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# THE NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESSES OF FOUR MEDIUM-SIZE CITIES

David A. Caputo
1970

A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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## SUMMARY

The dissertation develops a qualitative model which describes the political interaction discovered in the municipal budgetary processes of four medium-size cities. The cities are: Milford and Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Chicopee and Springfield, Massachusetts. The model is based on ninety-four intensive interviews with various budgetary participants and citizens in the four cities. The interviews were conducted during June to November, 1968.

After summarizing prior approaches to municipal budgeting and describing the four cities, a four stage budgetary process is developed. This process, made up of the formulation, review, decision, and expenditure stages, was used to structure and organize the research. Ninety-four interviews were held with a variety of budgetary participants and citizens in the four cities. Participant behavior was then analyzed for each of the four stages of the budgetary process. These results are summarized and form the basis for the model development.

The last chapter summarizes the major findings and compares them to other research results in the budgetary field. Significant differences are found. The most important of these centers on the role of political and informal behavior manifested during the budgetary research. Extensive political and informal behavior was found in all four cities. Budgetary participants described instances of informal interaction during each stage of the budgetary process. The possible explanations for this behavior are then offered. After two process models depicting informal interaction and change are presented, four recommendations are made pertaining to the direction of future research efforts in the budgetary field.

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# PREFACE

This dissertation represents an attempt to discover and describe the political forces affecting municipal budgetary processes. The politics of municipal resource allocation have long been immune from the critical analysis of the political scientist. I have succeeded if the budgetary process is brought to life and the political forces affecting it are accurately summarized within these pages.

My intellectual debts are many, but Professor James W. Fesler deserves credit for whatever merit this work has. He has been a helpful and cooperative advisor. John P. Crecine, Robert A. Dahl, Irwin N. Gertzog, Harold D. Lasswell, Peter A. Lupsha, Aaron Wildavsky, Garry D. Brewer, and Oliver Woshinsky have also provided comments, criticisms, and encouragement during various stages of the research. Financial assistance was provided by the Yale Political Science Department and the Leopold Schepp Foundation of New York City. My parents had the patience to encourage me while I was doing the field research and the writing. All of these individuals deserve and have my thanks. My wife provided constant and needed encouragement. To her, my special thanks. I alone am responsible for whatever deficiencies follow. Lastly, I would like to thank the budgetary participants and citizens in the four cities; without their cooperation, my research would have been impossible.

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# CHAPTER I

## MUNICIPAL BUDGETING: A METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Public budgeting has long attracted the attention of social scientists.[1] Writing in 1940, V. O. Key summarized many of the problems affecting budgetary research then and today.[2] He saw the basic budgetary problem (on the expenditure side) focused around the question of: "On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?" Key continued, "The completed budgetary document (although the budget-maker may be quite unaware of it) represents a judgment upon how scarce means should be allocated to bring the maximum return in social utility."[3] Key's comments are appropriate today; how does a public body decide the merits of various requests for scarce resources?

Since Key's article appeared, numerous answers have been provided

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[1]For a representative sample of the public budgeting literature see: Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956). Chris Argyris, The Impact of Budgets on People (New York: Controllership Foundation, 1954). C. E. Ridley and Herbert A. Simon, Measuring Municipal Activities (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1938). National Bureau of Economic Research, Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization: A Conference (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961). Seymour Sacks and W. F. Hellmuth, Financing Government in a Metropolitan Area (New York: The Free Press, 1961). Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964). John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969).

[2]V. O. Key, "The Lack of a Budgetary Theory," American Political Science Review, XXXIV (December, 1940), 1137-1144.

[3]Ibid., 1138.

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for this question.[4] I have chosen to call this concern over how a public body should allocate resources the optimum resource allocation approach to municipal budgeting. Key felt ". . . the necessity for developing methods by which public officials may select objects of expenditures which will bring the greatest utility or return and most accurately achieve social aspirations . . . . " was a pressing problem. To achieve this end, Key argued it was necessary to " . . . place alternatives in juxtaposition and compel consideration of relative values.[5]

Verne Lewis, who had extensive governmental service, agreed with Key and maintained that " . . . maximum returns can be obtained only if expenditures are distributed among different purposes in such a way that the last dollar spent for each yields the same real return."[6] Both Key and Lewis stressed this concept of marginal utility and it became an important variable for those interested in optimum resource allocation. Marginal utility had logical consistency and permitted comparisons among various items; stressed the effectiveness and results of monies spent (efficiency); and made it possible to apply a single measure to a wide range of municipal situations.[7]

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[4]See: Harvey E. Brazer, City Expenditures in the United States (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1959). Herbert S. Mitchell, School Budget Policies for Financial Control (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate School Accounting Series, 1962) Colin Clark, "The Economic Functions of a City in Relation to Its Size," Econometrica, XIII (April, 1945), 97-113. Werner Z. Hirsch, "Determinants of Public Education Expenditure," National Tax Journal, XIII (March, 1960), 29-40. Otto Eckstein, Public Finance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964). Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXVII (November, 1955), 350-356.

[5]Key, 1142.

[6]Verne B. Lewis, "Toward a Theory of Budgeting," Public Administration Review, XII (Winter, 1952), 44.

[7]The advantages and disadvantages of paving a street, building a school, or improving a physical structure could more easily be compared. It was maintained that all community needs and tasks had the same underlying value.

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As recently as 1967, two researchers for the George Washington University State-Local Finances Project stressed the need to compare alternative programs and the costs involved in each.[8] This was done under a planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS) recommendation. The emphasis was on increasing rational comparisons for decisions affecting resource allocation. Marginal utility was to be a tool to permit greater comparability on the part of the individual decision-maker.

While Key was interested in discovering what optimum resource allocation was, he also had some basic doubts about the role of marginal utility in budgetary decisions. The ". . . doctrine of marginal utility", he concluded, ". . . has a ring of unreality when applied to public expenditures. The most advantageous utilization of public funds resolves itself into a matter of value preferences between ends lacking a common denominator."[9] This absence of comparative standards made it more difficult for the observers of the budgetary process to draw meaningful conclusions about competing requests. The result was the introduction of normative evaluations as to what requests were more desirable than others. Personal and community values then became important in determining optimum resource allocation.

Although Key, (as the others who have attempted and are still attempting to develop criteria for optimum resource allocation), was not successful, he has had another of his recommendations reach fruition. Key suggested ". . . the desirability of careful and comprehensive analysis of the budgetary process."[10] This emphasis on the process approach stresses how a public body actually allocates resources, not how they should allocate those resources. In this approach, the emphasis is on the description of empirical reality, not theoretical concerns.

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[8]Harry P. Hatry and John F. Cotton, Program Planning for State, County, City (Washington: George Washington University, 1967), p. 7.

[9]Key, 1143.

[10]Ibid., 1144.

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For example, Aaron Wildavsky, using a term formulated by Charles Lindblom, supported the conclusion that the study of public budgeting should be done ". . . following an incremental approach . . . "[11] In his two major research projects on this topic, Wildavsky has shown how the federal budget is the result of a large number of individual interactions and decisions based on past decisions.[12] He found little comprehensive review by federal agency heads; instead, review was nonsystematic and often depended upon chance. Budgetary decisions were more likely to involve questions about funding levels, program improvements, and program initiation than the general review of all of the agency's or department's programs. Wildavsky's extensive study of the federal budgetary process led him to conclude that, "Whatever else they may be, budgets are manifestly political documents."[13]

Since Wildavsky's important contribution, attempts have been made to increase our knowledge of how public budgeting actually does happen. Ira Sharkansky, in his research with the agencies of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, developed a causal model to explain the variations he observed in the agencies' budgetary strategies. He found an agency's budgetary strategy could be differentiated from other agencies' strategies and that four separate variables could explain this differentiation.[14] At the same time, Sharkansky was critical of Wildavsky's "unsystematic" approach to the formulation of agencies' strategies, while concurring with Wildavsky that budgeting was incremental and political in nature.

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[11]Aaron Wildavsky and Arthur Hammond, "Comprehensive Versus Incremental Budgeting in the Department of Agriculture," Administrative Science Quarterly, X (1965-1966), 344.

[12]See Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process and Wildavsky and Hammond, "Comprehensive Versus. . .".

[13]Wildavsky and Hammond, "Comprehensive Versus. . .", 322.

[14]Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget Strategies," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IX (August, 1965), 254-255, 281.

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In addition to Sharkansky and Wildavsky, several other political scientists have studied public budgeting from the process viewpoint and their findings are not significantly different from those already discussed.[15]

One of the most recent and highly innovative attempts to study the municipal budgetary process was done by John P. Crecine.[16] Because of the interest and attention stimulated by Crecine's research, I will briefly summarize both his methodology and major conclusions. A critique of Crecine's work will then be offered. In his preface, Crecine described his approach:

> The basic research strategy employed consists of a systematic investigation (through interviews with paricipants) of the micro elements of the budgeting decision system (individual decision-makers). Guided by the rigor and discipline of a computer simulation methodology, the study aggregates decision elements to obtain a comprehensive, consistent model of the entire system. The macro system so obtained provides the focal point for the discussion of many questions central to the concern of organization theory, political science, sociology, psychology, and economics.[17]

Crecine divided the budgetary process into three stages: the departmental dollar requests; the mayor's recommended budget; and the legislative review of that budget. After an unspecified number of personal interviews, Crecine developed a computer simulation model to explain the municipal budgetary process. Using budgetary data from Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh, Crecine stated that his process model ". . . accurately reproduces budgetary decisions."[18]

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[15] See Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966). Allen Schick, "Program Budgeting in the States: The Pathology of an Administrative Reform," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: Yale Univeristy, 1966).

[16] John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969). John P. Crecine, "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Budgeting," Management Science, XIII (July,1967), 786-815.

[17] Ibid., p. vii.

[18] Ibid., pp. 4-5,136.

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Using the results of the process model and the model itself, Crecine drew a number of important conclusions.

First: "The municipal budget is but one decision process in a sequence. . . . The elements in this hierarchy of decisions are separated by time and partly because of this are treated as large independent problems."[19] Crecine maintained that the various decisions (revenue, allocation, and operating) faced by municipal decision-makers are seen as relatively isolated events by the decision-makers involved with them. In addition, the decisions in the sequence form a rigid constraint for the decisions following them in the sequence.

Second: Crecine found that the structure of decision rules formulating the municipal operating budget was basically the same in large cities. This conclusion is based on the comparative goodness of fit measures that are used to evaluate the models. Budgetary data from Cleveland, Detroit, and Pittsburgh, were used to evaluate the models.

Third: "The decision rules used by members of the municipal governments appear to be internalized and to a large extent insulated from external pressures. . . . The decision system appears to be responsive only to special revenue opportunities, to long-run, cumulative political pressures, or to reasonably catastrophic events in the short run."[20] These two conclusions are significant for the relationship(s) between the budgetary and political systems. Since most budgetary decisions are formally made by publicly elected officials, this conclusion indicates their set of decision rules is not subject to public pressure and that the budgetary decision system is closed to external pressure and influence. If this is the case, the public's will, no matter how it is voiced, (short of "catastrophic events") will not make much of an impact on the budgetary decision-makers in

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[19] Ibid., p. 218.

[20] Ibid.

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the short run. This, in turn, could have significant implications for the stability of that particular political system.[21]

Fourth: "The decision process can best be described as one in which the problem-solver is faced with a great deal of uncertainty about future events and must satisfy a large number of fairly restrictive constraints, rather than as a process having a great deal of political content."[22] If political content is not an important part of the budgetary process, what is? If political content does not structure the process, and Crecine concludes that it does not, then other explanations are necessary to explain participant behavior.

Fifth: Crecine offered four conclusions that relate to the power-pressure-influence models he discussed earlier in his book. Three have to deal with external public pressure and maintain that negligible pressure, and pressure not concerned with budgetary totals, is exerted by private citizens and the business and industrial community. He concluded that "relevant pressure for the system appears to be of a cumulative long-run nature which results in a very gradual adjustment. . . ."[23] Here again, Crecine is emphasizing the absence of direct public pressure on the budgetary decision-makers. Public pressure is only indirectly a factor in budgetary decisions.

Crecine's study should be evaluated from a number of different perspectives. First, it does break new ground methodologically. There is the attempt to quantify and formalize the budgetary process and its decision-rules. The speed and memory capabilities of the modern computer permit and encourage this type of research. Crecine's use of a complex model to represent the entire budgetary process is

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[21]If a budgetary system is not directly open to public pressure, the decision-makers in that system may create conditions among the public that result in either the replacement of the decision-makers (whether by force or ballot) or destruction of the budgetary system.

[22]Crecine, pp. 218-219.

[23]Ibid., p. 219.

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an important departure from prior attempts to isolate a particular segment of that process.[24] Despite these attributes there are serious disadvantages to the methodology he used.

First, the selection of his three cities may not permit him to make the generalizations that he does.[25] Crecine describes the problem of selecting relevant case studies, but fails to realize that the use of his simulation model may not result in the selection of relevant case studies.[26] While Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Detroit might be typical, all three could also be deviant cases. Since his model is based only on the experiences of these three cities, it could be inaccurate if the cities are atypical of other large American cities.

Second, the use of a computer simulation model may be quite innovative and rewarding, but it may not be the only way to explain and understand the budgetary process. Crecine formalizes the various decision rules and actions taken by the decision-makers. There are several disadvantages in this. First, he depended upon public documents and limited interviews for most of his information.[27] These may not be the only sources of relevant information. Second, the formalization of decision-rules requires that informal norms, if they

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[24]For examples of this approach see: Werner Z. Hirsch,"Determinants of Public Education Expenditure," National Tax Journal, XIII (March, 1960), 29-40. "Scale Effects in Local and Metropolitan Government Expenditures," Land Economics, XXXXI (November, 1965), 370-372. Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," The Journal of Political Economy, LXIV (October, 1956), 416-424.

[25]See Crecine, Chapters XII and XIII, pp. 217-250 for a full summarization of these generalizations.

[26]Ibid., p. 220. If his selection of cities did, on a random basis, result in the selection of atypical cities for his model development, then the very foundation of that model my be inapplicable to other large cities.

[27]Ibid., pp. ix-xi, 30. Crecine does not summarize the interviews that were held or their nature. This is a major shortcoming since aspects of his model may have been determined by these interviews. It would have been helpful if a summary of the respondents and the interview results had been presented.

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exist, either be formalized for use in the model or be overlooked.[28] This assumes two things that should be subjected to empirical investigation prior to their acceptance. First, that informal norms don't exist and second, if they do exist, they are unimportant. While perhaps correct, such assumptions could well account for the absence of political content found by Crecine during the budgetary process. His model would not be capable of ascertaining where or what informal political content (discussions, side payments, or political bargains) played a role in the budgetary decision-making. Wildavsky argued that ". . . budgets are manifestly political documents."[29] Crecine's findings led him to conclude the opposite. One of the reasons for this conclusion may be the method for rule formalization that he used. Despite the complexities of computer simulation, it cannot incorporate informal interaction among various participants if such interaction is random and unpredictable. This may explain the failure to find political factors and pressures influencing budgetary decisions and decision-makers.

These methodological problems are not minor. They permit the entire scope and content of Crecine's subsequent theoretical and normative conclusions to be questioned. Crecine devoted considerable attention to the extension and application of his model to other organizations and units of government.[30] In addition, he developed the normative conclusions that the results of his model permitted. Despite the reservations that I have raised, Crecine's simulation model (as he suggests) should be applied and tested in other situations. This will increase our understanding and evaluation of its

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[28]By informal norms, I mean written or verbal communication outside of the formal legal requirements. The submission of a budgetary request is a formal requirement. The personal interaction over the merits of that request is informal interaction. The content, nature, and extent, of this informal interaction may be crucial to the understanding of any complex organization.

[29]Wildavsky and Hammond, "Comprehensive Versus. . .," 322.

[30]Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving, pp. 221-231.

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validity and reliability.

This brief overview of the various approaches to public budgeting is meant to be suggestive, not exhaustive. The following conclusions are possible.

(1) Public budgeting has been viewed in a number of different ways. The emphasis on how resource allocation should be done resulted in the development and use of the marginal utility concept. The emphasis on how resource allocation is done resulted in the development and use of the process approach.

(2) Those investigators who have used the process approach maintain that public budgeting involves a complex process of interaction among participants, legal and revenue restraints, and the general public. The problem is to isolate the more important variables and to explain their effect(s) on participant behavior.

(3) Few political scientists have been willing to consider the political and theoretical ramifications of their budgetary findings for the political system as a whole. Questions relating to stability, change, legitimacy, and democracy, have not been adequately investigated.

## RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

As the preceding part of this chapter illustrated, public budgeting research can be conducted in a number of different ways. Since my research concerned four medium-size cities, Milford and Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Chicopee and Springfield, Massachusetts; the adoption of an appropriate "budgetary approach" that met my particular needs was an initial step in the study. This section explains the four-stage budgetary process used to depict municipal public budgeting (hereafter referred to as the budgetary process). The central questions and the research techniques used in the study are then summarized.

In his 1940 budgetary article, V.O. Key argued for ". . . the desirability of careful and comprehensive analysis of the budgetary

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process."[31] Key maintained that the budgetary investigator needed to study the various factors and stages involved in budgeting since the final budgetary document tended to overwhelm the investigator.[32] In order to include Key's suggestion that both the various factors and stages involved in budgeting be studied, a four-stage budgetary process was developed.

By using a process approach, it was possible to study the stages that comprise that process and the behavior of the budgetary participants during each of those stages. Formulation, review, decision, and expenditure comprised the four stages of the budgetary process; use of this model made possible the analytical investigation of each city's budgetary process.

The first stage of the budgetary process results in each operating department developing a departmental budgetary request.[33] The operating departments develop their own procedure(s) for the formulation of the budgetary request. These procedures may include written rules, unwritten standard operating procedures, or personal approaches to budgetary request formulation. The point is that there is a decision-process resulting in the formulation of a departmental budgetary request.

In most municipalities, the review stage involves the mayor, a fiscal officer, an independent board, or some combination of these three.[34] The appropriate body or individual systematically reviews the various departmental budgetary requests. The review stage results in the preparation of recommendations by the reviewing body or individual.

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[31]Key, 1144.

[32]Ibid.

[33]For my purposes, the education department in each of the municipalities was considered an operating department.

[34]The statutory requirements for each of the four cities are summarized in Chapter II.

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These recommendations are then acted upon, in most municipalities, by the local legislative body during the decision stage.[35] The legislative body decides if the recommendations offered by the reviewing body or individual should or should not be adopted. If its recommendations are adopted by the local legislature, the recommendations become part of the city's fiscal program. (Chapter II summarizes the legal requirements of each city's budgetary process.) Specified amounts of money are committed for specific purposes by the setting of the fiscal program.

The fourth stage of the budgetary process, the expenditure stage, involves the implementation of the adopted fiscal programs by the operating departments. The differences between adopted fiscal programs and final expenditure outcomes are important. Most municipalities have a contingency fund item included in their budget.[36] If the expenditure stage were not included in the budgetary process, budgetary study would stop with the adoption of the fiscal programs. The programs supported by the contingency fund would not be considered. Any change in fiscal programs during the time from their adoption to their implementation would also be ignored.[37] These expenditure outcomes may have a significant impact on the municipal budgetary process and require careful consideration. For example, if 5 percent of a city's budget is appropriated for contingency fund use, a full accounting of the final appropriations from that fund is necessary for complete

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[35]Chapter II discusses the statutory requirements for legal decisions in each of the four cities.

[36]All four of the cities in my study have a contingency fund item included in their budget.

[37]An example of an outcome differing from a fiscal program occurs whenever money authorized for a specific purpose is sent by a department to the contingency fund and then transferred from the contingency fund to another department. If only the final fiscal program is studied, the differences between it and the outcomes of the expenditure stage are ignored. These differences may be important in structuring future behavior.

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understanding of who gets what during the budgetary process.

Figure 1-1 summarizes the four-stage budgetary process and the results of each stage as I have developed the process.

| Budgetary Stage | Formulation → | Review → | Decision → | Expenditure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| Result | Budgetary Requests | Recommen-dations | Fiscal Programs | Outcomes |

Fig. 1-1.--Schematic diagram of the four-stage budgetary process.

The budgetary process depicted in Figure 1-1 is not a formal model of the budgetary process. The above process was used as an approach to facilitate my study of the budgetary processes of the four cities. A qualitative model, based on the results of my study, is developed in Chapter VII. Chapter VII also considers the complexities and relationships that exist among the four stages of the budgetary process.

Once this four-stage budgetary process was developed, the next task was to decide what aspects of the process were essential for the development of a qualitative budgetary model. Three questions were used to guide my inquiry.

The first question was who participates during each of the four stages. As the preceding discussion indicated, there are prescribed roles for various participants during each stage of the process. In addition to studying these prescribed roles, efforts were made to discover who participated in an informal manner during each stage of the process.[38]

The second question concerned the decision criteria used by participants during each stage of the process. Each participant was asked how he reached the decision(s) that he made during the budgetary

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[38]Each respondent was asked whom he consulted or discussed budgetary matters with during the four stages of the budgetary process. Appendix A contains a complete interview schedule.

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process.[39] Participant responses were then studied to determine if any pattern existed among them.

In addition to studying who made the decisions and the decision criteria that were used, each participant was asked the reason(s) for his behavior.[40] I have offered my own explanations for participant behavior wherever evidence warranted such speculation. Chapters III through VI describe the results obtained when these three questions were asked of the participants active in all the stages of each city's budgetary process.

The next step after the development of the four-stage budgetary process and the central questions was to select the unit of analysis. As the earlier discussion indicated, the emphasis was on learning and explaining the behavior of participants at various stages of the budgetary process. Since it was impossible to observe the majority of decisions made during each stage of the budgetary process, my research included personal interviews with participants in the budgetary process.[41] The interviews ranged in length from twenty minutes to three and a half hours. The average interview was approximately fifty-five minutes long. The interviews were open-ended and the respondent was given the opportunity to emphasize his role in the budgetary process.[42] The interviews focused on the respondent's

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[39]Each participant was asked what the criteria were that he used to make a decision involving budgetary matters. His answer was followed by a series of probing questions that attempted to ascertain the extent these criteria were used.

[40]Each participant was asked why he acted as he did. Responses to this question were then followed by a series of questions dealing with the intensity of his feeling towards these reasons.

[41]Chapter II describes the formal decisions that are involved in the budgetary process. Whenever possible, I attended public budgetary hearings.

[42]The interviews were completed during early June to mid-November, 1968.

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behavior during each stage of the budgetary process, not just his behavior during a particular stage of that process. The interviews were taped and the results transcribed. Detailed analyses of these interviews form the basis for the summarizations and conclusions contained in Chapters III through VI. Since each respondent was promised anonymity, citations in these chapters will refer only to personal interviews, not to the individual who supplied the information. I have selected excerpts from the interviews to illustrate the points that are made. Table 1-1 summarizes the interview sample.

TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWING RESULTS

| City | Total Interview Requests | Total Completed Interviews | Number of Refusals | % Completed Interviews |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 22 | 21 | 1 | 95 |
| Chicopee | 20 | 16 | 4 | 80 |
| Bridgeport | 43 | 30 | 13 | 70 |
| Springfield | 31 | 27 | 4 | 87 |
| Total | 116 | 94 | 22 | 81 |

Original plans had been to interview approximately twenty people in both Milford and Chicopee. After the fourteenth interview in Chicopee, I was convinced that little new information would be obtained from additional interviews. When the next two interviews confirmed this, interviewing in Chicopee was stopped. In Milford, I felt that little additional information would be obtained after the twenty-first interview. Interviewing in Bridgeport and Springfield was stopped when the information ceased to be additive. The interviews were productive and a great deal of information pertaining to each

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individual's role in the budgetary process was obtained.[43] In most cases, the respondents were willing to discuss complex and sensitive municipal financial matters with me. In only five cases of the ninety-four completed interviews was there any cause for me to question the reliability of the respondent's information.

In order to organize the interview data, the participants in the budgetary process were divided into five categories. The categories are: departmental budgetary officials, members of independent boards and commissions, mayors and auditors, members of municipal legislatures, and municipal group representatives.[44] Table 1-2 summarizes

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[43]The comparatively low 70 percent completion figure in Bridgeport was due to a variety of factors. Four of those who were asked to be interviewed had recently moved or retired and were no longer available. Three others, although still residing in Bridgeport, no longer held the same office and felt it would be better if I interviewed the present office holder. Six persons refused to be interviewed.

[44]These categories are not meant to be the only way of grouping budgetary participants, but they represent the most advantageous way of organizing and summarizing the interview respondents.

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the distribution of the 94 respondents into these five categories.

TABLE 1-2

SUMMARIZATION OF INTERVIEW CATEGORIES

| City | Departmental Budgetary Officials[a] | Independent Boards and Commissions[b] | Mayors and Auditors[c] | Legislative Members[d] | Municipal Group Representatives[e] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 6 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 |
| Chicopee | 7 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 |
| Bridgeport | 7 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 12 |
| Springfield | 7 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 9 |
| Total | 27 | 14 | 10 | 15 | 28 |

[a]Includes both department heads and departmental budgeting officials.

[b]Includes boards and commissions responsible for operating departments, the Milford Board of Finance, and the Bridgeport Board of Apportionment and Taxation.

[c]In Springfield, a former mayor and auditor were interviewed.

[d]Includes councilmen.

[e]This category contains municipal union leaders, black organizational leadership, organized political party leadership, and civic group leaders.

The next chapter describes the four cities that were included in the study.

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# CHAPTER II

## THE FOUR CITIES

Since I am attempting to develop a model of municipal budgeting applicable to medium-size cities, the analyses of the budgetary processes of the four selected cities should not be considered as separate case studies. This chapter describes the four cities and includes the information that is necessary for a basic understanding of the cities and their budgetary processes.[1] A comparative framework is used, wherever possible, to present the following information. Tables 2-1 to 2-5 summarize socio-economic data; Tables 2-6 to 2-10 summarize budgetary expenditures; and Figures 2-1 to 2-3 summarize legal budgetary requirements.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA

Population and land area characteristics for each of the four cities are presented in Table 2-1.[2]

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[1]There are a variety of ways to present such information. I decided against both case studies and detailed descriptions because of their tendency to become much too specific. My research is an attempt to analyze, by empirical investigation, the budgetary processes of each of these four cities.

[2]Because of dissimilarities in more recent data, I have used 1960 census data throughout. Although data is available on specific characteristics, such as population, for later years, there is reason to doubt its comparability.

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TABLE 2-1

SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: 1960 [a]

| City | Total Population | U. S. Population Rank | Population Change 1950-1960 % | Land Area Square Miles | Population Per Square Mile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 41,662 | 385 | 55.1 | 22 | 1,894 |
| Chicopee | 61,553 | 250 | 25.1 | 23 | 2,676 |
| Bridgeport | 156,748 | 79 | -1.2 | 16 | 9,797 |
| Springfield | 174,463 | 72 | 7.4 | 32 | 5,452 |

[a]Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office), pp. 474, 504.

As Table 2-1 depicts, Milford is a rapidly growing suburb. Located midway between New Haven and Bridgeport, Milford's increased population has been drawn from both urban centers.[3] The aircraft industry of South-Central Connecticut, although located in cities bordering on Milford, provides employment for many of its new residents.[4] A planning survey estimated that Milford could grow to as many as 95,000 residents by 1985.[5] The rapid population growth depicted in

[3]In Appendix F of U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 618., Milford is included in the official Bridgeport Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Yet on p. 629 of the same volume, Milford is depicted as being part of the New Haven Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

[4]Major aircraft plants are found in Stratford and Bridgeport.

[5]Frederick P. Clark and Associates, Milford: Land Use, Zoning and Potential Population (Milford: Town Planning and Zoning Board, 1955), p. 12.

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Table 2-1 has caused considerable demand for a variety of city services.[6]

Chicopee's total population, as shown in Table 2-1, can be misleading. Westover Air Force Base is located within the city limits and base personnel are included in the city's population total.[7] Military personnel at the base have been reduced, but it is impossible to predict what this reduction has done to the overall population figure of the city. Despite the presence of the Air Force installation, Chicopee should not be considered a military town. The city has ninety eight industrial firms within its boundaries and the impact of the Air Force base on employment is slight.[8] Chicopee has experienced population growth as residents of Springfield, blocked from moving to the West by the Connecticut River and to the South by the Connecticut border, have moved North into the newer sections of Chicopee. It is difficult to determine the impact of this population growth on city services.

Bridgeport, as illustrated in Table 2-1, is the only city with a net population loss during the 1950-1960 period. This population loss was largely due to the outmigration of white, middle-class city dwellers. The suburban communities in the Bridgeport area have grown considerably in the past twenty years.[9] Business officials and

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[6]There are a number of ways to measure these demands. One would be increased school construction and the development of the demand for increased educational expenditures. Another would be increased demands for trash collection and street improvements. A reading of back issues of the city's weekly newspaper, The Milford Citizen, verifies the existence of these demands.

[7]The last public estimate placed the number of base personnel at 8100. Arther Balthazar, Manual of City Officers 1968 (Chicopee: City Clerk's Office, 1968), p. 32.

[8]Greater Chicopee Chamber of Commerce, Manufacturers' Listing (Chicopee: Chamber of Commerce, 1967), pp. 1-11.

[9]Fairfield and Stratford both border on Bridgeport. During the 1950-1960 period, Fairfield increased its total population from 30,000 to 46,000; a growth rate of 51.5 percent. During the same period, Stratford grew from 33,000 to 45,000; a growth rate of 34.7 percent. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 582.

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professionals have been especially prone to move to the surrounding suburbs. At the same time, there has been considerable immigration into the city.[10] In short, despite Bridgeport's net population loss, it is still undergoing rapid population change. The groups moving out are being replaced by new population groups.[11] Because of its small land area (16 square miles) Bridgeport has a high population density. This enables the city to concentrate city services, but leaves little unused land to alleviate the problems associated with high density population.

Springfield, despite being a central city, has not experienced the net population loss that Bridgeport has. Considered the leading urban center of Western Massachusetts, Springfield has the largest population and land area of the four cities. It also has the second highest population density. Parts of the city are still relatively open areas and may remain that way due to unsuitable topographical features hindering their utilization. Springfield's total area of 32 square miles creates problems in determining where city services should be located.

Table 2-2 is the first of four tables to provide a more detailed description of each city's population. The tables provide insight into the social and economic characteristics of the cities' populations. The information presented is necessary to understand the reasons that are later offered to explain each city's budgetary process.

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[10]This immigration is summarized in Tables 2-2 and 2-3.

[11]Mainly Negroes and Spanish Americans.

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TABLE 2-2

NON-WHITE POPULATION: 1960 [a]

| City | Non-white Population % 1950-1960 | | % of Population Negro |
|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | NA | 0.8 | 0.7 |
| Chicopee | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Bridgeport | 4.3 | 9.9 | 9.8 |
| Springfield | 3.9 | 7.7 | 7.5 |

[a]Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 474, 504.

Both Springfield and Bridgeport have significant non-white populations. In Bridgeport, the non-white population more than doubled during the 1950-1960 period and almost doubled in Springfield during the same period. Projecting a continuation of this trend for the 1960-1970 period, nonwhite population in Bridgeport would be 22.8 percent of the total population.[12] In Springfield, the non-white population would be 15.1 percent of the total population.[13]

In both cities, Negroes make up most of the non-white population. In Bridgeport, the black population is concentrated in five separate sections of the city.[14] This has tended to impede efforts to organize

[12]This figure was obtained by taking the non-white growth rate, 230 percent, for the 1950-1960 period times the percentage of non-white population in 1960 of 9.9 percent.

[13]This figure was obtained by taking the non-white growth rate, 197 percent, for the 1950-1960 period times the percentage of non-white population in 1960 of 7.7 percent.

[14]These areas include four public housing projects and a larger concentration of blacks along Stratford Avenue.

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the black community on a city-wide basis.[15] In Springfield, the black population is concentrated in two areas of the city.[16] From the impressions gained during my fieldwork in both cities, the Springfield black community is more effectively organized than the Bridgeport black community.[17]

In addition to the increased black population, the Spanish American population of both cities is also growing. The Spanish speaking communities, if measured by the number of organized neighborhood groups, appear to be increasing faster than indicated in the 1950-1960 figures presented in Table 2-2.[18] Springfield has an active and energetically organized Casa Hispanoamericana that emphasizes the distinctiveness of Spanish-American culture and tradition.[19] The Spanish Americans have organized both a credit union and a militant civil-rights organization, the Spanish-American Union.[20] Bridgeport's Spanish speaking population has not been as extensively

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[15]At the time of the field research, only a local chapter of the NAACP was active in Bridgeport. There were no branches of CORE or the Urban League and the SCLC had one field representative in the city. Since that time, there have been reports of the formation of a Black Panther group in the city. If these reports are true, it will be the first organization staffed and supported by lower income blacks.

[16]These are the areas bordering on the central business district and the old Springfield Armory.

[17]Springfield, at the time of my field research, had active chapters of the NAACP, the Urban League, and the Black Coalition. A cultural center for city blacks, called Black House, was opened in February, 1968. Several neighborhood corporations were being organized to deal with slum housing conditions.

[18]This statement is based on my impressions gained during field research in each city.

[19]The Springfield Union, February 1, 1968, p. 21; February 9, 1968, p. 21; and February 21, 1968, p. 21.

[20]The Springfield Union, October 10, 1968, p. 58. For details of the Spanish-American Union see The Springfield Union, October 18, 1968, p. 1.

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organized, but several neighborhood organizations have been formed.[21]

The fact that Bridgeport and Springfield are undergoing significant population change should be emphasized. Old residents are moving out and newer residents of both cities have a different racial composition.[22] This also means a different socio-economic composition. Milford and Chicopee, although experiencing percentage changes in their non-white populations during 1950-1960, have not experienced the relative gain of these groups. In both cities, the non-white population is probably under 3 percent of the total city population.[23]

Table 2-3 presents data for selected ethnic characteristics for each city's population.

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[21]The most important of these is the Spanish Action Committee which was formed during the early part of 1968 and is attempting to organize the Spanish speaking community of Bridgeport into a political force.

[22]Outmigrating whites are being replaced by immigrating Negroes and Spanish Americans.

[23]This 3 percent figure is the most accurate estimate that I can give from the data available and the impressions gained during my field research.

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TABLE 2-3

SELECTED ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS: 1960 [a]

| City | Total Foreign Stock % | Leading Countries of Origin and Percentage of Foreign Stock |
|---|---|---|
| Milford | 30 | Italy (16) United Kingdom (15) Canada (13) |
| Chicopee | 41 | Canada (37) Poland (35) United Kingdom (7) |
| Bridgeport | 44 | Italy (25) Poland (10) Czechoslovakia (9) |
| Springfield | 38 | Canada (25) Italy (17) Ireland (14) |

[a]Table entries computed from data presented in: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1960, Census of Population, Volume 1, Parts 8 and 23, Characteristics of the Population (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 154, 155, 234, 236.

Political analysts often ignore ethnic factors due to a variety of assumptions concerning the assimilation of ethnic groups in the American political system.[24] In these four cities ethnic considerations are essential variables in any analysis of the cities' political and budgetary processes. As illustrated in Table 2-3, over 70 percent of Chicopee's total foreign stock is composed of persons claiming either Canadian or Polish ancestry. French Canadians, a result of immigration from the province of Quebec, make up most of this Canadian group. Large numbers of Polish immigrants moved into Chicopee during the 1830's and the late 1890's. They came first to dig a canal to bypass the falls on the Chicopee River and then to fill factory jobs in the various industries of Chicopee.[25] Since the French Canadians and the Polish settled in certain geographical areas of the city, politics

[24]For an excellent summary article concerning the question of ethnic assimilation, see Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review, LXI (September, 1967), pp. 717-726.

[25]L. L. Johnson, Chicopee Illustrated (Holyoke, Mass.: Transcript Publishing Company, 1896), p. 48.

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became structured along ethnic divisions.[26] Ethnic considerations still structure political action in Chicopee.[27]

In the other three cities, ethnic factors, although important, do not appear to be as important as they are in Chicopee. In Springfield, the Irish and French Canadians have successfully competed for the bulk of city offices.[28] An interesting aspect of both Milford's and Bridgeport's ethnic composition is the absence of the Irish population as one of the three largest ethnic groups. In Milford, the Irish account for 8 percent of the total foreign stock.[29] In Bridgeport, the Irish account for 7 percent of the total foreign stock.[30] Despite these relatively small percentages, both cities have had mayors of Irish ancestry for the past four years. During the interviews, it became apparent that ethnic considerations played a part in structuring political decisions in all four cities.[31]

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[26]The Polish settled along the falls and in the central sections of the city; the French along the river meadows and higher elevations.

[27]There are several pieces of evidence to support this claim. First, the tickets for various city elections are usually carefully balanced between the Polish and the French Canadians. Second, each respondent was asked whether he felt ethnic politics were important. All of the Chicopee respondents indicated that they felt it was the single most important issue in the city. They then went on to outline specific instances where ethnic considerations were significant.

[28]Based on my analysis of various city election results in the past 10 years.

[29]U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1960, Census of Population, Volume 1, Part 8, Characteristics of the Population (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 155.

[30]Ibid., p. 154.

[31]Responses to several questions were made in ethnic terms. For instance, in Milford, one of the Irish political leaders constantly referred to his fellow legislator as being an Italian and felt that the Italian areas of the city could be written off in terms of improving city service available there. One public works director when asked why he refused to pave a certain street responded, "It's in a Polish area of town and they've never done anything for me. Besides, they don't deserve it."

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Table 2-4 summarizes selected age and educational characteristics for the four cities.

TABLE 2-4

SELECTED AGE AND EDUCATION CHARACTERISTICS: 1960 [a]

| City | Median Age | Under 18 % | 65+ % | Completed Less Than 5 Years of School % | Completed High School or More % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 29.2 | 39.0 | 7.1 | 2.7 | 50.6 |
| Chicopee | 28.3[b] | 35.2 | 7.4 | 7.0 | 34.5 |
| Bridgeport | 33.0 | 31.1 | 11.0 | 9.2 | 32.4 |
| Springfield | 32.5 | 33.2 | 11.8 | 7.0 | 41.8 |

[a]Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 474, 475, 504, 505.

[b]Figure includes military personnel based at Westover Field.

Of the four cities, Milford has the least percentage of its population over 65 years of age and it has (in percentage terms) the largest school population. Since all four cities have approximately one-third of their population under 18, each has had demands for new schools and increased educational expenditures.[32]

Educational attainment in the four cities varies a great deal. Milford has the largest percentage of its population with a high school degree or more (50.6 percent); Bridgeport, the lowest percentage (32.4 percent). There is only a 2.1 percentage difference between Bridgeport's and Chicopee's educational attainment levels, but a 9.4 percentage difference between Bridgeport and Springfield, and an 8.8 percentage difference between Springfield and Milford on educational attainment levels. Survey research has indicated the tendency of more

[32]All four cities have been under public pressure on educational expenditures. In the past ten years, Milford has built three schools; Chicopee, two; Bridgeport, three; and Springfield, three.

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highly educated citizens to be more actively involved in the political process.[33] Attempts will be made to see if this is the case with these four cities.

Table 2-5 summarizes selected economic characteristics for the four cities.

TABLE 2-5

SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 1960 [a]

| City | % Manufacturing | % White Collar | Median Income $ | % Under $3,000 | % Over $10,000 | Firms with 20 or More Employees 1963 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 43.5 | 47.2 | 7121 | 5.9 | 20.3 | 31 |
| Chicopee | 54.4 | 32.6 | 6170 | 10.9 | 12.6 | 47 |
| Bridgeport | 45.0 | 34.8 | 5982 | 14.7 | 14.0 | 193 |
| Springfield | 33.9 | 44.7 | 5994 | 14.6 | 13.2 | 119 |

[a]Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 475, 477, 505, 507.

Milford, despite the large percentage of its population engaged in manufacturing, has the wealthiest population of the four cities. With 20.3 percent of its population earning over $10,000/year and only 5.9 percent of its population earning under $3,000/year, Milford also has the largest percentage of white collar workers (47.2) of the four cities. Chicopee's economic characteristics accurately portray it as an industrial city with fewer people earning over $10,000/year and more earning less than $3,000/year than in Milford. Chicopee's labor force is basically blue collar; only 32.6 percent of its labor force is white collar.

[33]V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 328-331.

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Bridgeport and Springfield have similar income characteristics, but dissimilar industrial characteristics. The median income figures for both cities are within $12 of each other. Both Springfield and Bridgeport have similar percentages of their populations in the income categories over $10,000/year and under $3,000/year. Despite the income similarity, Bridgeport is more industrially oriented than Springfield. Although Springfield is larger, it has approximately one-third less firms than Bridgeport does in the 20 or more employee category. Springfield has 44.7 percent of its labor force in white collar occupations and 33.9 percent of its labor force in manufacturing. This reflects the city's importance as a service and insurance center.[34] In Bridgeport, 34.8 percent of the labor force is engaged in white collar occupations and 45.0 percent in manufacturing.

The information presented in Tables 2-1 to 2-5 provides the reader with a basic and comparative description of the socio-economic characteristics of the four cities. This information will be referred to as later explanations for each city's budgetary process are developed. Tables 2-6 to 2-10 summarize budgetary information for the four cities. These tables will be discussed next.

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[34]Springfield serves as the regional distribution center for Western Massachusetts. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company has its home office in Springfield.

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## BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE INFORMATION

Budgetary expenditure data can be summarized in a number of ways.[35] I have compared the budgetary growth rates of the four cities over a fourteen-year period (computed from data in Table 2-6). The budgetary data for the departments included in the interview sample are compared with one another and the total budgetary growth rate (Tables 2-7 to 2-10). Before discussing these tables an often overlooked theoretical point should be mentioned.

When considering departmental shares of budgetary expenditures, it is also necessary to consider what is happening to the total budget. The total budget, over any specific time-span, may increase, decrease, or remain constant. During a period of increasing expenditures, departmental budgetary totals could be expected to increase. The departmental rate of increase as compared to the total budgetary rate of increase indicates whether the department is maintaining, improving, or losing its position as compared with the other departments.[36] In addition, a period of increasing expenditures may permit various departments to be satisfied with budgetary increases even if those increases are not at as high a rate as other departments receive. In short, an expanding budgetary total permits increased

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[35]Budgetary documents often summarize expenditure data in the form of a pie and departmental authorizations are indicated by the relative size of their slices of that pie. This method of data summarization was considered, but wasn't used because it failed to convey all the information that was pertinent to the explanations of participant behavior during the budgetary process.

[36]For instance, if the total budget increases by 10 percent for a given year and the department's total budget increases by 8 percent, that department has not maintained its relative share of the total budget. To do that, its budgetary total would have to increase by 10 percent. In order to improve its relative share, the department's budgetary total would have to increase by more than 10 percent.

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departmental expenditures without necessitating subsequent budgetary cutbacks for other departments. The intriguing questions during such a period are which departments get what amounts and why.

A significantly different setting for participant behavior during the budgetary process would exist if the budgetary total were constant or decreasing. In the case of a constant budgetary total, departments must compete for a fixed amount of funds. Budgetary officials can increase a department's budgetary allocation only by allocating less for another department(s). A decreasing budgetary total results in the various departments having to compete for shrinking funds. For a department to maintain its current budgetary total, another department(s) must be reduced by that amount. The change, or lack of it, in the budgetary toal could be an influence on departmental behavior.[37]

As Table 2-6 indicates, all four cities have experienced an expanding budgetary total for the period from 1954 to 1968. This is representative of an expanding total for all cities during a similar period.[38]

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[37]The following hypotheses are derived from this assumption. When the total budget increases, department officials attempt to maximize their departmental allocations. When the total budget remains constant, departmental officials attempt to protect or minimize their requests over prior departmental allocations. When the total budget is decreasing, departmental officials attempt to remain in a static position regarding their budgetary allocations. Since all of the departmental officials that were interviewed were operating during a period of increasing budgetary totals (see Tables 2-7 to 2-10), only the first hypothesis was considered.

[38]During the period from 1954 to 1966, direct city expenditures increased by 98 percent. Lynden Mannen, "Trends in Municipal Finances," Muncipal Yearbook-1968 (Washington: International City Managers Association, 1968), p. 248.

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TABLE 2-6

BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES FOR THE FOUR CITIES: 1954-1968[a]

(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

| City | 1954[b] | 1960[c] | 1968[d] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 3,719 | 9,844 | 14,296 |
| Chicopee | 5,474 | 10,175 | 11,599 |
| Bridgeport | 18,625 | 25,199 | 34,408 |
| Springfield | 28,823 | 42,443 | 55,148 |

[a]Expenditure data does not include capital expenditures.

[b]Milford figure from: Town of Milford, Annual Report: 1953-1954 (Milford: Town Manager's Office, 1954), p. 33. Other figures from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1956 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 370, 386, 394.

[c]Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1967 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 482, 512.

[d]Source: Total Municipal Budget Figures in Tables 2-7 to 2-10.

Milford's budget, reflecting the population change described earlier, has shown the greatest percentage increase during this period. In 1954, Milford had a $3.7 million budget and in 1968, a $14.2 million budget. This represents an increase of 384 percent.[39] Chicopee had a $5.5 million budget in 1954; in 1968, an $11.6 million budget for an increase of 211 percent. Despite Chicopee's larger population, its budget for 1960 was only slightly larger than Milford's budget. For 1968, Chicopee's budget was less than Milford's budget for the same year.

[39]The increase is calculated by dividing the 1954 total for budgetary expenditures into the 1968 total for budgetary expenditures. This process was used in calculating the percentage increases for all four cities.

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The two larger cities also show budgetary growth, but at rates less than either Milford or Chicopee. Brigeport's budget increased by 184 percent in the 1954-1968 period; from $18.6 million to $34.4 million. Springfield's budget increased by 191 percent during the same period; from $28.8 million to $55.1 million.

In addition to the high growth rate illustrated in Table 2-6, the total dollar figures that each city had to allocate increased significantly. Milford spent $10.6 million more in 1968 than in 1954. Chicopee spent $6.1 million more in 1968 than in 1954. Bridgeport spent $15.8 million more and Springfield $26.3 million more in 1968 than in 1954. It would make an interesting, but separate, study to discover the sources for the increased expenditures on the part of the four cities.[40] The relevant point for my purpose is that there has been increasing municipal expenditures distributed among competing departments and priorities in all four cities.

The next four tables, 2-7 to 2-10, summarize expenditure data for the departments that were included in my interview sample. The tables reflect the distribution of the total municipal expenditures among departments in fiscal years 1966/1967 and 1967/1968.

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[40]While this type of research would help to answer questions about the sources of city revenues, it would do little to explain how these revenues are then divided among departments and priorities.

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TABLE 2-7

SELECTED DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES: MILFORD[a]

(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

| Fiscal Year<br>Department | 66/67[b] | 67/68[c] |
|---|---|---|
| Education | 7,085 | 7,618 |
| Fire | 686 | 758 |
| Parks and Recreation | 112 | 136 |
| Police | 780 | 847 |
| Public Works[d] | 1,671 | 1,893 |
| Total for 5 departments | 10,334 | 11,252 |
| Total other departments | 3,822 | 3,044 |
| Total Municipal Budget | 14,156 | 14,296 |

[a]Operating expenditures only.

[b]Source: City of Milford, Annual Report: 1966-1967 (Milford: Mayor's Office, 1967), pp. 23-25.

[c]Estimated from: City of Milford, Mayor's Recommended Budget: 1968-1969 (Milford: Mayor's Office, 1967), pp. vi.-viii.

[d]Includes sanitation expenditures since the departments are merged in Milford.

Milford's budgetary expenditures, summarized in Table 2-7, permit the following conclusions. First, the education budget accounts for over 50 percent of the total municipal expenditures in both 1966/1967 and 1967/1968.[41] Second, the specifically listed departments in Table 2-7 accounted for 73 and 79 percent of the total budgetary expenditures in 1966/1967 and 1967/1968.[42] This left 27 percent and 21 percent

[41]Percentage obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total spent for education.

[42]Percentages obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total budgetary expenditures for the five departments listed in Table 2-7.

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respectively of the total budget to be divided among the other departments, agencies, and boards. Third, while the total city budget increased by 1 percent from 1966/1967 to 1967/1968, all of the departmental budgetary totals for the specific departments listed in Table 2-7 grew at a rater greater than the overall city budget.[43] In Milford, the departments in Table 2-7 were competing for, and gaining, increased budgetary expenditures.

Table 2-8 summarizes the budgetary expenditures for the seven departments in Chicopee where interviews were held.

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[43]The total city budget percentage increase was obtained by dividing the 1967/1968 total budgetary expenditure by the 1966/1967 total budgetary expenditure. The departmental percentage increases were obtained by dividing the 1967/1968 departmental expenditure totals by the 1966/1967 departmental expenditure totals.

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TABLE 2-8

SELECTED DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES: CHICOPEE[a]

(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

| Fiscal Year / Department | 66/67[b] | 67/68[c] |
|---|---|---|
| Education | 5,032 | 5,236 |
| Fire | 896 | 955 |
| Health | 164 | 205 |
| Highway[d] | 451 | 508 |
| Police | 652 | 736 |
| Treasurer | 41 | 54 |
| Welfare[e] | 920 | 1,354 |
| Total for seven departments | 8,156 | 9,048 |
| Total other departments | 2,425 | 2,551 |
| Total Municipal Budget | 10,581 | 11,599 |

[a]Operating expenditures only.

[b]Source: City of Chicopee, 1967 Municipal Budget (Chicopee: Mayor's Office, 1967), pp. 5, 19-22, 30, 32, 34-46, 49-60.

[c]Source: City of Chicopee, 1968 Municipal Budget (Chicopee: Mayor's Office, 1968), pp. 5, 19-23, 30-32, 34-46, 49-60.

[d]This does not include sanitation figures.

[e]The Commonwealth of Massachusetts assumed the cost and administration of the local welfare program on July 1, 1968.

The following statements are based on data found in Table 2-8. First, the education budget accounts for nearly 50 percent of total city expenditures.[44] Second the seven departments in Table 2-8 account for 77 percent and 78 percent of the total budget for

[44]Percentage obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total spent for education.

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1966/1967 and 1967/1968 respectively.[45] Third, the total city budget grew by approximately 10 percent from 1966/1967 to 1967/1968.[46] The health, highway, police, city treasurer, and welfare departments had budgetary percentage increases greater than the 10 percent total budgetary increase.[47] The education and fire departments had increased budgetary totals, but these were less than the 10 percent total budgetary increase.[48]

Table 2-9 summarizes selected departmental budgetary totals for the city of Bridgeport.

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[45]Percentage obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total spent for education.

[46]Percentage obtained by dividing the 1967/1968 total budgetary expenditures by the 1966/1967 total budgetary expenditures.

[47]Based on the percentage increases obtained when the 1967/1968 departmental expenditure totals were divided by the 1966/1967 departmental expenditure totals.

[48]Ibid.

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TABLE 2-9

SELECTED DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES: BRIDGEPORT[a]

(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

| Fiscal Year<br>Department | 66/67[b] | 67/68[c] |
|---|---|---|
| Community Development | 87 | 95 |
| Education | 12,866 | 11,522 |
| Fire | 3,181 | 3,662 |
| Humane Affairs | 2,116 | 2,163 |
| Park and Recreation | 1,048 | 1,024 |
| Public Works[d] | 2,751 | 2,481 |
| Total for six departments | 22,049 | 20,947 |
| Total for other departments | 12,334 | 13,461 |
| Total Municipal Budget | 34,383 | 34,408 |

[a]Operating expenditures only.

[b]Source: City of Bridgeport, Office of the Comptroller, Annual Financial Report: 1966-1967 (Bridgeport: Department of Finance, 1967), pp. 60-64.

[c]Source: City of Bridgeport, Office of the Comptroller, Statement of Departmental Requisitions and Comptroller's Recommendations 1968-1969 (Bridgeport: Department of Finance, no date), pp. 13, 23-36, 38-44, 51, 53.

[d]Includes sanitation figures.

These aspects of Table 2-9 are important. First, the education budget in Bridgeport accounted for approximately 33 percent of the total municipal budget for the two year period from 1966 to 1968.[49] Second, the six departments in Table 2-9 accounted for 64 percent of

[49]Percentage obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total spent for education.

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the total budget in 1966/1967 and 61 percent in 1967/1968.[50] Third, the education, park and recreation, and public works departments had lower budgetary totals in 1967/1968 than in 1966/1967. Fourth, the community development, fire, and humane affairs departments had budgetary precentage increases greater than the total budget increase of less than 1 percent for the same period.[51]

Table 2-10, which summarizes selected departmental expenditures for Springfield, reveals a different pattern than Table 2-9's pattern for Bridgeport.

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[50]Percentages obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total budgetary expenditures for the six departments listed in Table 2-9.

[51]Total budget percentage increase calculated by dividing the 1967/1968 total budgetary expenditure by the 1966/1967 total budgetary expenditures. The departmental budgetary percentage increases obtained when the 1967/1968 departmental expenditure totals were divided by 1966/1967 departmental expenditure totals.

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TABLE 2-10

SELECTED DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY EXPENDITURES: SPRINGFIELD[a]

(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

| Fiscal Year<br>Department | 66/67[b] | 67/68[c] |
|---|---|---|
| Education | 14,495 | 14,564 |
| Fire | 3,213 | 3,705 |
| Park and Recreation | 1,058 | 1,249 |
| Police | 2,639 | 2,874 |
| Public Buildings | 1,148 | 841 |
| Streets and Highways[d] | 3,547 | 3,776 |
| Traffic Engineering | 170 | 192 |
| Total for seven departments | 26,270 | 27,201 |
| Total other departments | 25,264 | 27,947 |
| Total Municipal Budget | 51,534 | 55,148 |

[a]Operating expenditures only.

[b]Source: City of Springfield, Annual Financial Report: 1966 (Springfield: City Auditor's Office, 1967), pp. 17-22.

[c]Source: City of Springfield, Annual Financial Report: 1967 (Springfield: City Auditor's Office, 1968), pp. 11-19.

[d]Includes sanitation figures.

These aspects of Table 2-10 are relevant to my explanation of budgetary behavior in Springfield. First, the education budget in Springfield is approximately 28 percent of the total budget.[52] Second, the seven departments included in Table 2-10 accounted for 51 percent and 49 percent of the total city budget for the

[52]Percentage obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total spent for education.

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1966/1968 period.[53] Third, the public buildings department had a lower budgetary total for 1967/1968 than for 1966/1967. Fourth, the fire, park and recreation, and traffic engineering departments had budgetary percentage increases greater than the total budget increase of approximately 10 percent for the 1967/1968 period.[54] The police, education, and streets and highways departments had increased budgetary totals for this period, but their budgetary increases were less than the total budgetary increase of 10 percent.[55]

The above data and accompanying descriptions are not meant to be exhaustive, but illustrative of the budgetary experiences a variety of municipal departments have undergone.[56] In summary, Tables 2-7 to 2-10 show that all four cities were experiencing total budgetary growth during the 1966-1968 period. Four departments expended less in 1967/1968 than in 1966/1967. The remaining twenty-one departments experienced increased expenditure totals for the same period. Sixteen of these departments grew at a rate greater than their respective city budgets. The interesting question is how the different departments went about gaining their budgetary expenditures. Before discussing this question, a short summarization of the legal requirements of each city's budgetary process is in order.

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[53]Percentages obtained by dividing the total budgetary expenditure into the total budgetary expenditures of the seven departments listed in Table 2-10.

[54]Total budget percentage increase calculated by dividing the 1967/1968 total budgetary expenditure by the 1966/1967 total budgetary expenditure. The departmental budgetary percentage increases obtained when the 1967/1968 departmental expenditure totals were divided by the 1966/1967 departmental expenditure totals.

[55]Based on the percentage increases obtained when the 1967/1968 departmental expenditure totals were divided by the 1966/1967 departmental expenditure totals.

[56]The problem of data summarization in this type of research should not be underestimated. Missing data is common and often available data for one city is hard to compare with data for another city. To the best of my knowledge, these figures are accurate.

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## LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

The legal requirements structuring Milford's budgetary process are found in that city's charter provisions.[57] Milford's present charter was enacted in 1959 and changed the form of local government from an appointed council-manager form to an elected mayor-board of aldermen form.[58] The 1959 charter was revised by the public in the 1963 municipal election.[59] These revisions took effect on January 1, 1964, and since that date there have no major changes in the charter. The mayor is elected for a two-year term and takes office seven days after the November election date.[60] He may succeed himself. Municipal elections are partisan.[61] Milford's fiscal year begins July 1 and ends June 30.[62] By considering the role that three legally prescribed dates play, the legal requirements of Milford's budgetary process can be summarized.

January 1 is the first date. By that time, the mayor is required to have submitted to the Board of Finance a proposed fiscal budget containing: (a) a brief description of the total budget plan; (b) revenue estimates; (c) expenditure estimates; and (d) a capital projects program.[63] The mayor's January 1 budgetary submission deadline

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[57] Milford, Charter, Art. IV.

[58] Ibid., Art. II, sec. 1.

[59] Milford, Revisions to the Charter, 1963.

[60] The municipal elections are held the first Tuesday after the first Monday in odd-numbered years. Milford, Charter, Art. II, secs. 1 and 2.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid., Art. VI, sec. 4.

[63] Ibid., sec. 1.

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forces him to request expenditure estimates from the operating departments by December 1. The mayor then has a full month to review the departmental requests and to submit his final budget to the members of the Board of Finance.

March 31 is the second legally prescribed date. By then, the Board of Finance is required to have held". . . one or more public hearings at which any elector or taxpayer of the city may have an opportunity to be heard on the said proposed budget . . ." and to have submitted ". . . the proposed fiscal budget . . ." and to have made a ". . . recommendation as to the tax rate. . . ."[64] The five members of the Milford Board of Finance are appointed by the mayor, subject to the majority approval of the board of aldermen. One Board of Finance member is appointed each year for a five year term.[65] The Board of Finance acts as a review board for all city expenditures and capital projects requests. In short, the Board of Finance reviews the mayor's budgetary requests and prepares budgetary recommendations of its own.

April 30 is the third legally prescribed date in the Milford budgetary process. By that date, the members of the board of aldermen ". . . shall adopt . . . the budget for the ensuing fiscal year and fix the tax rate to be levied on property in the city in the ensuing year."[66] The board of aldermen has the power to reduce or delete any item in the budget by a simple majority vote of the members present and voting; by a two-thirds vote of the aldermen present and voting, the board of aldermen may increase budgetary items.[67] The board of aldermen has fifteen members; three from each of the city's five voting districts.[68] Each alderman serves a two year term and

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[64] Ibid., Art. II, sec. 1.

[65] Ibid., Art. IV, sec. 10.

[66] Ibid., Art. VI, sec. 3.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid., Art. II, sec. 4.

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is elected in partisan elections held in conjunction with the mayor's election.[69] Figure 2-1 summarizes the legal requirements structuring Milford's budgetary process.

| INSTITUTION | ROLE | DATE BY WHICH ACTION MUST BE COMPLETED |
|---|---|---|
| Mayor | Budgetary Proposal | January 1 |
| Board of Finance | Conduct Public Hearings<br>Review Mayor's Budget<br>Recommend Budget and Tax Rate | March 31 |
| Board of Aldermen | Adopt City Budget<br>Adopt City Tax Rate | April 30 |

Figure 2-1.--Summarization of Milford's Budgetary Legal Requirements.

As was the case with Milford, a summarization of the dates involved is the best way to describe the legal requirements structuring Bridgeport's budgetary process. Bridgeport's fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31.[70] The legally prescribed dates are January 1, the first Tuesday in February, and the last Tuesday in February.

By January 1 of each year, ". . . each board . . . each committee . . . and each officer of the city . . . (must) report to the comptroller an estimate of the amount of money required by said board, or said committee, or said officer."[71] Since the January 1 date is the legal deadline for all budgetary requests, the budgetary officers of the departments seldom fail to meet it.

By the second date, the first Tuesday in February, the comptroller of the city must submit to the Board of Apportionment and Taxation an ". . . estimate(s) of the amount required by each

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[69] Ibid., sec. 1.

[70] Bridgeport, Charter, c. VI, sec. 83.

[71] Ibid., c. VII, sec. 95.

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department of the city government for the ensuing year. . . ."[72] Included in this message must be his recommendations for ". . . appropriations for all the city expenses for said year . . . and . . . such tax . . . as he shall deem necessary to meet such expenses for said fiscal year."[73] The method(s) by which the comptroller decides what his recommendations will be is determined by the comptroller. No guidelines are spelled out for him.

After the first Tuesday of February and before the last Tuesday of the month, the Board of Apportionment and Taxation must meet to hear ". . . all parties who may desire to be heard relative to any alterations . . . " in the comptroller's recommendations.[74] On the last Tuesday of February, the third legally prescribed date, the members of the Board of Apportionment and Taxation ". . . shall . . . make appropriations and lay taxes for all city purposes."[75] This is the final step in the adoption of the budget.

The seven members of the Board of Apportionment and Taxation are appointed by the mayor for six year terms.[76] Legislative approval of the mayor's appointments to the Board is unnecessary. Every second year the mayor has the opportunity to either appoint two new members or reappoint the present members to the Board.

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., sec. 91.

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Figure 2-2 summarizes the legal requirements structuring Bridgeport's budgetary process.

| INSTITUTION | ROLE | DATE BY WHICH ACTION MUST BE COMPLETED |
|---|---|---|
| Department | Develop Budgetary Request | January 1 |
| Comptroller | Review Budgetary Requests<br>Recommend Budgetary Appropriations<br>Recommend Tax Rate | First Tuesday in February |
| Board of Apportionment and Taxation | Conduct Public Hearings<br>Set Final Budgetary Appropriations<br>Set Final Tax Rate | Last Tuesday in February |

Figure 2-2.--Summarization of Bridgeport's Budgetary Legal Requirements

Two final comments are necessary regarding the legal requirements of Bridgeport's budgetary process. The city's legislative body, the Common Council, has no legally prescribed role in the budgetary process. The Council has to approve special appropriations only.[77] Second, the mayor, despite being popularly elected for a two year term in partisan elections, has no direct legal role in the budgetary process.[78] These prescribed exclusions of both the Common Council and the mayor are unique among the four cities.

Chicopee and Springfield, unlike Milford and Bridgeport, have very similar legal requirements prescribed for their budgetary processes. Under Massachusetts state law, a city or town can adopt one of several forms of municipal government.[79] Springfield has adopted the Plan A

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[77] Ibid., c. VI, sec. 83.

[78] Ibid., c. II, sec. 13.

[79] Massachusetts, Annotated Laws, c. 43, sec. 1.

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form of city goverernment; Chicopee, the Plan B.[80] Plan A calls for a ". . . city government and legislative body composed of the mayor and a city council, the councillors being elected at large."[81] Plan B calls for ". . . a city government and legislative body composed of the mayor and a city council, the councillors being elected from both districts and at large."[82] For the purpose of my study, the other significant difference between Plan A and Plan B forms is the power delegated to the mayor. Although both plans are strong-mayor forms of government, Plan A authorizes the mayor to appoint and remove all heads of departments and members of municipal boards (except the school committee).[83] Plan B gives the mayor the same power, but majority approval of the city council is required.[84] Under both plans, the mayor is popularly elected for a two year term in nonpartisan municipal elections.[85] The mayor may succeed himself.

Both cities operate on a municipal year running from 10:00 a.m. on the first Monday in January to 10:00 a.m. on the first Monday of the following January.[86] Chapter 44 of the General Statutes of Massachusetts contains the legal requirements for municipal finance in the state.[87] There are three legally prescribed dates in the process. Under existing law, "Every officer of any city . . . requesting an appropriation shall, between November first and December first of each year, furnish the mayor and the city auditor . . .

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[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid., sec. 52.

[84] Ibid., sec. 60.

[85] Ibid., sec. 48 and sec. 49.

[86] Ibid., sec. 15.

[87] Ibid, c. 44.

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detailed estimates of the full amounts deemed necessary for the then ensuing year for the ordinary maintenance of the . . . department and for expenditures other than ordinary expenditures . . ."[88] The December 1 deadline forces the operating departments to determine their budgetary requests prior to that date

Within 45 days after January 1 of each year, the mayor is required to submit his budgetary recommendations to the city council.[89] The 45 day requirement forces the mayor to submit his budget not later than February 15 of each year. If the mayor fails to submit a budget by the end of the 45 day period, the city council may submit its own municipal budget by March 14.[90] There are no statutory requirements concerning the method or methods by which the mayor is to decide on his final budgetary recommendations.

After receipt of the mayor's proposed budget, the city council has 45 days in which to act upon it.[91] If the council fails to act in those 45 days, the mayor's requests become part of the budget. The city council, by majority vote, can reduce or reject any amount requested by the mayor in his budget, but it can add to the budgetary items only upon the recommendation of the mayor.[92] The 45 day provision makes April 1 the latest possible day for final council action. During the council's consideration of the budget, if it so decides or if at least 10 voters request, a public hearing must be held.[93] In Springfield, there are nine city council members, all elected on an at-large basis.[94] Chicopee's city council has thirteen members;

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[88] Ibid., sec. 31 A.

[89] Ibid., sec. 32.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid., sec. 52.

[94] Ibid., c. 43, sec. 50.
See also: City Council and Committees, School Committee, Department Heads and Boards, Commissions and Committees: 1968 (Springfield: City of Springfield, 1968), p. 1.

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four elected at-large and nine elected from districts.[95] In both cities, city council elections are nonpartisan and are held concurrently with the mayor's election.[96] Figure 2-3 summarizes the legally prescribed dates for Chicopee's and Springfield's budgetary process.

| INSTITUTION | ROLE | DATE BY WHICH ACTION MUST BE COMPLETED |
|---|---|---|
| Department | Develop Budgetary Request | December 1 |
| Mayor | Review Budgetary Requests<br>Develop Budgetary Recommendations | February 15 |
| City Council | Adopt Final City Budget | April 1 |

Figure 2-3.--Summarization of Chicopee's and Springfield's Budgetary Legal Requirements.

Despite the relative simplicity of the requirements just described, the adoption of a city budget is still complicated. Two factors cause this. First, the cities of Massachusetts receive from the state a portion of the state taxes collected within the cities' boundaries.[97] Since the amount of money to be redistributed to the cities is not required to be announced till May 1 of each year, the cities must use estimates of anticipated tax revenue when drawing up their budgets.[98] This complicates the entire budgetary process. Second, the city tax rate is set annually by elected assessors, not the mayor or city councillors of the cities. The assessors are required to assess taxes ". . . to an amount not less than the aggregate of all amounts appropriated, granted, or lawfully

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[95]Arthur Balthazar, Manual, p.2.

[96]Massachusetts, Annotated Laws, c. 43, sec. 49.

[97]Ibid., c. 58, sec. 18 A.

[98]Ibid., sec. 25 A.

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expended by their respective towns. . . ."[99] This provision means that the tax rate is set independently of the mayor and the city council and can only be anticipated while they work on adopting the fiscal year budget. If a mayor or city council wrongly estimate the state tax return, the final tax rate needed to raise revenue for their approved budget could drastically change from their anticipated rate.

While this chapter has discussed and described information pertaining to the four cities included in the study, the emphasis has been on presenting relevant, not comprehensive, descriptions of the cities. Now that the preliminaries have been dealt with, it is time to summarize the findings of my field research. Chapters III through VI consider each of the four stages of the budgetary process and the behavior of the participants during each stage of the process.

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[99] Ibid., sec. 23.

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# CHAPTER III

## THE FORMULATION STAGE

This chapter considers these questions about the formulation stage of the budgetary process. (1) Who participates during the formulation stage of the budgetary process? (2) What decision criteria are used by these participants? (3) Why are these decision criteria used? (4) What is the effect(s) of the decisions reached during this stage on subsequent stages of the budgetary process? In order to simplify the presentation, the behavior of the respondents in the five categories presented in Chapter I will be described. The next three chapters (IV through VI) are organized in similar fashion.

## DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY OFFICIALS

Three categories of behavior were discovered during the interviews with the twenty-seven departmental budgetary officials included in the interview sample.[1] The first category includes the behavior of those departmental budgetary officials, hereafter referred to as the DBOs, who made all but the most trivial budgetary decisions by themselves. The DBOs in this category did not discuss budgetary matters with either fellow workers within the department or with persons outside of the department. The second category includes the behavior of those DBOs who sought the advice of fellow workers within the department on what they perceived to be important budgetary matters. The third category is made up of the behavior of those DBOs who discussed budgetary matters with their fellow workers in the department and with others who were not members of the operating departments.

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[1]Departmental budgetary officials include department heads and departmental fiscal officers responsible for budgetary decisions.

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Table 3-1 summarizes the distribution of the twenty-seven DBOs into these categories.

TABLE 3-1

DISTRIBUTION OF DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY OFFICIALS BY BEHAVIOR CATEGORY DURING THE FORMULATION STAGE

| Category / City | I | II | III |
|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| Chicopee | 2 | 1 | 4 |
| Bridgeport | - | 3 | 4 |
| Springfield | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Total for each category | 4 | 10 | 13 |

Category I behavior was unique in that the DBOs stressed the independence they had while making budgetary decisions. Usually the only help they received was from their secretarial staff and that was often in the form of updating estimates on prior expenditures. The DBO was also the department head in the four cases of category I behavior. The following excerpt typifies the responses when the four DBOs in category I were asked who participated during the formulation stage of their budgetary requests.

> Q Do you do most of the work on the budget yourself or do you discuss it with other people?
>
> A I, well, the girl, like I say, does the figuring, but I make the decisions.
>
> Q By yourself?
>
> A Yes. Certainly. I wouldn't have it any other way.[2]

[2]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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Category II behavior was described by ten DBOs. Their budgetary decisions were made after they had consulted fellow workers within the department as to what their needs and views were. There were two variations of this behavior. The first involved the departments where the DBOs were also the department heads. They usually solicited information from their supervisory personnel. After consultation with them, the DBOs decided the final departmental budgetary request. This consultation gave the supervisory personnel an opportunity to make their case for any proposed funds that they had requested. Seven of the ten DBOs included in category II made their budgetary decisions concerning their requests after consulting with their supervisory personnel. One department head summarized his procedure as follows.

> Q With your particular departmental budget, do you consult with your deputy chiefs or is it drawn up by yourself?
>
> A I do consult the department mechanician who is in control of the maintenance of apparatus and the entire fire alarm system. If we need a particular item, say a pumper or a ladder or a big item which would have to be a special item in the budget, I would consult with him. . . . I feel he is the man who is going to work on it. He is the man in the field and I talk with him.[3]

A superintendent of schools described a similar procedure when he answered this question.

> Q Could you describe for me how you go about drawing up your education budget each year?
>
> A . . . it is his responsibility (the business manager's) to bring together all the information relative to the programs which we are going to introduce. . . . we ask the principals with their faculties to, as best they can, assess what they need and then submit their assessment to the central office for inclusion . . . All individuals who have a specific program will develop their own programs for submission. . . . then the whole thing is discussed as to content, to direction, by myself and my staff. Finally, the superintendent must decide what will be included and what will not be included prior to its submission.[4]

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[3]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[4]Personal interview, November, 1968.

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These excerpts are illustrative of department heads who included the opinion of their staffs in reaching their decisions about their budgetary requests. In addition to this type of behavior, there are the DBOs who are not in the position to make the final departmental budgetary request decisions by themselves. These DBOs serve as intermediaries between the department head and his staff. The following excerpt describes the behavior of one of the three DBOs who served as intermediaries.

> Q Could you describe for me how you go about drawing up the department's annual budget?
>
> A Well, . . . I work with the chief. . . . We determine what he wants for the coming year. . . . Now we have to call on our staff people. I get those people in from the several divisions . . . and then I have them submit a brief to me. Or a requisition. They lay out what they want with an estimated cost. . . . In other words, I act as the liaison so everything comes in here and I have it. . . . The chief then has to determine what he wants to submit.[5]

The third category summarized in Table 3-1 is the most complex of the three categories of DBO behavior. All thirteen of the DBOs in category III had contacts with persons outside of their departments regarding budgetary requests during the formulation stage. Since no formal rules required these contacts, they were informal.[6] There were two types of informal contact.

The first resulted in an exchange of technical information between the DBO and another city official. Usually the mayor's or auditor's office furnished the information to the DBOs. An example

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[5]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[6]Formal rules include written departmental directives, charter provisions, and state statutes regulating the formulation of budgetary requests by operating departments.

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of an informal contact used to gain technical information follows.

> Q When you are drawing up the budget, do you ever consult with others outside of the department?
>
> A Certainly. Otherwise, I would be lost. I've got to talk to the auditor to know exactly what amounts I've got left in what accounts. If I don't, he'll nail me on down the road if he can. I've got to be accurate.[7]

Despite this expressed need for technical information, only three of the thirteen DBOs in category III said they sought such information from the auditor or other city officials. Ten of the DBOs said that they discussed their budgetary requests with either the mayor's office or various councilmen prior to formally submitting the requests. One of the DBOs described these informal discussions this way.

> Q Do you discuss the budget with anyone outside of the department prior to its submission?
>
> A Sure. The mayor came to this office and he went over the budget with us before we even submitted it to him. . . . The mayor was in this office one night for about five hours and we went through the whole budget, column by column.[8]

Another DBO responded to the same question in this way.

> Q Do you discuss the budget with anyone outside of the department prior to its submission?
>
> A Yes. I do.
>
> Q Would you describe these discussions?
>
> A Certainly. They are with the council members concerned with my department. I advise them of things that are put in and sometimes they will suggest programs or equipment. I do consider their requests.

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[7] Personal interview, July, 1968.

[8] Personal interview, July, 1968.

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Q How often are these requests made?

A Oh, I'd say probably three to four on a particular budget. . . . Good logical requests, such as priority for street paving, sewer work, or other things are usually included.[9]

These two examples typify the informal discussions that were described by the other ten DBOs in category III. The DBOs openly discussed the details of their conversations with the elected officials with me.[10]

The next question deals with the decision criteria that were used by the DBOs in making their decisions about departmental budgetary requests. The interviews revealed that the DBOs used dual criteria for these decisions. When asked how they arrive at their final budgetary request decisions, the most common reply was through the use of historical precedent. Two DBOs described their decision criteria this way.

Q How do you decide what items should be included in your budget?

A Well, we recognize that there is never enough to finance an ideal budget. . . . So we do list priorities . . . we do have a priority basis so that we can decide this above that.

Q After you have considered the various programs and expenses, how do you decide what your final figure should be?

A It's decided, really, on what has been done in the past.[11]

The other DBO also stressed experience.

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[9]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[10]Only one DBO concluded that I couldn't "publicly report this part" when we discussed the importance of informal contacts during the formulation of his departmental budgetary request. He did not elaborate on why he felt this way.

[11]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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> Q How do you decide what items should be included in your budget?
>
> A I get into the details of the past. I base it on obviously a prior year. Experience in other words. My prior experience is my large source of historical data. . . . Yes, I base it on . . . historical data. What the increases were over the last year or two and apply a factor to it. It's sort of crystal ball too. I mean anybody that can look into the future has no business working in government. They should be a fortune teller. So I depend on the past.[12]

The other DBOs also cited historical precedents as the main decision criteria used in making decisions concerning their budgetary requests. Along with this emphasis was another one stressing the need to "fly by the seat of the pants" and "guesstimate" about future costs.[13] None of the DBOs mentioned either the planning, programming, budgeting approach, or regular program budgeting as ways they reached decisions during the formulation stage.

Before each interview, a careful study of budgetary requests formulated by that particular DBO had been done. The DBOs' emphasis on historical precedent as the criterion for their budgetary request decisions did not seem consistent with the historical pattern of their budgetary requests. This fact requires additional explanation.

Of the twenty-seven departments included in the interview sample, twenty requested increases of 18 percent or more over their prior year's authorizations.[14] The other seven departments

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[12]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[13]Personal interviews, July, September, and October, 1968.

[14]This analysis was done prior to each interview. The department's authorizations for years $x_1$ to $x_n$ were compared with its requests for years $x_1$ through $x_n$ where year $x_1$ was the latest year. In most cases, a three to five year historical pattern was studied. The percentage differences between requests and authorizations were determined as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Total requests for years } x_1 \text{ to } x_n}{\text{Total authorizations for years } x_1 \text{ to } x_n}$$

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requested increases ranging from 5 to 9 percent of their prior year's authorization.[15] The twenty DBOs whose requests were markedly above prior year authorizations responded in one of two ways when asked why they had requested sucha great deal more in their budgetary requests than they had received during the previous year(s). These two excerpts best summarize the DBOs' responses to this question.

> Q Why do you request substantially more than you have received during the past year?
>
> A Look, sometimes I know I'm not going to get the money. . . . But it's my duty to tell . . . what the picture is as honest and as clear as I can. . . . I say it's my job to give a complete picture of our needs. Then it's the responsibility of the powers that be to decide what should be finally adopted.[16]

The above response differs from the next response to the same question.

> A . . . the mayor will, every mayor will, want the reputation of being a budget cutter. So we put in there what we think we need. . . . We have an understanding with the mayor. We sit in with him and say, look, are you going to cut this or are you going to give us what we are requesting? If it's right on the line, he'll usually tell you to add a percentage so that he can cut it and make everyone look good.
>
> Q When and how are the percentages agreed upon?
>
> A Before the sheets are submitted. I put down what the actual figures are going to be, what I need, the honest requests. When we ascertain what we are going to do, if he's going to allow what I am requesting of if he's going to cut what we're asking. Then I jumble my figures either up or down.[17]

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[15]The same formula cited in footnote 14 was also used to determine the percentage increases for these seven departments.

[16]Personal interview, November, 1968.

[17]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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Although the DBO who described the above procedure was more frank than many of the other DBOs, it became apparent that these twenty DBOs inflated their departmental requests for either of the above reasons. Seven of the twenty DBOs described the need for including all items as a basic means of self-protection. That way, if the department came under criticism, they could cite the lack of budgetary authorizations as the major reason for the department's failure to perform. Thirteen of the twenty DBOs admitted that they either informally agreed with the mayor on what their proposed budgetary requests should have been and then inflated their requests so that the mayor could publicly reduce those requests or they assumed that their requests were going to be reduced and inflated them without discussing the matter with either the mayor or the other budgetary participants.

Why do the DBOs cite historical precedent, but then use practical political considerations in formulating their budgetary requests? DBOs use this dual decision-criteria because they assume they are operating within a political arena and that often decisions made by them and those made affecting them are based on political expediency and not objective rationality.[18] Some DBOs are willing to support their requests by citing the merits of their proposed programs; others feel it more expedient to arrange advance approval prior to the submission of their budgetary requests. Both types of behavior were found in all four cities and among a wide variety of departments and DBOs. No single variable can adequately explain why the DBOs make their decisions as they do. The most common one offered by the DBOs was that it was in their "self-interest to act this way.[19]

---

[18]This theme was frequently stressed by the DBOs. The following statement typifies their feeling. "Look, this is the real world. Not a book. I'm telling you how it's done, not how it should be done."
Personal interview, July, 1968.

[19]In these cases, the DBOs defined self-interest as both the interest of the departments and their personal interest.

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## MEMBERS OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

The fourteen independent board and commission members described two categories of behavior for themselves during the formulation stage of the budgetary process. The first category includes those members who had only occasional or infrequent interaction with the DBOs of the operating departments during this stage. The second category is more complex; it includes those members who either consulted with or negotiated with the DBOs during the formulation stage. Consultation refers only to discussing the DBOs' budgetary requests. Negotiation refers to reaching agreement, with both the DBO and the independent board and commission member having informal veto power over any agreement, on the DBO's subsequent budgetary requests.[20] Table 3-2 summarizes the distribution of the fourteen members of the independent boards and commissions into these two categories.

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[20]For a more developed description of the consultation-negotiation concept, see Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 22-23.

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TABLE 3-2

DISTRIBUTION OF MEMBERS OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS BY BEHAVIOR CATEGORY DURING THE FORMULATION STAGE

| Category<br>City | I | II |
|---|---|---|
| Milford | 2 | 2 |
| Chicopee | 1 | - |
| Bridgeport | 4 | 2 |
| Springfield | 2 | 1 |
| Total for each category | 9 | 5 |

Nearly three-fourths of the respondents had only infrequent or occasional interaction with the various operating departments in the four cities during the formulation stage. When these nine were asked about their role in formulating the departments' budgetary requests, five of them stressed that they were non-professionals and that their jobs were to approve what the departmental budgetary officer felt was necessary to efficiently operate the department. Only infrequent and minor instances were cited to suggest that these five members requested any additional expenditures to a DBO or requested that a reduction in the request be made. The other four members of category I were members of either Bridgeport's Board of Apportionment and Taxation or Milford's Board of Finance.[21] There was no indication that the DBOs or these board members attempted to contact each other to arrange any informal agreements or to obtain information as to what might be happening with the requests from other departments during the formulation stage.

The other five members of the independent boards and commissions were placed in Table 3-2's second category. Their

[21]See Chapter II, pp. 42-46, for a description of the composition and legal powers of these two boards. In later chapters, their behavior will be discussed separately.

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responses indicated that they were actively involved in the formulation of the appropriate department's budgetary request. The following interview excerpt emphasizes consultation.

> Q Do you participate while the department's budgetary request is being drawn up?
>
> A Oh, yes. You have to remember that it is very difficult to assimilate all the information necessary to assemble a five to six million dollar budget. So you have to rely tremendously on the superintendent of schools.
>
> Q You do this?
>
> A More or less. We look at everything he is requesting on a line by line basis. . . . We made a few changes or suggested a few changes, but the superintendent would come up with reasons why we shouldn't or should do it.[22]

This consultation example differs from negotiation. The five DBOs in category II summarized the negotiating process as follows.

> Q Do you participate while the department's budgetary request is being drawn up?
>
> A Certainly. If we have to approve it, we want to have a say in it. . . . They prepare it and give it to us. We look it over and when we get to the final decisions, we ask a lot of questions. . . . I mean, you know, why do you want this? Then we decide on a figure and take a vote. Sometimes our figure stands and sometimes they, the department, get their . . . way.[23]

The members of the independent boards and commissions used two different sets of decision-criteria to reach their decisions concerning the formulation of budgetary requests. As was mentioned, five of the nine members in category I usually agreed with whatever the DBO had proposed. They justified this by citing their lack

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[22]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[23]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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of professional training about the operations of the departments involved.[24]

The category II respondents adopted a complex set of decision criteria that included considerations outside of the department and its particular budgetary needs. The following description is representative of the decision criteria used by the five category II respondents.

> Q When you receive the proposed budgetary request, prior to its formal submission, do you have any type of guidelines that you use while reviewing it?
>
> A He, the DBO generally puts down what we asked for last year on a line to line basis, what was actually appropriated and what we want this year. That way we have a chance to compare what we had last year. . . . We try to put what we think first things first. . . . We generally ask for more than we expect to get. . . . Then we might decide to eliminate this request for the next year or two to see how we make out.
>
> Q Do you have criteria for considering various items?
>
> A Yes. We also keep in mind what we think we might get from the city in the way of an appropriation. We have to keep in mind any impact on the tax rate and so on. The result is that we, as a rule, we adopt a budget which is probably less than what the (DBO) recommended. . . .[25]

The five respondents described decision criteria that included the establishment of priorities, historical precedent, considerations of appropriations from the city, and the impact of such appropriations on the tax rate and the department. These are complex decision criteria when compared with those used by the five category I members. Why do the two groups behave so differently?

The explanatory variable appears to be the method by which the position on the board or commission was obtained. Only one of

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[24]In all five cases, the respondents held private jobs and served in the city government at a sacrifice to their time and convenience.

[25]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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the five category I members who deferred to the judgment of the DBO held elective office. Four of the respondents in category II were elected officials. The five considered their job as one of overseer of public funds and of the public trust.[26] More important, they had dual responsibility. Unlike the five members of category I, these five had more than an obligation to just the department they worked with and supported.[27] They were also publicly responsible for their departmental operating procedures and their fiscal projections. This dual responsibility, both to the department and to the public, forced the five to be more aware of the ramifications of departmental budgetary requests than if they had been responsible for only the department's program. Their decision criteria reflected this dual responsibility.

## MAYORS AND AUDITORS

Even though the mayors and auditors did not have a legally prescribed role in the formulation stage, they were still actively involved while the departments were formulating their budgetary requests.[28] Three patterns of behavior were found.

The first pattern includes two mayors who refused to discuss budgetary proposals with the DBOs prior to their formal submission of those requests. The two mayors described their behavior in the following excerpts.

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[26]This distinction is important. All five members expressed an interest in seeing that a "dollar spent was a dollar spent wisely." Personal interviews, June, September, and October, 1968.

[27]The four members of the independent boards and commissions are not included in this discussion. The five members in category I were usually co-opted by the department they worked with and usually identified with that department's interests and leadership.

[28]See Chapter II, pp. 42-50, for a description of the legal requirements structuring the budgetary process in each city and the relationship prescribed by each city charter for the mayor and auditor.

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> Q Prior to a department's formal submission of its budgetary request on the estimate sheet, do you have either formal or informal conversations with the DBO concerning his request?
>
> A If you say prior to their submission, no. . . . You get to understand the operation of the different departments during the year. Therefore the most important thing that you do with them is to bring them in for a discussion, but not till after their request has been formulated and formally submitted.[29]

The second mayor described similar action.

> Q Prior to the departments' formal budgetary requests, are you in touch with them informally?
>
> A Not actually. Last year, I wasn't in touch with any department head. I feel that if they have a question or a particular problem that it is up to them to contact me. If this happens, and it has several times the past year, I'll ask the departmental head to include the request, regardless of its nature, into his budget. This then permits me to make my decision at a later date. This is the only type of consultation that has taken place.
>
> Q You and the department head do not arrive at an informal agreement prior to . . .
>
> A If you mean do we agree to an amount and then he makes me look good by asking for more than that and then I cut him back, the answer is no. That would be a waste of time on my part.[30]

Both excerpts indicate the mayors' unwillingness to make a commitment prior to the actual time required for that commitment. The mayors argue that this provides them with additional bargaining flexibility because they are in better position to weigh all the alternatives open to them at that point in the process. By refusing

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[29]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[30]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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to negotiate an informal agreement, the mayors have avoided committing themselves favorably or unfavorably and the DBOs must then gauge what the mayors' responses to their requests will be. This often creates uncertainty in the minds of the DBOs and may influence their behavior.[31]

This type of behavior is also characterized by the absence of any major role for the two auditors. They supplied technical information (methods for budgetary preparation, account data, etc.), but they were not approached by the DBOs regarding their chances for their various requests. In both cases, the auditors acted under instructions from the mayor and refused to discuss budgetary matters with any of the DBOs.

The second behavior pattern is more complex. It includes the one example of a mayor and auditor who worked closely together to determine budgetary request levels and then attempted to persuade the various DBOs to keep their budgetary requests within these levels. The mayor described his procedure in this exchange.

> Q Prior to the formal submission by the department heads of their budgetary requests, do you ever discuss informally with them the general levels in which they should be operating?
>
> A Yes. . . . We'll make a note, let's take that up at budget time. I've been noticing such and such a thing which might be improved if we did this or that.
>
> Q Do you then expect the DBOs to keep their requests within reason?
>
> A That's correct. Of course, I've never given them any instruction to limit their requests. That doesn't mean that I'm going to approve it and he knows it. Of course, this whole process is done quite informally and with very little pressure.

---

[31]Several departmental budgetary officials described the problems created for them when the mayor does not give them a definite answer on a prior budgetary request. They felt this restricted their subsequent behavior because the mayor often used his approval as an incentive to get them to go along with other ideas that he wanted them to implement.

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> I meet with the auditor and get a glimpse of what the whole picture looks as if it might be and then I pass the word, very informally, of course, to the departments.[32]

During the year, this man discussed budgetary matters informally with the DBOs and stressed that the city auditor could provide assistance when they drew up their budgetary requests. The DBOs then attempted to sound the auditor out as to what request levels the mayor would approve. The auditor often provided the DBOs with informal cues as to whether or not their requests might be approved.

This pattern of behavior had three results. First, the auditor answered many of the questions and dealt with the DBOs more than the four auditors included in the other behavior patterns. This permitted the mayor more time to devote to other city matters and to budgetary decisions prior to the time required for a decision. Second, this procedure provided the mayor with flexibility when dealing with the various requests. He had not made prior commitments that he had to honor. Third, the mayor had indicated, even though informally and in general terms, what he expected from the DBOs. This permitted the DBOs to formulate their requests so that they were "in the ballpark."[33] This reduced uncertainty on both their parts.

The third behavior pattern includes those mayors who negotiated tacit approval for various budgetary items prior to the formulation of the budgetary requests by the DBOs. The mayors did not seek the advice of their auditors. This behavior is described below.

> Q Prior to the formal submission of a department's budgetary request, does the department head ever consult with you about what is contained in that budget?

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[32]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[33]Several DBOs and the mayor used this term during the interviews.

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A Sometimes, yes.

Q What sort of things would he be asking about?

A . . . The head of the department would want opinions on a particular program, item, or some other aspect of the budget. If it . . . didn't have a chance, he wouldn't put it in. If it did, he would. . . . There was a prior discussion of major inputs to the departments' requests where they could talk over with me ahead of time.

Q When did you make up your mind about these items?

A Well, ideally not till I had everything. . . . It was usually better if everything was in front of me. In practical terms, however, I often decided that item then and there. My informal approval gave them something to plan around.[34]

Two of the mayors described several situations in which they had to make agreements prior to the DBOs' formal budgetary submission.[35] Both mayors felt they had had little choice in the matter since the department heads were demanding informal agreement before they would implement policies desired by the mayors. Both mayors insisted they would avoid prior agreements whenever possible, but did not rule out the possibility of making them again. One mayor summarized this feeling when he said, "Look, I'll get what I need by any way I can. If this means prior approval with the department head, I'll do it."[36]

Why did the mayors behave as they did during the formulation stage? If the relationships between the mayors' length of time in office and margin of victory are compared with the mayors'

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[34]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[35]Personal interviews, September and October, 1968.

[36]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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participation during the formulation stage, an interesting result becomes apparent.[37] Spearman's $r_s$ for the relationship between the mayors' margin of victory and participation during the formulation stage is -.10. Spearman's $r_s$ for the relationship between the length of time in office and the degree of participation during the formulation stage is +.85. The second correlation coefficient is significant at the .10 level.[38] A mayor's participation during the formulation stage appears to increase with his length of time in office, but his margin of electoral victory is not related to his subsequent participation during formulation. Why?

Two answers to this question seem most likely. The first is that as the mayor gains more experience he becomes more capable of manipulating those about him. Thus, informal agreements are used to gain desired ends. The second, and I think more likely explanation, is that as the mayor gains more experience, he also loses some of his political resources. At some point, prior approval of the budgetary request must be used as a resource to gain action that he wants. He must induce, not persuade, at this point. As the one mayor pointed out, he would be willing to use prior budgetary approval, if necessary, to gain what he feels he needs. A new mayor may not need to make such commitments because he has other resources and prior approval becomes an option only after they have been used.

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[37]The mayor's length of time in office was computed by determining the number of calendar months he had held office. The mayor's margin of victory was computed by the following formula:

$$\frac{\%\text{mayor received}}{\%\text{ opponent received}}$$

If the mayor had served one term or more, his average margin of victory was computed. The mayor's participation during the formulation stage was based on the mayor's own description summarized in the text. Each of the mayors was then ranked on each of the three scales from (1) most, to (5) least.

[38]For a description of the technique used to calculate Spearman's $r_s$ and a cautionary note on the sample size, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), pp. 317-319.

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## COUNCIL MEMBERS

Table 3-3 summarizes the distribution of the councilmen into two categories of behavior they attributed to themselves.

TABLE 3-3

DISTRIBUTION OF COUNCILMEN BY BEHAVIOR CATEGORY DURING THE FORMULATION STAGE

| Category / City | I | II |
|---|---|---|
| Milford | 3 | 1 |
| Chicopee | 1 | 2 |
| Bridgeport | 2 | 1 |
| Springfield | 2 | 2 |
| Total for each category | 8 | 6 |

A councilman was placed in category I if he answered the following question negatively: While the departments are preparing their budgetary requests and prior to the submission of those requests, are you ever informally consulted or asked to discuss the proposed budget request by any departmental officials? Eight councilmen answered the question no. These two statements typify the responses of the councilmen included in category I.

> A No. The budgetary officers of the departments very seldom contact us concerning budgetary matters. There is usually no contact at all.[39]
>
> Q Does the head of the . . . consult with you while he is drawing up his budget? Does he ever get your reaction to it or what you would like to see included in it?

[39]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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A No. No.

Q Do other department heads?

A No.

Q After the department head has drawn up his budget does he refer it to you for your comments?

A No.[40]

This behavior contrasts with the behavior described by the councilmen found in the second category. They responded affirmatively when asked if they discussed departmental budgetary requests with DBOs prior to the formal submission of those requests. Two variations of this behavior were described. The first occurred when a department head would approach a particular councilman and ask for his help. Five of the six councilmen in category II described their role as follows.

Q Do you ever discuss the departmental heads' budgets with them prior to their submission?

A Yes. They do.

Q What do these discussions concern?

A Well, to go back a moment, as I mentioned, I was influential with the . . . I know what the city needs in that area. So they come to me. . . . how about giving us a hand . . . . We need fifteen thousand dollars this year . . . and we don't think we can get it unless you help us.[41]

Even though five of the councilmen described specific instances where they were consulted by a DBO prior to the formal submission of his budgetary request, only one of the six councilmen in category II and none of the eight councilmen in category I answered affirmatively when asked if they ever contacted the DBOs to ask that

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[40]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[41]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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they include specific items or funds in their budgetary requests. The councilman who answered yes described his behavior this way.

> Q Do you ever attempt to informally influence people such as department heads?
>
> A Yes.
>
> Q And this was done prior to their budgetary request submission?
>
> A Right.
>
> Q Was this done on your initiative or did they seek your advice?
>
> A No. Only at my initiative.[42]

This excerpt illustrates that (except in one case) whenever contact between department budgetary officials and councilmen occurred during the formulation stage the department head initiated that contact. By not attempting to influence the formulation of budgetary requests, councilmen are open to later criticism when they argue for increased services by a particular department. Responses such as "Why didn't you talk with me while there was time to do something about it?" and "It's too late now for this year. See me next year when I'm drawing up my requests.", were common by the DBOs when various councilmen later requested increased services.[43]

Now that the behavior of the councilmen has been described, what are the reasons for it? One of the Massachusetts councilmen put it succinctly when he was asked why there wasn't more contact among department heads and councilmen during the formulation stage.

> A They realize that they have to impress the mayor and not us with their request. That is why they don't talk with us concerning it. I mean, in very simple terms, that the department head is dead if the mayor can't or won't approve a certain budgetary item. Everyone knows that and operates under that assumption.[44]

---

[42]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[43]Personal interviews, June and September, 1968.

[44]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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Despite the fact that two Massachusetts councilmen had discussed budgetary requests with the DBOs ( see Table 3-3), this statement is accurate. It does the DBO little good to get the approval of various councilmen unless they can then bring pressure on the mayor or other budgetary officials.

The relationships between the councilmen's behavior during the formulation stage and their length of service and leadership position within the council were investigated. The Spearman $r_s$ measuring the relationship between behavior during the formulation stage and length of council service is +.34. Spearman's $r_s$ for the relationship between behavior during the formulation stage and leadership position is +.29. Neither correlation is significant at the .10 level. The best explanation for the behavior of the councilmen has to do with the DBOs rather than the councilmen themselves. It seems that the DBOs select the councilmen they wish to discuss budgetary requests with on the basis of the DBOs' perceptions of which councilmen can do the most in advancing their particular requests.

## MUNICIPAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES

Only three of the twenty-eight municipal group representatives interviewed said they had participated during the formulation stage of the budgetary process. In all three cases, the municipal group representative approached the department heads and asked for consideration. The department heads did not approach them. The three participants were from the same city, but two were more successful than the third representative.

The first of the three was a prominent black leader. He said that he was "distressed" by the general living conditions of the poor in the city and decided that the best course of action was a direct one. The following excerpts summarize his subsequent action.

> Q Are you ever consulted by or do you ever contact city departmental officials about levels of budgetary requests?
>
> A No. . . . Occasionally, we point to areas of great need and concern. . . . For instance, in the area of housing, I

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> have been lobbying for a person who could serve as a housing director. . . . We have asked for things like this. We have asked for many things in the area of education. . . .[45]

When asked about the response of departmental officials to his budgetary requests, he replied that "usually we're listened to politely and dismissed." Why? Because of "arrogance. Arrogance which is grounded in power. They really don't have to do anything. . . ."[46] While the act of participating during the formulation stage had not produced, in this respondent's opinion, the inclusion of his requests in subsequent departmental budgetary requests, he had gone on record with the various department heads. They could not claim ignorance of his requests when they were later asked why they hadn't responded to the requests made during the formulation stage.

The other two municipal group representatives who participated during the formulation stage thought they were more successful. Both men were officers of the local business-civic organization. Several years ago, they successfully organized a drive to have the city raise not only the expenditures of several departments, but also the city's tax rate. This was done by convincing the heads of the police, parks and recreation, and education departments that they would continue to have serious deficiencies in their programs without increased budgetary requests and authorizations. By informally discussing the matter with department heads, it became apparent that the department heads were reluctant to request substantial budgetary increases because of the impact of the increases on the city's tax rate. These two men then talked with the executives of the twenty largest industrial firms in the city and

> . . . went in and . . . pointed out what the problem was, what the needs were, and what we thought might happen as far as the tax rate was concerned. Without exception all of the industry people that we talked to were in full agreement that we did need it and yes the taxes will increase and yes we will be willing to accept and pay them.[47]

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[45]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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After gaining this informal approval, the two men then persuaded both the mayor and the three department heads to substantially increase their budgetary requests. The agreement called for the increased tax revenues to be used only for the three designated departments.[48]

These examples are interesting for three reasons. First, they were specific attempts by municipal group representatives to influence the formulation of budgetary requests. In both cases, the department heads were willing to discuss the requests with the municipal group representatives. Second, the business-civic representatives succeeded in gaining their budgetary requests; the other municipal group representative did not. Why? The critical factor seems to be the assurance given both the mayor and the three department heads that the increased requests could be financed by a tax increase which the city's large industrial firms were willing to absorb. (The tax increase would also apply to individual property-owners.) The black leader could not offer the assurance that the costs of his requests would be borne by a large number of taxpayers. Third, although the behavior of the three municipal group representatives who did participate has been explained, what explanations can be offered for the lack of participation by the other twenty-five municipal group representatives?

This is a difficult question to answer. The majority of the twenty-five emphasized their lack of knowledge about the timing of requests and their feelings that they were to respond to requests, not influence their formulation.[49] The attitude of the twenty-five was summarized by one respondent. "I really don't know very much about the way requests are drawn up. Anyway, it's easier to work in reaction to something than to develop it yourself."[50]

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[48]The city could increase other departmental authorizations only by accepting a larger tax increase than agreed. The agreement called for the three departments to receive their usual annual authorizations plus the revenues raised by the agreed tax increase.

[49]Interviews in all four cities supported this conclusion.

[50]Personal interview, November, 1968.

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## SUMMARY

This chapter has presented evidence to support the following conclusions.

(1) Informal participation was important during the formulation stage of the budgetary process. Ten of the twenty-seven departmental budgetary officials and three of the five mayors informally interacted while developing departmental budgetary requests. Five members of the municipal boards and commissions, six city councilmen, and three municipal group members also participated during the formulation stage.

(2) The budgetary participants used a variety of decison criteria during the first stage of the budgetary process. These decision criteria included historical precedents, professional judgments, and political considerations.

(3) The development of the departmental budgetary requests did not generate serious disagreement among the participants. By permitting discussion to continue until a final decision was required, the tentative nature of the departmental budgetary requests reduced the chances of serious disagreement. This tended to increase the incentive to consult and negotiate.

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# CHAPTER IV

## THE REVIEW STAGE

The second stage of the budgetary process, the review stage, differs in three of the four cities.[1] Departmental requests in Springfield and Chicopee are reviewed by the city auditor and the mayor. The mayor receives the departmental requests during a series of public meetings.[2] The mayor then makes specific recommendations to the city council concerning budgetary levels. In Bridgeport, the auditor makes the recommendations.[3] In Milford, a two-step process is involved. The mayor, after receiving each department's request, submits his budget to the city's Board of Finance.[4] Its members hold public hearings and act upon the mayor's recommendations and then send their recommendations to the board of aldermen. Although the formal requirements do differ, participant behavior is determined more by other variables than these. This chapter describes participant behavior during the review stage.

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[1]For a complete description of the legal requirements of the review stage, see Chapter II, pp. 42-50.

[2]Massachusetts, Annotated Laws, sec. 31 A.

[3]Bridgeport, Charter, c. VI, sec. 95.

[4]Milford, Charter, Art. VI, sec. 1.

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## DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY OFFICIALS

Twenty of the twenty-seven DBOs spoke at a public hearing during the review stage.[5] The twenty DBOs described their formal activity in the following way.

> Q What do you do at the public hearing?
>
> A Well, actually it's twofold. First, it gives me the opportunity to tell the mayor what I feel in my professional judgment, we need in this community. Second, it's really window dressing. Wait, it's really threefold in purpose. The press is there and I get the opportunity to get on the public record how I feel about things.[6]

Nineteen other DBOs stressed their attempts to convince the mayor, the auditor, or the Board of Finance of the need for their budgetary requests. This was done by providing detailed information and cost estimates. In addition, the "window dressing" aspect was important. One DBO described the "window dressing" this way:

> A Look, the hearing gives us a chance to be the public guardian. We can look and sound good without getting overly involved.
>
> Q You feel this benefits you?
>
> A It definitely does. We're on record and now the mayor or council is the culprit. We're protected and rightfully so.[7]

This need for self-protection was a constantly stressed theme. The DBOs felt they were in a sensitive position and that the public

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[5]The other seven DBOs were in Bridgeport where a public hearing is not part of the review stage.

[6]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[7]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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hearing offered them the opportunity to protect themselves from both the mayor's later criticism or public reaction if things were to go wrong.[8]

The role of the press was the third important aspect of the public hearing. It was during the review stage that the press in Springield, Milford, and Chicopee began to develop stories around budgetary requests.[9] This permitted two things to happen. First, the DBO was able to get his news in the press and before a larger segment of the community's populace. Several DBOs felt this increased their chances of getting their requests accepted by either the mayor or the Board of Finance. They felt that if they could get the information to the public, public reaction might increase the chances for adoption. When asked how often this succeeded, the DBOs conceded that the mayor paid only marginal interest to support generated this way. Despite its ineffectiveness in this case, the possibility of press coverage provided the DBO with another way to protect himself. The following interview excerpt illustrated this.

> Q Did you attempt to arrange for newspaper coverage when you appeared at the hearing?
>
> A Well, let's just say that there were always steps taken to assure that the press boys were there.
>
> Q Why?
>
> A Look, you've got to understand that I have to protect myself. I'm the one the public looks to when the mayor passes the buck. It's up to me and it's really important if I can point back and say, look, where were all of you when I needed help?

---

[8]The ability and willingness of the DBOs to use the public record to defend themselves was not unique during the review stage. One resource which they all tried to use effectively was the news media. This gave them access during all stages of the budgetary process to the public and permitted the DBOs to tell their story.

[9]This coverage was usually part of their regular news coverage. On several occasions, a department head recounted how he contacted the news media in order to be sure of news coverage during his presentation.

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Q Is this effective?

A You would be surprised at how effective it is.[10]

This theme of personal and professional protection against subsequent attacks by either the mayor or the public was stressed throughout my discussion with the DBOs about formal aspects of the review stage. The DBOs felt that the review stage provided them with the means to gain some insurance if future problems were to arise. They could then blame the problem on the lack of adequate funding which they had warned against.

It is important to keep in mind that in Bridgeport the auditor makes the budgetary recommendations after receiving the DBOs' requests and that there is no public hearing during this stage of the Bridgeport budgetary process. This had significant impact on the process. First, it did not permit the DBO to publicize his programs or requests. Second, the DBO had to depend upon informal means to influence the auditor since there were no formally structured ways to accomplish contact. This was important in structuring auditor-DBO relationships during this period. Finally, the public's attention was not called to the auditor's decisions on budgetary requests. In the other three cities, the DBOs' requests were given extensive press coverage. In Bridgeport, the auditor did not release the DBOs' requests until he released his recommendations regarding those requests. This often made it difficult for the DBOs to gain public support and emphasized their informal communications with the auditor.

In addition to the formal aspects of the review stage, nineteen of the twenty-seven DBOs were also informally active.[11] They worked privately and informally with, in all cases, the mayor and the auditor. It is interesting to note that in Milford, despite

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[10]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[11]Informally means that they attempted to either directly influence the review officer or have the public do so outside the formal process already described.

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the power of the Board of Finance, no attempts were made to informally influence its action. The six DBOs in Milford agreed that "others might try to talk to them (the members of the Board of Finance), but I don't because the Board would see it as pressure. Besides, the mayor is the man you have to convince. Without him, it doesn't do much good to talk with anyone on the Board."[12] Table 4-1 summarizes the informal behavior of the twenty-seven DBOs during the review stage.

TABLE 4-1

DBO INFORMAL CONTACT WITH REVIEWING BODY OR PERSON

| City | Present | Absent |
|---|---|---|
| Milford | 4 | 2 |
| Chicopee | 5 | 2 |
| Bridgeport | 5 | 2 |
| Springfield | 5 | 2 |
| Total | 19 | 8 |

Several things should be emphasized. First, as the table entries show, there were similar amounts of informal action in all four cities <u>despite</u> the formal differences cited in Chapter II.[13] I will return to this factor after discussing the variation in behavior.

All nineteen of the DBOs who described informal behavior did so in the following manner.

[12]Empirical evidence supports this conclusion. The Board of Finance had not made any measurable reduction (over one-half of one percent) in the mayor's request for three years.

[13]This eliminates the formal rules as the <u>sole</u> explanation for behavior during the budgetary process. The formal rules do structure informal action, but they don't eliminate it.

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Q What do you do at the public hearing?

A I'll get the mayor at the formal hearing and present a budget that is the . . . budget. There might be things in there that I don't believe in, but I'll present them just as forceful. Then, after the hearing and before the mayor's recommendations, I'll get hold of him and discuss what I feel my real priorities are.

Q How do you do this?

A Well, it's really very simple. I've been here under two mayors and both have called me into his office on a Saturday or whenever he's working on a budget and we discuss aspects of it privately.

Q What do you discuss?

A The benefits and costs of my needs. I try to convince him that financially and politically it is the thing to do. It is my opportunity to lay the chips on the table; he usually does the same.[14]

The nineteen DBOs felt the informal contacts permitted them to talk to the mayor in a language that he could "understand."[15] This contrasts with the belief of the eight DBOs who did not informally interact with either the mayor or auditor during the review stage. They felt that "once the request is in, it's up to the mayor to decide. My job is to develop a realistic request, not to badger him."[16]

Another type of informal behavior had even more political content. Six of the DBOs described elaborate attempts on their part to create pressure on the mayor's office during this stage. These six DBOs organized community groups which wanted specific

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[14]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[15]They stressed the willingness of the mayor to consider their reasons why something should not be reduced without raising the question of tax rates and efficiency. Practical political questions were often discussed during these sessions.

[16]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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programs included in the budget. These programs coincided with departmental programs, and provided the DBO with the information necessary to exert pressure on the mayor. The following interview excerpt illustrates this procedure.

> Q When you're faced with your budget and you are getting public pressure from citizens for different things, do you ever attempt to have them influence other political leaders?
>
> A Oh, absolutely. The mayor's our man. I tell them to get petitions and to come down to the mayor. When petitions don't work, I tell them to get twenty-five women with their kids and get into the mayor's office. You get in there and make the kids squeal and everything else. That's the way to get him to act. Especially for a trouble spot where I can't get him to act.
>
> Q Is this effective?
>
> A Absolutely. That's the most effective way because there is no mayor who can stand twenty women and a bunch of kids.[17]

The other five DBOs that informally organized this type of pressure described a similar chain of events. All six agreed that this was more effective than rationally attempting to persuade the mayor about a budgetary item or departmental program. One of the more interesting aspects of this was that in all three cities where a DBO behaved in this manner, the mayors were unaware of their efforts to instigate the pressure.[18] The six DBOs felt informal pressure produced results and admitted that they used it when they felt a request was in danger and was especially important to them.

Several comments concerning the DBOs and the results of their efforts during the review stage are now in order. As I have mentioned, nineteen DBOs participated informally during the review stage; despite

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[17]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[18]In each case, the mayor described various pressure groups that had made him reconsider his decision. None of the mayors, when asked how the group was organized, realized the DBO involved had initially organized the group. This fact was substantiated by dealing with the group's leadership.

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this, there was no way to predict which DBOs would participate informally. Length of time in office, allegiance to the mayor, and nature of the departmental function had very little to do with who participated and who did not.[19] The DBO's individual outlook was the best explanation for his behavior during the review stage. If he felt it was his job to protect the department's interest throughout the budgetary process, the DBO tended to be more informally active.[20] One DBO summarized this feeling in the following exchange.

> Q Why do you attempt to informally influence the mayor while he is preparing his recommendations?
>
> A Why? Well, you have to realize my position. The mayor may be worried about his tax rate, but I'm worried about my departmental budget.
>
> Q What do you mean?
>
> A If the mayor cuts me too much in his recommendations, my department suffers. If that happens, morale and public confidence falls. I have to fight for my men and my programs. This is my responsibility. I have to look out for the department and for myself. Informal discussion with the mayor, when we both don't have to worry about the press and the public, is most productive. At least I'm sure the mayor understands my position. Sometimes, I even understand his.[21]

The formal and informal behavior patterns of the DBOs during the review stage had three results. Of the twenty-seven DBOs, twelve felt their participation affected the mayor's, the auditor's, or the Board of Finance's final recommendation. Although it was

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[19]On all three measures, the correlation with informal activity during this stage was less than +.15.

[20]The internalization of the formal rules of an institution is cited by many observers to explain bureaucratic behavior. In this case, individual personal outlook as to the role of the DBO in defending his interests and the relationship of those interests to the community interest was more important in determining behavior than the formal rules.

[21]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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difficult for them to determine the exact effect of their activity, most of the twelve argued that the mayor would have consistently recommended less if they hadn't intervened. Nineteen of the twenty-seven did feel that their behavior resulted in the mayor's checking with them prior to his official recommendations. This permitted them the opportunity to try to "salvage" a request or at least attempt to have the mayor make his cuts where the DBOs felt they would be less harmful to the overall performance of their department. As one DBO described the situation:

> Q While the mayor is reviewing your budget, do your attempts to influence him have any weight?
>
> A Well, he knows that I'm concerned and if he's doing his job right he'll ask me about a cut before making it. I have to remind him that I'm still around and that I care a great deal about what happens. That's the real benefit from keeping on him while he's reviewing the budget.[22]

Eight DBOs described situations where they had no informal contact during the review stage. They learned of the reviewer's recommendations only when he made them public. This lack of prior notification offended them and most felt it was indicative of the mayor's feelings towards them.[23] All eight felt they had little influence in budgetary determinations and felt this affected the reviewer's final recommendations.

The second result was that the informally active DBOs had a sense of participation. Their job did not stop with budgetary formulation; they tried to convince the review officials of the worth and benefits of their proposals. Their formal and informal roles during the review stage permitted them to have a feeling of control over the end result of the review stage -- the recommendation. This increased their willingness to try to influence policy.

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[22]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[23]They felt that it indicated the mayor's disdain for their department and its role in the city.

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Third, the formal and informal behavior patterns summarized indicate that the DBO is not confronted with a definite and final decision regarding his budgetary requests. He realizes that he may be able to restore a mayor's recommended reduction if need be.[24] By participating during this stage, the DBO gets a better idea about the mayor's receptivity to his program and also some inclination of the degree of public support for it. This permits him to gauge his future course of action in light of his prior experience.

## MEMBERS OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

Four types of behavior were described by the fourteen respondents in the independent board and commission category. Type I includes the two members of the Milford Board of Finance who were legally required to participate during the review stage. Type II includes those board and commission members who participated informally, but only infrequently. Type III includes the board and commission members who participated extensively during the review stage. Those board and commission members who did not participate either formally or informally in the review stage were placed in type IV. Table 4-2 summarizes the distribution of the fourteen board and commission members into these four types.

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[24]There are two ways of doing this during later stages. First, the mayor can later ask the Council to increase his original recommendation. This did not happen during the period of time I studied. Second, the DBO may be able to obtain either a transfer or a supplementary appropriation during the expenditure stage of the budgetary process. This did occur.

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TABLE 4-2

REVIEW STAGE BEHAVIOR OF INDEPENDENT BOARD AND COMMISSION MEMBERS

| City \ Type | I | II | III | IV | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Milford | 2 | 1 | 1 | - | 4 |
| Chicopee | - | - | 1 | - | 1 |
| Bridgeport | - | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 |
| Springfield | - | 2 | 1 | - | 3 |
| Total | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 14 |

Type I behavior was described by the two members of the Milford Board of Finance. One of the Board's members, when asked his impression of the role of the Board, responded

> A . . . I think the primary role of the Board of Finance is one of advisory. It takes a very close look and bisects and dissects every item in the budget. . . . so we do review the budget in very fine detail.
>
> Q How do you do this review?
>
> A We have departmental hearings where we call all the department heads to our meetings. We give them a chance to explain their budgets. We ask questions of them. . . . Then we have a public hearing. We don't participate per se, but we do listen. We'd rather have the public express their opinions. Then we take the entire budget under advisement and reach our recommendations.[25]

Both men agreed that the Board's role was nonpartisan and that it involved the gathering of sufficient information to permit an intelligent decision. The decision criteria used by the Board's members in making budgetary decisions were described as follows.

> Q How does the board decide what to recommend?
>
> A We look at several factors. Probably the most important

[25]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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is the mayor's recommendation. You have to remember that he works with the departments and usually has a better understanding. So naturally we put more weight on his recommendation than on what the department requested.

Q Do you tend to go along with the mayor's requests?

A In most cases. Especially if there is sufficient information to support him. After all, he is responsible for overall city government and we are to assist him. Keep in mind that we know quite a lot about the city and its operation. The mayor and department heads would not be able to fool us even if they wanted to. We do what is best for the city.

Q While you are considering the requests, do any departmental officials attempt to informally contact you?

A No. I would resent it if they did. They know that so they wouldn't try it.[26]

This excerpt illustrate the "above-politics" approach expressed by the two members of the Board of Finance. It appears to be well accepted by the DBOs as none attempted informal contacts with the members of the Board of Finance during the review stage. In Milford, the DBOs focused their attention and effort on the mayor and attempted to persuade him to agree with their requests.

Five board and commission members described type II behavior. These men were informally active; however, their informal activity was limited to providing information to the reviewing official. They made no attempt to actively influence the recommendations of the reviewers. The following interview excerpt summarized their behavior.

Q After the department head has submitted his budget, what do you do?

A Very little and then only if we are asked to . . . Usually we supply information if requested.

Q Can you give me an example?

A Certainly. Say an item is in the budget the mayor doesn't understand. . . . He might ask us why it's there. We tell him, but only after we are asked.

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[26]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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Q How often does this happen?

A Perhaps several times a year. Never more than that.[27]

This type of behavior is contrasted with the board and commission members' behavior depicted in type III of Table 4-2. The following interview excerpt summarizes their behavior.

Q Once your departmental budget is set, it then goes to the mayor. Does he ever consult with you or other board members concerning it?

A Definitely. Usually with one or another board member as well as the department head. He will ask us if such and such a program is acceptable. We then have to decide if it is or not.

Q How do you decide this?

A Usually on our guess of the mayor's strength. If I think we can get public support, I fight him. If not, I'll give in.

Q How often does the mayor consult with you while preparing his recommendations?

A Usually three or four times. We try to work out all of the details with him and to reach a mutual understanding.[28]

Type III behavior is different from that described under type II. In this case, the board member is actively involved in bargaining with the mayor over what his recommendations should be. Relative strengths and weaknesses are assessed and the board member attempts to influence the mayor as much as possible. Of the four board members who were placed in type III, all were elected school board members. The four felt they had a public obligation to influence school recommendations.[29]

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[27]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[28]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[29]This was based on both their personal perceptions of their positions and on their legal interpretations of what their positions required.

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Type IV behavior was described by those board and commission members who did not attempt to influence the auditor's recommendations. The three members of this category were from Bridgeport. They were quite content not to try and persuade the auditor and often argued that their job was to approve a budget as submitted to them by a DBO; the auditor's job was to make specific recommendations concerning those budgets.

What were the effects of these four types of behavior? Most independent board and commission members did not participate during the review stage; if they did participate, it was usually to provide information. Even where the independent board and commission members had great autonomy, (the Board of Finance), they saw their role as advisory and nonpolitical. They did not seriously disagree with the mayor's recommendations although there were several occasions where their actions prompted public reaction.[30] Most independent board and commission members saw their job as being completed once the departmental budget had been submitted to the mayor. Except for the four independent board and commission members in type III, they chose to withdraw from subsequent action during the review stage. The four who were active did feel they had moderate success in influencing the reviewer's final recommendations. As one of these four summarized, "If you stay at it long enough, the message gets through and you get the recommendation you want or need."[31]

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[30]In two cities, the board would issue a statement in response to the mayor's review of their budget. This often increased public interest in the final budgetary outcome.

[31]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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## MAYORS AND AUDITORS

The mayors and auditors of the four cities participated extensively during the review stage. Despite the similar legal requirements, there were three types of auditor behavior during this stage. In all three types, the mayor was the dominant figure and made the basic budgetary decisions, but in the second and third types, the auditors were either moderately or very active.[32] The first type included one auditor who provided the mayor with the comprehensive budget as submitted by the various department heads. This auditor did not attempt to influence the mayor concerning his recommendations and the mayor did not seek such advice.

Two auditors described the second type of behavior. They prepared the final departmental budgetary requests, but provided more information to the mayor. The following exchange typifies this relationship.

> Q After the departments had submitted their budgets, what role did you play with the mayor?
>
> A We would put this all together . . . We would sit down and we would go over department by department with the mayor.
>
> Q What would happen during these meetings?
>
> A We would look at the past record of the department. If we felt something was out of line the mayor would ask me to request more information. Usually I approached the department head and asked for more information.

---

[32]Moderately active means that the auditor did more than merely compile the various requests. He often supplied projections and comparative estimates for the mayor's use. Very active means that in some cases, the auditor was directly involved in negotiating as the mayor's representative with the DBOs over final budgetary figures and levels.

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Q When the mayor had to make the final decision, what was your role?

A Well, he might ask me, but usually he had all the information he wanted and he would decide what should and what should not be included in his final request.[33]

The third type of behavior involved two auditors who were active participants during the review stage. This involvement went beyond providing information or acting as an intermediary; it included specific attempts to persuade a DBO to accept a lower recommendation than his original request and included long range analysis of the impact of the mayor's decisions. One of the two auditors described his role as follows:

Q Once the budget requests have been cut, are these discussed with the DBOs?

A In some instances. . . . As to specific areas that are to be cut . . . an informal or I'll play it by ear situation may develop. Whatever the mayor feels is best is done.

Q What happens in these discussions?

A Well, if the department head feels that something is of a critical nature and can't possibly be left out of the budget, he would contact me and we would have a discussion at that time. We'd try to come up with some intelligent solution.[34]

Both auditors stressed the planning role they played. The mayors depended upon them for their projection of tax and revenue levels for a variety of periods of time.[35] The technical information supplied by the auditors may have been a factor in subsequent budgetary decisions by the mayors.[36]

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[33]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[34]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[35]Usually these projections were done on a yearly and three year basis.

[36]It is impossible to isolate the sole reason, if one exists, for the mayors' final decisions. In some cases, although not many, the mayors did cite technical information provided by the auditor as the basis for his final decision. In every case, the decisions were minor ones and did not involve large amounts of funds.

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Despite the differing roles of the auditors during the review stage, the mayors were the central and pivotal figures. It is important to know how they gained the information needed to make their decisions and the decision criteria they used in making these decisions.

All five mayors described how they developed and used a complex information network to gain necessary data. This network included such diverse elements as random notes taken during departmental inspections; conversations with DBOs during the fiscal year; written justifications accompanying departmental requests; their auditor's evaluation of needs and revenues; and their own political reading of what was necessary to please the public. After this information had been gathered, it was usually an informal process, the mayor would then decide a course of action and attempt to justify it. This resulted in the development of decision criteria used by the five mayors to prepare their recommendations during the review stage. Figure 4-1 places the five mayors on a continuum of decision criteria.

| Nonpolitical | Community Oriented | Political |
|---|---|---|
| (1) | (2) | (2) |

Fig. 4-1.--Decision Criteria Used by the Five Mayors During the Review Stage

Each of the three criterion should be briefly discussed. The nonpolitical approach was stressed by one mayor. When asked what criteria he used in making his budgetary recommendations, the mayor responded:

> A All of my decisions must be guided by one central idea. The citizens of this city do not want political factors involved in budgetary decisions. Rational and objective reasons, not political deals, must be the basis for my budgetary decisions.[37]

[37]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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This mayor's insistence on "rational and objective" reasons had three ramifications. First, the mayor refused to discuss his recommendations with DBOs during his deliberations; this meant that the DBOs had no chance to set priorities and often expressed the view that the mayor's cuts were arbitrary and that the DBOs should have been consulted. This tended to increase the feeling of distrust and uncertainty on the part of the DBOs towards the mayor.[38]

The second implication was that the mayor was unwilling to listen to groups outside of the budgetary process while making his recommendations. The following excerpt illustrates the mayor's insistence that he not be "pressured" during the review stage.

> Q While you are considering your requests do others in the community ever discuss budgetary requests with you?
>
> A No, never. Most people just don't care and even if they were interested, they wouldn't contact me prior to my recommendations.
>
> Q What would your attitude be if someone did attempt to discuss budgetary requests prior to your recommendations?
>
> A I would listen politely and then usher him out. If anything, they would probably hurt their case more than help it. . . . I must make the decisions and if I need information and assistance, it is up to me to seek it. Not for them to seek me. I would really resent that.[39]

When this line of questioning was pursued, the mayor stated he would be unwilling to listen to all community groups and would take such interaction as a direct threat to his power to make recommendations.

In addition to the absence of informal contact with the DBOs and community groups, this mayor emphasized the "nonpolitical" nature of his recommendations. The mayor was quite emphatic when he replied to this question.

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[38]Personal interviews, October, 1968.

[39]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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> Q As an elected official, you are aware of political factors affecting your decisions. How important are they and how do you evaluate them?
>
> A To be quite honest . . . I doubt if political considerations entered my decisions at all.[40]

The mayor then retold three or four instances where he took a nonpolitical stand and why he used this approach.[41]

This nonpolitical approach contrasts with the "community oriented" approach that two mayors used. These men stressed that community betterment and progress was the key criterion used in their decisions. By adopting this viewpoint, the mayors argued they were able to take a broad view of the community and labeled those who differed as promoters of narrow interests. One mayor described his role as follows.

> A Because of our history . . . and past experiences, the mayor has to be responsible for community-wide programs . . . I'm the only person who speaks for the community and it is my job to see that the right decisions are made. Therefore the community leaves the decisions to me and it is up to me to make them.
>
> Q How do you do that?
>
> A By taking the community's interest above all others. It comes first . . . [42]

The community interest approach has several implications for public policy decisions during the review stage. First, each department head, if he is aware of the criterion used by the mayor, will attempt to develop a program appealing to the mayor on this basis. Thus the departments that can stress community good may be

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[40] Ibid.

[41] All of the cited instances involved projects of community interest. They included urban renewal, police and schools.

[42] Personal interview, October, 1968.

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in a better position to see their budgetary requests approved or receive less of a reduction.[43]

Second, the mayor decides the community interest. He interprets what is good or not good for the community. Since there is no standard formula that he can use to compare programs, his personal biases are most likely to be used to evaluate the DBOs' requests. If you share the mayor's policy preferences, you may feel he is doing a very capable job; if not, you may feel he is totally inadequate as a leader. The important point is that the community oriented mayor is not acting in a value free way, but interpreting what he perceives the community good to be.

In both cases, the mayors used informal means to supplement their own concept of community good. They developed frequent contacts with community groups and attempted to encourage private citizens to discuss problems or concerns with them.[44] After sifting the information they had gained, the mayors then decided what their budgetary recommendations would be.

This behavior is in sharp contrast to the behavior of the two mayors who were politically oriented. These mayors described decision criteria that carefully weighed the political implications of their budgetary recommendations during the review stage. The following excerpts characterize their approach.

> Q What sort of criterion did you use in making your recommendations?
>
> A My own sense of, I suppose my own sense of priorities . . . These were related to my experiences as mayor. It's funny how at budget time you have the resources to attack some of the political problems that have plagued you. Recalcitrant department heads and councilmen listen at that time of the

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[43]When the departments in this city were analyzed using community good as a standard, the education, police, fire, parks, and public works departments were more successful in obtaining funds than other departments.

[44]This was done as much as possible, but in both cases, the time demands on the mayor prohibited him from speaking to more than two or three individuals per week.

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year. It's up to me to make them listen. That was always high on my priorities.[45]

Q What criterion do you use in evaluating a department's request?

A Well, I separate things into paper clip accounts and programs. . . . on programs quite often it is your own ideal for it. . . . If I feel a program is important, I'll increase the total. To some people this may be skullduggery, but it's a fact of political life.

Q So the political aspects are very important in some areas?

A Certain areas, yes. . . . There are certain issues that are bread and butter to political life. You try and provide as many new services as possible to as many people at as low a cost as possible. A city has various population segments and you have to try and satisfy them, if not, you don't get the votes.[46]

The mayors' emphasis on political considerations have three implications for the review stage and the entire budgetary process. First, the mayors are willing to bargain with their DBOs about budgetary requests. Both of these mayors were the most active in this respect. Informal bargaining and discussion over the mayors' final budgetary recommendations were common.[47]

Second, since the mayors viewed their decisions as political ones, they attempted to gain more information about community feelings. This broadened their network of formal and informal contacts and made them more accessible to the public. This public accessibility made them more responsive to public pressure. Both mayors described specific situations where they felt they had been

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[45]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[46]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[47]The mayors described situations where they would negotiate concessions from a DBO over how he ran his department in return for budgetary approval of his requests.

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compelled by public pressure to recommend larger amounts than they really wanted to.[48] They felt, given their political outlook, there was little they could do. They saw this public pressure as a legitimate part of the budgetary process.

The third implication was that these two mayors were forced to consciously balance votes won and lost before making decisions. This excerpt illustrates that process.

> Q How do you decide if two or more groups offer you conflicting advice on a request?
>
> A . . . It's not easy. I simply say okay and look at who is going to benefit me the most. That group is usually listened to; the other group is not.
>
> Q How often does this happen?
>
> A Several times each budget year and I've always decided it on the same basis. Those with the most votes get it.[49]

This type of behavior is not going to benefit minority groups (whether they be racially, socially, legally, or economically drawn) who lack the votes to gain the mayor's support on issues they feel are vital to their well-being.

Now that the behavior of the mayors-auditors have been described, the next question is what explains it? Using the Spearman $r_s$ correlation technique, there is no significant relationship between the mayor's margin of victory and behavior during the review

---

[48]Both cases involved significant amounts of money. In one, it had been rumored in the press and by citizens that the mayor had cut or was going to cut the supplementary school budget. In fact, he had done so. The public reaction to his anticipated reduction convinced him that it was politically disadvantageous to do so. His final recommendation did not include the reduction. In the other instance, the mayor received extensive public support for a road paving program that he had promised to reduce. He felt it was better not to ignore the pressure and did not make his promised reductions in the original request.

[49]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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stage.[50] Spearman's $r_s$ for the relationship between length of time in office and behavior category during the review stage was significant at the .10 level. This is a similar finding to the one developed to explain the mayor's behavior during the formulation stage.[51] In this case, it would seem that the mayor becomes more politically oriented as he learns the strengths and weaknesses of his office. The longer he is in office, the more likely he is to see the review stage and his recommendations made during it as specific incentives or rewards for behavior that he approves. The granting or withholding of specific budgetary requests is a way of ordering his political house and of gaining some control over community politics. Since his recommendation is not final, he does not have ultimate political control. The importance of his decision necessitates that those affected by it attempt to influence it. Thus you have the development of different strategies by the various participants. This activity during the review stage helps to structure activity in the subsequent stages of the budgetary process.[52]

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[50]The mayor's margin of victory was computed as described in footnote 37, Chapter III, p. 69.

[51]See pp. 68-69 of Chapter III.

[52]If the mayor grants requests, the DBO is interested in attempting to see that the mayor's request is adopted. If the mayor reduces the request, the DBO attempts to maximize the possibility that he can gain additional funds during the later stages of the budgetary process.

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## COUNCIL MEMBERS

The fourteen council members described their behavior during the review stage in active and inactive terms. Seven of the councilmen were inactive during the review stage. They did not attempt to influence the review officials and they learned of the reviewer's recommendations only when these were made public. In additon to this lack of activity, the seven council members felt they had no right to participate during the review stage. The following excerpt summarizes this feeling.

> Q Does the mayor ever consult with you or the other members of the Council concerning budgetary recommendations that he might make?
>
> A . . . Not as far as budgetary levels. He would feel that we are encroaching on his rights under the Charter if we tried to influence him there. . . .
>
> Q Are you satisfied with this?
>
> A Given the restrictions of our Charter, I think it is completely adequate.[53]

Contrast this inactive behavior and its acceptance with the behavior of the other seven council members who were active participants during the review stage. Three of them attempted, with little success, to influence the recommendations being made during the review stage. They felt their lack of power to influence the recommendations caused this. Nevertheless, they did attempt to influence the recommendations and usually on a regular basis.[54]

In this group of seven, four council members were even more active. They negotiated directly with the mayor while he was making his review and recommendations. This usually was the result of a

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[53]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[54]Personal interviews, June, July, and September, 1968.

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department head or heads requesting their assistance prior to the mayor's public announcement of his recommendation. One council member described his role in this manner.

> Q Were you in touch with the mayor while he was considering his budgetary recommendations?
>
> A Well, sometimes I was contacted prior to the mayor's meeting with the department head. In those cases, I was permitted to sit in on the meeting and this gave me a tremendous insight.
>
> Q In what ways?
>
> A Well, I could try to influence the mayor. I knew the same facts that he did, so I could argue with him. Sometimes I was successful and the department head was grateful to me.[55]

Although this council member felt he had limited success, others weren't so sure that their negotiations with the mayor had accomplished a great deal. One council member summarized his experience as follows:

> Q Does the mayor ever consult with you while he is preparing his budgetary recommendations?
>
> A Sure, all the time. I meet regularly with him and try to convince him that certain things should or should not be adopted.
>
> Q How effective are you?
>
> A Well, he says he considers our opinion. Our mayor is a real cutie. He never says yes and he never says no. He's the kind of a guy you can go in and talk to him for an hour and you don't know any more than when you went in. And you'd say to yourself, I said, what the hell did I, you know, what transpired and what did I accomplish. . . . The guy is clever. He knows how to move. . . . He's rough to deal with. In the past, you could say you wanted a street and he would say fine, this for that. This guy doesn't do it. Many times he gives you an inch and he takes a mile.[56]

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[55]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[56]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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While this individual was dissatisfied with his informal role during the review stage, he was not unique. The other six council members felt the same way.

What accounted for the different behavior by the two groups of council members? The answer is complicated and the best, but far from complete answer, centers on the length of time the council member had served and on his leadership position. The length of service was not significantly related to informal activity.[57] The Spearman $r_s$ for this relationship is +.51. This is not significant at the .10 level. If the council member were a committee chairman or the president of the council, he was, except in one case, informally active during the review stage. The Spearman $r_s$ for the relationship between leadership position and informal activity during the review stage is +.67.[58] This is significant at the .10 level. Despite this correlation, leadership position alone does not tell us why that person is involved. Did the council members develop their own power or did the mayor attempt to co-opt them early in the process in order to have their support later? If they were involved in the initial recommendation, it would make it difficult for them to then criticize that decision. Whatever the reasons for the council members' behavior, it had significance for the later stages of the budgetary process. The council members became acquainted with the departmental budgetary requests and the mayor's recommendations. They heard the pros and cons of the various positions and requests. Political lines had been drawn by the end of the review stage.

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[57] The councilmen were ranked according to length of time on the council. They were also ranked according to their informal activity during the review stage.

[58] The councilmen were ranked according to their leadership position. Council presidents were ranked first, then committee chairmen, and then council members holding none of these positions.

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## MUNICIPAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES

Eight of the twenty-eight municipal group representatives, two from each city, were informally active during the review stage. There were a variety of reasons given by the twenty inactive municipal group representatives for their behavior during the review stage. The two most cited reasons are summarized in the following excerpts.

> Q While the mayor is considering his final recommendations, are you ever in contact with him concerning them?
>
> A No. Definitely not.
>
> Q Why?
>
> A It's none of my business. He does his job and I do mine. . . . I'd resent it if he butted in with me and I don't blame him for doing the same if I butted in where I didn't belong.[59]

In addition to this feeling of not having the right to participate, a strong feeling of ignorance was often cited by municipal group representatives who did not participate.

> Q While the mayor is considering his final recommendations, are you ever in contact with him concerning them?
>
> A No. Never.
>
> Q Any particular reasons why?
>
> A Well, I really don't know too much about budgetary matters. It's really very confusing to me. I only get involved when it affects me.[60]

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[59]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[60]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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The eight municipal group represenatives who did participate during the review stage agreed that their informal participation was an expression of their ". . . right to influence budgetary levels for whatever purposes by whatever means . . ." available to them.[61] There were three types of municipal group representatives active. The first type consisted of two political party leaders who regularly discussed the mayor's budgetary recommendations with him. They described their behavior as follows.

> Q Before the budget is submitted, are you ever informally contacted . . . concerning it?
>
> A Sure. Quite regularly.
>
> Q In what way?
>
> A Well, it's all very informal, but it's done. On certain items that are going to have a heavy effect on the tax structure, we will meet and seriously discuss it.
>
> Q What happens when you discuss it?
>
> A Everyone listens and offers his views. Then the decision has to be made. . . . Even if I disagree with the decision, I'm still a participant. That makes me feel a little better.[62]

From the interviews, it was impossible to tell the effect of these political leaders on subsequent decisions. My impression is that they were used as consultants and that the mayor retained the right to make the basic budgetary decisions. Nevertheless, they were involved in the review stage.

The second type of active municipal group representatives included two taxpayers' groups and one business organization. Their representatives described their role as one of ". . . bringing efficiency to government and keeping the cost down."[63] They

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[61]Personal interviews, June, July, September, and October, 1968.

[62]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[63]Personal interviews, July and September, 1968.

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were active during the review stage because they were concerned with the tax rate. They felt the business and taxpayer communities should ". . . be heard as early as possible so that leaders know where we stand."[64] Only one of the three representatives felt he was instrumental in having the mayor reduce his budgetary recommendations. The other two felt they were cordially received, but doubted if their attempts had much to do with subsequent recommendations.[65]

The third type of active municipal group representatives included the secretaries of two civil-rights organizations and several officers of a League of Women Voters chapter. These representatives were found in three different cities. When one of them was asked if he participated during the review stage, he responded:

> A Someone has to. The politicians will ignore the public interest unless they know how you feel. The city has ignored needs for years and my job is to prod their conscience.
>
> Q How effective are you in influencing the mayor's recommendations?
>
> A You'd be surprised. I know there are specific things in his budget, expecially in the areas of public works and education that wouldn't be there if I hadn't really badgered him during his consideration. Later than that may be too late.
>
> Q You feel you were effective?
>
> A Very definitely.[66]

The other two municipal group representatives had similar

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Personal interviews, June and October, 1968.

[66] Personal interview, July, 1968

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feelings and emphasized specific programs the mayor had supported because of their insistence. Their ability to intervene prior to the mayors' decisions was crucial.[67]

It is significant that in all four cities, municipal representatives, even if a minority, were active during the review stage. This was a link between the wider community and the decision-making perspective of the mayor's office. Their impact on his final decisions is impossible to measure, but the act of participation is not.

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[67]This permitted them to convince the mayor he should make another decision. The mayor did not have to change his mind publicly and could react more openly to their requests.

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## SUMMARY

This chapter has established the following concerning the review stage of the budgetary processes in these four cities.

(1) All five participant groups were active during the review stage, but the DBOs and the mayors-auditors were the central figures. Citizen involvement, although found in three cities, did not have substantial impact on the decisions made during the review stage.

(2) In addition to the formal requirements for action, there was significant informal participation among the members of the various groups. This usually took the form of informal discussion and negotiation.

(3) As the mayors' tenure in office increased, so did the probability of their informally negotiating with the DBOs during the review stage. This may be due to their increased understanding of the office or the exhaustion of other resources at their disposal.

(4) If a councilman held a leadership position, he was more likely to be active than if he did not.

(5) The eight municipal group representatives who attempted to influence outcomes during the review stage felt they had achieved limited success.

(6) Despite the legal requirements structuring the review stage, all four cities had extensive informal activity during this stage. Informal participant behavior was found in all four cities.

(7) As in the formulation stage, no final decisions were reached; the participants knew they might influence later outcomes by additional activity during other stages of the budgetary process. This promoted compromise and negotiation.

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# CHAPTER V

## THE DECISION STAGE

In three of the four cities, the city's fiscal program has to have the approval of the local legislative body. Bridgeport's Board of Apportionment and Taxation approves that city's budget.[1] Despite this difference, there is a great deal of similarity among the activities of the various participants during this stage of the budgetary process. This chapter summarizes the formal and informal behavior described by the various participants during this stage.

## DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY OFFICIALS

The twenty-seven departmental budgetary officials were required to appear before the decision-making body and to provide whatever information was requested. This formal behavior is illustrated in the following interview excerpt.

> Q When the city council is considering your budget are they in touch with you?
>
> A Yes. Usually.
>
> Q What are they concerned with?
>
> A Always details. Remember that this is a line item budget and I have to supply a lot of additional information. I do this willingly and it makes the process much easier. Usually by meeting formally with the council, I can provide them with this information.

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[1]See Chapter II, pp. 42-50, for a description of each city's formal budgetary requirements.

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Q Do you ever meet informally with them, either individually or collectively, while they are deciding the budget?

A No, no actually. I'm too busy and it wouldn't make much difference. I give them the information that they ask for and that's all.[2]

Of the twenty-seven DBOs, all are in this formally active category. The twenty-seven cited specific cases where the decision-making body had formally requested more information from them. The DBOs felt this was an important aspect of their jobs and stressed the need to quickly and accurately supply this information to the members of the decision-making body.[3]

In addition to their formal activity, sixteen DBOs were also informally active during the decision stage. Informally active is defined as the attempt, by a variety of informal means, to influence the decision-making body's final decision. Table 5-1 summarizes these findings.

TABLE 5-1

INFORMAL ACTIVITY DURING THE REVIEW STAGE

| City | # of DBOs Inactive | # of DOBs Active |
|---|---|---|
| Milford | 1 | 5 |
| Chicopee | 3 | 4 |
| Bridgeport | 3 | 4 |
| Springfield | 4 | 3 |
| Total | 11 | 16 |

There were a number of reasons why the eleven DBOs were informally inactive. These ranged from a distinct personal dislike

[2]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[3]Personal interviews, June, September, and October, 1968.

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for playing "politics" to a belief that informal activity leads only to increased attention and possible budgetary reductions. One police DBO summarized his feeling when he responded to the following questions.

> Q When the council is considering your budget do you ever informally contact council members?
>
> A No. Never.
>
> Q Do they ever informally contact you?
>
> A No.
>
> Q Any special reasons for this lack of informal contact?
>
> A Sure. Look, I don't think any politician ever wants a really upgraded department. . . . I think it's human. . . . I don't think anybody likes to have a real sharp department, to clean up the whole city and lock up all of their friends . . . It's because of this they don't bother me and I don't bother them. I put my requests in and they decide, but I'm not going to ask for favors. Once I do that I get asked for favors and that's not good.[4]

As Table 5-1 illustrates, the sixteen informally active DBOs were found in all four cities regardless of the legal requirements for the decision stage. Two patterns of behavior were found among the informally active DBOs.

Ten of the sixteen informally active DBOs attempted to "sell" the decision-making body on the merits of their budgetary requests. This was usually done through informal discussions with either individuals or small groups of the members of the decision-making body. This "selling" approach is illustrated in the following interview excerpt.

> Q Do you ever informally attempt to discuss your requests with the decision-making body during its deliberation.
>
> A Certainly. Every chance I get.

---

[4]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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Q How do you do this?

A Well, I feel that any good department head has to be a salesman for his department. I try to sell them on the soundness of the request. I show them where the money is going and why it is needed. I stress my professional competence in this area and that they can say no, but they would have to have professional experts to justify the decision. I stress my expertise.[5]

The other six informally active DBOs described a more indirect and complex method of informal activity. These six felt that it was important to activate other groups or individuals and to have them intervene with the members of the decision-making body. In three cases, the DBOs attempted to activate public groups to bring pressure on the members of the decision-making body. One education DBO described his procedure in the following excerpt.

Q How did you attempt to influence the members of the decision-making body when they were considering your budget?

A Well, I knew they'd listen to the public. That meant I had to organize the public without the members realizing it. So that's what I did. When I needed support, I placed a few phone calls and grass roots support, or so it appeared to the members of the decision-making body, materialized. It was very easy to organize.[6]

Three other DBOs felt public pressure was important, but the development of that pressure was more indirect. They organized community groups that became community "lobbies" for departmental programs.[7] The members of these groups closely followed budgetary developments and when they felt various departmental programs were jeopardized, they attempted to influence the decision-makers. The three DBOs were satisfied with the success of these groups.

Although there were three types of informal participation during the decision stage by the DBOs, all sixteen agreed on the

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[5]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[6]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[7]Personal interviews, June, July, and September, 1968.

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basic reason for being informally active. All cited the duty of the DBO to gain maximum budgetary requests and to get these requests approved by whatever means possible. One DBO described his reasons for being informally active in the following excerpt.

> Q Why are you informally active?
>
> A Listen, it's a fact of life that people need to realize that budgetary decisions are the result of give-and-take. If you refuse to negotiate or if you take a holier-than-thou attitude, you give more and take nothing. I have to protect my department's interest and to do that I need to know what is going on during the final decisions . . . The only way I can do that is to be in informal contact with the people making the decisions.[8]

If we now know the reasons for the presence or absence of informal activity, what are the results of such activity? The sixteen DBOs who were informally active all stressed the fact that this activity was crucial to their receiving their budgetary levels. They felt that if they had not been informally active, they would have been less successful in gaining final appropriations. While this perception of success may be important, there was not a great deal of empirical evidence to support it. When the budgetary requests and final authorizations of the formal and informally active DBOs were compared, only minor differences were found.[9] Informal activity was not a significant explanatory variable in explaining why one DBO had more success than another. Perceived success was important. All of the informally active DBOs felt their informal efforts did result in increased appropriations. These DBOs felt that reductions were quite often more limited due to their informal participation. While it is impossible to measure these

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[8]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[9]This was done by dividing the DBOs into two categories based on their behavior during the decision stage. Then the original request of each DBO in each category was compared to the final authorization he received. In only two cases was the difference between formal and informal DBO behavior significant (resulting in more than a five percent differential).

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differences, it is possible to conclude that informal participation did not result in consistently higher appropriations.

The best explanation of the reasons why a DBO was informally active during the decision stage is related to his activity during previous stages of the budgetary process. If he was informally active earlier, he tended to be informally active during the decision stage. In short, informal activity during the decision stage was an adjunct to informal activity during other stages of the budgetary process.

## MEMBERS OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

The fourteen independent board and commission members were less likely to participate than the DBOs during the decision stage. This was due to a variety of reasons; however, the most important reason was the legal regulations prescribing the independent board and commission members' behavior.[10] The two members of the Milford Board of Finance and the six departmental commission members did not have a legally prescribed role during the decision stage. These eight were not informally active. One of the eight summarized his feelings as follows.

> Q When the city council is making a final decision on the departmental budgetary requests, are you ever in touch with them?
>
> A Absolutely not! My job is to be nonpartisan and if I get involved with them it leads only to trouble. I don't see where I am supposed to do that.[11]

The other six independent board and commission members

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[10]See Chapter II, pp. 42-50, for a detailed description of the powers and duties of the independent board and commission members.

[11]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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had legally prescribed roles and were quite active informally during the decision stage. Two of them were on the final decision-making board that set the city's final budget and tax rate. Both of these board members were formally and informally active. Several interview excerpts will best explain what I mean.

When the two members were asked how they and other board members decided on the final budgetary authorizations, they responded in a similar fashion. One summarized the board's decision-making process as follows:

> Q How do you decide what requests should and should not be granted?
>
> A Well, we look at everything. We go over things on a line-item by line-item basis.
>
> Q Does the board have any criteria that are used to evaluate requests?
>
> A Usually what you do is go back through the preceding year. . . . You see if what was granted was spent. If not, and if this happens too often, you try to reduce their request and give it to another department that needs it.[12]

Both board members emphasized prior experience. They studied past and projected performances and attempted to develop realistic fiscal programs.[13] Both men stressed the need to be careful of certain DBOs' requests. These DBOs were seen as less experienced and the board closely scrutinized their budgetary requests.[14]

Although impartiality and objectivity were the standards stressed by these two men, additional questioning revealed an informal pattern of contact between the decision-making board and the city's political leadership. The following excerpts illustrate

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[12]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[13]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[14]Ibid.

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this interaction.

> Q When you are deciding the final requests, are you contacted by department heads who informally request certain funds?
>
> A Well, yes. At different times, but usually with your politically important departments, such as education, police, and public works. They call us and let us know that they will be unhappy if we reduce their requests. . . . You have to take this into consideration since they are the important departments politically.[15]

While the above excerpt illustrates informal contact by the DBOs, the mayor is not likely to be passive when an important department may be adversely affected by a fiscal decision. One of the board members described the mayor's role as follows:

> Q While you are considering the various departmental requests, are you ever in touch with the mayor?
>
> A No. He is in touch with us. He realizes the importance of our decision and we do try and work with him. We provide him with a business viewpoint of the city; he has a broader view . . . He comes in and discusses what he would like to see done and then we try and work it out with him.
>
> Q Are there serious disagreements on these matters?
>
> A . . . We iron things out. . . . The mayor gets his way unless we feel we just can't go along with him. This doesn't happen very often.
>
> Q During a yearly review, how often would you say other board members disagree with the mayor?
>
> A Well, perhaps several times, but he still gets his way.
>
> Q Why?
>
> A Well, it's a matter of political muscle. We can't really oppose him. I doubt if we have the right to. He is the elected leader and we should follow his requests.[16]

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[15]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[16]Ibid.

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Despite the decision board's independent nature, the mayor is able to exert influence when he feels a decision is important to him. There are no legal requirements for this, but the board members informally interact with the mayor and follow his suggestions.[17]

The other four independent board and commission members were elected school board members and were informally active during the decision stage. The four stressed the need to protect the education budget from reduction and felt that this goal justified their action. Two strategies were used.

The first involved direct interaction with the members of the decision-making body. Two of the four used this strategy and felt it simplified their problems. Whenever any aspect of their request got into difficulty or was threatened, they intervened with the decision body's members and attempted to sell their requests. They stressed the technical and practical knowledge that they were able to provide.[18]

The second strategy was more indirect and called for activating another person or group to intervene on their behalf with the decision-making board. In one case, the mayor was approached and asked to intervene. In another, a community organization was activated to bring public pressure on the decision-making body to rescind a previously made reduction.[19] Both members felt they had been successful.

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[17]The mayor does appoint the members of this board, but he lacks the authority to remove them. In practice, the board's members appear to be little more than public watchdogs who only rarely become involved in program decisions. They seem more concerned with carefully scrutinizing departmental expenditure procedures.
Personal interviews, September, 1968.

[18]Personal interviews, July and November, 1968.

[19]This was done by the board member's efforts to organize a public reaction to any proposed reductions. He was quite successful in doing this.
Personal interview, June, 1968.

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## MAYORS AND AUDITORS

The five mayors and auditors provided significant insight into the dynamics of decision-making during the decision stage. All five auditors described situations where they were asked, either by letter or at a meeting of the decision-making body during this stage, to provide the decision-makers with technical information. One auditor described the process in this fashion:

> Q What is your role with the council during their deliberations and decisions establishing the city's final budgetary program?
>
> A Well, I have to be at every meeting on the budget. I answer all the technical questions.
>
> Q Could you give me an example of a typical technical question?
>
> A There are factors, there are laws, many technicalities under the budget. Last year they wanted to increase a salary, but I told them they couldn't because it meant reclassification to do that. That's the kind of technical information that I provide.[20]

The five auditors agreed that this type of information was important for the members of the decision-making body. The supplying of technical and historical information was seen, by both the auditors and others, as part of the auditors' formal duties.

Two of the five auditors were also informally active during the decision stage. The patterns of their activity varied a great deal. One auditor, as illustrated in the following excerpt, attempted to act as a spokesman for the mayor.

> Q Are the members of the council ever informally in touch with you during the final stages of their decision-making affecting the budget?
>
> A Yes. They are.
>
> Q Could you describe what happens?

---

[20]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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A Well, they need to know how the mayor feels on an important budget item. So they ask me. If I've discussed it with him or if I think I know how he feels, I tell them. If I'm unsure, I check with him and then relay the information back to them. That way, the mayor doesn't have to devote time to something he has someone else do.

Q How often does this happen?

A When the final budget is being decided, three or four times a day. That's why the mayor needs me to do it.[21]

The other informally active auditor attempted to influence the decision-makers whenever they asked him for informal opinions and suggestions. He described his actions as follows:

A Well, when someone asks me for an informal opinion, I try to give it to him. After all, he is seeking help and if I can save him embarrassment I might be able to ask him a favor one day. So that is what I do. . . . If possible, I can give him the information that is necessary to justify a decision that I want to make. Of course, I have to be discreet about this. If the mayor or other people found out, I'd be in trouble.[22]

As with the auditors, the five mayors also had different behavior patterns during the decision stage. Three mayors were informally active. One of the informally active mayors summarized why he was active in the following excerpt.

Q Why are you informally active when the final budgetary decisions are being made?

A I am the one who is responsible for the budget and the city's program. I get the criticism, so it's only fair that I get the program that I want. This is exactly what I do. I fight and attempt to influence as many people as I can. I don't want the budget vitiated and believe me, I feel I have an obligation to prevent that.[23]

---

[21]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[22]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[23]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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Despite the agreement on why they were informally active, each mayor pursued a different strategy.

One mayor attempted to influence the final budgetary decisions by informally lining up support of the members of the decision-making body. He sounded its members out in advance and attempted to persuade them that he needed everything in his request. This mayor described the process as ". . . one of utmost importance. Therefore anything goes and no holds are barred. I try to influence and persuade any way that I can to get the best results."[24]

The other two mayors were more indirect in their actions during the decision stage. They both attempted to rally community support for their programs, but their timing was different. One mayor attempted to activate a variety of community groups while the final decision was being made. He organized and utilized the local teachers and parents organization whenever the education budget was in jeopardy. He felt that a display of public support would be very significant and would have a retarding effect on the proposed reductions under consideration.[25]

The third mayor also attempted to activate community support, but only after the decision-making body had tentatively announced their plan to reduce the budget by a specific amount. This mayor then attempted to gain publicity for his programs and argued that the proposed reduction, regardless of what department it affected, would hinder the community's progress.[26]

All three informally active mayors were effective. In all three cases, specific instances were documented where the mayor's activity did result in either a decision not to delete funds or a decision to restore funds that had tentatively been scheduled to be dropped.[27] From my observations and interviews, it is possible

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[24]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[25]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[26]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[27]While it is impossible to say that any particular event or action caused a specific result, it is possible to say in these cases that the mayors' informal activities were responsible for these decisions. Several participants verified each other's description of the decision process and these descriptions were verified by accounts in the local newspaper.

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to conclude that the mayors' informal activity did result in reduced reductions by the final decision-making body.[28] All three mayors felt that this was the case.

What of the two mayors who were not informally active? One of them summarized his inactivity in response to these questions.

> Q Are you ever informally active with the members of the council while they are making final budgetary decisions?
>
> A No.
>
> Q Why not?
>
> A Their actions are political and I don't want to get involved. The very men who are making the most noise are those who don't have the ability to do their own house budget. Look, I have to keep taxes down and yet provide services. My budget is a reflection of these two goals. Without it, there is nothing I can do. So if I simply announce that these are my requests and that I need them, the members of the council are on the spot. Let them cut if they want, but if they do, they have to take the blame.
>
> Q Do you feel by not informally working to keep the reduction to the minimum that you are more effective?
>
> A Definitely. They know my final requests are it. That way, I don't have to bargain or anything. It's much simpler.[29]

The reasons for the different behavior by the mayors are difficult to isolate and explain. When margin of victory and length of time in office are correlated with informal participation

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[28]In each of the three cases where the mayor was informally active, the council either failed to significantly reduce the mayor's request or it restored large cuts that it had previously made.

[29]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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during the decision stage, the Spearman $r_s$ coefficients are +.30 and +.65 respectively.[30] Neither coefficient is significant at the .10 level although length of time in office appears to again be related to informal activity. Individual personality and political perception are possible explanations for a mayor's informal behavior during the decision stage. If he feels he must informally bargain for funds and if he perceives positive gains from this action, he is likely to participate informally.

## COUNCIL MEMBERS

In each of the four cities, a distinct pattern of behavior was described by the councilmen interviewed about their activities during the decision stage. Each of these will be discussed.

In Bridgeport, the councilmen were not active during the decision stage. They did not attempt to influence the Board of Apportionment and Taxation's final decisions nor did they attempt to have others intervene in their behalf. There was one reason cited for their failure to act -- they felt that this was not their place for action due to their prevention from such activity by the city's charter provisions.

In Springfield, the city council members described a decision-making process that did very little to challenge the mayor's basic requests.[31] One councilmen described the process as follows:

> Q After the mayor has sent his budget to the council, how do you decide if additional cuts should be made?

---

[30]The mayors' margin of victory was computed by the following formula:

$$\frac{\%\text{ mayor received}}{\%\text{ opponent received}}$$

If the mayor had served more than one term, his average margin of victory was then computed. The mayors' length of time in office was computed by determining the number of calendar months he held office. The mayors' participation during the decision stage was based on the mayors' own descriptions in the text.

[31]Personal interviews, October and November, 1968.

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> A . . . Well, we make notations throughout the budget hearing on items that we think can be removed. And if in then reviewing the mayor's budget we see that it was not removed, we may cut it. . . . Of course, this doesn't happen very often as we have to take the mayor's request as being quite basic.[32]

When the Springfield councilmen were asked why they operated under the assumption that the mayor's budget was a minimum one, they responded in similar fashion, as the following exchange illustrates.

> Q Why do you, in your deliberations, assume that the mayor has made the minimum recommendations?
>
> A Well, you have to understand that we are only part-time. We get the budget and have only a very short period of time to study it. Who are we to argue with the men who live and work with the budget all year? We have to go along with their judgment. I know they are often wrong, but I just don't have the time to try and figure out what the requests mean. It's simply a matter of not enough time.[33]

This lack of time was the reason cited by the councilmen for their perfunctory consideration of the mayor's requests. The council members felt their council jobs should be full-time salaried jobs or a full-time budget director reporting to them should be hired if they were expected to do a competent review of the mayor's requests.[34]

This relative inactivity of the Bridgeport and Springfield city councilmen contrasts with the intense formal and informal activity of the city councilmen in Milford and Chicopee. In Milford, the city council gave careful scrutiny to the entire budgetary proposal. One of the councilmen described their decision-making process in the following excerpt.

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[32]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[33]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[34]Personal interviews, October and November, 1968.

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Q Do the members of the city council have any guidelines that they use in setting final budgetary levels?

A Well, not really. We do use subcommittees who get to know a department and its activities. . . . So we do have a more or less of a watchdog to report back and so forth.

Q How does the council reach a final decision?

A Well, we say we look at past experience, but actually it's a matter of organization. Since the Democrats control the council, we caucus prior to each meeting with the mayor and auditor and decide what we will do. That means we can prevent haggling in public and things go smoother. Yes, the basic decisions are made in the caucus.

Q How are they reached in the caucus?

A Well, it's a give and take matter. We hammer out some sort of a compromise. Usually it can be a pretty involved sort of compromise. We try to keep things from getting out of hand. At least it's done privately. We trade items in some cases and usually everyone is fairly well satisfied.[35]

This person mentioned three incidents where the mayor and various councilmen bargained for different things.[36] The other Milford councilmen described similar situations. While the Milford council (Milford has a board of aldermen, not a council. I am using council interchangeably with board of aldermen. This insures the anonymity of the respondents.) did not drastically reduce the mayor's budgetary requests, the council did force the mayor to politically bargain with it. Despite the political majority the mayor had, the council members had sufficient energy and political strength to force the mayor to bargain with them. They were not always successful, but neither was he. In this way, the council played a very active formal and informal role during the decision stage.

---

[35]Personal interviews, June, 1968.

[36]Of the three incidents, one involved jobs and who would do the hiring. Another concerned whether a new program should or should not be funded. The third involved the total dollar request of the department.
Personal interview, June, 1968.

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In Chicopee, political considerations were even more central to the council's formal and informal roles during the decision stage. All of the councilmen who were interviewed described decision-making processes similar to the following one.

> Q How do you decide if a request is justified when the council is making its final consideration of the budget?
>
> A Well, we generally sit with the auditor. We utilize him a lot. He's a hell of a guy too. . . . We get their opinions and those of the people who are working on this thing every day of the week. . . . So we have to take their opinions and validate them. You know what I mean? . . . And that's the only way we can arrive at whether enough money is there or if there's too much money for it. . . .[37]

In short, expertise on the part of other budgetary officials is utilized, but that is not the only or even the most important criterion. The councilmen went on to describe the political criteria.

> Q Are there any other factors that the council uses in deciding whether a request is justified or not while it is making its final decision?
>
> A Well, I must admit that the mayor can't expect us to pass his budget unless he has things in it that will benefit us. Do you know what I mean?
>
> Q Could you expand your last comment?
>
> A Listen, we're mostly elected from wards and we have to satisfy those people. We look at the budgetary requests in terms of what they can do for the wards we represent. . . . No one ever votes to drop out sidewalks or other ward items, but we will fight like hell if we feel we aren't getting out fair share.
>
> Q How do you do that?
>
> A Very simple matter. We get organized and tell the mayor that something dear to his political heart is going to be cut out of the budget unless he comes

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[37]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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through with us. That almost always works.

Q How often does this happen?

A I'll be quite truthful with you -- almost on every item. We've got the mayor and we bargain with him. If he wants projects, he has to make concessions to us. So we more or less compromise, but we make sure we get our share of the budgetary boodle.[38]

Figure 5-1 places the four city councils on a continuum from the least to the most informally active during the decision stage.




Fig. 5-1.--Informal council activity during the decision stage.

It appears informal council activity was an extension of the general political situation prevalent in each community.[39] Chicopee and Milford had ethnic-centered politics and well organized political factions. These factions were active during other stages of the budgetary process and probably were the cause of the informal activity during the decision stage. Springfield and Bridgeport did not have a great deal of informal council action during the decision stage because of formal requirements and the historical role of each council.

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[38] Ibid.

[39] If the community had a long listing of political interaction and bargaining, it was natural for this to be part of the budgetary process.

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## MUNICIPAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES

The municipal group representatives described both active and inactive behavior during the decision stage. There were two categories of behavior for each type of behavior. Table 5-2 summarizes these results.

TABLE 5-2

MUNICIPAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVE BEHAVIOR DURING THE DECISION STAGE

| | Inactive | Active |
|---|---|---|
| Category I | 5 | 3 |
| Category II | 12 | 8 |
| Total | 17 | 11 |

The seventeen municipal group representatives who were inactive during the decision stage gave two general reasons for their inactivity. The five who were in category I stressed their ignorance of the procedures and practices followed by the decision-making bodies during the decision's crucial stage.[40] Hence, they felt it was justifiable for them not to participate during the decision stage.

The twelve municipal group representatives in category II stressed a different reason. One community leader summarized his feelings when he responded to these questions.

> Q When the final budgetary decisions are being made by the . . . do you ever attempt to influence them?
>
> A No. Never.

[40]Personal interviews, June, July, September, and October, 1968.

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Q Why?

A Actually they are just figureheads. . . . Things have been worked out ahead of time and there is nothing we can do at that point. . . . So we don't even try because our pleas fall on deaf ears.[41]

This dual feeling of ignorance and inability to persuade is contrasted with the feelings expressed by the eleven municipal group representatives who were active during the decision stage. These eleven also fell into two categories and each deserves brief attention.

Category I included three political party leaders whose political party was not in local control. The following exchange illustrates their efforts during the decision stage.

Q When the final budgetary decisions are being made by the city council, do you ever attempt to contact councilmen about items in the budget?

A Very definitely. I do this quite regularly.

Q Is this your first contact with people concerning the budget?

A Yes. In most cases, it is. You have to realize I have no idea about what is coming until the public announcement. This means the final decision is my only opportunity to organize whatever opposition I can. This way things get put on the public record. I have a very good idea about what things should be stressed in upcoming campaigns.[42]

The three men stressed the political necessity for their activity during the decision stage. This contrased with the dominant theme expressed by the other eight municipal group representatives who were active during the decision stage. The eight stressed their obligation, as community representatives, to participate.

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[41]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[42]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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One service organization leader summarized his feelings as follows:

> Q When the council is making its final decision on budgetary matters, what do you do?
>
> A Well, everything possible to make sure that the right decisions are made. I hound them and keep in close touch so that I am sure I know what is going on.
>
> Q Why do you do this?
>
> A This is a good question. . . . The really basic reason is that I feel it is my job and obligation, because it is my job and obligation, because of my duty as a citizen and leader, to see that the community continues to progress.[43]

Despite the differences among the four categories of behavior by the municipal group representatives, there is a clear indicator of the reasons for such behavior. If the municipal group representative belongs to a community service organization or is a political party leader whose party is out of power, he, with no exceptions in my sample from the four cities, will participate during the decision stage of the budgetary process. If the municipal group representative belongs to a more narrowly based organization, such as a union or an ethnic organization, he is less likely to participate at this stage.

If we can understand which group representatives tend to participate and which ones do not, what do we know about the results of their participation? In each of the four cities, and twice in one of the four, there were specific instances in the 1968-1969 budgetary decision consideration where municipal group participation

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[43]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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resulted in a different decision than that wanted by the city administration.[44] Although these decisions did not result in the total redirecting of municipal budgeting priorities, they nevertheless made a sizable impact. From my observations and interviews, it is possible to conclude that the action on the part of the municipal group representatives during the decision stage was the main reason for the different decisions. They were successful in obtaining enough publicity and agreement to gain the acceptance of their demands. In short, their activity did have an impact.

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[44]One case involved a significant (approximately fifteen percent of the total city budget) amount of money. The other four involved a total of seven percent, five percent, four percent, and two percent of the total city budget. In all five cases, the mayors were unsuccessful in getting the councils involved to take courses of action opposite of those desired by the public.

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## SUMMARY

Chapter V considered the formal and informal behavior of the various participant categories during the decision stage of the budgetary process. The following conclusions are possible:

(1) Informal activity was prevalent during the decision stage. It was not confined to any particular participant category

(2) Within each of the participant categories, behavior varied. Those who were both formally and informally active during the decision stage were usually informally active during other stages of the process.

(3) Different strategies were adopted by the various members of the participant categories. Several participants developed direct contact with the decision-makers; others indirectly intervened by activating other individuals or groups.

(4) The outcomes of the decision stage were measurably affected by the informal activity of several councilmen and municipal group representatives. The informally active DBOs felt their activity increased their budgetary appropriations, but this could not be empirically verified.

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# CHAPTER VI

## THE EXPENDITURE STAGE

The fourth stage of the budgetary process is the expenditure stage. During this stage, the participants attempt to increase their resources and try to do so at as low a cost as possible. In this chapter, the behavior of the various participants is discussed.

## DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY OFFICIALS

Each of the twenty-seven departmental budgetary officials was asked to describe his role during the expenditure stage. If the description, and subsequent documentation of that behavior, included only formal contacts during this stage, the DBO was placed in category I of Table 6-1. If the DBO described, and it was verified, that his behavior included both formal and informal contact during this stage, he was placed in category II of Table 6-1.

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TABLE 6-1

BEHAVIOR OF DEPARTMENTAL BUDGETARY OFFICIALS
DURING THE EXPENDITURE STAGE

| City \ Category | I | II |
|---|---|---|
| Milford | 2 | 4 |
| Chicopee | 3 | 4 |
| Bridgeport | 3 | 4 |
| Springfield | 3 | 4 |
| Total | 11 | 16 |

Table 6-1 permits the following conclusions. First, more than half of the DBOs participated informally as well as formally during this stage. Second informal participation was not limited to specific cities, but was found in all four cities. Two interview excerpts summarize the different viewpoints held by the DBOs in both categories of Table 6-1.

Q After the budget has been adopted what do you do?

A Well, I decide how much I have to do what with. I set my programs and do the best that I can. I'm not happy, but you can't grumble.

Q Is that all?

A Occasionally, I request a transfer for additional funds.

Q How do you do that?

A I ask the mayor for money from a special account. I don't ask often and only when I must.

Q How do you go about asking for the transfer?

A I submit it in writing to the mayor. I don't politic because I want that left out. I argue my case, but

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only to the people directly involved. . . . [1]

This outlook contrasted with the view held by an informally active DBO.

> Q After your budget is approved, what happens?
>
> A Well, I'm never satisfied. I mean you have to keep on your toes and always look for that extra dollar. . . . That's what I do. When I think the time is right or if I have enough favors, I spring at that point.
>
> Q What do you mean?
>
> A I ask for more. I know the city has a contingency fund and my job is to get my full share of it.
>
> Q How do you do this?
>
> A By requesting transfers. I mean I put them in and then approach as many people and do as many things as I can. I'm always active. At some point, I might even collect the favors owed me.[2]

While the use of informal contact varied between the two categories of DBOs, the results of their requests for transfers were similar. Only one DBO in each of three cities had difficulty in getting the mayor and the decision-making body to decide in favor of his requests. In short, informal behavior, at least on the surface, did not appear to make much difference during the expenditure stage in terms of transfer outcomes. One caveat should be raised. Despite the fact that twenty-four of the twenty-seven DBOs usually had their requests approved, informal factors were related to their success in several ways. First, those DBOs who were informally active were also the DBOs who received the larger amounts of

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[1]Personal interview, November, 1968.

[2]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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transferred money.[3] Second, the informally active DBOs also requested transfers more often than the DBOs who were not active. This gives support to the conclusion that informal activity was related to both size and frequency of transfer approvals.

One other point concerning the role of the DBO during the expenditure stage should be pointed out. Informal activity by the DBOs was not limited to only the transfer process; two other patterns of informal behavior were described.[4] The first was the way the DBO implemented programs -- implementation policies were often used to gain budgetary support in subsequent years. Several DBOs described situations where they went either "fast" or "slow" in expending money.[5] This was done after informal consultation with the mayor and in every case the DBO felt he was able to gain increased leverage with the mayor the following year. Second, the DBOs stressed the fact that hiring and supply procurement policies were sometimes used to build up informal good-will.[6] This was done in a variety of ways. In several cases, the mayors' "suggestions" concerning supply purchases were followed.[7] On items not requiring competitive bids, the DBOs often followed the mayors' suggestions.[8] Another procedure was to agree that if a program received approval, the mayor could "recommend" part of the labor force

---

[3]In this case, total dollar amounts are stressed. These large transfers usually came from the cities' contingency funds.

[4]Personal interviews, June, July, September, and October, 1968.

[5]Personal interviews, July, September, and October, 1968.

[6]Personal interviews, June and September, 1968.

[7]Three DBOs described situations where they decided to follow the mayor's "suggestions" rather than purchase necessary supplies without his "suggestions."
Personal interviews, June, September, and October, 1968.

[8]In all four cities, competitive bids were unnecessary if the item(s) to be purchased cost less than one thousand dollars.

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necessary to staff that program.[9] Occasionally, the DBO was successful in delaying departmental action until he had obtained specific assurances from others involved in the budgetary process. If the DBO felt he could gain more resources, he often refused to begin a program until he gained the benefits the delay might provide.[10]

## MEMBERS OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS

Only five of the members of the independent boards and commissions were active during the expenditure stage. These five had legally prescribed roles to play. The other eleven board and commission members did not participate, either formally or informally, during the expenditure stage. All of them cited the fact that they were "too busy" to get involved in the day to day acts of the operating departments; they also stressed the department head's expertise and knowledge in running his department.[11] The eleven board and commission members felt their job was to approve any transfer request submitted to them by the department head. They did not approach other decision-makers on behalf of the head's request; this was left to him.

---

[9]This resulted in several interesting arrangements. In one, a DBO "sold" his program to the mayor on the basis of the program's providing patronage jobs to the mayor. In this case, the DBO and the mayor each agreed to hire half the necessary labor force. In another instance, the mayor agreed to a program only after it was agreed that employees would be cleared by the mayor's office and his political party's office. In both cases, the DBOs felt the mayors' requests were reasonable and accepted them in order to gain program funding.
Personal interviews, July and September, 1968.

[10]In one instance, a DBO felt he had been given insufficient funds for street paving. He refused to do any paving until additional funds were provided. They were. He then paved designated streets.
Personal interview, July, 1968.

[11]Personal interviews, June, July, September, and October, 1968.

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The five board and commission members who were active during this stage were members of either the Milford Board of Finance or the Bridgeport Board of Apportionment and Taxation. The members of the Milford Board of Finance are required to review and recommend various transfer requests made by department heads. The following exchange illustrates the operating procedure used by the members of the Board of Finance in their consideration.

> Q When you receive a transfer request, how do you proceed?
>
> A Well, we study it and see if it's necessary and why so.
>
> Q The department heads don't sound you or other members of the board out in advance?
>
> A No. I wouldn't listen and I'm sure the other members wouldn't either.
>
> Q How do you decide if a request should be granted?
>
> A We look at the overall picture. Is there money available. . . . Is the transfer needed. . . . Why is it needed. . . . If we are satisfied with the answers to these questions it is usually approved.
>
> Q What happens to the requests?
>
> A Usually they are approved. If we are uncertain, we may delay them for a while, but usually they are approved.[12]

The members of the Bridgeport Board of Apportionment and Taxation described similar behavior during the expenditure stage, but their behavior included an informal aspect. The Board of Apportionment and Taxation's members were much more active in on-site inspection and frequent checks of the operating departments.[13] Departmental activities were closely followed and the Board's members were familiar with day-to-day operations of the city's departments. They felt this

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[12]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[13]Personal interviews, September and October, 1968.

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gave them a more accurate perspective to judge transfer requests. The Board's members did not feel they were interfering with departmental operations and stressed the fact that they were responsible for preventing waste and inefficiency. The result of this increased participation was that the Board's members were able to obtain information to supplement that supplied by the department head at the time of the transfer request. In most cases, this meant the Board's members were able to use the transfer as leverage to gain changes in policies and practices by the department head. If the department head refused to modify his action, usually his transfer request was delayed or subjected to restrictions. Their ability to obtain their own information was a major factor in the Board's members' ability to exercise control. Despite the nonpartisan nature of the Board, political decisions were still made.[14] It appears the members' information gathering was not used for partisan political purposes. It was partisan in that the Board often attempted to persuade department heads to trade transfer approval for a change in practices, but there was never any attempt, by the Board members, to do so for financial, personal, or political party gain. The emphasis was always on "what is good for the city."[15]

---

[14]The Board's members described several instances where street repair and paving funds were redirected. They cited another instance which involved the resetting of building priorities. These were political decisions to the extent that the Board's action directly countered all public recommendations concerning these issues.
Personal interviews, September and October, 1968.

[15]Ibid.

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## MAYORS AND AUDITORS

The mayors and auditors described formal and informal behavior patterns during the expenditure stage. All of the mayors, and several of the auditors, acting under instructions from the mayors, were actively involved in the general overview of city operations and budgetary expenditures. The mayors were not involved in each department's day-to-day operations, but each mayor attempted to have a general knowledge of what the various departments were doing.[16] They had legal authorization for such action. One mayor summarized his feelings in this excerpt.

> Q After the budget has been set and the departments are spending the money, what do you do?
>
> A Well, I try to keep a finger in as many pies as possible. That's my chief concern as the executive of the city. I'm responsible and it is up to me to know what is going on. If anything goes wrong, I get blamed, so why shouldn't I also get the credit that is involved? . . . So I keep in touch and know what is going on. As much as that is possible.[17]

The five mayors also described two types of informal activity. The first involved informal discussions and decision-making with departmental officials concerning expenditure priorities and plans. One mayor described his behavior as follows.

> Q When the department is operating during the year, do you ever have any informal contact with it?
>
> A Ideally, no. Practically, yes. I've got to help my department heads make the right decisions. If I don't, I lose support. So quite often I'll talk to them, nothing written, but just a quiet talk in the hopes of persuading them to do things my way. . . .

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[16]Personal interviews, June, July, September, and October, 1968.

[17]Personal interview, October, 1968.

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Q Can you think of a recent example?

A Well, yes. I discussed our paving program.

Q Street paving?

A That's right. I discussed it with the departments involved and found out they had their own ideas about what was going to be paved. I had to exert my influence, but roads are more important to me than they are to the departments. The result is that I get the roads I want paved. So you see why I need to stay on top of what is going on.[18]

In addition to this type of informal activity, the mayors were also informally active whenever a transfer of funds was being considered. The five mayors described their activity during the transfer process and in each case, they were influential in obtaining or rejecting transfer requests. The following interview excerpt describes one mayor's role during the transfer process.

Q What happens when a department requests a transfer?

A First, I study it.

Q How do you do that?

A That's a good question because I'm usually unsure myself. I first look at how much we have to play with, you know, transfer. Then I talk with the auditor about whether or not he feels that the transfer makes sense. If the answers satisfy me, I then go ahead and recommend the transfer.

Q How often does this happen?

A Several times a month late in the year. Often I will have agreed to this procedure during the prior discussions I have with the department heads. That way I know if something is coming or not. . . .

Q Is this all you do when a transfer is requested?

A No. I get busy and make sure the council is going to accept it.

---

[18]Personal interview, June, 1968.

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Q How do you do that?

A Well, usually I'll meet informally with them. If things go well, I'm all set. If not, I sometimes have to promise various projects in return for their vote. It's not a good thing to do because you accumulate debts, but at least you satisfy what you need at the present.[19]

As in the other stages of the budgetary process, the mayor acts informally to secure necessary transfers. The emphasis is on his informal behavior and the need to gain support by whatever means possible.

Since the mayors are informally active during this stage, are there any reasons why this is the case? When degree of informality is correlated with length of time in office and margin of electoral victory, neither Spearman $r_s$ measure is significant at the .10 level.[20] The mayors seem to be active during this stage because, as several of the excerpts illustrated, they blend their formal duties and responsibilities as chief executive officer with their informal needs to exert political control. The fact that they are publicly responsible for administrative actions by the operating departments encourages them to participate.

---

[19]Personal interview, July, 1968.

[20]The mayor's length of time in office was computed by determining the number of calendar months he had held office. The mayor's margin of victory was computed by the following formula:

$$\frac{\%\text{ mayor received}}{\%\text{ opponent received}}$$

The mayor's average margin of victory was used if he had served more than one term. The mayors were ranked according to the number of informal conversations and contacts they had during the expenditure stage. These were derived from the interviews with the mayors and the other participants. The $r_s$ correlation for the relationship between length of time in office and informality during the expenditure stage was +.34. The $r_s$ correlation for the relationship between margin of victory and informality during the expenditure stage was +.26.

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## COUNCIL MEMBERS

The behavior of the fifteen councilmen fell into two categories. Each will be briefly discussed. In three of the four cities, the city council has to approve transfer requests. This is the only formal control they have during the expenditure stage of the budgetary process. Most of the councilmen felt that if the mayor decided to approve a request they should agree to it also. They justified this by citing the mayor's working knowledge of the city and the fact that he had more access to information than they had.[21] The usual procedure, if the mayor had recommended a transfer, was to have the department head appear at a council meeting and justify his request. In most cases, the requests were approved.[22] If they were not approved at that particular meeting, subsequent approval was usually forthcoming.

While twelve of the fifteen councilmen were formally active, only six were informally active during the expenditure stage. The informally active and inactive deserve to be briefly discussed. Those councilmen who did not participate informally during the expenditure stage were from all four cities. Three Bridgeport councilmen did not participate informally due to charter restrictions.[23] The other six informally active councilmen were evenly drawn from the other three cities. The following interview excerpt summarizes their feelings about their participation during the expenditure stage.

> Q When the departments have been granted their budgets and the final figures are set, what do you do?
>
> A Well, we are through. It's a lot of work and I'm glad it's done. Yes, we're through. We don't see those people for a full year.

---

[21]Personal interviews, June, July, and September, 1968.

[22]This happened over ninety-five percent of the time.

[23]Bridgeport, Charter, c. VI, sec. 83.

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Q You never meet with them during the year?

A Only when they want a transfer. That goes through everyone and we all decide it.

Q How do you find out when a transfer is needed?

A I am informed by letter sent to the whole body. I then think about it and decide.

Q Are you ever contacted or do you ever contact anyone outside of these meetings?

A No. I don't have the time or personal interest to do so. I have to make a living and if I tried to run the city or a particular department, I would go broke. No, I don't get involved outside of the regular budget hearings and the meetings. I feel my job is to represent my area and not to feather my own cause.[24]

The six informally active councilmen stressed their obligation to better the city and to keep the city well-run. They emphasized the need for informal action in order to "know what is going on" and to "keep a finger in the pie."[25] The following excerpt summarizes their informal behavior.

Q After the department has received its authorization for the year, what does the council do?

A Well, very little. Some of us keep up on what is going on, but most don't. I do.

Q How do you do that?

A I dig and poke and look for facts. I have a few friends in every department and I try to keep up on the happenings. I do a little discreet inspecting of programs and I know if something isn't going the way it's supposed to.

Q Why do you do this?

---

[24]Personal interview, October, 1968.

[25]Personal interviews, June, July, and October, 1968.

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A It's simple. I have two jobs. One is to stay in office. The second is to help the city. In order to do both well, I need to have more information than the department head is willing to give. So I have to get it and I do it by the best and most available means.[26]

The importance of this informal activity should not be underestimated. The councilmen attempt to develop information which permits them to increase their control or potential control over a DBO or the mayor. The more information the councilman has the more capable he is of embarrassing or delaying a DBO who is requesting a transfer. The result is that the councilman's bargaining position is often enhanced and he may gain political advantage from this position. This advantage can take a variety of forms -- from favor accumulation to agreements concerning a department's performance in a particular area. The informal contacts permit the councilmen to develop their own perspective and to exercise some personal control over the day-to-day operations of the city departments.

## MUNICIPAL GROUP REPRESENTATIVES

Of the twenty-eight municipal group representatives interviewed, twelve were active during the expenditure stage. The other sixteen representatives had their viewpoints summarized by a leader when he responded to the following questions.

Q After the budget has been set for the year, what do you and your organization do?

A Actually, we both do nothing. We fight our fight during the discussion and if we lose then, we just plain forget about it.

Q Why?

A I can only answer part of that, the basic reason is that

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[26]Personal interview, July, 1968.

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we are capable of exerting very little influence. We would become less effective if we decided to become presumptious. We make waves when they might reach the boat. At other times, we're very docile.[27]

The twelve active representatives described two patterns of behavior. Four municipal group representatives described the first pattern; the attitudes and practices of these four are described in the following excerpt.

Q After the budget has been adopted, what do you and your organization do?

A We remain active. During the hearings and the decisions we get certain agreements and we attempt to make sure that they are going to be carefully followed.

Q How do you do this?

A By constant checking. We make sure that things are being done the way they are supposed to. For instance, if the mayor has agreed that certain streets should be paved, we try to get him to have those streets paved. That's the way it works.

Q Do you ever attempt to influence a decision that has not been formally agreed to?

A No, not at all. We don't get involved in policy matters. We care just about the decisions that already have been made.[28]

These four municipal group representatives were very careful to draw a distinction between agreements already made and decisions being made. The other eight municipal group representatives did not make this distinction and were placed in the second category.[29] Their behavior is described below.

Q After the budget has been adopted, what do you and your organization do?

---

[27]Personal interview, September, 1968.

[28]Personal interview, June, 1968.

[29]These eight were drawn from all four cities.

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A Well, we do a lot. We keep on top of things and make sure that promises are kept. It is up to us to see that the money is spent as it is supposed to be.

Q Is this all?

A Usually, but not always. Three or four times a year there are important discussions. Perhaps a contingency fund item. If we are on the ball, we usually get listened to. That way we can benefit those we represent. It's tough to always be there, but we usually manage.[30]

This attempt to influence actual decisions separates the municipal group representatives into the moderately and the extremely active. Both patterns of behavior appear to have significant impact in the decision-making area during the expenditure stage.

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[30]Personal interview, September, 1968.

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## SUMMARY

Chapter VI described the behavior of the five participant groups during the expenditure stage of the budgetary process. These conclusions are possible.

(1) Informal contact is important during the expenditure stage. The legally prescribed regulations for the expenditure stage do not prevent extensive and varied informal participation.

(2) All five budgetary participant groups have members who are informally active. Their activity takes a variety of forms and appears to affect outcomes during the expenditure stage.

(3) Both the formal and informal activity described during the expenditure stage centers around attempts to gain increased budgetary resources for the various operating departments. Increases may be gained by the transfer process or more indirectly. Favor accumulation and concessions are two such indirect methods.

(4) The expenditure stage permits budgetary participants to compete for scarce resources. Since the informal activity is continuous, tension and conflict does not accumulate. If a participant loses a particular decision, there are other decisions he may attempt to influence.

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# CHAPTER VII

## SUMMARY AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter: (1) The methodological and substantive findings of my research are summarized. (2) These substantive findings are compared with those offered by Crecine and Wildavsky. (3) The implications of these comparisons for budgetary research are developed. (4) Once this has been completed, a qualitative model, based on the interview data, of the municipal budgetary process is developed. (5) The role this model should play in future municipal budgeting research is then discussed.

Using a four stage budgetary process, ninety-four interviews were held with members of five different budgetary participant categories in four medium-size cities. Each of the ninety-four interviews recreated and summarized the respondent's role in the municipal budgetary process. Based on the interview data, the following conclusions are possible.

(1) Municipal budgetary decisions exhibit a high degree of political content; they are the product of both formal and informal interaction among the various participants. The respondents often emphasized the political aspects of behavior when they described their activities during the various stages of the budgetary process. Since municipal budgeting involves resource allocation and the expression of value preferences, it can be considered a sub-unit of the political process. Political pressure, influence, and strategy are important aspects of the municipal budgetary process.

(2) The interview results indicate there is substantial differentiation among the budgetary processes of the four cities, but that this differentiation is in terms of degree, not the presence or absence of political factors determining budgetary decisions. This

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finding increases the probability that political content will be a factor in budgetary decisions in other American cities.[1]

(3) It is possible to conclude that no one participant (or group of participants) can formally or informally dominate the budgetary process. Evidence was presented to show, in the four cities studied, no one individual or municipal body had absolute formal authority over budgetary decisions.[2] This was insured by (a) diffusing ultimate authority; (b) creating a process during which a variety of individuals would be participating; and (c) making the process subject to popular control through the electoral process.[3] In addition to these factors, informal relationships developed among the participants which prevented one individual or municipal group from gaining absolute control over the budgetary process. Evidence was offered to indicate the range of options open to those who wanted to participate.[4]

(4) During each stage of the budgetary process, a minority of the municipal group representatives attempted, usually with some

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[1]Since the cities did vary in a number of ways, it is reasonable to expect that other American cities, (and I would add cities in general), have political factors at work during budgetary decision-making. See Chapter II, pp. 18 to 50, for descriptions of the four cities included in my study.

[2]See Chapter II, pp. 42-50.

[3]These three factors tend to provide an "open" budgetary process which handicaps any attempt to rigidly control that process. The probability of successful control of the budgetary process is directly related to the probability of successful control over each of the three variables. By summing the various probabilities, a probabilistic theory of budgetary decision-making may be possible.

[4]See Chapter III, pp. 73-75.
See Chapter IV, pp. 103-106.
See Chapter V, pp. 126-129.
See Chapter VI, pp. 143-145.

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degree of success, to influence the budgetary process. This activity took a variety of forms, but usually had one common aspect; the attempt to change budgetary allocation decisions.[5]

(5) The business communities in the four cities did not have the same outlook on budgetary decisions. In one city, business leaders succeeded in obtaining a tax increase in order to improve existing municipal services.[6] In the other three cities, the business leaders pursued a variety of policies. Except for one case of early activity during the budgetary process, the business leaders reacted to decisions rather than attempting to influence them during the actual decision-making.[7]

(6) The majority of the budgetary decisions were based on prior budgetary expenditures and were incremental in nature.[8] The most common response to the question of how one decided what was a reasonable request was the citing of prior experience. When changes did occur, they were incremental, not major in either scope or direction.[9] For instance, new programs had a much better chance of being funded if they appeared similar to something either currently being done or that had been done in the recent past. New programs

---

[5]This should be differentiated from another possible aspect; the attempt to influence and to get adopted a set of budgetary decisions. The public groups usually intervened late in the process and only after a decision had been reached. Earlier action might have led to a different set of outcomes.

[6]See Chapter III, pp. 74-75.

[7]The interview data offer conclusive evidence for this statement.

[8]See Chapter III, pp. 56-59, 63; Chapter IV, pp. 91-92; and Chapter V, p. 123; for a description of the importance of experience. See Chapter II, pp. 30-41, for the incremental nature of municipal budgetary decisions in the four cities.

[9]In this case, scope refers to the total dollar amount and direction to the purpose the money was allocated for. There were no instances where both the scope and direction of a particular budgetary item drastically changed.

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had to be justified on the basis of need or fund availability; most decision-makers were unwilling to "experiment" with scarce financial resources. The practical implication of this was that program development could not be highly innovative. Thus department heads and others involved with program development and operation reacted to problems by using procedures justified and approved in past years.

(7) In all four cities, the absence of skilled and highly trained professionals was the rule, not the exception. Of the twenty-seven department budgetary officers interviewed, only eight had had formal training in the management and operation of their departments.[10] Most had extensive "on-the-job" experience.[11] This helped to add greater emphasis to the experience factor; if something had either worked or failed in the past, it was generally a known quantity. Experimental approaches were not encouraged because of their increased costs and uncertain results. Budgetary innovations (such as program budgeting or PPBS) were not in use, nor under consideration.[12]

(8) The absence of trained professional staff personnel, not only at the departmental level, but throughout the budgetary process, was a factor in the use of less modern data gathering and reporting techniques. The budgetary decision-makers usually used their "memories" on most complex points; there were few attempts to routinize the gathering of performance data and expenditure patterns. Confusion

---

[10]Formal training means: (1) a college degree in a field of work; or (2) an acceptable substitute for such training. Examples of (2) would include, but not be limited to, fire or police training that included regular course work and examinations.

[11]"On-the-job" training and experience means that the men involved had either worked their way up the ranks or had held their position for a number of years. This enabled them to learn the skills necessary to maintain and operate the department.

[12]One city had attempted to implement program budgeting, but dropped it when most of the DBOs refused to try it.

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often dominated the organizational aspects of the various municipal offices.[13]

(9) The behavior of the budgetary participants is best described as "gamesmanship." Because of the legal structure and the need for future interpersonal contacts, the participants did not approach each stage of the budgetary process with the attitude that they had to have their total requests funded. The usual behavior pattern was one of compromise and negotiation. The rules of the game included occasional victories with frequent defeats. The dynamics of the budgetary process permitted the participants to lose at one point, but still hope to win at a later point.

How do these nine conclusions compare with other important findings describing the budgetary process? Rather than compare them with the entire range of findings, I have chosen Wildavsky's and Crecine's conclusions as representative of other findings and will compare their major conclusions with mine.

Wildavsky's conclusions are very similar to my major findings. We both found that budgetary decisions were usually incremental in nature and that no one individual or public group dominated the process.[14] Wildavsky cited the role of the expert in the federal budgetary process; my findings indicate that the expert's role is not as prevalent in municipal budgeting.[15] The most important conclusion supported by both studies is that public budgeting is highly political.[16] There is competition for scarce resources and this often results in extensive political interaction. Political bargains and trades are often characteristics of the budgetary

---

[13]Although all four cities did have data-processing equipment, only one auditor attempted to use that equipment to provide complex information in an understandable fashion. Most DBOs resisted attempts to introduce data-processing. The reasons for their opposition would make an interesting case study.

[14]Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, pp. 13-16, 32-62.

[15]Ibid., pp. 35-39, 57-58.

[16]Ibid., pp. 131-133.

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process. This fact has implications for any suggested reform of the public budgetary process, regardless of the level of government. Wildavsky developed this point and my findings support his conclusions.[17] Until any proposed reform of the budgetary process adequately evaluates and considers the political aspects of public budgeting, the reform's impact will be marginal.

While there is substantial agreement between my findings and Wildavsky's, there is substantial disagreement between my findings and those of John P. Crecine.[18] I found substantial differences among the four cities in terms of the degree of political content in the budgetary process, but not in the presence or absence of political content.[19] Crecine concluded the opposite. He found that political content was not a major factor in municipal budgetary decisions.[20] In addition, the role of the public and municipal groups was negligible in Crecine's three cities; in my four cities, the municipal group representatives (although a minority) who participated played significant roles.[21] For Crecine, the mayors dominated the budgetary process; I have pointed out the formal and informal reasons for the mayors' inability to dominate the process in the four cities included in my study.[22] In addition, Crecine, although he does not provide sufficient information concerning this point, implied there was substantial professional expertise available in the three cities he studied.[23] I did not find this in the four cities I studied.

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[17] Ibid., pp. 178-180.

[18] Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting, pp. 217-221.

[19] All four cities had extensive political content in their budgetary decisions, yet they could have been ranked on the degree to which political content was present. The interview and other data conclusively support this statement.

[20] Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving, p. 219.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., pp. 67-98.

[23] Ibid., pp. ix-x, 50.

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These differences are not minor and should be resolved. There may be a number of explanations for them.

First, the size variable may be significant. Crecine's three cities ranged in size from 600,000 to 1,700,000 residents.[24] The cities included in my study ranged in size from 41,000 to 174,000 residents.[25] This difference in size might explain the different findings. If we assume that in the smaller cities, there would be greater interaction, then the probability of informal interaction should increase as the size variable decreases.[26] This might explain why I found greater informal interaction.

Second, the absence of skilled professionals might explain the emphasis on informal interaction that I found and Crecine did not. Whatever the reasons (low salaries, prestige, or interest), a testable hypothesis could be developed relating professional training to informal interaction. My assumption would be that the greater a person's professional training, the less willing and likely he would be to informally interact when making a budgetary decision.[27] This would be consistent with Crecine's findings on professional staff relationships.[28]

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[24]They were Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Detroit.

[25]See Chapter II, pp. 18-29, for a description of the four cities included in my study.

[26]If pII= probability of informal interaction and sc=size of city, the relationship between the two variables can be written as: pII increases as sc decreases.

See Robert A Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1967), 953-970. Dahl has some relevant and important comments on size and democratic behavior in this article.

[27]The reasons for this may vary, but would probably include: (1) the fact the professional wants to use his training to gain or maintain an advantage; and/or (2) the professional would be reluctant to appear to be "playing politics."

[28]See Crecine's discussion of internalized decision rules and public pressure, pp. 218-219.

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A third reason for the differences might be that we: (1) both chose atypical cities; or (2) one of us chose atypical cities. Additional research is necessary to reach a conclusion concerning whether either of those alternatives did in fact happen. The seven cities included in the two studies all had some form of mayor-council government.[29] This limits both sets of conclusions to this type of city and is another reason for additional research efforts.

Fourth, and finally, a probable reason for our different findings may be the methods we selected for our respective studies. Crecine chose to simulate budgetary decisions. This enabled him to develop and use complex information and data analysis techniques. It also forced him to rule out any behavior or informal interaction that could not be incorporated into a series of decision-rules. If Crecine's respondents did not provide him with an adequate, accurate, and comprehensive description of the budgetary process, his subsequent model development and simulation would rest on a very questionable empirical foundation.[30] His model might be able to explain gross outcomes, but it could not adequately develop the explanations for those outcomes. His methodology did not include an extensive empirical description of the budgeting process by the numerous participants in each city; therefore Crecine's subsequent model development may not fit the reality of the situation.[31] This would explain the differences in political content we found in the budgetary process. It should not be underestimated.

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[29]Both the weak-mayor and strong-mayor forms were included.

[30]Crecine does not provide a summary of whom he interviewed or how these interviews were conducted. Since his model depended on his initial information, it could have been based on inadequate information. Even though it does provide a good fit with subsequent decisions, the internal aspects of the budgetary process may not be accurately described. See Crecine, pp. ix-x.

[31]Ibid.

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My methodology stressed empirical description and the development of conclusions based on those descriptions. Whatever the reasons for the different conclusions, Crecine and I do differ a great deal. The reader and critic must decide which of us is closer to political reality.[32]

## MODEL DEVELOPMENT

While Crecine's methods and findings differed from those I developed, we share the basic desire that our empirical work ". . . aggregates decision elements to obtain a comprehensive, consistent model of the entire system."[33] The next few pages describe a model of the municipal budgetary process which: (1) considers the role of both formal and informal relationships among budgetary participants; (2) includes the multiplicity of participants at the municipal level; and (3) has dynamic qualities which permit it to overcome the stasis orientation of most models.[34]

Figure 7-1 depicts the relationship among the budgetary process and other municipal variables.

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[32]This is an important and necessary question. The significance of our methodological and substantive findings depend upon this comparison and evaluation.

[33]Crecine, p. vii.

[34]For an excellent summary of the modeling approach, see: Martin Shubik, Simulation of Socio-Economic Systems (New Haven: Cowles Discussion Paper #203, 1966).

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


Fig. 7-1.--The municipal budgetary process: its relationship to to other municipal variables.

Each of the variables preceding the budgetary process should be seen as input variables. They, either directly or indirectly, influence the decision-making that occurs during the budgetary process. The socio-economic variables are the standard variables used to describe most cities. Size (both in area and population), population groupings (whether they be age, race, or class), and economic characteristics (industrial base and work force description)

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offer important descriptive information about a city. The personal perspectives variable will be considered after the two remaining variables are discussed. Formal requirements include the entire range of statutory provisions relating to the budgetary process.[35] The political variables include the form of government (city-manager, mayor-council, commission), quality of leadership, leadership orientation (personalistic versus issue orientation), and informal pressure (such as bargains and trades).

The personal perspectives of decision-makers and community residents are important, but often overlooked, variables. Banfield and Wilson have developed the concept of political ethos in their writings.[36] Alford has stressed political culture.[37] Both approaches attempt to describe shared perceptions and attitudes by residents and leaders. The crucial point is whether these attitudes and perceptions differ from municipality to municipality or at a higher geographical unit (the state, region, or country). I lack sufficient information to offer more than a tentative conclusion and that is that attitudes and perceptions do vary among the four communities included in my study.[38] This variation influences participant behavior during the budgetary process, but does not appear to be the dominant explanatory variable.[39]

A central problem to the usefulness of the overview presented in Figure 7-1 is that there is little, if any, way to explain the interrelationships among the various input variables and the subsequent expenditure decisions made during the budgetary process. Even the

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[35]See Chapter II, pp. 42-50.

[36]Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. and Random House, Inc., 1963), pp. 33-35, 37-38.

[37]Robert R. Alford, "Bureaucracy and Participation in Four Wisconsin Cities," Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 5 (September, 1969), 5-29.

[38]Survey research would have been a useful tool, but time and money restraints prevented conducting a community survey.

[39]Again, this is my impression of the role of attitudes and perceptions. They are important, but there are a large number of other variables interacting with them.

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complex model developed by Crecine fails to account for the possible relationships influencing budgetary decisions.[40]

Instead of trying to solve this problem which may be insoluble and even if it were solved would have little relationship to the major thrust of my work, I have developed a process model which permits change to occur and which builds in informal relationships. Figure 7-2 depicts this process model for any given fiscal year.

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[40]Crecine, pp. 208-216.

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


Broken lines indicate informal interaction

Solid lines indicate formal interaction

Fig. 7-2.--A process model of the municipal budgetary process.



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The four stages of the model have been developed and described during the data presentation. The solid line arrows indicate direct interaction among the various stages. Thus, the formulation stage, and its subsequent results, directly affects what will happen during the review stage. The same is true for all four stages. Each is directly affected by the result reached during the stage preceding it. Each stage directly affects the stage following it.

The broken line arrows are often overlooked, but may be the most important. Informal relationships may be crucial to the development of subsequent policy; however, if political scientists refuse to consider the informal relationships, their analysis will be less valuable. The results might be applicable in the "ivory tower", but they will have little effect or impact on the real world. The broken line arrows indicate the possible informal relationships that may exist during any fiscal year's budgetary process. Note that they indicate reciprocal relationships. Action taken during an early stage may be motivated by anticipation of action to be taken during later stages. At the same time, action taken during a later stage, may be based on previous decisions made earlier in the process.

The formulation stage, and its subsequent request outcomes, may have an indirect effect on behavior during the review, decision, and expenditure stages. Let me explain. If a department head informally interacts with a mayor during the formulation stage, this may indirectly influence the other participants of the budgetary process. I have offered evidence to indicate this type of interaction does take place.[41] Another possibility is that interaction during the formulation stage indirectly affects either or both the decision and expenditure stages. If a departmental budgetary official is unhappy with the results of the formulation stage, he may try, during subsequent stages, to (1) persuade others to support him; (2) alter the performance of his department in order to encourage and attract public attention. Either action has a very high probability of

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[41]See Chapter III, pp. 55, 66-68.

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influencing subsequent behavior.

In similar fashion, the informal interaction during the review stage may have an effect on the decision and expenditure stages. If the mayor does not include an item in his budgetary recommendation, either or both the council or the DBOs involved may attempt to intervene and add that item or in other cases attempt to have the mayor rearrange his budget. Evidence was offered to illustrate this.[42]

Expenditure patterns may be affected by decisions reached during the review stage. If a mayor does not recommend all that a DBO would like, the DBO may pursue three courses: (1) attempt to live with his allocation; (2) attempt to reallocate his budgetary priorities within the department; and (3) attempt to increase his total expenditures by expending funds beyond those initially allocated to him.[43] The importance of these various informal possibilities should not be overlooked. The threat or anticipation of such informal action may bring about the results desired by the DBO.

The behavior during the decision stage may produce intense informal interaction during the expenditure stage. Here the DBOs, mayor, and others interact in an attempt to maximize their allocations. The DBOs are usually working toward two goals: (1) efficient and effective programs; and (2) increased future expenditures.[44] The mayors are attempting to maintain the contingency fund and usually follow two courses of action to do this: (1) encouraging transfers from both accounts and departments to other accounts and departments; and (2) promising

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[42]See Chapter III, pp. 67,71-72.

[43]The third course of action assumes the existence of a contingency fund. Contingency funds were available in the four cities studied.

[44]This is based on interview data. The DBOs repeatedly stressed these themes.

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more funds during the next allocation process.[45] The degree to which a mayor is successful in not using all the contingency fund reflects his administrative and political leadership.

The process model presented in Figure 7-2 describes the dynamics of each individual fiscal year. The participants are not engaged in a single encounter, but in a series of encounters which permit the loser to hope for victory in subsequent encounters. This also forces the winner to realize that his victory may be temporary. In short, the municipal budgetary process is not a zero-sum-game. One may lose at a variety of stages and places, but still have the opportunity to win at another stage or place.

While Figure 7-2 does portray the formal and informal interaction for a particular year, it fails to portray the dynamic aspects of the municipal budgetary process. Earlier, evidence was offered that stressed the experiential and incremental aspects of municipal budgeting; Figure 7-3 develops the dynamic aspects of the municipal budgetary process for two successive fiscal years.

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[45]Whenever possible, the mayor will avoid using the contingency funds as their use reduces his future flexibility and may create a fund shortage near the end of a fiscal year if unexpected expenses (heavy snow, capital loss, etc.) were incurred by the city.

[46]This may challenge many of the participants. They tended to view the process in a game-oriented fashion and stressed the need to play hard, but to always be prepared for the outcome.

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


Broken lines indicate informal interaction

Solid lines indicate formal interaction

Fig. 7-3.--A process model of the municipal budgetary process for two fiscal years.

Figure 7-3 describes the relationships among the stages of the budgetary process for two successive years. The only solid arrow (between stages in each of the two years) connects the decision stage of FY I with the formulation stage of FY II. This permits the development of flexible proposals. A DBO may react to the preceding decision stage outcomes (and possibly more than one outcome) when formulating his requests. The DBO has some knowledge of past decisions and this permits him the experience needed to develop a request.

The informal relationships are much more subtle, but may have greater impact on participant behavior. Since the informal relationships among the various stages of FY I have been explained, this will not be done for FY II. They are the same. Attention will be focused on the informal relationships among the various stages of FY I and FY II.

A dotted line links the formulation stage of FY I and FY II. The various decisions, etc., used in FY I budget preparation may be factors during the formulation stage of FY II. For instance, during the formulation stage of FY I, a DBO may have decided to wait a year before requesting a new program or large increases for present ones. This then becomes a factor in subsequent formulation stages.

The review stage of FY I is indirectly linked with both the formulation and review stages of FY II. If in FY I, the DBO and the mayor seriously disagreed on the mayor's recommendation and what it should include for the DBO's department, the DBO would probably be influenced by that the following year. The mayor would also have to anticipate the DBO's reaction. The nature and extent of this informal interaction is an empirical question, but can be verified by extensive interviewing and observation.

The decision stage of FY I may indirectly affect the first three stages of FY II's budgetary process. Formulation will be based on the decisions and the factors influencing those decisions during the decision stage of FY I. Review and subsequent recommendations for FY II will be related to decision outcomes of FY I. And decision outcomes of FY II will be related to decision outcomes of FY I. Again the relationships are subject to empirical investigation and verification.

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The expenditure stage of FY I will indirectly influence all four stages of FY II. How the money allocated for municipal needs is spent will be of prime consideration during each of the subsequent stages of FY II. Cues will be taken and often the results of the expenditure stage in FY I will mean increased interaction among the participants in FY II.[47] In practice, the formulation stage of FY II begins when only one-half to three-quarters of FY I expenditures have been completed. This limits the use of FY I's expenditure patterns. Since most contingency fund activity is limited to the last half of FY I's expenditure stage, anticipated results of that activity are often used to formulate subsequent requests for FY II.

Figures 7-2 and 7-3 can be expanded indefinitely. By adding preceding or successive fiscal years, the historical pattern of budgetary politics becomes apparent. Again the emphasis must be on the budgetary process as a non zero-sum-game. There are many winners and losers; usually the win or loss is only a temporary advantage or disadvantage. This encourages continued participation and the willingness to accept the rules of the budgetary process.

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[47] If a participant is dissatisfied with any aspects of behavior and outcome in FY I, he may attempt to change either that behavior or outcome in FY II.

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## FUTURE RESEARCH EFFORTS

Political scientists should not be reluctant to study political behavior. The budgetary process involves such behavior and should receive additional and concerted attention by political and other social scientists. On the basis of my findings and conclusions, future research would be most fruitful if directed towards the following four goals.

(1) Continued refinement of the process model approach should be stressed. Investigators should attempt to describe and explain the budgetary process in process terms, not in terms of how budgeting should be done. The process model approach permits comprehensive and meaningful comparative analysis of the budgetary process.

(2) The investigation of municipal budgeting should be broadened to include cities with different characteristics. These include: population, economic structure, form of government, geographical location, and historical background. Future research should be as comparative as possible. Hypotheses generation, based on earlier research efforts, would facilitate comparative efforts.

(3) The research emphasis should center on the development of thorough and rigorous analysis, not the development and experimental testing of methodology. Methodological considerations should not be ignored, but the central thrust of future research attempts should be to describe and explain the municipal budgetary process. Any methodological approach which increases this possibility should be used.

(4) In the last analysis, the study of municipal budgeting and the municipal budgetary process should not be an end in itself. It should be another wedge to open further and expand our understanding of the political system and the nature of politics. Serious normative questions (the openness of the system, degree and extent of representation, and the presence or absence of democratic procedures) can be pursued through the use of the knowledge obtained in budgetary studies. Efforts in this direction should be encouraged.

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All four of these research recommendations are based on several assumptions I feel are important for the political scientist. That is, budgetary research, because it involves formal and informal interaction by a large number of participants and results in resource allocation, is a vital aspect of the political process. In many ways, it may be more important than the electoral process and may have greater implications for the future of America's urban centers than is commonly felt. If political scientists are interested in making policy contributions, the description and analysis of the municipal budgetary process is a meaningful starting point.

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# APPENDIX

## INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The following questions were asked of the various respondents. In some cases, the order of the questions was changed; in others, certain questions were omitted. In all ninety-four interviews, the respondent was encouraged to describe his participation in and impressions of the municipal budgetary process.

To start with, would you give me a brief biographical sketch of yourself? Please include any information which you feel is important.

Could you describe your educational and occupational background?

Age?

How long have you lived in the city?

How many children?

Where do your children attend school?

Is that a public or private school?

Do you belong to a political party? Which one? Why?

How long have you been a member of that party?

Have you ever held any public or political office?

Which one? When? For how long? How were you selected for that office? What were your duties when you held that office?

Do you hope to hold other party, political, or public offices? Which ones? Why?

How do you plan to get selected for those offices?

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I'm interested in your impressions of the political parties active in this community. Could you describe these parties to me? (Two of the cities had nonpartisan local elections. The respondents in those cities were asked a series of questions concerning informal interaction among community leaders.)

As far as the local parties are concerned, do you see any differences in their philosophies toward local government?

What the differences? Why do you think they exist?

As far as the local parties are concerned, do you see any differences in their policies toward local government?

What are the differences? Why do you think they exist?

Are the local parties (or factions) concerned with local issues more so than state or national issues?

Why do you think this is the case?

Series of questions was then asked to gauge present community political developments. These questions dealt with recent controversies, etc..

The respondent was then asked to describe his current position, organizational placement, and his perception of his community role.

Please describe your role in the budgetary process?

(The next series of questions varied according to who the respondent was.)

If a department budgetary officer, the questions asked included the following: (for the other participant categories, similar questions were asked)

How does your department go about drawing up its annual budgetary request?

What is your role in this process?

How many people and work hours are involved with the development of the department's request?

Are you ever formally or informally in contact with other city officials or citizens concerning your request?

What is the nature of this contact?

What effects do these contacts have on your subsequent recommendation?

What criteria do you use to judge whether an item should be included in your budget? Why?

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What criteria do you use to judge the amount of money you should request? Why?

How effective are these criteria? How helpful are they?

After you have submitted your request, what do you do?

Do you either formally or informally discuss the requests with other people?

Which people?

Why do you discuss the request with them?

What are the results of these discussions?

While your request is under consideration, do you attempt to gain private and/or public support for it? Why? Why not?

How do you attempt to do this?

What are the results of these attempts?

(The above questions were repeated in similar fashion for each stage in the city's budgetary process.)

Do you think you receive equal treatment during budgetary request consideration? Why? Why not?

What contact do you have with the public during budgetary consideration?

Why? Why not?

What is the result of that contact?

Do you think the public is aware of the decisions being made during the budgetary process?

Do you think they are concerned about these decisions?

Do you have any suggestions as to how the budgetary process in this city might be improved?

What are chances of these being adopted? Why? Why not?

Who would favor them? Who would oppose them?

Are there any other items pertaining to either the community, the budgetary process, or yourself which you feel are important, but which I have left out?

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Finally, please read these two statements and then select the option below that best describes this city's decision-making.

| A | B |
|---|---|
| Almost all important community decisions are made by a small group of people. These few leaders usually take the initiative in starting projects. They almost always stop any project they oppose. Members of this group frequently get together to discuss their plans. Their influence is dominant over nearly all community affairs, regardless of the subject. They seldom find it necessary to concern themselves with the opinion of other individuals or groups of individuals. In short, _____ is pretty much run by a small group of personalities with a great deal of influence. | Almost all important community decisions are made by a process of give and take among a large number of groups and individuals. On one issue, one combination of interested people will develop; on another issue, an almost entirely different combination is formed. Many different persons bring up important issues for consideration. There is no group which stops nearly every project. Leaders find it necessary to pay close attention to what most people are thinking in the community. In short, _____ is pretty much run by constantly changing alliances in which many individuals and groups play significant parts. |

_____Is much more like A than B_____.

_____Is somewhat more like A than B_____.

_____Is slightly more like A than B_____.

_____Is slightly more like B than A_____.

_____Is somewhat more like B than A_____.

_____Is much more like B than A_____.

_____Don't know_____.

Why do you feel this way?

This concludes the interview. I appreciate your time and interest. I would like to thank you for your cooperation.

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