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CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY

AMERICAN EXPANSIONIST SENTIMENT AND THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII

GEORGE FRANKLIN PEARCE

The purpose of this study is to add another dimension to existing interpretations of what caused the United States to turn its back on its anti-colonial tradition in 1898 and adopt an expansionist foreign policy, and to clarify the role of expansionist sentiment in producing this significant change in foreign policy.

The question of annexing the Hawaiian Islands sparked the first national debate in American history on overseas expansion. It continued for a period of five years. Finally, on July 6, 1898, in the midst of the Spanish-American War, the Senate passed a joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. This political action inaugurated an expansionist foreign policy that would reap an empire in less than a year.

Historians have long debated the reasons that the United States suddenly cast aside its anti-colonial tradition. Indeed, the anti-colonial tradition seemed strengthened by the Congressional resolution for war with Spain in April, 1898. Paradoxically, in less than three

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months, this same body consented to annexing the Hawaiian Islands.

Studies of late nineteenth century American expansion generally have concluded that the political decision for this departure in foreign policy reflected a favorable expansionist sentiment within the nation. Some studies have described it as mass sentiment while other studies have referred to it as a growing sentiment during the 1890's without, however, defining the extent of change. These interpretations imply that by some method the politicians had received a measurement of this popular sentiment for expansion and that it had influenced some of their votes on the annexation issue. However, these interpretations generally fail to reveal the complicated nature of popular opinion. That is, they do not say what part of the American public held opinion on expansion, or indicate how popular opinion on expansion was communicated to the politicians, or point out to what extent popular expansionist opinion influenced the politician's vote on Hawaiian annexation.

Present-day measuring devices of public opinion were not used in the 1890's. Hence there is no precise record of expansionist opinion on the question of annexing Hawaii. In an attempt to determine the role of public sentiment in the political decision for annexation, the student must arbitrarily select and analyze data which he feels will shed some light on the question. Modern theories about public opinion also are applied to the situation in the

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1890's when possible.

The findings of this study indicate that popular opinion was possibly more disposed to accept Hawaiian annexation in 1898 than it had been in 1893. But the evidence also reveals that if a measurable change in public sentiment did occur during the 1890's, it occurred in small, sharply defined segments of the population called the foreign policy public. But being numerically small and divided along party lines the foreign policy public was ineffective in influencing political decisions on foreign policy. Indeed, expansionist sentiment may have had some influence on the final action for annexing Hawaii, but it was not the most important cause. The evidence indicates that there was no great upsurge of popular opinion for annexing Hawaii, but that the major political parties took opposite sides on the issue and that action, aided by the Spanish-American War, followed party alignment.

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AMERICAN EXPANSIONIST SENTIMENT AND THE

ANNEXATION OF HAWAII

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INTRODUCTION

The question of annexing the Hawaiian Islands sparked the first national debate in American history on imperialism and in many ways presaged the outcome of the subsequent debate over the retention of the Philippines. It continued intermittently in the Congress and in the nation's press for a period of five years. Finally on July 6, 1898, in the midst of the Spanish-American War, the Senate passed a joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. This political action inaugurated an expansionist foreign policy that would reap an empire in less than a year.

Historians have long debated the reasons that the United States suddenly cast aside its anti-colonial tradition. The Senate had rebuked, and the public had ignored, attempts by Secretary of State William H. Seward in the 1860's and by President Grant in the 1870's to acquire colonial possessions. Indeed, the anti-colonial tradition seemed strengthened by the Congressional resolution for war with Spain in April, 1898. To silence those who suspected American intentions Congress had called for Cuban independence and had renounced any intention of exercising sovereignty over that island. Paradoxically, in less than three months, this same body consented to

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annexing the Hawaiian Islands.

Some historians have concluded that the political decision for this vast change in foreign policy reflected an upsurge of favorable expansionist sentiment within the nation. They argue that expansionist sentiment had grown throughout the 1890's and that the favorable vote for annexing Hawaii reflected this mass sentiment. Sylvester K. Stevens claims that "a majority of the American people in the feverish days of 1898" favored annexation.[1] The favorable vote on the joint resolution, Albert K. Weinberg argues, reflected the voice of the American people which demanded such action.[2] Commenting on the favorable vote for annexation, Thomas A. Bailey states that "The time had finally come when the American people concluded that an independent Hawaii, like Texas of an earlier day, was . . . an anachronism. . . ."[3] These interpretations imply that by some method the politicians had received a measurement of this popular sentiment for expansion and that it had influenced many of their votes on the annexation issue. However, these interpretations generally fail to reveal the complicated nature of popular opinion. That is, they do not say what part of the American public held opinions

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[1]Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898 (New York, 1968), p. 295.

[2]Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Gloucester, 1958), p. 269.

[3]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York, 1969), p. 435.

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on expansion, or indicate how popular opinion on expansion was communicated to the politicians, or point out to what extent popular expansionist opinion influenced the politician's vote on Hawaiian annexation.

Three interpretative studies on the topic of late nineteenth-century American imperialism, all of which tend to support the Bailey thesis in a modified form, have recently appeared. These well-known works are Richard Hofstadter's essay, "Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny," in The Paranoid Style in American Politics. Walter LaFeber's, The New Empire, and Ernest R. May's, American Imperialism.

Walter LaFeber stresses economic forces as the most important factor which directed the nation towards a new colonial policy in 1898-1899. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, American expansion was confined to contiguous territory on the continent. In LaFeber's view, the nature of American expansion began to change when William H. Seward became Secretary of State in 1861. Under the impact of industrialization, Americans began to search for markets, not land. When the Senate purchased Alaska, it did so with the view of a future commercial empire in mind. This view applied to the acquisition of the Midway Islands, and for the hold the country had on Pago Pago in Samoa.

These pre-1898-1899 acquisitions of territory, LaFeber argues, had one particularly striking characteristic

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in common with the acquisition of territory resulting from the war with Spain. "The United States obtained these areas not to fulfill a colonial policy, but to use the holdings as a means to acquire markets for the glut of goods pouring out of highly mechanized factories and farms."[4]

By the mid-1890's the American business community and policy makers had reached a general consensus "that additional foreign markets would solve the economic, social, and political problems created by the industrial revolution."[5] Almost all Americans, LaFeber contends, supported this consensus.

Richard Hofstadter explains the agitation for overseas expansion in 1898-1899 as a manifestation of a widespread "psychic crisis." A number of disturbing events during the 1890's combined with the effects of an economic depression, provided the background for the "psychic crisis." Hofstadter argues that such events as the claim that the frontier no longer existed, "the growth of trusts, and the intensifications of internal social conflict, had brought to large numbers of people intense frustrations in their economic lives and their careers."[6]

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[4]Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithica, N. Y., 1963), p. 408.

[5]Ibid., p. 412.

[6]Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York, 1965), p. 184.

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In the view of Hofstadter, an outlet for this frustration and anxiety--this psychic crisis--was national self assertion, aggression, and expansion. "Men often respond to frustration with acts of aggression, and allay their anxieties by threatening acts against others."[7] Jingoism, Hofstadter claims, ran deep in the stream of public sentiment during the seven years preceding the outbreak of war with Spain in 1898.

Ernest R. May presents another factor influencing expansionist opinion in addition to those stressed in other studies--"the impact on Americans of English and European examples." May described the American foreign policy establishment in the 1890's as consisting of a few "well-traveled and well-read"[8] Americans who selected their stance on the expansionist issue by identifying it with the position taken by some illustrious European statesmen. These men of the establishment who kept abreast of ideas and events abroad gave some guidance to the small American foreign policy public, and possibly "provided political leaders with evidence as to how the interested public might bend."[9]

Claiming that his study is as much a synthesis as an interpretation, May describes the public "that would have had opinion about expansion." In addition, he

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[7] Ibid., p. 185.

[8] Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968), p. 16.

[9] Ibid., p. 226.

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indicates how Manifest Destiny, "Social Darwinism, market hunger, and psychological turmoil"[10] combined with an awareness of foreign ideas and events to cause a departure from the anti-colonial tradition prevailing in 1890 to a policy of genuine imperialism in 1898-1899.

Thus these three interpretations generally conclude that there was a growing public sentiment for expansion during the 1890's, without, however, defining the extent of change. Each interpretation indicates than an observable shift away from anti-colonialism was taking place by the beginning of the 1890's.

Public opinion is a very general concept that can be expressed in many ways by many different segments of the public. Those members of the public who express common opinion on one particular issue are not necessarily the same ones who express common opinion on a different issue. For any number of reasons a certain portion of the public will reach a common opinion on a national issue. But as the issues change a realignment will occur among those who will be expressing a common opinion about them.

For the purpose of this study expansionist opinion is defined as that opinion on expansion held by the American voting public in the 1890's which may have been communicated to the politicians and which may have influenced their position on the question of annexing Hawaii.

Present-day measuring devices of public opinion were

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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not used in the 1890's. Hence there is no precise record of expansionist opinion on the question of annexing Hawaii. In an attempt to determine the role of the public sentiment in the political decision for annexation, the student must arbitrarily select and analyze data which he feels will shed some light on the question. There are few sources containing such data. The data used in this study includes Senate voting on the proposals relating to annexation, the protracted debate on the issue in the Senate and in the nation's press, biographical literature on some of the Congressional leaders during the 1890's, resolutions on national issues contained in House and Senate journals of various states during 1897 and 1898, and expressions on annexation contained in the 1898 state party platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties. Modern theories about public opinion also are applied to the situation in the 1890's when possible.

An analysis of this data reveals little evidence to support the view that a growing mass sentiment developed for expansion during the 1890's. At the same time, the evidence does indicate that the public climate in 1898 was probably more disposed to accept expansion than it had been at the beginning of the decade. Indeed, expansionist opinion may have had some influence on the final action for annexing Hawaii, but it was not the most important cause. The evidence indicates that there was no great upsurge of popular opinion for annexing Hawaii, but that the

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major political parties took opposite sides on the issue and that action, aided by the war, followed party alignment.

Since there is a lack of concrete data available for such a study, there must be disciplined conjecture about the influence popular expansionist sentiment had on the political decision to annex Hawaii.

This study has relied heavily on magazines, newspapers, and the Congressional Record. These sources contain what was being written and said about Hawaiian annexation and imperialism during the protracted debate. Editors and politicians were foremost among those expressing opinions on expansion.

An attempt has been made to place the debate in its proper setting. Although the spirit of imperialism seemingly prevailed in the international scene, the question of annexing Hawaii had little significance for most late nineteenth-century Americans. Indeed, foreign relations generally seemed to have little relevance to their everyday lives. Besides, the economic upheaval of the 1890's created innumerable social and economic problems demanding more immediate solutions. At best, only a few Americans had more than a parochial view of foreign affairs.

The purpose of this study is to add another dimension to existing interpretations of what caused the United States to turn its back on its anti-colonial tradition in 1898 and adopt an expansionist foreign policy, and to clarify the

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role of expansionist sentiment in producing this significant change in foreign policy.

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CHAPTER I

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN HAWAII

Early in February, 1893, Secretary of State John W. Foster received a report from John L. Stevens, the American Minister to Hawaii, giving his account of the recent uprising in Honolulu that overturned the Hawaiian Monarchy. Minister Stevens concluded his report with the statement that: "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it."[1] To understand the Minister's unusual statement, it is necessary to review a century of Hawaiian-American relations.

While engaged in the Pacific Northwest-China fur trade in 1789, Captain Robert Gray became one of the first Americans to come into contact with the Hawaiian (Sandwich) Islands. Gray found them a convenient rest and reprovisioning station. By the end of the century, putting in at the islands had become a most welcome interlude for those engaged in trans-Pacific trade.[2]

Meanwhile, enterprising New England captain-traders began to monopolize the sandalwood trade between the

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[1] Foreign Relations of the United States 1894, Appendix II, "Affairs in Hawaii," p. 402.

[2] Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom (New Haven, 1965), p. 1.

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Hawaiian Islands and China.[3] Although avaricious exploitation depleted the sandalwood forests by 1830, American commercial interests in the island-kingdom had been irrevocably established. Between 1840 and 1860 the islands enjoyed unprecedented prosperity from visiting whaling vessels, most of the vessels being from New England. In the 1860's, the sugar industry supplanted the whaling trade, much as whaling had replaced the trade in sandalwood earlier in the century. Americans controlled the sugar industry from the beginning. By mid-century, "Boston traders, with their missionary allies, had transformed the Hawaiian Islands, with their port of Honolulu, into an important Pacific depot."[4] Some foreign observers predicted that the islands would play an increasingly important role in America's future in the Pacific. The Hawaiian Islands are "a stepping-stone from the whole of the American coast to the Celestial Empire,"[5] wrote Sir George Simpson in his Narrative of a Journey Round the World. French explorer Eugene Duflot de Mofas "regarded Hawaii as an appendage of California and predicted that the nation which controlled one would also control the other."[6]

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[3]The fragrant and fine-grained sandalwood was highly prized by the Chinese for making elaborately carved boxes and the fragile carved sticks of fans.

[4]Quoted in Norman A. Graebner, ed., Ideas and Democracy (New York, 1964), p. 335.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

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The reciprocity treaties of 1875 and 1887 further strengthened Hawaii's ties with the United States. Besides abolishing most duties on commodities passing between the two nations, the 1887 treaty granted the United States exclusive rights to develop the harbor of Pearl River for a coaling and repair station. The treaties proved a boon to Hawaiian industry and trade. Capital flowed in from American investors and by 1890 American investments in Hawaiian plantations exceeded more than 25 million dollars. Sugar production showed a phenomenal growth with the chief beneficiaries being the sugar planters, most of whom were "of American birth or descent."[7] The impact of this economic and commercial penetration, coupled with the American missionary influence, drew the Hawaiian kingdom ever closer to the United States. The United States became inextricably involved in molding Hawaii's destiny.

In the spring of 1890, Senator William McKinley introduced a tariff bill which would have permitted all foreign-grown raw sugar to come into the United States free of duty. It also would have given American sugar growers a bounty of two cents a pound. Quickly sensing the adverse consequences that passage of the bill would have on the Hawaiian sugar industry, Hawaiian Minister H. A. P. Carter lodged a protest with the American government. Carter protested the absence of a bounty for Hawaiian-grown sugar.

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[7]Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (New York, 1951), p. 34.

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He argued that if the bill passed without extending the bounty to Hawaiian planters, it would violate the reciprocity treaty of 1887. The intent of that treaty had been to put Hawaiian sugar in the same category as American sugar, but "the proposed legislation would place Hawaiian sugar in the same category as that from non-reciprocating nations."[8] Despite Carter's protests, the McKinley Tariff bill became law.

Stripping the Hawaiian sugar industry of its favored trading position adversely affected the island nation both economically and politically. American Minister John L. Stevens alleged "that sugar prices in Honolulu fell from $100 to $60 a ton and that property in the islands depreciated by not less than $12,000,000."[9] Anxious to regain their previous advantages, some planters advocated annexing the islands to the United States to secure the bounty.[10] Spurred on by the injurious McKinley Tariff, the white propertied group in Hawaii made plans for "a most auspicious plot."[11] Annexation sentiment among Americans in Hawaii continued to increase "despite the fact that Hawaiian people had racial and cultural heritages

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[8] Ibid., p. 43.

[9] Ibid., p. 45.

[10] Tate, op. cit., p. 206.

[11] Albert Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Gloucester, 1958), p. 259.

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vastly different from those of any American groups."[12]

In 1890 the Hawaiian Islands had a population of 89,990. Included in this number were 34,436 native Hawaiians, 15,301 Chinese, 12,360 Japanese, 8,612 Portugese, 1,928 Americans, 1,334 British, 1,034 Germans, and lesser numbers of other nationalities. Western civilization had a fatal effect on the previously isolated Hawaiian islanders. A forty per cent loss occurred in the native population during the twenty years preceding 1893.[13] This decline in native population corresponded to the time when Hawaii's economy was expanding.[14] To meet the demands for labor, workers were imported from abroad. China and Japan became dependable sources for a contract labor system. "Both the contract labor system and the original supply were fundamental to Hawaii's progress and prosperity in the 'nineties.'"[15] The small white minority was clearly the most powerful group on the island.

On July 6, 1887, a constitution which Hawaii's King Kalakaua reluctantly agreed to accept curtailed his royal prerogatives and increased the power of the legislature.

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[12]John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (New York, 1947), p. 408.

[13]Tate, op. cit., p. 44.

[14]John C. Appel, "American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii," in The Shaping of American Diplomacy, ed. by William Appleman Williams (Chicago, 1956), p. 407.

[15]Ibid.

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Fearing that the native regime would curtail their rising influence, the white foreign residents forced the new constitution upon the King. Franchise restrictions strengthened the political power of the white propertied class at the expense of the native Hawaiians. The Chinese and Japanese were excluded from the franchise. Neither King Kalakaua nor his sister Liliuokalani who succeeded him ever relished the constitution. Kalakaua died in January, 1891, while on an extended visit to California.[16]

Queen Liliuokalani, who had the misfortune to ascend the throne when the kingdom was in the throes of a depression resulting from the McKinley Tariff bill, held political ideas similar to those of her brother. However, she was more strong-willed and determined than her brother and had "charged him with cowardice for signing the constitution of 1887."[17] Upon being crowned sovereign Liliuokalani swore to uphold the same constitution, but her smoldering dislike for the constitution and her penchant to take action made trouble with a legislature dominated by foreign, white businessmen unavoidable. When it became evident that the constitution of 1887 would not survive the increased agitation between the crown and the legislative body, Liliuokalani made preparations to prorogue the legislature and promulgate a new constitution which she had prepared.

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[16] Tate, op. cit., p. 109.

[17] Ibid., p. 113.

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On the other hand, members of the Annexation Club had prepared another solution for the political problems which had beset the islands. This closely knit group of lawyers, merchants, planters, and bankers, "had millions of dollars invested in their own names or as trustees in property in Hawaii."[18] They were white, and most were American citizens or Hawaiian-born Americans. They planned to protect their investments through the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.

The dawn of January 14, 1893, signaled an eventful day in Hawaiian history. It was the appointed day for Queen Liliuokalani to proclaim a new constitution, a constitution which the white community claimed would enhance the Queen's power at their expense, but which the Queen claimed would redress the wrongs done to her people. Failing at the last minute to receive the support of her ministers, she temporarily postponed promulgating the new constitution.[19] Though unsuccessful, the import of the Queen's abortive maneuver was not lost upon the white owners of island property. They set into frenzied motion a plan for deposing her as the first step in consummating Hawaiian annexation to the United States.

In the afternoon of January 17, 1893, members of the clandestine and recently formed Committee of Public Safety (most were members of the Annexation Club) walked

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[18] Ibid., p. 116.

[19] Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874-1893 (Honolulu, 1967), III, 582.

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into Aliiolani Hale, the building serving as the seat of the Hawaiian government and demanded possession of the building from the few startled clerks present. Finding no opposition to their demands, one of the members read a proclamation declaring that the existing royal government was incapable of guaranteeing "representative and reasonable government."[20] Claiming that the personal, political and property interests of all were in jeopardy, the proclamation announced the abrogation of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the establishment of a Provisional Government. It was to exist until an acceptable agreement on annexation to the United States had been approved.[21]

Quickly receiving word in the Royal Palace of this unusual turn of events, Queen Liliuokalani first flatly rejected the demand that she abdicate the throne and relinquish her official duties. But after an assessment of the situation, and after consulting with close friends, she agreed to relinquish her authority but only until a settlement was forthcoming from Washington.[22]

After almost a century of commercial and missionary penetration, American ascendency in Hawaii culminated in 1893. Appeals for annexation to the United States were heard more frequently. Previously, some planters had

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[20] Tate, op. cit., p. 185.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., p. 189.

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expressed concern over annexation because of the possible adverse affect American labor and immigration laws would have on the existing contract labor system.[23] In 1893 these planters cast aside any misgivings they held for annexation and acquiesced in the overthrow of the Queen. They had decided to take their chances on the labor question in order to gain a stable political situation. But even if it were a revolution for stable government rather than a sugar planter's revolution, "the business and investments which they sought to safeguard were largely sugar or adjuncts of sugar."[24]

The somewhat unusual actions taken by the United States Minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, seriously undermined the Queen's position. On the day before the bloodless coup, Stevens had a contingent of American sailors and marines from the U. S. S. Boston land in Honolulu ostensibly to protect American lives and property. However, the position they took up appeared far removed from most Americans and their property but menacingly close to the government buildings and the Royal Palace. Perhaps it could be argued that the landing of troops followed custom, but their deployment appeared to aid

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[23]Graebner, op. cit., p. 336.

[24]Richard D. Weigle, "Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution," Pacific Historical Review, XIV (February, 1947), 58.

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the revolutionists.[25] Stevens' sympathy with the revolutionist forces was well known. Secretary of State Blaine had appointed Stevens as Minister to Hawaii. Both had been friends and neighbors in Augusta, Maine, and both were on record as favoring Hawaiian annexation to the United States.[26] Although the American troops took no direct part in overthrowing the Queen or in establishing the Provisional Government, the Minister's recognition of the Provisional Government within a few hours of its establishment, sealed the fate of the Hawaiian Monarchy.

By the following day the Provisional Government, headed by a Williams College graduate, Sanford B. Doyle, was in complete control of the situation. Members of the government pointed to the smooth transition as verification of the corruption and unpopularity of the deposed royal regime. All the diplomatic representatives accredited to Honolulu, except those of Japan and Great Britain, had given de jure recognition to the government.[27] On January 19, 1893, two days after the proclamation abrogating the monarchy was read in Aliiolani Hale, a five-member committee representing the Provisional Government boarded the steamer Claudine in Honolulu bound for the

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[25]Alice Felt Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine (Hamden, 1965), p. 215.

[26]Ibid., p. 216.

[27]Tate, op. cit., p. 191.

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United States. Four Americans--Lorrin Thurston, William R. Castle, William C. Wilder, and Charles L. Carter--and an Englishman, Joseph Marsden, comprised the special committee.[28] The committee's special mission was "to journey to Washington to negotiate a treaty of annexation."[29] No representative of the Queen was permitted to sail on the Claudine. Yet, the steamer did carry letters from the deposed Queen to President Benjamin Harrison and President-elect Grover Cleveland entreating each to refrain from endorsing annexation until they were in possession of all the facts surrounding the revolution.[30] Apparently both the Provisional Government and the Queen were unsure of the direction in which American sentiment leaned.

During the century when American influence gained ascendency in Hawaii, American expansionist sentiment waxed and waned. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the American people confined their territorial expansion to the continent. Encouraged by the mystical belief in "manifest destiny," they inexorably pushed the frontier westward until they had secured their position in the Pacific with treaties in 1846 and 1848. Some publicists and politicians even insisted that American sway should extend from pole to pole. The presence of mixed populations of Indians, blacks,

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[28] Ibid., p. 192.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

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and whites south of the Rio Grande stood in the way of this ambitious scheme, however.

After the Civil War, Secretary of State William Seward actively sought insular possessions in the Caribbean. Although his design for expansion in this area failed, he did acquire the tiny Midway Islands north of Hawaii in 1867. In the same year, and at Seward's insistence, the Senate purchased Alaska from the Russian Tsar. Later President Grant attempted to acquire the Dominican Republic, but he was rebuked by the Senate. Neither Seward nor Grant aroused much popular enthusiasm for their schemes for overseas expansion.

In the 1880's and 1890's the nation experienced renewed agitation for overseas expansion. American Social Darwinists like John Fiske and Josiah Strong argued that American superiority in power, energy, and political institutions resulted from natural selection. They insisted that the United States had an obligation to extend its rule to "the backward, less fit peoples of the world."[31] At the same time, Captain Alfred T. Mahan was persuasively writing that the survival and greatness of industrialized nations depended upon their success in competing for foreign markets and colonies. At the beginning of the 1890's the basic ideas contained in these justifications for expansion were in circulation. According to one American diplomatic

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[31]Graebner, op. cit., p. 336.

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historian, these writers "contributed to the 'intellectual climate' of the United States in the decade in which it inaugurated a program of overseas expansion."[32] Their influence on popular thought during a decade of domestic crises is more difficult to measure, however.

The American of the late nineteenth century looked at the world as an "extension of his everyday experience because that, essentially, was his only experience."[33] Some Americans took an interest in foreign affairs, but only a tiny fraction of them had any influence on foreign policy. And this small group tackled world problems with "that common American inclination to project familiar assumptions upon a huge and ill-perceived canvas."[34] Those Americans interested in foreign policy can be divided into two groups. A profit-oriented group searched for profits abroad by finding markets, seeking concessions to develop their own industries, and by locating opportunities for lucrative financial investments. Not infrequently members of this group asked their own government to intercede in the affairs of foreign nations on their behalf. Most generally they demanded protection from the government before risking foreign investments. That is, they wanted

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[32]Pratt, op. cit., p. 18.

[33]Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), p. 224.

[34]Ibid., p. 229.

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"a foreign policy . . . to parallel their economic policy."[35]

The second group influencing the origins of foreign policy emphasized national power. Among its members were politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, the famous naval theorist Alfred T. Mahan, editors such as Whitelaw Reid, Albert Shaw, and Lyman Abbott, educator Franklin Giddings, and sometime adviser to the State Department, John Bassett Moore. They held important and influential seats of power and publicity.[36] These men had no common view toward foreign policy, but they did believe that "at the root of international affairs . . . lay national power, a vague concept that mixed portions of mystic social strength with large doses of force."[37] Being power-minded strategists they did not turn to the need for markets or to the need for lebensraum to justify their opinions. These men were armchair theorists whose opinions grew from visions based on their own untethered imaginations and on myth. "They quite simply wanted the United States to master the world."[38]

Irrespective of the widely divergent forces that molded the foreign policy views of the two groups, their

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[35] Ibid., p. 232.

[36] Ibid., p. 233.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p. 235.

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foreign policy objectives had much in common. Both saw a need for the country to assume the commitments of a world power and both saw a need for colonies. Both also emphasized the importance of stability, and "both construed stability in a way that would draw them deep into internal affairs of other countries."[39]

In spite of the fact that they had common objectives and that, "almost all of them were Eastern, urban Republicans,"[40] seldom could the two groups coordinate their efforts in one direction. Divergent forces guided them to common objectives. Yet, these same forces made cooperation between them tentative and thus seriously weakened their influence on foreign policy.

James G. Blaine, who in 1889 became Benjamin Harrison's first Secretary of State, championed and helped formulate expansionist thought. On occasions, Blaine advocated American supremacy in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. Writing to President Harrison in August, 1891, Blaine expressed the view that there were only three places beyond the nation's present boundaries worth taking--Hawaii, Cuba, and Porto Rico. "Hawaii may come up for decision at any expected hour and I hope we shall be prepared to decide it in the affirmative."[41] Two months later Harrison

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., p. 236.

[41] Albert T. Volwiler, ed., The Correspondence Between Benjamin Harrison and James G. Blaine, 1882-1893 (Philadelphia, 1940), p. 174.

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reminded his Secretary of State that the "necessity of maintaining and increasing our hold and influence in the Sandwich Islands is very apparent and pressing."[42]

In June, 1892, John W. Foster succeeded Blaine as Secretary of State. Foster's expansionist beliefs generally were in harmony with those of his predecessor. He considered Hawaiian annexation as vital to American interests in the Pacific because the islands might otherwise eventually come under the domination of either Japan or Great Britain. He considered either development as inimical "to the interests of the United States."[43] Both men helped to shape the expansionist policy adopted by the Harrison administration. It was the policy which struck the theme for those advocating the "large policy" throughout the 1890's.[44] The Benjamin Harrison administration of the early nineties provided a "leadership ready to inaugurate policies which would capitalize the opportunities made possible by previous American activity in the Pacific."[45]

When the commissioners representing the Provisional Government of Hawaii reached Washington on February 3, 1894, "the climate of opinion was temporarily favorable to

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[42] Ibid., p. 206.

[43] John W. Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs (Boston, 1909), II, 166-167.

[44] Pratt, op. cit., p. 26.

[45] Graebner, op. cit., p. 337.

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Hawaiian annexation."[46] Minister Stevens' de facto recognition of the Provisional Government in Hawaii apparently met with approval in the Department of State. Foster disavowed the Minister's premature action which set "the authority of the United States above that of the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector."[47] Yet, Stevens escaped any form of public rebuke by either the President or the Secretary of State. According to Foster, the government had been waiting for the proper opportunity to annex Hawaii "and in the judgment of President Harrison and his Cabinet the fit time had arrived."[48] The Hawaiian commissioners also took comfort in knowing that "Secretary of State John W. Foster had inherited Blaine's expansionist proclivities along with his office."[49]

Opinion in Congress on annexation was more mixed and generally it followed party lines. Democratic senators expressing an opinion were averse to annexation. Some argued that the United States had enough domestic problems to occupy its attention without seeking additional problems overseas. After all, the nation had been beset by intermittent disasters and almost unrelieved discontent. The expense of defending the islands, and the probability that

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[46]Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 609.

[47]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 406.

[48]Foster, op. cit., p. 168.

[49]Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 609.

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annexation of overseas territory violated the Constitution were among other objections coming from the Democrats.[50]

Republican Senator Orville Platt considered annexation as only natural and was impatient with the administration for delaying negotiations that would bring it about.[51] In the Senate chamber Senator Chandler, Republican from New Hampshire, asked that immediate attention be given the resolution he submitted: "That the President be requested to enter into negotiations with the present Provisional Government of . . . Hawaii for the admission of the islands as a territory into the United States. . . ."[52] Senator Dolph remarked that American ascendancy in Hawaii had guided our relations with that island-kingdom for half a century. Recognizing that the present crisis in Hawaii was the natural result of this past policy, the Oregon Republican thought "it necessary for us either to cowardly abandon our claim to control the destiny of Hawaii or manfully to go forward and secure what appears to be providentially thrown at our feet."[53]

These emotional remarks for courageous and immediate action reflected the first wave of excitement over the dramatic event in Hawaii. But after a few days' reflection

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[50]Tate, op. cit., p. 197

[51]Ibid.

[52]Congressional Record, 52d Congress, 2d Session, p. 929.

[53]Ibid., p. 999.

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on the event, most of the lawmakers became skeptical and remained silent. "In the House of Representatives the majority was either averse to annexation or noncommittal."[54] To say the least, circumstances surrounding the revolution in Hawaii were shrouded.

The lack of early Congressional action reflected the reluctance of most Senators and Representatives to commit themselves to a position on annexation until more information attending the revolution in Hawaii became available. The Washington Evening News reported on January 31, 1893, "that could a vote be taken on the question of annexation now, with the limited information at hand, a good two-thirds majority would be recorded against it."[55] Since Hawaii had no telegraphic connections with the outside world, news from the islands traveled slowly.

The nation's press waited impatiently for more information on the revolution to arrive by steamer. A two-fold increase in the circulation of daily newspapers occurred during the 1890's. By 1900 the dailies would have a circulation of fifteen million, and a circulation of weekly and semi-weekly papers of over forty-two million. News agencies, syndicates, and newspaper chains also developed in this period.[56] News-gathering agencies often provided

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[54]Tate, op. cit., p. 198.

[55]Public Opinion, XIV (February 4, 1893), 414.

[56]Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York, 1959), p. 20.

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rural weeklies with news which previously had been available only to the large city dailies. These and other innovations broadened the newspaper's scope until it provided something (fiction, recipes, advice to the lovelorn) for everyone in the household. But the growth of syndicated articles and chains also brought with it "standardization of subject, style, and even editorial opinion."[57]

Magazines were undergoing a similar metamorphosis in the 1890's. In 1893 McClure's sold for fifteen cents a copy and Munsey's and Cosmopolitian each sold for ten cents. McClure's had a circulation of 250,000 in 1895. Like the newspaper, the magazine became livelier and less pedantic. However, they seldom, if ever, devoted space to foreign affairs and consequently they had no effect on molding opinion on foreign affairs. Thus the student must consult such periodicals as The Form, The Nation, Harper's Weekly, and North American Review, to learn what was being said, and by whom, about annexing Hawaii. The periodicals in the foregoing group had small circulations, usually between 25,000 and 90,000.[58] This small circulation limited their impact on public opinion; yet they were read by those whom Gabriel A. Almond calls the "attentive public" or that part of the public "which is informed and interested in foreign

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[57] Ibid.

[58] Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines, 1885-1905 (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 6-9.

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policy problems. . . ."[59]

The first reaction from the press indicated that most editors believed that American inaction would deliver the islands over to a European power. Irrespective of their political inclination, most journals argued that American annexation of Hawaii was preferable to letting the islands come under foreign domination. The rumor persisted that the English had designs on Hawaii. Yet some editors appeared to be torn between their Populist anglophobic impulses, and their strong desire to imitate the British example of imperialism.[60] The Baltimore American, New York World, Iowa State Register, New York Press, Chicago Tribune, Denver News, Atlanta Constitution, Kansas City Times, and Chicago News Record took the position that any hesitancy or failure on America's part to annex the islands would surely lead to British annexation.[61] The Chicago News Record succinctly expressed the theme of those editors suspecting British designs on the islands: "The Nation which owns Gibraltar and has established convenient coaling stations and moles wherever opportunity afforded would not be slow to respond with vigorous affirmation to

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[59]Gabriel A. Almond, "The American People and Foreign Policy," in Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1965), p. 84.

[60]Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York, 1955), p. 271.

[61]Public Opinion, XIV (February 4, 1893), 415-417.

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a similar appeal addressed to her."[62] A few words could sum up the Hawaiian question, declared the anglophobic Chicago Tribune: "Shall the United States annex the islands or shall England?"[63]

The Scientific American recognized that British interest in the islands extended back to Captain Cook's discovery of them in 1778. In fact, the English captain named the islands after Lord Sandwich. Although the British might lay claim to the islands through discovery, the editorial continued, the proximity of the islands to the American mainland brought them "within the operation of the Monroe Doctrine, and goes to forbid the establishment there of a European power."[64]

Taking a more bellicose attitude, the Kansas City Times thought Hawaii would rank high among our states as a productive region, and that Hawaiian commerce alone was worth fighting for.[65] An editorial in the San Francisco Examiner stressed the naval and commercial advantages of annexation.[66] Scoffing at the contention that a naval station two thousand miles away could protect the Pacific

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[62] Ibid., p. 417.

[63] Public Opinion, XIV (February 11, 1893), 441.

[64] "The Hawaiian Islands and Their Annexation," Scientific American (February 11, 1893), p. 82.

[65] Public Opinion, XIV (February 4, 1893), 417.

[66] Public Opinion, XIV (February 11, 1893), 441.

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coast, the Pittsburg Dispatch maintained that America's strongest defense was its isolation.[67] But the Washington Post urged the administration to seize the opportunity to annex this "natural and logical outpost of the United States in the Pacific."[68] If England interfered, she would do so fully aware of the risk involved. "This country," the editorial warned, "has grown since 1776."[69]

The Nashville American, Chicago Herald, and New Orleans New Delta opposed annexation from the start. If annexing territory had any practical utility, the New Orleans New Delta was not aware of it. Furthermore, it felt public opinion was against establishing colonies.[70] To some in the South, particularly the Southern Populist, and to the nativist in post-"Haymarket Riot," Chicago, "imperialism was questionable because it brought new alien races into the national fold."[71] The economic unrest of 1893 added to the rising fear of the foreigner.[72] Arguing that the population lacked political experience, the Chicago Herald questioned if any form of popular government could succeed

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[67]Public Opinion, XIV (February 18, 1893), 469.

[68]Public Opinion, XIV (February 4, 1893), 415.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., p. 417.

[71]Hofstadter, Age of Reform, p. 271.

[72]Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialization 1885-1914 (Chicago, 1957), p. 43.

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in the islands.

Convinced that annexation would bring a clamor for statehood, an editorial in The Nation questioned whether a constituency composed of aborigines, Japanese, Chinese, and Portuguese--"ignorant and foreign"--would not dilute American democracy.[73] This editorial reflected the growing nativist impulse resulting from the economic breakdown in 1893, which manifested itself in an increased prejudice toward impoverished and unskilled immigrants.[74]

Emotion and a nationalistic spirit largely dictated the first avalanche of editorial comments on the Hawaiian revolution. Most editors favored annexation, but as the Hawaiian episode began to unravel, this unanimity of opinion quickly vanished. Within a fortnight editorial opinion had largely undergone a realignment along the lines of the editors' political inclinations. Evidence suggests that in the early editorials dealing with the Hawaiian question, an editor's political affiliation was most likely to determine his position. He had little official information upon which to form his opinion, and in such a short time he had no way of gauging public opinion on the subject.

Near the middle of February, Republican journals such as the New York Press, Cincinnati Tribune, Boston Traveller, Denver Republican, New York Recorder, and

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[73]"Hawaii," The Nation, LVI (February 9, 1893), 96.

[74]Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (New York, 1956), p. 29.

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Indianapolis Journal contended that the American people had spontaneously adopted a policy of annexation, and that the American flag should never be hauled down in Hawaii.[75] The New York Press praised the decisive action of Minister Stevens in upholding American interests, and thought it incumbent upon President Harrison, despite "the shrieks of a few silly mugwumps,"[76] to support the Minister's action vigorously. With popular sentiment favoring annexation, the Denver Republican declared, "there is very little doubt that Congress would uphold the President if he were to take a stand in favor of annexation."[77]

Newspapers opposing annexation generally took the position that it would be a violation of our principle of self determination, because Minister Stevens had interfered in the political affairs of a sovereign nation. The Brooklyn Eagle could understand why officials at the Department of State "looked grave when they heard the news."[78] Stevens' declaration of a protectorate over Hawaii could only be described as incredible, declared the editor of the Democratic St. Louis Republic. The dispatches of February 8, 1893, "showed that he held Honolulu with a force from the U. S. S. Boston, and that to all interests

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[75] Public Opinion, XIV (February 18, 1893), 466-467.

[76] Ibid., p. 466.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., p. 467.

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and purposes he had made himself dictator of the country.[79] The St. Louis Republic believed it apparent that Stevens and his conspirators wished to seize Hawaii "before Mr. Cleveland's inauguration can put a stop to further action."[80] Questioning whether a revolution actually had taken place, the Chicago Herald viewed the whole affair as a pretended revolution resulting from a conspiracy between the "sugar ring" and the American Minister.[81]

In the West press opinion on the annexation of Hawaii did not split as sharply along political lines as it did in other parts of the country. Between February, 1893, and July, 1898, Public Opinion carried editorials about annexation from twenty-four western newspapers. Of the eleven newspapers affiliated with the Democratic party, four supported and seven opposed annexation. The thirteen newspapers affiliated with the Republican party were more closely divided on the issue with seven supporting and six opposing annexation. This apparent tendency of the western editors to be more independent of party affiliation when taking a position on annexation was probably attributed to Populist influence in the trans-Mississippi region. Yet, in the South where Populist influence was also reasonably strong, southern editors were largely inclined to permit

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., p. 466.

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party affiliation to dictate their position on annexation. Public Opinion carried editorials about Hawaiian annexation from seventeen southern newspapers (all Democratic) between February, 1893, and July, 1898. Editorial opinion in fourteen of the seventeen newspapers opposed annexation.

On July 9, 1898, The Literary Digest reported that "Among regular Democratic papers which commit themselves there seems to be general opposition to expansion. This is true of most of the old-line Southern papers like the Richmond Times and the Charleston News and Courier."[82]

On February 4, 1893, the Hawaiian commissioners met with Secretary of State Foster and submitted their proposal for a formal treaty. It contained a request for the form of government "now existing in territories of the United States with such modifications, restrictions, and changes therein as the exigencies of the existing conditions may require and as may be hereafter agreed upon."[83] Instructions to the commissioners from the Provisional Government before and after arriving in the United States stressed the importance of getting specific commitments from the United States incorporated in the treaty. Their plan included securing promises from the American government to lay and maintain a submarine cable from the west coast to Hawaii; to improve Pearl Harbor and to use it as

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[82]"The Newspapers and the Issue of Imperialism," The Literary Digest, XVII (July 9, 1898), 32.

[83]Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 610.

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a coaling and naval base; to make bounty payments on sugar available to Hawaiian planters; to exclude the islands from immigration restrictions on importing Chinese laborers,[84] and to make a financial settlement with the ex-queen and Princess Kaiulani.[85] Foster quickly rejected much of the Hawaiian plan. He maintained that action on the cable should come from private enterprise, and that traditionally strategic requirements alone dictated the location and development of overseas naval stations.[86] To send a treaty to the Senate incorporating a sugar bounty clause "and a clause permitting importation of Oriental laborers under contract[87] would be politically inexpedient. Such controversial clauses, Foster claimed, would unite the opposition.

The Secretary of State handed a draft of a treaty to the commissioners on February 9, 1893. The commissioners hesitated to accept a treaty which differed noticeably from what they had been instructed to obtain. But Foster convinced them that all controversial matters which could obstruct the treaty's passage had to be omitted. Otherwise, the treaty had no chance of getting through the Senate

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[84]Pratt, op. cit., p. 118.

[85]Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 610.

[86]Tate, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

[87]Pratt, op. cit., p. 119.

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during the short time remaining in Harrison's administration.[88]

Secretary of State Foster and the five commissioners affixed their signatures to a treaty on February 14, 1893. Thirty-one days had elapsed since the overthrow of the Queen.[89] The treaty provided for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as "an integral part of the territory of the United States,"[90] the cession to the United States of all rights of sovereignty, and the prohibition of "further immigration of Chinese laborers into the Hawaiian Islands."[91] The United States would assume the public debt of the Hawaiian Islands, would provide for the payment of an annuity of $20,000 to Liliuokalani for life, and would make payment of a lump sum of $150,000 to Princess Kaiulani.[92]

President Harrison sent the treaty along with his message to the Senate on February 15, 1893. A report from Foster also accompanied the treaty. Both Harrison and Foster urged its prompt ratification. Claiming that the policy of the administration respected and encouraged

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[88] Ibid.

[89] Tate, op. cit., p. 203.

[90] Senate Reports, 55th Congress, 2d Session, III, No. 681, p. 94.

[91] Ibid., p. 95.

[92] Ibid.

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Hawaiian independence, Harrison denied that the United States promoted the overthrow of the monarchy. The revolution, he asserted, had its origin in the revolutionary and reactionary policy of the Queen. Harrison concluded that quick action on the treaty would promote "the best interests of the Hawaiian people,"[93] and would "adequately secure the interests of the United States."[94] In his report, Foster further disclaimed any collusion between the American government and the Hawaiian revolutionists. Moreover, he pointed out that the Hawaiian commissioners voluntarily brought the annexation proposal to the United States.[95] Foster failed to say that the administration made its decision on the treaty without hearing the Queen's views on the revolution.

Paul Neumann, a lawyer from California, had arrived in Honolulu during the reign of King Kalakaua and soon became a favorite at the royal court. By 1893 he had become Queen Liliuokalani's most trusted adviser. After the Queen appealed to President Harrison to delay action on annexation until her envoy arrived in Washington, she gave Neumann "a commission as minister plenipotentiary and

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[93] James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1898), IX, 348.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Executive Documents of the Senate of the United States, 52d Congress, 2d Session, VIII, No. 76, p. 5.

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a power of attorney."[96] Neumann, acting as the Queen's envoy, arrived in San Francisco on February 9, 1893. After wiring Foster to delay action on the treaty until he could present the Queen's views, he entrained for Washington. He met with Foster on February 21, six days after the treaty had been sent to the Senate. Neumann insisted that the Provisional Government lacked support of the masses of the Hawaiian people. Besides, many who favored annexation objected to the Provisional Government. The envoy explained that the Queen was merely demanding "a popular referendum on the question of whether the Hawaiian people wished her restoration or the continuance of the existing government."[97]

Meanwhile, the treaty had been "promptly approved by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and favorably reported to the Senate."[98] Knowing that a two-thirds majority vote on the treaty depended upon obtaining some Democratic votes, administration officials endeavored to secure Democratic support. Appearing confident, Secretary of State Foster contended that "the annexation of Hawaii had been the open policy of both parties in the United States for many years. . . ."[99] However, at the request

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[96]Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 617.

[97]Tate, op. cit., p. 21.

[98]Pratt, op. cit., p. 121.

[99]Foster, op. cit., p. 168.

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of the President, Foster conferred with Democratic Senators John T. Morgan and A. B. Gorman about prevailing opinion on the treaty among their party colleagues. Both senators assured Foster "that they anticipated no serious opposition to the treaty from their side of the chamber. . . ."[100] Foster also asked James H. Blount, Democratic Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to use his influence within the Democratic party to gain supporters for the treaty.[101]

Events soon changed these optimistic predictions of a quick confirmation for the treaty. While not unalterably opposed to the acquisition of Hawaii, some Democrats questioned the tactics used by the Harrison administration in the whole Hawaiian affair. The treaty had the appearance of a purely Republican measure, and Democrats looked to President-elect Cleveland for guidance.[102] The Democratic party platform in 1892 said little on foreign affairs other than that it favored the construction of a Nicaraguan Canal.[103] The campaign had been almost entirely based on the tariff issue.[104] When Cleveland met with some of his

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[100] Ibid.

[101] Senate Reports, 53d Congress, 2d Session, II, No. 227, p. 404.

[102] Pratt, op. cit., p. 122.

[103] Kirk A. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms, 1840-1964 (Urbana, 1966), p. 176.

[104] Faulkner, op. cit., p. 131; Donald Dozer, "Benjamin

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Cabinet appointees on February 22, 1893, at Lakewood, New Jersey, "the case of the Hawaiian Queen" had been a topic of discussion.[105] There is no record of the conversations or decisions, but shortly after this meeting the Democrats in Congress learned that Cleveland desired "that the treaty be left for the new administration to deal with."[106] Writing to President-elect Cleveland on February 27, 1893, Liberal Republican Carl Schurz expressed "the hope that the annexation of Hawaii may be avoided. All the advantages we might gain by it can be secured without irrevocably abandoning the safe, time-honored tradition of our government."[107]

After the treaty had been submitted to the Senate, editorials in the press reflected the political tensions developing over annexation. The New York Tribune, of which Republican leader Whitelaw Reid was editor, accused the Democratic party of deliberately delaying a vote on the annexation treaty. This myopic attitude, the editorial declared, not only ignored the sentiment of the country

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Harrison and the Presidential Campaign of 1892," American Historical Review, LIV (October, 1948), 49-77.

[105]Matilda Gresham, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895 (Chicago, 1919), II, 684.

[106]Pratt, op. cit., p. 122.

[107]Frederick Bancroft, ed., Speeches, Correspondence, and Political Papers of Carl Schurz (New York, 1913), V, 128.

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but also disregarded the necessity for new markets resulting from burgeoning industrialization. To let the markets of Australia and "the newly-awakened empires of China and Japan"[108] slip from our grasp would be most unfortunate. The reform periodical, The Nation, took issue with those who claimed annexation would greatly expand American trade in the Pacific. It failed to see how planting the American flag in the middle of the Pacific would "make American goods either cheaper or any more desirable to the inhabitants of Australia or China and Japan, or will lower freight charges or do any of the things that create a foreign market."[109] Convinced that the interest of American commerce demanded annexation, the Republican New York Press rebuked Democratic senators for their "obstinate opposition to ratification of the treaty."[110]

Some editorials stressed the strategic importance of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. The country "could not afford to see so valuable a naval outpost . . . in the possession of a foreign country,"[111] declared the St. Louis Pioneer Press. And in the March issue of The Forum, Captain Alfred T. Mahan expressed a similar attitude. Mahan maintained that in a large-scale naval war the

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[108] Public Opinion (February 25, 1893), p. 487.

[109] "The Hawaiian Fiasco," The Nation, LVI (March 2, 1893), 154.

[110] Public Opinion, XIV (February 25, 1893), 489.

[111] Ibid.

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strategic importance of the Hawaiian Islands would prove invaluable to the United States.[112]

The New Orleans Picayune, displaying the "nationalist belligerence and crusading cedulity of the native American in the 1890's,"[113] assured its readers that the United States would annex Hawaii and would eventually absorb both Canada and Cuba. It stressed that the time had come to make preparations for protecting the new territory when acquired.[114] Two Democratic journals questioned the strategic importance of Hawaii, however. "Hawaii will be a source of expense and difficult to defend in time of war with a powerful enemy,"[115] declared the editor of the Macon Telegraph. Joseph Pulitizer's New York World considered most claims about the strategic importance of Hawaii as greatly exaggerated. In an editorial, it expressed doubt that the Hawaiian Islands, located "farther from San Francisco than the Azores are from New York,[116] had much strategic value for the United States.

California's proximity to Hawaii, asserted William Randolph Hearst's San Francisco Examiner, dictated that

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[112]"The Hawaiian Fiasco," op. cit., p. 154.

[113]Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 271.

[114]Public Opinion (February 25, 1893), p. 488.

[115]Ibid., p. 489.

[116]Ibid., p. 488.

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Congress should turn to that state "for an expression of public sentiment on the Hawaiian question and should be guided by what they hear. . . ."[117] It claimed that California supported annexation but only on certain conditions. The most specific condition was that no Chinese contract laborers be allowed to come to California. The Chinese must remain on the islands, "and when their term of service is up they must be returned to their homes without acquiring any privileges as American residents."[118]

Probably organized labor had some influence on the position taken by the San Francisco Examiner. On the whole, few American workers feared that the annexation of Hawaii would jeopardize their jobs. Still, fearing competition from a sizeable Oriental population in Hawaii, the Coast Seamen Union did protest annexation. "The A. F. of L. and the Knights of Labor, along with such local bodies as the San Francisco Central Labor Union, threw their official weights against annexation in support of their members who had an economic stake involved."[119] An editorial in the Indianapolis Journal attempted to minimize the arguments against annexation based on racial reasons. Unlike some of the leading racial nationalists, the editor of the

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[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid.

[119] John C. Appel, "American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii," in The Shaping of American Diplomacy, ed. by William Appleman Williams (Chicago, 1956), p. 407.

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Indianapolis Journal did not dread any racial mixture that might result from annexation. He expressed "the earlier theory of John Fiske that Anglo-Saxons posses a unique capacity to merge with other peoples while retaining their own dominant traits."[120] After annexation took place, he predicted a rapid change would occur in the character of the population because "This population problem always works itself out in favor of the Anglo-Saxon."[121]

When so little time remained in the Harrison administration, it is difficult to understand why it consented to negotiate and submit the annexation treaty to the Senate for ratification. The supporters of the treaty apparently did not anticipate any serious opposition to its ratification. Expansionist opinion may or may not have had an influence on this policy decision. Sometimes those who make foreign policy decisions do so without having any "knowledge of the existing state of public opinion."[122] It can happen when public opinion has not been conveyed to them (which seems likely in this instance), or because "they do not, consciously or otherwise, perceive its existence."[123] If this were the case, political policy

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[120]John Highman, Strangers in the Land (New Jersey, 1955), p. 145.

[121]Public Opinion, XIV (February 25, 1893), 488.

[122]James N. Rosenau, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," in Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1965), 69.

[123]Ibid.

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probably influenced the decision for a treaty. Treaty backers probably expected it to be approved along with the mass of other legislation in the hectic closing days of the congressional session without much thought being given to it.

On the other hand, public sentiment may have influenced the policy decision. Perhaps the policy-makers believed they correctly perceived a pervasive and favorable American expansion sentiment. If this were the case, they could expect the treaty to be popularly received in the Senate.

If the Harrison administration could have successfully inaugurated a policy of overseas expansion, it would have fulfilled the foreign policy ambitions expressed by Seward, Grant, and Blaine. However, by the end of February, 1893, enough opposition to the annexation treaty had developed to make the Harrison administration believe it inexpedient to force a test vote. Possibly it was inexpedient because the story of how Stevens had used American forces to aid the Revolution broke in the press during February.[124] The evidence suggests that most of the opposition was motivated by partisan politics rather than public opinion. President Harrison's term in office ended on March 4, 1893, with Senate action on the treaty still pending.

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[124]Editorial in Chicago Herald, February 11, 1893, (Public Opinion, XIV, February 18, 1893, 467).

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CHAPTER II

CLEVELAND'S POLICY

When Grover Cleveland entered his second term as President on March 4, 1893, he was familiar with the affairs of Hawaii. During his first administration he had proclaimed the reciprocity treaty of 1887 with Hawaii, and had asserted that "the intimacy of our relations with Hawaii should be emphasized."[1] Yet, at the same time, he indicated an aversion to overseas territorial expansion. "I do not favor a policy of acquisition of new or distant territory. . . ."[2] His attitude toward annexation, based largely on moralistic grounds, contrasted sharply with the expansionist tendencies of the previous administration, but it proved to be no more effective in settling the Hawaiian problem than the political approach which Harrison had tried.

When Cleveland moved into the White House for the second time, he had already discussed the Hawaiian treaty of annexation with his Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham.[3]

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[1] Public Opinion, XIV (March 18, 1893), 562.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Matilda Gresham, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895 (Chicago, 1919), II, 714.

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Gresham had served in the Cabinet during the Arthur administration and in 1894 Arthur appointed him a United States circuit judge. In 1888 Gresham contended with Senator John Sherman and Benjamin Harrison for the Republican presidential nomination. Harrison won the nomination on the eighth ballot. Gresham, who previously had always voted the Republican ticket, bolted his party in 1892 to vote for Cleveland and subsequently accepted the Cabinet post.[4] Gresham's views on Hawaii coincided closely with Cleveland's and apparently they weighed heavily in formulating the administration's Hawaiian policy.

The speed with which the Harrison administration proceeded with the treaty shocked both Cleveland and Gresham. "Thus from the beginning each must have found and confirmed in the other an impulse to halt the annexation programme."[5] Enough information concerning Stevens' role in the Hawaiian revolution also had come into the possession of Cleveland and Gresham to make them suspicious of the whole affair. Moreover, Cleveland distrusted "the vigorous foreign policy inaugurated by James G. Blaine."[6] The Brooklyn Eagle claimed that Minister Stevens got his diplomatic training under

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[4]Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York, 1959), p. 130.

[5]Henry James, Richard Olney and his Public Service (New York, 1923), p. 83.

[6]Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (New York, 1951), pp. 123-124.

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James G. Blaine and, like his sponsor, favored the annexation of the islands.[7]

Many Republicans, fuming over Gresham's acceptance of the Cabinet post, charged him "with harboring such feelings of personal jealousy and dislike toward his former political rival Harrison, that he could not review any of Harrison's policies without bias."[8] Gresham's wife and biographer, Matilda Gresham, did not reject the accusation. "If my husband was actuated only by resentment towards President Harrison, the Republican leaders, and the Republican party, he had the satisfaction of knowing he embarrassed them greatly. . . ."[9] Henry James could say that being a lawyer by training and a judge by experience, Gresham's "natural tendency was to take a legalistic view of the Hawaiian case."[10] In spite of the epithets tossed his way by the Republicans, Gresham remained silent on annexation. In so doing he was probably following the example of the President. Speaking in New York shortly before his inauguration, Cleveland had said, "I have not expressed an opinion on the question of annexation, and if I had an opinion I do not consider that it would be proper

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[7]Public Opinion, XIV (February 18, 1893), 467.

[8]James, op. cit., p. 83.

[9]Gresham, op. cit., pp. 738-739.

[10]James, op. cit., p. 83.

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for me to express it at this time."[11]

On March 9, 1893, Cleveland sent a special message to the Senate withdrawing the treaty. "For the purpose of re-examination I withdraw the treaty of annexation between the United States and the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. . . ."[12] Such a malicious attempt to "brand as infamous the foreign policy of the preceeding Administration," the Chicago Skandinaven declared, "is something unknown hitherto in the history of diplomacy."[13] Despite such charges Cleveland denied that his action was prejudicial to annexation. Writing to Liberal Republican Carl Schurz soon after withdrawing the treaty, Cleveland indicated that he still had an open mind on the subject. "I do not now say that I should hold annexation in all circumstances and at any time unwise, but I am sure we ought to stop and look and think. That's exactly what we are doing now."[14] However, Cleveland said nothing about getting an expression of public sentiment on the matter. There is no evidence that anything influenced his decision other than his own predilection to review the matter.

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[11]Gresham, op. cit., p. 741.

[12]James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1898), IX, 393.

[13]Public Opinion, XVI (November 30, 1893), 214.

[14]Frederick Bancroft, ed., Speeches, Correspondence, and Political Papers of Carl Schurz (New York, 1913), V, 133-134.

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Cleveland's terse message withdrawing the treaty caught the nation's press by surprise. There is no evidence that anyone predicted such a course of action. When the President gave no reasons in the one-sentence message for his action, he deprived the editors of the provocative stuff which makes editorials. A few editors and writers of articles speculated on Cleveland's intention, but most reacted by renewing and elaborating their previously expressed opinions on annexation.

Recent studies in public opinion estimate that the number of Americans showing an interest in foreign policy (the foreign policy public) in the 1890's "numbered between 1.5 and 3 million, or something between 10 and 20 per cent of the voting public."[15] James N. Rosenau estimates that the "mass public"--"the public which is uninformed about either specific foreign policy issues or foreign affairs in general"--incorporates up to 90 per cent of the adult population.[16] Considering the educational opportunities in the 1890's it is unlikely that over 10 per cent of the voting public concerned itself with foreign affairs. Most of those who did "would have come from the 500,000 or so who had graduated from colleges and the 1 to 1.5 million

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[15]Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968), p. 24.

[16]James N. Rosenau, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," in Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1965), p. 78.

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who had graduated from high school."[17] A recent survey shows that "on questions of foreign policy the disinclination to express an opinion is especially marked among persons with only grade-school education."[18]

Among those who express opinion on foreign policy to the pollsters "the proportion of professional men and businessmen runs very high; that of clerical and skilled workers less high; that of unskilled workers and farmers markedly low."[19] The wealthier and better educated also have a higher representation in the foreign policy public than in the voting public. In make up, then, the foreign policy public is less representative of the total population than is the voting public. The findings of these studies indicate that public sentiment concerning territorial expansion in the 1890's would be represented by what was being said, written, and done about it within this "comparatively well-to-do, well educated, and politically active public."[20] Statements about public opinion on expansion in this study refer to the small portion of the voting public in the 1890's that would have shown an interest in foreign policy.

George Belknap and Angus Campbell, writing in Public

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[17]May, op. cit., p. 24.

[18]V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1964), p. 333.

[19]May, op. cit., p. 22.

[20]Ibid., p. 24.

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Opinion Quarterly, point out that affiliation with a political party largely determines the position many people take on foreign policy questions. That is, the "party serves the people as a reference point to which they look . . . for their position on foreign policy questions." They further claim that the more well informed followers of the Democratic and Republican parties are more sharply divided on foreign policy issues than less informed people.[21] Despite their high educational level, "citizens interested in foreign policy tend to take unqualified stands and hold opinions dogmatically."[22] Perhaps the more informed people clearly perceive their party's position on a foreign policy issue and thus can follow it more easily.[23] Ernest R. May claims that today's foreign policy public can also be characterized "as opinionated and unpredictable."[24] Belknap and Campbell concluded from their study that the attitudes regarding foreign policy held by many people in both parties result consciously or unconsciously from "adherence to a perceived party line, rather from influences independent of party identification."[25] For the purpose of this study

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[21]George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Party Identification and Foreign Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly (Winter, 1951-52), pp. 616-623.

[22]May, op. cit., p. 23.

[23]Belknap and Campbell, loc. cit.

[24]May, op. cit., p. 24.

[25]Belknap and Campbell, loc. cit.

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we can assume that newspaper and periodical editors were among the more well-informed followers of political parties.

Most newspapers were affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican party and slanted their editorials on international affairs in the direction of their party's foreign policy line.[26] This affiliation of newspapers with either the Republican or Democratic party prompts the assumption that for political reasons most newspapers in a community would have a particular group of readers. Writing in the Atlantic Monthly in January, 1893, E. L. Godkin stated that few "readers subscribe to more than one paper, and consequently few readers have any knowledge of the other side of any question on which their own paper, possibly, is speaking with vehemence."[27]

Contemporary studies reveal that the volume of international news makes up only a small proportion of the total news space in most newspapers. But if little news on foreign affairs is published, even less is read. A readership survey of fifty-one newspapers taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1953 reveals that adults read about half a column of foreign news daily and devote an estimated two and one-third minutes to reading this material. Other studies reveal a similar pattern for the

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[26] Ibid.

[27] "Do People Read Editorials in the Paper?" The Review of Reviews, XVII (1898), 100.

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over-all readership of foreign affairs news.[28]

Using data from another readership survey, V. O. Key states that "Day in and day out the odds are that less than 10 per cent of the adult population could be regarded as careful readers of political news. . . ."[29] He claims that it would be several percentage points lower for foreign affairs. These careful readers seem to be those people who are well-informed on foreign affairs. "Basically . . . it is educational level and socio-economic status that seem to be the best predictors of newspaper readership of foreign affairs."[30]

These contemporary studies reveal that, in spite of increased educational opportunities and national prosperity, less than ten per cent of Americans reading newspapers read any significant amount of news on foreign affairs. We can assume that in the 1890's this percentage would not have been higher, and probably it would have been lower. This low percentage of citizens reading news on foreign affairs prompts the conclusion that although the press was in the most favorable position to mold opinion on foreign policy, its influence was mitigated by the citizen's lack of interest in foreign affairs.

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[28]Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1963), p. 251.

[29]Quoted in Cohen, op. cit., p. 257.

[30]Ibid.

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The editors who supported annexation usually justified their position by what Robert E. Osgood calls the Realist approach to foreign relations. The Realist believes that nations generally are not capable of transcending their own interests and thus the struggle for national power characterizes international relations. Viewing conflict as inevitable, the Realist supports a policy that enhances his own nation's power relative to the power of other nations. "He believes that if power conflicts can be mitigated at all, they can be mitigated by balancing power against power. . . ."[31] The editors opposing annexation frequently used such terms as morality, law, honesty, and self-determination to describe relations among nations, manifesting what Osgood calls the Idealist approach to foreign policy.[32]

The strategic significance of the islands was frequently cited to support annexation. The Philadelphia Press took the position that the defense of the Pacific Coast required the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands. It claimed that the nation's Hawaiian policy had long been guided toward this end and that the reciprocity treaties of 1875 and 1887 were the first steps in its consummation. "The next logical step," the Philadelphia Press reasoned, "is

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[31]Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953), p. 9.

[32]Ibid., p. 7.

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annexation or complete control."[33] Articles appearing in the Chautauquan[34] and Education pointed to the strategic significances of Hawaii. Control of the islands "would give the American navy the best and most important harbor and coaling station in the North Pacific Ocean."[35] Senator Henry Cabot Lodge believed the strategic importance of the islands to the United States could not be overemphasized. In an interview, Lodge declared that they "were the key to the control of the Pacific Ocean, and no foreign power should be allowed to occupy them."[36] Taking a similar position, naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan believed that American possession of the islands would enable the United States to influence the military and commercial control of the Pacific.[37]

In countering the strategic argument for annexation, Carl Schurz urged caution lest the nation find itself irrevocably committed to a new version of "Manifest Destiny." He opposed annexing territory merely for the sake of gaining

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[33] Public Opinion, XIV (March 18, 1893), 563.

[34] Arthur A. Black, "The Hawaiian Islands," Chautauquan, XVII (April, 1893), 57.

[35] Frank H. Palmer, "Our Prospective Territory," Education, XIII (March, 1893), 418.

[36] John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1953), p. 150.

[37] A. T. Mahan, "Hawaii and our Future Sea Power," The Forum, XV (March, 1893), 7.

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commercial advantages or strategic positions. "It is evident that if we once are fairly started in the annexation policy for such purposes, the appetite will grow with the eating."[38]

Some racial nationalists did not agree with Schurz's contention that the nation should use the utmost caution in annexing territory. One stream of racial nationalism in the 1890's was characterized by an aggressiveness that called for expansion overseas. The other stream of racial nationalism "pointed at the foreigner within . . . and warned the Anglo-Saxon American of a danger of submergence."[39] For the most part, the former stream of racial nationalism stemmed from domestic frustrations, and "reflected a groundswell of national feeling." It assured the American "of a conquering destiny."[40] T. Graham Gribble made little effort to conceal his aggressive racial nationalism in his assessment of the Hawaiian situation. Writing in the Engineering Magazine, he maintained that native Hawaiians lost control of their country "not by slavery, or by the massacre, but by simple weakness." The Anglo-Saxon treated the natives fairly, but he dominated their "country simply because he was able to use it to profit in a manner of which the native

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[38]Carl Schurz, "Manifest Destiny," Harper's New Monthly, LXXXVII (1893), 739.

[39]John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Jersey, 1955), p. 144.

[40]Ibid.

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was incapable." Any thought of supporting "the ignorant and weak native as ruler over the white man was . . . foolish. . . ."[41]

The constitutionality of annexing Hawaii came under the scrutiny of some writers. T. M. Cooley, formerly a member of the Michigan Supreme Court and of the Interstate Commerce Commission, claimed that annexation of "outlying colonies" did not come "within the contemplation of the Constitution. . . ." Cooley believed that the founding fathers expected the country to expand, but only into contiguous territory. The latter stream of racial nationalism influenced Cooley's legal outlook on annexation. Cooley worried that annexing Hawaii could set a precedent of annexing "other countries regardless of the difference of race. . . ." In the case of Hawaii, he pointed out, most of the population is comprised of people from "colored races with habits and ideas very different from our own. . . ."[42] The independent New York Herald praised Judge Cooley for finding "an insurmountable barrier in the Constitution . . ." to incorporating in the national domain "distant islands inhabited by a mongrel population. . . ."[43]

On March 11, 1893, Cleveland appointed James H. Blount

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[41]T. Graham Gribble, "American Annexation of Hawaii," Engineering Magazine, IV (March, 1893), 898.

[42]T. M. Cooley, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation," The Forum, XV (June, 1893), 393-396.

[43]Public Opinion, XV (June 3, 1893), 218.

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as his special commissioner to Hawaii. The former Georgia Congressman and Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had instructions to investigate all matters touching on the recent revolution in Hawaii and to make a report of his findings to the President.[44] Cleveland wanted all "the facts."[45] On the same day Gresham penned a message to Minister Stevens informing him that "the President had determined to send to Honolulu, as a Special Commissioner, the Honorable James H. Blount. . . . In all matters pertaining to the existing or other Government of the Islands the authority of Mr. Blount is paramount."[46] To indignant Republicans he became "Paramount" Blount.[47] If the Harrison administration's approach to securing an annexation treaty precipitated political opposition and put the whole question of annexation in a political context, Cleveland's failure to appoint a bipartisan commission had no less an effect.

While Blount took the sunny ocean voyage to Honolulu, Secretary of State Gresham held talks on "the Hawaiian question with the diplomatic representatives of the three leading Pacific powers, Japan, Russia, and Great Britain."[48]

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[44]Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874-1893 (Honolulu, 1967), III, 622.

[45]Gresham, op. cit., p. 744.

[46]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 467.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Pratt, op. cit., p. 125.

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The conversations revealed that each of the nations had an interest in the islands, but that none seriously objected to the United States extending its sovereignty there if that became its policy.[49]

Meanwhile, Hawaiian Commissioners Thurston and Castle attempted to discover the intentions of the new administration regarding the destiny of the treaty. They had two meetings with Gresham for this purpose, but the Secretary divulged nothing.[50] Blount's instructions remained secret so the Commissioners, like everyone else, could only listen to rumors and speculate about the fate of the treaty.[51] From the time of Blount's appointment until he submitted his report, "the President and his Secretary of State maintained a spinxlike silence, refusing to commit themselves on the disposition of the Hawaiian question."[52]

Excitement prevailed in Honolulu as the ship carrying Blount edged into its berth on March 29. The city was decorated with American flags and girls were at the dock to welcome the Commissioner and his wife.[53] Blount accepted the floral tributes. However, he refused the Queen's offer

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[49] Ibid., p. 127.

[50] Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom (New Haven, 1965), p. 231.

[51] Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 622.

[52] Tate, op. cit., p. 232.

[53] Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 622.

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of the use of her carriage, and the Provisional Government's offer of the use of an "elegant house."[54] The Blounts took accommodations at the Hawaiian Hotel.

Blount first used his paramount authority on April 1, when he ordered Admiral Skerrett, commander of the United States naval forces in Honolulu, to lower the American flag over the government building and reembark the troops who had been on duty in Honolulu since January 16.[55] Acting on his own authority and at the request of the Provisional Government Minister Stevens had established an American protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands on February 1, 1893. But President Harrison soon disavowed the conduct of the American Minister in "setting the authority and power of the United States above that of the Government of the Hawaiian Islands in the capacity of protector."[56] Yet, Stevens had maintained a semblance of a protectorate on the pretense that it maintained order. Blount apparently decided that the conspicuous presence of the flag and the troops did not provide a setting conducive to an impartial investigation. Still, if Hawaii were not a protectorate of the United States, "Why . . . should the flag stay up?"[57] Harrison's message to Stevens also had disavowed

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[54]Pratt, op. cit., p. 130.

[55]Ibid., p. 131.

[56]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 406.

[57]Gresham, op. cit., p. 745.

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any act that impaired the sovereignty of the Hawaiian government "by substituting the flag and the power of the United States as the symbol and manifestation of paramount authority"[58] over Hawaii.

Most editorials about hauling down the American flag were emotionally and politically inspired. Theodore Roosevelt seemingly set the theme for many editorials. Expressing his feelings over Blount's action, Roosevelt declared, "I am a bit of a believer in the manifest destiny doctrine. . . . I don't want to see our flag hauled down where it has been hauled up."[59] Every enemy of American ideas and republican institutions, declared the Republican New York Press, "Will rejoice at the deliberate insult offered by Grover Cleveland to the American flag at Hawaii. Has Cleveland permitted the flag "to be dishonored before the world?" asked the Republican Kansas City Journal. If so he has committed the sin for which there is no condonation.[60] Another Republican journal, the New York Commercial Advertiser, thought Cleveland's order to pull down "Old Glory" put civilization in reverse. "He has declared that the superstitious orgies of the heathen queen and her wild-eyed Kanakas may be resumed. . . ."[61]

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[58]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 407.

[59]Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), p. 47.

[60]Public Opinion, XV (April 22, 1893), 70-71.

[61]Ibid.

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Democratic newspapers such as the Kansas City Times, Louisville Courier-Journal, and St. Louis Republic took the editorial position that Cleveland's decision to lower the flag and remove the troops before beginning an impartial investigation strengthened the principles of liberty and justice. "Now Hawaiians will be allowed to follow the democratic principle of governing or misgoverning themselves," stated the Louisville Courier-Journal. The Democratic Chicago Times lashed out at the Republican journals that questioned Blount's loyalty. The New York Press, for instance, thought it significant that the President had chosen a "Bourbon ex-Confederate, who had fought to tear down the American flag and trample it under foot," to haul down the flag at Honolulu. Those professional patriots who utter venomous remarks about Blount's confederate affiliations should transfer their allegience . . . to the service of England," suggested the Chicago Times. Stevens' action closely resembled the "British land-grabbing policy: Blount's was . . . distinctively American in its conservatism and dignity."[62]

Annexationists harshly criticized Blount's appointment and the nature of his mission. Yet, they generally respected the impartiality he displayed while conducting an independent and judicious investigation.[63] Using

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[62] Ibid.

[63] Tate, op. cit., p. 132.

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laudable discretion, he refused all invitations to social affairs, and seldom appeared in public. Blount patiently listened to all opinions and remained silent while taking testimony from both royalists and revolutionists. His disinclination to express opinions resulted in his being dubbed the "reticent minister." Writing in the Independent the Reverend Sereno E. Bishop of Honolulu, an annexationist enthusiast and a son of an American missionary, praised Blount for his accessibility to all men with different shades of opinion. Commenting further he added that "Mr. Blount has highly commended himself to us all by his wise and candid temper . . . and by his manifestly impartial search for the truth."[64] Yet, it is likely that Reverend Bishop's accolade was motivated by something other than his esteem for Blount. Bishop's article ended with the statement that "it is . . . now quite generally surmised that he favors annexation."[65]

Three days after Cleveland's inauguration Minister Stevens submitted his resignation to Secretary of State Gresham. Stevens said that he was aware of the Provisional Government's desire that he remain as Minister. Still, he believed, "it to be proper and just for the administration of President Cleveland to have the appointment of a United States Minister abroad who fully represents its views as

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[64]Quoted in Pratt, op. cit., p. 132.

[65]Ibid.

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to foreign policy."[66] On April 25, 1893, Gresham wired Stevens that "I am directed by the President to inform you that your resignation is accepted. . . ."[67] Stevens officially quit his post on May 18, 1893, after turning "over the archives and other property of the legation to Honorable James H. Blount. . . ."[68] With Stevens removed from the scene, the New York Tribune fervently hoped that the Provisional Government in Hawaii "could sustain itself in control of public affairs . . . until the treaty of annexation has been . . . properly disposed of."[69]

On July 17, 1893, Blount submitted his report to Gresham. The investigation had begun on April 1, 1893. Having declined for personal reasons proposals to remain on permanently as Minister to Hawaii, Blount departed from Honolulu on August 8, 1893. Blount's long report "indicated that on moral and legal grounds the treaty of annexation was unjustified."[70] It began with a narrative of some length on "the rise to power of the American group in the Hawaiian Islands. . . ."[71] He then set forth his answer to the two

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[66]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 413.

[67]Ibid., p. 420.

[68]Ibid., p. 421.

[69]Public Opinion, XV (June 10, 1893), 242.

[70]Tate, op. cit., p. 235.

[71]Pratt, op. cit., p. 133.

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questions for which he had been instructed to find answers: the role of Stevens and the troops from the U. S. S. Boston in the revolution, and the feeling of the natives toward annexation. Blount condemned Stevens' action both before and during the revolution. He concluded from voluminous testimony that Stevens had been in consultation with the revolutionists and that they had revealed their plans to him. "They feared arrest and punishment. He promised them protection. They needed the troops on shore to overawe the Queen's supporters. . . . This he agreed to and did furnish." Testimony also revealed that Stevens had promised to extend early recognition to a Provisional Government. His only stipulation was "that the proclamation dethroning the Queen and organizing a government should be read from the Government building. . . ." Blount also furnished evidence that Queen Liliuokalani surrendered to the Provisional Government believing that the "American minister and the American troops were promoters and supporters of the revolution, and that she could only appeal to the Government of the United States to render justice to her." Blount placed the blame for the revolution squarely upon Stevens. The report stated that "the leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens' promise to protect them against any danger from the (royal) government."[72]

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[72]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 594.

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Blount produced evidence that the preponderance of native opinion was adverse to annexation. He claimed that the will of the majority had been flouted. Blount believed that if the issue could be voted on by secret ballot, and if persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded from voting, the majority vote against annexation would be more than five to one.[73] Many natives who signed petitions for annexation, the report charged, did so, "through fear of losing their jobs as government employees or as workers on sugar plantations."[74] Blount concluded that "the undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the Provisional government, and against annexation."[75]

Blount departed from Honolulu without divulging the conclusions contained in his report. He later remarked that, "When I left those islands nobody had any idea . . . what my report was."[76] Cleveland had decided to keep the report secret until it could be thoroughly studied. Several weeks passed, and the government remained mute about releasing the report. Unfortunately, the administration's procrastination in releasing the report to the public

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[73] Ibid., pp. 846-847.

[74] Pratt, op. cit., p. 135.

[75] Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 598.

[76] Senate Reports, 53d Congress, 2d Session, No. 227, p. 406.

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added fuel to the partisan and personal bias being displayed over the issue.[77]

Since editors lacked official information on the content of the report, their editorials on the report were largely based on guesswork or rumor. The St. Paul Globe thought it very likely that the President would act favorably upon the recommendations of Commissioner Blount, "and that the deposed queen will be restored to her throne." Mr. Blount's recommendation to the President, "amounts to advising the restoration of the queen," claimed the Chicago Record. However, the New York Press thought that Blount had advised the President to submit the question of annexation to a popular vote in the Hawaiian Islands. Stressing that "multitudes of Hawaiians are notoriously venal, superstitious and ignorant," the New York Press warned that a plebiscite would be a farce and a tragedy.[78] A charge that the administration had secretly leaked the substance of Blount's report to a few friendly newspapers appeared in the Baltimore American. This Republican journal asserted that "such a deliberate assault on the American press . . . will surely meet with the popular condemnation which it deserves."[79]

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[77]Montgomery Schuyler, "Walter Q. Gresham," in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York, 1958), p. 245.

[78]Public Opinion, XVI (October 13, 1893), 46.

[79]Public Opinion, XVI (November 23, 1893), 190.

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The Cleveland administration did not officially reveal the content of Blount's report to the public until late in November, 1893.[80] During these months of silence from July to November the administration insisted that the military forces stationed in Hawaii remain impartial to both political parties in Hawaii. "The expression of political opinion or the wearing of badges was strictly forbidden."[81] Whether intentional or not the release of the report came "too late for the Congress to take action, as was generally expected during the extra session held from August 7 to November 3, 1893."[82]

In the meantime, Secretary of State Gresham had sent a candid letter to President Cleveland outlining his position on the Hawaiian affair. The letter, dated October 18, 1893, summarized Blount's findings and ended with Gresham's recommendation of an Hawaiian policy. Apparently Blount's report had confirmed Gresham's suspicions about Stevens' part in the revolution and the absence of native support. Gresham thought that if Cleveland considered the facts he would be convinced "that the treaty which was withdrawn from the Senate for further consideration should not be resubmitted. . . ." He then asked "should not the great wrong done to the feeble but independent State by an

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[80]Pratt, op. cit., p. 137.

[81]Tate, op. cit., p. 232.

[82]Ibid., p. 236.

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abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government?" Only such action, Gresham asserted, would "satisfy the demands of justice." Gresham ended the letter by saying that "our government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands, and it should be the last to acquire sovereignty over them by force or fraud."[83] Gresham "believed there was such a thing as public morality, that 'right and justice' should govern the conduct of nations the same as that of individuals. . . ."[84]

The administration released Gresham's letter on November 10, 1893, and the press published it the following day. The release of the letter, which contained the substance of Blount's report as well as Gresham's provocative suggestion to reinstate the Queen, brought forth a strong and varied reaction from the nation's press.

Two Republican journals expressed concern that vital American interests in Hawaii could be sacrificed on the altar of petty jealousy. The St. Paul Pioneer Press considered it a strong possibility "that our interests in Hawaii will be sacrificed to the eager desire of Secretary Gresham to score a point against his ancient and implacable rival, ex-President Harrison."[85] It is incredible, stated

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[83]Gresham, op. cit., p. 752.

[84]Ibid., p. 755.

[85]Public Opinion, XVI (November 23, 1893), 189.

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the Chicago Inter-Ocean, that any man occupying "so high a position as that of Secretary of State"[86] could let his personal animosity for former President Harrison lead him to pervert incontestable facts. In Gresham's defense, the Democratic New York Times maintained that nothing could place the administration higher in the esteem "of fair-minded and right-thinking men than the act of justice to Hawaii which is announced in the letter of Secretary Gresham."[87] The gravity of the Hawaiian affair, the Independent Indianapolis News contended, rendered it unlikely that a competent lawyer like Mr. Gresham, "whose whole life business it has been to weigh evidence, would speak lightly."[88]

Writing in the Kennebec Journal shortly after the release of Gresham's letter, former Minister Stevens maintained that the Provisional Government of Hawaii represented seventy years of Americanization. For ten months a "noble band of men and women" have stood faithfully in defense of American civilization. "I know not the influence which induced Secretary Gresham to become an active agent in attempting such a grave offense against American civilization, justice and law,"[89] he wrote. Stevens expressed the same sentiment

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[86] Public Opinion, XVI (November 16, 1893), 163.

[87] Ibid., p. 165.

[88] Public Opinion, XVI (November 23, 1893), 191.

[89] Public Opinion, XVI (November 16, 1893), 162.

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in an article in the North American Review. He asked if America would continue to follow its noble record of favoring republican government and "free Christian civilization," but he suspected that the nation was about to repudiate its past "by murdering its own offspring."[90]

The same issue of the North American Review carried an article by Democratic Congressman William M. Springer which disputed Stevens' appraisal of the Provisional Government. Springer contended that a majority of the Hawaiian people never were consulted on the subject of government. Consequently the present government neither emanated from the people nor received their sanction.[91] In a companion article, Eugene Tyler Chamberlain doubted that Stevens' intrigue in dethroning the Queen and establishing an oligarchy would be acceptable to the American people. Chamberlain considered it "repugnant to the traditions and temper of the American people since it clearly involves adherence to the theory of insular colonial expansion by conquest. . . ."[92]

Minister Stevens deceived both President Harrison and Secretary of State Foster, charged an editorial in

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[90]John L. Stevens, "A Plea for Annexation," North American Review (December, 1893), p. 736.

[91]William M. Springer, "Our Present Duty," North American Review (December, 1893), p. 748.

[92]Eugene Tyler Chamberlain, "The Invasion of Hawaii," North American Review (December, 1893), p. 732.

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The Nation. Proof of this charge, it explained, was Foster's statement accompanying the treaty of annexation that "a change of government was entirely unexpected, so far as this Government was concerned."[93]

The Independent Washington Post wanted to know by what ruse Mr. Blount obtained the second hand information he used in slandering Stevens and discrediting the Provisional Government. Moreover, it questioned the credibility of such information. "Mr. Stevens, who was on the spot and speaks from personal knowledge, flatly contradicts every statement of fact set forth by . . . Mr. Blount."[94] However, the Democratic journals Philadelphia Times and Baltimore Sun were joined by the Knights of Labor Journal in condemning Stevens' part in the revolution. The thought that annexation could propagate evil features which organized labor long had opposed may have swayed the labor journal's opinion. "If the United States should annex Hawaii, it would be annexing Hawaii's labor problems and its twin solutions--contract labor and oriental immigration."[95] A Baltimore Sun editorial expressed its general attitude. If the Queen's disposition resulted from wrongful interference by the American Minister, "the duty of undoing the

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[93]"Hawaiian Conspiracy," The Nation, LVII (November 16, 1893), 362.

[94]Public Opinion, XVI (November 16, 1893), 164.

[95]John C. Appel, "American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii," in The Shaping of American Diplomacy, ed. by William Appleman Williams (Chicago, 1956), p. 409.

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consequences of that wrongful act is plain."[96]

In a press interview former President Harrison reluctantly and tersely commented on Gresham's proposal to restore the Queen to her throne. He felt certain that the Queen could not regain her throne without a struggle and attending bloodshed. "It remains now to see whether the United States service will be used to establish her power again."[97] Lorrin Thurston, a former Commissioner of the Provisional Government and now its Minister to the United States, echoed Harrison's remarks in a separate press interview. He asserted that restoration could only be accomplished by force which made bloodshed inevitable.

To the Republican journals, Detroit Tribune, Portland Oregonian, and Pittsburg Dispatch, Gresham's proposal meant interfering with the sovereignty of the Provisional Government. The Pittsburg Dispatch cautioned the Government against rectifying one mistake by committing another.[98] Putting it more strongly, the Detroit Tribune declared that the Provisional Government "has as clean a title to its existence as any government on the face of the globe. To overturn it is to commit a glaring act of aggression that this country should never be guilty of in any part of

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[96] Public Opinion, XVI (November 16, 1893), 164.

[97] Ibid., p. 162.

[98] Ibid., p. 163.

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the world."[99]

"Justice is going to be done at last in Hawaii, and Queen Liliuokalani will have her throne restored to her," claimed the Democratic Minneapolis Times. Another Democratic journal, the New Orleans Picayune, said "it is difficult to see how the United States can refuse the order of things which existed in Hawaii prior to the revolution."[100]

Writing in The Nation, veteran anti-imperialist E. L. Godkin took issue with those who claimed restoring the monarchy would entail overthrowing a sovereign government, since "it was to last only until Hawaii was annexed by treaty to the United States. . . ." Hawaii had not been annexed by treaty thus "the present government continues to be provisional, or temporary."[101] Voicing an opposing opinion, Lyman Abbott's expansionist The Outlook considered the action Gresham proposed as an insult to the people of both countries. To The Outlook, civilization dictated that the superior dominate the inferior. Hence it was foolish to hold back progress by opposing annexation over some false scruples concerning an uncivilized Queen.[102] Abbott had once proclaimed that "barbarism has no rights which

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[99]Public Opinion, XVI (November 23, 1893), 191.

[100]Public Opinion, XVI (November 16, 1893), 164.

[101]E. L. Godkin, "Two Remaining Points," The Nation, LVII (November 23, 1893), 384-385.

[102]Public Opinion, XVI (November 23, 1893), 191.

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civilization is bound to respect."[103]

Secretary Gresham's proposal contains a nicer display of political justice toward the deposed Hawaiian monarchy than the American people are able to appreciate, boldly maintained the Milwaukee Catholic Citizen. Joining it in praising Gresham, the Pittsburg Catholic looked upon Gresham's proposal as "a simple act of justice. . . ."[104] A wave of anti-Catholicism, dormant since the Know-Nothing movement of the 1850's, accompanied the economic tempest of the early 1890's. The Protestant churches were among the agencies disseminating the story that as tools of Rome the Catholics had deliberately disrupted the economic system "to prepare the way for Rome's seizure of power."[105] Having felt the brunt of this anti-Catholic nativism, it is understandable why the Catholic journals could appreciate Gresham's apparent display of justice for another victim of xenophobia.

President Cleveland and most of his Cabinet apparently approved of Gresham's proposal that anything short of restoring the legitimate government would not "satisfy the demands of justice."[106] But Attorney General Richard Olney cautioned that serious obstacles stood in the way of

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[103]Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), p. 234.

[104]Public Opinion, XVI (November 23, 1893), 191.

[105]Higham, op. cit., p. 81.

[106]Pratt, op. cit., p. 138.

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implementing such a course. Irrespective of the views of the present administration, he warned, the previous administration had sanctioned the Provisional Government. With this in view, the government could not punish those who followed Stevens, thinking that his actions represented the policy of his government. To do so would "be grossly unjust and unfair, and would deservedly bring the Government of the United States into great discredit both at home and abroad."[107] A serious attempt to restore the Queen by diplomacy should be made, Olney contended. But if force in the nature of war did become necessary as a last resort, the action should be authorized by Congress. The government should require of the Queen the authority to accomplish the restoration of her government on terms reasonable to the United States. One such term would be a "full pardon and amnesty"[108] for all those serving the Provisional Government.

After considering the various alternatives, President Cleveland formed his Hawaiian policy along the lines proposed by Gresham and revised by Olney. Cleveland did not indicate that public opinion was a factor in his decision.

Secretary Gresham probably did not consider public sentiment or receive professional advice from trained foreign policy experts when formulating the proposal. A Secretary of State worked against almost insurperable odds in the late

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[107] James, op. cit., p. 85.

[108] Ibid., p. 86.

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nineteenth century. Most Americans had a parochial attitude toward what happened beyond the nation's boundaries, and Congress had an inordinate distaste for appropriating money to a department which had no constituency. The foreign service had few career personnel and, more often than not, the Secretary himself had little if any experience in foreign diplomacy. To make matters worse, he had "no experts close at hand to compensate for his ignorance."[109] Under such conditions, the initiative in American foreign policy came from beyond our borders in the form of actions by other countries or individuals. Consequently, American "foreign relations were composed of incidents, not policies. . . ."[110] The Hawaiian problem did not result from pursuing a particular foreign policy; it resulted from the absence of a long-range foreign policy.

In September, Albert S. Willis, a former Congressman from Kentucky, had been appointed Minister to Hawaii to succeed Blount. He received special instructions from Gresham dated October 18, 1898. These instructions brought Willis up to date on the administration's policy and outlined his duties upon arriving in Honolulu. The Secretary said that after a careful examination of Mr. Blount's report "the President is satisfied that the movement against the Queen . . . was encouraged and

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[109]Wiebe, op. cit., p. 227.

[110]Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 1190-1191.

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supported by the representatives of this government. . . ."[111] Hence the President had determined not to resubmit to the Senate the treaty of annexation "which he withdrew from that body for further consideration" on March 9. Upon his arrival in Honolulu, Willis was to inform the Queen of the President's "regret that the reprehensible conduct of the American minister . . . obliged her to surrender her sovereignty for the time being," but that she could "rely on the justice of this Government to undo the flagrant wrong." However, the President demanded that upon being reinstated, the Queen should "pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her . . ." and to assume "all obligations created by the Provisional Government." After the Queen had assented to "this wise and humane policy" Willis was to advise the executive and ministers of the Provisional Government "of the President's determination of the question which their action and that of the queen developed upon him, and that they are expected to promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority." The instructions concluded by directing Willis to report and wait further directions if either the Queen or the Provisional Government refused to accept the President's decision.[112]

The administration had naively anticipated that both

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[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

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parties would quickly assent to Cleveland's solution. But Willis' task proved far more difficult. Willis arrived in Honolulu on November 4, 1893. He presented his letters of credence to the Dole government "but gave it no indication of the policy he had been directed to follow."[113] He next arranged for a meeting on November 13 with the deposed Queen at the American legation. In their first meeting Willis informed Queen Liliuokalani of the President's decision. Responding to the President's request that upon being reinstated she should display forgiveness and magnanimity toward those who participated in the revolution, she expressed her belief that all of those persons "should be punished with capital punishment and their property confiscated." She maintained that her belief conformed "to the law under the constitution of 1887."[114]

After this first meeting with the Queen, Minister Willis communicated a brief message to Gresham on November 16 saying "views of first party so extreme as to require further instructions."[115] Gresham shot back the reply that "you will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations to the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration." In another communication to Willis on December 3, Gresham warned that if the Queen did not assent

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[113]James, op. cit., p. 91.

[114]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 1263.

[115]Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 643.

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to the President's conditions, that he "will cease interposition in her behalf."[116]

At their second meeting on December 16 the Queen modified her previous position by relenting on the mandatory death penalty. Instead, she insisted upon banishment from the islands for life for the revolutionists and their children. When asked by Willis if she would consent to honor the obligations assumed by the Provisional Government, she answered in the affirmative with the exception that she would insist that the military and police expenses incurred by it should be met through property confiscation. Before the meeting ended Willis queried the Queen again concerning amnesty for the revolutionists. Do I correctly understand "that you would not be willing to grant absolute amnesty both as to persons and property to those who have either supported or who have aided in setting up the Provisional Government?"[117] Expressing concern for the safety of her subjects, the Queen rejected absolute amnesty for the insurgents.

The state of affairs in Hawaii caused Cleveland much anxiety and by early December he had reached the end of his patience in waiting for the Queen to accept his conditions. "After receiving Willis' account of his first interview with Liliuokalani, Cleveland seems to have known that he

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[116]Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 1191.

[117]Ibid., p. 1264.

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had come to the end of his resources."[118] In a cabinet meeting on December 7, the President resolved to "lay the whole matter before Congress."[119] On December 18 President Cleveland sent a 6,000 word special message to Congress on the subject. For the first time, Cleveland officially and publicly announced his Hawaiian policy.

In the message, Cleveland reviewed the history of the Hawaiian revolution and restated the conclusions previously expressed by Blount and Gresham. "Believing . . . that the United States could not . . . annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods,"[120] Cleveland stated that he would not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate. Cleveland reported that he had hoped to restore the monarchy "upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned." But since those conditions proved unacceptable to the Queen, he was commending the "subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress." The message concluded with the President's assurance that he would gladly cooperate in any Congressional plan to solve "the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality."[121]

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[118] James, op. cit., p. 92.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Richardson, op. cit., p. 470.

[121] Ibid., p. 472.

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Cleveland's Hawaiian policy reflected his moralistic approach to international affairs. At a time when it was fashionable to trample on small nations, he insisted that American relations with Hawaii should meet the loftiest obligations of honesty and unselfishness.[122] Cleveland's policy could be classified as the Idealist approach to international affairs. Professor Robert E. Osgood describes the Idealist as having "an abiding faith in man's ability to direct his conscience and reason toward restraining . . . or overcoming the self-seeking and aggressive impulses that foul national sentiment and conduct."[123] Another way of understanding Cleveland's policy is in terms of what George F. Kennan calls the "American dream." Kennan claims that in the early nineteenth century American statesmen dealt forthrightly with power realities in foreign policy. But as the century progressed Americans acquired a strong sense of security resulting from the absence of a serious challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, and that this dulled their "consciousness of the power factor in the scheme of . . . foreign relations."[124] Hence, Americans in the Victorian age, Kennan contends, wanted their statesmanship, like their architecture, "impressive, unfunctional, with

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[122]Allan Nevins, Letters of Grover Cleveland 1850-1908 (Boston, 1933), p. 561.

[123]Osgood, op. cit., p. 9.

[124]George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1954), p. 14.

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emphasis on outward appearances rather than inner reality." America wanted "to appear as something--something lofty, something noble. . . ."[125] Cleveland's moralistic policy had a noble appearance, but it proved to be unfunctional when confronted with the realities of international politics.

On the same day that Cleveland sent his message to Congress, the Queen notified Willis that she unqualifiedly accepted the conditions required by President Cleveland. After being restored as the constitutional sovereign, she unreservedly consented "to grant amnesty and assume all obligations of the Provisional Government." Queen Liliuokalani's note revealed that she relented on her previous demands after "the most careful and conscientious thought as to my duty."[126] Unaware of the latest developments in Washington, Willis called upon the Provisional Government on December 20 and revealed his instructions. After informing the officials of the Queen's agreement, he stated that the President expected the Provisional Government to promptly accept his solution on the Hawaiian question: "Are you willing to abide by the decision of the President?"[127]

Three days later Minister Willis received the

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[125] Ibid., p. 15.

[126] Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 1269.

[127] Quoted in Pratt, op. cit., p. 144.

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Provisional Government's reply signed by its president, Sanford B. Dole. Dole reminded Willis that if American forces acted illegally during the revolution it was not the responsibility of the present Provisional Government. He considered their action as a private matter between the American Government and its own officers. Dole further pointed out that as a recognized sovereign power, the Provisional Government could not be destroyed by the United States "for the sake of discharging its obligations to the ex-queen."[128] In closing, Dole stated that the Provisional Government "declines to entertain the proposition of the President of the United States that it should surrender its authority to the ex-queen."[129]

Cleveland never entertained any thought of enforcing his solution to the Hawaiian question by using American bayonets to place the Queen back on her throne.[130] Gresham informed Willis that the President had not thought of himself as arbitrator, but that he felt ethically obligated to restore the lawful authority which had been subverted "by an abuse of the authority of the United States."[131] Professor Wiebe says that Grover Cleveland gave a "tidy

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[128]Quoted in Gresham, op. cit., p. 767.

[129]Quoted in Pratt, op. cit., p. 145.

[130]Nevins, op. cit., p. 557.

[131]Pratt, op. cit., p. 145.

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moral answer to each matter coming from abroad."[132] By not divulging his policy in a message to Congress or in a press interview before he handed the whole matter to Congress, Cleveland missed the opportunity to sound out public sentiment on the question. An expression of public sentiment could possibly have convinced him to alter his policy. Yet, Cleveland's apparent failure to seek opinion beyond his narrow circle of policy advisers, could indicate that public opinion was not an important factor influencing the formulation of foreign policy. In any case, Gresham reminded Willis that the whole affair was now out of the President's hands, and that future policy must await the pleasure of Congress. In the late nineteenth century, foreign relations were uniquely identified with the executive. And, although tradition and practice left the initiation of policy to the executive, "tradition and practice also told its officers to be extremely cautious. As a matter of course, the executive avoided foreign troubles."[133]

Cleveland's failure in solving the Hawaiian question lay in his attempt to impose a strictly moral solution to a rancorous political problem. During the ten months Cleveland wrestled with the Hawaiian problem, there is no record that he considered alternative solutions. Even if his policy

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[132] Wiebe, op. cit., p. 225.

[133] Ibid., p. 228.

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displayed a certain naivete in making foreign policy, it nevertheless reflected his firm conviction that it was the only solution worthy of the United States Government. Yet, its implications seemed to escape him. Apparently he never entertained the thought that one of the parties might reject his solution. And when it became evident that an impasse existed, Cleveland's policy, lacking both flexibility and imagination, floundered and then stalled on dead center. Having no alternative plan, and ruling out any form of coercion to enforce his policy, he rid himself of the frustrating situation by dumping it in the lap of Congress. One historian criticized "Cleveland and Gresham for 'Quixoticism' in foreign policy."[134] In laying the whole matter before Congress, Cleveland not only sacrificed his prerogative to formulate a successful Hawaiian policy, but also insured that the Hawaiian question would continue to be bogged down in partisan political strife.

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[134]Tate, op. cit., p. 250.

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CHAPTER III

FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF THE ANNEXATIONISTS

When Cleveland handed the matter of Hawaiian annexation to Congress on December 18, 1893, he temporarily ended the executive stage of finding a solution to the question. During the next fourteen months the Senate approved proposals sustaining the status quo in Hawaiian-American relations. However, a few die-hard expansionists kept the spirit of annexation alive. They staked the success of annexation on the outcome of the 1896 presidential election. They won the presidency. The newly elected President was favorably disposed toward Hawaiian annexation but another attempt to secure annexation by treaty failed. In the long run, however, the sweeping Republican success at the polls in 1896, and the Spanish-American War made possible the annexation of Hawaii.

Upon receiving President Cleveland's special message to Congress on December 18, 1893, Senator John T. Morgan, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, offered a resolution that his committee be empowered to investigate and report on Hawaiian-American diplomatic relations during "the recent political revolution in Hawaii."[1]

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[1] Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 2d Session, p. 404.

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The resolution received quick approval and the committee, headed by the Alabama Democrat, set forth on the laborious task.

Harrison's reluctance to force a test vote on the Hawaiian annexation treaty, and Cleveland's action withdrawing the treaty from the Senate, prevented the Senate from expressing its sentiment on annexation in the form of a vote in 1893. But as the new year opened a number of senators submitted resolutions seeking to define the attitude of the Senate on the Hawaiian question. Republican William Frye, of Maine, proposed on January 3, 1893, "that pending the investigation by the Committee on Foreign Relations, there should be no interference on the part of the government of the United States with affairs in Hawaii. . . ."[2] Five days later David Turpie, Democrat from Indiana, proposed a similar resolution but it added that "any foreign intervention in the political affairs of those islands will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the Government of the United States."[3]

Debate in the Senate on the Turpie resolution followed partisan lines. The opinions expressed by most senators appeared to be of a personal nature rather than having been influenced by any expression of sentiment coming from their constituents. Senator Frye, evading any

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[2] Ibid., p. 694.

[3] Ibid., p. 2121.

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mention of the similarity of his resolution to Turpie's stated that he objected to the resolution "because I am . . . a very earnest annexationist. . . ."[4] Orville Platt, Republican from Connecticut, regretted the absence of any allusion to annexation in the resolution. He wanted it understood that he would gladly "vote for a resolution . . . annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States."[5]

From the other side of the Senate Chamber, George Vest, of Missouri, objected to the resolution because it seemed suggestive of future annexation and he was opposed to annexation at any time. George Gray approved of the resolution as far as it went, but the Delaware Democrat had hoped it would contain a statement condemning the actions taken by Stevens against the royal government. The New York Sun classified Gray's speech in behalf of Liliuokalani as "the ablest . . . defense of the policy of infamy that has yet appeared."[6] The Democratic New York Sun consistently opposed the administration's Hawaiian policy. Its editor, Charles A. Dana, had taken a violent dislike to Cleveland when the latter was Governor of New York. Cleveland had refused to nominate a friend of Dana to his staff.[7]

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[4] Ibid., p. 1309.

[5] Ibid., p. 1313.

[6] Public Opinion, XVI (February 22, 1894), 499.

[7] Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York, 1933), p. 148.

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Press reaction to the resolution reflected a partisan bias. The Democratic Chattanooga Times agreed editorially with the New York Times that Hawaiians should settle their own domestic problems. However, both journals expressed regret over the failure to right the wrong committed by Stevens.[8] "If Mr. Cleveland had been wise he would have left the question where he found it, and thus have escaped all complications and the humiliating defeat that has befallen him," asserted the Republican Indianapolis Journal. An editorial in The Nation claimed the Hawaiian problem poignantly illustrated the need for a trained diplomatic service. "Had we had it, had Mr. Stevens . . . learned his trade under competent instructors, his meddling in the conspiracy of the 'missionary element' would have been impossible."[9]

When the Senate failed to act on the Turpie resolution, it was referred to committee. With the resolution temporarily disposed of, the debate switched to other issues surrounding the Hawaiian question. The debate shed little light on the issue of expansion, however, For the most part, it centered on defending or denouncing the persons involved in the affair, and the legality of Blount's appointment. Senator Turpie unleased invective against Stevens. "The military invasion . . . of the territory of

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[8] Public Opinion, XVI (January 25, 1894), 405.

[9] "What to do with Hawaii," The Nation (January 18, 1894), p. 42.

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Hawaii, the self-assumed protectorate, these insolent and lawless acts of violence, mark the man."[10] Mr. Stevens has a clear conscience and can ignore petty charges hurled at him, thundered Illinois Republican, Shelby Cullom.[11] Mr. Gray took the floor in defense of Cleveland's appointment of Blount. He claimed a study revealed that presidents have always had and used the power to appoint special emissaries.[12] Mississippi Democrat, James George, cited precedents "extending back to 1832, of Presidents appointing officers when Congress was in session, but without the advice and consent of the Senate."[13] Republican Senator H. M. Teller agreed that Cleveland probably had the right to appoint Blount. But the Colorado lawmaker declared that Cleveland over-stepped his authority by conferring upon Blount powers which superseded those of the regularly accredited agent of the American government.[14]

On February 26, 1894, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations submitted its report on the Hawaiian affair to the Senate. The Philadelphia Times stated that "the substance of Senator Morgan's report is that everybody did exactly

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[10] Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 707.

[11] Ibid., p. 1233.

[12] Ibid., p. 2126.

[13] Ibid., p. 3131.

[14] Ibid., p. 2126.

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what was right. . . ."[15] The only exception was that Morgan thought Cleveland had drawn the wrong conclusion from the evidence. Morgan alone accepted the report entirely. Republicans on the committee agreed with the essential findings and signed the majority report written by Morgan, but they also dissented from some of its conclusions, particularly on Morgan's approval of the actions taken by Cleveland and Blount.[16] The Democrats disagreed with Morgan's conclusion that the "only substantial irregularity in the conduct of Mr. Stevens . . . was his declaration of a protectorate. . . ."[17] The New York Times called the report, written by "that antiquated Southern Whig," a "rather picturesque bit of patchwork,"[18] but the Toledo Blade thought it more closely resembled a "crazy quilt."[19]

Meanwhile, the Hawaiian government displayed an interest in getting action on the Turpie resolution. Hawaii's new Minister to the United States, Francis M. Hatch, argued that so long as Congress abstained from making a definite commitment on Hawaiian-American relations, "native Hawaiians would be restive and the Provisional Government

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[15] Public Opinion, XVI (March 8, 1894), 545.

[16] Senate Reports, 53d Congress, 2d Session, II, No. 227, p. 33.

[17] Ibid., p. 35.

[18] Public Opinion, XVI (March 8, 1894), 546.

[19] Ibid.

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unable to solidify its position."[20]

The Hawaiian debate received new impetus on May 22, 1894, when Republican Senator James Kyle, of South Dakota, offered a substitute resolution for the Turpie resolution. Kyle claimed that the impression existed among both natives and royalists that the Senate would ultimately restore the Queen to the throne. This being the case, the absence of any expression of the Senate's sentiment on the question only increased the "bitter hostility between the factions on the islands."[21] Senator Frye also pressed for Senate action on the question. First disclaiming any belief in rumors, Frye then stated that the rumor persists "that since Congress had not acted, the moment it is adjourned the President would place the Queen once more on the throne."[22] After much political maneuvering, the division over the wording of the resolution remained insurmountable. Neither Turpie's original resolution nor Kyle's substitute proved acceptable.[23]

On May 31, 1894, Turpie brought forth a compromise resolution from the Committee on Foreign Relations that broke the impasse. The new resolution proposed that

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[20]Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom (New Haven, 1965), p. 256.

[21]Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 5194.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Tate, op. cit., p. 256.

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America should refrain from interfering in Hawaii's internal affairs, while providing the islands with an external protective shield against foreign aggression. The Senate adopted the resolution by a vote of fifty-five yeas and no nays, with thirty senators not voting. Being dissatisfied with the wording of the resolution, some of the leading partisans were among those abstaining. Twenty-eight Democrats and twenty-three Republicans voted yea, and twelve Democrats and fourteen Republicans did not vote. Passage of the resolution pleased many Democrats who considered it at least an oblique approbation of Cleveland's action. Moreover, it pleased most Republicans and the expansionists in Hawaii who were willing to accept the status quo until the political climate in Washington became more favorable to annexation. When evaluating the Turpie resolution one historian apparently had in mind Stevens' recommendation that the United States should pluck the ripe Hawaiian pear. "Thus the ripe fruit was to be left dangling, but the United States had posted trespass notices and presumably would patrol the orchard."[24]

Faced with the realization that their ambitious scheme for annexation had been temporarily thwarted, Hawaiian officials put into motion a plan for putting their government on a more permanent basis. The government called for a constitutional convention for the purpose of

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[24]Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1874-1893 (Honolulu, 1967), III, 650.

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establishing a republic. However, the rules governing the convention insured that the majority of delegates would represent the ruling oligarchy. The convention convened on May 30, 1894, and on July 4, 1894, President Dole proclaimed the new constitution. Loyalty oaths, literacy tests, and property and income qualifications severely restricted political participation in the Hawaiian Republic. In a letter to President Dole containing the salutation "Great and Good Friend," President Cleveland extended recognition to the Hawaiian Republic on August 8, 1894.[25]

In the wake of proclaiming the new constitution, a Hawaiian delegation representing Liliuokalani arrived in Washington. The delegates departed from Honolulu with instructions to get a definite answer from Cleveland to the question of whether he would do anything to restore the deposed Queen to her throne. In a note to the delegation on August 15, 1894, Cleveland called their attention to the Turpie Resolution. He thought this action made it clear that he would neither encourage nor aid any movement to restore the Queen to her throne.[26] On the other hand, neither would he intervene in a strictly internal matter, such as an uprising against the government.

Meanwhile, the U. S. S. Philadelphia sailed from Hawaii. Having been stationed at Honolulu for many months,

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[25]Nevins, Letters of Cleveland, p. 363.

[26]Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (New York, 1951), p. 152.

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the warship was recalled home without being replaced. For almost three months no American warship visited Hawaiian waters.[27] Since 1887 at least one American warship had been continuously stationed in Honolulu.[28]

To some Republican senators, the visit of Liliuokalani's representative in Washington, and the withdrawal of the warship from Honolulu, had all the earmarks of a conspiracy. Nelson Aldrich, from Rhode Island, insinuated that Cleveland had conspired with the Queen's agents to aid in her restoration by removing the warship from Honolulu.[29] Expansionist Henry Cabot Lodge warned of a possible uprising in the islands and urged that a warship be dispatched there immediately.[30] When Cleveland asked Congress to approve of the Hawaiian government's request to lease one of its uninhabited islands to Great Britain for a telegraph cable station, he added fuel to the conspiracy charge. A provision in the reciprocity treaty necessitated congressional consent to the lease. By straining their imaginations some senators contended that the cable proposal "was part of the same policy that had taken away our warships from the islands."[31] In a move to thwart this

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[27] Senate Reports, 55th Congress, 2d Session, II, 117.

[28] Tate, op. cit., p. 260.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 3d Session, p. 623.

[31] Tate, op. cit., p. 261.

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insidious conspiracy for a royalist uprising aided by the British, Senator Lodge submitted a resolution for laying an American cable to Hawaii.[32] Lodge could have found comfort in the Hawaiian Star's statement that "Hawaii had dreamed of a cable for years; nevertheless the Government should act circumspectly so as not to endanger annexation."[33] The Philadelphia Record noted that "President Cleveland had driven another Hawaiian arrow into the quivering sides of the Senatorial annexationists."[34] Apparently both Lodge and Cleveland suspected ulterior motives in each other's cable proposals. In a letter to Thomas F. Bayard, Cleveland wrote that "I do not believe we should in present circumstances boom the annexation craze by entering upon Government cable building."[35]

Meanwhile, word of an abortive royalist uprising reached Washington. News of the uprising intensified the attack upon the administration. Senator Frye offered a resolution which expressed the Senate's indignation over the uprising and extended "to the young Republic the warmest

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[32]John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge (New York, 1953), p. 152.

[33]William Adam Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian Republic, 1894-98 (Selingrove, 1961), pp. 253-254.

[34]Public Opinion, XVIII (January 17, 1895), 52.

[35]Nevins, Letters of Cleveland, p. 378.

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sympathy in her effort to suppress the rebellion."[36] Lodge introduced a resolution approving "the dispatch of a ship of war to the Sandwich Islands."[37] The Republicans received some unexpected support from Senator William Allen, a Nebraska Populist and previously an anti-expansionist. Allen offered a resolution that "steps should be taken by this government . . . to annex those islands to the United States."[38] However, George Vest offered a substitute for Allen's resolution. Vest's resolution merely reaffirmed the sentiment of non-interference which the Senate had expressed in the Turpie resolution. The resolution passed on January 26, 1895, by a vote of twenty-four to twenty-two with thirty-nine not voting. A breakdown of the vote reveals that twenty-three Democrats and one Republican cast yea votes while twenty-one Republicans and one Democrat voted nay. Nineteen Democrats and twenty Republicans did not vote.[39]

Both the Turpie and Vest resolutions expressed a similar formula for guiding Hawaiian-American relations. But an analysis of the votes on the two proposals indicates that many Republican senators had changed their minds about

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[36] Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 3d Session, p. 1183.

[37] Ibid., p. 1167.

[38] Ibid., p. 1277.

[39] Ibid., p. 628.

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accepting the status quo in Hawaii during the eight months separating the voting. In the 1894 congressional elections the Republicans gained control of both Houses. However, the vote on the Vest resolution came before the new Congress organized. Congressmen on speech-making tours in their districts during political campaigns can mold public sentiment on an issue.[40] But there is no evidence that the issue of Hawaiian annexation was the topic of any campaign speeches. Since the question of annexation was not an issue in the congressional elections, Republican success at the polls could not be attributed to increased expansionist sentiment and likewise neither could the Republican opposition to the Vest resolution. On the other hand, the expansionist enthusiasts were not completely unaware of the implications of this seemingly increased sentiment for annexation.

Cleveland's use of troops in the Pullman strike figured as a major issue in the 1894 congressional elections. Politically it completed an existing split in the Democratic party. Cleveland already had driven a wedge in the party by supporting the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and by prefering gold over silver coinage. "The internal weakness of the party, as much as any strong preference for the Republicans, explains the Democratic defeats in 1894."[41]

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[40]James N. Rosenau, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," in Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1965), p. 71.

[41]Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York, 1959), p. 20.

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The administration had antagonized many of its mugwump supporters when it failed to secure reductions in the tariff. When Cleveland enlarged the civil service and vetoed pension bills he displeased still other groups of voters. However, the most formidable obstacle standing in the way of Democratic success was the depression.[42]

Unwilling to let the Hawaiian debate die, Lodge led the expansionist orators in the Senate during February and March in their call for a policy designed to annex Hawaii. With indefatigable energy, Lodge expounded his thesis that only through acquiring strategically located colonies could a nation survive in the struggle among nations. Using a large map of the world which he had brought into the Senate chamber, Lodge showed how British bastions ringed America's Atlantic coast. "It would be madness to permit England to absorb Hawaii."[43] .Lodge's thesis came through clearly in a speech before the Senate on March 2, 1895. He maintained that the desirability of annexing the islands lay not in their salubrious climate and fertile soil, but in their strategic importance. "The main thing is that they lie there in the heart of the Pacific."[44]

Wishing to take his appeal for an expansionist policy to a larger audience than that reached by the Congressional

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[42] Ibid., p. 182.

[43] Quoted in Garraty, op. cit., p. 152.

[44] Ibid.

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Record, Lodge further attacked Cleveland in an article entitled "Our Blundering Foreign Policy" which appeared in The Forum. He belittled Cleveland's Hawaiian policy and called for the annexation of the islands. His grandiose policy also called for strengthening the navy, for getting control of Cuba, and for cutting a canal across the isthmus of Central America.[45] With the publication of this article, "Lodge became one of the leading publicists of imperialism."[46]

Lodge's call for a more assertive foreign policy expressed the views of resolute expansionists to whom a policy of non-interference in Hawaiian affairs was anathema. "Republican politicians and editors led the charge" against Cleveland's timid conduct of foreign policy. "They resented deeply the rebuke to them inherent in Cleveland's Hawaiian policy, they hated Gresham as a renegade Republican."[47] Believing the 1894 congressional elections presaged the outcome of the 1896 presidential election, these expansionist enthusiasts, who were influential men in out of government and generally members of the Republican party, set out to gain ascendency for their foreign policy views within the leadership of their party.

At the time Lodge led the campaign for a more

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[45]Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," The Forum, XIX (March, 1895), 8-17.

[46]Garraty, op. cit., p. 153.

[47]Nelson M. Blake, "Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy," The American Historical Review, XLVII (1942), 260.

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belligerent posture in foreign affairs, he also campaigned against the new immigrant on racial grounds. He justified American expansion largely by denouncing the English; he justified his opposition to the new immigrant on the ground of protecting the purity of the Anglo-Saxon American. "Lodge the jingo hated England as much as Lodge the Anglo-Saxon loved the English. . . ."[48]

Although the expansionists attacked Cleveland for a timid and obtuse foreign policy, Cleveland's seemingly bellicose Venezuelan policy in 1895 satisfied even the jingoes. Cleveland looked upon the British-Venezuelan boundary dispute as an overt attempt by the British to extend their possessions in that area of the continent by occupying the disputed territory. He considered this action by the British not only as inimical to American interests, but also as a flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine.[49] Even Lodge lauded Cleveland's strong stand against "European meddling" in the Americas. When writing his mother, Lodge noted "I am no longer lonely--Jingoes are plenty enough now."[50]

Cleveland's Venezuelan policy appeared inconsistent

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[48]John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Jersey, 1955), p. 96.

[49]James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1898), IX, 657.

[50]Quoted in Garraty, op. cit., p. 161.

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with his action in the Hawaiian affair. But when considered in the context of the 1890's it reveals a definite consistency in policy. At the time the Monroe Doctrine and "Neutrality" stood tall among the nation's sacred principles. These principles, like "Sound Money" or "Protection," acquired their superior importance not so much from their substance as from their emotional appeal. They remained sacred principles to the end of the century because the issues they sanctioned were of marginal rather than vital interest to the nation. They never had to withstand the rigorous challenge of being the subject of a protracted national debate. "Comfortable in their loose fit, they supplied a warming sense of righteousness to foreign affairs."[51] Upholding the Monroe Doctrine was consistent with Cleveland's moral approach to foreign affairs.

In 1895 the Cuban insurrection began, and American public sympathy soon expressed itself for the Cubans in their struggle against an autocratic "Old World" power. Exaggerated accounts of atrocities by the sensational press, and the threat of chaos to the $50 million American investments in Cuban sugar plantations, found expression in congressional action. Congress adopted a concurrent resolution in April, 1896, suggesting that the belligerency of the insurgents be recognized. However, Cleveland refused

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[51]Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), p. 227.

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to take this unneutral step, and resisted other pressures for intervention.[52] Cleveland revealed in a statement to the Associated Press that during the Cuban crisis he and his family were constantly threatened with "dire calamities" over his failure to intervene in the Cuban cause.[53]

Cleveland believed that if Spain would offer Cuba genuine home rule, which at the same time would preserve Spain's sovereignty over the island, a peaceful settlement would follow. To the suggestion that the United States should intervene in the Cuban crisis even at the risk of war, Cleveland maintained that the United States had "a character to maintain as a nation, which plainly dictates that right and not might should be the rule of its conduct."[54]

George W. Auxier contends that "in seeking to discredit Cleveland's policy of neutrality the Republicans introduced the Cuban issue into American politics." Editorial columns in newspapers in the Middle West "indicate that editorial attitude on the issue . . . was influenced to a large extent by political considerations." The partisanship elicited by these editorials, Auxier claims,

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[52]Pratt, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

[53]Nevins, Letters of Cleveland, p. 492.

[54]Quoted in William Appleman Williams, ed., The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents in American Foreign Relations 1750-1900 (Chicago, 1968), I, 415.

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reflected a clash "between the waning dogma of Democratic isolationism and the rapidly emerging doctrine of Republican imperialism. In this struggle the Cuban question became the issue which determined the trend of American foreign policy."[55]

In an article in The Forum, William Graham Sumner stated that expansionists justified their position with the fallacious argument that a "gain of territory is a gain of wealth and strength for the state."[56] Sumner argued that the expense and burden of jurisdiction usually out-weighed the advantages and wealth gained. He saw no reason to annex Hawaii when America had all the advantages of trade and investment it desired without assuming the burdens of jurisdiction. He did concede, however, that the situation in Cuba might dictate intervention "in order to police the territory, and establish the necessary guarantees of industry and commerce."[57]

A call for an expansionist foreign policy found its way into the Republican platform in 1896. It favored "Hawaiian annexation, purchase of the Danish West Indies, an isthmian canal, and strong sympathy toward Cuba."[58]

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[55]George W. Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI (1939-40), 528.

[56]William Graham Sumner, "The Fallacy of Territorial Expansion," The Forum (January, 1896), p. 415.

[57]Ibid., p. 417.

[58]H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and his America (Syracuse, 1963), p. 293.

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The Democratic platform said little on foreign policy except to renew its endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine, and extend sympathy to the oppressed Cubans.

During the 1896 Presidential campaign, domestic issues, particularly the free-silver and tariff issues, dominated the speeches of both the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, and the Republican candidate, William McKinley. Foreign policy was scarcely mentioned.[59] After his election, McKinley assured Carl Schurz that his administration would not tolerate any jingo nonsense.[60] McKinley's appointment of John Sherman as Secretary of State seemed to give some credence to his statement to Schurz. Writing in 1895, Sherman had cautioned Americans against burdening themselves with the knotty problems associated with colonization,[61] and declared he would do nothing toward extending the country's boundaries. Annexationists in Hawaii had wished for McKinley's election "because the Republican platform said that the United States must control Hawaii. . . ."[62] However, American politicians ignored the Hawaiian annexation issue during the 1896 Presidential campaign and stressed domestic issues in their

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[59]Stanley L. Jones, The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison, 1964), p. 335.

[60]Pratt, op. cit., p. 215.

[61]Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire (New York, 1968), p. 198.

[62]Russ, op. cit., p. 119.

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appeals to the American public for votes.[63] The Republicans captured the presidency and won big majorities in both Houses of Congress. "When a Republican President came into office in 1897, with a heavy majority in the Senate, the handful of enthusiasts could insist that the project (annexation) be revised."[64]

Soon after McKinley's election the expansionists concentrated their efforts on converting McKinley to favor the annexation of Hawaii. Diplomat and journalist, Whitelaw Reid, wrote the President-elect predicting that both Cuba and Hawaii would eventually come under American control. "To get both, in your administration, would put it beside Jefferson's in the popular mind and ahead of it in history."[65] Shortly after the election, Lodge traveled to Canton, Ohio for a short visit with Mr. McKinley. Lodge noted that "I first talked with him about Hawaii."[66] A few days after his inauguration, McKinley received Senator Frye and former Secretary of State, John W. Foster, in regards to an Hawaiian annexation treaty. Foreign affairs were intruding more frequently in the thoughts of President McKinley who

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[63]Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People (New York, 1964), p. 166.

[64]Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968), p. 180.

[65]Quoted in Tate, op. cit., p. 265.

[66]Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New York, 1925), I, 240.

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previously "had never manifested much interest in world affairs."[67] One of the first questions McKinley considers will be the annexation of Hawaii," wrote John R. Musick in The Arena. Musick said "the Republican platform . . . pointed in that direction, and those who claim to be near the president-elect say that he is favorable to the plan."[68] The Nation observed that one of the latest signs that plans are active for reviving the annexation scheme, "is the circulation of a pamphlet containing a lecture on the subject delivered by the Hon. John W. Foster. . . ."[69]

President McKinley suddenly became the guiding force behind annexation. During a Cabinet meeting in early June he decided a new treaty should be negotiated. Assistant Secretary of State William R. Day received the assignment to get a new treaty framed. At Day's request, John M. Foster prepared the draft of an annexation treaty.[70] In a slightly amended form, it was signed on June 15, 1897, by Secretary of State John Sherman and F. M. Hatch, Lorrin A. Thurston and William A. Kinney for the Hawaiian government. With the exception of provisions relating to compensation for the Queen and Princess, it embodied

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[67]Morgan, op. cit., p. 292.

[68]John R. Musick, "Should Hawaii be Annexed?" The Arena, XVII (February, 1897), 461.

[69]"Hawaiian Annexation," The Nation, LXIV (May 6, 1897), 332.

[70]Morgan, op. cit., p. 292.

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practically the same features as the 1893 treaty.[71] A report by Secretary Sherman and a special message from the President accompanied the treaty to the Senate. McKinley also confided to close associates that he "wished to gauge opinion while the treaty was debated."[72] The treaty emerged from the Committee on Foreign Relations on July 14, 1897, with a favorable recommendation, but due to the more pressing business of tariff revision it received no action before the adjournment of Congress.[73]

When McKinley transmitted the second treaty of annexation to the Senate, perfunctory opposition from some special interests did appear. American labor leaders remained indifferent to the annexation issue until late 1897. At the upper levels both the American Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor protested annexation. The Knights "decried it as a conspiracy of government and plutocracy."[74] It was another example of the capitalists enlisting the support of the government to enhance their own interests. On the local level the strongest opposition came from the West Coast unions. Economic interests and racial antagonisms

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[71] Senate Reports, 55th Congress, 2d Session, III, No. 681, pp. 96-97.

[72] Morgan, op. cit., p. 295.

[73] Tate, op. cit., p. 272.

[74] John C. Appel, "American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii," in The Shaping of American Diplomacy, ed. by William Appleman Williams (Chicago, 1956), p. 410.

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fed their opposition. They feared that if the Chinese contract laborers in Hawaii emigrated to the West Coast that it "would depress living standards and dilute the labor movement."[75] An article in The Literary Digest claimed that union leaders believed that coolie labor in Hawaii would reduce wages of American labor from 80 to 90 per cent.[76] "Pure and simple" unionism dictated that workers protect their jobs from both foreign and domestic threats.[77]

There was no opposition of any significance from American farmers. "The American Agriculturist, in its 1893 and 1897-98 issues, . . . carried no articles or letters of disapproval."[78] However, late in 1897 the Beet Growers Association of Nebraska came out against the treaty. Annexation, it claimed, would seriously jeopardize the American beet-sugar industry.

Fearing that its monopoly would be threatened by sugar being refined in Hawaii, the Western Sugar Refining Company of San Francisco strongly opposed the treaty. The company, owned by Claus Spreckles, monopolized the refined sugar market "in all the United States lying west of the

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[75] Ibid.

[76] "Labor Interests and Annexation," The Literary Digest, XVIII (October 29, 1898), 511.

[77] Appel in Williams, op. cit., p. 413.

[78] Tate, op. cit., p. 291.

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Missouri River."[79]

Foreign opposition to the annexation treaty came in the form of a protest from the Japanese government. Japanese-Hawaiian relations had been strained since Hawaiian authorities refused to admit 1,174 Japanese immigrants in March, 1897. Some Japanese officials charged that Hawaiian officials intentionally agitated trouble "for the purpose of facilitating annexation to the United States."[80] On the other hand, Professor Thomas A. Bailey thinks it likely that the Japanese protest against the treaty was largely a political maneuver for home consumption.[81] It appears that Japan's protest found its motivation in its concern for the rights of Japanese citizens. Having secured certain rights by treaty, Japanese subjects questioned if annexation would endanger these rights.[82] After being assured by the Department of State that the rights ensured by treaty would not be prejudiced by annexation, Japan did not press its objection. In the meantime, American naval forces were strengthened in the Pacific, in case the use of force proved necessary.[83]

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," Journal of Modern History, III (1931), 47.

[81] Ibid., p. 55.

[82] Morgan, op. cit., p. 363.

[83] Pratt, op. cit., p. 220.

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In a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, nationalist Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, declared that "the United States ought to decide whether or not it will annex Hawaii wholly without regard to the attitude of Japan or any other power."[84] In the opinion of the jingoes, declared a Harper's Weekly editorial, the advantages of annexation matter little. The islands should be taken to "show that we will not be bullied by any other power."[85] Many German-American journals, perhaps influenced by Germany's interest in that area of the Pacific, expressed the sentiment that Japan was well within its rights to protest any action harmful to its nationals. "Japan's protest contains nothing that could give offense to the United States," declared the St. Louis Anzeiger des Westerns. The New York Volks-Zeitung warned against the jingo attitude "that Japan is only a nice little breakfast for us."[86]

Since the treaty came out of committee too late for Senate action, the annexation debate found an outlet in the press for the remainder of 1897. Readers of The Forum were told that the nation's need for trade with the enormous markets of Eastern Asia dictated annexation of Hawaii. To reach those valuable markets over vast expanses of the

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[84]Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 268.

[85]Carl Schurz, "Hawaii, Japan, and the United States," Harper's Weekly, XLI (August 21, 1897), 823.

[86]"German-American Views of Hawaiian Problems," Literary Digest, XV (September 11, 1897), 578.

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Pacific necessitated a coaling and repair base strategically located in the middle of the Pacific.[87] Writing in the same periodical the noted British observer of American institutions, James Bryce, maintained that annexation of Hawaii would be inimical with the American tradition. "The Policy of . . . annexing territories beyond the sea would be . . . an un-American policy, . . . and a complete departure from the maxims of the illustrious founders of the Republic."[88]

At the beginning of 1898 the fate of the treaty still hung in balance. "While native Hawaiians remained antipathetic, the American public as a whole was apathetic to annexation."[89] Gabriel Almond claims that the characteristic response of Americans "to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference."[90] He sees this indifferent attitude as being particularly strong during the latter part of the nineteenth century. During this period a relatively stable world political situation existed, and most Americans were intensely involved with private interests.[91] Almond's

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[87]"Hawaii and the Changing Front of the World," The Forum, XXIV (September, 1897), 40-41.

[88]James Bryce, "The Policy of Annexation for Hawaii," The Forum, XXIV (December, 1897), 395.

[89]Tate, op. cit., p. 286.

[90]Gabriel A. Almond, "The American People and Foreign Policy," in Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1965), p. 84.

[91]Ibid., p. 55.

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view is supported by James N. Rosenau who stresses that the mood of the mass public toward foreign affairs is one of "indifference and passivity." Except during acute crises (and not always then) Rosenau claims, "the mass public is usually unmoved by the causes of world events. Few of its members are likely to have more than headline acquaintance with public discussions of foreign policy issues."[92] After five years of public discussion on the issue of Hawaiian annexation, at the beginning of 1898 the American mass public still displayed an indifferent attitude toward it. Mass sentiment for or against territorial expansion did not exist. If it had, politicians probably would have made it an issue in their campaigns for office. That foreign policy issues were ignored in the national elections between 1893 and 1898 indicates that the American mass public showed little interest in foreign policy.

Realizing that the American mind was not ready for expansion, some annexationists made a last desperate attempt to stimulate support for the treaty. Lorrin Thurston argued that annexation would not be a financial encumbrance for the United States. "Hawaii is a rich and fertile country, more than self-sustaining." Thurston further contended that the United States would soon have to assume the role and responsibilities of a world power and that the most appropriate

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[92]Rosenau, op. cit., p. 79.

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place for it to begin such a policy was in the Pacific.[93] When delivering a speech before the National Association of Manufacturers in New York, Senator Frye called his listeners' attention to some "cold facts" about Hawaii. He revealed that Americans owned $30 million of the $39 million in property on the islands, and that the United States enjoyed over 92 per cent of Hawaii's commerce. If you are looking for markets, why lose that one, Frye asked his audience. "Well, if the United States Senate does not give a two-third vote in favor of annexation, you have lost it."[94] In an article entitled "A Twentieth Century Outlook," Captain Alfred Mahan "referred to Hawaii as an outpost of an isthmian canal, as surely as Aden or Malta was of Suez."[95]

By the time the debate on Hawaii had resumed in late 1897, the annexation question had become a politically partisan question. "Since a Republican administration had negotiated the original annexation treaty and a Democratic administration had not only rejected the treaty but impugned the methods of the negotiators, Republicans had no choice but to defend the project. . . ."[96]

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[93]Lorrin Thurston, "President Dole and the Hawaiian Question," The Outlook, LVIII (February 5, 1898), 320.

[94]Carl Schurz, "Cold Facts and Hawaii," Harper's Weekly, XLII (February 12, 1898), 147.

[95]Tate, op. cit., p. 276.

[96]May, op. cit., p. 180.

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In a statement to the Associated Press on January 24, 1898, former President Cleveland revealed that from the time Hawaiian annexation became a question he had "been utterly and constantly opposed to it." He considered the proposed annexation as both contrary to our national policy and a perversion of our national mission. "The mission of our nation is to build up and make a better country out of what we have, instead of annexing islands."[97]

With the threat of war with Spain becoming more likely during February and March, especially since the De Lome incident and the sinking of the U. S. S. Maine, the annexation treaty received less attention. But in the long run, the expansionists expected developments in Cuba to have a favorable effect upon their efforts to annex Hawaii.

Although supporters of annexation did not relax their efforts to accomplish their objective, they had agreed not to submit the treaty to a test vote in the Senate. During February they were letting it be known that they supported dropping the treaty, and early in March McKinley consented to abandon it. If McKinley measured public sentiment while the treaty was being debated, he apparently received an unfavorable reading. On March 16, 1898, a Senate joint resolution for annexing Hawaii--which could be put through by a simple majority in each House of Congress--was introduced to replace the treaty. The joint resolution for

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[97]Nevins, Letters of Cleveland, p. 491.

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annexing Hawaii could be quickly approved in the event of war.

While Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt was making preparations for a possible war with Spain over the Cuban question, the Philippines caught his eye. On February 25, Roosevelt sent orders to Commodore George Dewey to move his Asiatic Squadron against the Spanish base at Manila if war came.[98] The expansionists were looking beyond the annexation of Hawaii.

Intervention in Cuba seemed avertable when at the last minute Spain yielded to practically all of America's demands. McKinley apparently believed this action by Spain was not enough and sent his war message to Congress. By a joint resolution on April 20, 1898, Congress recognized the independence of Cuba and authorized the use of armed forces to drive out the Spanish. In an amendment proposed by Senator Henry M. Teller, the United States disclaimed any intention of acquiring Cuban territory. The war resolution suggests that the politicians believed Americans would go to war to free the Cubans but not for the purpose of acquiring territory.

Public response to the declaration of war appeared to be highly favorable. The reaction of the public in this case, as contrasted to the Hawaiian issue, appears to support Rosenau's contention that citizens in the mass lack

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[98]Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Cambridge, 1931), p. 112.

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structured opinions. "Thus their response to foreign-policy matters is less one of intellect and more one of emotion; less one of opinion and more one of mood, of . . . undisciplined feelings which easily fluctuate from one extreme to another--from . . . withdrawal to intervention."[99]

Four specialized studies of public opinion in 1898, published before 1940, contribute little to an understanding of popular expansionist sentiment in 1898. In his studies, "The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898,"[100] and "Middle Western Newspapers and the Spanish-American War,"[101] George W. Auxier fails to come to grips directly with either the relationship between public opinion and imperialism in 1898, or with the extent to which public opinion influenced McKinley's decision for war. However, Auxier does conclude in his study of middle western newspapers that the propaganda activities of the Cuban Junta, together with Spanish violation of American interests in the Caribbean and the implications of the Cuban question in American politics, led to American intervention in the Cuban crisis. Auxier argues that "the political implications of the Cuban

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[99]Rosenau, op. cit., p. 79.

[100]George W. Auxier, "The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Hispanic American Historical Review, XIX (1939), 286-305.

[101]Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers," pp. 523-534.

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question in . . . domestic politics" received much journalistic comment directly before the declaration of war. "The political factor involved was especially reflected during this period; apparently, it was the force that determined McKinley's action."[102]

Marcus Wilkerson's, Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War is a study dealing with the role of the sensational press in creating a favorable public sentiment for war with Spain in 1898. Wilkerson believes the American press played a large part in leading the United States into war with Spain. "Sensing the public tide, a hesitant administration, egged on by a 'jingo' congress, proposed war with . . . (Spain)."[103] Since the work ends with the outbreak of war, Wilkerson does not comment on the attitude of public opinion toward overseas expansion.

Joseph E. Wisan's, "The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press," contributes little to an understanding of popular expansionist sentiment in the 1890's. From his analysis of newspaper opinion in the New York Press from 1895 to 1898, Wisan concludes that the public, aroused by the sensational press, demanded war with Spain.[104]

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[102] Ibid., p. 531.

[103] Marcus M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War (New York, 1932), p. 132.

[104] Joseph E. Wisan, "The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press," in Problems in American Civilization, ed. by Theodore P. Greene (Boston, 1955), pp. 43-54.

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When Commodore Dewey received word of the declaration of war, he steamed from Hong Kong. On May 1, 1898, Dewey engaged and practically destroyed a Spanish fleet anchored in Manila Bay. The victory, which gave the United States an unexpected foothold in the Philippines, also brought a significant change in the efforts to annex Hawaii.

On May 4, 1898, a joint resolution for annexing Hawaii was introduced in the House by Francis G. Newlands. The Newlands resolution was reported favorably from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 12. Eight Republicans and one Democrat approved the resolution; of those opposing all were Democrats. It was expected to receive quick approval in the heavily Republican House, but Speaker Thomas B. Reed, a Republican and ardent anti-annexationist, prevented it from coming to the floor for a vote. For three weeks Reed would not relent on his position. Writing to Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge stated that "the opposition now comes exclusively from Reed. . . ."[105] The Republican Indianapolis Journal denounced Reed for using his influence as Speaker to impose his will on the House. But the Democratic Boston Herald hoped Reed would persist in his antagonism to a scheme which has been conceived in fraud. . . ."[106] However, after it "became clear that a majority of the House favored action on the resolution,

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[105]Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 302.

[106]Public Opinion, XXIV (June 9, 1898), 708.

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Reed yielded."[107] Reed's biographer quotes The Nation as saying that the contest between Reed and the annexationists had ended with the former "standing almost absolutely alone, so far as party friends are concerned, and as one of a feeble minority, nearly all Democrats."[108] The Newlands resolution passed in the House on June 15, 1898, by a vote of 209 to 61 with only three Republican votes recorded against it.[109] Expansionist Albert Shaw's Review of Reviews criticized the leadership of the Democrats in the House for holding a party caucus to whip their members into line to oppose the resolution. "The practical unanimity of the Republicans in the House was not due to party pressure," the editorial claimed, "but to the desire to support President McKinley in a policy which he considered necessary for the welfare of the country in this period of war."[110] Without being amended the resolution was reported favorably to the Senate on June 17. The Senate joint resolution which had languished in the Senate was abandoned in favor of the Newlands resolution.

Meanwhile, Roosevelt urged Lodge to "prevent any

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[107]Beisner, op. cit., p. 207.

[108]Quoted in William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian (New York, 1930), p. 367.

[109]"Another Step Toward Hawaiian Annexation," Literary Digest, XVI (June 25, 1898), 751.

[110]"Passage of the Newlands Resolution," Review of Reviews, XVIII (July-December, 1898), 20.

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talk of peace until we get Porto Rico and the Philippines. You must get Manila and Hawaii. . . ."[111] In a letter to Roosevelt a few days later, Lodge reported that he thought Hawaiian annexation would come at any time. "The whole policy of annexation is growing rapidly under the irresistible pressure of events."[112]

Many royalists and foreign property owners in Hawaii, fearing property loss resulting from Spanish raids or post-war claims if Spain won the war, insisted that the government proclaim its neutrality. But from the outbreak of hostilities the government of Hawaii never seriously entertained any thought of remaining neutral. The course of action "adopted by the Hawaiian government, was the rendering of active assistance to the United States prior to and without any definite assurance of annexation."[113] In and out of Congress the American annexationists insisted that the acquisition of strategically located Hawaii was imperative to prosecuting a successful war in the Philippines. Without the use of the harbor facilities at Honolulu, the St. Paul Pioneer Press maintained, "we should now be in the greatest straits in the matter of sending naval and military support to Admiral Dewey."[114] President McKinley remarked,

[111] Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 309.

[112] Ibid., p. 311.

[113] Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii During the Spanish-American War," American Historical Review, XXXVI (1931), 554.

[114] Public Opinion, XXIV (June 9, 1898), 707.

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"We need Hawaii just as much and a great deal more than we did California. . . ."[115] Lodge confided to Roosevelt that he did not think the Senate could oppose the joint resolution for long because "the President has been very firm about it and means to annex the islands anyway."[116]

A survey of newspaper opinion during the months immediately preceeding annexation does not reveal any appreciable change in pro-annexationist sentiment among American newspapers. A number of newspapers had modified or shifted their position on the annexation issue during the years it had been debated. Still, there is no indication that this practice had measurably accelerated during the early months of 1898. In July, 1898, The Literary Digest summed up the general positions that the nation's newspapers had taken on the issue of expansion. "The leading Republican Party papers of the cities, with few exceptions, advocate a policy of expansion and territorial acquisition. . . . Independent Republican papers oppose a colonial party." According to The Digest, the Silver Republican papers took a similar position on the issue. "Among regular Democratic papers which commit themselves there seems to be general opposition to expansion." The Independent Democratic press "strenuously opposes every step in expansion, beginning with the annex-

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[115]Quoted in Albert Weinberg, Manifest Destiny (Gloucester, 1958), p. 263.

[116]Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 311.

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ation of Hawaii." Sometimes the Gold Democratic press opposed expansion, "but it is not solidly against it."[117]

The joint resolution introduced in the Senate on June 17, met with more opposition than it had encountered in the House. Debate on the joint resolution began on June 21, and the Senate was in continuous session until July 6 when the resolution passed. Senator Justin B. Morrill, a Republican from Maine, joined the opposition by attacking the argument that the need for a coaling station in the Pacific dictated annexation. Morrill considered this a weak pretense for annexation since we already had the use of the harbor at Honolulu for such purposes under an irrevocable grant.[118] Wisconsin Senator John Mitchell questioned the strategic significance of the islands. To defend them successfully, Mitchell argued, would require building heavy fortifications and stationing a fleet around them.[119] Since no demand for annexation had ever come from the people of Hawaii, it would be larcenous for the American government to take the islands, claimed Samuel McEnery.[120] The Louisiana Democrat was also disturbed over the thought that annexation would mean the removal of sugar duties.

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[117]"The Newspapers and the Issue of Imperialism," Literary Digest, XVII (July 9, 1898), 32-33.

[118]Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, p. 6141.

[119]Ibid., p. 6145.

[120]Ibid., p. 6306.

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Free sugar, he claimed, would "destroy a promising industry in over twenty States of this Union."[121] Those who use manifest destiny to justify annexation, argued Richard Pettigrew of South Dakota, advocate the plunder of the weak by the strong.[122] Seeking further assurance that the contract labor system would cease with annexation, Pettigrew submitted an amendment to the joint resolution to that effect.[123]

The senior Senator from Massachusetts, Republican George F. Hoar, took a shaky position on annexation. In a speech coming at the end of the Hawaiian debate, he strongly contended that he was unalterably opposed to the annexation of Cuba or the Philippines. However, he considered the case of the Hawaiian Islands as being unique, and favored annexation "as an isolated measure carried out solely to protect the islands from Japanese aggression and strengthen America's military position in the Pacific Ocean."[124]

Lodge could write to Roosevelt in Cuba in late June that "the filibuster on Hawaii is about broken down. Everything is looking promising. . . ."[125]

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[121] Ibid., p. 6303.

[122] Ibid., p. 6191.

[123] Ibid., p. 6341.

[124] Beisner, op. cit., p. 149.

[125] Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 317.

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For the most part, the annexationists refrained from the debate. They had exhausted their supply of arguments. Some administration spokesmen, however, emphasized the relatively new theme that "we must have Hawaii to help us get our share of China."[126] They presented the argument that the United States "needed Hawaii not only for its own economic or cultural worth, but also for its commercial and military value as a stepping-stone to the China market."[127] Previously McKinley had assured Hoar that those who justified annexation on the grounds that it would "help us get our share of China" did not express the administration's position.[128]

The repetitious arguments, which were becoming boringly redundant, were "interrupted almost daily with roll calls to adjourn or to determine a quorum. . . ."[129] In spite of the enervating heat, the debate continued through July 4. The Republicans were determined to get a vote on the resolution before adjournment of the session, and the Democrats carried on a filibuster to prevent it. "We are still fighting," Lodge wrote Roosevelt on July 4, but "we are

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[126]Thomas McCormick, "Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the Spanish-American War," Pacific Historical Review, XXXII (1963), 161.

[127]Ibid.

[128]George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York, 1903), p. 308.

[129]Tate, op. cit., p. 302.

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determined and are going to put it through."[130] Lodge would not have long to wait before his prediction came true. After successfully fending off a last minute surge of amendments, the joint resolution passed in the Senate on July 6, 1898, with a vote of forty-two yeas, twenty-one nays, and twenty-six paired and not voting. The enervating summer weather in Washington, plus the likelihood that some senators would have been mending political fences by speaking at Fourth of July festivities in their constituencies, possibly could account for so many senators being absent and not voting on the joint resolution. At the same time, pairing enabled them to put their position on annexation on record. Only one Republican, Justin Morrill, joined the Democrats to vote nay. Four Democrats (A. Gorman of Maryland, J. Morgan and F. Pettus of Alabama, and W. Sullivan of Mississippi) voted yea. Democratic Senators Morgan and Gorman had favored an annexation treaty as early as 1893. Lodge thought the annexation resolution passed "very handsomely."[131] The affirmative vote was still far short of the sixty votes needed to ratify the treaty. So turning to a joint resolution for annexation proved to be good political strategy.

Some of the politicians serving in Congress in 1898 were important enough to have their biographies, auto-

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[130] Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 318.

[131] Ibid., p. 323.

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biographies, or papers published. An examination of this literature suggests that if a favorable popular opinion for annexation did exist in 1898, either it was not conveyed to the politicians and they were unaware of its existence or the politicians received little opinion on the issue and thus it did not significantly influence their position on annexation. In the biographies of Senator Arthur Pue Gorman[132] and Congressman Joseph G. "Uncle Joe" Cannon[133] and the autobiography of Senator Thomas Collier Platt[134] the issue of Hawaiian annexation is not mentioned. Gorman was one of the four Democratic senators who voted for the joint resolution annexing Hawaii. Gorman later opposed annexing the Philippines because it would undermine the Democratic party's "campaign against imperialism."[135] Remarking about the same Philippine question, Senator Platt stated that "I joined with President McKinley and the Republicans in insisting that American sovereignty be maintained over the Philippines until the 'little brown men' had shown a capacity for self-government."[136]

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[132]John R. Lambert, Arthur Pue Gorman (Baton Rouge, 1953).

[133]L. White Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon: The Story of a Pioneer American (New York, 1927).

[134]Louis J. Lang, ed., The Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt (New York, 1919).

[135]Lambert, op. cit., p. 271.

[136]Lang, op. cit., p. 376.

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There is no evidence in Senator Shelby M. Cullom's autobiography that he ever considered public opinion when making up his mind about the Hawaiian annexation question.[137] The same conclusion must be drawn after examining a biography of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and the published correspondence between Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt.[138] Primarily for strategic reasons both Cullom and Lodge were determined that the islands should not come under the domination of any power other than the United States.[139] "For Lodge, the importance of the islands to America out-weighed all other considerations."[140]

Apparently the strategic importance of the islands also influenced Senator Joseph Benson Foraker's position on annexation. Foraker recalled that he eagerly supported annexation of the Hawaiian Islands because they "belonged within our sphere of influence and . . . should not be allowed to fall into the hands of any other great power."[141] Foraker does not say whether expansionist opinion in Ohio helped him arrive at this conclusion.

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[137] Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service (Chicago, 1911).

[138] Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit.

[139] Cullom, op. cit., p. 286.

[140] Garraty, op. cit., p. 151.

[141] Joseph Benson Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life (Cincinnati, 1917), II, 422.

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Senator Orville Platt believed that by late 1894 "the Hawaiian question had developed into one of party policy." But, he declared in a Senate speech, "I do not believe that the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States would violate either the proclaimed or the traditional policy of the United States."[142]

Senator Mark Hanna's biographer gives no indication that public opinion was a factor influencing Hanna's position on annexation. Hanna had become a convinced imperialist. Possibly Hanna's imperialistic outlook reflected his loyalty to the Republican party's traditional position toward national expansion.[143]

Senator R. F. Pettigrew claims in his autobiography that Hawaiian annexation resulted from the patriotic frenzy accompanying the Spanish-American War.[144] Congressman Champ Clark expresses a similar attitude in his autobiography. The joint resolution "would not have passed but for the fact that the claim was set up that it was a 'war measure' and that Hawaii was the 'key to the Pacific.'"[145]

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[142]Louis A. Coolidge, Orville H. Platt: An Old Fashioned Senator (New York, 1910), p. 285.

[143]Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna (New York, 1912), p. 279.

[144]R. F. Pettigrew, Imperial Washington: The Story of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920 (Chicago, 1922), p. 320.

[145]Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics (New York, 1920), I, 403.

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Republican Speaker of the House, Thomas B. Reed, was one of the few Republican Congressmen who opposed the annexation of Hawaii. Reed's biographer claims that Reed "made no attempt to conceal his views in the interests of party harmony." He stated them frequently "declaring that the addition of such territory would be a source of weakness rather than strength."[146]

Senator Benjamin R. Tillman stated "that he would vote for annexation of Hawaii if only persons of white blood should participate in the government."[147] Most likely the South Carolina Democrat arrived at this conclusion without consulting public opinion, but it probably represented South Carolina opinion. However, Tillman did not vote on the joint resolution. He paired with Republican Senator William E. Mason, of Illinois.

Texas Congressman, Joseph Bailey, was an opponent of annexation. Bailey's biographer, Sam H. Acheson, feels that Bailey's position on annexation was out of step with public opinion on the issue. Acheson claims that there was little public clamor for the anti-imperialist suggestion that we renounce our claim to empire. "As for the great body of Texans, the suggestion was positively absured."[148]

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[146]William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian (New York, 1930), pp. 363-364.

[147]Francis Butler Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman: South Carolinian (Gloucester, 1964), p. 355.

[148]Sam Hanna Acheson, Joe Bailey, The Last Democrat (New York, 1932), p. 115.

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If such a favorable expansionist sentiment existed, apparently Bailey and the two Senators from Texas were either unaware that it existed or ignored it. Bailey voted against the joint resolution for annexing Hawaii when it came to a vote in the House. A look at the results of the vote on the resolution in the Senate reveals that Senator Horace Chilton voted against it, and that Senator Roger Q. Mills, an avowed opponent of annexation, was paired and did not vote.[149]

The biographer of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich claims that the "Four" (Republican Senators Aldrich, W. B. Allison, J. C. Spooner, and O. H. Platt) played no little role in achieving the favorable vote in the Senate for annexing Hawaii. "Hawaii was taken over as a territory of the United States, the 'Four' leading the Senate into this result."[150]

Senator William E. Chandler's biographer makes a similar claim about Chandler and some of his Republican colleagues. To make his point, he quotes a comment made to Chandler by a friendly newspaper correspondent: "I seriously think that you and Lodge, with three coadjutors, had as much to do with fixing the Cubans, the Hawaiians, and now the Philippines as anybody."[151]

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[149] Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, p. 6712.

[150] Nathaniel W. Stephenson, Nelson W. Aldrich: A Leader in American Politics (New York, 1930), p. 161.

[151] Leon Burr Richardson, William E. Chandler: Republican (New York, 1940), p. 584.

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Senator John T. Morgan claimed that the few letters he received concerning foreign policy were from citizens of other states rather than from his own constituents.[152] The senior Senator from Massachusetts, George F. Hoar, apparently had a similar experience with his constituents when it came to foreign policy issues. Senator Hoar voted for the joint resolution to annex Hawaii. Earlier when talking about the treaty for annexing Hawaii, Hoar stated that "My approval of it was then, I suppose, well known. Certainly no friend of mine, and nobody in Massachusetts, so far as I know, in the least objected or remonstrated against it."[153]

There remains one more way of trying to assess the significance of public opinion on the annexation issue. It was still customary in the 1890's for the state legislatures to pass resolutions directing their Congressional delegations to support particular positions on issues of major concern. The presence or absence of such resolutions on annexation, therefore, should provide evidence to weaken or support the thesis of this study.[154]

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[152]May, op. cit., p. 25.

[153]Hoar, op. cit., p. 306.

[154]"Annual sessions of (state) legislatures were common until the late nineteenth century, when distrust of legislatures resulted in increasing restrictions on their sessions." (Wilder Crane, Jr., and Meredith W. Watts, Jr., State Legislative Systems (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), p. 77.) In the move to biennial sessions many states elected to hold their legislative session in odd numbered years. An examination of House and Senate journals of fifteen states

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An examination of the House and Senate journals of those states that held legislative sessions in 1897 or 1898 shows that one of the legislatures supported the annexation of the Philippines, and that two legislatures passed resolutions pertaining to Hawaiian annexation, one rejecting and one supporting annexation. Six of the legislatures, three in 1897 and three in 1898, passed resolutions supporting the independence of Cuba. During this time most of the legislatures passed resolutions urging their congressional delegations to take a certain stand on such national issues as tariff legislation and direct election of senators. The state legislatures showed more concern with national issues of a domestic nature than with those dealing with foreign affairs. Of the foreign issues that did attract their attention, Cuban independence was more important to the legislators than the question of annexing Hawaii.[155]

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holding legislative sessions in 1897 or 1898 gives an indication of the number of state legislatures that were taking positions on the issue of annexing Hawaii.

[155]In 1897 the Nebraska, Kansas, and Colorado legislatures sent resolutions to Washington directing their Congressional delegations to support legislation that would bring about the independence of Cuba. The Florida legislature took similar action for a Nicaraguan canal, but the Indiana, Washington, and Wyoming legislatures failed to pass any resolutions on foreign policy issues.

The 1898 legislative sessions in Louisiana and Tennessee passed no resolutions on foreign policy issues. But in the same year the legislatures of Mississippi, Vermont, and Michigan passed resolutions supporting congressional action to secure Cuban independence. A resolution passed in the Kentucky House in January, 1898, urged

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The nation's press in 1898 also reflected this attitude. The Cuban affair and the war with Spain had practically pushed the Hawaiian annexation issue off the editorial page. Public Opinion did not carry any editorials on annexation in 1898 until June 9 and then they came under the caption "Hawaiian Annexation as a War Measure."[156]

During the summer of 1898 the Republican and Democratic parties held their state conventions. The Literary Digest compiled the positions taken by some of these political gatherings concerning American policy toward the Philippines. After Commodore Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor on May 4, 1898, the future political status of the Philippines had to be decided. An analysis of the utterances or lack of utterances in the party platform toward this Philippine question could possibly provide some evidence that would shed light on American expansionist sentiment in 1898. If there was a groundswell of expansionist sentiment in 1898 most likely the platform committee of the conventions would have recognized it and they would have included expressions on expansion in the party platforms. Since these conventions were held throughout the summer, their expressions or lack

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Kentucky's senators and representatives in Congress to reject the Hawaiian annexation treaty on the ground that it would enslave labor. The following month the Illinois legislature passed a joint resolution supporting the annexation of Hawaii for economic and strategic reasons and sent copies of it to the state's delegation in Congress.

[156]Public Opinion, XXIV (June 9, 1898), 707-708.

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of expressions on expansion could be fairly representative of expansionist opinion at the time of the vote on annexing Hawaii in July, 1898.

In 1898 there were forty-five states. The Literary Digest compiled data on the party platforms for twenty-seven Republican and twenty-four Democratic conventions, or from approximately 57 per cent of all the state conventions held. Of the twenty-four Democratic party platforms, twelve contained no expressions on the Philippine issue, seven were positively opposed to extending American sovereignty to the Philippines, two indicated that they favored retaining a portion of the islands, and three took indefinite positions on the issue.

There were no utterances on the Philippine question in eight of the twenty-seven state Republican party platforms. Thirteen platforms contained planks that indicated they favored keeping part of the islands. Utterances in six platforms indicated a willingness to leave the issue in the hands of the administration. The Ohio (President McKinley's home state) platform best expressed the latter position: "The people can safely leave the wise and patriotic solution of these great questions to a Republican President and a Republican Congress."[157] None of the state platforms of either party supported extending American sovereignty to the entire group of the Philippine

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[157]"Party Platform and the Philippines," The Literary Digest, XVII (October 22, 1898), 481-482.

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Islands. In only two states (California and Nevada) did the platforms of both the Democratic and Republican parties indicate that they favored keeping part of the Philippines. The Nevada and New Jersey Republican platforms were the only two that mentioned the annexation of Hawaii; both favored this action.[158]

It is risky to draw generalizations from partial data. Yet it seems that the expressions on annexation contained in these state party platforms could provide a reasonably reliable reflection of American expansionist opinion in the summer of 1898.

The evidence reveals that half of the Democratic conventions apparently did not think the Philippine question important enough to warrant a plank in their platforms. The thought of extending American sovereignty over part of the Philippines and Hawaii was more popular with the Republicans than with the Democrats.

If those politicians responsible for including limited expansionist planks in state party platforms did so because they discerned mass expansionist sentiment within their states, it could be assumed that they previously had conveyed this information to the politicians in Washington and that it influenced their position on annexation. A look at the voting on the joint resolution seems to verify this assumption.

All except two of the thirteen states whose Republican

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[158] *Ibid.*

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conventions had included limited expansionist planks in their party platforms had one or two Republican senators. In all, these eleven states had fifteen Republican senators. Of these fifteen senators, nine voted for the joint resolution to annex Hawaii, five were paired on the vote, but when their names were called it was announced that they would have voted for the resolution had they been voting. One Senator, Morrill of Vermont, voted against the resolution.

It seems likely that in the 1890's the leading party politicians in a senator's home state were a main source of public opinion on national issues that would have been frequently tapped by a senator. It is also probable that these politicians would have received much of their information on expansionist opinion from that segment of the foreign policy public whose party affiliation was the same as their own. If it can be assumed that the members of the foreign policy public in the 1890's generally adopted their party's position on a foreign policy issue, and that they served as an important source of opinion for those politicians to whom senators would have turned for information or opinion, then it could be assumed Democratic and Republican senators had been getting an expansionist opinion that would have encouraged a partisan position on annexation. This could explain why the voting on annexation generally followed party alignment.

By 1898 the McKinley administration had accepted the

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views of the expansionists who supported annexation. Some Republicans who previously abstained from backing annexation were apparently won over by a combination of party loyalty and the patriotic fervor that flowed in the wake of Dewey's victory. Advocates of annexation claimed that the resolution constituted an administration measure, "and that the Senate may choose between annexation by resolution, an extra session called for the express purpose of securing annexation, or seizure of the islands by the President as a war measure."[159] In a study of Hawaiian-American relations during the Spanish-American War, Thomas A. Bailey concluded that "if the war had not come when it did and if Dewey had not fought successfully at Manila, Hawaii would not have been annexed for some years to come, if ever."[160] One of the participants in the debate, R. F. Pettigrew, stated that "the fight against annexation might have been won but for the Spanish-American War with its tidal wave of patriotic frenzy."[161]

In the end McKinley became a convinced annexationist. Lodge informed Roosevelt that, "He [McKinley] did everything to secure the annexation of Hawaii, and speaks of it as a step in a policy."[162] Professor H. Wayne Morgan

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[159]"Another Step," p. 751.

[160]Bailey, op. cit., p. 560.

[161]Pettigrew, op. cit., p. 320.

[162]Selections Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., p. 330.

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writes that later McKinley "urged the retention of the Philippines not for the sake of public opinion, but after reflection on and work with the similar Hawaiian problem."[163]

While some expressed their pleasure over annexation, Cleveland wrote to Olney noting that "Hawaii is ours. As I look back upon the first steps in this miserable business, I am ashamed of the whole affair."[164]

In a simple but impressive ceremony the transfer of the sovereignty of the Republic of Hawaii to the United States took place on August 12, 1898.[165]

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[163] Morgan, op. cit., p. 297.

[164] Nevins, Letters of Cleveland, p. 502.

[165] Tate, op. cit., p. 306.

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CONCLUSION

The findings of this study indicate that popular opinion was possibly more disposed to accept Hawaiian annexation in 1898 than it had been in 1893. But the evidence also indicates that the extent of this change in expansionist sentiment during the 1890's was somewhat less than that which is implied, but not defined, in the previously mentioned interpretative studies on expansion by Richard Hofstadter, Walter LaFeber, and Ernest R. May. There is little evidence to support the contention of some historians such as Sylvester K. Stevens, Albert K. Weinberg, and Thomas A. Bailey that a majority of the American people favored a policy of expansion in 1898, and that the action of the politicians in acquiring Hawaii mirrored this expansionist sentiment.

Public opinion concerning expansion in the 1890's refers to that small portion of the voting public that would have shown an interest in foreign policy, or the foreign policy public. The mood of the mass public in the 1890's, like today, to problems of foreign policy was predominantly one of indifference. Few of its members gave any attention to foreign affairs. The foreign policy public in the 1890's most likely numbered around 1.5 million or 10 per cent of the voting public. What was

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being said and written about annexation and an expansionist foreign policy took place among this relatively small number of people.

Studies reveal that many people look to their political parties for their position on questions of foreign policy. This practice is particularly true among the more well-informed followers of political parties. Possibly they can more clearly understand their party's position on a foreign policy issue than the less informed followers and thus can follow it more easily. Many of those in this category would be among the foreign policy public. Many of those who were expressing expansionist sentiment probably let their party affiliation, rather than influence independent of party identification, dictate their position on foreign policy issues. Being numerically small and divided along party lines the foreign policy public was ineffective in influencing political decisions on foreign policy.

Opinion on expansion held by the relatively small foreign policy public could have been communicated to the senators and might have had some influence on their votes. However, the evidence indicates that senators received little opinion on the Hawaiian issue because of its small interest to most Americans. Only during acute crises, and not always then, is the mass public moved to take an interest in foreign policy.

The debate in Congress covered the spectrum of

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justifications and attacks on the merits of imperialism. Few things that were said in the subsequent Philippine debate were left unsaid during the Hawaiian debate. Too frequently, however, the topics of debate centered on the actions or personalities of those involved in the affair instead of the broader and more important issues of expansion. Political affiliation generally seemed to be the primary factor determining the politician's position on the issue. The senators defended their politically determined positions with all sorts of arguments. Generally the debaters used the same justification to defend or attack a position. For instance, if the Republicans defended annexation on strategic grounds, the Democrats attacked annexation on strategic grounds. Both dipped heavily into historical precedent to support their arguments.

There is no indication that the Senate debate influenced or was influenced by public sentiment. The debates are devoid of remarks by senators about the general attitude of public opinion toward the annexation issue or about the impact of this opinion on their own positions on the issue. Senator John T. Morgan, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and author of the Morgan Report, seldom received a letter concerning foreign policy from a constituent.[1] Moreover, the question of annexing Hawaii never became a campaign issue in the national

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[1]Ernest R. May, American Imperialism" A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968), p. 25.

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elections held during the extended debate. For some of the senators the debate provided a rehearsal for the subsequent debate on the retention of the Philippines.

The editors of newspapers and magazines had the most advantageous position from which to influence public sentiment. The nation's press was the primary news media in the 1890's. Although newspapers and magazines were widely circulated, for educational and socio-economic reasons few of their subscribers read news on foreign affairs. A publicist complained in 1898 that the newspaper reader "is not willing to summon the attention and concentration necessary to pursue an adequate editorial article."[2] Editors, like the few who read editorials and news on foreign policy, often let their political affiliation determine their position on the issue of annexation. Many people subscribed to certain newspapers and magazines for political reasons. Thus the editors largely reinforced rather than influenced the opinions held by their subscribers. Writing in 1898, journalist E. L. Godkin claimed that "the effect of newspaper editorial writing on opinion is small, so far as one can judge."[3]

None of the evidence about the vote on the joint resolution annexing Hawaii reveals that the press swayed

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[2]"Do People Read Editorials in the Paper?" The Review of Reviews, XVII (1898), 100-101.

[3]Ibid.

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public sentiment for or against annexation sufficiently to make it a force influencing the politician's vote. An issue may become important over a period of time; still, some issues never arouse the public despite their treatment by the press. It appears that the matter of annexing Hawaii was in the latter category.

Some special interests made a perfunctory effort to influence the annexation issue. The efforts by organized labor and the sugar beet growers to exert influence on the issue were on a local or regional level at best. They had a negligible effect on general public opinion, but probably did influence the votes of a few Congressmen from the West Coast and from the sugar beet growing state of Nebraska.

An analysis of the vote on the joint resolution for annexation reveals that the question of annexation had become a politically partisan issue. While favorable expansionist opinion probably had some influence on the final action, party commitment seemed to be the dominant influence determining the outcome of the vote. Only one Republican joined with the Democrats in casting a nay vote. If a mass public opinion had supported annexation it would have transcended party affiliation, forcing senators, in many instances, to abandon their party's position on the issue if for no other reason than in the interest of their own political futures.

The failure of both the Harrison and McKinley administrations to force a test vote on an annexation treaty

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is one indication of an absence of a mass popular sentiment for annexation. During both administrations the annexationists thought it unsafe to force a test vote on an annexation treaty. In their view failure to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote for ratification could possibly relegate the treaty to limbo. One historian interprets this lack of necessary Senate votes to ratify the treaty as an indication "that Senators sensed some effective opinion against annexation."[4]

President Cleveland's action of withdrawing the annexation treaty from the Senate resulted from his personal opposition to overseas expansion and not from the pressure of public sentiment. Cleveland never indicated that he considered public sentiment, or was conscious that any existed, when he formulated his Hawaiian policy.

An examination of biographical literature on some of the politicians serving in Congress at the time of annexation reveals little data that is helpful in estimating the importance of public opinion as a force molding the politician's position on annexation. Few politicians ever made statements about public opinion when discussing annexation.

State House and Senate journals for the years 1897 and 1898 contain some resolutions urging state Congressional delegations to vote a certain way on annexation. A similar

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[4]May, op. cit., p. 181.

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interest in expansion is also contained in state party platforms drafted in 1898. Several of the platforms contained expressions on expansion. While the number of expressions on expansion contained in these sources does not indicate mass support for expansion, it does reveal the existence of some favorable expansionist opinion. It can be assumed that senators would have been aware of these expressions of opinion and weighed their significance when deciding their positions on the annexation issue.

In all likelihood, popular expansionist sentiment was greater in 1898 than it had been in 1893. Yet, the evidence does not indicate that it was sufficiently strong to have been the major force responsible for the favorable Senate vote annexing Hawaii. Indeed, anything resembling mass sentiment for annexation would certainly have forced many senators to desert their party's position on annexation for political expediency. Probably this was not so likely to happen when senators were still being elected by state legislatures as it is today. Still, a senator could not have totally disregarded mass public opinion without jeopardizing his party's chances at the polls and, indirectly, his own political future. The administration's arguments supporting annexation probably had a greater influence than public opinion on the outcome of the vote.

The forty-two yea votes on the joint resolution to annex Hawaii fell far short of the sixty votes needed to ratify a treaty of annexation. Four days after the vote on

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annexation, the New York Times commented that "it is worth while to recall how curiously lacking is any evidence of a strong and intelligent popular opinion in its favor."

If a measurable change in public sentiment on Hawaiian annexation occurred during the 1890's, it seems to have occurred only in small, sharply defined segments of the population previously described in this study as the "foreign policy public."

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APPENDIX I

THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII IN COLLEGE TEXTBOOKS.

In general the writers of college level textbooks in American history and diplomacy have treated the annexation of Hawaii lightly, if not in a perfunctory manner. The question of annexing Hawaii precipitated the first national debate in American history on the merits of overseas imperialism. Yet, the significance of this debate generally has escaped most historians who write textbooks. Most writers on foreign affairs during the years 1893 to 1898 have directed their attention to the Venezuela boundary dispute and the Spanish-American War at the expense of the Hawaiian annexation question.

A study of the debate on annexation, which took place intermittently over a period of five years, gives a clear insight into the forces that shaped and launched an imperialistic foreign policy in 1898. The debate brought into clear focus the divergent foreign policies of President Cleveland and the imperialists or advocates of the "large policy." Most of the arguments heard in the subsequent debate over the retention of the Philippines were heard earlier in the Hawaiian debate. And, according to one of William McKinley's biographers, McKinley's experience in deciding

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the Hawaiian issue largely prepared him for his decision in the Philippine question. The debate reveals that, contrary to the conclusions of some historians, Hawaiian annexation did not result from the pressure of a growing favorable American expansionist sentiment. Hawaiian annexation represented the fulfillment of the Republican party's imperialistic foreign policy in 1898. Finally, the annexation of Hawaii inaugurated an expansionist foreign policy that would reap an empire in less than a year.

An inspection of the treatment given the Hawaiian annexation in five well-known college survey texts in American history reveals some interesting data. The texts are: Richard Hofstadter and others, The Structure of American History, Prentice Hall (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1957); Dexter Perkins and G. Van Deusen, A History of the United States of America, The Macmillan Co. (N. Y., 1962); T. Harry Williams and others, A History of the United States, 2 vols., Alfred A. Knopf (N. Y., 1966); Harry T. Carman and others, A History of the American People, 2 vols., Alfred A. Knopf, (N. Y., 1956); and John A. Garraty, The American Nation, Harper and Row, (N. Y., 1966).

The space devoted to the treatment of the topic of Hawaiian annexation in the five texts varies in length from one-half page in the one volume Hofstadter and Perkins texts to slightly over three pages in the two volume Carman text. Usually the two volume texts devote slightly more space to the topic, but as a whole the writers treat the topic

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superficially. Moreover, most of the writers utilize the limited space allotted to the topic to give the historical background on American interests in Hawaii. Their accounts of the Hawaiian revolution and the extended imperialist debate over annexation suffer as a result. For the most part, they give an objective account of America's role in the revolution. However, Hofstadter fails to mention the key player in the drama, John L. Stevens. Queen Liliuokalani is treated kindly in all the works, but Hofstadter implies that her arbitrary rule, rather than the machinations of the white propertied class instigated the revolution.

One could expect that such brief accounts of a topic would be free of factual errors. Such is not the case, however. Garraty has Queen Liliuokalani ruling as an absolute monarch. Carman did not know that James G. Blaine had stepped down as Secretary of State. And Hofstadter is a year early in forming the Hawaiian Republic.

Each text presents the annexation question in a chapter dealing with American imperialism, but only two of the texts mention the extended debate on imperialism elicited by the question. Garraty gives the debate a nodding recognition, but Carman cites some of the issues around which the debate centered. Both lack any solid interpretation of the forces influencing expansionist thought, however.

Three of the writers fall prey to facile phrases in explaining the forces behind the nation's imperialistic

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venture. Williams refers to the "force of destiny." Hofstadter mentions the "imperialistic temper." To Carman the decision for empire represents the nation's "date with destiny." These generalized phrases contribute nothing to the student's understanding of imperialism.

With the exception of the Carman text, the treatments of the question of annexing Hawaii are too superficial to promote useful learning in a history course. They contribute nothing to broadening the student's understanding of imperialism. They contain little that would stimulate the student to inquire further into the matter. If the historian misses the broader significance of the Hawaiian annexation debate, we can expect no less from the student. We can only conclude that writers of survey texts in American history attach little significance to it. Possibly they feel that the subject should be within the province of the writer's of diplomatic history. Yet, many students never take a course in diplomatic history, and the survey course is their only exposure to American imperialism. Although the writers include their few paragraphs on Hawaiian annexation in chapters entitled "American Imperialistic Adventure," "Expansion Overseas," "American Imperialism," they fail to reveal its contribution to American imperialistic thought or to connect it in a meaningful way to American imperialism.

A look at some widely used diplomatic history text books reveals a better treatment of Hawaiian annexation.

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Alexander DeConde's, A History of American Foreign Policy, Charles Scribner's Sons, (N. Y., 1963); Richard Leopold's, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, Alfred A. Knopf, (N. Y., 1964); and Thomas Bailey's, A Diplomatic History of the American People, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., (N. Y., 1969) give a deeper scholarly account of America's early interests in Hawaii, the Hawaiian revolution, and the protracted debate on the issue of annexing Hawaii. Smauel Flagg Bemis', A Diplomatic History of the United States, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, (N. Y., 1965) contains a sketchy treatment of Hawaiian-American relations, and says nothing about the debate on imperialism evoked by the proposal for annexation.

DeConde, Leopold, and Bailey give well-written informative narratives on annexation, but they generally fail to interpret its significance to the imperialistic debate. Thus they fail to include the provocative stuff surrounding imperialism that would challenge or excite the student to investigate the issue further. An imaginative teacher could probably compensate for this shortcoming. However, one's first thought is to supplement the texts with books of readings and interpretations in American history and diplomacy.

For this purpose, the contents of several such works were scanned. Armin Rappaport, Issues in American Diplomacy, The Macmillan Co., (N. Y., 1965); John A. Denovo and others, Selected Readings in American History,

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Charles Scribner's Sons, (N. Y., 1969); Vincent De Santis, American Past and Present: An Interpretation with Readings, Allyn and Bacon, (Boston, 1968); and Robert Goldwin, Readings in American Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, (N. Y., 1956) contain no readings relating to the issue of annexing Hawaii. But most contain readings on the war with Spain and Cleveland's Venezuelan policy. However, William Appleman Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents in American Foreign Relations, Rand McNally, (Chicago, 1956) contains two readings and two documents dealing with the Hawaiian revolution and the question of annexation.

This investigation of the college textbooks and collections of readings reveals a lack of material on the Hawaiian annexation question. It also reveals that the question is treated as an isolated incident which in some way was remotely connected with imperialism. Thus, if the teacher is going to present late nineteenth century imperialism as a number of isolated incidents, and rely entirely upon textbook materials, he will have an abundance of materials relating to some incidents and an extreme shortage of materials relating to others. The importance of the incident depends upon the arbitrary judgment of the writers of textbooks.

America's relationship with Hawaii is almost always found in a chapter on American imperialism in American history survey textbooks. The treatment of this relation-

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ship usually reveals how Hawaii early became "Americanized," and how it became the first sizeable overseas territory annexed by the United States. However, the textbooks fail to point out the relationship between the Hawaiian annexation question and late nineteenth century imperialism. When presented superficially in this manner, it contributes little, if anything, to the student's understanding of imperialism.

The teacher can present the American annexation of Hawaii in a way that will contribute to the student's understanding of late nineteenth century imperialism. Accepting the fact that college survey textbooks in American history generally do a poor job presenting the event, the teacher must supplement the textbook with additional teaching materials. To assure that these materials will contribute to learning, the teacher must establish his objectives and develop materials that will assist the student in achieving these objectives.

Possibly the objectives could best be achieved by permitting the students to explore specific topics relating to the Hawaiian annexation question. The teacher might want the students to investigate the position taken by special interests toward Hawaiian annexation. Two readings from William Appleman Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents in American Foreign Relations could serve this purpose: Richard D. Weigle, "Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution," and John C. Appel, "American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii." Other

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appropriate material for this topic can be taken from an editorial in the Knights of Labor Journal found in Public Opinion (November 16, 1893).

Perhaps the teacher believes that it is important for the students to understand the intellectual justifications for and against overseas expansion. William Graham Sumner's article, "The Fallacy of Territorial Expansion," appearing in The Forum (January, 1896), and Alfred T. Mahan's article, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," appearing in The Forum (November, 1893) would serve as valuable materials for achieving this objective.

The relation between racism and imperialism may be a topic the teacher thinks the students should explore. T. Graham Gribble's,"American Annexation of Hawaii," Engineering Magazine (March, 1893), and T. M. Cooley's, "Grave Obstacles to Hawaiian Annexation," The Forum (June, 1893) are appropriate articles for such a topic.

Carl Schurz's, "Hawaii, Japan, and the United States," Harper's Weekly, XLI (1897), and Thomas A. Bailey's, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," Journal of Modern History, III (1931), can be used for achieving the objective of obtaining a foreign view of American annexation of Hawaii.

For a possible topic contrasting the Hawaiian policies of President Cleveland and President McKinley, the teacher can use excerpts from a congressional debate on the Hawaiian annexation question. Appropriate excerpts from

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such a debate are in the Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, pp. 6141, 6145, 6191, 6303, 6306.

If the teacher thinks the students should have an understanding of the role partisan politics played in the Hawaiian annexation question, appropriate reading materials might be Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," The Forum (March, 1895), and E. L. Godkin, "The Hawaiian Conspiracy," The Nation (November, 1893).

Selections from such compendiums of press editorial comment as Public Opinion (June 24, 1897), and the Literary Digest (June 26, 1897) could serve as reading material for a topic on public opinion and Hawaiian annexation.

To help students to understand how historians try to assess the importance of public opinion in their research and writing, the teacher could use two readings from Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy: Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion, Opinion Makers, and Foreign Policy," and James N. Rosenau, "The Opinion-Policy Relationship."

Little space is given to the annexation of Hawaii in most survey textbooks in American history. However, the resourceful teacher will utilize other sources for materials to supplement the superficial treatment the event receives in the textbooks. The teacher must choose his objectives carefully and develop his own materials along the lines suggested above to accomplish these objectives. With the right objectives, the right materials, and the right

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teaching strategy, a traditionally neglected event like the annexation of Hawaii can be presented to students in a way that yields positive educational results.

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