bygones be bygones], we are willing to drain our bitter memory away in water. From now on let us hold hand-in-hand with the Japanese people for mutual prosperity and co-existence. . . .
>
> We thereby organized a resident association to resolve ourselves with an all-out effort the problems of our fellow countrymen in Japan. We sincerely hope that you will extend to us your understanding, cooperation and support [for the undertaking].[50]

In contrast to the Chōren's approach, the statement outlining the future policy was conciliatory and moderate in its tone in formulating the rationale for their activities in Japan. A similar appeal was made personally by Pak Yŏl, asking the Japanese people to be more sympathetic and generous in dealing with the Korean problems in Japan.[51]

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[50]For a text of the "Appeal to the Japanese People," this was carried by Kokusai Shimbun, October 28, 1946.

[51]Pak Yol, "Nihon kokumin ni kisu" [An Appeal to the Japanese People], Bunkyō Shimbun, April. 1948.

At the same time, he cautioned the Koreans that it would be unwise for them to hold hostile feelings or the desire to retaliate against the Japanese people. The ancien regime under the imperialists, he said, was out enemy but "the Japanese people under the new democratic regime are no longer our enemy." "When Japan regrets her wrong-doing by abandoning the imperialist design of the past, and endeavors to tread the path of justice in the future, we must extend our sincere congratulations." Furthermore, the two countries were interdependent in every respect. Present industries in Korea were founded by the Japanese techniques and machinery. If Koreans rejected them, he stated, the future industrial growth in Korea would be in jeopardy. Therefore, he urged the Koreans to promote a cordial relationship with the Japanese, because they needed each other's help to build up their countries from the ravages of the war.[52]

Despite these ambitious beginnings in the right direction, the Mindan's performance under Pak Yŏl's leadership in practice proved to be contrary to what it had purported to do for the Koreans in Japan. Although Pak Yŏl's presence might have given an impetus for a new separate and rival organization, he failed to display convincing reasons to the majority of the Koreans why they should oppose the Chōren. The Chōren already had a nation-wide organizational structure with a good financial backing, and programs to act

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[52]Pak Yŏl, "Nihon wa teki ka mikata ka" [Is Japan Our Foe or Ally?], Kyoto Taimusu, November 20, 1948.

as a spokesman for the Koreans in Japan. Only later did it become apparent that, under the cloak of anti-Communism and a pro-Japanese attitude, the Mindan's real concern was to enlist help from the Japanese government to destroy its rival and to capture the hegemony over the Koreans already predominated by the Chōren.[53]

To accomplish his own personal goal, Pak Yŏl, with the aid of his supporters, launched a propaganda campaign to erase his image of being an anarchist. He felt that his experience with the anarchist movement might hamper his political career in the future. He even tried to dissociate himself from his old anarchist colleagues. Several pamphlets and books were published to idolize him as a great leader and a patriotic nationalist who had struggled for the independence of Korea.[54]

One of the few cases of agreement within the Mindan was their unanimous choice of Pak Yŏl as their leader. The Mindan was a loose conglomeration of various factional groups. They were divided on the basis of personal ties, regional origins, and selfish motives. Constant factional discord and a series of scandals were to follow, both of which

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[53] Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 3-4.

[54] For instance, see Chŏng T'ae-sŏng, Ningen Pak Yŏl [Pak Yŏl as a Man] (Tokyo: Shin Chōsen Kensetsu Dōmei, 1946). By the same author, Tokuritsu shidōsha Pak Yŏl [Pak Yŏl, as a Leader for Independence] (Tokyo: Shin Chōsen Kensetsu Dōmei, 1946). Pak Yŏl, Shin Chōsen kakumei ron [A Treatise of Revolution for a New Korea] (Tokyo: Chūō Shuppansha, 1949). Yamakawa Tadao, Chōsen wa dōnaruka [What Will Happen to Korea] (Tokyo: Tokyo Jōhōsha, 1948).

seriously impaired the Mindan's activities during the most critical period. Moreover, Pak Yŏl began to set his eyes on the home country for his political ambitions, especially after the establishment of the South Korean Interim Government in January, 1947.[55] The Mindan, to him, was a springboard upon which to build his political base in the home country. He often threatened to resign as a means to test the loyalty of his supporters. He called Special National Convention for six times during his two and one-half years as head of the Mindan.[56] Since no single faction in the Mindan was overwhelmingly preponderant over the other, Pak Yŏl was thus able to command the factions by playing a balancing role. When he could no longer perform such a role, he failed to be re-elected to head the Mindan in April, 1949.[57]

Throughout all these upheavals the Mindan's finances had been mainly dependent upon the illegal disposal of rationed goods in the black market. The financial report submitted in October, 1948, clearly indicated that profits were earned through illegal transactions.[58]

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[55] It is reported that Pak Yŏl once asked Syngman Rhee to appoint him as Korean Ambassador to Japan. See Pak Hi-chŏl, op.cit., p. 72, and Chang Hyŏk-chu, op.cit., p. 109.

[56] Bunkyō Shimbun, March 8, 1948, and Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 39-40, 50 ff.

[57] Pak Hi-chŏl, op.cit., pp. 70-71.

[58] Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 51-52.

When such transactions were no longer permitted by the stringent control of the Japanese police, Pak Yŏl appointed Whang Sŏng-p'il, a wealthy Korean, to be his deputy to handle the financial problems. Then it became a practice for some time to draft wealthy businessmen to important positions in the Mindan as a means of raising funds. However, it usually misfired, as each wanted to utilize the institution as a tool for his own business enterprises.[59] The Mindan resorted to every conceivable means to raise funds. For instance, when the South Korean National Assembly passed the "Overseas Korean Nationals Registration Law" on November 24, 1949, the Korean Mission in Japan delegated some of its administrative work to the Mindan to expedite the registration process for the Koreans. However, bitter complaints were heard among the Koreans, when the Mindan charged exhorbitant fees for registration on the pretext that the fund would be used to finance future Mindan activities.[60] Consequently, the Mindan in the first few years of existence lost its original stance and was never able to win public confidence among the Koreans in Japan. The Mindan gained support neither from SCAP nor from the Japanese government, despite its appealing doctrine of anti-Communism. Throughout the American occupation in Japan, it was predominantly the Chōren which served as a spokesman for the majority of the Koreans in Japan.

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Pak Hi-chŏl, op.cit., p. 69, and Kokusai Nichinichi Shimbun, July 27, 1949.

CHAPTER III

THE ERA OF UNREST AND THE POLITICAL REPRESSION

Aside from the ideological affinity, the desire for cooperation between the JCP and the Chōren appears to have stemmed from a practical need for reciprocal support. The urgent task for the postwar JCP was to rebuild the organization of the Party, which had been shattered completely by the mass arrest in the early 1930's. For this, the JCP needed support from all conceivable sources. The availability of the dedicated Korean Communists, and the presence of the Chōren were instrumental as a departure point in broadening the mass base throughout Japan.[1] The Chōren, on the other hand, needed the JCP's backing as an ally and spokesman for the oppressed and underprivileged Korean minority in Japan. The JCP was able to exert its influence over the Chōren through Kim Ch'ŏn-hae's interlocking position in both the JCP and the Chōren. Judging from the available evidence, however, the scope of his influence within the Central Committee of the JCP seems to have been limited only to matters

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[1]Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō [The Korean Movement in Japan] (Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955), pp. 42-43.

concerning Koreans in Japan.[2] Instead, it appears that he was being installed in the Central Committee, so the JCP could gain the strength of members by allying themselves with the Chōren.

However, the fraternal solidarity between the Japanese and Korean Communists in Japan was not a new development, but had previous historical roots. In the September, 1922, issue of Zen-ei, the Japanese Communists stressed the need for "unity of the Japanese and Korean workers" to struggle against the "Japanese imperialists and militarists."[3] By 1931, the Japan Bureau of the Korean Communist Party dissolved as a separate entity, and merged with the JCP.[4] As a demonstration of their solidarity and common struggle, the 1931 and 1932 Political Theses of the JCP adopted as their slogan the fight for the liberation and independence of Korea.[5] Subsequently the JCP

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[2]For example, see Akahata, November 22, 1945, and No. 6, December 22, 1945, and No. 36, May 28, 1946. Also Yaginuma Masaji, Nihon Kyōsantō undō shi [A History of the Japanese Communist Movement] (Tokyo: Keibunkaku, 1953), p. 3.

[3]The full text is in Kim Chŏng-myŏng, comp., Chōsen dokuritsu undō: Kyōsanshugi undō hen [The Korean Independence Movement: The Communist Movement] Vol. V (Tokyo: Harashobō, 1967), pp. 689-690.

[4]The dissolution statement made by the Japan Bureau of the Korean Communist Party was carried by Akahata, No. 61, December 23, 1931. See also Kim Chŏng-myŏng, comp., op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 198-199, 959-960, and ibid., Vol. V, pp. 790-791.

[5]English translation of the 1931 and 1932 Political Theses of the JCP is in George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji, the Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), Appendixes E and F.

established a "Minority Section" in every local Communist Party Committee to accept Korean membership.[6]

Although the JCP then began to recruit its Korean members, the JCP had little faith in them. The Korean members were always treated with extreme caution by fellow Japanese Communists, and were never given any responsible positions in the Party hierarchy. According to the Japanese police record, the JCP was said to have characterized its Korean members as "brutish," "treacherous," and "unprincipled" people of a low intellectual sophistication.[7] In comparison with the Japanese adherents, it was reported that the Koreans tended to possess traits of "daring" and "persistency" once a mission was assigned; they, therefore, were best suited to serve as functionaries or agitators in front-line activities.[8] In view of all these, it was a radical departure for the JCP from its customary policy, when Kim Ch'ŏn-hae was elected to the highest Party organ after the War. Presumably, it was necessitated by the cognizance of the strength of the Chōren, and subsequent desire to incorporate this strength into the postwar JCP strategy.

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[6]"Chōsen ni okeru kakumei undō no hatten to puroretariato no nimmu" [The Development of the Revolutionary Movement in Korea and the Task of the Proletariat], Akahata, No. 91, August 20, 1932, and ibid., No. 93, August 30, 1932.

[7]Kim Chŏng-myŏng, comp., op.cit., Vol. IV, pp. 212-213, and Tsuobe Senji, Chōsen minzoku dokuritzu undō hishi [The Hidden History of the Korean Independence Movement] (Tokyo: Nikkan Rōdō Tsūshinsha, 1959), pp. 336-339.

[8]Ibid.

The initial postwar JCP strategy was set forth during the Fourth Party Congress, which was held for the first time after the War. The report on the Fourth Party Congress indicated the continuing influence of the 1932 Thesis and the tactical line of the prewar era.[9] Two major themes loomed large: the overthrow of the Emperor system and a democratic revolution. However, this extreme position was modified by Nosaka Sanzō upon his return from exile in Yenan in January, 1946. Under his direction, the JCP's strategy and tactics were given a new slant designed to make the Party "loved by the Japanese people." His intention was to soften its militant posture and to make the Party's image more acceptable to the people. In a joint statement issued by Nosaka and the Central Committee in January, 1946, they agreed upon the need for abolishing the Emperor system. However, they made a distinction between the Emperor as a political institution and the Imperial Household. The overthrow of the Emperor system, they stated, referred to the destruction of the monarchy as a political institution. However, the question of retaining the Imperial Household should be determined by the will of the Japanese people.[10] This theme was elaborated upon further during the Fifth Party Congress held in February, 1946. The "Manifesto" issued by this Congress declared that their immediate objective was "to complete the bourgeois democratic

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[9]For the Fourth Party Congress Report, see Akahata, December 6, 1945.

[10]Akahata, January 22, 1946.

revolution by peaceful and democratic means."[11] To relieve any misgivings, Nosaka clarified that "peaceful means" did not mean passivity, but referred to refraining from overt violence, such as armed uprising to capture power. "The Communist Party is a revolutionary party," he said, "we have great obstacles and many enemies which we must crush. We must be militant to the last degree." To carry out the peaceful revolution, Nosaka advocated the unity of all political forces as a "democratic front."[12]

Within this framework, the Chōren found a common ground on which to form a united front with the JCP. Such a front, according to the JCP's scheme, did not require a complete uniformity of views; each group was allowed to develop its own position freely. The task delegated to the Chōren was to act as a "vanguard unit" to democratize not only Japan but also all Asian nations.[13]

Now that the theoretical justification for the Chōren to join the JCP's united front was complete, the political stage was set for action in the early spring of 1946. This period was marked by continued unrest, arising from food

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[11]"Daigokai Tōtaikai Sengen" [Manifesto of the Fifth Party Congress] Zen-ei, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1946), 16-17.

[12]Nosaka Sanzō, "Taikai sengen ni tsuite" [Concerning the Party Manifesto], Zen-ei, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1946), 18-19.

[13]Nakanishi Inosuke, "Nihon tennō no datō to tōyō minzoku no minshu dōmei: Chōsenjin Renmei he no yōsei" [The Overthrow of the Emperor System and the Democratic League for the Asian Races: an Appeal to the Chōren], Minshu Chōsen, No. 7 (July, 1946), 28-29.

shortages and increasing unemployment. Tokyo was plagued by a series of massive demonstrations placing the blame on the Shidehara cabinet. "A People's Rally to Overthrow the Reactionary Shidehara Cabinet" was held on April 7, sponsored by the League for the Democratic Peoples, which was a loose coalition of the left-wing groups. The Chōren was there, 20,000 strong, of the 70,000 people assembled.[14] They made a five-point demand which included a resolution asking for the cabinet's resignation. Later, they marched to the Shidehara's official residence to present their demands, but there were met by three hundred policemen. They ultimately clashed with each other and several persons were seriously injured. It was the most violent disorder experienced in Japan since the War had ended. Several other demonstrations soon followed. These prompted General MacArthur to issue a stern warning on May 20, 1946, that while "every possible rational freedom of the democratic method has been permitted, the physical violence which undisciplined elements are now beginning to practice will not be permitted to continue."[15]

To further control unruly Koreans, SCAP defined the scope of legal authority in that Japanese courts should continue to exercise jurisdiction over Koreans in Japan, and that the Japanese government should be held responsible for the preservation of law and order including the control of

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[14] Asahi Shimbun, April 8, 1946.

[15] Summation, No. 8 (May, 1946), 4-5.

violent acts committed by Koreans.[16] Once the question of jurisdiction over the Koreans became clear, the Japanese authorities wasted no time in exercising strict control over Koreans.

Nevertheless, despite the stringent law enforcement, there was little sign of any decline of "violent acts" perpetrated by Koreans. There had been 128 "violent acts" perpetrated by Koreans reported by the Japanese police at the end of 1945, since the surrender. However, the frequency was increased to 5,336 in 1946, and in the following year 5,681 cases were reported by the Japanese police.[17] This increase of violence and unlawful acts appears to have given the Japanese police sufficient excuse for resorting to systematic intimidation of Koreans, as in the pre-War period. Subsequently, the Koreans were frequent subjects of unreasonable search and seizure, against which they had little defense. Even on the occasion of an "anti-crime" campaign conducted by the police, a Korean emblem was used in the posters as a background to illustrate a clutching hand

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[16] Directives, SCAPIN-75, AG 015 "Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction," February 19, 1946, and ibid., SCAPIN-1111/A, AG 250.1 "Misconducts Committed by Koreans," April 29, 1946.

[17] According to Japanese police, "violent acts" constitute: e.g., mob violence, assault and battery, robbery, fraud and extortion, assault on police officers, disputes and brawls among Koreans, non-negotiable demands to the Japanese authorities and illegal occupancy of public buildings, etc., see Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., Chapter 7.

reaching out to rob a cringing Japanese woman.[18] It was an obvious outgrowth of the high crime rate among Koreans, coupled with the built-in prejudice of the Japanese police toward Koreans (Fig. 2).

JAPANESE POSTER—This poster, distributed by the Tokyo Ueno Police Station, appeared all over downtown Tokyo in 1947. It warns the householder to beware of dangerous robbers, and with the Korean Rag symbol as its central motif, implies that Koreans are the criminals.

Eventually the conditions for Koreans in Japan became so precarious that the Koreans of all political shades got together and organized a "Committee for Protection of Korean Rights."[19] The Committee issued a statement listing sixteen

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[18]David Conde, "The Korean Minority in Japan," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XVI (February, 1947), 45. His same article was reprinted in the Korean Survey (December, 1959), 3-21. The picture is photocopied from the Korean Survey.

[19]It was organized by the combined efforts of the Japanese and Korean lawyers in Japan. The most noted member was Fuse Tatsuji, a champion of civil rights and lawyer, who led the famous Jiyū Hōsōdan [The Liberal Judicial Group]. Fuse Tatsuji was always a legal counsel, without fee, to many Korean political prisoners in the Japanese trial courts. See Kim Il-myŏng, "Zainichi Chōsenjin to Jiyū Hōsōdan" [The Koreans in Japan and the Liberal Judicial Group], Koria Hyōron, Vol. X, No. 93 and 94 (December, 1968 and January,

violent acts and brutality committed against Koreans mostly by the Japanese police. Among the charges included was the responsibility for the death of two hundred and seventy-two Korean repatriates from starvation and lack of medical attention, at the Sasebo detention camp from June 23, to September 15, 1946, in addition to various other cases of police brutality.[20]

Protest Movements: The Legal Status, Taxation and Education

From the early days of the American occupation, SCAP made no provision for the legal status of Koreans in Japan, apparently with the belief that all Koreans would soon be repatriated. However, the ambiguous nature of the SCAP's policy in treating Koreans as "liberated nationals" or "enemy" subjects if necessary, had been the cause of confusion and misunderstanding for both Japanese authorities and Koreans. The intended implication of the term "liberated nationals" appeared to have been merely a means for SCAP to make some distinction between the Japanese nationals and her former colonial subjects such as Koreans and Taiwanese. Obviously

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1969), 19-31 and 44-48. Concerning Fuse Tatsuji and his civil rights movement in Japan, see Morinaga Eisaburō, "Jinken yōgō undōshijō no sentatsu - Fuse Tatsuji [The Pioneer in the History of the Movement for the Protection of Human Rights - Fuse Tatsuji], Hōgaku Semina, (December, 1956), 44-48, and Hirano Yoshitarō, "Jinken o mamotta hitobito - Fuse Tatsuji" [The People Who Protected Human Rights - Fuse Tatsuji], Hōgaku Semina (November, 1959), 56-61.

[20]Conde, op.cit., p. 45.

SCAP never intended to classify the "liberated nationals" in the same category as the privileged United Nations nationals in the occupied country. When SCAP defined the status of the United Nations, neutral nationals and enemy nationals, Koreans were not even mentioned as nationals of "nations whose status has changed as a result of the war."[21] Even when special supplementary rations were distributed to most foreign nationals in Japan, Koreans were not included. The SCAP directive on rationing specifically stated that "nothing in this directive will be construed to change the food ration for Korean nationals who have elected to remain in Japan, and who receive the same ration as Japanese nationals."[22] Furthermore, SCAP noted that the legal jurisdiction over Koreans continued to be exercised by the Japanese authorities. In short, SCAP intended to lump Koreans legally together with Japanese without any clear mention of the future status of Koreans in Japan. Finally, fifteen months after the War, SCAP made its intention known to the public in a press release: the Koreans who elected to remain in Japan would be considered as Japanese nationals, until they were recognized as Korean

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[21] Directives, SCAPIN-217, AG 312.4 "Definition of United Nations Nationals, Neutral Nations, and Enemy Nations," October 31, 1945.

[22] Ibid., SCAPIN-1094, AG 430 "Ration for United Nations' Nationals, Neutral Nationals, and Stateless Persons," July 30, 1946, and SCAPIN-1841 under same subject above, January 8, 1948.

nationals by a lawfully established government of Korea.[23] The SCAP statement was the target of vigorous protest by Koreans, who felt that it was intended to prolong the enslavement of Koreans under the Japanese rule. "We had suffered enough," they cried, demanding that the Koreans should receive different treatment from that accorded to the "defeated" nationals. The charge prompted SCAP to make a further clarification on November 20, 1946, that it had "no intention of interfering in any way with the fundamental rights of any person of any nationality in regard to retention, relinquishment, or choice of citizenship.[24] But SCAP stressed that to exempt Koreans from the observance of the Japanese laws might create a form of extra-territoriality which was against the Occupation policy.[25] Then, for the most part, the question concerning the legal status of Koreans in Japan was left to the discretion of the Japanese government to handle within the policy outlined by SCAP.[26]

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[23] Tatsumi Nobuo, Zainichi Kankokujin no hōteki chii kyōtei to shutsunyūkoku kanri tokubetsuhō kaisetsu [The Treaty Defining the Legal Status of Koreans in Japan and Commentary on the Special Immigration Law] (Japan, Immigration Office, Ministry of Justice, 1966), p. 5, and Conde, op.cit., p. 45.

[24] The Nippon Times, November 21, 1946.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Directives, SCAPIN-852, AG 053 "Entry and Registration of Non-Japanese Nationals in Japan," April 2, 1946.

Accordingly, the Japanese government legally classified Koreans as aliens under the Alien Registration Act,[27] and the Koreans were subsequently disenfranchised from participating in the political process.[28] However, when the Ministry of Justice later added a legal interpretation, it was stated that the Koreans in Japan would cease to hold Japanese nationality, in a strict legal sense, from the date the Peace Treaty was to come into force in 1952.[29] In other words, the Japanese government would continue to regard the Koreans in Japan as retaining Japanese nationality in principle until the official termination of the war became effective by the Peace Treaty. Yet, for all other practical purposes, Koreans were treated as aliens, still subject to the Japanese laws.

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[27] Imperial Order No. 207, the Alien Registration Act, see Kanpō, May 2, 1947.

[28] Korean suffrage was suspended by the Law No. 42, Amendment to Election Law of the House of Representatives, on December 17, 1945, and subsequently Law No. 11, the Election Law of the House of Councilor enacted on February 24, 1947, and the Law No. 67, the Prefectural Home-rule Law enacted on April 17, 1947. For further details, see Tatsumi Nobuo, op.cit., pp. 5-6.

[29] See "Circular Notice Concerning Nationality and Family Registration Pursuant to the Coming into Force of the Treaty of Peace" Civil Affairs, A. No. 438, issued by the Director of the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice on April 19, 1952. See Satō Shigemoto, "Chōsenjin no kokuseki ni tsuite" [Concerning the Korean Nationality], Minji Geppō, No. 5 (May, 1967), 14-19, and Hashimoto Yutaka, "Heiwajōyaku to Chōsenjin no kokuseki" [The Peace Treaty and the Korean Nationality], Minji Kenshū, No. 57 (January, 1962), 33-34. Some discussion from the international law point of view, see Tameika Yoshio, "Nationality of Formosans and Koreans," The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2 (1958), 55-65.

Notwithstanding the legal technicality, the Koreans generally refused to recognize the applicability of Japanese laws to them especially on matters concerning some specific taxation. This was illustrated when the Japanese government promulgated the Capital Levy Tax Law in 1947. This law created a highly progressive property tax applicable to all individual assets, "valued in excess of 100,000 yen," retroactive to March, 1946. The only ones exempted from the tax were United Nations nationals and their military personnel. Although there were very few Koreans who possessed sufficient wealth to be subject to the law, the Korean community as a whole objected to it, not so much on the basis of legal principle, but on moral grounds.[30] They argued that such heavy taxation was to meet the reparations resulting from the aggressive war waged and lost by the Japanese imperialists, for which no Korean was responsible in sharing the consequences. The SCAP policy on taxation had specified in a memorandum that taxation for the purpose of reparation or "charges falling upon the Japanese government as a result of the war" should not be levied by the Japanese government upon property of United Nations nationals who bore no responsibility for the war.[31] Those

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[30]Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan: 1904-1950 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 64.

[31]For this specific provision, see Directives, SCAPIN-4938/A, AG 012.2 "Applicability of Taxes to Non-Japanese Nationals," November 29, 1947, and SCAPIN-1826/A, "Applicability of Ordinary Taxes to Non-Japanese Nationals," July 25, 1946.

Koreans who had been enslaved and exploited by the Japanese imperialists for forty years, argued that Koreans should be exempt from the levy as were United Nations nationals. These sentiments were expressed when, before the official enactment of the taxation, the Chōren organized a mass rally and presented a petition to the SCAP Commander on December 13, 1946. It was stated: "We petition you to grant us exemption from laws which are applied to Japanese and not to foreigners. We belong to the latter and can never observe such laws as are connected with payment of reparations."[32] Again in March, the following year, the Chōren petitioned to General MacArthur, stating that: "Upon the honor of a liberated race, it is not only unbearable but impossible for us to obey such an unjust and humiliating law."[33]

In further protest against the overall Japanese government policy concerning Koreans, the Chōren collaborated with the JCP in a "National Mass Meeting for the Security of Livelihood and Overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet" on December 17, 1946. A few days later a Committee for the Protection of the Livelihood of Koreans, under the auspices of the Chōren, called a rally on the Imperial Palace ground on December 20th. About 40,000 Koreans assembled and selected 10 representatives to present a resolution to Premier Yoshida. While the demonstrators were marching past the Premier's residence, the 10

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[32] Quoted in Wagner, op.cit., p. 65.

[33] Ibid.

representatives went inside to present the resolution. Violence soon broke out, seemingly the result of an exchange of unpleasant remarks between the Japanese police and the marchers.[34] Later the 10 Korean representatives and several others were arrested, on charges of inciting a riot which was prejudicial to the Occupation policy. Despite the Koreans' request to have more time for preparing their defense, they were tried within a week after the incident by the Military Court. One American observer noted that the proceedings appeared to be "going through the legal motions to arrive at a pre-determined verdict." Later in March, 1947, when American lawyers stationed in Korea had occasion to review the trial record, they commented that "insufficient evidence appears indicating beyond reasonable doubt either several or joint activity constituting incitement to riot" on the part of the ten Koreans accused.[35] Since MacArthur's warning had concerned violence, it had become quite evident that whatever the Korean problems might have been, SCAP's sympathy no longer rested with the Koreans.

Nevertheless, yet another protest movement erupted with the enactment of the Alien Registration Law in May, 1947. It was designed to have all aliens registered, for administrative control purposes. Such registration was undoubtedly aimed at the Koreans, who comprised approximately 93 percent

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[34] Chōren Chūō Jihō, December 5, 1947, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 67.

[35] Wagner, op.cit., pp. 64-66.

of the total aliens in Japan.[36] The registration required photographs, fingerprinting, and registration cards had to be carried at all times. For Koreans, it was all too strongly reminiscent of the pre-War period. In addition, the registration might uncover not only those who entered Japan illegally, but also those who drew double rations by using the ration-cards of repatriated persons.

TABLE 2

ALIEN REGISTRATION BY NATIONALITY AS OF JUNE, 1948

Nationality	Number	Nationality	Number
Annam	2	Italy	198
Arabia	3	Korea	591,410
Argentina	20	Lebanon	1
Albania	4	Lithuania	2
Australia	52	Luxemburg	7
Austria	35	Malaya	10
Belgium	31	Mexico	31
Brazil	131	Netherlands	231
Bulgaria	2	Norway	6
Burma	2	New Zealand	3
Canada	567	Panama	11
Ceylon	1	Peru	115
Chile	1	Philippines	286
China	20,421	Poland	55
Columbia	1	Portugal	174
Cuba	7	Rumania	3
Czechoslovakia	27	El Salvador	1
Denmark	24	Spain	125
Egypt	4	Sweden	43
England	473	Switzerland	81
Estonia	11	Syria	18
Finland	7	Taiwan	14,958
France	346	Turkey	328
French-Indochina	12	Tartar	12
Germany	728	Uruguay	4
Greece	18	U.S.	2,364
Guatemala	6	Soviet Union	338
Hungary	44	White Russian	343
India	132	Yugoslavia	12
Indonesia	173	Stateless Persons	579
Iran	5	Grand Total	635,142
Iraq	4		
Ireland	32	Korean	591,410

[36] See Table 2.

Source: Hōmubu (Ministry of Justice), Nihon ni zai jūsuru Hinihonjin no horitsujō no chii ni tsuite, hōritsu shiryō No. 308, December, 1949.

Practically all Koreans united before this matter of vital concern, and voiced the following objections:

1. The registration was not based on established international procedure;
2. It should be conducted by Korean organizations such as the Mindan and the Chōren;
3. Koreans should be accorded full and conscientious treatment as foreign nationals. . . ;
4. The lives and properties of Koreans should be properly safeguarded;
5. The Japanese government should take steps to insure that the Japanese people know and respect the status of Koreans.[37]

If these conditions were not met, both the Chōren and the Mindan threatened that they would boycott the registration. Consequently, during a month-long registration period, only a few Koreans complied. Finally SCAP felt it necessary to issue a statement assuring the rights of aliens and clarifying the purpose of the registration. However, under the pressure of both persuasion and threat of punishment, Koreans were all the more reluctant to register.[38]

Another issue that had a significant impact upon the Koreans was the question of Korean education in Japan. Many Koreans were concerned since they had elected to remain in

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[37]Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., pp. 136-138, and Wagner, op.cit., pp. 66-67.

[38]Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., pp. 138-144, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 67.

Japan, as to how to de-Japanize themselves and their children. They argued that the Japanese colonial policy over the years was designed to drive the Korean national culture into extinction, by depriving Koreans of their language and literature. They believed that they had acquired the fundamental right, as "liberated" people to recover their lost language and their cultural identity through their own education programs. Subsequently, the majority of Korean parents had withdrawn their children from Japanese schools and sent them to the Korean Language Institute operated by the Chōren. Later the Chōren established a Primary Education Committee which supervised the overall educational programs, expanding courses to include not only Korean language, but Korean history, arithmetic and science. The Chōren's Primary Education Committee succeeded in establishing schools, as are shown in Table 3. Although the educational standards provided by the Chōren generally fell far short in quality compared to those of the Japanese school system, the Korean community was content with the curricula. In some high schools, a course on the Marxist doctrine was offered to indoctrinate students with Communist ideals.

In the early days of the occupation, SCAP took no official cognizance of the proliferating Korean schools. After October, 1947, SCAP issued a note that the Korean educational institutions should comply with the rules and regulations established by the Japanese Ministry of Education.

TABLE 3

COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND STUDENTS

		Primary Schools	Middle Schools	High Schools	Youth Schools	Total
As of October, 1946	Schools	524			12	537
	Students	42,182			724	42,906
	Teachers	1,032			54	1,076
As of October, 1947	Schools	541	4		30	575
	Students	46,961	1,123		2,148	50,231
	Teachers	1,250	48		160	1,458
As of April, 1948	Schools	566	7		32	605
	Students	48,930	2,416		1,726	53,072
	Teachers	1,229	65		120	1,423
As of July, 1949	Schools	331	15	4	23	372
	Students	34,415	4,487	666	952	40,520
	Teachers	995	165	52	75	1,287

Source: Wŏn Yong-dŏk, "Yoshida Seifu he no kōkaijō" [An Open Letter to the Yoshida Regime], Minshu Chōsen, No. 5 (May, 1950), 26.

However, SCAP did mention that "Korean schools would be permitted to teach the Korean language as an addition to the regular curriculum."[39] Similarly the Japanese authorities apparently had no objections to the Korean educational programs. In some cases, the local school authorities

[39]Wagner, op.cit., p. 69, and Shinozaki, op.cit., p. 159.

permitted part-time use of classrooms for Korean education, as Koreans were taxpayers like other Japanese citizens.[40]

However, in accordance with the SCAP plans to reform the Japanese educational system, the Korean educational programs were also affected. Hence, the Ministry of Education issued a circular note to all Prefecture Governors in January, 1948, that the new School Education Law would be applicable to Korean schools. Consequently, Korean schools, including the curricula, as well as the qualification of teachers, were required to be accredited by Prefecture Governors.[41] It was also added that all Korean children must attend accredited public or private schools to meet the legal standard. In addition, although the Korean language could be taught as an extra-curricular subject, other regular classes had to be conducted in the Japanese language.[42] The Chōren vigorously opposed this on the grounds that the basic goal of the separate Korean education was the preparation of future Korean citizens, and the Japanese educational programs were not suited for these ends.

While the Chōren opened negotiations with the Ministry of Education to accredit Korean schools as private

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[40] Counter Measure Committee on Korean Education, Kōbe Chōsenjin Kyōiku mondai no shinsō [The Truth About Educational Problems of Koreans in Kōbe], May 22, 1948. Hereafter cited as Chōsenjin kyōiku mondai.

[41] Summation, No. 31, April, 1948, p. 303.

[42] Bunkyo Shimbun, June 21, 1948, and Wagner, op.cit., pp. 69-70.

institutions within the framework of the School Education Law, Koreans staged demonstrations at Osaka and Kobe.[43] One of the slogans adopted by the Korean demonstrators was to demand the "right of autonomy in Korean education." In the meantime, the Chōren organized a Counter Measure Committee on Korean Education, and demanded the following four specific points of the Japanese Premier:

1. Instruction in the Korean language in class;
2. Use of textbooks compiled by a Korean committee, with the approval of SCAP;
3. Administration of schools by parents and teachers;
4. Teaching of the Japanese language as a required curriculum.[44]

In addition, some members of the Counter Measure Committee on Korean Education paid a visit to the Far Eastern Commission to appeal the matter. Finally, in an appeal to gain the American authority's sympathy, Korean school children petitioned the Commanding General of the 25th Division in Osaka. The petition stated:

> We are Korean primary school boys and girls in Osaka. We wish your valuable consideration so that our teachers, whom we all respect, may freely teach us Korean subjects in our own language, inasmuch as it was your great army that has liberated our fellow Korean brothers and sisters from ruthless Japanese oppression. . . . please give our teachers freedom so pupils educated under them will be able to assist in the formation of and maintenance of a strong,

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[43] Summation, No. 31, April, 1948, p. 303.

[44] Chōsenjin kyōiku mondai, May 23, 1948, p. 1, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 70, and Shinozaki, op.cit., 162-163.

> unified, independent Korea, able to stand proudly with the rest of the independent, peace-loving nations of the world.[45]

The appeal by the school children, the demonstration, and the demands of the Counter Measure Committee to the Premier, had no apparent success. On the contrary, the attitude of the Japanese authorities was firm and uncompromising, ostensibly to lessen the mounting tension concerning the issue at stake. Subsequently, Prefecture Governors began to enforce the law throughout Japan by ordering all Korean schools closed which failed to comply with the law by April 15. Fierce protests sprang up in all quarters wherever the Korean schools were located.[46] Among them, the Kobe incident is noteworthy due to the intensity of violence and protest.

On April 10, 1948, when the Korean schools in Kobe were ordered to close by Hyogo Prefecture Governor, the Chōren's Kobe Chapter tried to negotiate with the Governor and the Mayor of Kobe, asking for special consideration on the question of Korean education. As a basis of negotiation, the Chōren stated that the Korean schools would be ready to comply with the law, provided that Koreans were allowed to maintain autonomy in organizing curricula and methods

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[45] United States Army Military Government in Korea, South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 30 (March 1948), 12, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 71.

[46] Summation, No. 31, April, 1948, p. 55. The most notable protests took place in Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe.

of teachings.[47] For several days, starting from April 12, while a crowd of several hundred Koreans waited outside of the Prefectural building, their negotiators tried in vain to secure an interview with the Governor. Their interview was denied on the pretext of the Governor's absence. By April 14, the crowd had grown to several thousands and they decided to sit in and wait in the building until the Governor would meet them. The Governor still had not appeared, and did not appear until the following evening. Instead, the protesters were warned by the Japanese police to clear the building or else be arrested. Soon violence broke out as the protesters ignored the police order. As a result, 65 were arrested and the rest were forcibly expelled from the building. From this time on, the situation worsened, with increasingly more violent confrontations between the protesters and the police. On April 24, another crowd of about 500 Koreans and some Japanese sympathizers marched together to the Prefectural government building and demanded again to meet with the Governor, but the request was denied again under the subterfuge of the Governor's absence. This time, the mob wasted no time, but quickly stormed into the Governor's office and found him having a meeting with the public procurator and the Mayor of Kobe. The angry mob surrounded the Governor's office and held the Governor, Mayor, and Police Chief as hostages for six hours, cutting

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[47] Chōsenjin kyōiku mondai, May 23, 1948, p. 1.

off all communication lines with the outside, until the Governor was compelled to accept their demands. The proclamation he signed agreed:

1. To rescind the order to close the Korean schools;
2. To postpone the return of the classroom buildings to the Japanese rented by the Korean schools;
3. To release protesters who were arrested by the police in connection with the school issue.[48]

Having accomplished their objectives, the protesters held a brief triumphal rally in front of the Prefectural building and then dispersed. But the thing did not settle as they had anticipated. Later in the evening, General Menoher, local U.S. Military Commander, belatedly proclaimed a state of "limited emergency" and deputized the Kobe police force under the Provost Marshal. He also instructed the Governor to nullify the proclamation signed under duress, and to reaffirm the original school-closure order. The Japanese police, reinforced by the American Military Police, set up roadblocks and surrounded the Korean ghettos in Kobe to round-up all members of the Chōren at midnight on the 24th. By dawn of the 25th, they had arrested more than

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[48] Ibid., p. 2, and Summation, No. 31, April, 1948, p. 55. Also, Wagner, op.cit., pp. 71-72. A more detailed and authentic account of the incident was written by Kobe historian, Ochiai Shigenobu, "Kobe Chōsenjin gakkō sōgi no gaikyō" [The Korean School Dispute in Kobe], Rekishi to Kobe, No. 4 (1953), 73-77, and "Kobe Chōsenjin jinken shokuhatten: Shōwa Nijūsannen no Chōsenjin gakkō heisa o meguru Kobe no sōran jiken" [The Cause of the Korean Incident in Kobe: The Korean Riot Incident in Kobe concerning the Korean School Case in 1948], Hyogo Shigaku, No. 28 (1961), 133-140.

1,600 persons. These were in addition to almost 3,000 arrested since the month-long dispute had erupted. As a result of the midnight wholesale round-up, several hundreds were injured while "property damage ran into millions of yen."[49] Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General of the Eighth Army, arrived at Kobe to take charge of the aftermath. He deplored the incident as "uncivilized" mob violence, and noted that he wished he "had the Queen Elizabeth here to ship the whole lot of them [Koreans] to Korea."[50] Later, the thirty Koreans and eight Japanese who led the protest were indicted on the charge of inciting a riot which was directed against the Occupational policy. The occupational authorities believed that "the prime moving force" behind the incident was the Communists.[51] Viewed in the light of post-war JCP strategy and tactics, it must have been undoubtedly the concerted actions of the JCP and the Chōren members which stepped up Korean demonstrations to such an extreme degree throughout various

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[49] Chōsenjin kyōiku mondai, May 23, 1948, p. 2, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 72, and Ochiai Shigenobu, op.cit., pp. 74-77.

[50] The Nippon Times, April 28, 1948. Because of his public statement wishing to ship the Koreans back to their homeland, there was an uproar among Koreans who accused the General of being "ignorant" and "irresponsible" for the statement showing his unawareness of what fundamental issues were involved with the incident. See Ch'oe Son, "A Reply to General Eichelberger's Statement," Bunkyo Shimbun, May 3, 1948.

[51] The Nippon Times, April 28, 1948, and Wagner, op.cit., p. 72.

cities in Japan, climaxing in a monster rally to build support for their demands and, by this means, to enlarge their following and enhance their power.

Also, the violent protests which spread to various cities of Japan were not without success. The Ministry of Education actually did moderate its original posture concerning the school issue, and decided to negotiate with the Chōren officials in Tokyo. After several days of talk, both sides agreed to sign a memorandum on May 3, 1948, acknowledging the Korean ethnical study programs with the provisions that:

1. Korean schools shall comply with School Education Law and Fundamental Education Law;

2. Korean schools may apply for accreditation, provided that they may conduct autonomous ethnic study programs within the scope permitted under private school systems.[52]

Viewed in the light of short-term objectives, the violent protests and strong-arm tactics frequently employed by the Chōren might have had some effect on obtaining their demands from the relevant decision makers. In the long run, however, their just causes had suffered more than benefited by their resorting to these tactics. Eventually, it invited not only repressive measures from the authorities, but the seed of self-destruction.

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[52] Chōren Chūō Jihō, May 14, 1948.

The Dissolution of the Chōren

Multiple factors contributed to the Koreans availing themselves of violent means to attain their goals, especially in the early years of American occupation. Among other reasons, however, Koreans were in general intensely frustrated and discontented people, as they were unable to obtain their demands, which they thought they deserved as "liberated" people. Furthermore, their hope for a forthcoming, better life turned out to be a false expectation. This feeling of deprivation was skillfully exploited to an extreme degree by the Japanese Communists; otherwise it might not have been expressed in such a militant manner. Also, the availability of options for Koreans to channel their demands to the policy makers was very limited by their legal classification as aliens. After their suffrage was suspended, the Chōren members felt a sense of impotency and helplessness in expressing their interests and needs. Hence, at the Fifth National Meeting held on October 15, 1948, one item included in the Programs of Actions by the Chōren was to endeavor to secure suffrage from the Japanese government.[53] In fact, acquisition of suffrage by a Korean in Japan means legally becoming a Japanese citizen. However, the Chōren's justification for seeking suffrage was that it was needed as a weapon to struggle more effectively to achieve their goals. Even

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[53] Chōren Chūō Jihō, October 26, 1948.

the JCP encouraged Koreans to seek suffrage from the Japanese government.[54]

The overall effectiveness of the Chōren's activities was not without criticism. As early as in the spring of 1947, Kim Tu-yong pointed out the fragmented and disunited actions taken by some local members, who ignored the proper guidance of the Central Organ of the Chōren.[55] Since the majority of Koreans were not well equipped with ideological perspective, Kim noted that they did not understand the broad objectives of the Korean movement. Their actions, therefore, tended to be rather spontaneous, only generated by emotional outburst as if they were engaged in some form of retaliatory action against the Japanese. This sort of action, he warned, would only cause Koreans to isolate themselves from the Japanese mass. Kim suggested that the "task of Koreans was to create cells and fractions to build a mass base," without whose support the position of Koreans would be vulnerable to the reactionary attack. "As things stand now," Kim feared that "we would become victims of the reactionary forces."[56] Therefore, he concluded that the ethnic problems

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[54] Chosŏn ŭi Byŏl, June 15, 1948, p. 1.

[55] Kim Tu-yong, "Chōsenjin undō wa tenkan shitsutsuaru" [The Korean Movement is Changing], Zen-ei, (March 1, 1947), p. 38.

[56] Ibid., p. 39.

of Koreans ought to be subjugated under the larger scheme of the class struggle.[57]

Consequently, the series of mass meetings and demonstrations openly advocating the overthrow of the government, inspired by the JCP, were ever increasing. And without fail, the Chōren always participated in the rallies. Especially after the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the fall of 1948, the Chōren publicly stated its support and allegiance to the Republic, and began to display the North Korean flag on all occasions. However, when SCAP issued a ban on the display of the North Korean flag in public, the Chōren waged another protest, but without apparent success.[58] The Chōren's persistent display of the North Korean flags, and the strict enforcement of the ban by the Japanese police caused numerous clashes everywhere.

To combat ever increasing left-wing inspired unrest, the Japanese government with the consent of SCAP enacted the Organization Control Law in April, 1949. The Law was designed to outlaw any organization which purposely resorted to violent tactics to influence the government policy. In keeping with this, on September 9, 1949, the Japanese government suddenly

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[57]Kim Tu-yong, "Chōsenjin undō no tadashii hatten no t: eni" [Toward Correct Development of the Korean Movement], Ze: -ei, No. 16 (May 1, 1947), p. 18.

[58]Chōren Chūō Jihō, November 6, 1948, and December 29, 1948.

deployed about 500 police around the Chōren's headquarters in Tokyo and issued an order for it to disband. The charges were that the Chōren was an "undemocratic and terrorist organization," falling under the provision of Article 2 and 4 of the Organization Control Law. Included was the specific charge that the Chōren had played a role in inciting riots over the school issues in Kobe and Osaka.[59] In addition, Ueda Shunkichi, Attorney General, ordered the confiscation of the property of the Chōren.[60] Furthermore, 28 Chōren leaders including Kim Ch'ŏn-hae, JCP Central Committee member, were placed on the purge list by the order of Attorney General Ueda.

The dissolution of the Chōren was a serious blow and was without doubt the opening step in a campaign to constrict the activities of all leftist organizations. With the mounting tension of the cold war in Europe and the rise of Mao's force in mainland China, this was what the conservative government of Yoshida had long desired, encouraged by the tacit consent of the SCAP authorities. The JCP, represented by Nosaka Sanzo, protested to the Attorney General that the action was clearly a "violation of Potsdam Declaration and

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[59] The New York Times, September 9, 1949, p. 12. Concerning the Dissolution Order of the Chōren, see Kanpō, No. 6797, September 8, 1949, p. 66.

[60] The estimated amount of the Chōren's property confiscated by the Japanese police was about ¥25 million. See Shinozaki, op.cit., pp. 230-231. However, Wagner quoting from The Nippon Times, November 11, 1949, stated that the confiscated value was more than ¥70 million. See Wagner, op.cit., p. 87.

the Japanese Constitution."[61] The purged Chōren officials appealed to SCAP to rescind the order, as well as to the Attorney General, but their efforts were in vain. Finally the ex-Chōren officials brought civil suit against the Government on the basis of the illegal seizure of the Chōren's property and the unlawful dissolution order.[62] About ten days after the dissolution of the Chōren, an additional order was issued from the Attorney General's office which invalidated all Korean school systems operated under the auspices of the Chōren. The destruction of the Chōren was thorough and complete, and the repercussions of these events were felt in two Koreas. Kim Il-sung, Premier of North Korea, sent a message to both the JCP and the Chōren condemning the Yoshida Government's action as a fascist reactionary move to destroy the democratic system in Japan. He advised the Chōren members to remain calm and not to resist the Yoshida's action with physical force which might jeopardize the position of the JCP as well.[63] In South Korea, on the other hand, President Syngman Rhee, blamed what he termed the "little lieutenants and colonels" of the SCAP staff who had been led to believe by the Japanese that "all Koreans are Bolsheviks,

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[61] Akahata, September 9, 1949, and September 12, 1949.

[62] The civil suit case claiming the illegal seizure of the Chōren's property was settled by the Tokyo Local Civil Court Division in March, 1959, and the court awarded ¥42,461.52 to the Chōsōren, which succeeded the Chōren. See Naigai Shūhō, No. 9, (April 8, 1959), 5-6.

[63] Shinozaki, op.cit., pp. 235-236.

anarchists and gangsters."[64] In addition, he raised a question as to why the Organization Control Law was applicable only to the Korean Chōren and not equally to the JCP. He concluded that this was a clear indication of the Japanese Government's intention to "drive the Koreans out of Japan."[65]

Meanwhile, the Mindan issued a statement praising the Japanese government's action, with the hope that the dissolution of the Chōren would provide a unique opportunity for the Mindan to expand its hegemony over all Koreans in Japan.[66] In fact, several weeks before the dissolution order was issued, a violent clash between the Chōren and the Mindan had taken place in Shimonoseki on August 18, and 131 Koreans had been arrested and several injured. After the incident, both organizations had accused each other of being terrorist organizations, and each demanded the Japanese authorities to disband the opponent organization. Nevertheless, it did not take too long for the Mindan to realize that the Yoshida government's move to dissolve the Chōren was not aimed only at the left-wing Korean movement, but directed at all Korean activities in Japan. This prompted the Mindan and some former Chōren members to patch up their differences and to create a Committee for the Common Struggle in order

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[64] The New York Times, July 29, 1949, p. 4.

[65] The Nippon Times, October 23, 1949, p. 1, and Sinsekye Sinmun, September 19, 1949, p. 1.

[66] The Kokusai Nichinichi, September 14, 1949, p. 1.

to encounter any further repressive measures.[67] However, this attempt to create a unified Korean organization out of the Mindan and the disbanded Chōren, which would certainly have enabled them to strengthen their positions in Japan, never fully materialized.

The Rift of the Left-Wing Korean Movement from JCP

Yoshida's move to dissolve the Chōren in September, 1949, was a total surprise to the JCP. Gratified by the gains of 35 seats in the House of Representatives in the early 1949, the JCP's leaders were jubilant. Nosaka Sanzō made a report at the 14th Central Plenum of the Central Executive Committee that the result of the election was an indication of a fully-grown class consciousness of the mass and a sign of readiness for a democratic revolution.[68] He boasted that the establishment of a people's government was possible even under the occupation, and that "it is a question of realization."[69] He even set a target date of September 1949 for capturing political power from the Yoshida regime.[70]

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[67] Chŏng Chŏl, Mindan (Tokyo: Yōyōsha, 1967), pp. 105-110 and 331-333.

[68] His report was later published under the title of: "Seiken he no tōsō to kokkai katsudō," [The Struggle for Political Power and Diet Activities], Zen-ei (April, 1949), 1-11.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Koyama Hirotake, Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō shi [A History of the Post-war Japanese Communist Party], (Tokyo: Hōgashoten, 1966), pp. 62-63.

Hence, the dissolution order of the Chōren was an unexpected event which awakened them from the illusion of the September revolution.[71] However, the occasion provided a sufficient warning for the JCP leaders that, without reassessment of the present policy, they could sooner or later expect to face a similar fate to that of the Chōren.

Bitter criticism of the JCP policy came from Cominform in a special article which appeared in the Cominform organ several months after the dissolution of the Chōren.[72] The criticism was mainly directed at Nosaka's erroneous theory that a peaceful revolution could be possible under the American occupation in Japan. The prime objective of the Cominform's attack was apparently designed to push the JCP into a more militant and radical role in the face of the United States policy to build Japan as a bulwark against Communism. On January 17, about ten days after the Cominform's criticism, the Chinese Communist Party also endorsed the main theme of the Cominform's article.[73]

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[71] Ibid., pp. 63-65.

[72] "Concerning the Situation in Japan," For a Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy! (January 6, 1950), 2. It was reprinted in Nihon Kyōsantō gojūnen mondai shiryō shū [A Collection of Documents Concerning the Japanese Communist Incident of 1950], Vol. I, pp. 1-3. Hereafter cited as Nikkyō gojūnen mondai.

[73] Jen-min Jih Pao, January 17, 1950. It was reprinted in Nikkyo gojūnen mondai, Vol. I, pp. 9-11. In regard to the JCP's strategy during the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Theodore McNelly, "The Communist Party of Japan and the Sino-Soviet Dispute" the paper was presented at a University Seminar on Modern East Asia: Japan, Columbia University, on November 10, 1967.

Despite the initial reluctance to accept the criticism from abroad, the JCP after long and heated discussions decided to admit the error in its strategy and tactics.[74] From the early spring of 1950, the JCP was faced with the problems of planning a new course of action which would eventually meet the "expectation of international proletariats," as pointed out by the Cominform. However, the problem was complicated by a serious division within the Party over their degree of militancy. Two factions began to emerge: one was the Main Stream faction headed by Tokuda and Nosaka, and the other was called the Internationalist under the leadership of Shiga Yoshio and Miyamoto Kenji. They all agreed that the JCP should take a more militant posture repudiating the United States' occupation policy to convert Japan into its base for further imperialistic ventures in East Asia. However, the Main Stream insisted that the Cominform's criticism did not object to the basic strategy of the Party, but rather demanded more vigorous and resolute action for the attainment of their goals. Therefore, the immediate task of the Party was to intensify its effort to expand and strengthen the democratic national front.[75] The Internationalists

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[74]The blame was placed on Nosaka who had been a JCP strategist. Nosaka admitted his errors in his strategic thinking and guidance. His confession was published under the title: "My Self-Criticism," Akahata, February 6, 1950.

[75]Actual lines of policy disagreement within the JCP were complex and confused by a web of factional struggles over the JCP leadership. For further details see Koyama Hirotake, op.cit., pp. 81-98, and Robert Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 91-96.

argued that the Cominform called for a complete overhaul of the Party strategy corresponding with the internationally oriented communist movement. They stressed a more militant stance, emphasizing illegal activities, insisting that the main issue was the elimination of American imperialism, thereby strengthening ties with other international proletariats.[76]

The latter's militant viewpoint was vehemently supported by most Korean JCP members. In fact, the Koreans in the JCP during the early 1950's were no less of a negligible force within the rank and file of the Party, than the hard-core ex-Chōren members who joined the JCP after the dissolution of the Chōren.[77]

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[76] Ibid.

[77] After the dissolution of the Chōren, so many Koreans wished to join the JCP in reaction to the Yoshida's move that the Party was obliged to accept them only on the quota basis not exceeding more than one quarter of the local Japanese Communist members. The membership quota was allocated as follows:

Region	Membership Limitation
Hokkaido	No more than 2,000
Kantō	" 5,000
Hokuriku	" 2,500
Chūgoku	" 6,000
Kyūshu	" 5,000
Tōkai	" 2,000
Kansai	" 4,000
Shikoku	" 1,600

Source: Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō [The Korean Movement in Japan] (Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955), pp. 233-235.

While the Main Stream leaders continued to refrain from assuming the militant role, they were unable to curb violent actions taken by some extreme groups of the international faction. This group mostly consisted of young radical students, Koreans, and day-laborers. They began to stage violent demonstrations and riots throughout Japan. Finally, when several American soldiers were attacked by anti-American demonstrators in Tokyo on May 30, 1950, SCAP found a convenient excuse to take repressive action against the JCP. A week later on June 6, SCAP ordered the Japanese government "to remove and exclude from public service" the 24 members of the JCP Central Committee and 17 members of the Akahata's editorial staffs.[78] Following the outbreak of the Korean War, SCAP's pressure on the Communist Party intensified. Subsequently, the Japanese government and private employers began to launch a large scale "red purge" which resulted in the dismissal of many thousands of Communists and their sympathizers. Furthermore, SCAP ordered not only the suspension of the publication of Akahata, but the arrest of nine JCP leaders for the violation of the Organization Control Law, by which the Chōren was ordered to dissolve. The JCP leaders immediately went underground as they had anticipated the forthcoming repressive measures ever since the dissolution

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[78] For the detailed account of the Red Purges, see Yaginuma Masaju, Nihon Kyōsanto undō shi [A History of the Japanese Communist Party Movement] (Tokyo: Keibunkaku, 1953), pp. 173-180. And Scalapino, op.cit., pp. 84-86. Koyama Hirotake, op.cit., pp. 86-98.

of the Chōren. The time finally had come for the JCP to resort to an armed struggle against the oppressive force.[79]

Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Korean War stimulated the scattered and disorganized ex-Chōren members to form another organization to replace the dissolved Chōren. In January, 1951, after several months of deliberation, the Zainichi Chōsen Tōitsu Minshu Sensen, or Minsen [Democratic Front in Japan for the Unification of Korea] was established. In fact, it was a reincarnation of the Chōren. The Minsen from its inception was purported to be a political organization. Following the deteriorating battle situation against the North Korean Army as a result of the MacArthur's Inchon landing and the drive to the Yalu river, the Minsen pledged to consolidate all the left-wing Koreans in Japan to devote their efforts to the defense of the fatherland.[80] To implement the goal, the underground organization, Sokoku Bōei Iinkai or Soboi [A Committee for the Defense of the Fatherland] was brought in under the Minsen's control as a

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[79]It was not until the Fourth Party Conference was held underground on February 25, 1951, that the JCP officially adopted the strategy of an arms struggle. However, the rationale for the arms struggle was published in two articles appearing in the illegal JCP underground journal, Naigai Hyōron, No. 4 (October 12, 1950), titled: "Kyosanshugisha to aikokusha no atarashii ninmu - chikara niwa chikara o motte tatakae" [The New Task of Communists and Patriots - Struggle against Power with Power], and another article appeared in ibid., No. 5 (January 24, 1951) titled: "Naze buryoku kakumei ga mondai ni naranakattaka" [Why Has Armed Revolution Not Become the Issue of Our Party].

[80]Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., pp. 58-59, and 98-99. Also Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan: 1965-66, p. 583.

paramilitary unit.[81] The Sobōi, coordinating closely with the JCP's "self-defense unit" was planned to be developed as a full-scale guerrilla force and to eventually become a part of a Japanese Red Army.[82] The overall Action Policy adopted by the Sobōi, except a section which committed itself to the defense of the fatherland, was almost identical in its strategy to that of the JCP's military policy outlined in the "JCP's Immediate and Basic Action Policy."[83] In short, their strategy was to wage guerrilla warfare against the "American imperialism and the Japanese reactionary forces" to bring about what they now termed as a "national liberation democratic revolution."

From the latter part of 1950 to 1952, the Sobōi was marked with an "era of Molotov cocktail." In cooperation with JCP's "self-defense unit," it began to wage hit-and-run terrorist activities, not only throwing fire bombs at police

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[81]Soon after the Korean War broke out, Sōboi was organized by young Korean radicals as an underground action unit. See Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., pp. 99-101.

[82]Tamagi Motoi, "Nihon Kyōsantō no Zainichi Chōsenjin shidō" [The JCP's Guidance on the Koreans in Japan], Koria Hyōron, (August, 1961), p. 6. Scalapino, op.cit., pp. 85-86, and Shinozaki Heiji, op.cit., pp. 100-101.

[83]Tamagi Motoi, op.cit., p. 13. For the complete text of the Resolutions adopted at the 4th and 5th National Conferences, see Nihon Kyōsanto daiyonkai daigokai zenkoku kyōgikai kettei shū [The Collected Resolutions of the 4th and 5th National Conferences of the JCP] (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1952). A brief excerpt may be found in Yaginuma Masaji, op.cit., pp. 235-248.

stations but sabotaging factories and American military bases.[84] The terrorist actions really amounted to a guerrilla warfare to employ harassment tactics in order to stir up public disorder in Japan. While the violence was prevalent in metropolitan areas, the JCP leaders even considered creating some guerrilla bases in the countryside.[85] However, the overall result of these actions was a catastrophic failure. The JCP became a symbol of extremism and none of its members was elected to the Diet in the October 1952 election. Moreover, the fear of a Communist uprising spurred the Japanese government to enact a law which was designed to be more repressive against them.[86]

Tokuda Kyūichi, realizing the adverse effect resulting from the violent tactics, criticized the Party leaders in employing "irresponsible adventurism."[87] He, then exiled in Peking, urged that the Communists should "learn the art of combining legal with illegal activities," and refrain from the overt street violence which would only end in

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[84]For major violent incidents which took place during this period, see Keisatsuchō, Keibikyoku [Police Department, Security Bureau], Sayoku undō [The Left-wing Movement] (Tokyo: 1968), pp. 113-115.

[85]Koyama Hirotake, op.cit., pp. 111-112.

[86]The Japanese government enacted the Subversive Activities Control Law in July, 1952, which gave the government power to control public demonstrations, ban publications, and suppress organizations which it deemed to endanger the security of the state.

[87]Tokuda Kyūichi, "On the 30th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Japan," Akahata, July 15, 1952.

self-destruction.[88] Although the principle of an arms struggle had never been abandoned, the JCP's efforts, including Sobōi, to resort to open violence had come to an end.

In the meantime, the cessation of hostilities in Korea in July, 1953, provided the Minsen with a need to reappraise its future policy. An argument erupted around two policy alternatives. One was to maintain close collaboration with the JCP's strategic policy to fight for the unification of Korea. Such united action with Japanese people was necessary for the Minsen to fight under the "Three-anti" slogan,[89] because Japan had now become America's advance base to serve as a springboard to launch an imperialistic aggression in Korea.

The other alternative emphasized that the national consciousness of Koreans in Japan and their allegiance to North Korea was exalted by the armistice which signified a successful check against the aggression of the American imperialism in Korea, and that the task of Koreans in Japan was to devote their effort to the reconstruction of the fatherland after the war devastation. If the Minsen continued to remain under the JCP's strategic guidance, they argued, the Minsen could hardly maintain its autonomy and

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[88] Ibid.

[89] The "Three-anti slogan" was referring to anti-U.S., anti-Yoshida, and anti-rearmament of Japan.

independent posture for the pursuit of the future policy.[90] The Minsen was soon plagued by an internal dispute about these policy differences. Those advocates of the former were called the "pro-JCP" faction, while the latter were called the "Nationalist" faction. The dispute had become intensified during the Minsen's Fourth National Conference held in November 1953, but the expulsion of the nationalist faction was decided upon as a result of the JCP's pressure.[91]

However, a gradual breaking up of the cold war tension and the peaceful offensive initiated by the Communist camp began to affect the Minsen's future policy. In February, 1955, Nam Il, North Korean Foreign Minister, declared that his country was prepared to enter into friendly relations with Japan for cultural and trade exchange. Although Japan gave no official reply to it, informal contact between the two countries followed immediately, and a campaign to promote trade with North Korea got underway in Japan.[92]

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[90]For further detail, see Tamagi Motoi, op.cit., pp. 14-15, and Hiroyama Shirō, "Minsen no kaisan to Zainihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai no kessei ni tsuite" [The Dissolution of Minsen and Concerning the Creation of the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan], Kōan Jōhō, No. 22 (July, 1955), 5-7.

[91]"Zainichi Chōsenjin undō ni tsuite" [Concerning the Korean Movement in Japan], Zen-ei, No. 92 (May, 1954), 40-44. And see Tamagi Motoi, op.cit., 15.

[92]See, "Nam Il Hokusen Gaiso no Nihonseihu ni taisuru tainichi kankei ni kansuru seimeini tsuite" [Concerning the Statement of Nam Il, Foreign Minister of North Korea], Kōan Jōhō, No. 21 (June, 1955), pp. 53-54.

The Minsen issued a statement supporting Nam Il's proposal, but the situation demanded an alteration in its "Three-anti" policy. It was an apparent contradiction for the Minsen to pursue a policy of overthrowing the government, with which their home government was about to enter into friendly relations. Finally the dispute between the Nationalist and the Pro-JCP factions flared up again. Because of this, the 19th Central Committee meeting was hastily summoned on March 11, 1955, to discuss the question but the results were a head-on collision. Fierce debates took place at the meeting, Han Dŏk-su representing the Nationalist faction, and Pak Ūn-chŏl representing the opponent faction. It was at this meeting that Han Dŏk-su made his landmark speech which eventually led the left-wing Korean movement in Japan to pursue an independent policy without any strategic policy guidance from the JCP.

In his speech, he objected to the Minsen's policy of functioning as if it were a kind of political party in collaboration with the JCP which concerned itself solely with capturing political power in Japan.[93] He made it clear that the Koreans, as aliens in Japan, should not be directly involved with the domestic politics in the host country. He insisted, instead, as citizens of the Democratic

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[93]Han Dŏk-su's speech was later published under the title of: Zainichi Chōsenjin undō no tenkan ni tsuite [Concerning a Change of the Korean Movement in Japan] (Tokyo: Gakuyū Shobō, 1955). For a brief summary, see "Zainichi chōsenjin undō no shintenkai" [A New Step of the Korean Movement in Japan], Shinwa, No. 20 (1955), pp. 20-22.

People's Republic of Korea, their allegiance should be directed to the fatherland and their only political objective should be the attainment of the unification of Korea through peaceful means.[94] He argued that the Koreans' movement in Japan ought to be oriented primarily to the protection of their fundamental rights. He stated, however, that such activities should be confined so as not to impair the friendly relations between the host government and their home country.[95]

The rising tide of nationalistic sentiment among Koreans in Japan was clearly in favor of the argument advanced by the Nationalist faction. Moreover, some left-wing Koreans began to feel not only a sense of weariness but also doubt as to the effectiveness of remaining within the frame of the JCP's strategy and tactics. The dispute between the two factions was finally settled by the defeat of the Pro-JCP faction at the Sixth Minsen National Conference on May 24, 1955, which was convened for the purpose of making a final settlement. The Minsen unanimously decided to terminate its relationship as a peripheral organization of the Japanese Communists, and declared to pursue an independent course by pledging their allegiance to North Korea. To create a new image, they decided to dissolve the Minsen. On the following day of the National Meeting on May 25th, they created a new organization and called it Zainihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai or Chōsōren [The General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan].

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[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

At the same time, all the Koreans were instructed to withdraw their membership from the JCP. In the Chōsōren's General Policy Statement, it stated that "any individual or organization affiliated with the Chōsōren shall be neither permitted to join foreign political organizations, nor allowed to intervene in any political dispute in a foreign country."[96]

Subsequently, the Chōsōren was endorsed by the North Korean regime as an exclusive organization representing Koreans' interests in Japan, while the Mindan was supported by South Korea, which denied the existence of the Chōsōren. Thus, the two organizations were pitted against each other, just as were their respective home governments which differed strongly in almost every ideological issue. In the following chapters, three major issues will be examined as to how the two rival organizations interacted on each issue in order to obtain their maximum objective.

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[96]Hiroshima Shirō, op.cit., pp. 5-7.

PART II. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AS INTEREST GROUPS

CHAPTER IV

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Before the examination of major issues in the following chapter, it is necessary to discuss demographic characteristics and trends which may bring some understanding of the social and economic conditions of the Korean residents in Japan.

As of March, 1968, it was reported that 592,892 Koreans were living in Japan.[1] This figure represents 87.5 percent of the total aliens registered in Japan. According to the 1967 survey, it was found that approximately 27 percent of Koreans lived in Osaka, 12 percent in Tokyo, 10 percent in Hyōgo prefecture and 8 percent in Aichi prefecture. (Table 4) In other words, approximately a total of 57 percent of Koreans were located in the densely populated areas along the Pacific coastline of Japan. This concentration of the population in the urban and metropolitan

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[1]Kim Sang-hyŏn, Cheil Hankuk'in [The Korean Residents in Japan] (Seoul: Haksul yŏnkuwŏn, 1969), p. 42. Presently, the above author is a member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. In October, 1968, he was commissioned by the Assembly to undertake a survey on the conditions of Koreans in Japan. The book is an outgrowth of his report submitted to the Assembly. Unless otherwise mentioned, all statistical figures and charts are derived from his findings with his kind permission.

areas indicates that a majority of Koreans were engaged in non-agrarian occupations.

TABLE 4

THE KOREAN POPULATION IN JAPAN BY REGION AS OF MARCH, 1967

Prefectures	Numbers	Percent
Osaka	160,400	27.3
Tokyo	67,688	11.5
Hyogo	59,589	10.2
Aichi	46,971	8.0
Kyoto	39,803	6.8
Fukuoka	25,531	4.3
Yamaguchi	15,948	2.7
Kanagawa	26,006	4.4
Hiroshima	14,303	2.05
Hokkaido	8,648	1.5
Others	11,566	19.0
Total	587,086	100.0

The age distribution of Koreans in Japan is shown in Figures 3 and 4. In the early migration period of 1920, an excessive imbalance of male and female population is indicated. The Korean population was predominantly male between 15 to 35 years of age. Perhaps, it may be assumed that the Koreans had left their families behind when they migrated to Japan. However, the imbalance of the male to female ratio was gradually adjusted with the passing of the years. The increase of the infantile age group may be an indication of the development of a relatively settled family life after migration. In comparison with the Japanese population, the age and sex composition of the Korean population

in 1964, shows a similar pyramidal shape, which may be a result of a corresponding trend of the Korean population in Japan to that of the Japanese (Figures 3 and 4). As of 1964, 68 percent of the total Korean population consisted of those who were born in Japan (Table 5). Many of them are now second and third generation. They have never set foot in their homeland, nor are they well versed in the language of the mother country. Though they have grown up in Japan, they are not recognized as Japanese. One writer noted that they are what he called "half-Japanese."[2] Their age group distribution is shown in Table 6.

TABLE 5

THE LOCATION OF BIRTH FOR KOREANS IN JAPAN

Place of Birth		Total		Male		Female
Japan		395,907 (68%)		201,476		194,431
Korea		180,842 (30%)		111,355		69,487
Sakhalin	651)		318)		333)	
China	90)		67)		23)	
Taiwan	80)		5)		3)	
Hongkong	2)	1,823	2)	962	-)	861
U.S.	18)	(2%)	12)		6)	
Others	27)		11)		16)	
Unknown	1,027		547)		480)	
Total		578,572 (100%)		313,793 (54%)		264,779 (46%)

[2]Chang Tu-sik, "Kikoku to Han-Nihonjin" [The Repatriation and the Half-Japanese], Sekai, No. 10 (October, 1959), pp. 198-199. It is important to note that the Japanese Government does not recognize the principle of jus soli as a requisite for legal acquisition of citizenship.



Figure 3. Age Group Distribution



Comparison of Age Group Distribution Between
Japanese and Koreans in Japan
As of 1964



Figure 4.

Source: Japan, Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau, Zainichi Kankokujin no Ōteki Chii Kyōtei to Shutsunyūkoku kanri tokubetsumō kaisetsu (Tokyo: 1966)

TABLE 6

THE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
AS OF APRIL 1, 1969

Age Group	Male	Female
0- 4	31,230	29,139
5- 9	29,323	27,848
10-14	31,001	29,122
15-19	36,424	34,455
20-24	34,747	33,103
25-29	28,863	28,150
30-34	23,156	21,762
35-39	17,486	15,539
40-44	18,558	14,217
45-49	22,490	13,987
50-54	16,630	10,238
55-59	13,249	8,724
60-64	9,663	6,471
65-69	5,598	3,973
70-74	2,906	2,298
75-79	1,026	1,151
Over 80	412	71
Unknown	6	5
Total	322,768	280,217

Source: "Zainichi Chōsenjin no zairyū jōkyō to kokuseki mondai," Chōsen Kenkyū, No. 97 (August, 1970), 7.

According to a survey undertaken during the three-year period, 1959-61, the average population increase was approximately 8,400 a year (Table 7). Analyzing the Korean population by age distribution, 22 percent were born after 1945. This younger generation will undoubtedly continue to grow in number, while the older generation who came to Japan during the pre-war period will gradually decrease. Yet, there is little sign that this generation like the old could be readily assimilated into the

mainstream of the affluent Japanese life at present, or in the future. Two factors may have effectively kept them apart: one is a legal and the other is a social barrier.

TABLE 7

BIRTH AND DEATH RATE OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

	Year	Total Number	Male	Female
Birth	1959	12,651	6,567	6,074
	1960	12,122	6,266	5,865
	1961	11,824	6,208	5,616
Death	1959	4,028	2,830	1,198
	1960	3,775	2,778	997
	1961	3,486	2,530	956
Increment	1959	8,613	3,737	4,876
	1960	8,347	3,737	4,876
	1961	8,338	3,678	4,660

Legally the status of Koreans in Japan is classified as alien, hence they are naturally excluded from the benefits reserved for Japanese citizens, such as the National Health program, the National Housing Service, etc. Nevertheless, Koreans are subject to the same taxation as any Japanese citizen.[3] The avenue to become a naturalized Japanese citizen is not entirely closed to a Korean, but the legal process and one's eligibility is so complicated that only a very limited number of "good" Koreans are

[3]For further detail, see Kim Sang-hyŏn, op.cit., pp. 342-330.

qualified under the provision of the Japanese Nationality Law.[4] From the end of the war to 1966, only 41,142 Koreans were naturalized and took Japanese citizenship (Table 8).

TABLE 8

NATURALIZED KOREANS IN JAPAN

Year	Number	Year	Number
1952	232	1960	3,763
1953	1,326	1961	2,710
1954	2,435	1962	3,222
1955	2,434	1963	3,558
1956	2,290	1964	4,632
1957	2,313	1965	3,438
1958	2,246	1966	3,816
1959	2,738	Total	41,152

Source: Japan, Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau, Zainichi Kankokujin hōteki chii kyōtei to shutsunyūkoku kanri tokubetsuhō kaisetsu (Tokyo: 1966).

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[4]Under the Nationality Law of 1950, permission for naturalization is in the complete discretion of the Minister of Justice and, in contrast to the United States Nationality Law, its denial is not subject to judicial review. According to Article 4, the qualifications for naturalization of an alien include: (1) he has had his domicile in Japan consecutively for five years or more; (2) he is twenty years or more of age; (3) he is a person of upright conduct; (4) he has property or ability permitting him to maintain an independent livelihood; (5) Since the date of the enforcement of the Japanese Constitution, he has never plotted or advocated, or organized or belonged to a political party or other organization which has plotted or advocated, the forceful overthrow of the Japanese Constitution or the government. For other details, consult Albert A. Ehrenzweig, et al., ed., American-Japanese Private International Law (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964), pp. 94-105.

Another force working against Koreans in Japan is Japanese ethnocentrism. The Japanese people are, in general, extremely race-conscious.[5] They feel little racial affinity for anybody. They look at themselves as a unique people with a history and culture unlike any other ethnic group. Hence the assumption of their own superiority like arrogating to themselves divine origins or divine missions could be found in numerous legendary tales which had been taught to their children from the early ages until the end of World War II.[6] The Japanese prejudice is generally directed against four or five ethnic groups. The foremost outcasts are Koreans and Eta followed by Okinawans and Ainu.[7] Still another group is the mixed-blood children, the illegitimate offspring of the American soldiers and Japanese women. All the above ethnic groups, except Koreans, are Japanese citizens. As legal and social outcasts, chances for Koreans

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[5]Hugh H. Smythe, "A Note on Racialism in Japan," American Sociological Review, Vol. XVI, No. 6 (1951), 823-825.

[6]These divine legendary tales are no longer taught in nowadays in the Japanese elementary schools. For further details, see Kawai Kazuo, Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), especially Chapter X.

[7]For further study on the underprivileged ethnic groups in Japan, see Tsukahara Bison, Bikaihō buraku [The Unliberated Village] (Tokyo: Yūsankaku, 1969). For the late information on the Buraku Liberation Movement, see Kōan Jōhō No. 192 (September, 1969). About half of the issue is devoted to the question of Eta. See also, "Buraku kaihō undō gaikan" [A General Survey on the Buraku Liberation Movement], Chōsa Geppō (January, 1959), pp. 71-81.

to join the affluence of the Japanese society are much more slim than for any other ethnic group in Japan.

The origin of the Japanese prejudice against Koreans can be traced back to the time of the legendary tale of Empress Jimmu.[8] However, much of the prevailing bias toward Koreans was originated by the Japanese domination over Korea from the early part of this century. There have gradually developed over the years certain stereotyped Korean national characteristics equated with all the images of "bad guys." Even today, it is not unusual to find a Japanese grandmother scolding her grandchild about a bad sitting posture, by saying: "Don't sit like Chōsenjin do."[9]

Professor Izumi Yasuichi conducted a survey to determine Japanese views on different races on the eve of the final conclusion of the Peace Treaty at San Francisco in 1951.[10] He interviewed 344 Japanese at random. He found that a majority of them expressed their dislike of Negroes, then Koreans.[11] (Table 9) Similar studies were conducted

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[8]Inoue Hideo and Ueda Masaaki, eds., Nihon to Chōsen no nisennen [The Two Thousand Years of Japan and Korea], (Tokyo: Taihei shuppansha, 1969). This is one of 12 series of study concerning the relations between Korea and Japan.

[9]Hatada Takashi, Nihonjin no Chōsenjin kan [Japanese Views on Koreans] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobō, 1969), pp. 72-73, 79-80.

[10]Izumi Yasuichi, "Nihonjin no jinshuteki henken" [The Japanese Racial Prejudice], Sekai, No. 10 (October, 1963), 80-89.

[11]When he asked about Negroes, he included 15 different nationalities. Negroes, as a grouping, meant merely black people as a whole and did not refer to any particular nationality. See ibid., p. 81.

TABLE 9

JAPANESE LIKES AND DISLIKES OF OTHER NATIONALS

Nationality	Preference Order	Preference by Ranking	Ratio of Likes and Dislikes in Relation to all Respondents	
			Likes %	Dislikes %
American	3.4	1	49	2
French	4.1	2	34	1
British	4.3	3	31	1
German	4.8	4	24	1
Italian	6.5	5	7	2
Indian	6.7	6	8	2
Thailand	7.6	7	8	1
Burmese	8.9	8	3	2
Indonesian	9.7	9	2	3
Chinese	9.8	10	6	22
Vietnamese	10.3	11	4	2
Filipino	10.9	12	2	11
Australian	11.5	13	1	11
Russian	11.8	14	3	31
Korean	12.5	15	2	44
Negro[a]	12.6	16	1	19

[a]Negro is not, according to the investigator, a nationality, but includes all black people as a whole.

Source: Izumi Yasuichi, "Nihonjin no jinshuteki henken" Sekai, No. 3 (March, 1963).

in 1954, and 1959, by different investigators at different locations.[12] Again, Koreans were ranked very low in preference but always second lowest after Negroes in the

[12]Haratani Tatsuo, et al., "Minzokuteki suteriotaipu to kōaku kanjō ni tsuite no ichikōsatu" [A Study on Stereotypes and Preferences among Japanese Students toward Themselves and Other Nationals], Kyōiku Shinrigaku Kenkyū, Vol. 8, No. 1, (June, 1960), p. 107. Also similar studies were conducted by Kuzutani Takemasa "Minzokuteki kōaku to sono jinkakuteki yōin" [Interracial Preferences and Their Personality Determinants], ibid., pp. 8-17.

superiority-inferiority evaluation. These studies reveal that the Japanese attitude towards Koreans has remained remarkably consistent, attesting to the nature of prejudice that, unlike the simple misconception, prejudices are actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat them. In short, the Japanese attitude toward Koreans stems from a deep sense of contempt. The consequent superiority complex over Koreans in particular and Asians in general seems to be linked to the contempt for nations that are underdeveloped, in contrast to highly industrialized Japan. Even after World War II, the Japanese attitude toward Koreans have not been changed, instead, their prejudice has been more articulate and intensified in scope among many Japanese people.[13] One writer, by examining the substance of text books used by secondary schools in Japan, concluded that little effort had been made by the Japanese since the end of the war to minimize their racial prejudice against Koreans.[14]

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern the reason for the low Korean employment rate in Japan today, even in this time of unprecedented economic boom. Even a Korean who has a degree from the Waseda University has no alternative but to work as a scrap

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[13]Hatada Takashi, op.cit., pp. 70-71, and Izumi Yasuichi, op.cit., pp. 87-89.

[14]Chŏn Chun, "Ilbon kyokwasŏ e nat'tanan Hankuk kwan" [The Japanese Views on Koreans Reflected on the School Text Books], Sasangge, No. 5 (May, 1965), 167-173.

collector.[15] In the 1964 survey, only 23.33 percent of Koreans were reportedly engaged in some form of legitimate occupation and the rest were either unemployed or without steady employment (Table 10).[16] A considerable number of them are welfare recipients (Table 11). Consequently, many Koreans are living on a barely subsistence level, alienated from the affluence of the Japanese society, concentrated in the Korean ghettos. The following report written jointly by three well-known Japanese journalists provides a glimpse of Koreans' living conditions in the slum area.

> About 350 households are living around Nandaimon, in Minamiikuno, Osaka. Among those, 250 households are living in the depth of a poverty-stricken slum. In Nandaimon, there are 5 or 6 shabby tenement-houses being built with pieces of scrap board and stretched tin-cans. The height of the ceiling is so low that one can hardly stand straight inside the shack. One tenement house is compartmentalized by thin boards to accommodate about ten households. The size of one household is about 3 or 4½ jo,* and the widest one may be the size of the two combined.
>
> In this small shack, an average of 5 or 6 people are living together, or 10 people at the largest family. I happened to ask why the ceiling was built so low, and learned that these were said to have been originally built as hen-houses.
>
> Most of the 50 households crowded in the hen-houses are making their living by being rag-pickers or carving out soles of shoes from cardboard. They usually get up at three o'clock in the morning and

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[15] Dan Kurzman, Kishi and Japan (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1960), p. 365.

[16] Actually the total number of unemployed Koreans shown in this statistical figure is highly misleading, because the figure has failed to distinguish between the total number of working force and dependent children as well as the aged retired persons.

TABLE 10

CLASSIFICATION BY PROFESSION
AS OF APRIL, 1964

Job Classification	Number	%	Male	Female
Engineer	204	0.03	201	3
Teacher	790	0.13	647	143
Employed in Medical Insurance Firms	423	0.07	312	111
Clergy	234	0.04	158	76
Skilled Laborer	1,085	0.18	986	99
Holders of Managerial Positions	5,866	1.01	5,623	243
Business and Trade	214	0.03	209	5
Scrap Iron and Junk Dealers	9,909	1.71	9,423	486
Miscellaneous Retail Business	19,782	3.41	17,055	2,727
Agriculture and Fishing	679	0.11	435	244
Miners and Quarrymen	1,155	0.20	1,115	40
Employed in Transportation and Communication Industries	9,891	1.70	9,802	89
Construction Workers	6,218	1.07	6,155	63
Workers in Production Line	32,515	5.61	27,562	4,953
Semi-Skilled Labor	29,563	5.20	27,666	1,897
Cooks	460	0.08	420	40
Barbers and Beauticians	783	0.14	435	348
Employed in Entertainment & Recreation Industries as Servicemen	770	0.13	651	119
Other Professions which Provide Service	2,833	0.50	2,194	639
Unemployed	437,858[a]	75.67	188,582	249,271
Unclassifiable	162	0.02	101	61
Total	578,572	100.00	313,793	264,779

[a]This figure includes dependent children and aged persons who are unable to work due to old age.

TABLE 11

THE NUMBER OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS AMONG KOREANS IN JAPAN

Year	No. of Registered Koreans	No. of Recipients	No. of Recipients per 1,000
1951 August	554,768	59,968	108.0
1952 March	564,458	62,648	110.0
1953 March	543,065	81,168	149.5
1954 March	559,756	112,222	200.5
1955--Average	577,682	137,395	237.8
1956 "	575,287	109,765	190.8
1957 "	601,769	85,023	141.3
1958 "	611,085	81,129	132.8
1959 "	619,096	84,383	136.3
1960 "	581,257	78,650	135.3
1961 "	567,452	66,178	116.6
1962 "	596,360	59,946	105.3
1963 "	573,284	59,853	104.4
1964 December	578,545	55,471	95.9
1965 May	581,593	52,818	90.8

Source: Japan, Ministry of Justice, Zainichi Kankokujin no hōteki chii kyotei to shutsunyūkoku kanri tokubetsu kaisetsu (Tokyo: 1966), p. 68.

walk around all quarters of Osaka to pick rags by pushing a cart that looks like a fragile stroller loaded with a big box. They work more than 12 hours a day, yet they make only two or three hundred yen. When their children come home from school, they too are sent out to pick rags. Old men and women spend their day carving out soles of shoes from cardboard boxes to make extra money at home. Despite the hard work, I heard that there are many families who could not even afford to pay 60 yen for the community water bill for the last three months.[17]

*One jo is 3 x 6 feet room.

[17] Fujishima Udai, et al., "Zainichi Chōsenjin rokujūman no genjitsu" [The Reality of 600,000 Koreans in Japan], Chuō Kōron, No. 12 (December, 1958), p. 185.

Although the miserable conditions of Koreans in Japan have never been an open public issue, the matter has often been taken up by the Japanese Communists and Socialists. In a strict sense, however, the Japanese government has no legal obligation to look after their welfare, since they are aliens. Moreover, the Japanese government reserves the legal right to deport them, if they be classified as paupers. But the Japanese government points out that the Koreans in Japan enjoy the special privilege of relief, while complaining of the heavy financial burden.[18] Some even criticize the mendicant mentality of Koreans. The response of Koreans is that no one really wants to be on relief, but they are denied the chance to earn an honest living. How embarrassing and humiliating an experience it may be by being welfare recipients is well reported by the same journalists.

> A certain welfare official visited a Korean family, who are on relief, stated arrogantly that "I can do what even a police detective cannot do." Then he went to the kitchen and opened the lid of a kettle to see what was cooking. It goes without saying that if they happen to be caught cooking white rice, they would no longer be eligible for welfare on the following day. Did they buy anything new lately? Did they eat white rice? These are said to be important for a welfare official to investigate. A real dutiful welfare official often peeps inside the room while the welfare recipients are away from home.[19]

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[18] "Nikkan kokukyō chōsei no mondaiten" [The Points of Problems in Adjusting the ROK-Japan Relations], Seisaku Geppō, No. 6 (June, 1956), 23.

[19] Fujishima Udai, et al., op.cit., pp. 186-187.

On one occasion, according to Fujishima's report, welfare officials insulted a young Korean woman, who stopped at the office to pick up the relief check, by remarking, "why don't you become a prostitute rather than getting such a meager hand-out from the government."[20]

From the postwar period, the Japanese government policy concerning Koreans in Japan has been to reduce gradually the number by repatriation as much as possible for several reasons. First, the Koreans in Japan constituted persona non grata because they tend to create a source of social problems. The poverty-stricken Korean ghettos, often situated in the crowded metropolitan areas, are generally viewed by many Japanese as a seedbed of all sorts of social evil, for the crime rate and unemployment is very high among them. Second, those Koreans alienated from the affluence of the Japanese society may join the radical movement thereby expressing their grievances and sense of social injustice by resorting to collective violence, as was the case during the occupation period. Third, to provide welfare for needy Koreans or even trying to rehabilitate them as productive labor forces would be too costly a project for the Japanese tax payers.[21] As of December, 1955, it was reported that 138,972 Koreans were on relief

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[20] Ibid., p. 187.

[21] See table 9 which shows the number and percentage of Korean welfare recipients.

and cost the Japanese government more than ¥200 million annually.[22] In 1956, the Japanese government established rigid rules for eligibility for welfare. It caused the sudden drop of the figure from 1956 as shown in Table 12. Just before the repatriation to North Korea began, it was reported that while 16.5 per thousand Japanese were on welfare, Korean recipients were 136.3 per thousand. Hence, it was against this background that the question of repatriation to North Korea had taken place in 1959.

TABLE 12

WELFARE EXPENDITURE FOR KOREANS IN JAPAN

Year	Expenditure
December, 1954	¥203,333,042
December, 1955	¥208,371,306
December, 1956	¥145,116,688
June, 1957	¥142,096,663

[22] "Zainichi Chōsenjin no genjō to Hokusen kikan mondai" [The Reality of the Koreans In Japan and Repatriation Question to North Korea], Chōsa Geppō, No. 4 (April, 1959), 5.

CHAPTER V

CHŌSŌREN AND MINDAN

Chōsōren

Soon after Japan's surrender, the Chōren was the first organization which undertook an effort to protect the interests of Koreans in Japan. It was originally intended to be a non-political and temporary social service organization until the Koreans could be repatriated to their homeland within a reasonable time from Japan. Following the sharp decline of the repatriation and the desire of more Koreans to remain in Japan, the Chōren's function was rapidly reoriented to perform more than a social service. The hegemony of the Chōren's leadership was taken over by Korean leftists whose goals were closely identified with that of the JCP. They believed that there was little chance of improving the lot of the Koreans remaining in Japan, so long as the old political establishment persisted under the Emperor system. Hence the Chōren joined revolutionary ranks with the JCP and began to advocate the destruction of the Emperor system. Under the JCP's postwar strategic guidance, the Chōren became a front organization and its members served as JCP's functionaries. However, the Chōren's excessive reliance on violent tactics

and agitation forces the Japanese government to take repressive measures against the Chōren. Finally, the Chōren was ordered to disband by the Japanese government and it became the first target of the "red purge" policy in postwar Japan. The outbreak of the Korean war stimulated the Korean leftists in Japan to create another organization called Minsen to succeed the dissolved Chōren. The Minsen carried out the task of the dissolved Chōren until the present Chōsōren was officially organized in 1955. (Figure 5)

As to overall strategy, the Chōsōren differs from its predecessors in several respects. First, the Chōsōren is no longer under the strategic guidance of the JCP, but follows an independent policy. However, the Chōsōren pledges its allegiance to the DPRK and to function as an agent of the interests of the DPRK's nationals in Japan within the framework of the DPRK's foreign policy. Second, the Chōsōren has declared in its platform that it would refrain from direct involvement in matters considered as the internals affairs of the Japanese people. The Chōsōren regretted the radical actions taken by its predecessors and pledged to use legal means to further their interests in Japan.

In the platform adopted at the Chōsōren's inaugural meeting in May, 1955, they specified as their major activities in Japan the pursuit of the following goals: (1) to help strengthen the "democratic base" in North Korea in achieving the peaceful unification of Korea; (2) to protect the rights of Koreans in Japan; and (3) to



Figure 5. The Evolution of Korean Organizations in Japan

promote friendly relations between the DPRK and Japan.[1] According to Article 2 of the Chōsōren Covenant, the Chōsōren is supposed to be a national front organization of Koreans who pledged their support of the Covenant without discrimination in political belief, religion, and social status. Furthermore, it would be an organization which would represent not only the wishes, but the interests of Koreans in Japan.

The Organizational Structure

The core of the Chōsōren is four central organs which represent the highest echelon in a rigid chain of command. These are the Chōsōren's National Convention, the Central Committee, the Central Standing Committee and the Control Committee (Figure 6).

The Chosoren's National Convention. -- This organ constitutes the supreme authority within the Chōsōren. The delegates to its convention are elected by Chōsōren members through local organizations. These delegates formulate the Chōsōren's overall policy, discuss its governing regulations, appropriate the annual budget and lay down the principles of action. The National Convention elects the

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[1] "Chōsensōren katsudō hōshin" [The Action Policy of Chosoren], Atarashii Chōsen, No. 9 (September, 1955), 6-9; and Hiroyama Shirō, "Minsen no kaisan to Zainihon Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai no kessei ni tsuite" [The Dissolution of the Minsen and Concerning the Founding of the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan], Kōan Jōhō, No. 22 (July, 1955), 10-11.



Figure 6. Organization Chart--Central Organs

Chōsōren's executive organs: the Central Committee members and members of the highest investigative and judicial body, the Control Commission. At present, there are 674 delegates to the convention, which is scheduled to meet in May each year. They also determine the procedure for electing other delegates; and, since the Central Committee must certify all organizations electing delegates, members of the Executive Organs thus control to a large extent the actual make-up of the Convention delegates who, in turn, elect the members of the Executive Organs. A special convention can be convened if requested by one-third of the convention delegates or by the Central Committee members. However, with increasing stress on the concentration of power within the concept of "democratic centralism," the National Convention has functioned less and less as a supreme policy-making body. This trend is reflected in the decreasing frequency and importance of its annual convention.[2]

The Central Committee. -- In reality, the Central Committee is the most authoritative organ of the Chōsōren. In essence, the Central Committee has taken over the function of the National Convention and it causes the diminishing frequency of the annual convention. The Committee meets at least every four months, and is often called the "little convention." There are 198 members but not all of them are elected by the National Convention.

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[2]On this point, see Tōitsu Chōsen Nenkan: 1964, pp. 533-534.

Among them only 49 are elected at large by the National Convention, 60 by local organizations, and 89 members from various Korean organizations affiliated with the Chōsōren. The Central Committee is headed by a Board of Chairmen which consists of one chairman and five vice-chairmen. In 1963, seven of the Central Committee members, including four members of the Board of Chairmen, ran as candidates of the Supreme People's Corgress of the DPRK and were officially elected to serve as delegates.[3] Hence they are the DPRK's officials representing the will of the DPRK's nationals in Japan. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Chōsōren, Han Dŭk-su, often acts as a head of a quasi-diplomatic mission representing the DPRK in Japan. He invites diplomatic dignitaries from the Communist bloc nations who reside in Japan for cocktail and dinner parties on the DPRK's national celebration days. At the same time, the Chairman received invitations from them to participate in various social and diplomatic functions.

For all practical purposes, the Board of Chairmen has become a self-perpetuating group of the highest Chōsōren leaders whose authority is limited only by the pressure of the DPRK. All important decisions on strategy and general policy are made by this group, which meets in closed session. Although the Central Committee retains

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[3]"Hokusen Saikō Jinmin Kaigi no daigiin senkyo to Chōsensōren" [The Election of the DPRK's Supreme People's Congress and the Chōsōren] Gaiji Tokuhō, Vol. 12, No. 11 (November, 1964), 14-16.

the final authority in regard to formulation and implementation of Chōsōren policy, it has delegated the daily execution of these tasks to the Central Standing Committee which is staffed by Central Committee members.

The Central Standing Committee. -- The membership of the Central Standing Committee is composed of the Board of Chairmen, Secretary General, and eight Department Directors. Under the supervision of the Secretary General, there are eight departments: Foreign Affairs, Cultural, Social Welfare, Education, Public Information, Finance, Political, and Organizational. The Central Standing Committee meets twice every month and is summoned by the Board of Chairmen. Actually, it is the Central Standing Committee that manages and operates the entire Chōsōren activities in Japan.

The Control Committee. -- The members of the Control Committee are elected by the Chōsōren's National Convention, which is an independent agency. The members are selected on the basis of a superior record and outstanding devotion to duty to the Chōsōren. An important aspect of this Committee's activities consists of measures taken to protect the Chōsōren against all outsiders. The Committee is responsible for the prevention and detection of infiltration from the outside and the tracing of information leaks from within as well as for elimination of opponents within the Chōsōren. It also enforces absolute discipline among the Chōsōren members as prescribed by the decision of the

higher organs of the Chōsōren. Throughout Japan the Committee maintains counter-intelligence agents who investigate and evaluate the activities, strength, and background of anti-Chōsōren elements, groups and organizations. In addition, this Committee conducts auditing and other miscellaneous investigative duties.

Local Organizations. -- Local organizations form the echelon directly below the central organs in the Chōsōren's chain of command. Personnel of the lower echelon must be certified by the Central Committee in order to guarantee the uniform execution of Chōsōren's instructions from the higher commands. Japan is divided into seven regions, following the traditional geographical breakdown: Tōhoku, Kantō, Chūbu, Kinki, Chūgoku-Shikoku, Kyūshu and Hokkai-do. In each of these regions there is a Regional Council. Each region is subdivided into prefectural areas (to, do, fu, and ken), and there is at least one headquarters. These areas are further broken down into districts, branches, and units, similar in structure to the corresponding units of the higher echelons. The size and number of districts and branches vary in accordance with the number of Chōsōren members and Korean residents in the area. According to the latest account, there are 46 prefectural headquarters (to, do, fu, and ken), 419 districts, 2,700 branches, and 246 units throughout Japan.[4]

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[4]Pukhan Ch'onggam: 1945-68, p. 279.



Figure 8. Chōsōren's Organizations in Japan

The Regional Council is composed of various representatives from the prefectural level. Again, the size and number vary depending on the number of prefectures and Korean residents within the geographical region. Each Regional Council corresponds to the National Convention and the Regional Committee corresponds to the Central Committee. In fact, the regional and prefectural structures are central agencies in miniature. The Regional Council meets every two months and performs functions similar to those of the National Convention at the national level. It is at this Regional Council that delegates are elected to the National Convention.

Peripheral Organizations

The structure and operational procedures of the Chōsōren outlined here constitute only a small part of the overall picture. The Chōsōren draws much of its strength from a host of peripheral organizations and from Japanese left-wing organizations over which the Chōsōren exercises a varying degree of influence and control. The Chōsōren leaders feel that no segment of the population is insignificant; no group is too small; no field of interest is too remote for cultivating support. Presently, the following peripheral organizations are officially affiliated with the Chōsōren.

1. The Korean Youth League in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Seinen Dōmei]
2. The Korean Democratic Women's League (Zainihon Chōsenjin Minshu Josei Dōmei]

3. The Korean Teachers League in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Kyōshokujin Dōmei]

4. The League for the Korean Students in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Ryūgakusei Dōmei]

5. The Korean Literati and Artist League in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Bungaku Geijutsuka Dōmei]

6. The Korean Scientists Association in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Kagakusha Kyōkai]

7. The Korean Athletic Federation in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Taiiku Rengōkai]

8. The Federation of the Korean Industries and Commerce in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Shōkō Rengōkai]

9. The Korean Publishers Association in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Genron Shuppanjin Kyōkai]

10. The Association of Korean Credit Unions in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Shinyō Kumiai Kyōkai]

11. The League of Korean Buddhists in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Bukkyōto Renmei]

12. The Association in Japan for the Korean Compatriots on the Unification [Zainihon Chōsenjin Tōitsu Dōshikai]

13. The Korean Central Education Association in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Chūō Kyōikukai]

The Japan-DPRK Society [Nitchō Kyōkai]*. -- As to the Japanese organizations closely associated with the Chōsōren, the important role played by the Japan-DPRK Society can hardly be underestimated. It has local organizations throughout all of Japan, and 10 other Japanese organizations are affiliated with the Society. The membership is on a non-partisan basis, but mostly composed of prominent left-wing leaders and Diet members. Many prefectural governors

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*Note that the Chō for Chōsen in Japanese has a much less explicit Cold War implication than the expression DPRK in English.

and mayors hold local membership in the Society.[5] The Society published a monthly periodical called Nihon to Chōsen starting in 1951, but suspended it temporarily due to financial difficulties in 1955. However, the publication was resumed after financial aid was provided by the Chōsōren. Now the Nihon to Chōsen is a bi-monthly periodical and has a circulation of approximately 8,000 copies.

Originally the Japan-DPRK Society was intended to be a non-political organization for the promotion of the cultural exchange between the two countries. The original founders were mostly religious leaders, writers, educators and artists among Japanese and Koreans in Japan. As it was organized in 1951, in the midst of the Korean War, the Society actively engaged in the Korean war refugees relief campaign for both North and South Koreans.

Since the Society's participation in the Ethnic Study Revival Campaign conducted in cooperation with the Minsen in 1952, it has rapidly leaned toward the left. The Society's organizational expansion started with Hatanaka Masaharu's return from North Korea after a series of talks with Kim Il-sung in 1955. It also coincided with the founding of the Chōsōren in 1955. Upon his return, he immediately assumed the Society's chairmanship of the Board of Directors and called the first National Convention in

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[5]On this point, see Shakai Undō Chōsakai, comp., Sayoku Jiten [The Left-wing Dictionary] (Tokyo: Musashi Shobō, 1961), p. 235.

November, 1955. There were 266 Japanese delegates at the Convention representing 29 prefectures with some 900 prominent Japanese dignitaries representing the JCP, JSP, labor unions, well-known educators, and religious leaders who pledged support to the Japan-DPRK Society.[6]

Hatanaka Masaharu stated in his keynote speech at the Convention that: "The fundamental policy of the Japan-DPRK Society is that Japanese people will demonstrate the initiative in establishing friendly relations with Koreans as nationals of an independent nation. To this end, the Society will support the Chōsōren's Platform of Action and cooperate closely with the Chōsōren, . . ."[7] Later, various resolutions were adopted by the Convention to launch new programs. The programs included a help to realize Korean repatriation to North Korea, to expedite the mutual release of the Japanese fishermen in Korea and the Koreans in the Ōmura Detention Camp and many others.[8] Since then the Japan-DPRK Society has been playing a very active role to strengthen the ties between Japanese and North Koreans, and providing full support to the Chōsōren to safeguard the interests of Koreans in Japan. Today, the Japan-DPRK Society has become the most powerful P'yŏngyang lobbyist organization in Japan. Accordingly, Hatanaka Masaharu and

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[6]"Nitchō shinzen undō no hatten no tameni" [To Launch the Campaign for the Promotion of the Friendly Relations Between Japan and the DPRK], Kōan Jōhō, No. 27 (December, 1955), 59.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

a few other Japanese have been awarded the DPRK's Second Class National Flag Medals by Kim Il-sung for their meritorious services.[9]

The Chōsōren's Press and Propaganda Apparatus. — Since the Chōsōren shifted its strategy to use peaceful and legal means to safeguard Korean rights in Japan, the Chōsōren places great importance on propaganda. Presently, there are eight press and publishing firms under the control of the Chōsōren, publishing some 30 periodicals in five different languages (Figure 7). Chosŏn Sibo, the Chōsōren's official organ, is a daily newspaper written in Korean and is distributed on a nationwide scale. As of 1968, it had about 38,000 circulation in Japan. Chōsen Jihō is a weekly newspaper written in Japanese enjoying some 60,000 circulation. The papers carry all significant Chōsōren reports, resolutions, statements and articles by the recognized Chōsōren leaders in Japan and the DPRK interpretation of foreign affairs and domestic news. They also publish several other periodicals written in the English, French, and Spanish languages. Two book companies, Kugatsu Shobō and Gakuyū Shobō, have their own printing facilities to publish textbooks for Korean education in Japan. These book companies often reprint books from the DPRK for distribution in Japan.

Cinema and theatrical products are also distributed by the Korean central Artists Group [Chōsen Chūō Geijutsu

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[9]Shakai Undō Chōsakai, comp., op.cit., p. 237.

Name of Publication	Publisher	Period	Circulation	Language
Chosŏn Sibo	Chōsen Shinposha	Daily	38,000	Korean
Chōsen Jihō	"	Weekly	60,000	Japanese
Chōsen Tsūshin	Chōsen Tsūshinsha	Daily	500	"
Chōsen Eibun Tsūshin	"	Monthly	500	English
People's Korea	Chōsen Shinpōsha	Weekly	3,000	"
Jinmin Chōsen	"	Monthly	not known	French
Jinmin Chōsen	"	"	"	Spanish
Shashin Sokuhō	"	Tri-monthly	"	Korean
Sokoku	"	Monthly	"	"
Chōsen Gahō	Chōsen Gahōsha	Monthly	35,000	Japanese
Chosŏn Yŏsŏng	Zainichi Chōsenjin Josei Dōmei	Monthly	5,000	Korean
Chosŏn Ch'ŏngnyŏn	Zainichi Chōsenjin Seinen Dōmei	Weekly	5,000	Korean
Choŭn	Zainichi Chōsenjin Shinyō Kumiai	Monthly	not known	"
Chosŏn Sangkong Sibo	Zainichi Chōsenjin Shōkō Rengōkai	Weekly	3,000	"
Chōsen Bōeki Geppō	Sokoku Bōeki Iinkai	Monthly	not known	Japanese

Chokuk Muyŏk	Sokoku Bōeki Iinkai	Tri-monthly	not known	Korean
Chosŏn Tehak sinmun	Chosen Daigakkō	Irregular	"	"
Chosŏn Yuhakseng sinmun	Zainichi Chōsenjin Ryugakusei Dōmei	Irregular	2,000	"
Chosŏn Sonyŏn	Kansei Shōnenbu	Irregular	2,000	"
Chosŏn Ch'eyuk	Zainichi Chōsenjin Taiiku Rengōkai	not known	not known	"
Kwahak T'ongbo	Zainichi Chōsenjin Kagakusha Dōmei	Monthly	"	"
Chōsen Shiryō	Chōsen Mondai Kenkyūsho	Monthly	500	Japanese
Chōsen Tsushin Shiryō	Chōsen Tsūshinsha	Semi-monthly	1,000	"
Chōsen Mondai Kenkyū	Chōsenmondai Kenkyūsho	Bi-monthly	500	"
Atarashii Seidai	Zainichi Chōsenjin Seinen Dōmei	Monthly	300	"
Minchok Kyoyuk	Zainichi Chōsenjin Kyōiku Rengōkai	Monthly	2,000	Korean
Kyoyukhoebo	"	not known		"
Munhak Yesul	Zainichi Chōsenjin Bungaku Geijutsaku Dōmei	Monthly	not known	"
Gunchung Munye	"	Quarterly	"	"
Munye T'ongsin	"	not known	"	"

Figure 7. Periodicals Published under the Control of the Chōsōren

Dan] for the DPRK's propaganda campaign aimed at both Koreans and Japanese. Incidentally, there was a joint cinema production between the North Korean Workers Party and the JCP called "Ch'ŏllima" [A Thousand Li Flying Horse] in 1965, which was a propaganda film depicting the industrial development and the life in the DPRK. The film was shown to the Japanese public at commercial cinema houses throughout Japan and received very favorable reactions from Japanese and Koreans in Japan.[10]

Mindan

Currently the Mindan's membership is limited to those who have registered as nationals of the ROK. It maintains nationwide organizations: 48 prefectural headquarters and 384 branches throughout Japan. According to a 1965 report, the Mindan claims a membership of 268,655.[11] However, the accuracy of this figure is doubtful. The Mindan's organizational structure is very similar to that of the Chōsōren. It also has four central organs which represent the highest hierarchical organizations. They are: the Mindan's National Convention, the Central Committee, and the Central Standing Committee and the Control Committee. The function of each

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[10]"Nitchō gōsaku eiga 'Ch'ŏllima' no jōei undō ni tsuite" [Concerning the Campaign for the Showing of the Japan-DPRK Joint Cinema Production 'Ch'ŏllima,'" Kōan Jōhō, No. 140 (May, 1965), 40-47.

[11]Kim Sang-hyŏn, Cheil Hankuk'in [The Koreans in Japan] (Seoul: Dankok Haksul Yŏnkuwŏn, 1969), p. 96.

organization is almost identical to the Chōsōren organizations. However, Mindan's National Convention is held once every two years. There are 390 delegates selected by the local organizations, and the seats are apportioned by the Central Committee. The Mindan's Central Committee is composed of 130 members elected by the National Convention. They meet twice annually in the months of April and September. The Central Standing Committee functions as the executive arm of the Central Committee and is composed of 17 members. This committee is headed by a chairman and two vice-chairmen who are elected by the Central Committee. Whoever holds the chairmanship of the Central Standing Committee assumes the responsibility of being the chief spokesman of the Mindan.

Despite the Mindan's similarity to the organizational structure of the Chōsōren, it is a loose organization seriously lacking in discipline and unity among the members. Except for the slogan of anti-Communism, the Mindan has failed to provide any ideological force cohesive to tie its members together. However, the successive Mindan leaders blame its shortcoming on the organizational structure, and have tried to reform it time and again without much success. Moreover, the image of the Mindan's leadership has been seriously damaged by the series of graft scandals ever since the period of the American occupation. As a result, the Mindan failed to gain support and trust from its rank and file members. It has been a frequent practice among many Mindan leaders to

utilize the organization as a medium to make political deals with the home government not only to fulfill their political ambitions but also for personal economic gains.

Like the Chōsōren, many Korean organizations are affiliated with the Mindan. These are:

1. The Korean Students League in Japan [Zainihon Kankoku Gakusei Dōmei]
2. The Korean Youth League in Japan [Zainihon Kankoku Seinen Dōmei]
3. The Korean Women's Association in Japan [Zainihon Taikan Fujinkai]
4. The Great Korean Athletic Association in Japan [Zainihon Taikan Taiikukai]
5. The Great Korean Veterans Association in Japan [Zainihon Taikan Gunjinkai]
6. The Federation of Korean Commerce and Trade Associations in Japan [Zainichi Kankokujin Shōkō Rengōkai]
7. The Association of Korean Credit Unions in Japan [Zainichi Kankokujin Shinyō Kumiai Kyōkai]
8. The Korean Association to Support Education in Japan [Zainihon Kankokujin Kyōiku Kōenkai]
9. The Educational Committee [Kyōiku Iinkai]

There are 23 news organizations affiliated with the Mindan, and each of them publishes some periodical journals, but not a single daily newspaper is available. Even the official newspaper of the Mindan, Kankoku Shimbun, is published only three times a month in the Japanese language and has only limited circulation. In other words, the Mindan is not well-equipped with an official communication medium to disseminate public information for effective control of its members. Especially in recent days, the

ineffectiveness of the Mindan to serve as a representative body of the ROK supporting Korean community in Japan has been increasingly noticeable in many respects. Perhaps, the diminishing utility of the Mindan's role as an interest group results from the presence of the ROK Embassy in Japan which has taken over a major share of the Mindan's function. In fact, the ROK Embassy in Tokyo and seven other Regional Consulates located throughout Japan are able to look after the problems of ROK nationals better than the Mindan traditionally had offered service to Koreans in Japan. Consequently, the Mindan is no longer in a position to dispute the authority of the Korean Embassy on matters concerning Korean community affairs in Japan. Moreover, the opening of the diplomatic mission has provided an opportunity for the ROK government to strengthen the formation of the "Seoul lobby" among the LDP members in Japan. The DPRK is solely dependent upon the performance of the Chōsōren as a quasi-government agent and its auxiliary organizations to carry out similar activities.[12]

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[12]For further details, see Tokawa Isamu, "Nihon no korian robi" [Korean Lobby in Japan], Chūō Kōron, No. 6 (June, 1959), 234-243; and Chŏn Chun, "Chōsensōren" [Chōsōren], Jijū, No. 5 (May, 1970), 156-163.

PART III. ISSUES AND INTERACTIONS

CHAPTER VI

REPATRIATION TO NORTH KOREA

The mass exodus of Koreans in Japan to the North Korean Communist regime began in December, 1959, and lasted until 1967. The decision of the Japanese government on the matter was not an easy one, as it was related to Japan's delicate diplomatic maneuvering dealing with the two antagonistic Korean regimes. While the Japanese government held a determinant position as to the final decision, a triangular diplomatic battle was fought over the question of Korean repatriation. Under this situation the Mindan and the Chōsōren each played a role of an agent representing the interest of each respective home government. In this regard, the extensive lobbying activities launched by the Mindan and the Chōsōren were decisive in swaying the Japanese public opinion to influence the final decision of the Japanese government in their favor on the question of the repatriation.

When the actual repatriation began in 1959, the Japanese government maintained formal diplomatic relations with neither South Korea nor North Korea. The existence of the two opposing Koreas presented a complicated diplomatic dilemma for Japan. During the Occupation (September, 1945 to April, 1952) any diplomats in Japan were accredited to

SCAP, not the Japanese government. However, the South Korean government was allowed by SCAP to install what was called the "Korean Mission in Japan" accredited to SCAP in December, 1948.[1] Even after the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco in 1952, the Korean Mission continued to remain pending the development of a separate treaty to settle many issues between Japan and her former colony. Under the United States initiative, a bilateral negotiation between Japan and South Korea was opened in Tokyo in October, 1951.[2] The negotiation continued intermittently thereafter, but received an early blow when President Syngman Rhee announced on January 18, 1952, what was commonly known as the "Rhee Line."[3] It was a proclamation of a littoral boundary extending an average sixty miles from the Korean coast.[4] Rhee stated that it was

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[1]Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oemu hengchŏng ŭi sipnyŏn [The Ten Years of the Foreign Affairs Administration] (Seoul, 1959), p. 29. Hereafter cited as Oemu hengchŏng.

[2]Wŏn Yong-sŏk, Hannil hwaedam sipsanyŏn [The Fourteen Years of the ROK-Japanese Talk] (Seoul: Samwha Ch'ulp'ansa, 1965), pp. 2-5.

[3]The English text of Rhee's proclamation is reprinted in Tamura Kōsaku, "The Rhee Line and International Law," Contemporary Japan, XXII, No. 7-9 (1953), 389-390.

[4]The "Rhee Line" was similar to that of the MacArthur Line which had restricted the Japanese fishing fleet within this limit during the early days of the Allied Occupation. See Koh Kwang-lim, "International Regulation of Fisheries with Specific Reference to Those in the North Pacific Ocean," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Rutgers University, 1952, pp. 119-128. However, the MacArthur Line ceased to exist when Japan regained her sovereignty, but the line was later replaced by the Clark Line. It was established by

necessary for "safeguarding, once and for all, interests of national welfare and defense."[5] Though the declaration was applicable to all nations, it was obviously designed to restrict the Japanese fishery activities in the adjacent Korean waters. Fishing was a vital industry for both Koreans and Japanese as a major source of food. The Japanese government protested vigorously by denouncing Rhee's proclamation.[6] It would have been less provocative to many Japanese had there not been such stringent enforcement of the line by the Korean Coast Guard. In fact, even before the "Rhee Line" enactment, the Japanese fishermen along with their vessels were frequently seized by the Korean authorities on charges of crossing into the Korean territorial waters.[7] The fishermen were released after SCAP intervention. An early attempt to normalize diplomatic

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General Mark Clark on September 28, 1952, when he was Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea. General Clark himself stated that the zone was "strictly a wartime measure designed to safeguard the Koreans' and our line of communication and to bar the Korean coast to enemy agents and contraband." On this point, see Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), p. 154.

[5]Tamura Kōsaku, op.cit., p. 389.

[6]For the protest note, see Japan, Foreign Affairs Ministry, "Rhee Line" Problem (Tokyo: 1961), pp. 16-17.

[7]Mura Tsuneo, "Rhee Line," Japan Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (January-March, 1959), 26, and also see Kaigai Jijō Chōsasho, comp., Chōsen Yōran [A Handbook of Korea] (Tokyo: Musashino Shobō, 1960), pp. 71-72. It is to be noted that the Japanese fishermen were not seized by the Korean authorities alone, but by the Soviet Union as well as the People's Republic of China on the similar charge. On this point, see Japan Report, II, No. 1 (June 15, 1956), 6.

relations between the two governments, after several months of prolonged talk, failed to yield any satisfactory agreement. The meeting was finally adjourned in April, 1952. Thereafter, the enforcement by the Korean Coast Guard became tighter than ever before. As more seizures of Japanese fishermen by the Korean patrol boats were reported in Japan, tension mounted among the Japanese people. To stir up the already irritated Japanese sentiment, what was known as the Taiho Maru incident took place on February 4, 1953. What infuriated the Japanese most was that the Korean Coast Guard reportedly used arms to capture two unarmed Japanese trawlers on the high seas approximately 20 miles west of Cheju, a Korean island, and one crew member was killed.[8] Realizing the worsening situation, the Japanese Fishery Association and other groups urged their government to reach an early settlement with the Korean government. As a first step to settle the dispute, both governments agreed to resume their talks in April, 1953, but the meeting was deadlocked again. In October, the third official negotiation was reopened with a hope that something might be done to lessen the mounting tension between the two countries. The Japanese delegation faced its Korean counterpart at the conference, but the climate was never cordial. It was at this meeting that the Chief Japanese Delegate, Kubota Kannichirō, lost his patience during the negotiations

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[8]Mura Tsuneo, op.cit., pp. 26-27.

TABLE 13

NUMBER OF JAPANESE FISHING BOATS
AND THEIR CREWMEN SEIZED
(AS OF AUGUST 20, 1961)

Year	No. of Boats Captured	No. of Crewmen Detained	No. of Boats Sunk	No. of Boats Returned	No. of Crewmen Returned	No. of Crewmen Lost
1952	10	132	-	5	131	1
1953	47	585	-	2	584	1
1954	34	454	-	6	453	1
1955	30	498	-	1	496	2
1956	19	235	-	3	235	-
1957	10	98	-	-	98	-
1958	9	93	-	-	93	-
1959	9	91	-	1	91	-
1960	6	52	1	-	52	-
1961 (to Sept.)	9	70	-	5	57	-
Total	183	2,308	1	23	2,290	5

Source: Asian Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Ministry, Chōsen Benran [A Handbook of Korea] (Tokyo: 1961), p. 42.

and made inept remarks about Korea.[9] As Douglas Mendel has pointed out, nothing could have injured the pride and feelings of Koreans more than Kubota's remark that Japan's colonization actually benefited Korea.[10] The indignant Korean

[9]The essence of Kubota's remarks were: 1) he questioned the legality of Korea's independence without final conclusion of a treaty with Japan; 2) in regard to Korea's demand for reparation, Kubota stated that Korea could claim nothing from Japan because Korea benefited more than it was harmed as a result of colonization. For a detailed statemend of Kubota's, see Korean Survey, II, No. 10 (December, 1953), 13, and Wŏn Yong-sŏk, op.cit., pp. 37-40, and Oemu hengchŏng sipnyŏn, p. 16.

[10]Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 172-173.

delegates walked out of the conference. For the next four and one half years, until Japan decided to withdraw the statement in 1957, no official dialogue was held between the two governments. As their relations deteriorated, the hatred and hostility toward each other intensified.

While the Rhee regime continued to seize the Japanese fishermen and vessels, and to detain and confiscate them,[11] the Japanese government counteracted with strict enforcement of the Alien Registration Law of 1947, and the Immigration Control Law of 1951, against the Korean residents in Japan. Eventually the problem of the Japanese fishermen detained in Korea for the violation of the "Rhee Line" came to be linked with the problems of Koreans imprisoned in Ōmura Camp for the violation of Japanese laws.[12] A brief explanation is required of the provisions of the two laws, which the Japanese authorities used to harass Korean residents as a retaliatory measure against the seizure of fishermen by

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[11]See table 13 for the Japanese fishing vessels seized by the Korean Coast Guard.

[12]The Ōmura camp is located on the western tip of Kyūshu. It was built in December, 1950, exclusively to accommodate those who violated the Immigration Law and the Alien Registration Law. Since a majority of violators were Koreans, the camp was known as a Korean prison in Japan. The treatment given to the prisoners was so notoriously inhumane that many prison riots took place. For further details, see Nakazono Eisuke, Zainichi Chōsenjin: Nanajūnen dai Nihon no genten [The Koreans in Japan: The 1970's Focal Point of Japan] (Tokyo: Zaikaitenbō shinsha, 1970), Chapter II, entitled: "The Quiet Ōmura Camp." And also see a special issue on Ōmura Camp "In the Name of Human Beings' Dignity," Atarashii Chōsen (May, 1955), 15-19, and "An Appeal to the World," ibid., 21-25, and "Is There Such a Thing in the Society of Mankind?" ibid., 25-26.

the Rhee regime.

When the Alien Registration Law of 1947,[13] and the Immigration Control Law of 1951, were enacted, these might have aimed at Koreans in Japan, since Koreans comprised almost 90 percent of the total of the aliens in Japan. To cite a few examples in the provisions of the Alien Registration Law of 1947: (1) an alien must register his change of address with the Mayor of the city or town of his new residence within 14 days after the move (Article 8, paragraph 1); (2) the registration card must be carried by aliens at all times, and it must be presented upon request of proper authority (Article 10, paragraph 1). Failure to abide by the above provision shall be punishable by no more than one year imprisonment, or a fine of not more than ¥10,000 (Article 13). Furthermore, the Immigration Control Law of 1951, stipulated that any alien falling under the following categories could be subject to deportation: (1) pauper, vagrant, or disabled person, etc., who had become a charge of the State or a local public entity; (2) any person who has been subjected to punishment heavier than imprisonment for violation of the Alien Registration Law (Article 24, paragraph 4, sections e and f).[14]

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[13]This was superseded by a new Alien Registration Law of 1952, on the eve of the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty. However, the content substantially remained the same as the old. See Law No. 125, April 28, 1952.

[14]For an English translation of the laws, see EHS Law Bulletin Series, Alien Registration Law, X (Tokyo: Eibun Hōrei Sha, 1958), and Immigration Control Order (Tokyo: Eibun Hōrei Sha, 1957.

To simplify the two laws, it can be said that failure to carry the alien registration card could result in arrest, followed by imprisonment or fine, at worst, deportation. Therefore, one noted Korean writer in Japan stated:

> What a ridiculous thing it is! Everytime I changed my clothes I had to make sure that I had the registration card, even if I just went out for a cup of tea or to the barber shop in the neighborhood.[15]

The number of Koreans detained at Ōmura camp for the violation of the Immigration Laws rose gradually after negotiations were broken off in October, 1953 (Table 14). In fact, the worsening relationship between the two governments caused the Japanese government to resort much more readily to stringent enforcement of the laws. The result was the increased apprehension of Koreans who allegedly violated the laws. Meanwhile, the Rhee regime also responded to the Japanese detention of Koreans by more vigilant enforcement of the "Rhee Line."

While the rivalry between South Korea and Japan intensified in a form of arbitrary seizure and detention of the opponent's nationals, the North Korean regime did not remain silent. On August 30, 1954, Nam Il, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), protested against the Japanese government for the "outrageous

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[15]Kim So-un, Ajiano yontō senshitsu [The Fourth Class Cabin in Asia], quoted in Pak Che-il, Zainichi Chōsenjin ni kansuru sōgō chōsa kenkyū [A General Survey Study of Koreans in Japan] (Tokyo: Shin Kigensha, 1957), p. 159.

TABLE 14

THE NUMBER OF DEPORTEES

Year	Male	Female	Total
1950	796	159	955
1951	1,534	639	2,173
1952	1,500	798	2,298
1953	1,733	855	2,588
1954	567	268	835
1955	445	262	707
1956	-	-	-
1957	-	-	-
1958	713	290	1,003
1959	-	-	-
1960	986	445	1,431
1961	375	175	554
1962	462	168	630
1963	336	126	462
1964	428	156	584
1965	465	157	622
1966 (by June)	266	72	238
Total	10,606	4,574	15,180

Source: Zainichi Chōsenjin Jinken Yōgō Tōsō Iinkai, Zainichi Chōsen kōmin ni taisuru danatsu to tairyō tsuihō o mokuromu "Shutsunyūkoku kanri hōan" [The Oppression against Koreans in Japan and the Immigration Law Designed for Deportation], (Tokyo: 1969), p. 13.

persecution of the Koreans" in Japan.[16] He cited several incidents in which Japanese police raided Korean ghettos to make "unlawful arrests of Koreans." The North Korean Foreign Minister claimed that all the Koreans residing in

[16] "Statement of the Foreign Minister of the DPRK in Protest Against Persecution of the Korean Nationals in Japan," On the Question of 600,000 Koreans in Japan (P'yŏngyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1959) pp. 21-23. Nam Il's statement in Japanese was carried by Zen-ei, No. 98 (November, 1954), 16-17.

in Japan were the citizens of North Korea. He demanded that the Japanese government immediately cease the "unlawful arrest" of Koreans and stop the forcible deportation of North Korean nationals to the Rhee regime which was nothing but a lackey of the American imperialists.[17] However, the Japanese government ignored the protest.

The Rhee regime, on the other hand, maintained the Korean Mission in Japan in order to provide diplomatic protection for its own nationals. However, for all practical purposes, it accomplished little of what it originally intended to do. Above all, the rescue of distressed Koreans in Japan was not the primary concern of Rhee's regime. Rhee repeatedly insisted that the Japanese government must bear the responsibility of the well-being of all Koreans in Japan and should pay due compensation to those Koreans who were forcibly taken to Japan during the War. Consequently, the Rhee regime had no substantive policy to provide any relief measures for Koreans in Japan. For the first few years of its operation in Japan, the Korean Mission was allocated only a bare minimum of funds, just enough to keep its door open in Tokyo, by the South Korean government. Hence, it was a widely known practice for the head of the Mission to solicit funds from a handful of wealthy Koreans in the community for the Mission's support.[18]

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Kang No-hyang, Cheil Taep'yobu [The Korean Mission in Japan] (Seoul: Tong-a P. R. Yŏnkusŏ, 1966), p. 16. According to this source, a Korean businessman named Cho

A couple of other specific incidents may illustrate more fully Rhee's overall policy toward Koreans in Japan. In 1952, the Mindan President, Kim Chae-wha made several recommendations to help promote well-being of Koreans in Japan to the South Korean government. His recommendations, in the name of the President of the Mindan, were to include:

1. Some portion of the home government trade with Japan should be purchased through the Mindan and from those business firms owned and operated by Koreans in Japan;

2. Setting up a fund at the Bank of Korea's branch office in Tokyo to facilitate financial loans to small Korean businessmen in Japan;

3. Appointment of a delegate representing Koreans in Japan at the ROK-Japan negotiation;

4. Presence of six observers without voting privileges to represent Koreans in Japan at the Korean National Assembly.[19]

The response of the home government to the plea was rather cold. It must be understood that when the recommendation was submitted to the home government in 1952, the timing was inappropriate for its consideration because the Korean War was being waged. Nevertheless, it illustrates a lesser degree of concern, or perhaps, a total absence of Rhee's policy to help the Koreans in Japan. Finally, in June, 1959, the Mindan denounced its own home government, by stating that:

Byŏng-ho not only donated funds to purchase two limousines to be used for the Mission, but also paid the expenses for the remodeling of the Korean Ambassador's mansion in Japan. See ibid., pp. 51-52.

[19]Chŏng Chŏl, Mindan (Tokyo: Yoyosha, 1967), pp. 56-57.

> . . .We have pleaded to our home government to provide relief measures for Koreans in Japan for the last some ten years. However, the absence of any sincere reply from the home government makes us remain no longer in patience in this regard. Therefore, we should like to express our lack of faith in the Liberal Party regime.[20]

However, the ultimate blame for the failure should not be traced back to the home government alone, rather blame should be equally placed on the ineffective leadership of the Mindan itself. It is a now widely known fact that the Mindan officials in collusion with the Korean Mission in Japan used to issue passports for Koreans in Japan to travel abroad only after exhorbitant fees were paid to the officials for the purpose of raising funds for the Mindan's activities.[21] Because of this, the Mindan seldom gained public confidence among a majority of Koreans in Japan, but provided an image of an organization which stood for only a small number of well-to-do Koreans. Moreover, the heads of the two entities, the Chairman of the Mindan and the Minister of the Korean Mission in Japan, were rarely able to maintain a good harmony. They rather frequently clashed with each other in a refusal to be dominated by the other. The Mindan officials frequently resorted, through petition campaigns, to appealing to the home government to remove an unfit Minister from the post of the Korean Mission in Japan. Or conversely, the head of the Korean Mission often intervened

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[20] A full text of the statement by the Mindan is reprinted in ibid., p. 198.

[21] Ibid., pp. 58-59, 64. And also see Kang No-hyang, op.cit., pp. 204-210.

unofficially in the election of the Mindan's Executive Council by supporting candidates favorable to his own interests.[22]

It was against this background that Nam Il, the North Korean Foreign Minister, protested in 1954, against the mistreatment of the deserted Koreans in Japan. In February the following year, by taking advantage of the severed ROK-Japan talk as well as the Hatoyama government's policy to open trade with Communist bloc, Nam Il made a proposal to Japan expressing his government's desire to enter into friendly relations starting with trade and cultural exchanges.[23]

It is worthwhile to note the strikingly different approaches in which the North and South Korean regimes attempted to pursue their relations with Japan. Syngman Rhee, then the President of South Korea, stubbornly insisted that the solution of major political and economic issues between the two countries must proceed prior to any normalized relations. Until that time, Rhee, obsessed with the old grudges against Japan, was unyielding in irritating Japanese feelings by the constant seizure of the Japanese fishermen and their vessels for the alleged violation of the "Rhee

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[22]Concerning the numerous detailed incidents, see Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 25, 35-36, 64-65. And Kang No-hyang, op.cit., pp. 172, 175, 178-179, and 290.

[23]"Nam Il Hokusen Gaisō no Nihonseihu ni taisuru tainichi kankei ni kansuru seimei ni tsuite" [Concerning the Statement of Nam Il, Foreign Minister of North Korea], Kōan Jōhō, No. 21 (June, 1955), 53-54.

Line." On the other hand, the North Korean approach to Japan was quite conciliatory and willing to set aside many troublesome issues for future settlement. Nevertheless, they were ready to begin with non-political relations with Japan such as trade and cultural exchange as a starting point.[24] However, the real objective behind this approach was North Korea's intention not only to gain the allegiance of the dissatisfied Koreans in Japan, but also to disrupt any future re-opening of the ROK-Japan talks.

Although the Hatoyama government never formally responded to the proposal, unofficial contacts between the two countries soon followed. In May, 1955, a few months after the Nam Il's statement, the first Japanese Pacific Mission led by Handanaka Masaharu returning from the All Asian People's Conference in New Delhi, visited North Korea and had a long talk with the P'yŏngyang officials.[25] Following Hadanaka Masaharu's visit, many organizations to promote trade between DPRK and Japan suddenly mushroomed, including the DPRK-Japan Trade Association and a Policy Committee for the Promotion of the DPRK-Japan Trade in the

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[24] Ibid. See also Kiwon Chung, "Japanese-North Korean Relations Today," Asian Survey, IV, No. 4 (April, 1964), 789-790. And Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 190.

[25] "Zainichi Chōsenjin no genjō to Hokusen kikan mondai," [The Conditions of the Koreans in Japan and the Problem of the Repatriation to North Korea], Chōsa Geppō, No. 40 (April, 1959), 8. Hereafter cited as Kikoku mondai. Also on this point, see Shakai Undō Chōsakai, comp., Sayoku jiten [A Left Wing Dictionary] (Tokyo: Musashi Shobō, 1961), p. 236, and Kowon Chung, op.cit., p. 791.

Chōsōren headquarters. In October, 1955, an unofficial trade agreement was signed between Kim Che-sŏn, a standing member of the Korean Association for the Promotion of International Trade, and Tanabe Mamoru, Director of the Soviet-Japan Trade Association. Also a joint communique was issued by Kim Ŭng-ki, Vice-President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, and Furuya Sadao, a Socialist member of the Japanese House of Representatives. They pledged to cooperate in working out plans to: (1) normalize relations between the two countries; (2) establish a permanent trade mission; (3) open a channel for free travel between the two countries; (4) settle the fishery boundary.[26]

Meanwhile, the rapidly developing DPRK-Japan rapprochement caused the Rhee regime to refrain from further unnecessary escalation of tension with Japan over the "Rhee Line." In November, 1956, the Rhee government made a proposal to Japan concerning its readiness to discuss the question of detainees being held by both governments. The proposal was to include provisions that:

1. Japan would release all detained Koreans who had entered Japan before the date of the Japanese surrender.

2. The Korean government would release the Japanese fishermen who had completed their terms of sentence, while accepting the Korean deportees who

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[26] For the text, see Chōsen Jijō Kenkyūkai, ed., Chōsen no keizai [The Korean Economy] (Tokyo: Tokyo Keizai Shimpōsha, 1956), pp. 201-202. Also Kiwon Chung, op.cit., p. 792, and Kaigai Jijō Chōsashō, ed., Chōsen yōran [A Handbook of Korea] (Tokyo: Musashi Shobō, 1960), pp. 162-165.

had entered Japan illegally after the date of the Japanese surrender.[27]

However, it was objected to by the Japanese Foreign Minister, because he insisted on release of all Japanese fishermen detained in Korea.[28] The Japanese government was, in fact, in a better bargaining position to induce more concessions from the Rhee regime by seeming to incline toward the North Korean government. Several months before Rhee made the proposal, 48 Koreans detained in Ōmura camp went on strike expressing their wish to be repatriated to the North instead of South Korea. Consequently in July, the Japanese government decided to send 20 of them to North Korea aboard a Norwegian ship.[29]

Actually the plan to repatriate Koreans to North Korea was not a new one; neither was the scheme originated by the Japanese government. Soon after the armistice was signed in Korea, the Minsen adopted a resolution at the 11th Central Committee meeting held in August, 1953, to send Koreans to North Korea to help reconstruct the war-torn country.[30] However, the response was rather lukewarm, because the DPRK's economic recovery was still in the early stages and was not ready to accept the repatriates. On

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[27] Oemu hengchŏng, pp. 171-172.

[28] Ibid., p. 172.

[29] Ibid., p. 173.

[30] Tamagi Motoi, "Nihon Kyōsantō no Zainichi Chōsenjin shidō" [The JCP's Guidance over the Koreans in Japan], Koria Hyōron, V, No. 8 (August, 1961), 15.

September 29, 1955, Kim Il-sung stated that "DPRK will try to arrange repatriation if they wish to return." But, he suggested that "Koreans should try to build their living foundation in Japan and endeavor in a direction for the attainment of the unification of Korea through a close relationship between DPRK-Japan."[31] A few months later, on December 10, the DPRK informed the Chōsōren that it agreed on the question of repatriation in principle, but was not overly enthusiastic on the timing as to the immediate undertaking. However, the Japanese government had made the first inquiry into the feasibility of the repatriation to the North Korean regime through the representative of the Japanese Red Cross (JRC) who visited P'yŏngyang in February, 1956. Again, the DPRK's response was lukewarm.[32] In May, 1956, the Committee of the International Red Cross (CIRC) dispatched its representatives to Japan, North and South Korea to determine the question of repatriation. As a result, Leopold Bossier, chairman of the CIRC, made a proposal to the Red Cross organization of each of the three countries to open talks regarding the repatriation. But the proposal never materialized due to the refusal by the South Korean Red Cross.[33] At the same time, the question of the repatriation gradually subsided from the public mind.

Nevertheless, the DPRK never lost its deep interest

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[31] Kikoku mondai, p. 8.

[32] Ibid. [33] Ibid.

and genuine concern for the fate of the Koreans in Japan. The DPRK decided to remit regularly a vast sum of money in the name of the Korean Education Assistance Fund. The first remittance of above ¥121 million arrived at the Chōsōren in April, 1957, and another ¥100 million was to follow in October.[34] The DPRK's policy was apparently that of a propaganda campaign, and designed to lure the allegiance of Koreans in Japan. Regardless of its motives, the impact on the minds of the Koreans in Japan by the DPRK's gesture was profound, because it provided them, at least some belief that they were not completely "forgotten nationals." Subsequently some Koreans in Japan began to display a keen interest in the development of North Korea. Thus it laid the foundation for the grassroot movement for repatriation to North Korea.

On August 11, 1958, approximately 60 Koreans gathered at a meeting sponsored by the local chapter of the Chōsōren in the Kawasaki, Kanagawa prefecture. Having heard reports of the remarkable economic progress in North Korea, they wrote a letter to Premier Kim Il-sung expressing their desire to go to North Korea.[35]

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[34]The DPRK has been remitting the Korean Education Assistance Fund to the Chōsōren regularly ever since then. For the detailed amount, see Tōitsu nenkan: 1965-66, pp. 584-585.

[35]The Association for the Protection of Human Rights of the Koreans in Japan, Kikokoku kyōtei no enchō to kikoku jigyō no hoshō no tameni [For the Extension of the Repatriation Agreement and its Assurance for the Further Repatriation] (Tokyo: Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamoru Kai, 1967), pp. 25-26. And Fujishima Udai, "Chōsenjin kikoku

Furthermore, they pledged that:

1. Instead of living in Japan suffering under constant persecution and racial discrimination, let us return to our fatherland and struggle for the peaceful unification of Korea;

2. Let us present our legitimate demands to the Japanese government to make immediate arrangements for repatriation to North Korea;

3. To accomplish the objective, let us unite and try to seek the support of the Japanese people.[36]

Spurred by the move, the Chōsōren headquarters in Tokyo adopted an official resolution on August 13. It was when two thousand and five hundred local representatives assembled to commemorate the 13th anniversary of the Korean Liberation from the Japanese domination. The official resolution was designed to present four major demands to the Japanese government. The four demands may be summarized as follows:

1. To establish friendly relations with North Korea;

2. To call off the ROK-Japan talk and release the Korean detainees held in the Ōmura camp by allowing them to return to the country of their own choice;

3. To demand immediate formulation of a repatriation plan by the Japanese government;

4. To request issuance of entry visas to the North Korean Red Cross representatives to

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to Nihonjin no mōten" [The Korean Repatriation and the Blindspot of the Japanese], Sekai, No. 166 (October, 1959),

[36] Chosŏn Minbo, August 14, 1959. And Fujishima Udai, op.cit., p. 191.

> visit Japan, and grant permission for Koreans in Japan to travel to North Korea to attend the DPRK's Independence Day ceremony.[37]

In the meantime, the Chōsōren issued a directive to its nationwide local chapters to wage a massive campaign for the repatriation movement to the North.

The DPRK, realizing the widely spreading repatriation movement in Japan, was no longer able to remain in silence. Hence, Kim Il-sung apparently felt constrained to respond to the repatriation movement at a rally being held in P'yŏngyang on the 10th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK on September 8, 1958. He delivered a lengthy speech in which he stated:

> We cannot but direct concern to the recent situation of our compatriots in Japan. . . .
> Suffering under non-rights, national discrimination and difficulty of living, the compatriots in Japan recently manifested the desire to return to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
> Our people warmly welcome the aspiration of the compatriots who, having lost their means of living in Japan, desire to return to the bosom of their father land. . . .
> The government of DPRK will provide the Korean nationals in Japan with all the conditions for leading a new life after their returning to the homeland. We regard this as our national duty.[38]

Meanwhile, the Chōsōren organized a Central Counter Measure Committee for the Repatriation under the chairmanship of Yi Kye-pek in late September, and launched a massive campaign to influence the decision of the Kishi government.

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[37] Kikoku mondai, p. 9, and also see Fujishima Udai, op.cit., p. 191.

[38] On the Question of 600,000 Koreans in Japan, pp. 10-11.

To boost the campaign, the United Democratic Fatherland Front in North Korea appealed through "Radio of Free Koreans in Japan" to the Japanese government. They also sent letters in the name of the United Democratic Fatherland Front to practically every Japanese public figure who held a favorable image of North Korea, asking for cooperation in the undertaking.[39] The appeal to the Japanese people had an immediate effect. By October 2, twenty-two Japanese "democratic organizations and groups" manifested in public their willingness to support and promote the repatriation movement. A few days later, Asanuma Inejirō, General Secretary of the Socialist Party, and Fukuda Katsuo, Chief Secretariat of the LPD expressed their support of the movement.

About a month later after the North Korean Premier's speech, the Vice-Premier of the DPRK, Kim Il held a press conference on October 16. He stated that his government "will bear all the travel expense necessary for their return." He declared that the rest of the matter would lie within the decision of the Kishi government.[40] From this time on, the repatriation movement gained its full momentum. Encouraged by the new development, the Chōsōren at the 15th Enlarged Central Committee Meeting and the subsequent

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[39]"Letter to Our Compatriots in Japan," Document, New Korea, No. 31 (October, 1958), 27.

[40]On the Question of 600,000 Koreans in Japan, pp. 13-16.

Central Standing Committee meeting, decided to present a formal request to the Kishi government. It included:

1. Unconditional repatriation for those who wish to return to the DPRK;

2. To permit the North Korean vessels to dock at the Japanese port to transport the Korean repatriates;

3. Until the time of embarkation, all necessary procedures would be arranged by the Japanese government to assure the repatriation.[41]

At the same time, the Chōsōren decided that October 20th should be set aside as "A Demand Day for the Realization of Repatriation" to launch a nationwide campaign. The response to the Chōsōren's appeal was widespread among many prominent Japanese people. To give all-out support to the Chōsōren's effort, Japanese people also founded an organization called the Zainichi Chōsenjin Kikoku Kyōryoku Kai or KKK [The Cooperation Society for the Repatriation of Koreans in Japan] on October 17, 1958. The original members who founded the KKK formed an impressive line-up of the bi-partisan and national figures. Included were: Hatoyama Ichirō, ex-Premier and LDP member; Asanuma Inejirō, Secretary General of the Socialist Party, Nosaka Sanzo, chairman of the JCP; Iwamoto Nobuyuki, ex-Vice Speaker of the House and LDP member; Oda Kaoru, the Chairman of the Sōhyō; Hirabayashi Taiko, the widely-known authoress and

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[41] Kikoku mondai, p. 10.

and some 90 others.[42] Furthermore, 28 other organizations were affiliated with the KKK, and its headquarters was set up in the Diet building to direct an "Appeal to the Japanese People" in every prefecture and local government in Japan.[43] As a result of this massive campaign, by the following January, no more than four months after the North Korean Premier's speech, 22 prefectures, 122 cities, 34 village legislative bodies, 28 governors, mayors and village chiefs adopted various forms of resolutions and pledged to support the repatriation.[44] Indeed, it was an unprecedented bi-partisan movement embracing a unanimity of public opinion among the Japanese people such as had not previously been seen in the past decade.[45] However, the decision was not an easy one for the Japanese government to make without a careful examination. A major question was what would be the justification for the Kishi government to allow a mass exodus of Koreans from the "free world" of Japan to the Communist regime, while many people were still trying to flee from the shackles of Communist rule? Another question

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[42] Ibid., pp. 10-11, Fujishima Udai, op.cit., p. 194. Also see Kiwong Chung, op.cit., pp. 797-798, and "Hokusen kikoku undō no tenbō" [The Prospect on the Repatriation Movement to North Korea], Koria Hyōron, III, No. 1 (January, 1959), 44-45. Hereafter cited as Tenbō.

[43] Kikoku mondai, pp. 10-11.

[44] Fujishima Udai, op.cit., p. 194.

[45] Hatada Takashi, "Zainichi Chōsenjin no kikoku to Nihonjin no kyōryoku" [The Repatriation of Koreans in Japan and the Japanese Cooperation], Koria Hyōron, III, No. 2 (February, 1959), 28-29.

which had to be taken into consideration before any decision was made was what would be the reactions of the United States government and the South Korean regime.

The combined effort of both the KKK and the Chōsōren for the repatriation movement had suddenly emerged as a real, formidable force to be reckoned with in the Japanese political arena. While the Chōsōren mobilized its members through the local chapters to stage systematic demonstrations and petition campaigns at all levels of government, and the KKK dispatched some 600 Japanese delegates to every corner of Japan to persuade the Japanese people to support the movement. Mass media was also instrumental in swaying public opinion and in boosting the movement by reporting candid descriptions of the adverse living conditions of Koreans in Japan. From the beginning of the repatriation movement the major headlines in almost all of the Japanese news media dealt with the Korean in Japan. The Bunka Radio Broadcasting Corporation in particular carried a program once a week exclusively devoted to the problems of the Koreans in Japan. There also appeared several articles in Chūō Kōron, the most widely read monthly journal, dealing with the question of Koreans in Japan.[46]

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[46]Some of these articles were, "Zainichi Chōsenjin rokujūman no genjitsu" [The Reality of 600,000 Koreans in Japan], Chūō Kōron, No. 847 (December, 1959), and "kikoku to han Nihonjin" [The Repatriation and the Half-Japanese], "Chosenjin kikoku to Nihonjin no mōten" [The Korean Repatriation and the Blindspot of the Japanese], "Kawaranu yūjō o" [The Unchanging Friendship], Sekai, No. 166

Under increasing public pressure, the Kishi government was no longer able to remain silent over the imminent issue. Finally, on January 30, 1959, Fujiyama Aiichirō, Foreign Minister, broke the silence by issuing a statement that the Kishi government might soon take up the matter formally at the cabinet meeting for a final decision. A few days later, on February 2, Premier Kishi himself stated during the Diet Budget Committee session that his government "will repatriate the Koreans if they wish to return."[47] Not all the LDP members were content with Premier Kishi's intention. Naka Funada, a leading LDP member, warned the Kishi government that "indiscreet disposition of the repatriation problem against the wishes of South Korea will throw the pending ROK-Japan talk into a different position." The Kishi government responded that the repatriation problem was an issue based on an humanitarian principle and that it had nothing to do with the political question of the ROK-Japan talk.[48]

(October, 1959), and "Chōsen kikoku o habamu mono" [Those who Obstruct the Repatriation to Korea], Sekai, No. 167 (November, 1959). Rōdōsha Ruporutaju Shūdan, comp., Nihonjin no mita Zainichi Chōsenjin [The Koreans in Japan Seeing by the Japanese], (Tokyo: Nihon Kikanshi Tsūshinsha, 1959).

[47] Japan Time, February 5, 1959, and "Nikkan kaidan to Hokusen kikan mondai" [The ROK-Japan Talk and the Question of the Korean Repatriation], Koria Hyōron, III, No. 19 (April, 1959), 19.

[48] Japan, Gaimushō [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Waga gaikō no kinkyō [The Current Situation Concerning Our Foreign Relations], No. 4 (June, 1959), 30.

The ultimate decision concerning repatriation was finally reached at the cabinet meeting held on February 13. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement justifying its decision on the grounds that: (1) the principle that every individual is endowed with fundamental rights to choose one's own domicile is clarified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 13, Section 2), and the Japanese Constitution (Article 22); (2) to respect fundamental rights is the basic obligation of all free and democratic nations. Hence any attempt to ignore such fundamental rights because of political reasons would constitute a violation of the principle. The decision is made, therefore, not only based on the internationally accepted principle but also on a humanitarian concern to allow repatriation through one's own voluntary and free will.[49] However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that the decision should not be construed as an implication of de facto recognition of the North Korean regime. By the same token, the Ministry added, it is neither a violation of sovereignty of the Republic of Korea nor does it constitute an unfriendly act against it.[50] To maintain the unofficial governmental nature of the dealings with the North Korean Communist regime, the Japanese government entrusted the matter to the JRC. At the same time, the Japanese government through the JRC requested the CIRC to

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[49] Ibid., pp. 72-73.

[50] Ibid., p. 23.

provide an impartial service in determining the free will of those who wished to repatriate to North Korea. In the meantime, the JRC delegates opened negotiations with the NKRD (North Korean Red Cross) delegates in Geneva on April 13, 1959. It took several months and 18 official meetings for both sides to reach an agreement. A draft agreement was completed on June 18, and the final document was signed in Calcutta, India, on August 13, 1959.[51]

It is difficult to discern to what extent the decision of the Japanese government to sign the Repatriation Agreement with the DPRK was truly motivated by the humanitarian principle. Nevertheless, the decision had served several political purposes as far as the Japanese government was concerned. First, the signing of the agreement constituted a tacit understanding between the two governments, if not Japan's de facto recognition of the DPRK. It also demonstrated the Japanese government's inclination to pursue a two-Korea policy if it served the interest of Japan. Consequently the Japanese government's action had rendered a leeway for the DPRK to seek a more active role in promoting friendly relations with Japan. At the same time, the Kishi government was able to some degree to mitigate the mounting pressure of the left-wing

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[51]The agreement was effective only one year and three months after signing but subject to renewal. Subsequently it was renewed seven times before the repatriation was terminated in 1967. See Kongsankwŏn munje yŏnkuso [The Communist Affairs Study Institute] Puknan ch'onggam 1945-68 (Seoul: Kongsankwŏn munje yŏnkuso, 1968), p. 285.

groups against Kishi's pro-Western oriented foreign policy. Second, the Japanese government discovered a strong bargaining tool that could be applied most effectively in dealing with South Korea. That is: the pretense of Japan's move to come closer to the North Korean regime, Rhee's rival, would be sufficient to move the stubborn will of Syngman Rhee. As Rhee attempted to bargain with Japan by setting up the "Rhee Line," Japan was in a favorable position to use its leverage to counteract South Korea's challenge. The effect was clearly visible. For instance, when the Japanese government's decision on the repatriation was made public, South Korea made an immediate overture to Japan for an unconditional resumption of the ROK-Japan talk which had been deadlocked for 8 months. Furthermore, Rhee softened his stance, saying that his government was now willing to accept all repatriates, if the Japanese government would pay due compensation to Koreans who had been "forcibly taken" to Japan to serve her expansion policy.[52] Rhee's previous position had been a flat refusal to accept any of them unless other fundamental issues were simultaneously settled. The modified attitude was undoubtedly intended to stall or even disrupt the Japan-DPRK Repatriation Agreement. The action taken by the Japanese government provided a clear warning for South Korea to realize that Japan would not hesitate to deal with

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[52] The New York Times, March 2, 1959, p. 19.

the DPRK to embarrass the international standing of the South Korean government in East Asia.

For North Korea, it amounted to the greatest diplomatic triumph since the armistice, and provided a golden opportunity to boost the international prestige of the DPRK. While many elsewhere were still trying to free themselves from Communist rule, it was an unprecedented event for the DPRK to receive the reverse flow of the population. The prime objective of the DPRK's diplomacy had been to obstruct the successful conclusion of the ROK-Japan talk. Rhee's unbending and uncompromising attitude actually helped the DPRK to obtain that goal. Most particularly the successful mobilization of the Japanese left-wing group for the DPRK's cause provided a chance to create a powerful "P'yŏngyang lobby" in Japan. The DPRK was able to enhance its prestige not only in the eyes of the Koreans in Japan but to the Japanese people as well. Moreover, the DPRK's success in gaining the allegiance of the Koreans had a tremendous impact upon even those who did not accept the repatriation. While the DPRK promised jobs, homes and a better life, the Rhee regime offered nothing. Their allegiance to the homeland was more likely to be determined by what their home government could do for them, instead of any lofty ideological choice between the two regimes. It is difficult to determine the true motives of those who voluntarily repatriated to the North Korean Communist regime. However, it appears almost certain that they were primarily motivated

by socio-economic reasons rather than political. Actually most Koreans in Japan were originally from South Korea and seemed to have few family ties with North Korea. According to a survey conducted in 1954, only 2.4 percent of Koreans were from North Korea while the overwhelming majority of 96.6 percent of Koreans were actually from South Korea (Table 15). This was an embarrassing fact for the Rhee regime, because the repatriation represented a large number of people from SouthKorea who indicated their desire to go to North Korea rather than back to the place of their origin. Hence it constituted not only a slap at Rhee's regime but a strong vote of no confidence in the South Korean government. As a result of the successful negotiations on the repatriation, the DPRK increased not only its own confidence in dealing with the Japanese government but also acquired much needed manpower on the eve of its Seven-Year Economic Program (1961-67).[53] Had full-fledged political relations with Japan been the DPRK's immediate goal, the result would have been scored as a failure. However, for all practical purposes, the P'yŏngyang regime must be judged a major success.

The only loser in this diplomatic brawl turned out to be South Korea. As soon as the decision of the Japanese government was made known, Rhee's government became furious. His government charged that the Japanese government action

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[53]The number of Koreans repatriated to North Korea is shown in Table 16.

TABLE 15

THE BIRTH ORIGINS OF THE KOREANS IN JAPAN
(AS OF 1954)

Province	Number	Percent
South Korean Provinces		
Kyŏngsang Nam To	217,286	28.5
Kyŏngsang Puk To	142,744	25.3
Chechu To	70,764	15.2
Chŏlla Nam To	63,304	11.2
Chŏlla Puk To	13,982	2.5
Ch'ungch'ŏng Nam To	13,807	2.5
Ch'ungch'ŏng Puk To	11,918	2.1
Kyŏngki To	9,606	1.7
Kangwŏn To	3,161	0.6
Sub total	546,572	96.9
North Korean Provinces		
Kangwŏng To	3,160	0.6
Whanghe To	2,709	0.5
P'yŏng-an Nam To	2,614	0.5
P'yŏng-an Puk To	1,467	0.3
Hamkyŏng Nam To	2,507	0.4
Hamkyŏng Puk To	1,093	0.2
Chakang To	11	-
Sub total	13,561	2.4
Birth Place Unknown	4,013	0.7
Grand total	564,146	100.0

Source: Kikoku mondai, p. 3.

was an immoral plot to carry out compulsory deportation and that such action was most unfriendly to the ROK.[54] It

[54]The Republic of Korea, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Speeches and Statements by Foreign Minister Chung W. Cho (Seoul: Foreign Affairs Ministry, 1959), pp. 84-85.

TABLE 16

THE NUMBER OF THE REPATRIATES
FROM 1959-67

Month	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	196
1		2,995	2,303	87	228	68	59	109	4
2		4,056	-	141	174	-	-	138	14
3		4,079	-	283	123	162	191	210	11
4		5,356	2,046	578	190	266	192	176	16
5		4,284	4,332	272	290	344	205	217	16
6		4,354	5,118	615	311	-	269	212	19
7		5,326	2,724	330	296	-	222	117	16
8		4,129	2,105	-	278	-	263	134	15
9		4,801	1,164	-	236	303	294	150	21
10		4,341	1,915	504	223	308	197	155	20
11		3,894	816	350	104	182	226	150	-
12	2,942	2,141	278	337	114	189	127	92	25
Total	2,942	49,036	22,801	3,497	2,567	1,822	2,255	1,860	1,83
Grand Total									88,611

protested further that such unilateral action of the Japanese government without consultation with the ROK was contrary to international law and morality, because the Japanese government was obligated to consult with the lawful government of Korea which represented the interests of all Koreans in Japan. Moreover, "the North Korean puppet regime" was condemned by the U.S. as an aggressor, stated the Rhee government, and it was an unlawful government.[55] The ROK government said that many Koreans in Japan had been deceived by the North Korean propaganda and that the Japanese decision for

[55] Oemu hengchŏng, pp. 173-174.

repatriation was not "humanitarian" but politically oriented. In other words, Japan was trying to use the repatriation as a tool for diplomatic dickering on such issues as the "Rhee Line." Virtually all political parties in South Korea unanimously voiced support of Rhee's protest in a joint statement.[56] Anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea seemed to have reached a new height. By February 23, 1959, some 4.1 million persons had reportedly participated in the anti-repatriation demonstrations in South Korea.[57] In an attempt to stall Japan's repatriation deal with North Korea, Rhee offered unconditional resumption of the deadlocked ROK-Japan negotiations, and expressed his government's readiness to accept all repatriates provided that the Japanese government pay due compensation for them. Since no favorable response was forthcoming from the Japanese government, the Rhee regime became desperate and apparently felt compelled to employ their last resort. Foreign Minister Chung W. Cho announced that his government was determined to resist the repatriation plan "with all means and power at its command. This is not a bluff, but a simple statement of fact. To protect our citizens and prevent their enslavement by the Communists, we have no other choice."[58] Rhee elaborated

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[56] The New York Times, February 14, 1959.

[57] Voice of Korea, XVI, No. 248 (March 31, 1959), 3, and The New York Times, February 15, 17, 22, 1959.

[58] Republic of Korea, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Republic of Korea Bulletin, No. 18 (June, 1959), 16.

on this point further, saying:

> We have solemnly informed the Japanese that all ships carrying Koreans from Japan to North Korea will be intercepted by our naval vessels and our planes, which have been placed in the position of alert.[59]

Though the ROK's warning appeared to be deadly serious, the threat turned out to be a mere bluff. The ROK had little actual power either economically or militarily to back up its stance. In desperation, the South Korean government appealed to the United States to use its good office to mediate the dispute over the repatriation. The United States was gravely concerned about deteriorating relations between Japan and South Korea, two of its most important allies in East Asia. However, the United States was reluctant to mediate the dispute lest sensitive feelings in both countries be offended. A State Department spokesman stated that the United States would not do so unless Japan asked for United States mediation.[60] As a matter of fact, at that time the Japanese government had already preempted the United States' tacit support for repatriation. The South Korean Red Cross also made an appeal to General M. Gruenther, Director of the American Red Cross to block the repatriation scheme. But the effort was futile.[61]

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[59] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

[60] The Voice of Korea, XVII, No. 260 (August, 1960), 3. The New York Times, June 18, 1959.

[61] The New York Times, June 26, 1959.

In the meantime, the Mindan had also been quite active in trying to counteract the Chōsōren's effort to mobilize Japanese public opinion in favor of the repatriation. As early as October 9, 1958, the Mindan organized a "Counter Measure Committee for the Prevention of the Forces Labor Recruitment to North Korea." The Committee declared that the repatriation movement to North Korea amounted to no more than a "forced labor recruitment." It also pointed out that almost 5 million people had fled the North to seek freedom in the South since the DPRK was established in 1948. The present repatriation movement was aimed at filling the manpower shortage incurred by the mass escape. Therefore, in view of the humanitarian belief, the Committee stated: "We can hardly stand idle while watching our compatriots being dragged into forced labor. We are determined to smash the plot."[62] On October 14, 1958, the Mindan issued a directive to all prefectural and local chapters to take the strongest measures possible to counteract the Chōsōren's repatriation campaign. The directive also suggested that all Mindan members try to gain the Japanese public support by exposing the real motives behind the repatriation movement. The Mindan declared that the period between October 15, and November 15, would be set aside as "A Preventive Month against Forced Labor Recruitment." During this period, all Mindan members were urged to

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[62] Tenbō, p. 40.

participate in a series of demonstrations directed at the Japanese local legislatures. All the local Mindan members were instructed to dissuade those Koreans who had already expressed their desire to be repatriated, charging that it was a gimmick of Communist propaganda. A Mindan representative even managed to appear himself at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting hearing which was held on October 29, 1958, and tried to persuade the committee members against the repatriation.[63] Meanwhile, the Korean Mission in Japan issued a stern warning to Koreans not to sign any repatriation paper, since they would in effect be forfeiting their legal rights as Korean nationals in Japan, if and when the ROK-Japan negotiation succeeded. At the same time, the Mindan waged countless demonstrations and made appeals by sending petitions to all political parties, including the Speaker of the House, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Justice. Similar appeals were made to the Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, and Sankei newspapers to support their cause.

Despite all these efforts, pro-repatriation sentiment was already solidly behind the Chōsōren and the DPRK. The Chōsōren's movement in cooperation with the Japanese left-wing organizations were too formidable a force for the hastily organized Mindan to overcome. In order to plant a readily available "P'yŏngyang lobby" in Japan, ever since

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[63] Ibid., p. 41.

1955, the DPRK had worked patiently to build strong allies among the Japanese left-wing groups. It was reported that the Chōsōren, receiving funds from the DPRK, was annually spending some ¥2 billion including their political funds for Japanese politics to win the support of the Socialists and JCP members in the Diet.[64] The Japanese government's decision to repatriate Koreans was both a practical and realistic solution to the ever-vexing problem of the Korean minority in Japan. Certainly, the principle of freedom of choice of domicile, on which Japan rested its case, was unassailable.

When the Mindan realized the position of the Japanese government was irreversible, the sense of bitter defeat was projected to its home government. On June 15, 1959, the Mindan passed a vote of no confidence in the Rhee government and blamed its entire failure on Rhee's policy toward Koreans in Japan.[65] As was planned, the first ship-load of Koreans aboard the Russian vessel departed from Niigata, for Ch'ŏngchin, North Korea, on December 14, 1959.

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[64]Kōan Chōsachō, [The Public Safety Investigation Bureau], comp., Naigai jōsei no kaikyō to tenbō [The Current Situation and Perspective of the Internal and External Affairs], (Tokyo: Kōan-chō, 1963), pp. 87-89.

[65]Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 56-57, and a full text of the Mindan statement is found in p. 198.

CHAPTER VII

KOREAN EDUCATION AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF CHŌSEN UNIVERSITY

The Imminent task confronted by the Japanese Imperial government soon after the annexation of Korea in 1910, was to change its policy from the heavy-handed iron rule to a more subtle and conciliatory posture to placate the Koreans. To accomplish this end, an ambitious long-range program was launched by the colonial government in an effort to assimilate the natives gradually into the Japanese culture. The practicality of the program as a colonial policy was not entirely free from criticism among many Japanese. One of the outspoken criticisms came from Aoyanagi Nammei, a prominent history professor at Tokyo University.[1] He made a personal appeal to Katsura Tarō, then Prime Minister, objecting to the assimilation policy. He cited a past experience of the Japanese in the effort to assimilate the Korean minority in Japan. Even before the Meiji period,

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[1]Professor Aoyanagi has written three books concerning the Japanese colonial administration in Korea. These are: Sōtaku seiji [The Politics of the Government-General] (Keijō: Chosen Kenkyūkai, 1918), Chōsen tōji ron [A Treatise on the Governance of Korea] (Keijō: Chōsen Kenkyūkai, 1932), Sōtoku seiji shiron [A Treatise on the History of the Administration of the Government-General] (Keijō: Keijō Shimbunsha, 1928).

there were about 5,000 Koreans living around Kōrai village, Saitama prefecture. He pointed out that despite many hundred years of residence in Japan, this minority had maintained its traditional way of communal living and cultural heritage.[2] Furthermore, he cited the strong individualism and lack of any sense of "imperial centralism" which prevailed among the Koreans, as characteristics quite contradictory to the Japanese concept of state centralism based on the Yamato spirit and nationalism.[3] His plea against the colonial assimilation policy was unheeded. On the other hand, those who favored assimilation argued on the grounds of (1) ethnic affinity between the Korean and Japanese race; (2) geographic proximity; (3) and the Japanese understanding of Korea and her people. Therefore it would make easier the assurance of successful colonial rule. In reality, the policy was not basically motivated by genuine interest in cultural assimilation. Instead, it was founded upon a pragmatic purpose, i.e., to neutralize the national consciousness of Koreans, thereby minimizing the potential cause of unrest and to perpetuate colonial rule. Hence the

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[2]Aoyanagi Nammei, Sōtoku seiji shiron [A Treatise on the History of the Administration of the Government-General], pp. 246-251.

[3]Ibid., pp. 253-254. Similar objection was also raised by Yanaibara Tadao and Soejima Michimasa. Their alternative proposal was to provide an autonomous rule under direct supervision of the Japanese Imperial government. On this point, see Hatada Takashi, "Nihonjin no Chōsenjin kan" [The Japanese Views on Koreans], in Nihon Chōsen Kenkyūsho, ed., Nihon to Chōsen [Japan and Korea] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobō, 1965), pp. 8-10.

Japanese colonial government tackled the problem from its foundation and attempted to uproot the culture of the indigenous people. Subsequently, the native language and other subjects which had direct bearing on the ethnic identity were forbidden to be taught in the schools. These were eventually replaced by the Japanese language, history, and the loyalty to the Emperor. The policy was implemented through: (1) creation of the Education Affairs Bureau under the supervision of the colonial government; (2) special training of highly selected cadres to oversee the policy; (3) assumption of the management of the Korean school system, and (4) compilation and censorship by Japanese officials of textbooks.

Throughout some 40 years of the Japanese colonial rule, the assimilation process through education can be classified into three different phases.[4] The first phase was the "paternalistic protection" period covering from the signing of the Protectorate Agreement of 1905 to the annexation of Korea in 1910. While criticizing the traditional Korean education as "primitive," Itō Hirobumi introduced the Japanese educational system to Korea under the pretext of modernization. This he called "civilized education,"

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[4]Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yūsaku, Minzoku kyōiku [The Ethnic Education] (Tokyo: Aogi Shoten, 1966), pp. 18-21.

and laid down the groundwork for further permeation.[5] The Korean schools soon became the object of oppression by the Japanese officials who suspected the schools of being seed-beds for inspiring national sentiment against the presence of the Japanese in Korea. First Governor-General of Korea, General Terauchi Masatake, even went further by instructing the local provincial governors to outlaw any popular songs or folklore which might tend to encourage an independent movement and resistance against the colonial rule.

The second phase was the "annexation" period from 1910 to around 1938, when the Japanese government began to mobilize the Korean labor resources to meet the manpower shortage incurred by the continued expansion policy in Manchuria and China. During this period, the colonial government began to introduce a slogan for "Japanization" of Koreans as "imperial subjects of the Great Japan." Hence, in accordance with the Imperial Rescript on Education, the fundamental goal of the Korean education, like the Japanese, had to be based on Isshi Dōjin [universal benevolence] thereby directing their loyalty to the Emperor. Especially after the March First Movement in 1919, the colonial government became more anxious to destroy the national identity of Koreans. Yuge Kōtarō, then Director of the Education Affairs in the colonial government, wrote

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[5] Ibid., p. 18. In regard to a study of assimilation in Taiwan and Korea, see Chen I-te, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of its Effects upon the Development of Nationalism," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1968, pp. 71-85.

that the cause of the March First Movement was the Koreans' desire to be independent. The only way to eliminate the desire, he argued, was to make them realize that they were no longer Koreans but Japanese.[6] To infuse this notion, emphasis should be placed on education to help develop "a sense of rationality." The meaning of the "rationality," according to Yuge Kōtarō, was to help Koreans to develop a sense of appreciation of the benevolent colonial rule, to see colonial rule as an inevitable outcome in view of the current world situation, and to refrain from any rash actions against the colonial rule.[7] It was around this period that numerous studies appeared to justify the annexation of Korea and its colonial rule.[8] The main recurring theme of these studies was that the Japanese and Koreans had a co-ancestral origin, that paternalistic relationships existed between the two races and therefore the annexation of Korea was justified as no more than the restoration to their age old status as a single entity.

In the final phase, from 1938 to the end of World War II, the assimilation attempt was no longer confined to the sphere of education, but was extended to change the entire modes of life style of Koreans. To this end, Korean clothes were forbidden to be worn in public and Korean names were required by law to follow the Japanese style.

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[6] Ibid., p. 20. [7] Ibid.

[8] Hatada Takashi, "Nihonjin no Chōsenjin kan," in Nihon Chōsen Kenkyusho, ed., op.cit., pp. 35-38.

The Koreans were forced to convert to Shintoism and were encouraged to hold the ceremony of making obeisance in the direction of the Imperial palace every morning. The visit to the Shinto shrine was compulsory for all Koreans. All the governmental directives, mass media and public or private transactions had to be written and spoken only in the Japanese language. Furthermore, every Korean was required by law from October 2, 1937, to recite the "Oath of Imperial Subject" at all public and private gatherings including the Tennō Haika Banzai [The long live the Emperor]. The oath was divided into two sections. Section one was to be recited by elementary school children and Section two by other older age groups. It read as follows:

Section I

1. We are the subjects of the Empire of Great Japan;
2. We, by uniting our minds, pledge our allegiance to his Majesty the Emperor;
3. We, by perseverence and training, will be good strong subjects.

Section II

1. We are Imperial Subjects, and pledge our allegiance to the Empire;
2. We, the Imperial Subjects, by mutual faith, love and cooperation, will strengthen our union;
3. We, the Imperial Subjects, by perseverence and training, will cultivate strength to exalt the Imperial way.[9]

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[9]Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yūsaku, op.cit., p. 21, and Ito Yūten, Senman no kōa kyōiku [The Education for the Rising Asia in Korea and Manchuria], (Tokyo: Meguru Shoten, 1942), pp. 8-9.

This system of compulsory conformity expressed in an ideology of the Emperor cult was the formative force which molded and shaped the total subjection of Koreans to the colonial rule. In fact, many Koreans seemed to have converted to Shinto, believing that they were truly loyal subjects of the Emperor. Some Koreans even volunteered to serve in the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces and pledged to die in the name of the Emperor. A few Koreans even published books in support of the colonial policy.[10] When Japanese involvement in China became apparent with the Marco Polo Bridge incident, the Japanese government proclaimed the National Manpower Mobilization Law in April, 1938. The Koreans, then the loyal subjects of the Emperor, were no exception to the manpower mobilization program. During the period from the inception of the program until the end of World War II, more than one million Koreans were reportedly mobilized or often involuntarily taken to Japan to work for the war effort by the Japanese Imperial government.[11] When the war came to a close, they had almost

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[10]Kim Hong-o, Chōsen dōhō wa kataru [The Korean Compatriots Speak Out] (Nagoya: Kyōwa Gojōkai, 1935), 165p, and Yi Kwang-su, Naisen ittai zuisōroku [The Essays on Japan-Korea as a Single Body] (n.p., 1941); Kang Ch'ang-ki, Naisen ittai ron [A Treatise of Japan and Korea as a Single Body] (Tokyo: Kokumin Hyōronsha, 1939).

[11]According to a study made by Pak Kyŏng-sik, 1,259,933 Koreans were forcibly taken to Japan to work in the Japanese munition industries; for details, see his book, Chōsenjin kyōsei renkyō no kiroku [The Record of the Forced Korean Labor Mobilization] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1965), pp. 66-67.

become "quasi-Japanese" as a result of the systematic and thorough process of the assimilation policy.

Following the Japanese surrender, therefore, the primary goal of Korean ethnic studies was "de-Japanization" of Koreans and their children in Japan. It was truly motivated to regain what they considered the national identity of the Koreans, of which they had been deprived. Thus it began with the opening of Korean language courses in improvised classrooms in the war-torn houses. This movement became nationwide among Koreans in Japan. A slogan was introduced to encourage their effort in this direction. It said:

> Those who have money, with money
> Those who could give labor, with labor
> Those who could give wisdom, with wisdom
> Let us build our schools together[12]

A few other courses were added such as Korean history, geography and arithmetic, the subjects of which were primarily designed for teaching Korean children. Only a year after the Japanese surrender, the number of schools had increased as in table 17.

TABLE 17[13]

NUMBERS OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS AND TEACHERS

	No. of Schools	No. of Students	No. of Teachers
Elementary Schools	525	42,282	1,022
Middle Schools	4	1,180	52
Youth School	12	714	54

[12]Yi Tong-jun, Nihon ni iru Chōsen no kodomo [The Korean Children in Japan] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1956), pp. 66-67.

[13]Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yūsaku, op.cit., p. 43.

The effort behind the increased number of schools should be accredited to the Chōren, which had been organized in October, 1945, to protect the interests of Koreans in Japan. Within the Education Bureau in the Chōren, a Committee for the compilation of the Elementary School Textbook was organized to compile a good quality of textbooks suited to the education of Koreans in Japan. In the early stages of preparation, many known Japanese educators and intellectuals, such as Hatano Kanji, Kokubun Ichitarō, and Gotō Teiji, provided professional advice to upgrade the quality of education.[14] Meanwhile, in accordance with the recommendation submitted to the Japanese government by the American Education Mission in April, 1946, the Korean schools agreed to conform to the 6-3-3 system with co-educational programs. By the summer of 1947, the Korean School Management Union and the Korean Educators' Union were organized to oversee and improve not only the quality of teachers but also the school management as well. Despite many difficulties in the midst of confusion and chaos immediately after the defeat of Japan in the war, the progress made by the Korean schools was remarkable. The increased number of schools is shown in Table 18.[15] These schools were established with little financial help from the Japanese government, as they were private institutions. Hence these schools were

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[14] Yi Tong-jung, op.cit., pp. 68-69.

[15] Ibid., p. 70.

TABLE 18

THE INCREASE OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS

	No. of Schools	Increment	No. of Students	Increment	No. of Teachers	Increment
Elementary	566	+41	53,000	+10,718	1,200	+178
Middle Schools	7	+ 3	3,300	+ 1,120	120	+ 68
Youth Schools	33	+21	1,800	+ 1,086	140	+ 86

relatively free from the stringent governmental regulations in regard to curricula and the format of the education. However, the situation was beginning to change from early 1948, and eventually violent clashes and protests against the Japanese government broke out.

At first, the SCAP authorities took no official cognizance of the mushrooming Korean schools in Japan. SCAP's primary concern was directed toward reforming the undesirable chauvinistic indoctrination type of Japanese curricula and educational system. However, it was after October, 1947, that SCAP's Civil Information and Education Section issued a directive concerning the education of Koreans. It stated that "The Japanese government be directed to ensure that Korean schools comply with all pertinent Japanese directives, with the exception that Korean schools would be permitted to teach the Korean language as an addition to the regular

curriculum."[16] A few months later, on January 24, 1948, the Japanese Ministry of Education directed local prefecture governors to accredit Korean schools meeting the legal standards in accordance with the School Education Law of 1947.[17] What irritated most Koreans about this directive was the fact that Korean schools were told to conduct classes in the Japanese language, and that the Korean language could be taught only as an extracurricular subject.

The Koreans protested immediately, charging that the directive was actually intended to deny the right of Koreans to maintain an autonomous educational system. The Koreans felt that it was reminiscent of past experience in which the Japanese government tried to regulate every aspect of Koreans' life. The protest movement spread quickly throughout Japan. On March 6, 1948, the Korean Parent Teachers Association meeting was held in Tokyo, and they adopted the following demands to be submitted to the Ministry of Education. These were: to recognize the autonomous nature of Korean education in light of the special circumstances of Koreans in Japan and to defray the Korean educational

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[16]Tokyo Liaison Office USAMGIK to OFA USAMGIK, Weekly Report, October, 19-25, 1947, quoted in Edward W. Wagner, Korean Minority in Japan (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 67, and Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yusaku, op.cit., p. 51.

[17]SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan, No. 31, April, 1948, 303; hereafter cited as Summation. And also see, Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., p. 72.

expense by means of the Japanese government.[18] No response came from the Ministry of Education. By March 23, the Counter Measure Committee on Korean Education was organized under the auspices of the Chōren. This committee submitted a four-point demand to the then Premier Ashida for consideration. It included:

1. Instruction in the Korean language;
2. Use of textbooks compiled by a Korean committee and censored by SCAP, Civil Information and Education Section;
3. Administration of Korean schools by the School Management Union;
4. Teaching of the Japanese language as a required curriculum.[19]

The representatives of the Committee also made an appeal to SCAP headquarters in this regard. However, the response was no more than reaffirmation of the Japanese directive.[20] When the appeal was unheeded by both SCAP and the Japanese government, the education issue exploded with fierce intensity throughout Japan. It was touched off by the enforcement of the governmental order to close the unaccredited Korean schools beginning April, 1949. The Koreans were determined to resist the order, insisting that it was an act of oppression to deprive them of the right of autonomous Korean education in Japan. The uncompromising

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[18] Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., p. 75.

[19] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

[20] Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., pp. 67-77.

attitudes of both Koreans and the Japanese authorities resulted in violence. The dispute had lasted a month in Kobe, Osaka, and in other places where Korean schools were located. Many thousands of Koreans were arrested and imprisoned on charges of inciting a riot and resisting the order.[21] The dispute was finally settled by negotiations on May 3 between the Japanese Minister of Education and the representatives of the Chōren. They signed a memorandum agreeing that Korean schools should comply with the School Education Law and be subject to accreditation. But they were allowed to maintain autonomous ethnic study programs within the limit of the private school systems in Japan.[22] However, the agreement lasted little over a year. As a result of the dissolution order of the Chōren in September, 1949, 92 schools out of the total of 337 schools operated under the direct supervision of the Chōren were ordered to close. The closed school properties were confiscated by

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[21]This is commonly known in Japan as "Hanshin Incident of 1948." A more detailed and authentic account of the incident was written by Kobe historian Ochiai Shigenobu, "Kobe Chōsenjin gakkō sōgi no gaikyō" [The Korean school Dispute in Kobe], Rekishi to Kobe, No. 4 (1953), 73-77, and "Kobe Chōsenjin jiken shokuhatten: Shōwa Nijūsannen no Chōsenjin gakkō heisa o meguru Kobe no sōran jiken" [The Cause of the Korean Incident in Kobe: The Korean Riot Incident in Kobe concerning the Korean School Case in 1948], Hyogo Shigaku, No. 28 (1961), 133-140. Also Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yusaku, op.cit., pp. 58-67.

[22]Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., p. 82, and Chōren Chūō Jihō, May 14, 1948; Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yusaku, op.cit., pp. 66-67. Shinozaki Heiji, Zainichi Chōsenjin undō [The Korean Movement in Japan] (Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955), pp. 163-165.

the Japanese government, since they were regarded as those of the Chōren's. The students were told to attend the Japanese public schools. However, the schools that were ordered to close and located in Hyogo, Aiichi, Hiroshima, and Osaka prefectures were firmly determined to ignore the closing order. Especially in Hyogo prefecture, about 40,000 Koreans assembled almost every day in front of the prefectural government office and demanded that the school closing order be rescinded. On November 27, 1949, the Hyogo governor mobilized about 4,000 armed police officers to arrest more than 30,000 Koreans and quelled the never-ending demonstrations. However, among those schools ordered to close, 17 schools were allowed to remain open in Hyogo prefecture, perhaps due to the fear of a worsening situation.[23] The remaining schools unaffected by the closing order were told to change their curricula and educational system to conform to those of the Japanese schools. In fact, it amounted to no more than a restatement of the January, 1948, order which sparked the violent protest. This time, however, there was no incident comparable to the previous year, as the Japanese government was well-prepared to deal with the situation.

In conjunction with the Japanese government move, for instance, the Tokyo prefecture issued its directive to limit the scope of Korean ethnic studies as follows:

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[23] Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., p. 92.

1. Korean students should be transferred to Japanese public schools;

2. The class instruction should be conducted in the Japanese language. However, the Korean language and history could be taught as the extracurricular subjects;

3. Only Japanese could be eligible to be headmaster. However, Koreans could be appointed as regular teachers with the approval of the headmaster, and if they met the teacher qualifications prescribed by law.[24]

As a result of the stringent control by the Japanese government, the number of Korean schools and students were beginning to dwindle as shown in Table 19.[25] During the hayday in October, 1947, there were 541 elementary schools. But by May, 1949, the number had decreased to 288, and then in April, 1952, it went further down to 154 schools.

The real intention of the Japanese government to limit the Korean ethnic studies might have been to discourage further spread of the minority culture in Japan. For many Japanese, it was intolerable in the land where the country and her people were proud of being founded upon a homogeneous culture. However, the mounting tension of the cold was provided a convenient excuse for the Japanese government to suppress not only the Korean ethnic studies but also left-wing activities in postwar Japan. As a matter of fact, the essence of the curricula in the schools operated by the

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[24]Ibid., pp. 96-97; and Kajii Noboru, Chōsenjin gakkō no Nihonjin kyōshi [The Japanese Teachers in the Korean Schools] (Tokyo: Nihon Chōsen Kenkyūsho, 1966), p. 18.

[25]Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., p. 94.

TABLE 19

THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS

		Month and Year			
		10/1946	10/1947	5/1949	4/1952
Elementary School	Schools	524	541	288	154
	Students	42,182	46,961	32,368	14,144
	Teachers	1,022	1,250	955	327
Middle School	Schools	4	7	16	17
	Students	1,180	2,761	4,555	2,914
	Teachers	52	95	165	110
High School	Schools	-	-	3	3
	Students	-	-	364	570
	Teachers	-	-	50	54
Youth Schools	Schools	12	30	unknown	unknown
	Students	750	2,123	-	-
	Teachers	54	160	-	-

Chōren was heavily slanted in the education of the Communist doctrine in tune with the North Korean regime. The school children were taught to pledge their allegiance to Kim Il-sung and to embrace a revolutionary spirit against the United States and the "element of the reactionary forces" in Japan.

Following the dissolution of the Chōren in September, 1949, all Korean schools were ordered to incorporate into the Japanese public school systems under the direct supervision of the prefectural government. The Korean schools were to be headed only by Japanese principals appointed by

prefectural governor. The Korean ethnic studies were allowed to be taught only as extracurricular subjects. In the meantime, the school expense was defrayed by the Japanese public treasury as the Korean children were under the compulsory education system. However, after the Japanese Peace Treaty went into effect in April, 1952, the Japanese government refused to bear the financial obligation for Korean education. They argued that the Koreans in Japan were no longer considered to be Japanese nationals in accordance with the provision of the Peace Treaty (Chapter 2, Article 2), since the Japanese government abandoned the claim of their sovereignty over Korea. Because of fierce Korean protest, it was later modified that the program would not affect the Korean students who were already enrolled in schools. However, a new student from then on would be admitted to the public schools:

1. Only if a space and facility was available.
2. with a pledge not to disturb public order;
3. and not to demand the Korean ethnic studies;
4. but to agree to receive the education in accordance with the law prescribed by the Japanese government.[26]

Nevertheless, the attempt of the Japanese government to constrict the education of the Korean children at the public expense was not confined to the above conditions.

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[26] Ibid., op.cit., p. 106; Fujishima Udai and Osawa Yūsaku, op.cit., pp. 78-79; Kajii Noboru, op.cit., p. 124.

on December 8, 1953, the Tokyo prefecture issued six additional restrictions which had to be adhered to by the Korean public schools.[27] Later the restrictive conditions were further elaborated in details that consisted of 30 provisions, ranging from the curriculum programming to the management of the school administration.[28] The Japanese educational inspector was regularly dispatched to oversee any violation of the provisions. Again, the whole purpose was apparently to control the entire Korean educational program and eventually to eliminate it. However, the Japanese government soon found the infeasibility of eradicating the Korean ethnic studies and at the same time the difficulty of enforcing the provision. Instead, they decided to eliminate the Korean schools from the Japanese public school systems. In the Tokyo prefecture, it was announced that the matter concerning the Korean education would be transferred to the hands of Koreans effective from April, 1955, and that the expense would no longer be defrayed by the Tokyo prefecture. The Koreans immediately protested the move. They argued that they were entitled to

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[27] The six additional restrictions were: (1) no political education is allowed that may be prejudicial to the Japanese government policy; (2) The Korean ethnic studies should be taught only as extra-curricular subjects; (3) No students should be admitted beyond its admission capacity; (4) No students should be allowed to engage in collective petitioning; (5) Class should be conducted only by authorized teaching staffs; (6) no outsider should be allowed to attend the faculty staff meeting. For further details, see Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., p. 108; Kajii Noboru, op.cit., p. 134ff.

[28] Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., pp. 111-113; Kajii Noboru, op.cit., pp. 150-155.

public education since they were taxpayers like any other Japanese citizens. Finally, a compromise was reached between the Japanese government officials and the Korean community in Tokyo. The Tokyo prefecture agreed to provide the school expense of ¥120 million for five years beginning from the school year of 1955, to help those students complete their education who were already enrolled under the public educational system. But for a new student who would be enrolled from the school year of 1955, the Japanese government would bear no financial responsibility.[29]

As a result, permission was granted by the Tokyo prefecture for the legal incorporation of the Korean Education Institute [Tokyo Chōsen Gakuin], which would, as a kind of board of control, encompass all Korean schools in the Tokyo prefecture. Other prefectures soon followed suit. Now that Korean schools existed as private institutions, the ethnic studies programs once again flourished, especially after the formation of the Chōsōren in 1955, and under its guidance.

The Chōsōren's Educational Objective and its Policy

Prior to the formation of the Chōsōren in 1955, there were two fundamentally differing views as to how the interests of the Koreans in Japan could be well protected. One view was based on belief in world communism and proletarian internationalism in obtaining common goals. Hence the advocates of this view identified their goal with that of

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[29] Yi Tong-jun, op.cit., pp. 117-118.

the JCP. And they believed that it was in their interest to participate in the task of overthrowing the Emperor system and establishing a "People's Republic" in Japan. Whereas the other view grew out of the awareness of the national consciousness. They placed the primacy of their allegiance in their fatherland by dis-associating themselves from involvement in the JCP's cause and pursued an independent line.[30]

With the triumph of the latter view within the Chōsō-ren, the primary goal of Korean education in Japan was aimed at educating the Korean youth to be loyal to the fatherland and to hold a national pride as the citizens of an independent nation. Subsequently the emphasis was placed on the teaching of their own "patriotic tradition and culture" and other necessary knowledge and skills, so that they would be able to devote themselves to the construction of a "democratic fatherland." More specific details as to the educational objective and its policy were spelled out in the Decision Papers at the Inaugural Meeting of the Chōsōren in 1955. The Chōsōren openly declared their intent to carry out the Korean ethnic education in accordance with the rules and regulations of the DPRK's educational system and to accept guidance from North Korea.[31] Thus it became quite

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[30]Concerning the arguments on these points prior to the formation of the Chōsōren in May, 1955, see Supra, Chapter III, pp. 75-77.

[31]Zainichi Hokusenkei Chōsenjin no "minshu minzoku kyōiku" no jitsujō [The Current Situation Concerning

obvious from the outset that the Chōsōren set out to carry on the communistic education in line with the DPRK. For this education, the Chōsōren called it a "democratic ethnic education."[32]

It should be noted that the Mindan also maintains its own school system opposed to the Chōsōren's extensive education scheme. However, not only are the Mindan schools fewer in number, but its program and the scope of education are not even comparable to that of the Chōsōren's. For instance, while the Chōsōren operates 118 schools, the Mindan has only 12 accredited schools throughout Japan (Table 20). Nevertheless, the fundamental difference between the two organizations seems to lie in their attitudes toward education. The Mindan's emphasis on education is oriented toward adaptation to the Japanese surroundings by promoting individual welfare

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"Democratic Ethnic Education of the Pro-North Koreans in Japan] (1966), pp. 24-25. This pamphlet carries neither the name of the author nor the publisher. Nonetheless, it appears to be an authoritative report concerning the Chōsōren's educational programs and its activities in Japan. Judged from its scope and contents, it seems highly unlikely to be a work of a private individual. Rather, it might have been prepared as a staff research paper only for official consumption by the proper Japanese authorities. This pamphlet is in the possession of the East Asian Collection, University of Maryland (Call No: East Asia CS836 Z3. P.15). Hereafter cited as Minzoku kyōiku.

[32]Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Zainichi Chosenjin no minshushugiteki minzoku kyōiku [The Democratic Ethnic Education for the Koreans in Japan], (Tokyo: Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamoru Kai, 1965), p. 408. And Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yūsaku, op.cit., pp. 145-146.

TABLE 20

THE NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND ENROLLMENT IN COMPARISON WITH THE CHŌSŌREN AND THE MINDAN (AS OF JUNE 30, 1969)

	Mindan Sponsored Schools			Chōsōren Sponsored Schools		
	Accredited	Non-Accredited	Enrollment	Accredited	Non-Accredited	Enrollment
Kindergarten	1	-	23	-	34	unknown
Elementary	3	-	405	70	24	15,841
Middle School	4	-	696	38	7	10,050
High School	4	-	1,016	9	-	7,564
University	-	-	-	1	-	333
Others[a]	-	134	-	-	-	-
Total	12	134	3,784	118	61	34,388

[a]Others include miscellaneous small vocational schools and Korean language institutes.

Source: Kim Sang-hyŏn, Cheil Hankuk'in, p. 202.

and their livelihood in Japan.[33] The Chōsōren is obsessed with the enhancement of nationalistic sentiment with pride and the equating of individual welfare with the collective interests of the state--North Korea. Consequently, the children of the Mindan supporters are usually sent to Japanese schools to learn together with the Japanese and to compete freely in order to cultivate their living foundation in Japan. As a result, the Mindan supporters are less

[33]On this point, see pamphlets published by the Mindan, Zainichi kankojin kyōiku No. 1 (December, 1965), pp. 2-5, and ibid., No. 2 (January, 1967), pp. 3-7.

enthusiastic in developing separate school systems. It is not uncommon to find among many Mindan supporters those who carry Japanese names in public with a hope to be treated like any Japanese. On the other hand, the Chōsōren members are motivated by a strong sense of nationalism to preserve their ethnic identity under a slogan -- "Korean children should be taught in the Korean schools."[34] It is precisely by appealing to this sentiment, however, that the DPRK is attempting skillfully to induce the absolute allegiance of the Chōsōren members toward its regime.

The Supervisory Machinery for the "Democratic Ethnic Education" and its Financial Resources

The final responsibility to supervise the "democratic ethnic education" is entrusted to the Korean Education Association in Japan or KEA (Zainihon Chōsenjin Kyōiku Kai] under the direct control of the Chōsōren. There are two other organizations which assist in the work of the KEA: one is the Korean Teachers League in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Kyōshokuin Dōmei], and other is called the Korean Student League in Japan [Zainihon Chōsenjin Ryūgaku Dōmei]. The Korean Teachers League is organized not only to promote fraternal relations among its 1500 Korean teachers but also to improve the quality of teachers. In accordance with the guideline directed by the Chōsōren, they often conduct workshops and seminars during summer vacations in an effort

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[34]Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yūsaku, op.cit., p. 137.

to exchange information and to evaluate the progress of the ethnic education. The Korean Student League in Japan was originally organized to look after the welfare of the Korean students who came to Japan for studying. However, since 1955, it became a subsidiary organ of the Chōsōren to distribute scholarships and financial assistance to Korean students attending Japanese schools and to seek allegiance in return. However, it is the KEA that runs the entire school system and managed school administration. In addition, the KEA is held responsible for the allocation of educational funds remitted from North Korea to needy schools. Thirty-two other regional education associations are affiliated with the Central Education Association which makes a total membership of approximately 22,000.[35] It is a duty of the KEA to provide all possible support to upgrade the quality of schools to meet the legal standard for accreditation prescribed by the Japanese School Education Law. It is reported that the KEA is considering legalizing itself by becoming an incorporated foundation, thereby securing legal protection for its existence.[36]

To maintain the entire Korean school systems, the KEA derives its financial sources largely from tuition, association membership fees, donations and the Korean Education Aid Fund remitted regularly from the DPRK. According to a KEA report in 1963, only 27 schools were finan-

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[35] Minzoku Kyōiku, pp. 27-31. [36] Ibid., p. 28.

cially able to support themselves and the remaining schools relied heavily on financial aid to operate them. As a matter of fact, the remittance from the DPRK comprises more than 50 percent of the entire needed budget to carry out the "democratic ethnic education" in Japan.[37] An understanding of this high degree of financial dependency on the DPRK may help comprehend the true nature of the Chōsōren's educational programs and its goals. In fact, the financial aid from the DPRK played a decisive role in expanding the current democratic ethnic education program in Japan.

The funds began to arrive from North Korea beginning from April, 1957, about a year after four representatives of the Chōsōren visited Kim Il-sung in P'yŏngyang, and appealed for aid. Since the direct remittance of the funds from the DPRK was denied by the Japanese government, it was arranged through the International Committee of the Red Cross to transmit the funds to the KEA in Japan. Since then the DPRK has kept sending the funds. From the fiscal year of 1963, the DPRK included the item in the national budget and annually appropriated to support the education program in Japan.[38] As of June, 1968, the total amount of the funds received by the KEA was about ¥7.3 billion ($20 million) (Table 21). It is important to note that the DPRK spent approximately seven times more than the ROK government for the purpose of the Korean education in Japan

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[37] Ibid., p. 33.

[38] Ibid., p. 41.

TABLE 21

THE REMITTANCE OF THE KOREAN EDUCATION AID FUNDS FROM THE DPRK (AS OF JUNE, 1968)
[in yens]

No. of Remittance	Month & Year	Amount
1	4/1957	121,099,086
2	10/1957	100,510,000
3	3/1958	100,000,000
4	9/1958	100,210,000
5	2/1959	176,382,500
6	9/1959	114,654,090
7	2/1960	202,100,000
8	9/1960	217,892,231
9	3/1961	411,066,000
10	3/1962	568,470,000
11	3/1963	401,440,000
12	6/1963	202,770,000
13	9/1963	186,852,644
14	4/1964	303,930,000
15	7/1964	302,940,000
16	11/1964	201,400,000
17	3/1965	302,088,942
18	8/1965	202,020,000
19	11/1965	303,450,000
20	2/1966	303,570,000
21	8/1966	201,860,000
22	11/1966	303,210,000
23	3/1967	308,420,000
24	7/1967	201,420,000
25	10/1967	301,950,000
26	12/1967	194,246,800
27	2/1968	305,025,000
28	10/1968	345,783,600
Total		7,316,515,793

Source: Kim Sang-hyŏn, Cheil Hankuk'in, p. 280; and Zenbō Tokubetsu Tsūshin, No. 292 (November, 1968), pp. 21-22.

during the 10-year period between 1957-67 (Table 22).

Besides, the Education Aid Fund, the DPRK sends books,

TABLE 22

THE EXPENDITURES FOR KOREAN EDUCATION IN JAPAN BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
[in U.S. dollars]

Year	ROK	DPRK
1957	22,000.00	615,580.00
1958	74,800.00	556,136.11
1959	186,000.00	808,432.00
1960	367,200.00	1,165,256.40
1961	160,659.50	1,141,854.00
1962	214,238.70	1,551,305.60
1963	115,486.30	2,197,396.30
1964	119,294.91	844,250.00
1965	120,054.64	2,844,026.76
1966	321,121.00	843,250.00
1967	405,532.00	842,833.33
Total	$2,196,387.21	$14,210,320.73

Source: Kim Sang-hyŏn, Cheil Hankuk'in, p. 231.

Korean musical instruments and other teaching aid materials for more effective instruction. Furthermore, the DPRK awarded not only meritorious service medals to those who distinguished themselves in the Korean education in Japan but also the DPRK's professorship to the teaching staffs in the Chōsen University.[39] The question of whether or not this symbolic gesture is primarily motivated by a propaganda purpose is beside the point. But in all fairness, in view of the ROK policy, it must be stated that the DPRK's gesture is not totally devoid of good intentions

[39] Minzoku Kyōiku, pp. 40-41.

for the future welfare of the Koreans in Japan. Thus it is through DPRK's support plus the strenuous effort being made by the Chōsōren that the "democratic ethnic education" is still going strong among Koreans in Japan.

The Campaign for the Accreditation of the Chōsen University

Following the expansion of the Korean education program, the Chōsōren felt a need for higher learning institutions. The decision was announced at the Inaugural Meeting of the Chōsōren in May, 1955. Subsequently in the following year, a two-year college was established on the campus of one of the Korean high schools in Tokyo. In October, 1957, however, the arrival of a ¥100,510,000 (about $300,000) contribution from the Education Aid Fund of the DPRK enabled the Chōsōren to look for a new school building site for the construction of the Chōsen University.[40] But an initial attempt by the Chōsōren to purchase a farm land covering 10,000 tsubo (33,100 square meters) which spread to Itabashi-ku and Renma-ku, Tokyo, was denied by the local Agricultural Committee without a stated reason.[41]

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[40] Minzoku Kyōiku, p. 97; and Soshinkai, Chōsen Taigaku no enkaku to genjō [The Origin of the Chōsen University and the Current Situation] (n.p. Soshinkai, 1962), p. 1; "Chōsen Taigaku no shunkō o meguru himitsu shiryō" [The Confidential Data Concerning the Completion of the Chōsen University], Naigai Shūhō, No. 18 (July, 1959), p. 3. Hereafter cited as Chōsen Taigaku no shiryō.

[41] In accordance with the Agricultural Land Law, any transaction of farmland or a conversion of the land for other than agricultural purposes is subject to approval by the Agricultural Committee in each local government. For this point, see Articles 3, 4, and 10, of the Agricultural Land Law, No. 299, enacted in July 15, 1952.

Anticipating further difficulty in obtaining the school site, the Chōsōren in cooperation with the Japan-DPRK Society (Nitchō Kyōkai) established a dummy business firm called the Kyōritsu Industrial Company. The Company was incorporated under the names of Japanese who were the Japan-DPRK Society's members, and was officially registered with a capital investment of ¥3 million on November 25, 1958.[42] This company was, in fact, to serve as an agent of the Chōsōren to arrange a procurement of the building site and to file an application for a construction permit. It was through this arrangement that the Chōsen University was able to secure their present location for the school construction in Kodaira City, Tokyo.

In filing for the construction permit with the Kodaira city government office, it was stated in the application that the prospective building would be used for a transistor radio research institute to conduct research and to train engineers and technicians. Finally when the building neared completion in May, 1959, the Kyōritsu Industrial Company simply pretended to have arranged a lease agreement with the Chōsen University to rent all their structures and facilities.[43] For the Chōsōren, this arrangement served a dual purpose. First, by processing all the

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[42] Chōsen Daigaku no shiryō, p. 4.

[43] Ibid., pp. 4-5; Soshinkai, op.cit., pp. 1-2 and 10-11.

necessary legal matters in the name of the Japanese firm, the Chōsōren was able to circumscribe any existing legal obstacles to the construction of the university buildings. Second, since the Chōsen University became merely a leaseholder, and buildings and other facilities could not be subject to confiscation as the Korean schools had been in the school shut down case in 1949.

The official announcement to set up a new university campus at Kodaira city was made during the final day of the Chōsōren's 5th National Convention on June 10, 1959. As the plan was carefully concealed until its completion, the announcement was met by a total surprise among those delegates assembled at the convention. A formal opening ceremony was held at the new campus site on June 13. All the Chōsōren delegates and some Japanese guests were present at the campus covering the area of 66,000 square meters with four newly-erected modern school buildings. It was at this ceremony that Han Duk-su, who holds both the Chairmanship of the Chōsōren and the Presidency of the University, declared in his opening speech that:

> This university is completed by the kind aid given by the DPRK and the courses offered will be the same as those offered in a university in the fatherland. . . .
> In the near future, we are planning to invite foreign students from all over Asia to receive a Communistic education. If this materializes, this university will become the sole international university in the non-Communist world.[44]

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[44] Chōsen Daigaku no shiryō, p. 5; Soshinkai, op.cit., p. 2, and Naigai Shuhō, No. 43 (March 18, 1960), p. 3.

As implied above, the long-range goal of the university seemed to have rested upon not only giving an ethnic education to Koreans but utilizing it as a training base to propagandize its political ideology to the rest of the Asian region.[45] Further clarification of the educational goals was spelled out by Han Dŭk-su in his speech delivered at the Chōsen University on April 11, 1964. He stated:

> We must arm ourselves with the thought of Kim Il-ng and the idology of the socialistic patriotism strengthen the revolutionary tradition. . . . ne students must prepare to advance themselves to be the future national leaders. . . to expedite the independent peaceful unification of the fatherland.[46]

Now that the ultimate goal of establishing the Chōsen University became clearer, the question of how to deal with the avowed communistic education became a controversial public issue in Japan. It is noted that the Japanese government has always frowned upon the Koreans' insistence on ethnic education lest a minority culture be nurtured in

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[45]As of this writing, it is not known how many foreign students are enrolled in the university. As of 1967, however, the student enrollment was reported to be about 1,000 with about 100 teaching faculty members. The Chōsen University has now expanded to a 4-year college which is composed of a graduate school, 4 academic divisions, 2 academic departments and a 2-year teacher's college. For further details, see Minzoku Kyōiku, pp. 98-103, and Chōsen Daigakkō, comp., Chōsen Daigaku o mite [Seeing the Chōsen University] (Tokyo: Chōsen Daigakukkō, 1967). This is a compilation of many articles written on existence and progress of the Chōsen University by many Japanese educators and journalists. It contains a detailed description of the university. See also Minzoku Kyōiku Henshu Iinkai, comp., Zainichi Chōsenjin no kyōiku ni tsuite [Concerning the Korean Education in Japan] (Tokyo: Minzoku Kyōiku Henshu Iinkai, 1965).

[46]Minzoku Kyōiku, pp. 100-101.

Japan. However, the Ministry of Education had no legal administrative control over the school system for new Japan, as it was decentralized by the School Education Law of 1947. As a result, the jurisdiction over Korean education rested not with the Minister of Education but with the prefectural governors.[47] Thus the authorization of establishing Korean schools has been exercised by local governments under a classification of "miscellaneous schools" specified in Article 83 of the School Education Law.[48] Accordingly, Korean schools did file application for the approval of their establishment to each prefectural governor. There were several advantages accompanying the approval: acquisition of a tax exemption status, privileges of purchasing teaching aid materials and commuter passes at a discount rate. However, not all the local prefectural governors were fully cooperative in granting prompt approval of such

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[47]For instance, see the statements made by various Japanese officials in the Ministry of Education. Zainichi Chōsenjin Chūō Kyōiku Iinkai, Zainichi Chōsenjin Shitei no minshushugiteki minzoku kyōiku ni taisuru Nihonseifu tōkyoku no futō na shochi [The Improper Actions taken by the Japanese Government Authorities Against the Democratic Ethnic Education for Korean Children in Japan] (Tokyo: Zainichi Chōsenjin Chūō Iinkia, 1964), pp. 4-5, 7-9, and 26-29.

[48]Article 84, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the School Education Law. According to Article 83, it reads: "Those institutions other than those mentioned in Article 1 which give education excluding those which are provided for in other laws in regard to conducting the education in question similar to school education shall be classified as miscellaneous schools." Hence the schools mentioned in Article 1 refer to: elementary schools, secondary schools, universities, schools for blind and deaf, etc. Therefore,

privileges. Nevertheless, some Korean schools continued to conduct themselves without proper authorization from the local prefectural governor. In fact, no uniform patterns existed in granting the approval, neither was there a uniform policy among the prefectural governors due to the decentralized nature of school supervision and jurisdiction.

Although Japanese Education Ministry lacked direct control of the Korean schools, on many occasions its position not to issue any approval of the school establishment was made clear to prefectural governors.[49] However, this policy guideline was often disregarded by some local prefectural governors, because many local Japanese officials were sympathetic to the Koreans' desire for the ethnic study programs. As a result, the Korean schools continued to flourish especially in the area of Osaka and Tokyo.

In an attempt to bring about more effective control of the Korean schools, the Ministry of Education organized a Special Committee for Foreigners' Education to study the problem. The Chairmanship was held by the Education Minister and its members were drawn from the LDP's Education Committee and the Public Security Committee. Finally this committee

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"miscellaneous schools" are not regular schools but the schools which conduct education for training of particular vocational skills or techniques, such as beauty school, dress-design school, and barber school, etc.

[49]On this point, see the Ministry of Education Circular No. 210 issued on December 28, 1965, to all prefectural governors concerning the approval of Korean schools. The full text of this circular is reprinted in Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yusaku, op.cit., pp. 266-268.

came up with a proposal to revise the School Education Law and to propose a bill called "Foreigners' School System." The draft of this bill was officially endorsed at the cabinet meeting of May 13, 1966, and was to be submitted at the 51st session of the Diet.[50] No sooner had the proposal been announced to the public than the opposing forces rallied solidly behind the Japanese Socialist Party and JCP in the Diet. These forces were almost the same as those who had just led the unsuccessful attempt to bloc the passage of the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty of 1965. The Foreign Minister of the DPRK issued a strongly-worded statement criticizing the pending bill, and so did the Chōsōren.[51] Since it was not too long after the noisy confrontation over the treaty ratification, the LDP decided to postpone the proposal to the later date in the Diet.

It must be noted again that the ultimate objective of the "Foreigners' School System" bill was drafted without doubt to restrict the "democratic ethnic education" conducted by the Chōsōren. The aim was clearly spelled out in the provision of the draft that foreign schools were forbidden to conduct education which was considered prejudicial to the national interest of Japan.[52] The final authority to determine the question of what kind of education would be

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[50] Ibid., p. 188.

[51] Nodong Sinmun, April 20, 1966.

[52] Article 82, paragraph 11 and 13 of the "Foreigners' School System" bill.

prejudicial to the Japanese national interest would be exercised solely by the Minister of Education.[53] For this purpose, the Minister of Education would be equipped with the authority to establish or close foreign schools and to investigate the school administration and textbooks.[54] Furthermore, teaching staffs to foreign schools were to be appointed by the Minister of Education.[55] Therefore, had the bill passed the Diet, it would have meant the most sweeping power ever granted to the Minister of Education for unlimited control over Korean education.

The opponents of the bill, especially among the leading Japanese jurists, argued the case on the grounds that the Koreans' right to conduct ethnic education was one of the fundamental rights guaranteed not only by the principles of international law but by the Japanese Constitution as well.[56] At the outset, according to their argument, two things were made clear. First, each Korean was alien but endowed with certain rights, both as to person and to

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[53]Article 82, paragraph 15.

[54]Article 13, and Article 82, paragraph 16.

[55]Article 82, paragraph 7.

[56]In the fall of 1966, an academic symposium was conducted by many leading Japanese jurists to discuss the question of the pending "Foreigners' School System" bill in the Diet. The legal questions discussed by the participants are subsequently published under the joint authorship of Ogawa Masaaki, Etō Yoshihiro, Yamazaki Masahide and Kobakura Masatake, "Gaikokujin gakkō seido" [The Foreigners' School Systems], Hōritsu Jihō, Vol. 39, No. 2 (February, 1967), pp. 32-58.

property, which were his by virtue of his being duly protected by principles of international law. Second, since the presence of Koreans in Japan was due to the involuntary servitude forced upon them by the Japanese government during the war, they must be viewed differently than other ordinary aliens.[57] Nonetheless, to receive education is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the family of nations as is noted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 27, paragraph 1). Also, it upholds the principle that such "education shall be free" and that "parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children" (Article 27, paragraph 3). Furthermore, it stipulates that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized" (Article 29). They also quoted the provisions of the Declaration of Rights of the Child, in which the same principles were reaffirmed by the unanimous resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on November 20, 1959.[58] Even the Japanese Constitution guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms (Article 11 and 14) including education in Article 3 of the Education Fundamental Law of 1947. Furthermore, they noted that the Constitution stipulates: "All people shall have the right to receive an equal education. . . ." (Article

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[57] Ibid., p. 48.

[58] For a full text, see Resolution 1386 (XIV), Yearbook of the United Nations: 1959, pp. 198-199.

26 -- the emphasis added). Nevertheless, an important question raised at the symposium was whether or not these constitutional guarantees were applicable to aliens residing in Japan. On this point, Yamazaki Masahide contended that the fundamental rights, except political rights, should not be construed to extend only to Japanese citizens but to "all people," as is clearly stated in the Constitution. The words "all people," according to Yamazaki, are meant literally all people who established lawful residence in Japan without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, or national origin. It was an inconceivable assumption, he reasoned, that these guarantees did not apply to Koreans in Japan, and that the nature of the democratic ethnic education was in line with the educational policy of their fatherland.[59] It would be unconstitutional, concluded Yamazaki, to legislate a law to deprive some people of these fundamental rights because the education happens to be communistically oriented.[60] Although Yamazaki's argument came to predominate among leading jurists, the mood quickly shifted to support of a movement to sign a petition demanding the Japanese government to assure the right of democratic ethnic education.[61] The anti-Foreign School System bill campaign spread

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[59]Ogawa Masaaki, et al., op.cit., p. 49.

[60]Ibid., pp. 51-52.

[61]The Foreigners School System bill was finally dead at the committee stage and failed to reach even a plenary session of the House of Representatives. Also see ibid., pp. 57-58.

widely throughout Japan. It was against this background that the question concerning the accreditation of the Chōsen University received close public attention.

In fact, the Chōsen University filed an application for accreditation to the Tokyo prefectural governor for the first time in April, 1966, ten years after its founding.[62] However, the successive Tokyo governors rarely bothered to regulate it, as long as the education was not carried out at public expense.[63]

When the actual application was filed, Azuma Ryūtarō, then Tokyo prefectural governor, having consulted with the Ministry of Education, upheld its decision for more than a year. He did so to comply with the guideline issued by the

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[62]"Chosen Diagakkō ninka mondai o meguru uyoku dantai no dōkyō" [The Right-wing Group Activities concerning the Question of the Chōsen University Accreditation], Kōan Jōhō, No. 169 (October, 1967), 80. Hereafter cited as Chōsen Daigakkō ninka mondai, No. 169.

[63]According to Article 84, paragraph 1, of the School Education Law, prefectural governors may recommend the persons concerned to apply for the approval of the establishment of "miscellaneous schools" within a fixed time. However, this period should be less than a month. It further states in the following section of the same article that: "When the person concerned mentioned in the preceding paragraph consecutively conduct miscellaneous school education without complying with the recommendation under the provision of the same paragraph, or when they consecutively conduct miscellaneous school education in case where they were unable to get the approval, although they applied for the approval of the establishment of miscellaneous schools in accordance with recommendation under the provision of the same paragraph, the prefectural competent authorities may order the persons concerned to discontinue the educational work in question." However, there is no evidence to show that Tokyo prefectural governor even suggested to the Chōsen University to apply for the approval of the establishment.

Ministry of Education on December 28, 1965.[64] At the same time, by delaying its decision, the Ministry of Education hoped that it would eventually take over the control of the Chōsen University, if and when the Foreigners' School System bill passed the Diet. The Minister's Secretariat, spokesman of the Japanese government publicly expressed on many occasions the undesirability of accrediting the Chōsen University.[65] To cope with the touchy situation, the Chōsōren organized a Committee to Expedite the Accreditation of the Chōsen University on November 15, 1966. An additional organization was added to supplement the anti-Foreigners' School System Bill campaign already waged by the Japanese jurists and ed ators. It was called the Liaison Council for the Prctect.on of the Democratic Ethnic Studies of the Koreans in Japan [Zainichi Chōsenjin no Minshushugi Minzoku Kyōiku o Mamoru Renraku kaigi].

As part of the effort to promote public relations as well as to present a new image of the Chōsen University, a grand ceremony was held at the school on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of its foundation in April, 1966. Many thousands of prominent Japanese figures, as well as the USSR ambassador and other foreign dignitaries in Japan were

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[64] See the Ministry of Education Circular No. 210, dated on December 28, 1965. A full text is reprinted in Fujishima Udai and Ozawa Yūsaku, op.cit., pp. 266-268. Since then, the Ministry of Education repeatedly warned the Tokyo governor not to issue the accreditation to the Chōsen University, see Asahi Shimbun, August 23,1967, p. 1.

[65] Ibid.

invited to celebrate the occasion. Hundreds of congratulatory messages flowed in from university presidents and men of letters all over the world.[66] It was a perfect opportunity to develop an image of the Chōsen University as a school enjoying international recognition. The guests and dignitaries who visited the Chōsen University on the occasion reportedly numbered more than 10,000.[67] Furthermore, beginning from the early spring of 1966, a series of round table discussions was held by an invitation of Han Dŭk-su, the Chōsen University President, with prominent Japanese university presidents and professors in an attempt to enlist their support.[68]

In April of the following year, the movement to expedite the accreditation of the Chōsen University gained a new formidable ally, when Minobe Ryūkichi, economic professor and socialist, won the Tokyo prefectural governorship. It was made possible by the unprecedented coalition of the JSP and JCP to support a single candidate to defeat Matsushita Masatoshi, the LDP endorsed candidate, in the

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[66]The congratulatory messages received were not entirely from university presidents in the communist blocs, but included were some from the non-Communist world, such as from Cambridge, Stanford, and Yale Universities. For further details, see Chōsen Daigakkō, comp., op.cit., pp. 127-131.

[67]Ibid., pp. 125-126.

[68]As to the summaries of the round table discussion and the names of the participants including the conversation with Ōkochi Kazuo, the President of Tokyo University, see ibid., pp. 11-36, 40-41 and 56ff; and Taigakuchō to no kondankai [The Round Table Discussions with University Presidents], Atarashii Seidai, VIII, No. 4 (April, 1967), 30-34.

1967 local election.[69] Even prior to Minobe's successful bid for the Tokyo governorship, the adroitly coordinated effort exerted by both the Chōsōren and its Japanese counterparts began to gain public support for the Chōsen University. For instance, the Kodaira City Assembly, where the University is located, adopted a unanimous resolution on June 23, 1966, in support of its accreditation. By November 10th of the same year, the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly followed suit.[70] Moreover, the Association to Create Brighter Prefectural Government [Akarui Tosei o Tsukurukai] which was formed to run Minobe's successful campaign for the governorship came out in its support. Therefore, the pressure mounted high around Minobe Ryūkichi, when he took over the office.

Finally, on August 21, 1967, he was compelled to state that he would examine the application "purely on an administrative basis" without any political prejudice. His justification to take up the matter much delayed by his predecessor was that:

1. The attempt to legislate the Foreigners' School System Bill failed twice in the Diet.
2. The Tokyo Prefectural Assembly twice passed a resolution demanding immediate approval of the Chōren University.

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[69] For details concerning the alliance between the JSP and JCP to help elect Minobe Ryūkichi and its campaign strategy, see "To chijisen omeguru Sha-Kyō no kyōtō taisei to mondai ten" [The Problems and the Coalition between the JSP and JCP Concerning the Prefectural Gubernatorial Election], Kōan Jōhō, No. 163 (April, 1967), 1-8.

[70] The texts for both resolutions are reprinted in, Chosen Taigakukkō, comp., op.cit., pp. 173-178.

3. Many other local legislative assemblies including mayors either adopted resolutions or declared their support for the University.

4. In July, 1967, Mr. Nakano Yoshio handed in a petition signed by more than 2,000 men of letters and literati in Japan demanding a prompt accreditation.[71]

He stated, therefore, that he found insufficient ground to delay a decision any longer. Hence Minobe Ryūkichi referred the matter to the Private School Council for further study and recommendation.[72]

Minobe's statement drew immediate reactions from various right-wing groups including the Ministry of Education. Kennoki Toshihirō, then the Minister of Education, commented that even if accreditation were granted, it would not mean anything, because he believed that, sooner or later, the Diet would pass the Foreigners' School System Bill.[73] In other words, he implied readiness to cancel the accreditation, once the bill became law. In the meantime, the Ministry of Education showed its determination to block Governor Minobe's move in favor of the Chōsen University.[74]

The outright opposition came mostly from the right-

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[71] Chōsen Taigaku ninka mondai, No. 169, p. 80, and Asahi Shimbun, August 23, 1967, p. 1.

[72] According to Article 84, paragraph 4 of the School Education Law of 1947, to, do, fu or the prefectural governor is required to consult with the Private School Council which is composed of prominent educators in the locality. However, its recommendations are not legally binding.

[73] Asahi Shimbun, August 23, 1967, p. 1.

[74] Ibid., August 24, 1967, p. 2.

wing extreme groups, such as the Pan-Japanese Patriots Organizational Conference; the Association for the National Compatriots; the Shōwa Restoration League; the Committee for the Reconstruction of the Great Imperial Japan; the Anti-Communist Volunteers Unit and many others.[75] They condemned the university because it was financed and thus ultimately controlled by a country hostile to Japan. Moreover, the university would conduct communistic education disguised in the name of the ethnic studies which was not only incompatible with the Japanese educational goal but harmful to the national interest of Japan. If let be, they argued, the Chōsen University would eventually become a seedbed to launch a communist revolution to overthrow the Japanese government.[76] Also they denounced Governor Minobe's pro-Communist attitude. At the same time, the criticism was directed to the LDP for its irresponsible policy in allowing accreditation to take place. For nearly eight months while the matter was under study by the Private School Council, Governor Minobe was the target of pressure from all

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[75]There are about 400 right-wing groups in Japan. However, most of them are small groups with each membership no more than 100. For further details, see Nikkan Rōdō Tsūshina, comp., Uyoku undō yōran [A Handbook for Right-wing Movement] (Tokyo: Nikkan Rōdō Tūshinsha, 1964), Kinoshita Hanji, Uyoku tero [The Right-wing Terror] (Tokyo: Hōritsu Bunkasha, 1960), Suzuki Jirō, Uyoku no rekishi [The Right-wing History] (Tokyo: Tsubasa Shoin, 1967), Shigeta Genji, Uyoku no jinmayaku [Who's Who in the Right-wing] (Tokyo: Keisatsu Bunka Kyōkai, 1964), Kōan Keiji Kenkyūkai, comp., Uyoku zensho [The Collection of Right-wing] (Tokyo: Kōan Keiji Kenkyūkai, 1957.

[76]Chōsen Daigaku ninka mondai, No. 169, pp. 78-79.

quarters. The ROK government, too, joined the protest against Minobe's action, and so did the Mindan.[77] While the right-wing groups along with the LDP and the ROK government led the protests, the supporters of the Chōsen University organized a group called the Society to Encourage Governor Minobe [Minobe Chiji o Hagemasukai]. It was intended to boost Minobe's morale to support his firmness and to help overcome the insurmountable pressures emanating from all directions. As a matter of fact, during the 8-month long period of deliberation, hardly a single day passed by without a crowd of either protesters or supporters appearing at the Governor's office or residence.[78] However, the protest movement waged by the various right-wing groups was fragmentary in nature and was unable to exact any significant concerted action due to a lack of unity, and horizontal coordination. Furthermore, the motive of the right-wing groups appeared to have been mixed with a feeling of bitterness directed toward Minobe resulting from their recent defeat in the Tokyo gubernatorial election, and to embarrass the Minobe administration.[79]

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[77] Jōhō Shiryō, No. 93 (September, 1967), 14, and Asahi Shimbun, August 25, p. 2.

[78] Chōsen Daigaku ninka mondai, No. 169, pp. 81-86.

[79] Seven out of nine candidates in the gubernatorial election were right-wing extremists. Despite their common ideological background, the extreme right-wing groups did rarely see eye to eye with each other. See "Tokyo Chiji senkyo o meguru uyoku dantai no dōkyō" [The Activities of the Right-wing organizations in the Tokyo Guvernatorial Election], Kōan Jōhō, No. 164 (May, 1967), 73-80.

It was reported that Minobe's personal security was even threatened by some right-wing extremists.[80]

Generally speaking, these right-wing groups were usually the advocates of the supremacy of the Yamato race and held a strong bias against other ethnic groups in Japan, including Koreans. Hence the relationships between the Japanese right-wing groups and the ROK government including the Mindan were not always amicable enough to form a united front, despite their common goal in the protest movement. Whereas the DPRK through the unflagging effort of the Chōsōren was able to muster the solid support of the Japanese left-wing groups in Japan.

Soon after the case was referred to the Private School Council by the Governor, the Japanese left-wing stepped up its activities in support of the Chōsen University. On September 6, 1967, the Petitioning Assembly of the Scientists Demanding the Accreditation of the Chōsen University was held in Tokyo, and it decided to launch a nationwide petition campaign to obtain signatures of all sympathetic university professors. They also adopted a manifesto warning the Education Ministry officials to refrain from exerting any undue pressure on Governor Minobe. Similar warning was given in a statement signed by more than 300 nationally known literati in Japan and the Petition Signers' Associa-

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[80] Asahi Shimbun, April 18, 1968, p. 14.

tion to Expedite the Accreditation of the Chōsen University.[81] The representatives of the JSP and JCP also met with the Minister of Education and demanded that harassment of Governor Minobe stop. The attempt by the Education Ministry to interfere with the matter within the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Governor, they argued, would constitute a serious violation of the principle of the local autonomy specified not only in the Japanese Constitution (Chapter 8) but also in the School Education Law of 1947 (Article 84).[82]

The DPRK also charged that the Sato regime's intervention on the issue was a deliberate attempt to oppress Chōsen University. Thus the supporters of the accreditation tried to shroud the real issue in the principle of the local autonomy. The LDP's response to the charge was that the Fundamental Education Law and the School Education Law of 1947 were enacted not for aliens but in the interest of Japanese education. The currently existing laws were

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[81] Igarashi Akira, "Chōsen Taigaku ninka sokushin shomeisha no kai"[Petition Signers' Association to Expedite the Accreditation of the Chōsen University], Chōsen Kenkyū, No. 61 (May, 1967), 36-37; and also see Chōsen Taigakukkō no ninka mondai ni kansru shiryō [The Data Concerning the Questions of the Chōsen University Accreditation] (1) (Tokyo: Chōsen Taigakkō, 1967), p. 7.

[82] "Chosen Taigaku ninka mondai o meruguru ugoki" [The Activities Concerning the Problem of the Chōsen University Accreditation], Naigai Tokuhō, (October, 1967), 5-8, and Tenbō, No. 221 (September, 1967), 4-5; Jōhō Shiryō, No. 93 (September, 1967), 7-11; "Chōsen Taigakukkō ninka ni taisuru Monbushō no kainyu wa hōteki konkyo ga nai" [The Ministry of Education has no legal basis to Intervene on the Issue of the Chōsen University Accreditation], Akahata, September 9, 1967.

[83] Nodong Shinmun, September 10, 1967.

inadequate to regulate the education conducted by aliens that might be contrary to the objectives of Japanese education. Hence the proposal to legislate the Foreigners' School System Bill was designed tc meet this purpose. However, the position of the LDP was to ask Governor Minobe to withhold decision until appropriate action could be taken by the Diet.[84]

On April 5, 1968, after an 8-month period of careful study, a report by the Private School Council was submitted to Governor Minobe for final action. However, the report did not make any specific recommendation as to whether or not the accreditation should be granted to the Chōsen University. Apparently, the Council seemed to have intended to avoid involving itself with the controversial issue, since the Governor was not legally bound by the Council's decision anyway. Instead, the matter was left up to the Governor's discretion by merely pointing out 11 questions that might be taken into consideration prior to a final decision.[85] The report contained the following conclusion: the Council found that the school possessed adequate educational facilities and financial resources to run as a university.

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[84]The Liberal Democratic Party, Chōsen Taigaku o naze ninka dekinaika [Why Cannot the Chōsen University be Accredited?] (Tokyo: the LDP, 1967), pp. 1-11.

[85]A full text of this report is reproduced in Arikura Ryōkichi, et al., "Chōsen Taigakkō setchi ninka ni kansuru tōshinsho no gyōseihōteki bunseki" [The Analysis of the Report Concerning the Chōsen University Accreditation from the Administrative Law Point of View], Hōritsu Jihō, Vol. 40, No. 6 (May, 1968), 87-93. Hereafter cited as Tōshinsho Bunseki.

However, the Council was unable to determine the true objective and the scope of education, as the fundamental concept underlying the ethnic education was ambiguous. The pending issue, according to the report, was a matter of national educational policy associated with political questions as well as relations with other countries. Hence it would be beyond the capacity of the Council to pass judgment on the issue at stake. The Council suggested, however, not to permit the use of the university title [taigakkō] but to change the name of the school to one which would connote the nature of "miscellaneous schools" in order to differentiate it from a regular university, if accreditation was to be granted under the provision of the "miscellaneous schools" clause in the School Education Law.[86]

Several shortcomings were noticeable in the Council's report. First, despite its own awareness of incapability to pass judgment on the case, the suggestion was made by the Council not to permit use of the university title for the Chōsen University. Yet the Council recognized the adequate school facilities and financial resources of the school to run as a university. Second, the council failed to take into consideration the unanimous resolution passed by the Tokyo Prefectural Legislative Assembly demanding the immediate accreditation, while the report was concerned about Japan's

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[86] In Japan, private schools often use the words like gakuin or juku rather than taigakkō to distinguish themselves from other regular schools, even if they provide the same university level of education. For example: Aoyama Gakuin, or Keiō Juku.

foreign relations with other countries. Third, judged from the entire context of the report, one may infer that the report was negative in tone. Yet the report was devoid of the crucial answer to the matter of accreditation.

Upon the receipt of the report, Governor Minobe commented to the press that while he just briefly looked through the report, he noted that the Council's opinion was not entirely relevant to the matter in question. Since the report was silent in regard to the advisability of accreditation, he stated, he alone would assume the responsibility for its decision.[87]

In an attempt to assist the Governor under the situation, five professors represented by Yūkura Ryōkichi, professor of Administrative Law at Waseda, handed in their scholarly analysis on the Council's report to the Governor. Analyzing the report strictly from the legalistic point of view, they advised the Governor that not a single provision in the report could be construed to restrain him from granting the accreditation, even without accepting the Council's suggestion to disallow the use of a university title by the Chōsen University.[88] In the meantime, the supporters of the Chōsen University held an assembly at the first conference room in the Tokyo Prefectural Legislative Assembly building to encourage the Governor and to

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[87] Asahi Shimbun, April 6, 1968, p. 1.

[88] It was later published by the joint authorship, see Yūkara Ryōkichi, et al., Tōshinsho Buseki, 87-93.

hasten his decision. There were about 190 representatives from approximately 100 different left-wing organizations including the Sōhyō, Nikkyōso, JSP, and JCP.[89] Three groups visited Governor Minobe on separate occasions to express their support for prompt action. These were the representatives of 141 university presidents and professors, the representatives of 480 writers, columnists, actors and actresses, and those jurists agreeing with Yūkura Ryōkichi's analysis on the Council's report. Governor Minobe, prior to his final decision, met with the Minister of Education on April 11, to make his intention clear in favor of the accreditation. The Minister of Education acknowledged that the jurisdiction concerning the Chōsen University would legally reside with the Governor, but urged him to use the utmost prudence in his final decision. However, Governor Minobe's meeting with the Minister of Education was undoubtedly designed to warn them and thereby clear the way for his forthcoming announcement of his decision.

On April 18, 1968, the day finally arrived for Governor Minobe to announce his decision to grant accreditation to the Chōsen University. The announcement elicited front headlines of every major newspaper in Japan. He stated in the press conference that the Constitution of Japan and the subsequent statutory laws were the only

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[89] Asahi Shimbun, April 9, 1968, p. 10.

[90] Asahi Shimbun, April 12, 1968, p. 1.

scale used to weigh his decision. To grant accreditation, he believed, was an administrative matter and that his decision had nothing to do with a political question. Thus it took almost two years of strenuous campaigning by the Chōsōren and its Japanese counterparts to obtain the accreditation of the Chōsōren University.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROK-JAPAN NORMALIZATION TREATY AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

The ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty was signed on June 22, 1965, and the instruments of ratification were exchanged on December 18, 1965. Agreements accompanying the Treaty were: Agreement on fisheries; Agreement on property claims and the economic cooperation; Agreements on the art objects and cultural cooperation, and the legal status of the Koreans in Japan.[1] Most important of all, as far as the Koreans in Japan are concerned, was the agreement defining their legal status, rights, and subsequent treatment provided by the Japanese government.

The Legal Status of Koreans in Japan

According to a generally-accepted principle of international law, each state is the sole judge of the extent to which aliens enjoy civil privileges and other

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[1]For a complete Japanese text of the document, see special issue concerning the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty, Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi, Vol. 46, Nos. 5-6 (March, 1966), 163-222. For an English text, see The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 10 (1966), 263-323. For a complete Korean text, see Wŏn Yong-sŏk, Hanil hoedam sipsanyŏn [The 14 Years of the ROK-Japan Negotiations] (Seoul: Samwha Ch'ulp'ansa, 1965), 293-380.

substantive rights within its jurisdiction.[2] However, the significant thing in this case was that the status of Koreans in Japan was determined by an international treaty due to special circumstances determined by the historical experience. Prior to the final agreement, the Mindan demanded through its own home government representatives that the Japanese government give a permanent residence to all Koreans including their future lineal descendant who would be born in Japan. At the same time, they demanded that Koreans be awarded equal legal treatment in all matters except suffrage as that of Japanese citizens. However, the final outcome was far short of their expectations. The agreement on the legal status of Koreans in Japan consisted of three major parts: (1) the scope of permanent residence; (2) the causes for deportation; and (3) the subsequent legal treatment.

The Scope of Permanent Residence. -- According to the Japanese Immigration Control Law of 1952, an alien residing in Japan had to clarify his purpose of staying upon his entry into Japan and the duration of stay had to be limited to a maximum of three years. However, if his stay exceeded this period, it had to be approved by the Minister of

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[2]Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law. V. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 471-851, and Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations: An Introduction (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), pp. 94-122, and Harvard Research in International Law, "Responsibility of States," American Journal of International Law, 23 (1929), Special Supplement, 131-239.

Justice (Articles 4 and 21). When applying for permanent residence, an alien had to hold not only a record of good behavior, but also sufficient property or ability to secure an independent livelihood. It further stipulated that the purpose of establishing such a permanent residence in Japan should not be contrary to the best interest of Japan as determined by the Ministry of Justice (Article 22, Paragraph 1 and 2).

As a result of the Agreement, the Immigration Law of 1952 is not applicable to Koreans in Japan as conditions for permanent residence. However, the eligibility of Koreans to apply for permanent residence is limited to: (1) those who have been resident in Japan since August 15, 1945, continuously up to the time of their application (Article 1, paragraph 1(a), emphasis added); or (2) those who were born in Japan after August 16, 1945, within 5 years from the date of the entry into the Agreement, as a lineal descendant of persons categorized above (1) (Article 1, paragraph 1(a)); and (3) a son or daughter of a person who received a permanent residence in accordance with the above procedure, may be considered for permanent residence, provided that application is filed within 60 days from the date of birth (Article 1, paragraph 2).

However, the Agreement is silent as to the question of the future generation other than mentioned as above. It was undoubtedly intended to limit the scope of eligibility and privilege for Koreans to apply for permanent residency.

The agreement stipulated a continued residence in Japan without interruption, and that anyone who happened to have left Japan momentarily after the War could lose his eligibility for permanent residence. This provision was likely to create a confused legal status even within the same family depending on the circumstances. For instance, a husband might qualify for permanent residence if he lived in Japan from the time he was brought to Japan during the War as a conscripted laborer and forced to leave his family behind in Korea. However, his family who joined him after the War may be ineligible for such privilege.[3] Moreover, the applicant was required by law to produce a record of evidence to prove his continued residence in Japan.[4] At a glance, it may not appear to be much of a problem. However, those who had gone through life in the most chaotic era in Japanese history especially during and after the War, would be faced with an impossible task of producing a record of some 20 years of continued residence in Japan. In addition, the applicant was required to prove his or her nationality as a citizen of the ROK.[5] Consequently, those who failed

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[3]Ogawa Masaaki, "Zainichi Kankokujin no hōteki chii taigu hyōtei" [The Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of the Koreans in Japan], Hōritsu Jihō, Vol. 37, No. 10 (September, 1965), 26.

[4]On this point, see paragraph (a) of the Record of Discussions in "Agreed Minutes Regarding the Agreement on the Legal Status and the Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea Residing in Japan between Japan and the Republic of Korea." Hereafter cited as The Minutes Regarding the Agreement.

[5]Ibid., re Article 1, paragraph 1 (i).

to acquire the citizenship of the ROK would eventually lose their eligibility to apply for permanent residence in Japan, thereby excluding the supporters of the DPRK who would become stateless aliens.[6]

The Causes of Deportation. -- The permanent residence-ship which may be granted to Koreans by this Agreement does not necessarily assure Koreans of maintaining their permanent livelihood in Japan. Under certain conditions, they are subject to deportation to the country of their nationality if they fall in one of the following categories: (1) persons who are sentenced to imprisonment or heavier punishment for crimes of insurrection, foreign aggression, or crimes against the head of a foreign state, or diplomatic envoy, which may prejudice the interest of Japan; and (2) persons who are sentenced to imprisonment for more than three years for violation of the narcotics control law, or charged with the

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[6]Many Japanese jurists are critical about this legal point on the grounds that the Agreement leaves no alternative for the Koreans but to take the ROK nationality to be eligible for permanent residence. They argued that a chance to take a choice of nationality between the ROK and DPRK should be offered. Otherwise, they stated that the Agreement was a clear violation of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 22 of the Japanese Constitution. See Ogawa Masaaki, op.cit., p. 72; Miyasaki Hideki, "Zainichi Kankokujin no hōteki chii" [The Legal Status of Koreans in Japan, Jurisuto, No. 327 (December, 1965), 24; Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamorukai, ed., Zainichi Chōsenjin no hōteki chii [The Legal Status of Koreans in Japan] (Tokyo: Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamorukai, 1965), pp. 158-162. And Akiba Jun-ichi, "Iwayuru hōteki chii hyōteijō no eijū kyoka shinsei hōhō ni kansuru mondaiten" [The Problems with the Method of Applying Permanent Residence in Accordance with so-called the Agreement on the Legal Status] Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi, No. 64 (March, 1966), 422-430.

same crime for more than three times, or sentenced to more than seven years of imprisonment for the violation of any Japanese laws (Article 3, paragraphs a, b, c, and d).

Despite the claim made by the Japanese government that the agreement was designed to reduce the scope of possible causes for deportation, it still contained enough provisions to encompass almost any misconduct and very likely subject the individual to deportation from Japan. Ogawa Masaaki, a leading Japanese jurist, argues that in the absence of a clear definition of insurrection or acts prejudicial to the interest of Japan, there would be a danger for arbitrary application of this provision, thereby misdemeanors committed by Koreans could result in deportation from Japan.[7] Furthermore, the agreement enables the Japanese government to deport any Koreans to South Korea including those who pledged allegiance to the DPRK, because the South Korean government is obligated by the agreement to accept all Korean deportees from Japan.[8] For the South Korean government, the most serious mistake in the negotiation of the agreement was the failure to obtain assurance from the Japanese government in providing adequate means to redress of grievances for deportees, due process of law in the deportation process, and protection of the aliens' substantive rights.

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[7]Ogawa Masaaki, op.cit., p. 28.

[8]On this point, see The Minutes Regarding the Agreement, Record of Discussions, paragraph (2) of Korean Representative.

Treatment of Koreans. -- In determining the legal status of the Koreans in Japan, the subsequent treatment accompanying such status is spelled out in Article 4 of the agreement. It states that: "The Japanese government shall pay due consideration to . . . the matters concerning education, livelihood protection and national health insurance in Japan" for those who are granted permanent residence.

Originally, the National Health Insurance Law did not specify that nationality was a determinant factor for the eligibility in obtaining the insurance benefits. However, according to the administrative rule established by the Welfare Ministry to implement the Health Insurance Law, a person who did not hold Japanese nationality including his family was ineligible for the insurance unless determined by the ordinance of each city, county and village government (Article 1, paragraph 2). As of 1965, only 40 percent of the city, county and village governments had passed the ordinance to cover Koreans residing in each locality to provide the Health Insurance program.[9] Hence, if a Korean family happened to live in the locality where the local government fails to extend its insurance coverage to Koreans by ordinance, they would be excluded from the insurance benefits.

Also, the Livelihood Protection Law of 1950, provides

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[9]Ogawa Masaaki, op.cit., p. 30; Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamorukai, ed., op.cit., pp. 21-24.

that all people who suffer from destitution are entitled to get protection from the state (Article 1, emphasis added). Later the Ministry of Welfare interpreted the provision that all people meant only Japanese citizens, and that the law was not intended to provide protection to aliens residing in Japan. However, the livelihood protection law may be extended to aliens for public safety and humanitarian reasons but not as a legal right. In other words, according to the Ministry of Welfare, Koreans are provided with livelihood protection, not by right, but as a privilege bestowed upon them by the Japanese government. By doing this, the Ministry of Welfare implied that Koreans had no right to file a motion of formal complaint even if a Korean is aggrieved by irregularity in the benefits and the disposition of standard remuneration.

Due to the whims of this capricious interpretation by the Japanese officials, Koreans are likely to be excluded from other social security benefits, such as the Child Welfare, the Old Age Assistance and the Disabled Allowance programs and many others, even though they are subject to equal taxation like Japanese citizens. For instance, Koreans were excluded from the benefits of the Public Housing Law of 1951, which provided housing for low income groups residing in crowded metropolitan areas. In 1954, it was clearly stated by the Director of Public Housing, the Reconstruction Ministry that no alien had a right to demand

the benefits regardless of the amount of taxes being paid in Japan.[10]

The most serious problem is the treatment of the Korean veterans who had served in the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces during World War II. It was estimated that more than a million Koreans had served in them in various capacities.[11] Although the exact number of Korean veterans still remaining in Japan is unknown, they are not covered by the veterans' benefits and other privileges covered by the Special Relief Act for the Family of the War-Dead and the Wounded.

Under these circumstances, the only treatment of Koreans enumerated in the Agreement was the livelihood protection and the National Health Insurance program, which amounted to no more than a mere fraction of the social security benefits. Only in these matters that the Japanese government agreed to pay due consideration. In fact, neither the livelihood protection nor the national health programs instituted additional benefits for the Koreans in Japan. The Agreement is no more than a legal reaffirmation of what was already in existence. Then a question arises as to what would happen to Koreans who fail to acquire permanent

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[10]The Ministry of Reconstruction Circular No. 932, dated November 12, 1954, issued by the name of the Director of the Public Housing, quoted in Ogawa Masaaki, op.cit., pp. 30-31; and Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamorukai, op.cit., pp. 28-30.

[11]For this figure, see Pak Kyŏng-sik, Chōsenjin kyōsei renkyō no kiroku [The Record of the Forcibly Taken Korean Laborers] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1965), pp. 62-63.

residence. Does it mean to say that these social benefits would be denied to them? The Japanese government officials reiterated that a minimum social security benefit may be extended to a needy person on humanitarian grounds regardless of his or her permanent residence status.[12] As far as legal treatment is concerned, actually there is only a slight difference whether or not a person obtains the permanent residence in Japan. The real difference is that the applicability of the deportation clause to the holder of the permanent residence would be much more limited than those who do not hold it. An additional topic included in the Agreement was the matter of education. The Japanese government was obligated by the Agreement to take measures "as it deems necessary" that those children of Koreans with permanent residence status are permitted to enter the Japanese public schools and universities, if all the qualifications are met. Again, this amounts to a restatement of what the Japanese government had been offering to the children of Koreans in Japan.

To understand the final outcome of the agreement on legal status, however, it is necessary to examine from a broader perspective the foreign policy objectives of the respective countries reflected in the conclusion of the treaty. From the outset, it must be noted that the treaty

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[12]Ikegami Tsutomu, Hōteki chii nihayaku no shitsumon [Two Hundred Questions concerning the Legal Status] (Tokyo: Kyōbunsha, 1965), pp. 167-168.

was the product of 14 years of negotiations, since the first preliminary talk began in November, 1951. As was shown during the course of the long tedious negotiation, the deep-seated mutual antagonism and the emotional forces were the difficult part to overcome between the two nations. Generally speaking, the Japanese viewed their former colonial people with contempt, aversion, and a superiority complex, while the Koreans had feelings of hostility, distrust, envy, fear, and resentment toward the Japanese. These antagonistic emotional forces supported continuing conflict and militated against the early conclusion of the treaty. However, the primary pressure for reconciliation was necessitated by the circumstance of the Cold War in which both countries found themselves in the non-Communist bloc. Within this context, the United States played an important role in pressuring the two nations to come together for normalization. From the United States point of view, the embittered relations between its two allies would severely hamper, among other things, its effort to build an anti-Communist bastion in East Asia.

As for Japan, normalization would bring about not only an additional market for its growing industries but also an opportun ty for possible future financial investment in Korea. Another overriding concern of Japan was the matter of national security. A traditional strategic consideration among Japanese was the importance of South Korea to the Japanese security. This strategic military

importance of South Korea for the Security of Japan was reflected in the defense plan drafted by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.[13] Another consideration was the postwar rehabilitation of the Japanese foreign policy position after the decisive defeat of World War II. So crushing was the defeat that it resulted in a revulsion from the formerly almost mystic militarism that had gripped the populace. From this revulsion came a new pacifistic mood in Japan, a desire to redeem themselves from the prewar image of an aggressive, militaristic nation and to establish friendly relations with other nations. Japan had been pursuing this policy of reconciliation with respect to Asia in general. They adopted a good neighbor policy and economic aid programs toward fellow Asian nations in an effort to win their trust and goodwill. With these goals in mind, the Sato regime expressed its willingness to reach rapprochement with South Korea. This view was in accord with the United States

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[13] In 1963, a secret Japanese national defense plan called "Mitsuya Kenkyū" [The Three Arrow Studies] was exposed by a Socialist member in the Diet. Subsequently the Sato government admitted the existence of the plan. According to this plan, if and when Korea falls into a state of belligerency, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are to launch a joint military operation with the U.S. and the ROK armed forces against a hypothetical enemy (i.e., DPRK). As the plan was revealed in the midst of the ROK-Japan negotiation, the left-wing exploited this occasion to accuse the Sato regime of a deliberate attempt to form a military alliance with the ROK. For further details, see "Mitsuya kenkyū o meguru uyoku kankei dantai no dōkō" [The Mitsuya Studies and the Activities of the Right-wing Organizations], Kōan Jōhō, No. 141 (June, 1965), 72-81; and "Mitsuya sakusen keikaku to Nikkan jōyaku" [The Three Arrow Operation Plan and the ROK-Japan Treaty], The JCP Central Committee, comp., Nikkan jōyaku to Nihon Kyōsantō [The JCP and the ROK-Japan Treaty] (Tokyo: The JCP Central Committee, 1965), pp. 47-68.

Asian policy, and therefore, the United States enthusiastically supported the negotiation from the beginning.[14]

Meanwhile, for South Korea, more compelling reasons for a conciliatory attitude toward Japan stemmed from economic necessity. Actually, North Korea is geographically favored for the growth of heavy industries, whereas South Korea is climatically suited for agriculture and light industries. Hence both regions are mutually complementary for their economic survival. However, the emergence of the two Koreas had caused the southern regime to cripple itself in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Economic conditions further deteriorated due to the war devastation and the exorbitant expenditure for the maintenance of the ROK armed forces. Hence the existence of the South was solely dependent upon the assistance provided by the United States. However, the vital United States economic aid to Korea, an approximate annual $300 million, had begun to dwindle to $150 million in 1964, and there was even a strong indication that it would be further reduced. This situation roused the South Korean government to seek aid elsewhere. The ROK's long-term

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[14]These United States views are fully discussed in what is commonly known as the Conlon Report, see Conlon Associates, United States Foreign Policy: Asia, Studies Prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, No. 5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), and see also The American Assembly, The United States and the Far East, ed., Willard L. Thorp, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), especially Chapter I "The United States and Japan," by Robert A. Scalapino, pp. 11-73; and Chapter II, "The United States and Korea," by Shannon McCune, pp. 74-79.

agreement signed with West Germany in December, 1964, was the manifestation of this policy. However, the plain facts of geographical proximity and the phenomenal postwar economic growth of Japan made Japanese economic aid almost imperative. Therefore, it was the logical choice for Koreans to normalize relations with Japan. In the meantime, the military junta in South Korea was desperately in need of money to finance the 5-year economic recovery plan launched in 1962. The long deadlocked ROK-Japan talk was hastily resumed by the military junta in the hope of obtaining economic aid from Japan. Finally the original $800 million repatriation claimed by the Rhee regime against Japan was retracted by the military junta. Instead, an agreement was reached through an exchange of the Ōhira-Kim memorandum in November, 1962, that Japan was to provide $300 million economic aid and a $200 million long-term loan throughout a 10-year period.

Besides the economic consideration, there was another important political question which compelled the Park regime to seek normalization with Japan. That was South Korea's increasing fear of Red China and her possession of nuclear weapons and the military threat from North Korea. Also the possibility of the lessening of the American presence in Korea might sooner or later become a reality. South Korea was fully aware that the United States had been urging Japan to take a more active role and to share responsibility in the matter of Asian Affairs and security. If this happened,

South Korea feared that an inevitable outcome would be its subjection to Japan's influence. However, by normalizing relations with Japan, the Park regime hoped to create, with the support of Chiang Kai-shek, a kind of military alliance system which might be called the North East Asian Treaty Organization inviting the membership of Japan and the United States. Thus the organizational scheme would provide not only collective security in the region but also serve as a checking mechanism to prevent Japan from wielding an arbitrary influence. Moreover, the Park regime believed that the alliance would make Japan commit itself against the DPRK, thereby preempting the DPRK's attempt to maintain a close tie with Japan.

The Park regime, primarily concerned with obtaining these objectives, had tended to place lesser consideration on other pending questions such as fisheries and the legal status of Koreans in Japan.[15] In other words, the South Korean government was not in a favorable position to drive a hard bargain to secure the right of Koreans in Japan, because of much more important items on the agenda which were vital to the overall objectives of the Park regime.[16]

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[15]For the criticism directed to the South Korean government policy, see Pak Chun-kyu, "Kulyok ŭi oekyo lŭl iŏkalyŏnunka?" [Do We Continue to Carry on the Humiliating Diplomacy?], Sasangge, No. 4 (April, 1965), 50-59. And also Bu Wan-hyŏk, "Chokuk ŭi changne lŭl tobak hachi malla" [Don't Try to Gamble with the Future of the Fatherland], ibid., No. 5 (May, 1965), 40-50.

[16]The objectives of the South Korean government to normalize relations with Japan were analyzed well in the

The Sato government, realizing the desperate position of South Korea, was able to negotiate with a better bargaining position and a firm stand in seeking more concessions from its counterpart. Hence it is no exaggeration to say that the scope of the agreement on the legal status was almost entirely the work of the Japanese government, and the ROK government was incapable of exerting its influence to obtain a better legal status for its own nationals in Japan.

The Campaign Against the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty

It is difficult to separate the protest movement directed to the Agreement on the Legal Status from the overall movement against the ROK-Japan treaty. However, the Korean reaction can best be understood from the overall campaign waged against the ROK-Japan Treaty. Viewing the issue from all possible sides, one finds a plethora of arguments for and against the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty. However, the opposition to the treaty can be classified into two broad categories: one argument originates from the left-wing political ideology and the other from the dissatisfaction with the substance in the various agreements in the treaty. Those who held the former position

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report published by the Office of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, Nikkan jōyaku teikei o meguru naigai no dōkō [The Internal and External Situation Concerning the Conclusion of the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty] (Tokyo: Naikaku Kanbō Naikaku Chōsashitsu, 1966), p 7-9. Hereafter cited as Naigai no dōkō.

were mostly the Japanese leftists and the Chōsōren who denounced the whole idea of normalizing relations between the ROK and Japan. They argued that Japan's attempt to normalize relations only with the ROK would jeopardize the possibility of Koreans achieving a unified Korea, thereby perpetuating the division of Korea into two political units. Japan's action constituted not only a denial of the DPRK's existence but also an explicit manifestation of an unfriendly gesture against the government of the DPRK. They went on to state that the ROK-Japan Treaty would eventually lead to a formation of military alliance directed against the DPRK and that Japan might not be able to escape the consequences of a war in Asia. Furthermore, the normalized relations between the two nations would provide an opportunity for the Japanese monopolistic capitalists to penetrate into the Korean market for further economic exploitation.[17]

The non-ideological opposition to the treaty came from the element of the Mindan and the opposition forces against the Park regime in South Korea. They criticized the low posture maintained by the ROK government in the

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[17]For further details, see Tanaka Naokichi, Nihon o ugokasu Nikkan kankei [The ROK-Japan Relations Which Stir Japan] (Tokyo: Bunkyo Shoin, 1963), pp. 191-194, and 195ff; and JCP Central Committee, comp., op.cit., pp. 57-68. And also see Ando Hikotaro, et al., Nichi-Chō-Chu sankoku jinmin rentai no rekishi to riron [A Treatise and History Concerning the Unity of Peoples of Japan-Korea-China] (Tokyo: Nihon Chōsen Kenkyūsho, 1964), pp. 135-146; Ohira Zengo, Ajia Gaikō to Nikkan kankei [The Asian Diplomacy and the ROK-Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Yūshindō, 1965), pp. 27-46; Hatada Shigeo, Kawagoe Keizo, Chōsen mondai to Nihon [Japan and the Question of Korea] (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 1968), pp. 157-171.

treaty negotiation and its obsession with the goal of obtaining economic aid from Japan. As a result, the ROK government allegedly made excessive concessions to the Japanese government in all other important matters. They charged that all the agreements signed by the ROK government were the products of this humiliating diplomacy.[18]

During the first 10 years of the ROK-Japan negotiation starting in 1951, there was virtually little organized opposition in both countries to the negotiations because the chance of success in the talks seemed quite remote. However, the military coup in South Korea and the willingness of the junta to come to an earliest possible conclusion of the treaty with Japan changed the whole situation. While the negotiation between the two countries was making favorable progress, the forces opposing the talks gradually built up their strength around the Japanese left-wing groups. The Chōsōren especially drew up a plan to wage an anti-normalization treaty campaign in collaboration with the left-wing groups. On December 3, 1964, the Chōsōren convened a meeting of the Central Action Committee and drafted a protest note against the Japanese government's resumption of the 7th official negotiation with the ROK government delegates. On December 7th, the protest note was officially

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[18]For these points, see several articles in the special issue, "Hanil hwedam ŭi p'amyŏlchŏk t'akyŏl [The Ruinous Conclusion of the ROK-Japan Talks], Sasangge, No. 6 (June, 1965), 60-117, and also Pak Chun-kyu, op.cit., pp. 50-59.

adopted by some 1,800 local Chōsōren delegates assembled at the Bunkyo public hall in Tokyo, where they deliberated strategy for the forthcoming anti-normalization treaty movement in Japan.[19] Later the protest note was handed over to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Chōsōren representatives. The Chōsōren declared that 1965 would be the decisive year to crush the ROK-Japan talks. This would be accomplished by broadening its friendly relations and thereby strengthening its ties with the Japanese people. This marked the beginning of the hectic anti-normalization treaty campaign.

For two weeks beginning early January, 1965, the Chōsōren mobilized some 14,000 demonstrators in 28 different locations throughout Japan to protest against the resumption of the negotiations by the Japanese government. However, a distinctive feature that differentiates this campaign strategy from other occasions was that the Chōsōren strongly urged its members to refrain from any violent action and to limit the protest movement within the legal framework prescribed by the Japanese law. The thinking behind this strategy was that the Japanese government might take oppressive measures against the pro-North Korean elements in Japan upon a successful conclusion of the normalization treaty with the ROK government. Anticipating the worst situation, in reminiscence of the "red purge" in the early 1950's, it was also reported that the Chōsōren was even

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[19] Naigai no dōkō, p. 50.

preparing to go underground to carry on its activities.[20] Hence the Chosoren took the utmost precautionary measures not to give the Japanese government a convenient excuse to resume such repressive action. It was for this reason that "extreme adventurism" was condemned as part of their strategy and tactics in this campaign, because it would jeopardize Chōsōren's future course of action in Japan.

Instead, the Chōsōren decided to place its emphasis on the mobilization of the Japanese people and the dissident groups within the Mindan to participate in mass action in the street for the anti-normalization campaign. The task of mobilizing the Japanese left-wing groups for action was to be performed by the Japan-DPRK Society, since the left-wingers were ideologically committed to oppose Sato's attempt to normalize its relations only with South Korea.[21] In mobilizing the Mindan's dissidents, the Chōsōren lured them with a financial reward for participating in the campaign against the normalization treaty.[22] As a matter of fact, there was a large number of dissident elements within the Mindan looking for a chance to express their frustration

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[20]"Nikkan jōyaku hijun soshi seiryoku no dōkō [The Movement Concerning the Forces against the approval of the ROK-Japan Treaty], Nikkan Mondai Jōhō, No. 3 (September, 1965), 13-14. This periodical was published weekly by the Public Information Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party especially during the campaign for the consumption among the LDP members.

[21]Naigai no dōkō, p. 50.

[22]"Nikkan jōyaku hijun soshi seiryoku no dōkō," op.cit., pp. 50-51.

against their home government. The situation was aggravated by the ROK government's refusal to allow a Mindan representative to participate during the negotiation with Japan on the question dealing with their legal status in Japan.[23] Furthermore, the Chōsōren planned to manipulate the dissident elements in Japan to open a coordinated effort with the opposition forces in South Korea to direct an all-out campaign against the ROK-Japan normalization treaty.

The major task for the Chōsōren members would be to participate in only peaceful protest rallies and petition assemblies, with greater emphasis on the propaganda activities. A more extensive propaganda program was organized starting in early July, 1965. Many leading members of the Chōsōren were sent on speech-making tours around the country to persuade the public why the Chōsōren opposed the normalization treaty. By September, the Chōsōren had dispatched 863 of its members to 249 different cities in Japan to distribute propaganda materials in the streets. In some instances, the propaganda materials were stuffed in newspapers which were distributed to the subscribers through the regular delivery channels. Especially during the 20th anniversary of the Liberation Day and the DPRK's Independence Day, the Chōsōren never failed to use these occasions for the propaganda purposes of presenting a

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[23] Chŏng Chŏl, Mindan (Tokyo: Yoyosha, 1967), pp. 98-104.

favorable image of the DPRK and the cause of the anti-normalization treaty with South Korea. At the same time, various art and music festivals were sponsored throughout Japan by the Chōsōren, and each occasion was always designed to suit the needs of the Chōsōren's propaganda purpose.[24]

Meanwhile, the first wave of street demonstrations against the normalization treaty began in Tokyo in early March, 1965. The Mindan's dissident groups, including some students instigated by the Chōsōren, staged demonstrations in front of the office building of the Korean Mission in Japan. They protested the humiliating low posture maintained by the ROK governmental delegates during the negotiation and its failure to secure from the Japanese government better legal status for Koreans residing in Japan. The demonstration against the South Korean government officials were conducted even at the places where the ROK delegates were staying during the negotiations. In several instances, the demonstrators broke through the police cordon and 19 of them were arrested by the Japanese police.[25] Despite the series of demonstrations staged by the Mindan members, the official position of the Mindan was to discourage the demonstrations and to support the ROK government policy. However, there was little action that the Mindan could take

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[24]Naigai no dōkō, pp. 75-76, and "Hōteki chii o meguru dōyō" [The Unrest Related to the Question of Legal Status], Asahi Janaru, Vol. VII, No. 42 (October 10, 1965), 86.

[25]Naigai no dōkō, p. 51.

to stop the demonstration against their home government.[26]

As for the mobilization of the Japanese left-wing groups, it is difficult to ascertain as to how much influence the Chōsōren actually had in their anti-normalization treaty campaign. However, there was little doubt that the Japan-DPRK Society played quite an active role in this endeavor on behalf of the Chōsōren appealing to the Japanese people for support of the movement. To this end, the Japan-DPRK Society had established a detailed plan in early December, 1964, for enlisting the support of the Japanese left-wing organizations in the forthcoming anti-normalization treaty campaign.[27] In an attempt to block the ROK-Japan Treaty, the Chōsōren was reported to have received ¥50 million from the DPRK and another ¥100 million was raised among the Koreans in Japan.[28] With these funds, the Chōsōren pledged to aid both "materially and morally" the Japanese left-wing groups for the direct involvement in the campaign.[29]

In early February, 1965, the Japanese involvement in the campaign against the ROK-Japan Treaty began to pick up

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[26]Chŏng Chŏl, op.cit., pp. 88-89; and "Nikkan jōyaku hijun sohi seiryoku no dōkō," op.cit., p. 19.

[27]Naigai no dōkō, p. 50.

[28]"Nikkan jōyaku hijun soshi seiryoku no dōkō" [The Movement Concerning the Forces Against the Approval of the ROK-Japan Treaty], Nikkan Mondai Jōhō, No. 11 (October 29, 1965), 12.

[29]Naigai no dōkō, pp. 51, 73.

momentum and the movement spread throughout the country. The following series of demonstrations staged by both Japanese left wingers and some of the Mindan's dissident groups were particularly violent and accompanied by massive civil disobedience: the demonstration to block the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to South Korea on February 17th; the demonstration to oppose the signing of the initial draft treaty on February 20th; the demonstration against the signing of the draft agreements on fisheries, property claims and the legal status of Koreans in Japan on April 3rd; and the demonstration against the official signing of the ROK-Japan Treaty and other related documents on June 22nd.[30] From April to August, 1965, the magnitude and the intensity of the demonstrations by the Japanese left-wing against the ROK-Japan treaty appeared to have been eroded by the sudden eminence of the US bombing raids and the escalation of the ground war in Vietnam. However, following the opening of the 50th Diet session to consider the approval of the treaty, the ferocity of the demonstrations was rekindled

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[30]For further details concerning these demonstrations, see "Nikkan jōyaku hijun hantai undō no sōkatsu" [A Summary of the Campaign against the ROK-Japan Treaty], Chōsa Geppō, No. 123 (March, 1966), 34-50; "Nikkan jōyaku hijun o meguru uyoku kankei dantai no dōkō" [The Movement of the Right-wing Activities Concerning the ROK-Japan Treaty], Kōan Jōhō, No. 148 (January, 1966), 96-103; Gotō Naoshi, "Nikkan kaidan to handō ideologu no dōkō" [The ROK-Japan Talk and the Movement of the Reactionary Ideology], Bunka Hyōron, No. 17 (April, 1963), 54-62; "Nikkan jōyaku hijun soshi tōsō no gaikyō to sono tokuchō" [The Characteristics and a General Situation of the Campaign against the ROK-Japan Treaty], Kōan Jōhō, No. 146 (November, 1965), 29-35.

and they reached a peak from October through the middle of December, 1965. It must be noted again that Chōsōren members were conspicuously absent from direct involvement in the series of the demonstrations staged by the Japanese left wing. Instead, each time the Chōsōren sent a handful of representatives to the rallies to express their sincere appreciations to the Japanese people.[31]

The number of Japanese demonstrators who participated in the campaign against the ROK-Japan Treaty is shown in Tables 23, 24, 25, and 26 as tallied by the Japanese police. The figures illustrate the number of demonstrators mobilized by the Japanese left wing beginning from February 9th, the demonstration to block the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to South Korea until its peak on December 18, 1965, the demonstration to block the approval of the ROK-Japan Treaty in the Japanese Diet. During this period, mass demonstrations took place in 2,900 different localities throughout Japan and nearly two million people participated in these demonstrations mobilized by the Japanese left-wing groups (Tables 23 and 24). However, the figures represented only 33.7 percent of total demonstrators the left-wing claimed they could mobilize for these occasions. The arrest of 889 people was reported, and among them, 607 were arrested in the Tokyo area alone. It indicates the intensity of the demonstration concentrated in this area. During the 68-day

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[31] Naigai no dōkō, p. 76.

TABLE 23

SIZE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE ROK-JAPAN TREATY
PERIOD COVERING FROM FEBRUARY 9 TO DECEMBER 18, 1965

	Number of Localities	Number of Participants	Projected Number of Mobilization	Percentage of Actual Mobilization	Number of Arrests
JSP and Sōhyō	1,000	61,000	1,949,000	33.1	
JCP	1,000	623,000	1,821,000	34.2	
Joint Demonstrations JCP-JSP-Sōhyō	600	588,000	1,688,000	34.8	
Others, including the anti-Yoyogi Student faction	300	61,000	124,000	49.1	
Total	2,900	1,882,000	5,582,000	33.7	889

Source: "Nikkan tōsō no gaikyo to tokuchō," Kōan Jōhō, No. 149 (February, 1966), 68.

TABLE 24

SIZE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE ROK-JAPAN TREATY
FROM OCTOBER 5 TO DECEMBER 11, 1965

	Number of Localities	Number of Participants	Projected Number of Mobilization	Percentage of Actual Mobilization	Number of Arrests
JSP and Sōhyō	800	488,000	1,434,000	34.0	
JCP	600	306,000	956,000	32.0	
Joint Demonstrations JCP-JSP-Sōhyō	500	520,000	1,458,000	35.6	
Others, including the anti-Yoyogi Student faction	200	37,000	84,000	44.0	
Total	2,100	1,351,000	3,952,000	34.3	572

Source: See table 23.

TABLE 25

NATIONWIDE DEMONSTRATIONS STAGED UNDER THE LEFT-WING UNITED FRONT

	Number of Localities	Number of Participants	Projected Number of Mobilization	Percentage of Actual Mobilization	Number of Arrests
1st Demonstration November 9, 1965	329	238,000	586,000	40.6	75
2nd Demonstration November 13, 1965	223	196,000	426,000	46.6	16
3rd Demonstration November 26, 1965	118	76,000	287,000	26.4	9
4th Demonstration November 4, 1965	20	22,000	125,000	17.6	2
5th Demonstration December 8, 1965	20	11,000	68,000	16.1	0

Source: See tables 23 and 24.

TABLE 26

DEMONSTRATIONS IN TOKYO STAGED UNDER THE LEFT-WING UNITED FRONT

	Number of Localities	Number of Participants	Projected Number of Mobilization	Percentage of Actual Mobilization	Number of Arrests
1st Demonstration November 9, 1965		74,000	200,000	37.0	52
2nd Demonstration November 13, 1965		69,000	150,000	46.0	10
3rd Demonstration November 26, 1965		23,000	100,000	23.0	9
4th Demonstration December 4, 1965		16,000	100,000	16.0	2
5th Demonstration December 8, 1965		5,000	50,000	10.0	0

Source: See Table 25.

peak season from October 5, to December 11, 1965, the Japanese left wing was able to mobilize more than one and a quarter million people in nationwide demonstrations to express their opposition to the ROK-Japan Treaty. Judging from this figure, the Japanese police suggest that the demonstrations had been the largest ranking only after the anti-Security Treaty demonstrations of 1960.[32]

Despite the impressive mobilization of the masses and magnitude of the protests to influence the Sato regime, the Japanese left wing and the Chōsōren failed to accomplish the objective: blocking the ROK-Japan Normalization Treaty. Before considering several possible reasons for the failure, it is necessary to make one thing clear. The Chōsōren certainly played a part in mobilizing the Japanese left wing through the medium of the Japan-DPRK Society. But it would be an unwarranted assumption that the massive involvement by the leftists in the anti-normalization treaty campaign was solely the result of the Chōsōren's influence. On the contrary, the JSP and the JCP had their own interests at stake in participating in the campaign. They found common cause with the campaign for the purpose of enlarging their ground for future political maneuvering. For both JSP and JCP, the occasion provided a perfect chance to pre-test and

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[32]"Nikkan jōyaku hijun soshi tōsō no gaikyō to sono tokuchō" [The Characteristics and a General Situation of the Campaign against the ROK-Japan Treaty], Kōan Jōhō, No. 146 (November, 1965), 69. Hereafter cited as Nikkan jōyaku hantai tōsō no tokuchō.

to display their strength in mobilizing the masses as a preliminary phase in the preparation for the forthcoming battle against the renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1970.

From the early phase of the anti-normalization campaign, the JCP proposed to the JSP to create a united front by reopening the defunct Joint National Council to Fight Against the Security Pact [Anpo Kyōtō Kokumin Kaigi], a key element in the 1960 demonstrations. While the mainstream faction of the JSP supported it, the non-mainstream faction opposed the JCP's proposal. Since 1960, the JSP and the JCP had been at odds with each other, resulting from the fundamentally different views on the questions of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the sponsoring of the annual ban-the-bomb meetings.[33] Moreover, the non-mainstream faction of the JSP including the Sōhyō frequently disagreed over the question of the militant tactics employed by the JCP in demonstrations.[34]

As for the JCP, the primary aim was to utilize this occasion as a means to an end. In fact, the JCP reportedly sensed from the start the infeasibility of blocking the ROK-Japan Treaty because of the prevailing political climate in Japan and Sato's firm determination on the pending issue

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[33] On this point, see Theodore McNelly, "The Communist Party of Japan and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," a Paper Delivered at the University Seminar on Modern East Asia: Japan, on November 10, 1967, at Columbia University, pp. 4-6.

[34] Naigai no dōkō, pp. 15-16.

supported by the United States.[35] In order to build and strengthen the local JCP's organizational structure, some pretext was needed in mid-1960's to stir up the public and mobilize people as a prelude to the 1970 struggle against the renewal of the Security Treaty. As a matter of fact, the JCP later claimed to have boosted its membership from about 150,000 to 200,000 and the circulation of Akhata from 620,000 to 900,000 copies during the hectic period of the demonstrations.[36] Despite very inflammatory polemics emphasizing the significance of the campaign which appeared as a series in Akahata, the JCP urged its members to avoid "extreme adventurism" in the protest movement. Hence the number of arrests throughout the entire campaign was relatively small in proportion to nearly two million people participating in the demonstrations (Tables 23 and 24). Even among the arrests, the JCP members were fewer than those of the JSP, Sōhyō and non-JCP organizations.[37]

As for the JSP, the year 1970 was selected as the target date for the establishment of a JSP government. By assuming the leading role in the campaign, the JSP's scheme was to get favorable public opinion by exposing the military implications inherent in the ROK-Japan Treaty and sharpening its criticism of Sato's pro-US oriented foreign policy. By

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[35] Ibid., p. 20.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Nikkan jōyaku hantai tōsō no tokuchō, p. 32.

alienating the public from the Sato regime, the JSP would be able to repudiate the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1970. Hence the importance of the campaign for the JSP was with the effective use of this opportunity as a preparatory step in a successful movement against the renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1970.

Thus the major concern of each left-wing group was to compete with each other and maximize effective strength by displaying its ability to mobilize the masses in the campaign. Therefore, there was no practical need for organizing a united front among the leftists until the announcement of the successful conclusion of the ROK-Japan talk. It was only then that the left-wing leaders hastily discussed the situation in terms of joint action. The only thing they could reach agreement on was to work together on a daily basis in participating in the campaign.[38] Through this temporary coalition, they were able to carry out the most sensational wavelike demonstrations five times within one month period (Tables 25 and 26). However, the united actions by the left wing in blocking the passage of the Diet approval came too late to reverse the tide. In the Diet, it was an unequal contest from the outset. The LDP enjoyed not quite a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and the less important House of Councillors. Hence the outcome of the Diet deliberation

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[38] Naigai no dōkō, pp. 16-21, 46-48; and Nikkan jōyaku hantai tōsō no tokucho, pp. 72-73.

was predictable, and indeed the treaty was ratified by both Houses.[39]

For the Chōsōren, the success of the campaign was heavily dependent upon the unity among the Japanese left-wing groups. However, the issue on the ROK-Japan Treaty alone was insufficient to arouse the interest of the Japanese public, unlike the 1960 protest movement. Besides, the real issue of the normalization treaty was somewhat blurred by other equally salient issues of the time, such as the anti-Vietnam war movement, the campaign against the visit of a US aircraft carrier and a Polaris submarine, and the campaign to expedite the withdrawal of US troops from Japanese bases. Nevertheless, the LDP was adamantly determined to pass the treaty and launched a well-organized counter campaign to the public through the mass media urging the need for normalization. Furthermore, the LDP was able to secure the support of the Democratic Socialist Party throughout the campaign. It was beyond the ability of the Chōsōren to block the normalization treaty even with the support of the Japanese left wing.

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[39]Hans H. Baerwald, "Nikkan Kokkai; the Japan-Korean Treaty Diet," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1970), pp. 19-45.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The presence of the Korean minority in Japan is undoubtedly a legacy of the Japanese expansion policy prior to World War II in East Asia. There were approximately two million Koreans in Japan at the end of the War. A large portion of this population had been mobilized by the Japanese government to meet the critical labor shortages incurred by the suddenly accelerated war economy since the 1930's. The continued flow of the Korean laborers to the mainland of Japan created serious socio-political problems. A few of them who were acutely conscious of the injustice of their condition joined the Japanese socialist movement. Many of them collaborated actively with the Japanese war effort. To improve their lot some became revolutionaries inspired by Marxian ideology. However, the Japanese government successfully managed to keep the Korean problem from protruding above surface until the end of the War. This was due to, perhaps, the effective surveillance and control devices utilized by the Japanese policy. Or it may be, partly, the result of the systematic process of assimilation and political integration through the franchise, thereby stimulating a sense of participation in the

Japanese imperial scheme. Nevertheless, the Koreans in Japan were forced to serve the ends of the proponents of aggressive Japanese nationalism and aid the military ventures for implementing the Great Asia Co-Prosperity program.

After Japan's surrender, the spontaneous Korean exodus from Japan marked the most unprecedented mass population movement in the history of Japan. Within a year after the Japanese surrender, almost one million Koreans repatriated to their homeland and more followed suit sporadically thereafter. Although greatly reduced in numbers, the remaining Koreans soon became a highly vocal and vociferous ethnic minority group during the early period of the American occupation of Japan. This situation seems to have been precipitated by the Koreans' frustration and disillusionment that their expectation for a better life after the liberation turned out to be a false hope. To make the matters worse, SCAP was ill-prepared to handle the Korean problem and relegated the whole question of Koreans to the Japanese authorities. The confusion was further aggravated by the ambiguous nature of the SCAP policy on the legal status of Koreans in Japan and the subsequent discriminatory treatment of Koreans by the Japanese authorities. The suffrage once awarded to Koreans in Japan to induce their absolute loyalty to the Emperor was suspended. The barrage of slogans such as "Brotherly Love" and "Japanese and Koreans as a Single Body" vanished conspicuously with the surrender of Japan. Now the Japanese government was eager to reduce the number

of Koreans in Japan by pushing the repatriation program. Under these circumstances, the Koreans were confronted with a paradoxical situation -- the desire to regain their national identity and the desire to establish residency in the country where their presence was no longer appreciated.

A majority of Koreans echoed Kim Tu-yong's call for political action which appeared as the best answer to the dilemma. The Koreans were well aware of the fact that minority interests had been always championed by the Japanese socialists and most vigorously by the JCP. A similar appeal was also made to the Koreans by the JCP to join a great crusade for the "struggle for people's liberation." Thus the Chōren aligned with the JCP and joined the common struggle to obtain a better life for the oppressed people in Japan. The role played by Kim Ch'ŏ -hae as a member of the JCP's Central Committee and Politburo was decisive in the conversion of the Chōren's strategy. For the JCP, the availability of the dedicated Korean Communists was a great help in broadening the mass base throughout Japan in the early party reconstruction period. Although comparatively small in number, the Chōren members actively participated in the revolutionary movement in postwar Japan. The Chōren employed organized mass action in the form of demonstrations, rallies, parades and to protest particular issues, they utilized collection of signatures on petitions, and the less organized action of support for JCP candidates in elections. The Chōren rarely hesitated to use effective

techniques of combining legal with illegal work, legal with illegal organizations resorting in mass agitation and violence aiming at an eventual mass uprising. It was climaxed in the Hanshin Riot Incident of 1948, which later provided a convenient pretext for the SCAP and Japanese authorities to take suppressive measures. Finally, in September, 1949, the Chōren was branded as a terrorist organization and was ordered to disband by the Japanese government. It marked a prelude for the subsequent "red purge" which was to follow directed to the JCP leaders.

When the Korean War broke out, the remnants of the ex-Chōren hard-core members formed an underground organization and engaged in hit-and-run guerrilla warfare in coordination with the JCP's Self-Defense Unit sabotaging the railroads and the US military bases in Japan. They planned to develop a full-scale guerrilla force and eventually to become a part of the Japanese Red Army. However, such militant tactics were later condemned by Tokuda Kyūichi, then in exile in Peking, as "irresponsible adventurism" which would only end in self-destruction. As a result of Tokuda's warning, "the era of Molotov cocktail" and the overt violence came to an end in 1952.

Following the cessation of hostilities in Korea, there was increasing reappraisal as to the present and future strategy among the Korean leftists in Japan. Two arguments erupted around the strategic alternatives. One was to continue to remain under the JCP's strategic guidance

in order to take concerted action in Japan, and the other was to dissociate itself from the JCP and to pursue an independent line pledging allegiance to the DPRK. The present Chōsōren was the outgrowth of the latter's viewpoint which triumphed over the former. Hence the Chōsōren made it clear at its inception that it would not function as if it were a political party solely concerned with capturing political power in collaboration with the JCP. Rather, as an organization composed of the DPRK's citizens, the primary effort of the Chōsōren would be devoted to the protection of the fundamental rights of Koreans in Japan. Furthermore, the Chōsōren pledged to act in conformity with the policy of the DPRK. Because of its tie, the principal officials of the Chōsōren came to hold seats in the DPRK's People's Congress in P'yŏngyang. In a sense, therefore, the Chōsōren performs a duty as a quasi-government agent of the DPRK in Japan. It is through the Chōsōren with its nation-wide organizations that lobbying funds from the DPRK are distributed to the Japanese leftists and sympathizers.

Since the Koreans in Japan are denied a legitimate avenue to channel their demands and support to the Japanese political system, the Chōsōren is increasingly dependent upon the aid of the Japanese leftists and propaganda to sway public opinion in its favor. In other words, the Chōsōren's tactics have shown a tendency to employ the technique of friendly persuasion by appealing to reason to convince the Japanese public of their just cause. The success in the

campaign for the accreditation of Chōsen University appears to be the result of this. It must be noted that the support of the Japanese public is essential, and without it the Chōsen University could not have obtained its accreditation from the Tokyo prefectural government. Nevertheless, the Chōsōren's excessive reliance upon the left-wing alone to arouse public interest in its favor has shown no warranty for success. Rather the Chōsōren's effort in any given issue has to be directed to obtaining full support from a substantial majority of the Japanese people. Hence the Chōsōren in close collaboration with the Japan-DPRK Society holds numerous annual events and cultural programs. It is not only aimed at the promotion of a better understanding of the two peoples but at opening various communication channels to embrace peoples of all kinds. The Chōsōren selects prominent Japanese who would be considered very important persons to receive official invitations from the DPRK to visit North Korea as national guests.

In retrospect, the various issues such as the Chōren dissolution order, the attempt by the Japanese authorities to discourage the ethnic studies and the repatriation to North Korea seem to each be unique and are somewhat unrelated. However, judging from the aftermath resulting from each incident, one can infer a certain uniform pattern of the Japanese policy directed to the Koreans in Japan. When the Mindan was organized under the anti-Communist slogan to oppose the Communist-led Chōren, the Mindan leaders

hoped that the Japanese government would give them favorable approval because the SCAP policy was to build an anti-Communist bastion in Japan. Contrary to their belief, the Japanese showed no preferential policy. Instead, a fear was added to the Mindan leaders that sooner or later they might be exposed to fate similar to that of the Chōren dissolution at the hands of the Japanese government.

The Mindan, after more than 20 years of existence, has certainly grown in its size and organization. However, it is not necessarily an indication of the Mindan's accomplishment as to what it originally purported to do. The history of the Mindan is filled with the stigma of graft scandals and a series of factional struggles. The incompetence in leadership and the feebleness of the organization are clearly evident in the various campaigns staged by the Mindan. The blame for its failure was often shifted to the home government denouncing publicly the ROK policy for Koreans in Japan. The Mindan was incapable of articulating their demands even to their own government delegates during the ROK-Japan talk during which the legal status was negotiated. Nevertheless, to show deference to their home government, the Mindan leaders came out in support of the outcome of the Agreement.

The split along the two antagonistic Korean regimes within the Korean community in Japan is so complete that a chance to utilize as a single cohesive ethnic group to protect their interests in Japan is quite remote. While the Chōsōren opposed bitterly the Japan-ROK normalization,

the Mindan objected to the Korean repatriation to North Korea. Nevertheless, when it came to the crucial question of their legal status in which mutual interest was at stake, both the Mindan and the Chōsōren failed to secure better provisions in the Agreement. Meanwhile, the Japanese government was in an advantageous position to push through its own version of the legal status without much revision during the ROK-Japan talk. So long as the Korean community is split between the two contending groups, the effectiveness of articulating Koreans' interests in Japan is severely hampered and it may eventually result in mutual annihilation. Hence the Japanese government has been able to keep the Korean problems very much under control through the means of "divide and rule." Moreover, the presence of the two antagonistic Korean minority groups often provides a convenient diplomatic leverage for the Japanese government to use in a two-Korea policy. In fact, several attempts have been made to unify the two rival organizations. However, there have been stiff resistance and harassment said to have come from the pro-Japanese elements in the Mindan supported by the Japanese government which is anxious to keep them apart.

The immediate disenfranchisement of the Koreans in Japan soon after World War II was a most effective action taken by the Japanese government to destroy the political influence of Koreans, otherwise they might have become a potent political force in Japan. However, it should be

viewed as a moral question, considering the service rendered by Koreans in the war effort, whether or not the Japanese government should have given option for Koreans in Japan to retain their Japanese nationality.[1]

Two persistent patterns of the Japanese government policy for the Korean minority in Japan loom large: one is to reduce the number of Koreans through repatriation and the other is to compel Koreans to conform and assimilate into the Japanese norms. The latter policy demands that the Korean minority abandon the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics which distinguish them from the national majority with whom they live and to become merged into nationally uniform communities with the majority. Yet, the Japanese government is still reluctant to broaden the legal scope of eligibility to facilitate the naturalization of Koreans in Japan. In the case of the Chōsōren, it has shown a firm determination to resist the latter policy and to preserve its own ethnic identity and culture. On the other hand, the Mindan members have generally been more amenable to the policy with a hope that by acquiescing in assimilation they might escape discrimination and persecution. Since the

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[1]After World War II, the United States and West Germany established legal precedents to grant an option to the colonial subjects to retain the former nationality upon the relinquishment of their colonial territories. However, it applied only to those who already settled in the parent state at the time of the cessation of territory. For further detail, see Paul Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (London: Stevens, 1956).

Mindan has offered neither a cohesive ideological force nor a strong leadership to tie its members together, they are likely to turn to their immediate surroundings for adaptation to secure a feeling of attachment and of belonging to a majority. The situation has been aggravated by a lack of faith in the home government stemming from the long absence of the ROK government to extend the protection of its own nationals in Japan.

Meanwhile, the Chōsōren has demonstrated its capability of offering a monolithic answer to the problems of cohesion and unity and to protect its interest but chiefly through complete and firm control of its members. It creates the advantage of seeming to provide both organizational and ideological antidotes for the instability, discontinuity and uncertainty of Koreans' life in Japan. Such antidotes tend to be reinforced by the constant financial and moral support coming from the DPRK stimulating a strong sense of nationalism and allegiance to the North Korean regime. For the DPRK, the presence of the dedicated Koreans to DPRK in Japan is an indespensable beachhead not only to secure a route for the espionage infiltration to South Korea, but a base to communicate with a non-Communist world. The additional function of the Chōsōren to serve as a DPRK's quasi-diplomatic agent in Japan is an already established fact. Under the auspices of the Chōsōren in Japan, the American-Korean Friendship and Information Center

was established in New York last year,[2] to undertake "Operation War Shift" campaign in the United States. Their aim is a part of the DPRK's peace offensive to mobilize the anti-Vietnam war groups in its favor. Although almost 100,000 Chōsōren supported Koreans repatriated to the DPRK, the Chōsōren's organizational strength and its ability to articulate their interests in Japan still remains intact and stronger than ever before. However, it remains to be seen as to how effectively the DPRK utilizes the Chōsōren machinery in the future, if and when hostilities again break out in Korea.

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[2]The office is set up at the following address: American-Korean Friendship and Information Center, 160 5th Avenue, Suite 809, New York, N.Y., 10010. Phone: (212) 242-0240.

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