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DOLAN, Jr., William Patrick, 1939-
THE ROLE OF THE ASSISTANT ACADEMIC VICE PRESIDENT, SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY--1972-73: AN ANALYSIS OF AN INTERVENTION.

Harvard University, Ed.D., 1973
Education, theory and practice

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THE ROLE OF THE ASSISTANT ACADEMIC VICE PRESIDENT

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY--1972-73

AN ANALYSIS OF AN INTERVENTION

400 PROJECT

W. PATRICK DOLAN

A FINAL REPORT PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION, 1973

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VITA

This paper is an analysis of a set of interventions I made at St. Louis University as Assistant Academic Vice-President and Director of a Danforth Grant during the academic year 1972-73. It will consist of three parts. The first is an historical description of the more critical facts of the University's existence during the last five years. I will concentrate on the more recent attempts at change that began under the Danforth Grant about two years ago. Included will be a description of the major set of actors and the scenario in which the action takes place as a basic guide and reference point to the following strategy and set of interventions.

In a second part I will try to describe and analyze my first set of interventions from September, 1972, to the end of the first semester in December. At that point there is a significant break not only in the time-action frame, but also in the strategy and type of intervention. Having begun to process the feedback over the first four months with the ad hoc committee at Harvard Graduate School of Education in December and discussing it with some of the people in the University I decided to begin a different series of strategies and actions for the period January, 1973, to April, 1973. I would then attempt to compare them with the help of both previous groups. This second set of strategies and a comparison of the two methods will comprise the third and final part of the project.

In the second and third parts I will use three concepts or dimensions to view St. Louis University. First, I want to examine and trace the set of interventions in the communication/information system that is at work at the University. I will refer particularly to some ideas about "open and closed systems" that appear in Chris Argyris' book Intervention Theory and Method. (Addison-Wesley,

1970, pp. 136-37)

Second, I am interested in the sources of "power" within St. Louis University, especially as they delimit the boundaries of the sources of change. So the mechanism of decision-making, the style of leadership, the political alignments, will be viewed from the perspective of the "sources of power". Flowing from this analysis of the sources of power, I am interested in what Amatai Etizioni calls the "compliance structures". For him this refers to the types of orientation to the power, the normative values around authority that reinforce it or question it, and the kinds of consensus needed and how it is attained. The mapping of the information flow, the identification of the power sources, and the set of normative values, remunerative and punitive, that are so woven through, create a complete system of information, choice, and action resistant to anything that threatened it. My goal was to attempt to open it to some degree. My hypothesis throughout is that the university represents a system in need of continuing change since its crucial environment is in more and more rapid flux. If the University is not in Donald Schon's terms a "learning system" it will be incapable of bringing about the continuing transformation demanded.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

To look at a private, Catholic university such as St. Louis University in the 1970's as it struggles to come to terms with its past, the growing financial pressures, the changing educational and religious scene probably needs no further justification. Still there are probably in those more pressured situations a precious laboratory

of institutional strain where the ordinarily vague forces can be seen operating with much greater speed and in higher relief. This last statement must appear now only as an hypothesis, if a very defendable one, and can surely add to the interest in doing such a study as I am attempting here.

To delineate the focus of the project further, the question is the attempt at educational change at the undergraduate and graduate level at St. Louis University from 1970 to the present. By 1970, St. Louis University had developed the complete set of professional schools: law, medicine, engineering, nursing, business administration, social service, and divinity. But the "center" of the University had always been considered the liberal arts college at both the undergraduate and graduate level. Typical of the Jesuit university in this country and elsewhere, the humanities areas were strongly built from the beginning. Atypically, St. Louis University had also developed a good natural science strength early in its history. The social sciences were late arrivals and for the most part substantially weaker. Such development left the humanities departments such as English, history, and philosophy with comparatively large departments with a large percentage of older, tenured professors.

As the recent Carnegie Report The Campus and the City points out, the Catholic universities that developed at this time were urban by design. The four Jesuit universities in the midwest, for instance, are almost all built at precisely the same location in the city. Marquette in Milwaukee is at "17th and Wisconsin"; Creighton in Omaha at "24th and California"; St. Louis at "Olive and Grand"; all were ten minutes from the central city, on the streetcar line. Whatever that meant then, however, it now makes

them "urban" in a dimension that they had not foreseen and still are hesitant to deal with. Although built as commuter colleges to a great extent, then only later as residential ones, they still view the modern city as a puzzle rather than a natural environment.

The church-related aspect of St. Louis University has taken various forms over the years, but the central elements have been substantial curricular requirements in theology and philosophy, and the presence of Jesuits and Catholic faculty and students. At many similar institutions the change in the Catholic Church during the 1960's, the dwindling number of Jesuits, and the need to recruit students from wider areas have altered this traditional Catholic stance. But these changes have not had that much effect on St. Louis University. The curriculum still remains heavily structured toward dogmatic and moral content, and one can still find courses in the catalogue that read: "Theology of Marriage, section 2, (for women only)."

Until very recently the self selection of students has continued to give St. Louis University a high percentage of Catholics from middle class, Midwest families. Only since 1969 has a growing percentage of urban black students entered the student body. Although numerically the Jesuits are fewer today, their presence is still strongly felt in the day to day operations of the university, and make for an information system and power base that really lies outside the regular University functions, yet impinges as a powerful sub-system in specific cases. The Jesuit Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences addressed the first full faculty meeting in the fall of 1972 with these two opening remarks. He first asked the prayers of the faculty for some faculty who were sick. He then said: "I

would like to remind you of an old custom here of beginning class with a prayer. I do not require it, but I strongly recommend it." The coming to terms with its religious tradition in a modern academic setting with a growing diversity of both faculty and student body provides some of the tension that go into the University's attempts at a new identity.

As for most of higher education, the middle 1960's were strong growth years for St. Louis University. In addition, in 1965-66, St. Louis University received a $5 million grant from the Ford Foundation that put an extra $1.6 million a year in the operating budget for the next three years. From 1966 to 1969 the Ford grant and growing enrollments kept the university geared to the expanded spending rate. But at the end of 1968-69 school year and the end of the Ford grant cracks began to appear. However, there was little warning of the extent of the damage to come. Rising costs, loss of enrollment, and curtailment of a sizeable portion of the soft money produced an abrupt and critical financial turn. The university swung from a $600,000 surplus in 1969 to a $2.3 million deficit in 1970, a $2.1 million in 1971, and a $1.2 million in 1972. There was, of course, no back-up endowment to speak of. The question quickly became one of financial survival.

At this same time the surrounding educational scene was changing drastically. The University of Missouri began building a major campus in St. Louis. Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Illinois started a substantial development. Three junior colleges appeared in the St. Louis area that had not been there a few years earlier. St. Louis University had always been a 50% commuter college drawing from middle class families in the area, and

they had that market pretty much to themselves for decades. Suddenly several new and low cost alternatives were available. Also the religious motivation for a Catholic higher education had lessened through the 1960's as attitudes significantly changed after Vatican II. With the financial picture of rising costs and diminishing soft money came dropping applications. Enrollment in 1972 in the College of Arts and Sciences was 750 students under what it had been in 1968. The Business School also began an enrollment slump. Within the College of Arts and Sciences the shift was markedly away from humanities and toward the social sciences. In a few years the market had entirely shifted, and the balance between faculty resources and student's interests was completely off. The only thing that kept a semblance of parity between size of departments and students served was the solid block of required courses in the humanities during the first two years.

During this drastic change from surplus to deficit, the Schools of Dentistry and Engineering were closed. It was an abrupt move, a frightening one for the rest of the University community, and the effect was to create what can best be described as a "survival mentality". In the future any hint of change was viewed as a threat to one's school, department, job, or the dwindling amount of possible university resources. Meanwhile, the tuition continued to rise each year from 1969 to 1972. The budget was finally balanced after three deficit years by a wage freeze in 1971-72. And with these moves the University was caught in a dynamic of its own making. In the forceful moves of closing two schools and freezing wages the Trustees and administration had averted immediate disaster. But for long term survival in a tighter and more competitive market the University had to come up

with some exciting and unique programs. The fear and institutional paralysis resulting from the earlier moves blocked any constructive change. It is that tension that provides the best description of the environment for change at St. Louis University in the years 1971 through 1973.

PROJECT 21

In 1970, the first year of the large deficit, Fr. Paul Reinert, President of St. Louis University had gone to the Danforth Foundation and asked for some money to try to come to terms with the crisis. He received $1,500,000 to be spread over the next five years. The general category of the grant was "academic innovation", and although a rather general proposal accompanied it, there were no real boundaries except that the grant should not be used to subsidize any of the regular operational budget. It is helpful to capture some of the language of the first press releases to understand how the University community was prepared for what was to come. The first release from St. Louis University said that the "basis for the Danforth Grant is the expectation that the St. Louis University study will develop innovation of national significance". It went on to say that the five year grant had been titled "Project 21: Toward a Redesign of the University for the 21st Century". Fr. Reinert concluded that the goal was to develop a new design particularly from the undergraduate and graduate programs of the University, "which is innovative and distinctive academically as well as financially feasible".

It was at this time that Fr. Reinert announced the closing of the Engineering School and a decision to find another sponsoring body

for Parks College of Aeronautical Technology, a small adjunct school of the University's in Illinois.* The letter to the community announcing these changes was filled with forceful language about a new direction toward the "nature of man and his environment". The letter was refered to as the University's "second credo", and the message was clear--a total redefinition of the university was at hand. A sample of the expectation was this breathless paragraph from the official St. Louis University Magazine.

> The Task Force will meet weekly; engage outside consultants; issue regular progress reports; arrange for meetings, round table discussions and other forms of faculty and student involvement. As an example of the latter, a series of twenty meetings will be held on campus shortly after Easter. A member of the Task Force will be present at each meeting, and as many as 800 to 1000 students and professors will be involved. An even larger gathering will take place shortly before final exams in May. An entire day will be set aside for group discussions on the restructuring study. All classes will be called off for the day to insure the greatest possible attendance.
>
> The University Council, highest all-University advisory body, composed of faculty, students and administrators, will play a key role in the study. Meeting more frequently than in the past, this council will both originate and receive from various sources all the options for curricular and structural redesign. Serving as the sounding board and reactor to these proposals, the Council will be in a position to present recommendations for a preferred design to the board of trustees.

This last decision to take all proposals for the undergraduate and graduate curriculum to the University Council was a crucial one.

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*The story of Parks College will reappear in later sections.

The Council is made up of administrators and faculty and a few students from all the schools including Law and Medicine. This group representing the entire University including the five professional schools that were not losing enrollment were too far removed from the problem and too disparate to take the drastic steps necessary for the College of Arts and Sciences. So discussion in a group of over sixty members, half of whom were not involved or acquainted with the problem time and again lost the issues, blunted alternatives to reach concensus, and provided a large and confusing enough forum where most progress was stopped.

With that rhetorical beginning, and with the University Council solidly in place, the next step was to put together the Task Force to guide the Project. Although there was mention of a National Advisory Board in the original proposal and Fr. Reinert spoke of the use of "experts and consultants", the original Project 21 Task Force included:

Paul C. Reinert	President
John W. Padberg	Academic Vice President
Clifford Murino	Vice President of Finance
Jerome Marchetti	Executive Vice President
Edward Eigel	Dean of the Graduate School
J. Barry McGannon	Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences
Paul Merz	Assoc. Professor, Econ. (Business School)
John Wilson	Assistant Professor, History
Hugh Donohue	Professor, Chemistry
Michael Garranzini	President of Student Congress
Larry Morgan	Graduate Student

The six chief administrators of the University composed more than half of the Task Force. In addition, however, four of those six, Frs. Reinert, Padberg, McGannon, and Marchetti were Trustees of

the University. So the situation looked like this:

(four trustees included)

President

Executive Vice President

Vice Pres. Finance | Acad. Vice Pres.

Grad. Dean | Dean of College

Plus 3 faculty

Plus 2 students

Reinert: had been president for twenty years; was very aware of the crises at St. Louis University and ready to do something strong and radical to counteract it. Paternalistic style of governing, usually with two Jesuit lieutenants, one in charge of academics and other in charge of finance.

Marchetti: Executive Vice President; had been very influential in finances for the past ten years. Ran St. Louis University inside for the last few years as Reinert had moved to the national scene. Style is shrewd, political, one-man show, governance by rumor.

Murino: Geologist who went to NSF for three years and came back to title of Vice President of Finance which at the time meant a great deal of attention to grants and contracts. Concern is with overhead and not academic innovation.

Padberg: Harvard Ph.D. in History. Harbison award winner. Was brought into the administration late to be the Jesuit in the academic area. Was not successful as administrator but moved up the ladder quickly anyway; had been picked by Reinert to be his successor.

McGannon: Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences for eight years. Conservative by any measure; astute politically; good admin-

istrator. He had established control over the key committees with his appointments over the years. By far the strongest member of the Task Force politically.

Edward Eigel: Mathematician. Had just entered administration as Assistant Dean of the Graduate School and was now Dean. Easy going, but had not as yet been a force in the administration. The graduate dean has no faculty and a relatively small budget, but strong opportunity to make policy from a low profile position. Was trusted by the faculty and politically knowledgeable. He grew stronger through the course of the first years of the Project.

John Wilson: Assistant Professor of History, the most conservative department in the College. Wilson was a good young professor from Syracuse; relatively unknown when asked; did not represent a strong contingent when he was chosen.

Paul Merz: From the Business School; a neutral figure. Well-liked but little academic position or leadership role in the faculty.

Donohue: Old timer in Chemistry; respected and liked by all; open to change; considered a safe represented from the natural sciences.

Of the three faculty members, none could have been considered strong leaders at the time. The two students were aware of the difficulties, concerned, but docile. The shape of the Task Force then was the leading administrators in the University with little faculty representation or weight.

During the Spring of 1970, then, the expectation for dramatic change began to build. At a weekend in May fifty people from the University including the Task Force spent time discussing the "assumptions of Project 21", and provided a position paper. The paper laid down the characteristics of Christian, Catholic, Jesuit and urban from which Project 21 would seek out the implications. We will see

that three years later the University and Project 21 are still at war over those words and their meaning. In a crisis of identity such as St. Louis University found itself, the instinctual return to the fundamental formulas is starkly evident. It is reminiscent of Donald Schon's return to "the last stable state", where and when things were clear and logical.

The paper is important because it gives clues to the climate of change at the time. There is a list of particulars concerning freedom of curriculum, interdisciplinary teaching and structure, and faculty retraining. Each one of these as they appear in the next two years are overwhelmingly opposed. On the whole the document is one of broad guidelines and some hints at a readiness to change. But significantly there is little if any discussion about the climate for change or obstacles that might present themselves. Instead there were plans for producing new alternatives.

Over the summer of 1970 a small task force worked on curricular and structural models and produced a rather thorough compendium of possible options. By the fall, two important but unexplained changes had been made on the original Task Force. Fr. Reinert had stepped aside because of "pressing commitments", and Dr. Murino had assumed a second title to make him Vice President of Finance and Research and he also stepped down. The Chairman and Executive Secretary had resigned. Fr. Padberg assumed Chairmanship of the Project. In September and October a series of conferences were held and recommendations began to form. Warren Bryan Martin, then of the Center of Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley, was used as a consultant in October and helped clarify some curricular proposals that were scheduled to go before the Uni-

versity Council on November 14. As a result of that meeting any direct action was avoided and three committees were named to operate through the Spring of 1971. One was on the "philosophy" of the university, one on general education, and one on specialized education. They were to produce reports by May 31.

Also by November of 1970 it had become obvious that relations with the faculty had become critical. It was bound to happen given the make up of the original Task Force. A "liaison system" was invented with Dr. Donohue in charge to try and establish relations again with the individual departments. However, by then it seems that the sides were beginning to form. In December the general Task Force was taking too much time and getting little done and people wanted a release from the time demands. An executive committee of the Task Force was formed of two administrators, two faculty, and two students. The feeling had surfaced that the power was not there to bring off the changes. In the Spring, Fr. Padberg was released full time to work on Project 21 as Reinert realized the Project was slowing to a walk and still had no direction.

Meanwhile, during the Spring of 1971, the Task Force entertained "innovative proposals" and approved, among others, a new freshman counseling program, an interdisciplinary film program and two Institutes, one on Peace and one on Environmental Studies. In those four proposals, all of which were periphery to the central problem of the undergraduate and graduate programs the Task Force committed a third of the entire grant. The programs were funded fully for two years, and two-thirds the third year and one-third the fourth. That amounted to $500,000. Another ten smaller one year projects were funded, some percentage of the salaries of the administrators

involved were paid, a public relations firm in New York was retained, and so the money went or was committed to go.

By the Summer of 1971, the three reports were in and Fr. Padberg began to work on the Philosophy report. Over the summer the report on general education and the ideas from the previous summer's workshop were used to work on a curricular proposal. So the first year, two administrators had resigned--Fr. Reinert being the crucial loss. Then the Task Force had really shrunk to a six person executive committee. The University Council had sent the Project's first approach off into three committees. The isolation from the faculty was heightened. So far the reform had been slowed, no concrete measures that threatened the core problems had brought a showdown or even a threat. All the newly funded proposals were "safe", over and above those in place and notoriously weak academically and completely outside the main system. And finally a measure had been taken of the Project's strength and without Reinert or any power faculty support it was clear that it was stopable if necessary. The fact that a separate body had been set up to recommend changes in curriculum in schools where the faculty were not included had not yet been seen in all its contradictions.

By September, 1971, and the beginning of the new institutes, the Project 21 curriculum design was ready. It was basically an opening up of a very structured curriculum from departmental requirements to general area requirements in the humanities, social sciences, and so forth. The Task Force spent September deciding on tactics for distribution of the proposal. By the meeting on the 28 of September the discussion had finally reached the point where someone asked what would happen if the curricular proposal was rejected

by any one of the undergraduate schools.

Fr. Barry McGannon, Dean of Arts and Sciences, as early as August 29, 1971, had begun to undercut the work of the Task Force and Father Padberg as Chairman. He resisted immediately the proposed curriculum as much too free and lacking the essentials. He began to object strenuously to the disappearance of the specific four courses in theology and four in philosophy. He was out-voted on several issues concerning the need for required courses in philosophy and theology in a Catholic University. As the discussion mounted and the University Council missed the real issues, through October and November McGannon became the most important person on the Task Force. He decided that he would have to take action to stop the proposed curriculum. He went back to the standing committee on curriculum in the College and drew up a counter curriculum known as Curriculum K. It was a slight reshuffling of the structured departmental requirements and in its formation many of the real power centers and decision-making prices come to the fore. Here we have, then, a key person on the Task Force, present at its deliberations, watering down wherever he could, and then summoning the faculty around another proposal that would defend the status quo.

During the fall, however, some of the real patterns began to emerge. On November 23 Fr. McGannon sent a copy of the minutes of the Executive Faculty Meeting of the College of Arts and Sciences directly to Reinert. It was accompanied by a note that said that the faculty had been very concerned about the role of the Project 21 Task Force vis-a-vis themselves. The minutes show however that McGannon is the one leading the chorus of "confusion, frustration, and disenchantment". All this from a member of that Task Force.

Then on November 29 a letter from Fr. Thro, Chairman of Philosophy, former Provincial of the Missouri Province, to Fr. Reinert asking for a meeting of the full professors in philosophy and the President, since they had found no clarification "through lower channels". This letter was relayed to Fr. Padberg and Dr. Eigel a week later with a key note attached. He asks them to discuss the problem and then says:

> Also Fr. Ong came to me confidentially indicating that he thinks our best departments--English, Philosophy, etc., are the ones most disturbed and upset--and that something must be done soon to prevent a serious faculty morale collapse.
>
> --Memo dated 12/4/71

What begins to pattern is a clear disregard for any of the deans of vice-presidents and a realization that the power really existed only at the top. Both McGannon's and Thro's letters are meant to show the "depth and breadth of faculty disenchantment with Project 21, not only in this Department but in the College of Arts and Sciences in general". Of course, the whole requirement structure that supported these departments not only with students at the undergraduate level but then justified graduate teaching assistantships so necessary for the graduate programs was being threatened by the opening of the curriculums. Still all the disapproval takes place in terms of losing the Catholic and Jesuit focus. The other flow of information directly to Reinert again, is the mention of a few words of concern from Fr. Ong. Ong is the best known Jesuit author-scholar at the University. His concerns about academic quality would be perceived as very important. That information system is totally outside the regular University channels but goes directly to the source of decision making.

The fight was clear now and the lines had been drawn. The Philosophy Department met with Fr. Reinert. The reaction in the College of Arts and Sciences continued to grow under Fr. McGannon's direction. The power of Project 21 had to be faced down and without Reinert behind it, it had no force. The Task Force had taken a position by then of "presenting and explaining the Project 21 curricular proposal but not to argue on its behalf, as a more effective path of action."* Having isolated themselves off from most faculty support, they began to feel that not to own the proposal would manifest either a commendable indifference or protection from the hurt when it failed. At any rate, there was no one but students to fight for it.

By January, 1972, Padberg and Eigel had changed the proposed Project 21 curriculum from area requirements to some extremely vague guidelines, leaving completely intact the departmental requirements within the schools and asking the schools to develop options around themes, including a contract option. The vote in the Task Force to take such a proposal to the University Council was 5-5 and Padberg broke the tie with a vote to do so. The pressure on Reinert, and hence on Eigel and Padberg had been too great and they had backed off. The College later in the Spring passed the Curriculum K with no difficulties. At this stage the student representation that had worked over the two years was totally disillusioned.

Project 21 had reached the end of its second year. It had put in place some interdisciplinary programs, each funded at about

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*(footnote: Minutes of Executive Committee of Task Force, December 22, 1971)

$30,000 a year with young, untenured directors who depended upon good will to put together a critical mass of course offerings. An office of freshman counseling with a young dean who was owned by none of the deans of the Schools although he theoretically cut across all of them. The Project had built toward a curricular design that threatened the already threatened major departments in the College such as Philosophy, Theology, English, and History. All were large, suffering both from the fall in enrollments and the shift in student interest toward the social sciences. The curtailment of their specific requirements would have cut the rest of the foundation out from under them. They fought for their lives. At the beginning, with Fr. Reinert's rhetoric and leadership the Project could have carried off a redesign of significant proportions. When he left it after the first summer, the structure top heavy with administrators and totally lacking in faculty leadership, the polarization began to grow. At the crucial time, McGannon emerged as the focal leader in a position on the Task Force and off to rally the opposition. The University Council was the perfect mechanism with an impossible number of unconnected people that met four or five times a year to stop any sharp reform. The lack of political force on the Project 21 Task Force and the growing pressure brought to bear on Reinert took its toll on Padberg and Eigel. The Project by the Spring of 1972 had really lost its chance with the sound defeat on the curricular issue, and was taken for dead by the College faculty. The job now was to get Padberg and Eigel off the hook. There was about $400,000 in "free" money still left over the next three years; the rest had been committed. Padberg was moving up to Acting Executive Vice President and Eigel to Acting Academic

Vice President to wait out the year while the University searched for a new President. Reinert was moving over to Chancellor and Marchetti had become Treasurer.

I was contacted for the job in April of 1972. I went out to look at it and spent three days speaking with many of the persons mentioned in this preceding history. Padberg and Eigel spoke of a position as Director of Project 21. From all I could determine, that was an impossible base to operate from. I suggested the open position of Assistant Academic Vice President and Director of Project 21. I would have access to money still free in 1973-74 and 1974-75 plus some $50,000 for 1972-73. With both Eigel and Padberg in "acting" positions the backup looked very weak. The political damage done looked almost irreparable, but the University was still in desperate need of coming to terms with crucial information and was still caught in its repetition of old formulas to find a new identity. With the knowledge that it was probably short term but that if I could produce the information and deal with some of the blockage, in a transition year, I might influence what direction the new leadership would take, I took the job.

SECTION TWO:

The First Set of Interventions

September through December, 1972

When I arrived in September I inherited the former Task Force, all the odium of the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences, the bitterness of defeat in those few who had worked in the curriculum reform, and student leaders that had decided that academic reform was not the path to joy, success, or even a good feeling. For September I listened and talked to people, trying to determine where the power was located in the structure and how it could help the Project recover. The two central power sources were Fr. Reinert, ending 23 years of very successful presiding, and the liberal arts faculty, especially in the humanities, with Fr. McGannon as Dean giving them control of the key committees. Between them, Fr. Marchetti on the Budget Committee was the only other strong force that people did not just walk around. It became very evident that both Padberg and Eigel wanted little to do with Project 21, having suffered enough through affiliation with it over the first two years. They were both "acting" vice presidents, neither one wanted another fight, and I was all alone. At this point, I probably decided on what has been termed, I think correctly, the "Lone Ranger" model of intervention.

At this juncture it was either going to be a very quiet year waiting out the search for the new President with every one else or trying to make some things happen. I decided on the latter. On October 1, I asked for the resignations of those on the Task Force for Project 21. I then tried to put together a new internal group with a different balance. Two people stayed on: Fr. Padberg as Chairman of Project 21 and Ms. Pat Costello, a senior in the College of Arts and Sciences. I asked Dr. Richard Blackwell, a very respected, conservative but responsive full professor of philosophy; Dr. Thomas Layloff, professor of chemistry, a very good teacher, a

loner, but also well respected among the natural science faculty; Fr. Bill Sullivan, Dean of the Divinity School, young, tough, liberal; Dr. Frank Wuest, Chairman of Psychology Department, one year at St. Louis University, excellent resource in change theory, working well to open his department, still "objective" about the University; Lee Fetter, Junior in College of Arts and Sciences, Academic Vice President of student body. I thus had a ratio of four powerful faculty, two student leaders, one administrator and myself.

Then, since I had little or no support inside, I called friends from around the country and formed a National Advisory Board. I had some specific needs in certain areas, but they were basically people who trusted me enough to lend me their names, and hopefully in the spring, some time at St. Louis. My hope was that this Board would give me some backing, even though outside, with its cumulative prestige and a set of powerful resources for later help.* By the time it was announced in late October, I was already

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*NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD TO PROJECT 21

William Arrowsmith, University Professor (Classics), Boston University
James Breeden, Associate Professor of Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education
Audrey Cohen, President, College of Human Services
James Dixon, President, Antioch College
Thomas Fitzgerald, S. J., Academic Vice President, Georgetown University
Gerald Grant, Associate Professor of Education and Sociology, Syracuse University
Clark Kerr, Chairman of the Carnegie Commission
Thomas Parker, Academic Vice President, Bennington College
Frank Newman, Vice President, University Relations, Stanford University
Neil Rudenstine, Dean of the College, Princeton University
Gerald Witherspoon, President, Goddard College

in a good fight and it may have saved me. At any rate its real importance came with the visits in the spring. My prime objectives were to try to open the system to the crucial knowledge about itself and its environment and the National Advisory Board bore directly on that goal. The other objective was to try and work through and bring to a head the continual flight to magic formulae as the sources of renewal. The constant repitition of the uniqueness of St. Louis University as Jesuit, Catholic, and urban had to be dealt with before any other avenues could or would open up.

In October, Fr. McGannon, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, let it be known that he was leaving St. Louis University at the end of the first semester. We had known that this was his last year and that he was clearly opposed to Project 21 and its work. I had tried to decide if a significant run-in with him, given the power base, was going to be profitable or not. He surprised everyone by moving at mid-year and that left the humanities faculty without a leader. Also the Dean of the School of Business Administration had been dean for twenty years and some new movement was desperately needed in that school. In November, he was asked to resign, and after some little resistance, did so. His faculty clearly felt that I had something to do with this and by December, the chairmen he had named over the years had come together to protect their school, especially against young assistant vice presidents.

In late November Reinert, Eigel, Padberg, and myself met to form the Search Committee for the new Dean of the College. We asked Dr. Blackwell, philosophy professor on the Project 21 Task Force, to be the Chairman. The group proceeded to put two students, a woman, a black, and then begin the political trade-offs.

Several neutrals were chosen and then Fr. Reinert suggested Fr. Brennan, Dean of the Graduate School, and a strong conservative. I then asked for Dr. Wuest, Chairman of Psychology, to counteract that force, and so it went. When we finished, we discovered there was only one Jesuit on the Committee. Fr. Reinert said he wanted two. I argued the reason for a Jesuit quota but got nowhere. We then spent the next hour with the President thumbing through the catalogue looking for a Jesuit. We went through the entire list alphabetically twice before we decided on someone. I then asked whether the Dean had to be a Jesuit. The first response from Reinert and Padberg was yes. I asked the reason why the Dean of the College and no other. The answer was in terms of "more exposure", and that the alumni expected to see a Jesuit there. We finally argued to the point where there were no stipulations of this nature to be placed on the candidate. It happened in fifteen minutes but the results as the search committee drew to a close in March were very significant given that conversation.

As I begin to approach two key incidents in the first four months, several aspects of the St. Louis University's situation appear more and more clearly. I have mentioned the power vacuum that existed at the Vice President's level. When McGannon announced his departure, the sense of "no one in charge" spread further. Only Reinert could lead, and everyone knew this, and he was a lame duck President, although as we shall see later his idea of future chancellor is not an altogether powerless position. But "power" in this setting seemed to disappear as people failed to exercise it. There continued to be a source of power completely outside of the University system that could impinge on it directly at the highest

level. A group of Jesuit faculty of many years and good academic reputation could and did approach Fr. Reinert and Fr. Brennan, the Dean of the Graduate School, when they deemed it necessary. What became very clear was that there was strong "blocking" or negative power on the part of the College faculty, but the only positive leadership that could overcome this was Reinert. The University resembled what J. B. Lon Hefferlin in the Dynamics of Academic Reform (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco: 1969) calls a patriarchal institution. St. Louis University represented an extreme form of a totally centralized source of power in a powerful leader who had announced he was stepping aside. Hefferlin's comments are interesting.

> "Yet centralization places so much influence in one person or clique that when the center goes dead, the institution of necessity follows. It appears to have the same effect as a fly wheel in physics: when the powerful person has momentum, he keeps the rest of the mechanism moving; but when he stops, tremendous energy is required to overcome his inertia."
> --(p. 169)

Decisions had so long been made from the top down, that when the top was changing, the powerful President of 23 years, a dean of 20 years, and another dean of 8 years and the Vice Presidents were not strong, the degree of paralysis was almost complete.

Seniority in such a system is also extremely powerful. It is the criterion for power in general in academic institutions but all-pervasive at St. Louis. The most common emotional response when change is mentioned is: "I've given 15 years of my professional life to this institution. I could have gone a lot of places for more money,

but I decided to stay here. I don't want anybody changing it now." The declining enrollment and shifting interests of the students is the "administration's problem", because the faculty have never been allowed to manage and have never conceived of themselves as decision-makers in the system. One would characterize the decision-making style around this central power base of the President and the central administration as quiet, very few people included, bent on avoiding all exterior conflict and tension, based more on persons than information, seldom including the people and programs about whom decisions were being made. To carry this type of decision-making off in a large University a very strong supportive system is required. At first its source eluded me.

Amatai Etzioni in his work A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (Free Press, New York: 1961) bases his whole analysis on a concept he calls "compliance". He defines it as "the relationship consisting of the power employed by superiors to control subordinates and the orientation of the subordinates to this power." (p. xv) It is a definition that includes the structure or distribution of power, but also the motivational sources of control. It tries to focus on the question, "on what is the power based?" As I tried to answer this question at St. Louis University I was driven towards an answer around a set of normative values. The patriarchal system depended for the most part for its control on a normative power. It appears to be closely related to a legitimacy given to authority figures in a church. I hesitate to use the metaphor because it seems too easy in this case, and yet the similarities are remarkable. Other church related universities have long ago passed to a collegial form of decision making. But at St. Louis it wasn't

so. The power here seemed to rest upon an internal "orientation of the subordinates" of a value kind. Decisions were then not questioned as to whether they were good or bad, informed or uninformed, but whether they were legitimate (made by the patriarchy) or not. In the Business School one hears them say on an unpopular decision, "Well, I'm a company man, I'll go along." But it is forbidden to disagree in public with that legitimate authority. It would be unthinkable at St. Louis University and time and again I was guilty of this sin.

Given this analysis of both the power center and the "compliance" structure that influences the kind of interaction of the different groups in the University, the level and kind of consensus needed, and the allocation of tasks and the resultant feeling of non-ownership, it is also crucial to examine what such a centralized system does with information. Very few people, as we have seen, are involved in the decision-making, they are isolated from faculty and students, and very fearful of any information that would disrupt or cause conflict within the University. Any such information is either ignored or denied whenever possible. It follows that any communication within the system vertically or horizontally must be superficial and non-threatening, and distorted almost to the point of being dishonest. Large and crucial pieces of information somehow don't appear or are brushed aside. A look at this problem would also help give us a handle on the analysis and criteria for judgement of my intervention.

Argyris speaks in some detail about the "openness" of a client system as crucial to the interventionist's ability to help. He also describes a shift from organizational effectiveness to organizational survival that applies very well at St. Louis. The final result is that

the chances of learning from the environment decreases considerably. The obvious case in point was the continued fall in enrollment over the last few years. I began on a Committee on Student Life that is made up of the five undergraduate deans, the Dean of Freshmen, the Dean of Student Affairs, and Dean of Admissions. In October, when the results of the enrollment figures were known I listened to the first meeting. There was absolutely no discussion of the decline for the thirdstraight year except to say that many other places were suffering the same fate. The faculty, perhaps because the decision making has happened elsewhere for so long, do not see it as their problem. The tactic of the system, as I watched, seemed to be to last through October when the regular rhythms of the academic year took over and the crucial facts were lost for another year.

In the entire first four months the group dynamic in this Committee was to use the time without touching on any crucial and threatening information either about the state of academic counseling, the causes of enrollment drop, the changing student, or the quality of the academic programs. A typical discussion would begin with causes of the decline in enrollment. The Dean of Admissions would report that the week before a woman in Cleveland had said she heard about "sex in the coed dormitory". Then there would ensue an hour's discussion about how disgraceful the situation was, and how the Dean of Student Affairs had better tighten up. The final statement would be made by the Jesuit Dean of the College to the effect that he was positive that there were only "20 or 25 students involved". When I attempted to interject some more critical data about academic programs, costs and competition, the discussion would close ranks and the stigma of "disloyalty" on my part would

arise. I found myself incapable of getting the group to isolate and solve problems even when the undeniable statistics were in front of them. In some sense I represented the moving inside of an exterior threat. To want to talk about the problems in that atmosphere was forbidden.

It became evident that almost no information of a negative kind was discussed in public--and this meant even in committee meetings. A second episode reveals not only the information loss, but the power intervention that could and would be made by Fr. Reinert, and finally the final form all questions begin to take at St. Louis University. They become questions of one's "christianity" or honesty or orthodoxy. In a system where open processing of information is not allowed, and no one can bring possible conflict into the open because that is disloyalty, then most critical decisions are made in private meetings with the President, and any counter process will be shut down as quickly as possible.

In mid October, 1972, the student newspaper approached me about academic planning. I responded by criticizing the present decision making process at St. Louis University and said that we had very little institutional information to base decisions on, and what we had, we refused to deal with. They followed that up with interviews with all those involved in institutional research, including the Vice President of Finance and Research and the President. A front page article followed with the head-line "Office of Institutional Research Under Fire as Inadequate". They compared definitions given by the five key people and pointed out the definitions didn't make sense together. I had criticized a general process publicly and the students had carried it to its logical conclusion.

Dissent within the administrative team was disloyalty and I was told so by the Academic Vice President, but he said nothing else.

By the following week the front page headline was "Qualifications of Murino Challenged". I had stayed low and was not quoted but several deans, assistant deans, and faculty were. There were plenty of people who said in effect that Dr. Murino, the Vice President of Finance and Research, didn't know what institutional research was and wasn't in the least bit interested. On the following day, Saturday, November 4, the University Council entered the fray, but in its own characteristic way. Several faculty voiced concern about the tone of the newspaper's article as being "unchristian". Two motions were made and defeated: one was to censure the student newspaper, the other to form a committee to investigate the matter. By this time the whole thing was running counter to all norms and accepted behavior and the need to close the discussion was crucial to the system.

During the following week Dr. Murino called several of the administrators who had criticized him and asked for a public recantation. He only got one. But he went to Fr. Reinert and asked him to intervene. In a public letter printed in the following weeks paper Fr. Reinert effectively shut down all debate. He replied that the tone of the articles were unchristian and any decision about institutional research represented not the priorities of a single vice president but "the best thinking of the entire senior administration". The message to the University community was clear--Stop this discussion. Surrounding his letter were two pages of discussion of christian and unchristian behavior. I responded in a private letter

that I am going to quote in toto. I do so because it set the issues and my posture and was the first major step to "marginality" on the administrative team.

> I am most amazed by your letter in the University News of November 10, 1972. I am first surprised that you entered into the discussion in such a way. I honestly can think of no major university where a president would have intervened in an affair of this kind. The tone and thrust of the letter are perfectly clear. "We know what we're doing. We will not tolerate any criticism." You take away the responsibility from one man and hide it in the "best thinking of the entire senior administration". You stifle all public discussion about University decision-making, you create a fear in your faculty and staff, let alone your students, to voice any of their thoughts or feelings about their experience here from whatever level of competence they may possess. In short you use the power of leadership in this community to crush the very spirit of questioning, self awareness, and problem defining and solving in an atmosphere of openness that should characterize a university. There is the incredible assumption in the "higher" administration here that any open conflict spells division and distrust. In my opinion what causes the division and distrust is precisely this heavy handed dismissal of criticism as personal affront, clear warning to everyone in the community that you view criticism as disloyalty, that the decisions of the "higher echelon" are beyond reproach, and that no one person can be held accountable for "their" or "its" decisions.
>
> My second point grows from the first. The University News story was a good one. It interviewed people across this university and got their opinions on a crucial area. They are frustrated and ignored from all the evidence. People who have competence in this area, such as Quelda Wilson, said what they thought, probably with the mistaken notion that they

were in a different league where differing professional opinion can be voiced publically and dealt with in a professional way--in fact where such controversy is cultivated. I would respond to your remark that I thought the article was extremely fair, and was consistent with the facts as I know them to be. And since you have gone on public record as you did, it almost demands that I do the same, since it is obvious that no one else here will. Your rhetoric about the search for truth and an atmosphere of Christian principles brings sadness, more than anything else, to me. To use those words in this setting, is to make their impact meaningless. One could, of course, ask about the search for truth in a message that says there is no room for questioning either me, the men I will protect, or the "university". The Christian principle issue, which some faculty so eagerly carried further, is the most disappointing use of your spiritual leadership in this community that I could have imagined. I guess the words "disappoint" and "sadness" come through here and that probably mirrors my state best at present.

Lastly, even if I agreed that the priorities listed in your letter should be foremost, I am convinced that we are not remotely heading in that direction. I say that as someone who believes he has some competency in this area and can make a professional judgment with respect to it. This is also the judgment of others who are involved in that office, but obviously, because of the atmosphere here, cannot say so.

This letter is written in as honest and straightforward a way as I can muster. If at any time you no longer want this kind of communication, you can say so. I don't know how much of it you get or desire. I hope it is of some value.

Fr. Reinert did not reply but mentioned to Padberg and Eigel that he had received a letter from me that was "incomprehensible".

Two weeks later a faculty member called and asked if I

would speak to three black students. When I had arrived in September I had written a memo to Padberg and Eigel asking about our plans for hiring black faculty. The University had gone from 30 black students in 1968 to 850 students in 1972. There were still in 1972 only one or two courses in the curriculum for blacks and one or two black faculty in a University of 7,000. The students arrived with these and other grievances. I said they were right, they ought to push, and I would help. They left and mentioned our conversation to the black administrator in charge of the special admissions and tutorial program for minority students. He fired a letter off to Fr. Reinert raving about a new administrator who was stirring up trouble when everything was fine. Fr. Reinert called in Dr. Eigel and angrily told him to inform me I was hired to work with new curriculum and not to continually cause disturbances. Two weeks later the Black Student Union began a series of public demands for black faculty, courses, and services. There were open letters to Fr. Reinert. There were a series of confrontations and a Committee of Afro-American Studies was formed to produce plans in hiring and curriculum for implementation the following September.

When Eigel had referred the message from Fr. Reinert, I mentioned that I thought he should discuss it with me. Fr. Reinert didn't respond for a week, so I made an appointment. We had not spoken in quite a while and Fr. Reinert began by questioning my rather abrasive actions of the last month. I replied that I felt we needed some direct and outward confrontation of some critical problems and discussion of them before we could move ahead. He replied that the University had been in a state of crisis for over two years and it was now necessary to talk positively about the future.

He asked me if I had any positive plans or whether all my input was of a critical nature. As a result of the ensuing conversation we agreed to begin a series of meetings between him and some key faculty around the issue of an urban-oriented program or school that would combine the value questioning base of the liberal arts with a greater concentration of problem solving in our urban surroundings. He and I both agreed that this was a direction that a new identity could take for the University. A first meeting was held before Christmas vacation late one evening in Fr. Reinert's office. The chairmen of psychology and education, the deans of social work and our adult extension college, the Director of the Center for Urban Programs were all there. The subsequent history of this group will be taken up in section three. In short I had allowed him to avoid the conflict between the two of us and we lost the information about decision-making. It was a major mistake on my part. In two crucial interventions I had disrupted the system and upset Reinert, Padberg, and Eigel considerably. But I still was unable to engage them in a discussion of the real issue of what I was saying about their style of leadership and decision making. Reinert asked me to "do something positive with him" about the need for creating an exciting academic alternative we could sell, and I bought in. I am not at all sure I should have. At this point I returned to Harvard in December to meet with my ad hoc committee and received further help in deciphering what was happening. I will return to that, but I would like to bring the working of the Task Force up to date.

Meanwhile, the Project 21 Task Force had begun meeting the last of October. By mid-November they began laying out a rather complete plan for information gathering and dissemination for the

Spring semester. There was little money for major programs for the 1972-73 academic year, but there was about $40,000 for a series of studies, papers, consultants, and conferences around what continued to be critical areas. First, they decided to give ETS's Institutional Functioning Inventory to the University community to help clarify the opinions about what faculty and students thought and found at St. Louis University. They also commissioned a series of papers to review the surrounding academic environment rather than once again run on hearsay, to review all the trends in admissions and American Council on Education data about changing attitudes of our incoming freshmen, and find out the total involvement of the University in the urban community around it. Finally they suggested that two conferences be held in the Spring, one around the theme of "Jesuit and Catholic" and one around what it meant to be an "urban" university.

During the first four months I tended to push the Task Force faster than they would ordinarily have gone, but it was safe to do so because I was pushing toward the educational scheme for the Spring. It did not involve any strong political stands, large philosophical differences, or threat. There was enough diversity on the Task Force that there was need of a period of work together without serious disagreement. They were unaware of the internal difficulties I was involved in, and their basic stance was to take the year as a breather year, regroup with some new information and have some new directions ready for the new President and deans. I was pushing faster than that at first. But I was convinced by December that they were right, if we could have some plans ready by May to direct the new leadership in certain well-conceived directions, or

at least have very good analyses ready of some key problem areas. The relationship then between the Task Force and myself and my staff was that we did most of the planning and they okayed with a certain cautious spirit as we went.

There is one last event that I did not get actively involved in, but furthers the pattern of power and decision making and also shows some small amount of what Aquinas used to call the thin line between the virtue of prudence and the vice of cowardice. I made a very quick reference in section one to the public statement made by Fr. Reinert at the beginning of the Project 21 grant. He spoke of a new direction away from specifically technical education at the time he closed the School of Engineering and he also said at the time that he was seeking a "new sponsoring body" for Parks College, the small aeronautical college the University had in Illinois. In Spring of 1970, when this announcement was made, the school was doing very well financially. This news made the following year's recruitment extremely difficult but the school hung on and Reinert could not find a buyer. There was no more said during the academic year 1971-72 and the school began to rally again. Suddenly, and totally without warning, in an open board meeting of Southern Illinois University, it was announced that they had the option of buying Parks College for one million dollars and assumption of two dormitory mortgages. This was the first news that anyone including Fr. Marchetti, Treasurer, and Chairman of the Parks College board had of this. Needless to say, neither the Dean, the faculty, or the students of Parks College knew anything about it. Reinert, in private dealings, had made the offer and told no one. He presumed that every univer-

sity made the decisions in the same way and had clearly forgotten about the open meetings of the SIU board. The news appeared in the paper and Parks College realized it was on the block again. The faculty was confused and angry and a vice president was sent over to "soothe and assure" them. On the second day I got a call from faculty at Parks I did not know. They wanted me to come to an "informal meeting" at one of their houses that Friday. I thought it over for a day, called them back and said I couldn't come. Very frankly, I told them I couldn't take Reinert on in this one, probably because he was too vulnerable but mostly because of the previous two months. They had no place to go, and there was every chance to bring my case to a head, but I backed off. The sale is still pending as of April, 1973, and looking less likely because of changes in SIU's budget.

By the time I had arrived for a meeting on the project with the ad hoc committee at the Harvard Graduate School of Education we were in the middle of December and the first semester was practically at a close. The original proposal had stressed the use of a National Advisory Board, but as I worked with the group, certain facts became increasingly clear. Since September had been a month of watching in the following two and a half months I knew some definite things about the system that St. Louis University was, I had taken a series of intervention steps myself, and because of the kind of system and the kind of interventions made I was now a marginal member of the administration at St. Louis University. The ad hoc committee suggested that maybe the most profitable step would be to deliberately take a different approach from January, 1973, through March and compare the two approaches. Keep-

ing the same goals of opening the system to new and crucial information about itself and clarifying problem areas, I would try and change the style of intervention.

A summary of the first three months might run as follows.

[A] *Facts and my part in them:*

1. I had formed a new Project 21 Task Force. It was functioning slowly but well.
2. I had set up a National Advisory Board.
3. One of the Vice Presidents had been criticized for a month publicly. I had been associated with that criticism and had written Reinert a strong letter about his intervention.
4. The Black students had confronted the administration and embarrassed them. I was seen as, and was, directly connected with that.
5. Two deans had resigned. I was suspected as having something to do with that.
6. My public observations in key committees had been confrontive, critical, and abrasive in the eyes of the faculty and administration.
7. I was involved with Reinert in running a quiet planning group around the idea of an urban college.

[B] Data I now had about the system:

1. Fr. Reinert was practically the single power center in the University.
2. His manner of decision-making was private, non-confrontive, made with a small elite, and completely ac-

cepted as legitimate by the community as a whole.

3. Threatening information was not allowed to be processed in any public way, and was generally ignored.
4. Religious rhetoric was often used to confuse and dampen unwanted conflict.
5. The normative environment abhorred any public conflict, and branded anyone using it, even if the data were correct, with "not being part of the team", disloyalty and so forth.

[C] Results of my intervention:

1. Reinert simply couldn't understand why I was bent on "causing trouble" and why I continued to be so disruptive.
2. Padberg simply stayed away from me for two and three weeks at a time. He would not discuss real issues, and in general remained a non-active mystery to me.
3. Eigel had tried very hard to work with me, but as the Academic Vice President he had to take a great deal of criticism from above and below because of me. He grew more distant but continued to ask why I did what I did, would nod when I explained, and say, "but St. Louis University does it differently".
4. By January I was a marginal member of the administrative team. I was not invited to the small meetings as before and my input was minimal. Eigel became my only contact.
5. The students, black and white, began to communicate more frequently and with trust.

6. The faculty saw me as the enemy because I was Director of Project 21 and not yet because of much direct confrontation.

The assessment would have to be that I had had very little effect on the system and in the process had placed myself in a position where chances were even slimmer that I would have any further opportunities. My only allies were three chairmen, all new to the University within a year, in psychology, biology, and education. I had some money for staff and research, and everyone completely left me alone as long as I did little to disrupt. In general it looked like I needed another course of action.

The history of the Project previous to my joining had clearly put restrictions on the range of possible actions. To have attempted to go to the liberal arts faculty again, I think, would have been hopeless after the polarization of the previous spring. A very proper and possible path would have been to spend the first year planning in a low key fashion and gaining some trust, building a small coalition, and beginning with the new President and his team. I must honestly say this never tempted me, and that because I was too much in a hurry, too impatient, and perhaps too ambitious to get it moving. The whole system was so much the other way that I found myself being even more extreme than I wished in some cases. At any rate the only real option was to try to provide what input I could using resources that were primarily "exterior" to the system. But even to use these properly I had to change my behavior within the University.

SECTION THREE:

Intervention

January, 1973 to April 1, 1973

To change a style of intervention described in the period from September to January and still keep as a goal the opening of the system with correct information was not quite that easy. My real decision was to stop the high profile disruption and yet still not buy into either the private decision making or the deliberate ignoring of data. It was probably the way I should have operated from the beginning.

During November and December, Fr. Reinert had been extremely concerned about "university morale" as he put it. That perhaps made my continual referral to the enrollment drops, mediocre academic programs, lack of leadership even more grating. Traditionally, at least once a year, at a conference center near St. Louis, the University had a President's Conference. Fr. Padberg and a faculty member of the psychology department with organizational development training were in charge. They had decided not to talk about morale directly but to have seventy administrators, faculty and students "share their perceptions about the University" over a three-day weekend. The conference was not content-oriented but based around open-ended questions and kicked off Friday night with a very poorly executed introduction that left the faculty asking, "Why are we out here?" The bitterness grew and by Saturday night, at a plenary session two of the seven reports were filled with sarcasm and hostility. Several key faculty members left Saturday night claiming manipulation, no planning, or small group nonsense. By late Monday morning the President's Conference had become the worst thing for faculty morale in months. What no one seemed to be conscious of was the tremendous store of tension and anger among the faculty so near to the surface. The structure of the conference and the leaders were blamed,

but what was so remarkable to an outsider like myself is how much these people distrusted each other, how much they hated to be together, and how little it took to surface the division and deep-rooted anger. I had been planning two conferences in the Spring, and began to have serious second thoughts as did the Task Force.

Two other administrative decisions in late January and February kept the tension high. In November and Deeember, Reinert, Eigel, and myself had had several meetings about giving our Metropolitan College a significant push. Historically Metropolitan College had been a non-degree but certificate type program, primarily for adults, run at night with very little resources or interest on the University's part. With the University of Missouri's new campus and low cost degree program we either had to make ourselves competitive or close Metropolitan College. The idea was to go with a non-traditional degree program for adults, at several different sites, with lower tuition and a chance to get up to two years of credit for "life and work" experiences. They had been looking at this posibility for two years and Fr. Reinert wanted some action. I was somewhat skeptical about the money base and the faculty available to carry it off. Our own faculty and others were to be "purchased" over and above their regular teaching load to deliver in a non-traditional way. I became more cautious as we talked and Eigel couldn't understand why I "who was in charge of innovation was not excited about this innovative idea". By January they went ahead without me, announced a new Dean of Metropolitan College about whom I had voiced a great deal of reservations, and in February at a press conference announced the new degree program. The following week the faculty

were up in arms. One degree was in general studies and another in business administration. The faculty had never been consulted and charges of weakening the degree and lack of academic quality came from the liberal arts faculty. The Business School had their own night program at $20 more a credit that looked like it would be wiped out. Eigel was thrown into the gap to protect the new Dean. The retiring Dean of the Business School fought it quietly in Eigel's office week after week in the accepted manner. No one said anything in public but departments began sending minutes of their meetings with negative comments. Eigel met with the business school faculty, said Metropolitan College was a fait accompli, and said he thought they'd better come along. They decided that they'd better fight for control of the curriculum lest they be left out completely. Two weeks later Eigel appeared before the Executive Committee of the College of Arts and Sciences. They asked why no one was informed about the new degree program and why they weren't included in the planning. Eigel replied in a most uncharacteristic fashion. "We saw what you did last spring to a rather modest change in the curriculum. We knew what you'd do to this, so we went around you." There was a period of silence and little dialogue followed. When Eigel left the Executive Committee passed a resolution that expressed "dismay" at the process of setting up a new degree program. But that was the last of it in any committee. The resentment perhaps was stronger, but there was no legitimate expression for it.

The next crisis that followed almost immediately involved the School of Divinity and the department of theology. The Divinity School had been for years a professional school that gave graduate

degrees including a doctorate to clergy primarily of Catholic and Protestant denominations. It also trained students for the Jesuit priesthood along with four other schools in the country. The Divinity School's salaries were low in the University, but the School was building under a new Dean, Fr. Bill Sullivan, when news from Rome closed the Divinity Schools at New York and St. Louis to Jesuit students. This effected 17% of the Divinity School's student body, and made the financial future questionable as a separate entity. They were a separate entity because the department of theology in the College of Arts and Sciences had historically been in place long before the School of Divinity arrived. The theology department taught the undergraduates the required theology courses, offered a small masters program, and were largely staffed by elderly Jesuits. The University then, badly in debt and freezing wages, was supporting two theology "resources" which politically the administration was afraid to touch. Whenever a motion to absorb the department of theology was made, all the departments in the College would rise to its defense. It was an "academic department" in the College and hence an integral piece that was not a professional school but fit into the array of the other liberal arts where theology should be, and so on. If one moved to integrate the Divinity School with a doctoral program into an undergraduate department the cries were also understandably shrill. And so things had gone until the news of the Jesuits not using St. Louis University for future training appeared. As it had for years, it now made even more sense to plan amalgamating the two faculties of theology. Reinert and Eigel began working with Fr. Sullivan. For simply political reasons St. Louis University could not close

another school, especially since they had just opened Metropolitan College two weeks before.

As the deliberations went on, tension began to build in the College and the Dean of the Graduate School, Fr. Brennan, was contacted by the faculty. They needed a spokesman. Meanwhile, Sullivan circulated a proposal among his faculty that he had been asked by Fr. Reinert to draw up. It was a possible plan for the merging of the two faculties. The theology department got ahold of a copy and by the afternoon there were rump meetings throughout the humanities faculties. And then the process we have seen begins again. The communication system works with breath-taking speed when the issue is defense. Whatever the real facts, by the next days shrill voices had magnified them out of all perspective and eventually several faculty angrily descended on Reinert with threats and the administration informed Sullivan that nothing would be done this spring. Next fall a group of three consultants will be asked to come in and make recommendations. The inability to make a hard decision with the prospect of some disagreement involved forced the administration into delay. The vice presidents had been totally ignored again in the process.

Both the instance of Metropolitan College and the Divinity School-Theology Department simply show that the same style of decision making continued, the same power bases for both positive and negative action remained, and everyone seemed to understand the rules.

In the Committee on Student Life, however, things were beginning to change. In a February meeting I asked the Dean of Admissions what was happening to the quality of the incoming students.

His first reply was that no one would have a job if his group were not out working hard and so on. Then the Deans began a long discussion in which they first began to surface their fears about a changing student body. They still hadn't seen it as a solvable problem, in fact, this was one of the first times I had heard them allow each other to talk about the facts. Slowly fear about the black students and policies of admission of minority students surfaced. One after another they spoke of a need "to review the policy". At the next meeting I opened with a series of statistics to show the change in distribution of incoming scores on the SAT and ACT. The bell-shaped curve had changed to a bar-bell shaped one with heavy distribution at either end. They began to talk of the diversity of the student body, the shifting academic needs, the Ph.D. faculty and how they had been totally uninformed of what was happening and yet had had to adapt with all the confusion that accompanied this.

At the next meeting I had asked the Dean of Admissions to bring the Director of Financial Aid. I began with a series of questions about our program for disadvantaged students; where the money had come from, where and in what proportion it would continue to come from, what kind of debts were incurred in four years, how much financial counseling students were given, and what our drop-out rate with this group of students was, and what responsibilities we had if we continued to recruit in large numbers. We were finally at the heart of one of our clearest problems. The student body was changing due to policies that we had refused to talk about or figure out the responsibilities of. Through March and April the deans started to see "problems", talk about them, and by April

were thinking in terms of solutions. My only feedback was from Eigel who presides over the Committee. The last week in March he said, "You've really changed in that Committee, no one is so defensive any more, but they're really working." For Eigel and for myself I'd been able to keep difficult information continually in a small sub-system and lower the level of threat to the point where persons began to deal with the data.

Interestingly enough while I was doing the distribution analysis, somehow the Chairman of the Board of Trustees found out and I received a call from him one morning asking if he could have the analysis and my comments on it. I replied that I would be very uncomfortable doing that. I would give it to Dr. Eigel and he would be responsible for the form in which it went to the Trustees. There was an exchange between us on the reasons for my action which I explained in terms of my responsibility and loyalty to the University as best served by observing the established line of authority. The small episode however gives an example, I think, of what happens when the people in a system are very aware that crucial information is being lost, and the lack of confidence, distrust, and eventual breakdown in the system that results.

I have mentioned that through the first two years of Project 21 and continuing into 1972-73 whenever new directions and identity of the University were mentioned there was an automatic return to historical-traditional formulae of Catholic, Jesuit, and urban. But all discussion around these topics took place at a very superficial level, with flag words, voices of Jesuit authority, and tests of orthodoxy. If I couldn't get the University past these blocks, every new proposal could and would be stopped by claiming it went in a direct-

ion alien to "our tradition as Jesuit, Catholic University". Fr. Bill Sullivan and I decided that the first three-day conference in March should somehow try to get the discussion deeper into this area with the hope that we could then lessen the blocking power of shouting unorthodoxy at every turn. I suggested that we not take the Jesuit Catholic identity on directly but deliberately plant the problem in a different light.

Traditionally, all talk of personal growth of the students, especially in the area of morality, has taken place at St. Louis in terms of content--i.e., exposure to four courses in theology, four courses in philosophy, and so on. Since the University consciously recruits students (and parents) on the basis of deep concern in this area, I thought that it would be a good entrance to the problem of the identity and effectiveness of the University's "Catholic and Jesuit" influence. I knew Bill Perry of Harvard's Bureau of Study Council, his research over 15 years in this area, and his recent book. I asked him to come out and give the first night's talk on "personal growth during the college years", knowing that his approach was a stage growth theory that for our group would appear devoid of content. At the same time it would open the whole question in a different way and might get us deeper into the question of our distinctiveness in this area, and where the University was and was not being effective. We prepared readings in Kohlberg, Perry, and Chickering. We commissioned an excellent paper comparing Kohlberg and Perry and got these materials to sixty members of the University community, administration, faculty and students and invited them to the "study conference".

Next, I thought we should take the shrill orthodox line on

in the first session but make amply sure it did not close down the conference. Representatives of that position had to be fairly represented but to prevent it from becoming an internal political fight I brought in three Jesuits from outside the University I knew would represent the voice of "legitimate authority" and yet would keep the discussion open. One was a president-elect of Fairfield University in Connecticut, one was chairman of theology at Georgetown University, and the third was a moral theologian from Regis College in Toronto.

Although it might seem that the design of the conference was somewhat manipulative, I simply tried to neutralize the voices that would say that such discussion was forbidden or unnecessary because the University already had the "truth" in this area, and then hope that a majority of the group, concerned and given good material, would run with the discussion. And, it worked. The problem grew more and more real, the solutions appeared more and more complex, and the group was able to isolate and speak of the problem areas and begin to think in terms of positive solutions. The continuum of views among Jesuits and Catholics appeared so vast that simplistic answers became increasingly laughable and the repetition of magic words was clearly not the way out. In three days one can't clear the blocks of years but the conference had opened the discussion in a new way and had freed people to begin to deal with the real areas of concern.

The second conference was to have been a similar large group around the topic of the "urban university", but the dynamics of the planning group that had been meeting over a three month period in Fr. Reinert's office changed the format considerably.

From the initial group the number had shrunk to four chairmen and Reinert, Eigel, and myself. Between meetings I had worked hard trying to put together a proposal for an interdisciplinary urban study program that would include the Center for Urban Programs, psychology, education, and the Community Medicine Program in the Medical School. The latter three groups were open to any viable model that would open up the curriculum, free faculty for the different kind of learning and teaching contexts, and reward them fairly. Reinert's pressure was to come up with an exciting program he could help get funds for and recruit with. He believed, as I did, that this was a direction the University ought to be taking.

However, the more I dealt with the Center for Urban Programs (CUP), the more impossible the situation became. They were 50% University salary and 50% supported by outside grants. They had begun with a masters program and were just beginning a new undergraduate major. However, they were only eight persons involved, and at 50% time that meant that only four full-time equivalent faculty were handling a masters program and the beginning of an undergraduate major. Our planning really was an attempt to involve other departments in an interdisciplinary way with them under some broader but structurally loose way. The blocks that Dr. Wendel, the Director of CUP, put in the way began to look insurmountable. But in a two or three hour meeting he would remain silent the first hour, close down the discussion in the second hour with loud bombast, and then at the end say he really wanted to cooperate and hold out the possibility of something happening. This went on for three months. At the last meeting Wendel suggested that each of the programs get money from Project 21 for the following year to do

further planning in this direction. That would have been the fourth year of a five year program spent planning, and in my view this was absurd--a further delaying process and a very poor use of scarce resources. We decided that a two-day conference with just the four chairmen and two members from each of their departments should use the weekend reserved for the urban conference to further discuss the issue. Reinert and Eigel said they would come and asked to bring Padberg, the Executive Vice President, and Brennan, the Dean of the Graduate School. The central academic administration would be there.

Instead of deciding how to spend the fourth year's money planning, I set the agenda up again as trying to develop an interdisciplinary urban program. We began Friday night and by Saturday noon the group of 15 was building a very interesting structure. On cue Wendel said the plan would put him out of business, he didn't come out to be part of putting himself out of business, and he would fight it. Fr. Reinert assured him of his importance and the plan was completely changed to his stipulations. At that point someone pointed out that it no longer included anyone else. The meeting then began to deal with the fundamental issues of CUP's inability to let anything else happen. It was angry, honest, and open--in front of Reinert, Eigel, and each other. Something that never would have happened in the regular course of the St. Louis University's operations. Yet if it hadn't happened they would never have been able to come to terms with the real blockage. A week later meetings were taking place around cooperative programs without CUP present. I was accused of "decision making by tension" by Eigel. Brennan thanked me for the "pleasant weekend", and

Reinert thought that all the trouble could have been avoided if the meeting had had more content and been structured "so that personalities wouldn't have been involved". It hadn't been a very pleasant experience for them, but once again it had only been necessary to heighten the University's political realities for less than 24 hours to pinpoint the real problems and free the key people to proceed.

Members of the National Advisory Board began to come in February and continued through March and April. The basic strategy was to let the interested parts of the University use the members of the National Advisory Board (NAB) as their resources. The first visit was from Dixon of Antioch and Witherspoon of Goddard. They came together to deal with the "living-learning" programs at St. Louis. They met with several of the curriculum planning committees, student development administration and staff, and the administration. They were extremely effective as an outside team asking probing and direct questions. Witherspoon continually sought to clarify the question of a "mature tradition" and how it was being communicated. In trying to respond each University group got deeper into their own questions about the same area. Dixon worked on the administrative structure and the environment created by its style of leadership. Theirs was the first visit and without any negative or threatening approaches they managed to help groups see critical problem areas by their questioning. The Project 21 Task Force had a final meeting with Dixon and Witherspoon asking questions about the process of change and the Task Force's role in it. They began to see themselves as an element in the process and not purely an idea-producing group.

Frank Newman of Stanford University came the first week in

March. Fr. Reinert was anxious to use him. Newman spoke before the St. Louis Higher Education Coordinating Council at a luncheon and before a dinner of Reinert's President's Council, a group of influential businessmen. He did an excellent job of helping St. Louis University publicly, but at the same time injected into the faculty and administration a direct, hardheaded, statistical approach to the University's dwindling pool of future students, the national job market's needs, and the dilemma of a high cost private institution in between. His message was loud and clear. If you don't know exactly what you do differently and don't do that very well, the chances of survival are slim. Reinert knows this at an operational level but Newman helped others at the University begin to hear.

Jim Breeden of Harvard's Graduate School of Education, a black who works in the area of urban education, came the second week of March. I asked him to look at our academic and cultural/living situation from the point of view of our black students. He spent a great deal of time with students as well as with the Committee on Afro-American Studies, and wrote a report for the Task Force with copies to Reinert and Eigel. His perceptions and questions after just two days were dead center on the problems we had to face. The report occasioned a complete review of the financial aid and counseling that went with it. The more fundamental question of a changing student body with different goals and professional needs is now being asked at the level of Deans and in general faculty meetings. It very much helped my efforts at asking closely related questions.

Tom Parker of Bennington College and Gerry Grant of Syracuse were coming in April 6 and 7 to look especially at the freshman program and make a short written report to the Task Force. Audrey

Cohen, President of the College of Human Services in New York, is coming in mid-April to speak to small groups in the Nursing School, Social Service School, and to various women's groups. Finally, Neil Rudenstine, Dean of Princeton College is due the last of April to speak with eight to ten chairmen in the College about decision-making and then present his views to the central administration. My hope is that this will bring some problems in that area to light.

If the National Advisory Board is used as a resource for different interest groups in the University, and one can structure definite feedback into the system through written reports and/or meetings at the end of the stay to summarize their impressions, the chances of faculty and administrators coming to terms with threatening information is high. I found they could make certain cases in a much more dramatic fashion by asking questions after only a short period of time, than I could who was clearly a political piece in an already established set of relations. The limitations are obvious. The National Advisory Board is seen as a group of outsiders, sometimes threatening, but individually seen as their own person without Project 21's agenda. So if we could convince people that NAB members were their resources, then the goal of strong and new information in the system was almost assured. It was better if it was written because I was then able to follow it up and push it further.

The last two major activities of the Spring were the two Search Committees. The Search Committee of the Dean of Arts and Sciences interviewed eight people out of 120 applicants. One person was from inside, a woman, chairperson of the Department of Communication Disorders. But the two leading candidates were very different. One was an Associate Dean of Kent State--cautious,

conservative, a protector of what is already in place. The other is a young, ambitious, ACE administrative intern from New York via Berkeley. He also is academically conservative, but aggressive and in a hurry, and much more might happen if he got the job. Of the seven finalists, not one was a Jesuit, and that 15-minute discussion about a non-Jesuit Dean when we were forming the search committee looked like a very important policy decision at a distance. However, the main input on the interviews of the candidates came from the humanities faculty who continued to show in significant numbers for over two months of interviewing. They clearly had a large stake in the results, and it was also obvious what kind of dean they wanted and were going to get.

The search for the President had all the elements we have already seen. There was a six-man committee of Trustees charged with finding a President. In October it became politically necessary to set up an Advisory Committee within the University to make the students and faculty feel they had some role in the selection. As I have mentioned elsewhere, Fr. John Padberg, had moved in five years all the way to Executive Vice President because Fr. Reinert had decided he was a leading candidate to succeed him. Yet all evidence pointed to the fact that Padberg was a very poor administrator. He had no feel for the political reality at all, was cautious and introspective and as a true German scholar trained at Harvard believed that once "truth" was found it was capable of marching alone. The faculty were dead set against him after two years of Project 21. The administrators that had worked with him for four or five years were vehemently opposed, yet the Board of Trustees kept him in the list of top three. In November, the Advisory Committee

sent the Trustee Search Committee a letter mentioning some preferences but stating clearly the one candidate they were opposed to was Fr. Padberg. Still nothing happened, and as candidates came and went and failed to impress, Padberg's star rose again in January and February. By this time I was fascinated. I knew the system would not let him slip in even with Reinert backing him. I knew that the information system would keep out all the data that was negative and so it would occur that way. It would happen quietly, when the time was right, in a small meeting of powerful people with Reinert, and, of course, Padberg would never know.

The target date for announcing the new President was May 1, 1973. The final serious negotiations would start the middle of April. The candidates were three by March 1. Cartter of New Orleans, Sellinger of Baltimore, and Padberg. The by-laws said the President had to be a Jesuit. By mid-March the tension was increasing. Three names would go to the Trustees and Padberg was still there. The Advisory Committee made the first bold move. They recommended four people as acceptable: Sellinger and Cartter, above; Byron from New York who had no chance; and finally they went inside and recommended Fr. Bill Sullivan the Dean of the Divinity School as their first choice. The Trustees were a little shaken up, having not even interviewed Sullivan as a candidate. Two days later they did, and then at least there were four names in the hopper. A week later the door closed on Padberg. Two key administrators, a vice president and a Jesuit dean, and two powerful faculty members, invited Reinert to dinner on a Friday night. They said that they and the University could not live with Padberg as President. If Reinert let the conversation go, there would be no

way out. For about half an hour he defended Padberg and then the opposition got bolder and more straight forward. He stayed, heard them out, and was in a compromised position, having let them declare their opposition so forcefully.

The next week word began to circulate that Padberg was probably off the list. Meanwhile Reinert released a six page document describing the role of President and that of new Chancellor, which he was going to fill. The Chancellor's work description takes four of the six pages. He will be in charge of all long-range planning, fund raising, public relations and the political arena, and so on. One of the vice-presidents bemoaned the fact that the new president was going to be meddling inside "in deans meetings", because it didn't look like there was anything else left to do. It will be very interesting to see who will take such a job and how he will be able to work out an identity with Reinert's continued presence. The Presidential Search Committee seems to have reached a list of three. Both Sellinger and Cartter are from small schools and did not excite much enthusiasm on anyone's part in their visits. Sellinger's strong point is exterior relations as is Reinert's. Sellinger would be the number one candidate if it were not for this conflict. Sullivan could very possibly be the third man, and he has the credentials, the head, and the courage. He has very little experience and a number of internal enemies. He's the best on the possible list, but the real long shot. And although everyone refers to Reinert as still the "king-maker", one has the distinct impression that even though someone will be named, it will be difficult to assume the crown.

In early March, as the Project 21 Task Force and staff began

to put in place a series of eight research monographs to be released through April and May, I began to talk about phasing out Project 21 as an identifiable funding source within the University. The name and its history raised such resistance and condemned an idea before it was heard that the most sensible thing seemed to me to set aside the remaining $400,000 as "academic development" money over the next two years to be used at the discretion of the Academic Vice President's office. As this idea grew, something happened that made the discussion academic. The Danforth Foundation, undergoing its own internal crisis because of the decision, had decided to give large matching grants to the two local private universities, Washington University and St. Louis University. St. Louis University had known for about two months that the amount was to be $20 million, after five years, on a matching basis. Fr. Reinert had asked that the money be allowed to work for the University during that time. They had agreed verbally to give 5 percent of the $20 million per year for the five years. Then, when the announcement came in mid-March, the Danforth Foundation followed the terms that included a neat little curve. The first two years, the fourth and fifth year of the Project 21 grant, its $300,000 would be included in the million dollars. The money went from Danforth's soft money to us for innovation, to the University's hard money for promised salary increases, and we were in a new ballgame.

Everyone at St. Louis University, including Reinert, was taken by surprise. Since I had been urging us to drop Project 21's separate, high-profile identity in favor of an academic development fund, I immediately renewed that line of argument. However, whether the administration was willing to keep that kind of money

apart for development purposes, or whether they really had it to hold back, is highly doubtful. The Danforth money may prove to be a very ill-timed gift. Fr. Reinert had written a book on how to balance the budget of a private university and appeared on the national circuit taking credit for the financial recovery of St. Louis University. Second, in order to come to terms with the morale problem, in November he had announced that for the coming year, there would be cost of living and merit increases. So the University had to come up with a balanced budget and make good on those increases. By December, the vice presidents saw the picture. They were anywhere from $750 thousand to $1 million short. There was nothing to do but to finally come to terms with some of the real problems and cut programs that were not drawing students, phase out Ph.D. programs that were expensive, non-productive, and third rate. For three weeks they struggled with the kinds of decisions this would entail. Then Reinert told them of the possible Danforth money and they found they had the $1 million they needed and no difficult decisions had to be made. They actually received less than the $1 million the first two years and will be pressed to meet even present needs with this windfall. Had it happened two years further on, when some very difficult, but, I think, necessary decisions had been made, it might have been much more valuable. As it is, everything will stay intact except the fragile experimental programs of Project 21 that have no source of funds now and must compete with the established departments for resources that will continue to grow more and more scarce again.

At this writing, in the first week of April, the fight over the additional funds has commenced. I will be able to keep Project

21 programs alive for the coming year, but to hold apart any decent monetary commitment for academic development will be impossible. The separate financial source for innovation at St. Louis University is gone. What one finds operating now are the separate programs, five or six faculty, student or combination ad hoc committees on curriculum reform. Some are writing proposals, others are working out alternatives within the present structure, but there is a great deal of curricular activity.

Some key committees and administrators are dealing with the critical problems of the changing student body, poorly structured freshman year, lack of financial aid counseling, and the questions of almost no black faculty, courses, and little support for the growing black student population. However, the larger problems of the Ph.D. programs, the actualization of the "urban focus" rhetoric, the identity and shape of the College of Arts and Sciences, are still far from being faced, and the new dean prospects are not promising in this regard.

The presidential search will have larger problems still. The new president is going to find it very difficult to get some operating room. Fr. Reinert has developed a style of leadership and governance over 23 years that he cannot possibly change. A testimony to the power of the man is that his own personal style has become the decision making style of the University. I have tried to document that style throughout the paper in specific cases but my fear was that I was exaggerating because of such a difference between my personal style and his. However, the first results of the Institutional Functioning Inventory arrived the last week in March and I am going to cite one scale. This paper has designedly been

an analysis of personal intervention. I have included institutional analysis only insofar as it seemed appropriate to my selection of strategies. But the central block which I continually met institutionally and personally was the patriarchal, autocratic style of decision making. I refer to the IFI to make that case from another point of view for the final time. The IFI contains a scale entitled "democratic governance" and is described as the "extent to which individuals in the campus community who are directly affected by a decision have the opportunity to participate in making the decision."

The scores ranged from 0 to 12. The faculty norms and percentiles were derived from faculty mean scores of 37 institutions representative of the national distribution of 4-year institutions. The following two tables for St. Louis University are self-explanatory.

TABLE 1

Faculty Scores According to Schools

	Arts & Sciences	Bus. Admin.	Nursing	Social Service
Frequency (N)	128.0	21.0	39.0	17.0
Mean	4.4	2.9	8.4	5.0
Standard Deviation	3.6	2.7	2.7	3.5
Percentile	7	0	82	8

TABLE 2

Norm Group Scores

Mean	6.99
Standard Deviation	1.77
Percentile	43

The 7% response in the College and the 0% response in the Business School indicate that the faculty have also sensed a certain undemocratic decision-making process in action. My hope is that the proper release of this data during April and May may have an effect on this problem along with Dean Rudenstine's work with the Chairmen around the same topic.

A perspective on my action since January shows a very different style of intervention, I believe. I have been more concerned with producing correct data, working it into the system with consultants and reports, and my own much less antagonistic behavior in committees has also helped. I haven't stopped what I think are the "hard questions" but others' perceptions of me are that I am not trying to embarrass people but am trying to face some difficulties we have. It is still perceived as a rather negative approach, but no longer a disloyal one. However, it is also clear that the information and not me has a greater chance of being dealt with now.

In limited but altogether insignificant ways I have affected the kind of information the system is producing and its flow. Some very threatening information is being dealt with now and Eigel among others admits to this change. My plan was that this information, if

well in place and irrefutable, would serve the purpose of defining the agenda for the new leadership as it begins to form over the summer with the new President and two new Deans. The limits are great as I have pointed out. The two crucial power bases are intact in many ways. The humanities faculty and Reinert are still very present to the system; and, the style of decision-making, despite the deep discontent of the faculty, is so deeply imbedded that no change here will take place very quickly. My ability to convince committees and the new Deans and President to look at the new reports will be the key to affecting even their definition of the decision making as a central problem with which they will try to come to terms.

SECTION FOUR:

Summary and Conclusion

As outlined in the original proposal with the ad hoc committee at Harvard, I've tried to sketch my strategies and interventions at St. Louis University over an eight month period. To understand the background and the persons involved, I used Section One to describe the brief two year history of Project 21 and whatever other information about the University it seemed important to have. Section Two described a rather strong, high-profile intervention attempt on my part. I had begun to assess the effects of that strategy and behavior in December when I met with the ad hoc committee. From them as well as from within the University there was enough clear feedback to make me reconsider my approach. My goal had been to get correct but threatening information into the system in such a way that it would be listened to and dealt with. During the first four months the system spent a great deal of time and energy dealing with me, and I with it. Meanwhile most of the information was still being ignored or lost. It didn't make much sense to continue that process. My goal remained the same, to force information into the system. I felt that the information was so important and crucial that if inserted with enough energy, a crisis within the system would occur that would force it to question its goals, values, and behavior. But I tried to do this not through my own direct interventions the second four months, but through a set of conferences, consultants and testing results. I would like to review briefly these goals and the strategies I chose.

Project 21 had been set up from the beginning as some sort of idea producing mechanism similar to what Donald Schon terms a "center-periphery" model of change. It was supposed to find innovative plans and ideas and diffuse them outward to faculty and

students. The ideas, if they were good and academically exciting, were then expected to proceed under their own strength. If one examines the first year and a half of Project 21, that is the theory being employed. There was a list and description of practically every experimental program in higher education in the United States. There were even creative adaptations of those ideas to St. Louis University's reality. And still nothing happened. There was little if any recognition of the University's built-in resistance to any change and the roots of this resistance. When the resistance appeared, it came with a sound and fury that no one expected. Donald Schon explains what he believes are the roots of this kind of reaction under the rubric of an institution's "dynamic conservatism". For him,

> ". . . social systems provide for their members not only sources of livelihood, protection against outside threat and the promise of economic security, but a framework of theory, values, and related technology which enables individuals to make sense of their lives. Threats to the social system threaten this framework."
> (Schon, Beyond the Stable State, p.51)

To believe, then, that St. Louis University was going to make a smooth transition into the future with a changed identity based on a set of new ideas from Project 21, represents a somewhat naive notion of the depth of the questioning which was involved. A strong set of "ideas" (theory, values, ways of performing) were in place at St. Louis University in which men and women over the years had tied up their own identities. What was needed was a disruptive series of events, a crisis, which would threaten the system, call it into question, and demand new solutions, new theories and behavior.

The crises in terms of falling enrollments, shift in student body, and the financial crunch were there and these were events, not ideas. I am convinced that my job was to heighten these crises before the system could ever set in motion a re-evaluation and new direction. My job was to take the irrefutable but threatening data into the system to the point where the University had to come to terms with it. As I did so, I had to keep myself out of the way insofar as possible, and bear the continual criticism from Reinert and others that I wasn't providing workable, positive ideas, but only working on the negative problems. Occasionally I would get sidetracked into such exercise when I knew it was the wrong direction. Finally, in the process of heightening the crisis there is every chance that I was making myself non-functioning in the second step of requestioning and positive renewal, but growing marginality seems to be a built-in risk in such a role.

As for the use of the National Advisory Board, I discovered that the deliberate ignoring of the threatening data had become almost universal in the College of Arts and Sciences over the three years of declining enrollments. As an outsider the data practically knocked me over with its message. That was one reason I was so confident about the use of outside consultants from the National Advisory Board. In a short time, anyone knowing institutions of higher education could spot the problems, ask the questions, and open the University to facing the threat a bit more. Breeden did it with the black student question, Dixon with the decision making style, Newman with the national market and questions of distinctiveness. The faculty could not deal with these outside threats as they did with internal ones, by claiming disloyalty or refusal to

accept the systems "christian" values of non-conflict. The external interventions could not be repulsed as I could be, and it was even difficult to isolate them as one could with me. They appeared for two days, stories and reports followed in newspapers and committees, and there was greater difficulty even outlasting temporary intrusions, because different consultants kept coming, and they left written reports behind.

From this, it appears to me that my strategy of intervention at the information system level, given the almost total lack of political power base, was the central decision I made. How correct it was still remains to be seen, although there are some indications that it is beginning to have its effect. One can repress information only so long as the majority of the individuals continue to ignore it. If one can cause a number of people to begin to pay explicit attention to the information, then more and more individuals must be forced apart. And if some powerful members of the system begin dealing with the information, one has freed up total discussion in the area. It is the movement of the ideas from the margin area of the system to the center that is the key. "Then, crises in the system permit or compel these ideas to come to public notice and to begin their progress toward public awareness, currency, and acceptance." (Schon, p. 131) It is with this hypothesis that I have been operating. The question is whether I've had enough strength to raise the information to the critical level long enough to have the desired effect. My hope was that this diffusion of the information was bound to bring about conflict and conflict would again increase the diffusion.

Unless the University can become responsive to the changing

educational environment, the growing competition, the changing market of students, the misplaced resources, the rising costs and falling enrollments and take some appropriate action, it will blindly continue to perform as before. There are some very clear indications that this type of drastic change in conditions is affecting a sizeable number of private colleges and universities. They are, like most institutions, not very good at gathering the critical data, processing it, and responding quickly. In fact, the tendency is to ignore all threats and clutch even more tightly to what has always been done. Added to this institutional paralysis is the academic profession's equally unresponsive system of tenure, and academic repetition in frozen disciplines and training. The profession holds St. Louis University in molds it needs to break but cannot. Twelve tenured professors in history, thirteen in English, twelve in philosophy, and on the chorus goes. It could not shift its resources even if it were ready. And as enrollment shrinks, in these departments and others, the number of assistant professors and lecturers is reduced. The sources of fresh blood and new ideas dwindle further. St. Louis has gone from 55% to 65% tenured faculty in the last three years via this process.

The forces, interior and exterior, that prevent universities from responding are surely in place at St. Louis University. But very often one hears the argument that one of the great advantages of the private college is that it can respond quickly to new needs, as public institutions, encumbered with state legislatures, cannot. Our look at the power centers and the decision-making style operating at St. Louis in some sense seems to affirm that claim. Reinert's power is far greater than one usually finds in large universities, and a strong compliance system continues to neutralize any real faculty

resistance. But with the changing of the president and two deans, with two key vice presidencies filled with "acting" appointments, it was not a year for direction and bold movements. But the gathering of information itself is a political activity, I find, and to have collected it around certain questions constructs an agenda for the system and its leaders simply by one set of data and not another being in place.

With the funds of Project 21 subsumed into the larger Danforth grant, and the pressure for significant and large scale change taken off by the additional money, St. Louis University appears ready for two or three years without financial crisis and without movement. As Chancellor, Fr. Reinert will concentrate even more on fund raising and will probably do quite well. But the fundamental question still remains. As the cost difference between public and private higher education continues to widen, will St. Louis University have something to offer, especially in the College of Arts and Sciences, that people will think is worth the price. In order to ask that question I tried to bring the crucial information into focus. Some committees, and key administrators and faculty are further along than they were. The new leadership will have to come to terms with the reports that Project 21 will continue to produce in April and May, but the Danforth money broke the crisis temporarily and released the system from the growing pressure.

My own status within the system has changed over the last four months. The compliance system, as I described it, really exists in a few key faculty who have been at St. Louis University for many years. They seem to socialize others into the submissive and non-questioning role vis-a-vis the Jesuit administration. I caused sev-

eral events that temporarily destroyed that stance and I have obviously declared myself against that value in the system. As for the style of decision making, it became increasingly more difficult to take part in it, and after watching it operate in the case of the search for the president, I am convinced I must continue in my own way. The information strategy actually puts me in conflict with the University's decision-making style quite often. It looks very much like the centers of power will remain the same. Reinert's move to chancellor will still keep him as the University's representative in the St. Louis community and on the national academic scene. How the new president will be able to move is confusing. The vice presidents may continue to cluster around Reinert as he has kept long range planning and money matters for himself. The new deans will need to spend at least a year determining who the faculty are and what their own power bases are and what is doable from there.

My relationship with Eigel, the academic vice president, is good, open, and trusting. We talk about how different our views are on conflict, decision-making, power. We listen to each other well. But most discussion about next year uses language like "activities of a normal assistant vice president", without the emphasis on change, or innovation. The terms are being spelled out, and they may be correct ones for St. Louis University now. After three years of crisis language and high profile change threatening or seeming to threaten the College of Arts and Sciences, perhaps the system needs very little talk of such things. I have a suspicion that some problem areas have been seen and enough energy has been freed over the three years that some quiet changes may now begin. They are not the kind that will take St. Louis University to the fore-

front of private education, but they may be enough to help it survive. What role I could honestly and effectively play in this is still questionable in my mind.

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