APPENDIX A: Cross-country Data Description

Table A1: Variable Definitions

Left-side Variables

Power concentration index. Measures the extent of power concentration, including both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Generated via principal components analysis (PCA) using 15 separate measures of power concentration (described below): Federalism, Subnational government layers, Subnational elections, Autonomous regions, Revenue decentralization, Government consumption, Separate powers, Divided party control, Decentralized parties, Judicial review, Bicameralism, Legislative fractionalization, Political constraints, Checks & balances, and Capital city. The variable comprises the first component of the PCA, averaged across 20 imputed data sets. Rescaled from 0-1. *PCA_index*

Federalism. An institutionalized division or sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and semiautonomous regional units, usually codified in a constitution. 0=nonfederal (regional governments, if they exist, are granted minimal policy-making power), 1=semifederal (there are elective governments at the regional level but constitutional sovereignty is reserved to the national government), 2=federal (elective regional governments plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority). Rescaled from 0-1. Source: Gerring & Thacker (2008: 88). *federalism_GT*

Subnational gov layers. Comprised of two variables measuring whether local and regional governments exist, as coded by research assistants and regional experts enlisted by V-Dem. These are added together to form a three-level index: 0=none, 1=one level, or 2=both levels. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *subnational_layers*

Subnational elections. Measures the existence (=1) or non-existence (=0) of elections at subnational levels, as coded by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms the binary variable into an interval variable. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *v2elffelrbin*

Autonomous regions. Measures the existence (=1) or nonexistence (=0) of regions enjoying substantial autonomy from the national government. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: DPI (Beck et al. 2001). *e_dpi_auton*

Revenue decentralization. Subnational revenue as share of total public revenue. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: GFS, as compiled by Enikolopov & Zhuravskaya (2007). *Decentraliz_rev_EZ*

Government consumption. Central government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services, including payment of employees and most expenditures on national defense and security (but not those considered part of government capital formation), as a share of GDP. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: WDI (World Bank 20??).

Separate powers. 1=the dominant executive (either the head of state or head of government) is directly elected, 0=otherwise. Coding by research assistants and regional experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *prez_JG2*

Divided party control. The extent to which a single party or coalition controls both the executive and legislative branches of national government, based on coding by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval variable. (The nominal V-Dem variable is reordered to reflect an ordinal scale.) Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *Natparmms*

Decentralized parties. Measures how centralized the process of candidate selection for the national legislature is – specifically, the extent to which national party leaders control the process or share power with constituents and local and regional party actors, as judged by country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval variable. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *v2pscnslnl*

Judicial review. Measures whether any court in the judiciary has the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision, as coded by country experts enlisted for the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval variable. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *v2jureview*

Bicameralism. Measures the existence of two chambers in the national legislature and – if they exist – how closely matched their powers are, based on the coding of country experts enlisted by the V-Dem project. Multiple ratings

aggregated by a Bayesian IRT measurement model, which transforms this ordinal variable into an interval variable. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). *Legbalance*

Legislative fractionalization. Measures the probability that two randomly drawn representatives from the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature will be from different parties. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: PolCon (Henisz 2002). *Legfralower*

Political constraints. "The extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in government policy," taking into account the number of independent branches of government and the preferences of each of these branches. Rescaled from 0-1. Source: PolCon (Henisz 2002: 363), where it is referred to as *PolConIII*. *polconiii*

Checks & balances. "The number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for whether these veto players are independent of each other, as determined by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party affiliations, and the electoral rules." Rescaled from 0-1. Source: DPI (Beck et al. 2001), where it is referred to as *Checks1*. *Checks_DPI*

Capital city. Population of capital city as a share of total population, transformed by the natural logarithm. Calculated by authors. Rescaled from 0-1. Sources for capital city population: UN (2014), supplemented by other sources. *capital_pop_share_ln*

Right-side Variables

Population. Official population of a country, counting only those acknowledged as citizens. This is based on data from the Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), Singer et al. (1972), and WDI (World Bank 2016), which are combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. *Source:* Fariss et al. (2017). *Maddison_pop_estimate_ln*

GDP per cap. Gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars. This is based on data from the Maddison Project (Bolt & van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from Bairoch (1976), Broadberry (2015), Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), and the WDI (World Bank 2016), which are combined in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. *Source:* Fariss et al. (2017). *Scale:* logarithmic. *Maddison_gdppc_1990_estimate_ln*

Urbanization. Share of total population living in cities, missing data within a time-series interpolated. Missing data interpolated within a time-series. Sources: Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) based on a variety of underlying sources. *e_urbaniz*

English legal origin. Dummy variable indicating English legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). *English_legal_origin*

French legal origin. Dummy variable indicating French legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). *French_legal_origin*

German legal origin. Dummy variable indicating German legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). *German_legal_origin*

Scandinavian legal origin. Dummy variable indicating Scandinavian legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). *Scandinavian_legal_origin*

Socialist legal origin. Dummy variable indicating Socialist legal origin. Source: La Porta et al (1999). *Socialist_legal_origin*

Latitude (ln). Distance from equator, transformed by natural logarithm. *Latitude_ln*

Lexical index of electoral democracy. A 7-level ordinal scale measuring the electoral components of democracy in a cumulative fashion. Source: Skaaning, Gerring & Bartusevičius (2015). *lexical_scale*

Muslim. Percent Muslim. Source: CIA WorldFactbook (on-line). *Muslim*

Protestant. Percent Protestant. Source: CIA WorldFactbook (on-line). *Protestant*

OPEC. Dummy variable indicating membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. *OPEC*

Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Probability of two randomly chosen individuals being members of the same ethnolinguistic group. Source: Easterly & Levine (1997), missing data imputed from other sources. *Ethnolinguistic_fract_imp*

Territory. Land area, square kilometers, transformed by the natural logarithm. Source: WDI (World Bank 2007). *wdi_area_extended_ln*

Arable land. Percent of state's territory that is arable land in 1960. Source: WDI (World Bank 2005). *Land_use_arable_ext_1960*

Internal armed conflict. Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. *Sources:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem. *e_miinterc*

External armed conflict. Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1. *Sources:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001), compiled by V-Dem. *e_miinteco*

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

Left-side variables	**Obs**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
Power concentration index	19,208	0.561	0.202	0	1
Federalism	6,354	0.191	0.374	0	1
Subnational government layers	16,181	0.931	0.176	0	1
Subnational elections	16,212	0.638	0.291	0	1
Autonomous regions	6,139	0.122	0.327	0	1
Revenue decentralization	1,398	0.282	0.241	0	1
Government consumption	6,638	0.188	0.092	0	1
Separate powers	16,477	0.232	0.422	0	1
Divided party control	16,106	0.549	0.266	0	1
Decentralized parties	16,281	0.339	0.199	0	1
Judicial review	16,403	0.543	0.293	0	1
Bicameralism	17,547	0.344	0.328	0	1
Legislative fractionalization	8,504	0.477	0.289	0	1
Political constraints	14,808	0.220	0.290	0	1
Checks & balances	6,004	0.246	0.229	0	1
Capital city	37,954	0.450	0.117	0	1
Right-side variables					
Population (logged)	25,913	15.03	1.942	7.372	21.38
GDP per capita (logged)	25,913	7.639	1.159	3.868	14.40
Urbanization	39,879	0.234	0.233	0.002	1
English legal origin	40,821	0.333	0.471	0	1
French legal origin	40,821	0.423	0.494	0	1
German legal origin	40,821	0.037	0.189	0	1
Scandinavian legal origin	40,821	0.021	0.144	0	1
Socialist legal origin	40,821	0.186	0.389	0	1
Latitude (logged)	40,205	-1.596	0.950	-4.500	-0.341
Muslim	40,850	23.26	35.89	0	99.90
Protestant	41,252	12.70	22.87	0	98
OPEC	41,065	0.058	0.233	0	1
Lexical index of electoral democracy	17,248	2.820	2.363	0	6
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization	40,641	0.342	0.282	-0.072	1
Territory (logged)	33,176	2.913	1.998	-5.900	8.164
Arable land	38,164	14.05	14.12	0.043	66.25
Internal armed conflict	12,932	0.098	0.297	0	1
External armed conflict	16,612	0.075	0.264	0	1

Sample constrained to 1800- period.

Table A3: Inter-Correlation among Measures of Power Concentration

	*	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.
* Power concentration index	1														
1. Federalism	-0.434	1													
2. Subnational gov layers	-0.078	0.159	1												
3. Subnational elections	-0.622	0.261	0.104	1											
4. Autonomous regions	-0.206	0.073	0.04	0.085	1										
5. Revenue decentraliz	-0.537	0.549	0.16	0.249	0.138	1									
6. Govt consumption	0.012	-0.036	-0.042	-0.013	0.012	0.138	1								
7. Separate powers	-0.302	-0.02	0.095	0.214	0.015	-0.054	-0.207	1							
8. Divided party control	-0.128	0.014	0.068	0.035	0.039	0.166	-0.044	0.006	1						
9. Decentralized parties	-0.699	0.278	-0.083	0.378	0.083	0.462	0.162	0.091	0.015	1					
10. Judicial review	-0.638	0.203	0.044	0.255	0.088	0.21	0.032	0.285	0.076	0.291	1				
11. Bicameralism	-0.646	0.323	0.085	0.402	0.048	0.263	-0.094	0.266	0.019	0.341	0.34	1			
12. Leg. fractionalization	-0.792	0.051	-0.075	0.286	0.087	0.184	0.028	-0.097	0.248	0.439	0.392	0.256	1		
13. Political constraints	-0.834	0.148	-0.137	0.423	0.108	0.247	0.077	-0.002	0.082	0.549	0.447	0.301	0.734	1	
14. Checks & balances	-0.854	0.182	-0.089	0.391	0.146	0.291	0.008	0.03	0.123	0.486	0.56	0.338	0.685	0.729	1
15. Capital city	0.086	-0.365	-0.198	-0.107	-0.15	-0.328	0.206	0.059	-0.078	-0.001	0.039	-0.103	0.08	-0.043	0.006

Includes all outcome variables listed in Table 2.

Table A4: Principal Components Analysis of Measures of Power Concentration

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	3.978	2.395	0.265	0.265
2	1.584	0.277	0.106	0.371
3	1.306	0.234	0.087	0.458
4	1.073	0.084	0.072	0.529
5	0.989	0.078	0.066	0.595
6	0.910	0.040	0.061	0.656
7	0.870	0.081	0.058	0.714
8	0.789	0.050	0.053	0.767
9	0.739	0.113	0.049	0.816
10	0.626	0.041	0.042	0.858
11	0.585	0.055	0.039	0.897
12	0.530	0.043	0.035	0.932
13	0.487	0.192	0.033	0.964
14	0.295	0.055	0.020	0.984
15	0.240	.	0.016	1.000

Variable	Component 1	Unexplained
Federalism	0.143	0.919
Subnational government layers	0.049	0.990
Subnational elections	0.305	0.631
Autonomous regions	0.097	0.963
Revenue decentralization	0.149	0.911
Government consumption	-0.013	0.999
Separate powers	0.145	0.916
Divided party control	0.063	0.985
Decentralized parties	0.338	0.546
Judicial review	0.319	0.594
Bicameralism	0.309	0.620
Legislative fractionalization	0.404	0.352
Political constraints	0.417	0.309
Checks & balances	0.421	0.296
Capital city	-0.048	0.991

Principal components analysis (un-rotated), retaining the first component. The results displayed above are based on the first of twenty imputed data sets generated by the Amelia II program. N = 19,208. *Rho* = 0.2652.

Table A5: Power Concentration Index by Country

	MEAN	MIN	MAX	YEARS
Korea, North	0.850	0.655	1.000	113
Angola	0.838	0.568	0.932	113
Swaziland	0.816	0.641	0.941	113
Tunisia	0.809	0.483	0.959	115
Togo	0.800	0.492	0.967	98
Bahrain	0.799	0.660	0.944	113
Djibouti	0.797	0.622	0.894	113
Bhutan	0.796	0.535	0.880	113
Qatar	0.782	0.669	0.849	114
Somalia	0.777	0.341	0.963	113
Congo, Democratic Republic	0.773	0.249	0.934	114
Lesotho	0.772	0.443	0.868	113
Saudi Arabia	0.772	0.693	0.950	114
Guinea-Bissau	0.766	0.442	0.854	114
Sao Tome And Principe	0.765	0.429	0.898	114
South Yemen	0.761	0.682	0.840	113
Seychelles	0.759	0.517	0.882	111
German Democratic Republic	0.753	0.687	0.847	91
Oman	0.743	0.654	0.820	113
Cape Verde	0.738	0.453	0.854	115
Brunei	0.735	0.666	0.856	113
Ivory Coast	0.734	0.284	0.931	114
Laos	0.733	0.620	0.810	113
Rwanda	0.733	0.457	0.900	97
Tonga	0.731	0.458	0.799	37
Gabon	0.728	0.422	0.882	104
Chad	0.728	0.492	0.881	93
Kuwait	0.724	0.423	0.933	113
East Timor	0.724	0.498	0.807	115
Equatorial Guinea	0.721	0.627	0.809	45
Albania	0.719	0.331	0.876	102
Maldives	0.719	0.332	0.810	115
Burundi	0.716	0.434	0.816	98
Nepal	0.713	0.331	0.877	115
Ethiopia	0.708	0.386	0.809	113
Iran	0.708	0.478	0.885	114
Mauritania	0.707	0.320	0.864	109
Comoros	0.706	0.370	0.916	114
Liechtenstein	0.705	0.644	0.775	103
Palestine_British_Mandate	0.697	0.647	0.731	31
Cambodia	0.696	0.455	0.843	113
Indonesia	0.696	0.219	0.849	115
Palestine, West Bank	0.694	0.472	0.927	67
Yemen	0.685	0.447	0.798	114
Mongolia	0.684	0.323	0.889	104
Namibia	0.682	0.412	0.828	115
Taiwan	0.682	0.234	0.983	113
Vietnam, Democratic Republic	0.682	0.570	0.728	68
Malawi	0.681	0.311	0.822	115
Singapore	0.680	0.464	0.868	113
Sudan	0.678	0.402	0.827	113
United Arab Emirates	0.678	0.644	0.731	42
Afghanistan	0.677	0.508	0.793	113
Benin	0.677	0.301	0.819	115

Central African Republic	0.676	0.386	0.850	94
Libya	0.674	0.459	0.906	81
Eritrea	0.669	0.527	0.754	113
Zanzibar	0.664	0.622	0.685	11
Vietnam, Republic	0.661	0.411	0.768	76
Burma (Myanmar)	0.660	0.256	0.790	115
Jordan	0.660	0.454	0.801	91
China	0.658	0.539	0.794	115
Guinea	0.658	0.344	0.757	114
Tanzania	0.656	0.349	0.866	115
Morocco	0.655	0.277	0.851	115
Syria	0.653	0.554	0.748	96
Hungary	0.652	0.300	0.799	114
Mozambique	0.651	0.371	0.736	115
Burkina Faso	0.650	0.411	0.839	95
Congo, Republic	0.648	0.179	0.809	110
Turkmenistan	0.644	0.593	0.735	24
Madagascar	0.642	0.282	0.802	113
Suriname	0.640	0.440	0.754	115
Dominica	0.632	0.456	0.796	113
Zambia	0.631	0.320	0.850	113
Botswana	0.631	0.340	0.827	115
Senegal	0.628	0.200	0.867	113
Mali	0.624	0.314	0.741	113
Palestine Gaza	0.624	0.558	0.743	67
Ghana	0.621	0.291	0.762	113
Gambia	0.620	0.437	0.737	113
Bulgaria	0.619	0.323	0.771	115
Iraq	0.618	0.369	0.768	94
Algeria	0.616	0.268	0.758	113
Lebanon	0.616	0.504	0.748	97
Serbia	0.612	0.290	0.774	114
Niger	0.610	0.275	0.795	92
Korea, South	0.609	0.263	0.822	115
Egypt	0.601	0.384	0.775	115
Uganda	0.597	0.233	0.790	113
Monaco	0.595	0.559	0.642	9
Somaliland	0.590	0.333	0.692	113
Montenegro	0.587	0.427	0.794	114
Hong Kong	0.585	0.490	0.639	113
Portugal	0.581	0.327	0.820	115
Zimbabwe	0.577	0.264	0.723	113
Fiji	0.576	0.366	0.735	115
Sierra Leone	0.576	0.337	0.744	113
Romania	0.574	0.240	0.796	114
Kenya	0.571	0.215	0.751	113
Thailand	0.570	0.287	0.752	113
San Marino	0.567	0.400	0.682	103
Samoa	0.567	0.399	0.762	51
Cameroon	0.560	0.447	0.654	53
Haiti	0.558	0.215	0.713	113
Cuba	0.557	0.351	0.762	114
Antigua and Barbuda	0.555	0.431	0.620	29
Uzbekistan	0.553	0.446	0.708	24
Azerbaijan	0.553	0.467	0.678	24
Kiribati	0.551	0.520	0.601	24
El Salvador	0.551	0.312	0.714	113

Paraguay	0.547	0.242	0.734	115
Poland	0.542	0.219	0.744	96
Turkey	0.539	0.219	0.871	114
Vanuatu	0.539	0.228	0.715	115
Guatemala	0.536	0.283	0.739	114
Kyrgyzstan	0.535	0.353	0.693	25
Dominican Republic	0.535	0.212	0.765	115
Honduras	0.530	0.300	0.709	113
Grenada	0.530	0.397	0.809	113
Kazakhstan	0.529	0.457	0.681	23
Bangladesh	0.528	0.364	0.728	44
Liberia	0.528	0.290	0.724	114
Belize	0.526	0.420	0.617	113
Belarus	0.525	0.372	0.633	23
Trinidad and Tobago	0.525	0.339	0.690	113
Guyana	0.522	0.452	0.642	114
Nicaragua	0.520	0.273	0.739	113
Lithuania	0.516	0.269	0.813	96
Cyprus	0.512	0.233	0.703	114
Czech Republic	0.508	0.150	0.786	96
Palau	0.505	0.470	0.542	8
Solomon Islands	0.501	0.228	0.628	115
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.497	0.451	0.577	33
Kosovo	0.494	0.451	0.556	14
Spain	0.491	0.245	0.738	115
Croatia	0.486	0.332	0.755	73
South Sudan	0.483	0.453	0.513	2
Nauru	0.483	0.449	0.535	31
Marshall Islands	0.476	0.433	0.519	11
Barbados	0.473	0.287	0.631	115
Peru	0.471	0.218	0.732	115
Malaysia	0.468	0.226	0.634	113
Mauritius	0.465	0.360	0.579	115
Costa Rica	0.463	0.284	0.666	115
Panama	0.463	0.264	0.725	115
Malta	0.462	0.379	0.576	114
Bolivia	0.458	0.141	0.771	115
Pakistan	0.455	0.167	0.653	68
Moldova	0.455	0.337	0.686	25
Micronesia, Federated States	0.455	0.414	0.474	17
Greece	0.452	0.264	0.715	114
Sri Lanka	0.451	0.250	0.644	115
Philippines	0.450	0.174	0.721	115
Chile	0.447	0.240	0.735	115
South Africa	0.443	0.291	0.566	115
Georgia	0.443	0.349	0.653	25
Papua New Guinea	0.442	0.144	0.614	115
Nigeria	0.439	0.152	0.574	99
Andorra	0.438	0.412	0.460	10
Saint Lucia	0.433	0.399	0.497	34
Jamaica	0.429	0.328	0.576	113
Armenia	0.429	0.329	0.584	23
Russia	0.429	0.144	0.656	114
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.424	0.380	0.475	33
New Zealand	0.422	0.341	0.512	114
Slovakia	0.413	0.221	0.730	96
Ecuador	0.410	0.235	0.640	114

Mexico	0.405	0.170	0.663	115
Venezuela	0.402	0.167	0.705	113
Macedonia	0.401	0.351	0.454	23
Tajikistan	0.399	0.234	0.566	23
Latvia	0.396	0.258	0.676	108
Colombia	0.392	0.198	0.705	113
Luxembourg	0.390	0.281	0.508	113
India	0.381	0.120	0.626	115
Bahamas	0.370	0.324	0.434	40
Uruguay	0.357	0.153	0.654	115
Italy	0.351	0.119	0.707	113
Netherlands	0.333	0.203	0.436	115
Slovenia	0.331	0.281	0.408	25
Austria	0.326	0.205	0.675	114
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.320	0.159	0.554	23
Ukraine	0.318	0.181	0.567	24
United Kingdom	0.318	0.254	0.365	113
Estonia	0.313	0.228	0.581	97
Israel	0.309	0.134	0.452	66
Sweden	0.295	0.204	0.373	115
Japan	0.287	0.141	0.458	115
Ireland	0.280	0.186	0.491	95
Argentina	0.278	0.089	0.588	113
Germany	0.275	0.118	0.782	115
Finland	0.260	0.189	0.477	115
France	0.257	0.156	0.680	114
Belgium	0.254	0.165	0.382	115
Brazil	0.249	0.016	0.603	113
Denmark	0.237	0.170	0.428	115
Norway	0.226	0.157	0.392	115
Iceland	0.221	0.101	0.315	114
Australia	0.196	0.117	0.457	115
Canada	0.191	0.132	0.245	115
Switzerland	0.147	0.093	0.226	115
United States	0.051	0.000	0.119	114

Figure A1: **Histogram of Population (ln)**



Figure A2: **Histogram of Power Concentration Index**



Table A6: Cross-country Tests of Power Concentration

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Pop (ln) at	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
VERTICAL										
1.Federalism	0.390***	0.825***	1.319***	0.885***	0.839**	1.138**	0.430***	0.852***	0.646***	0.390***
	[0.132]	[0.214]	[0.370]	[0.292]	[0.348]	[0.506]	[0.089]	[0.236]	[0.107]	[0.132]
2.Subnational	0.670***	0.571***	0.701	0.592**	0.554	5.761**	0.379***	0.560***	0.032***	0.670***
gov layers	[0.154]	[0.210]	[0.495]	[0.272]	[0.490]	[2.924]	[0.105]	[0.213]	[0.010]	[0.154]
3.Subnational	0.033***	0.036***	0.052***	0.026***	0.027***	0.026**	0.030***	0.024**	0.003***	0.042***
elections	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.011]
4.Autonomous	0.516***	0.651***	0.562	0.599***	0.543	1.290	0.640***	0.656***	0.236*	0.516***
regions	[0.149]	[0.239]	[0.362]	[0.224]	[0.355]	[0.893]	[0.168]	[0.246]	[0.123]	[0.149]
5.Revenue	0.046***	0.056***	0.077***	0.071***	0.053***	0.051**	0.023***	0.054***	0.004**	0.097***
decentraliz.	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.024]	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.021]
6.Government	-0.014***	-0.011***	-0.013***	-0.005	-0.002	0.001	-0.011***	-0.006**	-0.001**	-0.011***
consumpt.	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.004]
HORIZONTAL										
7.Sep. powers	0.050	0.232*	0.236	0.292**	0.268	0.692**	0.092	0.348	0.048	0.050
	[0.079]	[0.134]	[0.200]	[0.140]	[0.193]	[0.326]	[0.087]	[0.212]	[0.086]	[0.079]
8.Divided	0.021***	0.023**	0.032***	0.028***	0.018	0.050	0.020**	0.020*	0.002**	0.024*
party control	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.030]	[0.008]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.013]
9.Decentraliz	0.016	0.016*	0.030***	0.019*	0.021*	0.008	0.019***	0.019**	0.008	0.016
parties	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.010]
10.Judicial	0.003	0.018	0.011	0.006	0.011	0.020	0.020**	0.017	0.026*	0.003
review	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.012]
11.Bicameral-	0.041***	0.055***	0.067***	0.056***	0.070***	0.091***	0.202***	0.071***	0.004***	0.042***
ism	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.012]
12.Legislative	0.019	0.016	0.010	0.024**	0.019*	0.036**	0.029***	0.010	0.001	0.001
fractionaliz	[0.017]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.011]
13.Political	0.068**	0.044***	0.022**	0.035**	0.021	0.033*	0.029***	0.028**	0.002***	0.005
constraints	[0.030]	[0.016]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.006]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.012]
14.Checks &	0.008	0.024***	0.019***	0.029***	0.030***	0.040***	0.027***	0.018***	0.003***	0.028***
balances	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.009]
Vertical/Horizontal										
15.Capital	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.024***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.017***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.000*	-0.036***
city	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.003]
* Power conc.	-0.026***	-0.039***	-0.040***	-0.039***	-0.044***	-0.053***	-0.034***	-0.042***	-0.002***	-0.032***
index	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.007]	(0.004)	[0.005]	[0.000]	[0.006]
Covariates										
Basic	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Additional			✓							
Y_{t-1}									✓	

Outcome measures of power concentration (re-scaled from 0-1) regressed against population (logged) and selected covariates. Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. *Basic covariates:* per capita GDP (logged), Urbanization, Legal origin dummies, Latitude, Muslim, Protestant, OPEC dummy, Region dummies, Year dummies. (Year dummies are excluded from CCP outcomes – Constitution Length, Scope, Rigidity – because of collinearity.) *Additional covariates:* Lexical index of electoral democracy, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Y_{t-1}: lagged outcome. Electoral system dummies included in tests of Divided party control (row 8) only. Coefficients and standard errors shown for population. *Estimators:* ordinary least squares (for continuous outcomes), tobit (for left-censored outcomes), ordered logit (for ordinal outcomes), logit (for binary outcomes), random effects (for panel estimation in Model 9). Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 Model 7: datasets imputed with Amelia. Model 8: country-years in which multiparty elections are on course (Lexical>2). Model 9: panel analysis, conducted only with continuous outcomes that show substantial temporal variation. Model 10: second-stage results of a two-stage analysis, where land area (logged) and arable land (%) serve as instruments for population. Complete results displayed in Appendix B.

APPENDIX B: Cross-country Tests, Full Reports

Table B1: Federalism

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Estimator	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**10**
Population (log)	0.390***	0.825***	1.319***	0.885***	0.839**	1.138**	0.430***	0.852***	0.646***
	[0.132]	[0.214]	[0.370]	[0.292]	[0.348]	[0.506]	[0.089]	[0.236]	[0.107]
Urbanization		0.132	2.644	-1.556	1.257	9.099**	0.401	-0.232	0.484
		[1.425]	[2.185]	[3.249]	[1.623]	[3.765]	[0.635]	[1.561]	[1.110]
GDPpc (logged)		0.718**	1.641**	0.335	1.169**	-0.023	0.234**	0.677*	0.635***
		[0.359]	[0.755]	[0.378]	[0.511]	[0.785]	[0.106]	[0.382]	[0.232]
English legal origin		3.193*	4.550**	3.786*	3.780*	12.796***	-0.121	3.780**	0.838
		[1.904]	[2.228]	[2.170]	[2.153]	[1.905]	[0.638]	[1.863]	[0.930]
French legal origin		1.143	0.927	1.094	1.309	11.679***	-0.813	1.805	-0.187
		[1.556]	[1.679]	[1.678]	[1.622]	[1.850]	[0.617]	[1.506]	[0.793]
German legal origin		[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]
Scandinavian legal origin		[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]	[omitted]
Latitude (logged)		-0.227	-0.650	0.008	-0.078	-0.145	-0.165	-0.206	-0.320
		[0.365]	[0.552]	[0.595]	[0.510]	[0.530]	[0.167]	[0.382]	[0.207]
Muslim		0.020	0.065	0.046*	0.070**	0.020	0.016***	0.016	0.014*
		[0.017]	[0.109]	[0.026]	[0.032]	[0.066]	[0.006]	[0.018]	[0.008]
OPEC		2.558*	2.725	2.840	1.928	-0.372	0.750	3.228*	0.676
		[1.484]	[1.713]	[2.066]	[1.543]	[1.988]	[0.743]	[1.688]	[0.800]
Protestant		0.007	-0.025	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.010	0.009	-0.004
		[0.016]	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.032]	[0.009]	[0.017]	[0.011]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.222*						
			[0.134]						
Ethnolinguistic fract.			5.517**						
			[2.391]						
Internal armed conflict			-1.423***						
			[0.548]						
External armed conflict			-2.370***						
			[0.834]						
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Observations	6265	5982	4230	4702	4493	72	18165	5226	4151
Countries	159	152	92	123	78	72	201	148	111
Years	103	103	102	103	101	1	114	103	103
R2 (pseudo)	0.0671	0.345	0.474	0.365	0.384	0.416		0.349	

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B1: **Federalism**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B1. Federalism: min = 1; max = 1; mean = 0.191; SD = 0.374; values = {0, 0.5, 1}.

Table B2: Subnational Government Layers

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Estimator	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit	O.logit
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**10**
Population (log)	0.670***	0.571***	0.701	0.592**	0.554	5.761**	0.379***	0.560***	0.032***
	[0.154]	[0.210]	[0.495]	[0.272]	[0.490]	[2.924]	[0.105]	[0.213]	[0.010]
Urbanization		0.304	-4.002	-4.294	-2.069	40.571	1.395	1.044	0.019
		[1.992]	[3.291]	[2.885]	[2.487]	[25.292]	[1.076]	[1.990]	[0.096]
GDPpc (logged)		-0.861**	0.219	0.084	-0.534	-11.315*	-0.341*	-1.015***	-0.035**
		[0.368]	[0.576]	[0.308]	[0.388]	[6.567]	[0.199]	[0.355]	[0.016]
English legal origin		-17.336	-19.806***	-18.205***	-18.597***	-1.916	-1.904**	-16.689***	-0.059
		[.]	[3.576]	[0.705]	[1.679]	[6.237]	[0.933]	[2.964]	[0.045]
French legal origin		-16.343***	-17.270***	-16.183***	-16.351	-7.512**	-1.134	-15.610***	0.008
		[1.461]	[1.581]	[1.277]	[.]	[3.012]	[0.928]	[2.747]	[0.032]
German legal origin		2.449	0.592	1.258	1.230	-3.370	0.816	2.898	0.096**
		[2.106]	[1.162]	[1.637]	[0.814]	[6.746]	[1.168]	[3.058]	[0.038]
Scandinavian legal origin		2.015	-6.435	-1.754	-2.862	-41.457	2.485	1.661	0.048
		[.]	[4.339]	[1.636]	[.]	[38.165]	[1.813]	[4.518]	[0.059]
Latitude (logged)		-0.480	-2.377	-0.506	-0.743	-16.798**	-0.017	-0.632	-0.017
		[0.458]	[1.621]	[0.613]	[0.944]	[7.729]	[0.237]	[0.581]	[0.015]
Muslim		-0.012	-0.015	-0.006	-0.001	0.178	-0.004	-0.012	-0.001*
		[0.008]	[0.022]	[0.011]	[0.019]	[0.172]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.000]
OPEC		0.163	16.245***	-0.130	0.447	-20.747*	0.515	0.787	0.005
		[1.430]	[2.067]	[1.570]	[2.113]	[11.799]	[0.785]	[1.362]	[0.053]
Protestant		0.015	0.112**	0.054***	0.072***	0.724	0.002	0.020	0.001
		[0.016]	[0.046]	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.516]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			-0.051						
			[0.093]						
Ethnolinguistic fract.			-1.199						
			[2.109]						
Internal armed conflict			0.983						
			[1.228]						
External armed conflict			-1.027**						
			[0.476]						
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Observations	13381	12414	8121	9778	8540	81	18165	8252	12016
Countries	167	155	104	154	81	81	201	152	152
Years	115	112	111	115	110	1	114	112	112
R2 (pseudo)	0.134	0.284	0.429	0.336	0.387	0.775		0.314	0.202

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B2: **Subnational Government Layers**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B2. Subnational government layers: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.931; SD = 0.176; values = {0, 0.5, 1}.

Table B3: Subnational Elections

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.033***	0.036***	0.052***	0.026***	0.027***	0.026**	0.030***	0.024**	0.003***	0.042***
	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.011]
Urbanization		0.079	-0.113	-0.124	-0.062	-0.175	0.042	0.056	0.007	0.068
		[0.111]	[0.094]	[0.114]	[0.105]	[0.163]	[0.085]	[0.114]	[0.009]	[0.100]
GDPpc (logged)		0.030	0.058***	0.014	0.050**	0.093**	0.005	0.013	0.001	0.025
		[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.026]	[0.023]	[0.039]	[0.016]	[0.026]	[0.002]	[0.021]
English legal origin		0.026	-0.086	0.090	0.055	0.111	-0.004	0.103	0.006	0.046
		[0.061]	[0.074]	[0.061]	[0.071]	[0.174]	[0.061]	[0.073]	[0.004]	[0.063]
French legal origin		-0.072	-0.157**	0.002	0.002	0.181	-0.090	-0.033	-0.004	-0.061
		[0.060]	[0.060]	[0.053]	[0.051]	[0.168]	[0.059]	[0.076]	[0.004]	[0.062]
German legal origin		0.139**	0.056	0.183***	0.147**	0.163	0.032	0.135*	0.015***	0.188***
		[0.062]	[0.078]	[0.060]	[0.059]	[0.153]	[0.076]	[0.078]	[0.005]	[0.070]
Scandinavian legal origin		-0.131	-0.206**	-0.137	-0.176*	-0.173	-0.224**	-0.081	-0.005	-0.109
		[0.091]	[0.099]	[0.091]	[0.096]	[0.179]	[0.093]	[0.100]	[0.007]	[0.094]
Latitude (logged)		0.006	-0.020	0.009	0.004	-0.095**	0.017	0.018	-0.001	0.002
		[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.029]	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.002]	[0.020]
Muslim		0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.003**	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
OPEC		-0.043	-0.107*	-0.030	-0.044	-0.025	-0.020	0.057	-0.003	-0.046
		[0.079]	[0.063]	[0.078]	[0.083]	[0.082]	[0.070]	[0.109]	[0.006]	[0.080]
Protestant		0.001	0.000	0.002	0.002*	0.002*	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.030***							
			[0.006]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.119							
			[0.090]							
Internal armed conflict			-0.056**							
			[0.023]							
External armed conflict			-0.027							
			[0.025]							
Lagged DV									0.921***	
									[0.015]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	13478	12512	8268	9924	8687	82	18165	8328	12402	12114
Countries	168	155	105	155	82	82	201	152	155	152
Years	115	112	111	115	110	1	114	112	111	112
R2	0.041	0.323	0.397	0.334	0.370	0.489	0.337	0.342	0.899	0.335

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B3: **Subnational Elections**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B3. Subnational elections: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.638; SD = 0.291.

Table B4: Autonomous Regions

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Estimator	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**10**
Population (log)	0.516***	0.651***	0.562	0.599***	0.543	1.290	0.640***	0.656***	0.236*
	[0.149]	[0.239]	[0.362]	[0.224]	[0.355]	[0.893]	[0.168]	[0.246]	[0.123]
Urbanization		-1.765	0.122	-2.012	0.292	-1.050	-0.274	-2.843	-0.893
		[2.628]	[2.913]	[2.065]	[3.060]	[3.637]	[1.531]	[2.518]	[1.168]
GDPpc (logged)		0.251	-0.283	0.264	-0.322	-4.301	-0.369	0.514	0.279
		[1.210]	[1.358]	[0.394]	[1.227]	[3.274]	[0.478]	[1.157]	[0.127]
English legal origin		15.690***	15.815***	16.021***	17.046***	20.511***	0.900	14.985***	5.036***
		[1.815]	[2.316]	[0.258]	[4.752]	[5.207]	[0.879]	[2.039]	[0.447]
French legal origin		16.407***	15.798***	16.492***	17.433***	21.073***	1.122	16.002***	5.506***
		[1.573]	[1.821]	[1.664]	[3.856]	[4.375]	[0.819]	[2.312]	[0.439]
German legal origin		-2.285	-2.086	-2.546	-18.622***		-1.406	-0.808	
		[2.679]	[2.820]	[1.627]	[2.860]		[1.172]	[1.749]	
Scandinavian legal origin		18.666***	19.995***	18.610***	19.807***	23.648***	3.774**	17.917***	6.603***
		[2.438]	[3.107]	[1.970]	[3.789]	[6.743]	[1.655]	[2.665]	[0.756]
Latitude (logged)		0.899	0.747	0.544	0.131	0.185	0.294	0.704	0.445
		[0.867]	[0.960]	[0.745]	[0.672]	[0.661]	[0.507]	[0.626]	[0.098]
Muslim		0.015	0.025	0.019*	-0.025	0.090	0.017*	0.015	0.006
		[0.010]	[0.019]	[0.011]	[0.029]	[0.063]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.003]
OPEC		0.772	0.388	0.721	1.355	3.881	0.604	-0.666	0.522
		[1.171]	[1.213]	[1.217]	[1.335]	[3.089]	[0.998]	[1.210]	[0.259]
Protestant		-0.024	-0.038**	-0.023	-0.024	-0.014	-0.024**	-0.020	-0.014
		[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.012]	[0.016]	[0.005]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.088						
			[0.099]						
Ethnolinguistic fract.			1.763						
			[1.395]						
Internal armed conflict			0.681						
			[0.613]						
External armed conflict			1.211						
			[0.862]						
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Observations	6139	5394	3702	3975	2844	66	6872	3409	4833
Countries	176	158	106	157	78	66	199	139	143
Years	38	37	37	38	37	1	39	37	37
R2 (pseudo)	0.102	0.315	0.375	0.309	0.324	0.485		0.284	

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B4: **Autonomous Regions**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 1 in Table B4. Autonomous regions: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.122; SD = 0.327; values = {0, 1}.

Table B5: Revenue Decentralization

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.046***	0.056***	0.077***	0.071***	0.053***	0.051**	0.023***	0.054***	0.004**	0.097***
	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.024]	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.021]
Urbanization		0.265	0.095	-0.140	0.125	0.633**	0.101*	0.247	0.006	0.245
		[0.176]	[0.176]	[0.162]	[0.205]	[0.305]	[0.052]	[0.200]	[0.014]	[0.188]
GDPpc (logged)		0.017	0.048	0.091	0.041	-0.122	0.007	0.009	0.007*	0.018
		[0.039]	[0.042]	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.084]	[0.012]	[0.045]	[0.004]	[0.043]
English legal origin		-0.785***	-0.625***	-0.459***	-0.657***	0.296	-0.152***	-0.085	-0.052***	-0.514***
		[0.159]	[0.133]	[0.144]	[0.205]	[0.219]	[0.054]	[0.142]	[0.017]	[0.146]
French legal origin		-0.900***	-0.813***	-0.652***	-0.827***	0.001	-0.164***	-0.265*	-0.057***	-0.671***
		[0.149]	[0.103]	[0.113]	[0.185]	[0.249]	[0.052]	[0.147]	[0.017]	[0.130]
German legal origin		-0.459***	-0.319***	-0.198**	-0.433***	0.544	0.067	0.203	-0.036***	-0.171**
		[0.103]	[0.095]	[0.080]	[0.119]	[0.328]	[0.098]	[0.193]	[0.010]	[0.085]
Scandinavian legal origin		-0.677***	-0.434***	-0.344**	-0.607**	0.362	-0.007	-0.003	-0.047***	-0.353*
		[0.185]	[0.148]	[0.154]	[0.236]	[0.393]	[0.099]	[0.232]	[0.017]	[0.184]
Latitude (logged)		-0.013	-0.008	-0.026	-0.015	0.027	-0.012	0.011	0.004*	-0.017
		[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.049]	[0.054]	[0.077]	[0.013]	[0.039]	[0.002]	[0.036]
Muslim		0.002**	0.002***	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.001**	0.002**	0.000	0.003***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
OPEC		-0.160**	-0.268***	-0.192***	-0.183***	-0.178*	-0.057	-0.137**	-0.012*	-0.233***
		[0.063]	[0.060]	[0.058]	[0.069]	[0.105]	[0.038]	[0.066]	[0.006]	[0.064]
Protestant		0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001**	0.001	0.000	0.001
		[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.000]	[0.002]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.006							
			[0.007]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.463***							
			[0.142]							
Internal armed conflict			-0.113**							
			[0.046]							
External armed conflict			0.007							
			[0.030]							
Lagged DV									0.943***	
									[0.016]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1398	1350	1047	1054	1014	49	7366	1108	1223	1295
Countries	103	99	71	76	63	49	200	86	96	96
Years	29	29	29	29	29	1	42	29	28	29
R2	0.102	0.560	0.697	0.603	0.580	0.649	0.200	0.593	0.980	0.528

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B5: **Revenue Decentralization**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B5. Revenue decentralization: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.282; SD = 0.241.

Table B6: Government Consumption

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	-0.014***	-0.011***	-0.013***	-0.005	-0.002	0.001	-0.011***	-0.006**	-0.001**	-0.011***
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.004]
Urbanization		0.069*	0.102**	0.083**	0.093**	0.132**	0.048	0.049	0.003	0.076*
		[0.035]	[0.046]	[0.039]	[0.037]	[0.051]	[0.030]	[0.035]	[0.004]	[0.039]
GDPpc (logged)		0.005	0.008	-0.008	0.011	0.023*	0.007	0.004	0.001	0.017*
		[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.013]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.001]	[0.009]
English legal origin		-0.076	-0.055	-0.053	-0.109*	-0.098	-0.030	0.042*	-0.007	-0.075
		[0.064]	[0.062]	[0.067]	[0.064]	[0.068]	[0.044]	[0.025]	[0.005]	[0.065]
French legal origin		-0.091	-0.078	-0.081	-0.121*	-0.108*	-0.033	0.024	-0.009*	-0.092
		[0.065]	[0.064]	[0.070]	[0.063]	[0.065]	[0.048]	[0.020]	[0.005]	[0.067]
German legal origin		-0.104*	-0.108**	-0.083	-0.123**	-0.132**	-0.047	-0.013	-0.010**	-0.119**
		[0.054]	[0.053]	[0.059]	[0.056]	[0.058]	[0.039]	[0.043]	[0.005]	[0.058]
Scandinavian legal origin		-0.039	-0.025	-0.017	-0.064	-0.016	0.001	0.075**	-0.003	-0.039
		[0.067]	[0.067]	[0.068]	[0.069]	[0.071]	[0.049]	[0.034]	[0.006]	[0.068]
Latitude (logged)		0.000	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.002	0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.004
		[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.001]	[0.007]
Muslim		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001**	0.000	0.000	-0.000*	-0.000	0.000
		[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
OPEC		-0.002	-0.001	0.009	-0.009	0.004	-0.011	0.001	-0.001	-0.004
		[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.027]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.002]	[0.017]
Protestant		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
		[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Democracy (lexical scale)			-0.001							
			[0.002]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			-0.003							
			[0.019]							
Internal armed conflict			0.005							
			[0.009]							
External armed conflict			0.035*							
			[0.019]							
Lagged DV									0.918***	
									[0.009]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6638	6449	4192	4357	3584	80	9132	4408	6265	5827
Countries	176	169	102	159	82	80	200	154	169	151
Years	51	51	51	51	51	1	53	51	50	51
R2	0.0853	0.285	0.369	0.360	0.466	0.621	0.203	0.382	0.894	0.319

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B6: **Government Consumption**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B6. Government consumption: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.188; SD = 0.092.

Table B7: Separate Powers

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Estimator	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**10**
Population (log)	0.050	0.232*	0.236	0.292**	0.268	0.692**	0.092	0.348	0.048
	[0.079]	[0.134]	[0.200]	[0.140]	[0.193]	[0.326]	[0.087]	[0.212]	[0.086]
Urbanization		0.389	-0.628	-1.833	0.130	1.221	1.336**	1.362	0.191
		[0.766]	[1.025]	[1.478]	[1.188]	[2.493]	[0.544]	[1.132]	[0.451]
GDPpc (logged)		-0.139	-0.091	0.142	-0.257	-0.740	-0.260**	-0.762**	-0.110
		[0.215]	[0.343]	[0.212]	[0.280]	[0.856]	[0.131]	[0.306]	[0.103]
English legal origin		2.043**	1.109	1.402*	1.618	30.295***	1.170**	1.025	1.058***
		[0.833]	[0.852]	[0.845]	[1.045]	[3.687]	[0.491]	[1.023]	[0.414]
French legal origin		2.184***	1.423**	1.949**	2.198***	33.005***	1.195**	0.693	1.171***
		[0.751]	[0.710]	[0.810]	[0.837]	[3.086]	[0.499]	[1.000]	[0.419]
German legal origin		1.583	0.629	1.204	1.608	18.689***	0.253	-1.334	
		[0.988]	[1.090]	[1.022]	[1.107]	[2.961]	[0.792]	[1.430]	
Scandinavian legal origin		2.476	1.305	1.464	1.799		1.264	1.771	1.256
		[1.730]	[1.707]	[1.853]	[1.859]		[1.539]	[1.859]	[0.768]
Latitude (logged)		-0.465**	-0.470*	-0.409	-0.425	-2.613**	-0.307**	-0.369	-0.237**
		[0.198]	[0.256]	[0.258]	[0.360]	[1.207]	[0.141]	[0.260]	[0.094]
Muslim		0.016***	0.011	0.012	-0.006	-0.029	0.013***	0.014**	0.009***
		[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.023]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.002]
OPEC		-1.283***	-1.032*	-1.064**	-0.932	-0.081	-1.065**	-0.767	-0.678**
		[0.491]	[0.610]	[0.505]	[0.573]	[1.188]	[0.415]	[0.760]	[0.255]
Protestant		0.007	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.035	0.003	-0.001	0.003
		[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.022]	[0.008]	[0.015]	[0.005]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.389						
			[0.766]						
Ethnolinguistic fract.			-0.139						
			[0.215]						
Internal armed conflict			2.043**						
			[0.833]						
External armed conflict			2.184***						
			[0.751]						
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Observations	13650	12442	8313	9984	8,716	78	19005	8076	11620
Countries	169	153	105	152	82	78	203	149	146
Years	115	112	111	115	110	1	114	112	112
R2 (pseudo)	0.001	0.314	0.361	0.359	0.364	0.505		0.444	

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B7: Separate Powers



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B7. Separate powers: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.232; SD = 0.422; values = {0, 1}.

Table B8: Divided Party Control

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.021***	0.023**	0.032***	0.028***	0.018	0.050	0.020**	0.020*	0.002**	0.024*
	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.012]	[0.009]	[0.011]	[0.030]	[0.008]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.013]
Urbanization		-0.065	-0.081	-0.121	-0.018	-0.259	-0.027	-0.038	-0.014	-0.041
		[0.101]	[0.134]	[0.136]	[0.129]	[0.328]	[0.089]	[0.114]	[0.010]	[0.099]
GDPpc (logged)		0.004	-0.018	0.036	0.037	0.094	-0.006	0.004	0.001	0.001
		[0.022]	[0.027]	[0.036]	[0.026]	[0.083]	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.002]	[0.023]
English legal origin		-0.072	-0.135*	-0.045	-0.140*	0.128	-0.017	-0.221***	0.002	-0.060
		[0.060]	[0.071]	[0.109]	[0.076]	[0.263]	[0.054]	[0.063]	[0.007]	[0.065]
French legal origin		-0.024	-0.108	0.035	-0.025	0.150	0.004	-0.126**	0.003	-0.020
		[0.050]	[0.067]	[0.108]	[0.066]	[0.250]	[0.047]	[0.052]	[0.006]	[0.057]
German legal origin		0.076	0.028	0.113	0.057	0.263	0.109*	-0.024	0.007	0.099
		[0.066]	[0.079]	[0.111]	[0.104]	[0.304]	[0.062]	[0.091]	[0.008]	[0.098]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.069	0.092	0.179	0.034	0.301	0.110	-0.051	0.020*	0.078
		[0.095]	[0.119]	[0.133]	[0.110]	[0.290]	[0.095]	[0.100]	[0.010]	[0.099]
Latitude (logged)		-0.004	-0.015	-0.008	-0.040	0.012	-0.017	-0.015	-0.002	-0.003
		[0.024]	[0.025]	[0.030]	[0.035]	[0.078]	[0.022]	[0.025]	[0.002]	[0.024]
Muslim		0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.002	-0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
OPEC		-0.022	-0.054	-0.169**	-0.039	-0.131	-0.025	-0.113	0.006	-0.037
		[0.078]	[0.067]	[0.077]	[0.095]	[0.112]	[0.075]	[0.068]	[0.006]	[0.079]
Protestant		0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.021***							
			[0.008]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.169*							
			[0.100]							
Internal armed conflict			-0.073***							
			[0.026]							
External armed conflict			-0.010							
			[0.028]							
Lagged DV									0.896***	
									[0.010]	
Electoral system FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	9210	8530	6219	4009	5886	76	9644	6448	12359	8264
Countries	164	153	102	123	80	76	182	148	157	150
Years	114	111	111	75	110	1	114	111	111	111
R2	0.039	0.117	0.152	0.196	0.142	0.291	0.119	0.131	0.822	0.079

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B8: **Divided Party Control**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B8. Divided party control: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.549; SD = 0.266.

Table B9: Decentralized Parties

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**10**
Population (log)	0.016	0.016*	0.030***	0.019*	0.021*	0.008	0.019***	0.019**	0.008
	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.011]
Urbanization		0.173**	0.121	0.073	0.222**	0.064	0.173***	0.240***	0.215***
		[0.081]	[0.079]	[0.107]	[0.089]	[0.135]	[0.048]	[0.085]	[0.078]
GDPpc (logged)		0.015	0.002	-0.013	-0.014	-0.035	0.001	0.004	0.003
		[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.020]	[0.038]	[0.010]	[0.020]	[0.016]
English legal origin		0.043	0.036	0.084	0.062	0.264**	0.047	-0.018	0.055
		[0.046]	[0.053]	[0.054]	[0.064]	[0.107]	[0.044]	[0.042]	[0.043]
French legal origin		-0.070*	-0.095**	-0.030	-0.048	0.160*	-0.068	-0.175***	-0.059
		[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.042]	[0.045]	[0.081]	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.039]
German legal origin		0.090	0.083	0.126	0.092	0.246**	0.046	-0.044	0.106
		[0.081]	[0.077]	[0.077]	[0.089]	[0.117]	[0.073]	[0.107]	[0.086]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.010	-0.093	-0.004	-0.017	0.214	0.055	-0.046	0.009
		[0.093]	[0.097]	[0.106]	[0.116]	[0.159]	[0.085]	[0.094]	[0.094]
Latitude (logged)		0.004	-0.000	0.029	0.037*	0.027	-0.006	0.009	0.005
		[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.015]
Muslim		0.000	0.002**	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000
		[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
OPEC		-0.000	-0.058**	0.024	0.011	0.047	0.003	-0.012	0.007
		[0.036]	[0.026]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.074]	[0.032]	[0.031]	[0.034]
Protestant		0.002**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.002	0.001**	0.001	0.002**
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.024***						
			[0.003]						
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.033						
			[0.051]						
Internal armed conflict			0.024						
			[0.016]						
External armed conflict			-0.005						
			[0.014]						
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Observations	13509	12539	8216	9870	8621	82	18165	8338	12141
Countries	169	157	105	156	82	82	201	154	154
Years	115	112	111	115	110	1	114	112	112
R2	0.017	0.489	0.620	0.533	0.562	0.529	0.435	0.569	0.499

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B9: **Decentralized Parties**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B9. Decentralized parties: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.339; SD = 0.199.

Table B10: Judicial Review

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**10**
Population (log)	0.003	0.018	0.011	0.006	0.011	0.020	0.020**	0.017	0.026*
	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Urbanization		0.187*	0.228**	0.392***	0.311**	0.043	0.169***	0.215**	0.188**
		[0.096]	[0.104]	[0.142]	[0.119]	[0.156]	[0.060]	[0.100]	[0.096]
GDPpc (logged)		0.006	-0.036	-0.000	0.021	-0.007	0.014	0.000	0.002
		[0.023]	[0.033]	[0.024]	[0.025]	[0.042]	[0.015]	[0.025]	[0.023]
English legal origin		0.321***	0.314***	0.239***	0.161*	0.760***	0.240***	0.122	0.298***
		[0.100]	[0.112]	[0.086]	[0.092]	[0.158]	[0.071]	[0.129]	[0.102]
French legal origin		0.234**	0.196*	0.212**	0.182*	0.743***	0.165**	-0.002	0.210*
		[0.108]	[0.115]	[0.097]	[0.099]	[0.143]	[0.077]	[0.146]	[0.111]
German legal origin		0.341***	0.294***	0.270***	0.218**	0.697***	0.223***	0.016	0.293**
		[0.096]	[0.110]	[0.088]	[0.097]	[0.157]	[0.081]	[0.162]	[0.114]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.535***	0.535***	0.493***	0.447***	0.962***	0.432***	0.341**	0.517***
		[0.143]	[0.155]	[0.145]	[0.142]	[0.200]	[0.123]	[0.167]	[0.144]
Latitude (logged)		-0.032	-0.072**	-0.066**	-0.095**	0.006	-0.028	-0.024	-0.034
		[0.025]	[0.034]	[0.032]	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.021]	[0.026]	[0.025]
Muslim		-0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
OPEC		-0.134	-0.074	-0.112	-0.131	-0.262**	-0.097	-0.116	-0.138
		[0.088]	[0.089]	[0.088]	[0.093]	[0.122]	[0.074]	[0.102]	[0.087]
Protestant		-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.003**	-0.003*	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.003***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.047***						
			[0.008]						
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.092						
			[0.083]						
Internal armed conflict			0.024						
			[0.028]						
External armed conflict			-0.084***						
			[0.030]						
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Observations	13605	12659	8318	9977	8722	82	18165	8397	12261
Countries	169	157	105	156	82	82	201	154	154
Years	115	112	111	115	110	1	114	112	112
R2	0.0002	0.307	0.428	0.339	0.344	0.637	0.321	0.343	0.297

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B10: Judicial Review



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B10. Judicial review: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.543; SD = 0.293.

Table B11: Bicameralism

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.041***	0.055***	0.067***	0.056***	0.070***	0.091***	0.202***	0.071***	0.004***	0.042***
	[0.012]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.012]	[0.001]	[0.012]
Urbanization		0.260**	0.491***	0.343**	0.444***	0.151	0.665**	0.362***	0.016*	0.376***
		[0.100]	[0.154]	[0.146]	[0.134]	[0.240]	[0.313]	[0.116]	[0.009]	[0.125]
GDPpc (logged)		0.022	0.025	-0.054**	-0.004	-0.009	0.095	0.009	0.001	0.005
		[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.025]	[0.027]	[0.076]	[0.060]	[0.022]	[0.002]	[0.023]
English legal origin		0.040	-0.129	0.088	0.059	0.346	0.118	-0.025	0.000	0.114
		[0.073]	[0.080]	[0.079]	[0.081]	[0.210]	[0.199]	[0.122]	[0.006]	[0.074]
French legal origin		0.032	-0.076	0.091	0.072	0.298*	0.020	-0.029	-0.001	0.096
		[0.085]	[0.081]	[0.095]	[0.092]	[0.172]	[0.241]	[0.143]	[0.007]	[0.083]
German legal origin		0.250*	0.120	0.325**	0.294*	0.475**	0.641*	0.247	0.014	0.376**
		[0.128]	[0.130]	[0.157]	[0.173]	[0.221]	[0.366]	[0.227]	[0.010]	[0.150]
Scandinavian legal origin		-0.044	-0.197	-0.020	0.008	0.132	-0.350	-0.113	-0.008	0.027
		[0.139]	[0.149]	[0.148]	[0.153]	[0.271]	[0.509]	[0.171]	[0.011]	[0.136]
Latitude (logged)		0.008	-0.034	-0.003	-0.008	0.074	0.036	0.017	0.000	0.008
		[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.033]	[0.040]	[0.066]	[0.059]	[0.026]	[0.002]	[0.021]
Muslim		-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.004**	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
OPEC		-0.033	-0.046	-0.005	-0.045	-0.185	-0.147	-0.035	-0.003	-0.032
		[0.059]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.067]	[0.131]	[0.203]	[0.087]	[0.004]	[0.061]
Protestant		0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.001	0.000	0.001
		[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.039***							
			[0.008]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.034							
			[0.100]							
Internal armed conflict			-0.012							
			[0.028]							
External armed conflict			-0.054							
			[0.034]							
Lagged DV									0.926***	
									[0.008]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	14110	13051	8271	10189	8903	83	18165	8725	12907	12196
Countries	178	165	105	161	84	83	201	163	165	154
Years	115	112	111	115	110	1	114	112	111	112
R2	0.044	0.281	0.337	0.246	0.278	0.390	0.327	0.403	0.895	0.279

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B11: **Bicameralism**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B11. Bicameralism: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.344; SD = 0.328.

Table B12: Legislative Fractionalization

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	RE	Tobit
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.019	0.016	0.010	0.024**	0.019*	0.036**	0.029***	0.010	0.001	0.001
	[0.017]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.011]
Urbanization		0.059	0.134	-0.079	-0.055	-0.351*	0.175**	-0.013	0.008	0.136
		[0.113]	[0.087]	[0.145]	[0.124]	[0.177]	[0.077]	[0.087]	[0.010]	[0.084]
GDPpc (logged)		0.015	-0.024	0.062**	0.048*	0.111**	-0.005	0.010	-0.003	0.024
		[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.002]	[0.021]
English legal origin		0.666***	0.393***	0.556***	0.569***	0.417***	0.174***	-0.093	0.036***	0.451***
		[0.115]	[0.088]	[0.122]	[0.134]	[0.156]	[0.060]	[0.127]	[0.008]	[0.068]
French legal origin		0.659***	0.419***	0.624***	0.642***	0.612***	0.165***	-0.033	0.036***	0.450***
		[0.116]	[0.095]	[0.120]	[0.132]	[0.142]	[0.061]	[0.121]	[0.007]	[0.067]
German legal origin		0.765***	0.539***	0.685***	0.696***	0.642***	0.259***	-0.009	0.043***	0.536***
		[0.113]	[0.094]	[0.120]	[0.135]	[0.148]	[0.067]	[0.130]	[0.008]	[0.068]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.813***	0.610***	0.731***	0.746***	0.540***	0.283***	0.034	0.047***	0.598***
		[0.131]	[0.110]	[0.134]	[0.143]	[0.170]	[0.084]	[0.141]	[0.010]	[0.093]
Latitude (logged)		0.028	-0.005	0.018	0.012	0.008	-0.002	0.005	0.001	-0.003
		[0.024]	[0.014]	[0.027]	[0.038]	[0.046]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.002]	[0.017]
Muslim		-0.003***	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.004**	-0.002	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.000***	-0.002***
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
OPEC		-0.043	-0.067	-0.077	-0.066	-0.075	-0.043	0.123***	-0.002	-0.036
		[0.095]	[0.071]	[0.087]	[0.095]	[0.125]	[0.049]	[0.045]	[0.006]	[0.076]
Protestant		-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.002*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.082***							
			[0.008]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.019							
			[0.067]							
Internal armed conflict			0.038							
			[0.028]							
External armed conflict			0.051*							
			[0.028]							
Lagged DV									0.922***	
									[0.006]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	8466	7995	5554	6455	5115	79	21889	6023	7727	7634
Countries	156	149	105	146	82	79	201	141	149	142
Years	212	211	111	163	110	1	214	211	211	199
R2 (pseudo)	0.006	0.608	0.968	0.762	0.851	14.15	0.389	-4.830	0.923	

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B12: **Legislative Fractionalization**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B12. Legislative fractionalization: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.477; SD = 0.289.

Table B13: Political Constraints

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	RE	Tobit
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.068**	0.044***	0.022**	0.035**	0.021	0.033*	0.029***	0.028**	0.002***	0.005
	[0.030]	[0.016]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]	[0.006]	[0.011]	[0.001]	[0.012]
Urbanization		0.249	0.143	0.153	0.113	-0.664***	0.148**	0.150	0.007	0.172*
		[0.174]	[0.124]	[0.184]	[0.182]	[0.188]	[0.068]	[0.154]	[0.010]	[0.100]
GDPpc (logged)		0.046	-0.000	0.029	0.114***	0.176***	0.028***	-0.004	0.003**	0.042***
		[0.033]	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.041]	[0.047]	[0.010]	[0.029]	[0.001]	[0.016]
English legal origin		0.676***	0.281***	0.603***	0.507***	0.498***	0.112**	0.336**	0.024***	0.225***
		[0.141]	[0.105]	[0.131]	[0.151]	[0.182]	[0.051]	[0.165]	[0.005]	[0.044]
French legal origin		0.608***	0.270***	0.618***	0.553***	0.692***	0.107**	0.321**	0.024***	0.203***
		[0.134]	[0.104]	[0.121]	[0.128]	[0.158]	[0.053]	[0.159]	[0.005]	[0.041]
German legal origin		0.785***	0.445***	0.813***	0.684***	0.737***	0.158**	0.437**	0.031***	0.285***
		[0.158]	[0.123]	[0.150]	[0.148]	[0.162]	[0.073]	[0.177]	[0.006]	[0.059]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.600***	0.339**	0.535***	0.520***	0.439**	0.115	0.329*	0.021**	0.215**
		[0.172]	[0.142]	[0.162]	[0.177]	[0.218]	[0.089]	[0.191]	[0.009]	[0.097]
Latitude (logged)		0.062*	0.022	0.031	0.009	0.051	0.023*	0.048*	0.002	0.014
		[0.034]	[0.024]	[0.039]	[0.049]	[0.053]	[0.012]	[0.027]	[0.002]	[0.016]
Muslim		-0.003***	-0.001*	-0.003***	-0.005***	-0.006***	-0.001***	-0.003***	-0.000***	-0.001**
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
OPEC		-0.269***	-0.160**	-0.199**	-0.257**	-0.063	-0.081**	-0.033	-0.009**	-0.093**
		[0.104]	[0.076]	[0.101]	[0.107]	[0.146]	[0.035]	[0.083]	[0.004]	[0.043]
Protestant		0.002	0.000	0.004**	0.003	0.002	0.001*	0.001	0.000*	0.001
		[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.249							
			[0.174]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			0.046							
			[0.033]							
Internal armed conflict			0.676***							
			[0.141]							
External armed conflict			0.608***							
			[0.134]							
Lagged DV									0.903***	
									[0.007]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	14389	13587	7975	10070	7416	85	21889	7226	13380	12807
Countries	164	156	107	155	85	85	201	152	156	147
Years	212	211	111	163	110	1	214	211	211	199
R2 (pseudo)	0.018	0.454	0.713	0.457	0.471	1.008	0.468	0.477	0.908	

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B13: **Political Constraints**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B13. Political constraints: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.220; SD = 0.290.

Table B14: Checks & Balances

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	0.008	0.024***	0.019***	0.029***	0.030***	0.040***	0.027***	0.018***	0.003***	0.028***
	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.001]	[0.009]
Urbanization		0.031	0.103*	-0.012	-0.074	-0.111	0.110**	0.025	0.010	0.044
		[0.060]	[0.062]	[0.070]	[0.068]	[0.107]	[0.047]	[0.069]	[0.009]	[0.065]
GDPpc (logged)		0.034**	-0.002	0.029*	0.042**	0.055*	0.009	0.025	0.001	0.043**
		[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.033]	[0.012]	[0.019]	[0.002]	[0.018]
English legal origin		0.335***	0.134***	0.363***	0.347***	0.422***	0.239***	0.321***	0.052***	0.351***
		[0.038]	[0.036]	[0.037]	[0.047]	[0.073]	[0.047]	[0.065]	[0.007]	[0.037]
French legal origin		0.277***	0.055*	0.289***	0.282***	0.422***	0.188***	0.249***	0.044***	0.282***
		[0.034]	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.033]	[0.043]	[0.046]	[0.064]	[0.006]	[0.034]
German legal origin		0.270***	0.061*	0.308***	0.275***	0.409***	0.221***	0.245***	0.043***	0.306***
		[0.042]	[0.034]	[0.038]	[0.052]	[0.071]	[0.050]	[0.069]	[0.006]	[0.041]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.386***	0.244***	0.473***	0.419***	0.546***	0.308***	0.369***	0.063***	0.436***
		[0.060]	[0.073]	[0.059]	[0.069]	[0.109]	[0.066]	[0.076]	[0.009]	[0.061]
Latitude (logged)		0.015	-0.027**	-0.017	-0.026*	-0.011	0.001	0.008	0.000	0.004
		[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.024]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.002]	[0.011]
Muslim		-0.001**	0.000	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002*	-0.001***	-0.001*	-0.000***	-0.001**
		[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.000]
OPEC		-0.088**	-0.062*	-0.071*	-0.076	-0.156***	-0.080**	-0.032	-0.009*	-0.099***
		[0.036]	[0.036]	[0.042]	[0.046]	[0.059]	[0.032]	[0.059]	[0.005]	[0.038]
Protestant		-0.001	-0.002**	-0.001**	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001*
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Democracy (lexical scale)			0.064***							
			[0.003]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			-0.012							
			[0.030]							
Internal armed conflict			-0.003							
			[0.015]							
External armed conflict			-0.009							
			[0.016]							
Lagged DV									0.872***	
									[0.009]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	6004	5622	3677	4038	3048	83	6872	3614	5425	5086
Countries	177	168	107	167	85	83	199	149	168	153
Years	38	37	37	38	37	1	39	37	36	37
R2	0.004	0.507	0.733	0.511	0.587	0.746	0.459	0.249	0.883	0.502

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B14: **Checks & Balances**



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B14. Checks & balances: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.246; SD = 0.229.

Table B15: Capital City

Analysis	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Panel	Pooled
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	RE	OLS
Population	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-50	1900	1900	t-1	t-1	t-1	t-1, IV
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	2000	Imputed	Electoral	Full	Full
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (log)	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.024***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.017***	-0.031***	-0.030***	-0.000*	-0.036***
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.003]
Urbanization		0.157***	0.167***	0.169***	0.171***	0.156***	0.134***	0.145***	0.001	0.251***
		[0.026]	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.029]	[0.001]	[0.032]
GDPpc (logged)		-0.005	-0.009	-0.003	-0.006	-0.018**	-0.001	-0.007	0.000	-0.005
		[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.000]	[0.006]
English legal origin		0.025*	0.023	0.010	0.011	0.053**	0.023	0.026	-0.000	0.017
		[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.000]	[0.014]
French legal origin		0.038***	0.046**	0.023	0.023*	0.046**	0.026*	0.039**	0.000	0.024*
		[0.014]	[0.021]	[0.016]	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.000]	[0.012]
German legal origin		0.066***	0.086***	0.066***	0.073***	0.084***	0.046***	0.044*	0.001*	0.074***
		[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.030]	[0.016]	[0.023]	[0.000]	[0.020]
Scandinavian legal origin		0.037	0.106***	0.069**	0.119***	0.173***	0.059**	0.039	0.000	0.039
		[0.023]	[0.040]	[0.033]	[0.036]	[0.041]	[0.026]	[0.028]	[0.000]	[0.028]
Latitude (logged)		-0.004	0.007	0.001	0.014	0.016**	0.001	-0.005	-0.000	-0.002
		[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.000]	[0.007]
Muslim		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
OPEC		-0.023*	-0.001	-0.022	-0.007	-0.023	-0.004	-0.037***	-0.000	-0.023*
		[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.000]	[0.013]
Protestant		-0.000	-0.001*	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001**
		[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Democracy (lexical scale)			-0.001							
			[0.001]							
Ethnolinguistic fract.			-0.003							
			[0.019]							
Internal armed conflict			-0.003							
			[0.006]							
External armed conflict			0.002							
			[0.007]							
Lagged DV									0.985***	
									[0.005]	
Region FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	22856	22311	8057	13814	9166	84	21889	15183	22233	19402
Countries	185	179	105	177	86	84	201	176	179	154
Years	210	210	110	161	109	1	214	210	209	198
R2	0.338	0.557	0.532	0.443	0.581	0.671	0.462	0.557	0.989	0.419

Right-side variables measured at t-1 except in Model 4, where they are measured at t-50 and Models 5-6, where population is measured in 1900. Standard errors clustered by country except in model 6 where they are robust. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Figure B15: Capital City



Predictive margins for population (logged), holding other variables at their means, using Model 2 in Table B15.
Capital city: min = 0; max = 1; mean = 0.450; SD = 0.117.

Table B16: Countries covered by each measure of power concentration

	Tables														
Countries	*B1*	*B2*	*B3*	*B4*	*B5*	*B6*	*B7*	*B8*	*B9*	*B10*	*B11*	*B12*	*B13*	*B14*	*B15*
Afghanistan		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Albania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Algeria	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Andorra	Y														Y
Angola	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Antigua and Barbuda	Y					Y									Y
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Armenia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Australia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Austria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Azerbaijan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bahamas	Y			Y		Y								Y	Y
Bahrain				Y	Y	Y					Y		Y	Y	Y
Bangladesh	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Barbados	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Belarus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belgium	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Belize	Y			Y		Y					Y			Y	Y
Benin	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bhutan		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Bolivia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Botswana	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brazil	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Brunei				Y		Y					Y			Y	
Bulgaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burkina Faso		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burma (Myanmar)	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burundi	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cambodia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Canada	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cape Verde	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Central African Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chad	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Chile	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
China		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Colombia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoros	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congo, Democratic Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congo, Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Costa Rica	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Croatia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cuba	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cyprus	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czech Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Djibouti		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominica	Y					Y					Y				Y
Dominican Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
East Timor		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Egypt	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
El Salvador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Equatorial Guinea	Y			Y		Y						Y	Y	Y	Y
Eritrea		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Estonia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethiopia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Fiji	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Finland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
France	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Georgia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
German Democratic Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Germany	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ghana	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Greece	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Grenada	Y			Y		Y					Y			Y	Y
Guatemala	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea-Bissau	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guyana	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Haiti	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Honduras	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hong Kong											Y		Y		Y
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iceland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
India	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iraq		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ireland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Israel	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Italy	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ivory Coast		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jamaica	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Japan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Jordan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kazakhstan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kiribati	Y					Y									Y
Korea, North		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Korea, South	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kosovo		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Kuwait				Y		Y					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kyrgyzstan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Laos	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latvia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Leban	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Liberia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Libya		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Liechtenstein	Y														Y
Lithuania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Luxembourg	Y			Y	Y	Y					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Macedonia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Madagascar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malaysia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Mali	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malta	Y			Y		Y					Y			Y	Y
Marshall Islands	Y														Y
Mauritania		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mexico	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Micronesia, Federated States	Y														Y
Moldova	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Monaco	Y														Y
Mongolia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Montenegro		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				

Morocco		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Namibia	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nauru	Y														Y
Nepal	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Netherlands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
New Zealand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nicaragua	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Niger	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nigeria	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oman				Y		Y							Y	Y	Y
Pakistan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Palau	Y														Y
Palestine, British Mandate		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Palestine, Gaza		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Palestine, West Bank		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
Panama	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Papua New Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Paraguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Peru	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Philippines	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Portugal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Qatar				Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Romania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Russia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Y					Y									Y
Saint Lucia	Y			Y		Y								Y	Y
Saint Vincent and Grenadines	Y					Y									Y
Samoa	Y			Y										Y	Y
San Mari	Y														Y
Sao Tome and Principe	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y
Saudi Arabia		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y
Senegal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Serbia		Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
Seychelles	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				Y
Sierra Leone	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Singapore	Y			Y		Y					Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Slovakia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Slovenia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Solomon Islands	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Somalia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Somaliland		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y				
South Africa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
South Sudan		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	
South Yemen		Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sri Lanka	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sudan	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Suriname	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Swaziland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switzerland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Syria		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Taiwan	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Tajikistan		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tanzania		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Togo	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tonga						Y									Y
Trinidad and Tobago	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tunisia		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Turkey	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Turkmenistan		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tuvalu															Y
Uganda		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ukraine	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United Arab Emirates				Y		Y							Y	Y	Y
United Kingdom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
United States	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uzbekistan		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vanuatu	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y			Y	Y
Venezuela	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vietnam, Democratic Republic		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vietnam, Republic		Y	Y				Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y		
Yemen		Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zambia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zanzibar							Y	Y	Y	Y					
Zimbabwe	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

APPENDIX C: Within-country tests

Problems of causal inference often arise when nation-states form the primary units of analysis. For better identification strategies we turn to within-country tests. Institutional forms do not vary as much within countries as across countries, limiting our choice of outcome measures. Nonetheless, there is substantial variation in the degree to which power is concentrated within states, counties, and cities across the United States, and such variation as exists is less subject to confounding.

While many studies have exploited subnational variation in the US to understand the impact of (de)centralization on the quality of governance (e.g., Zax 1989), few have studied the sources of power concentration and only two studies explore the relationship with size. Wallis & Oates (1988) examines revenue decentralization across the fifty states and Clark (1968: 585) briefly reports on community structures across fifty-one localities. Results from these studies provide some support for our thesis, despite limitations in sample size and in the purview of outcomes surveyed.

Tests

In the analyses that follow, reported in Table C3, we explore institutional variation at state, county, and city levels. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Table C1 and descriptive statistics in Table C2. As previously, all outcomes are re-scaled from 0-1 to facilitate comparisons.

Table C1: Variable Definitions

Left-side Variables
City-county share total expenditures. Share of state expenditures attributed to cities and counties. Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. *state_localshare_exp*
City-county share total revenue. Share of state revenue attributed to cities and counties. Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. *state_localshare_genrev*
Special purpose governments. Number of governmental bodies designated as special purpose within the state. Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. *state_spgs*
Independent school districts. Number of independent school districts operating within the state. Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. *state_indep_schooldsts*
CSS0 selection. Chief State School Officer is appointed (=0) or elected (=1) by direct ballot. Source: National Association of State Boards of Education (2016). *state_selection_csso*
City share city-county expenditures. Share of county and local expenditures attributed to cities. Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. *county_cityshare_exp*
City share city-county revenue. Share of county and local revenue attributed to cities. Source: 1942-2012 Census of Governments. *county_cityshare_rev*
Executive veto. Chief executive can veto council legislation. Source: ICMA. *city_mayoral_veto*
Executive term-limits. Chief executive is limited to a fixed number of terms in office. Source: ICMA. *city_term_limits_mayor*
Mayor-council government. City has a mayor-council form of government (=1) rather than a council-manager or commission format (=0). Source: ICMA. *city_mayor_council*
Right-side Variables
Population. City, county, and state population, transformed by the natural logarithm. Source: U.S. Census. *city_logpop, state_logpop2012, county_logpop2000*
Income per capita. Income per capita by municipality, county, and state. Source: U.S. Census & ICPSR County Characteristics, 2000-2007. *city_incomepercapitainterp*, *county_percapita_perincome05, state_ lnincome*
Urbanization. Urban population as share of total population at state and municipal level. Source: U.S. Census. Rural-Urban Continuum code at county levels. Source: ICPSR County Characteristics, 2000-2007. *state_percent_urban, city_urbanpctpop, county_RuralurbanContinuumCode*
Democratic vote. For states, the percentage of votes received by the Democratic presidential candidate for the closest election year. Source: Federal Election Commission. At county-level, percent of voters that cast their ballot for John Kerry in 2004 presidential election. Source: ICPSR County Characteristics, 2000-2007. *county_PctKerry04state_pctdemvote*
College. Percentage of residents with a bachelor's degree or higher. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey. *state_bachelorplus*
Unemployment. Statewide unemployment rate. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey. *state_unemploymentrate*
Percent minority. Percent of residents in state or county that are non-white or of Hispanic/Latino origin. Source: U.S. Census. *state_percent_minority, county_Per_Minority00*
Region. Dummies for West, Midwest, Northeast, and South. Source: Authors. *state_region*
Black. Percentage of municipal residents that identify as black. Source: U.S. Census. *city_pctblkpopinterp*
Asian. Percentage of municipal residents that identify as Asian. Source: U.S. Census. *city_pctasianpopinterp*
Latino. Percentage of municipal residents that identify as Latino/Hispanic. Source: U.S. Census. *city_pctlatinopopinterp*

Table C2: Descriptive Statistics

Left-side variables	**Obs**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
City-county share total expenditures	348	0.488	0.172	0	1
City-county share total revenue	348	0.556	0.172	0	1
Special purpose governments	352	0.165	0.188	0	1
Independent school districts	355	0.076	0.139	0	1
CSSO selection	366	0.271	0.445	0	1
City share city-county expenditures	2,677	0.703	0.221	0	1
City share city-county revenue	2,676	0.679	0.232	0	1
Executive veto	23,559	0.291	0.454	0	1
Executive term limits	24,224	0.080	0.271	0	1
Mayor-council form of government	25,237	0.364	0.481	0	1
Right-side variables					
Population (logged, state)	356	14.771	1.085	11.192	17.453
Population (logged, county)	3,003	10.196	1.380	4.205	16.069
Population (logged, city)	19,753	9.252	1.237	3.091	15.136
Income per capita (logged, state)	306	9.058	1.115	6.874	11.221
Income per capita (logged, county)	3,086	10.192	0.218	8.546	11.444
Income per capita (logged, city)	19,737	10.542	2.340	8.363	23.024
Urbanization (state)	356	65.626	17.582	19.8	100
Urbanization (county)	3,143	5.129	1.682	1	9
Urbanization (city)	20,270	38.729	40.521	0	100
Democratic vote share (state)	353	45.702	12.062	19.6	95.7
Democratic vote share (county)	3,113	38.754	12.520	7.1	89.18
College	357	13.204	7.375	0	39.1
Unemployment	255	5.985	2.595	2.3	34.7
Percent minority (state)	354	16.974	15.277	0.1	77.3
Percent minority (county)	3,143	15.770	18.152	0.132	97.76
Region	357	2.588	1.193	1	4
Black	19,735	0.097	0.818	0	84.4
Asian	19,735	0.027	0.415	0	54.8
Latino	19,735	0.095	0.259	0	22.4
Territory (logged, state)	357	11.481	1.466	5.063	14.221
Territory (logged, county)	3,140	6.492	0.908	0.688	11.891
Territory (logged, city)	22,026	2.598	1.141	-2.302	8.918

Table C3: Within-Country Tests

Polities	State					County		City		
Outcome	City-county/ total expenditures	City-county/ total revenue	Special purpose governments	Independent school districts	CSSO selection	City/total expenditure	City/total revenue	Executive veto	Executive term limit	Mayor-council
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Logit	OLS	OLS	Logit	Logit	Logit
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	pop>50k
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population (ln)	0.104***	0.124***	0.124***	0.028***	1.713**	0.044***	0.043***	0.212***	0.460***	0.380**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.626)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.193)
Polities	51	51	51	51	51	3,153	3,153	7,503	7,503	2,225
Years	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	2000	2000	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011
Obs	250	250	252	253	200	2,642	2,641	16,955	16,439	1,903
R2	0.612	0.610	0.419	0.475	0.196	0.757	0.787	0.079	0.100	0.237

Data drawn from states, counties, and cities in the United States. Covariates for state-level analyses: Income per capita, urbanization, Democratic vote share, College, Unemployment, Minority (%), Region (dummies). Covariates for county-level analyses: Urbanization, Minority (%), Income per capita, Democratic vote, State (dummies). Covariates for city-level analyses: Urbanization, Black (%), Asian (%), Latino (%), Income per capita, County (dummies). County analyses are cross-sectional. State and city analyses represent a short panel, with standard errors clustered at the state and city level, respectively. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

At the *state* level, we employ five measures of power concentration: city-county share of expenditures (Model 1), city-county share of revenue (Model 2), the number of special purpose governments (Model 3), the number of independent school districts (Model 4), and the method of selection for the Chief State School Officer (CSSO), which may be either appointive or elective (Model 5). Measures of fiscal decentralization are widely used in crossnational studies (see Table 1) as well as in studies focused on the United States (Wallis and Oates 1988; Xie et al. 1998; Zax 1989). The number of special purpose governments and independent school districts is viewed as a key measure of political concentration in federalist systems (Foster 1993; Hammond et al. 2011; Nelson & Foster 1999). An elective CSSO presumably signals the independence of this official relative to other elected officials. All model specifications include a range of covariates that may affect power concentration, and may (plausibly) serve to block confounders: GDP per capita, urbanization, party control of state government, post-secondary education, unemployment, median household income, percent minority, and regional dummies (South, Northeast, Midwest, West).

County-level analyses focus on revenue decentralization (Model 6) or expenditure decentralization (Model 7), i.e., fiscal instruments controlled by cities as a share of total city-county revenue or expenditures. These specifications include covariates measuring urbanization, percent minority, income per capita, Democratic presidential vote, and state dummies.

At the *city* level, we are able to test three measures of power concentration. In Model 8 we examine executive veto power – the ability of the top official (usually a mayor) to veto council legislation. In Model 9, we look at executive term limits, i.e., the imposition of any sort of term limit on the chief executive (usually a mayor). In Model 10, we focus on the choice of a mayor-council form of government – as opposed to a council-manager or commission format. Note that because very small cities often cannot afford to hire a city manager they may be constrained to adopt a mayor-council form of government where the mayor serves pro bono or for a nominal salary. This

cost-constraint, which hinges on the willingness of elected officials to accept lower remuneration than appointed officials, lies outside the scope of our theory and has no plausible applicability to larger polities such as nation-states. Consequently, we limit the analysis in Model 10 to cities of at least 50,000 citizens. Data for city-level analyses are drawn from municipal surveys conducted by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) over six years – 1986, 1992, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 – generating a short panel. Specifications include covariates measuring urbanization, percent black, Latino, and Asian, income per capita, and county dummies. This means that comparisons are being drawn across cities within the same county. To protect against serial correlation in this short panel standard errors are clustered by city.

Analyses at all three levels support our contention that the size of a polity influences the way its institutions are structured, with larger polities developing less concentrated systems of rule. Judging by the estimated coefficients the effects are sizeable. For example, moving from a state with a population in the 25th percentile to a state with a population in the 75th percentile increases the probability of a directly elected CSSO by nearly 47 percent. Moreover, the impact of population on power concentration is consistent across all measured outcomes, as shown in Table C3. Indeed, population is the only variable among those tested in the foregoing models – including income, education, urbanization, minority share, and partisanship – that consistently predicts these outcomes in within-country analyses, as shown in Appendix C.

For a variety of reasons, which may now be summarized, we are fairly confident that the relationships depicted in Table C3 are causal. First, analyses below the state level enlist very large samples. Instead of 100+ nation-states we are able to draw upon 3,000+ counties and 7,000+ cities. This diminishes the possibility of stochastic error as well as problems of collinearity among right-side variables. Second, the possibility of X:Y endogeneity seems remote. Even if Tiebout sorting occurs, it is unlikely that varying levels of concentration across units have systematic effects on the

quality of governance sufficient to stimulate widespread patterns of migration. Third, the borders of subnational units, while by no means random, are unlikely to be affected by the outcome of interest, as they might be at national levels. Fourth, subnational units within a single country share many background characteristics, limiting the number of potential confounders. Ceteris paribus conditions are especially strong when comparing counties within a single state (using state fixed effects) or cities within a single county (using county fixed effects). Indeed, county- and city-level analyses are remarkably stable in the face of changes in specification, reflecting the large sample and the fact that covariates are not highly correlated with the variable of theoretical interest (population). Finally, the possibility of omitted confounders seems remote given that we have been able to measure, and condition on, many factors that might influence – or that might be correlated with factors that influence – institutional choices.

Table C4: State-level Outcomes (US)

Outcomes	City-county/total expenditure		City-county/total revenue		Special purpose governments		Independent school districts		CSSO selection	
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population	0.104***	0.070***	0.124***	0.082***	0.124***	0.096***	0.028***	0.024***	1.713***	-0.095
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.626)	(0.303)
Income per capita	-0.036**		-0.029*		0.008		-0.010***		0.161	
	(0.014)		(0.017)		(0.015)		(0.004)		(0.205)	
Urbanization	0.002		0.002		-0.001		-0.0002		-0.129**	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.0004)		(0.051)	
College	-0.001		-0.001		-0.0004		-0.0001		-0.042*	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.0003)		(0.023)	
Unemployment	-0.004		-0.007		-0.009		-0.002		-0.320**	
	(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.011)		(0.002)		(0.130)	
Minority	-0.004*		-0.004**		-0.00002		0.0002		0.009	
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.0003)		(0.032)	
Democratic vote	-0.003**		-0.001		-0.0003		-0.00007		-0.077**	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.0005)		(0.035)	
Region										
Midwest	-0.005		-0.037		-0.024		0.023		-3.265***	
	(0.034)		(0.032)		(0.086)		(0.015)		(1.098)	
Northeast	-0.078**		-0.090**		-0.114*		-0.004		____	
	(0.037)		(0.043)		(0.063)		(0.015)			
South	-0.047		-0.079**		-0.163**		-0.031*		-4.281***	
	(0.031)		(0.033)		(0.069)		(0.018)		(1.563)	
Polities	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51	51
Years	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	2012
Obs	250	348	250	348	252	352	253	355	200	336
R2	0.612	0.187	0.610	0.255	0.419	0.297	0.475	0.034	0.196	0.002

Full specifications from Table C3 along with minimal specifications. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table C5: County-level Outcomes (US)

Outcomes:	City/total expenditure		City/total revenue	
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**
Population	0.044***	0.033***	0.043***	0.032***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Income per capita	-0.045***		-0.054***	
	(0.013)		(0.013)	
Urban	0.004***		0.004***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Minority	0.0002		-0.000008	
	(0.0002)		(0.0002)	
Democratic vote	-0.001**		-0.004	
	(0.0002)		(0.0002)	
State dummy	√	√	√	√
Polities	3,153	3,153	3,153	3,153
Years	2000	2000	2000	2000
Obs	2,642	2,677	2,641	2,676
R2	0.756	0.773	0.787	0.799

Full specifications from Table C3 along with minimal specifications. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table C6: City-level Outcomes (US)

Outcomes	Executive veto		Executive term limits		Mayor-council government	
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Population	0.212***	0.107***	0.460***	0.431***	0.380**	0.547***
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.193)	(0.170)
Income per capita	-0.012**		-0.029**		0.007	
	(0.006)		(0.010)		(0.014)	
Urbanization	0.003***		-0.002*		0.003	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.004)	
% Black	-0.075		-0.668*		3.797***	
	(0.202)		(0.350)		(0.942)	
% Asian	-3.139***		0.981		0.105	
	(1.002)		(0.898)		(0.917)	
% Latino	-3.381***		0.759***		-0.747	
	(0.335)		(0.292)		(0.989)	
County dummy	√	√	√	√	√	√
Polities	7,503	7,503	7,503	7,503	2,225	2,225
Years	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011
Obs	16,955	18,345	16,439	17,866	1,903	1,944
R2	0.079	0.050	0.100	0.093	0.237	0.198

Full specifications from Table C3 along with minimal specifications. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

APPENDIX D: People or Territory?

We have operationalized size according to the population of a polity rather than its territory, even though these two features are obviously linked and also highly correlated – at least across nation-states (Pearson's r=0.79). This is premised on an assumption that population exerts greater – or at any rate, more direct – impact on power concentration than territory.

In previous historical eras, when modes of transport, communication, and control were primitive, and when modes of political control leaned more heavily on coercion, land may have posed a formidable constraint on the shape of political institutions (Stasavage 2010). In the modern era, however, it seems likely the number of people living within a political unit is a more important conditioning factor than the size of the territory they inhabit, for reasons laid out in Section I.

Extant work on the question (as it pertains to the modern era) is mixed, as shown in Table 1. It remains to be seen what picture emerges when a wider set of concentration measures and a broader sample of countries is encompassed.

In Table D1 we replicate benchmark cross-country tests (Model 1 from Table 3), this time including territory as an additional predictor. As previously, we present results only for the variables of interest – population and territory, both transformed by the natural logarithm. These tests confirm the superiority of territory as a predictor of constitutional federalism and revenue decentralization (fiscal federalism), as reported in previous studies. Territory is also correlated with bicameralism, which may be regarded as a by-product of federalism. However, for other outcomes population is generally a more successful predictor. While the estimated coefficient for territory is statistically significant in the expected direction in only four out of nineteen tests, the estimated coefficient for population is statistically significant ($p<.10$) in the hypothesized direction in fourteen tests.

In Table D2 we replicate within-country tests (from Table C3) with the addition of territory. Again, we present results only for the variables of theoretical interest. Here, results are stark. The estimated coefficient for population is correctly signed in all eight tests and statistically significant ($p<.05$) in seven. By contrast, territory is incorrectly signed in five tests and is never statistically significant in the expected direction.

It would seem that population is more strongly related to measures of power concentration than territory, at least in the modern era. Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that territory might affect some outcomes (e.g., constitutional federalism and fiscal federalism) but not others, or that it might have a small impact on all outcomes that is not detectable in our tests by reason of sample size, measurement error, or specification errors. However, if one is inclined to regard power concentration as a coherent theoretical outcome, and hence subject to similar causes, the evidence suggests that population trumps territory.

In our view, the impact of territory is best conceptualized as a prior cause – one that affects population but has little or no direct impact on most outcomes of theoretical interest to us here. This is the rationale for our choice of instruments in the two-stage analysis presented in Table 3 (Model 10). We exclude territory from other models in previous tests because of potential problems of collinearity and also, more fundamentally, because the interpretation of both variables changes when the other is included in a model. (Controlling for territory, population becomes a measure of population density.)

Table D1: Cross-country Tests of Population and Territory

			POPULATION		TERRITORY				
Model	**Outcome**	***H***	***β/SE***	***C***	***β/SE***	***C***	**Countries**	**Obs**	**R2 (pseudo)**
*	Power concentration index	+	-0.031 [0.007] ***	✓	-0.003 [0.005]		156	12768	0.615
1	Federalism	+	0.260 [0.245]		1.014 [0.317] ***	✓	132	5327	(0.470)
2	Subnational gov layers	+	0.238 [0.332]		0.378 [0.166] **	✓	153	12128	(0.315)
3	Subnational elections	+	0.024 [0.010] **	✓	0.013 [0.009]		153	12226	0.341
4	Autonomous regions	+	1.027 [0.306] ***	✓	-0.470 [0.252] *		143	4833	(0.310)
5	Revenue decentraliz	+	-0.017 [0.016]		0.085 [0.017] ***	✓	96	1295	0.694
6	Govt consumption	–	-0.018 [0.005] ***	✓	0.005 [0.004]		151	5827	0.325
7	Separate powers	+	0.349 [0.146] **	✓	-0.124 [0.087]		151	12156	(0.321)
8	Divided party control	+	0.017 [0.013]		0.007 [0.011]		8327	8327	0.118
9	Decentralized parties	+	0.009 [0.010]		0.006 [0.009]		155	12253	0.498
10	Judicial review	+	0.020 [0.014]		-0.004 [0.012]		155	12373	0.300
11	Bicameralism	+	0.035 [0.013] ***	✓	0.017 [0.011]		155	12308	0.281
12	Leg. Fractionalization	+	0.030 [0.014] **	✓	-0.018 [0.009] **		143	7685	(0.631)
13	Political constraints	+	0.077 [0.021] ***	✓	-0.044 [0.017] ***		148	13037	(0.463)
14	Checks & balances	+	0.036 [0.009] ***	✓	-0.012 [0.006] *		154	5123	0.504
15	Capital city	–	-0.031 [0.003] ***	✓	-0.001 [0.003]		154	19974	0.547

Replication of benchmark models in Table A5 (Model 2) with the addition of Territory (square kilometers, logged). *H:* hypothesized relationship. *C:* hypothesis corroborated. Outcome measures of power concentration (re-scaled to 0-1 scale) regressed against key variables and "basic" covariates: per capita GDP (logged), Urbanization, Legal origin dummies, Latitude, Muslim, Protestant, OPEC dummy, Region dummies, Year dummies. Electoral system dummies included in tests of Divided party control (row 8) only. Right-side variables measured at t-1. *Estimators:* ordinary least squares (for continuous outcomes), tobit (for left-censored outcomes), ordered logit (for ordinal outcomes), logit (for binary outcomes). Estimated coefficients and standard errors (clustered by country) shown for variables of theoretical interest. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table D2: Within-Country Tests of Population and Territory

Polities	State					County		City		
Outcome	City-county/ total expenditures	City-county/ total revenue	Special purpose governments	Independent school districts	CSSO selection	City/total expenditure	City/total revenue	Executive veto	Executive term limit	Mayor-council
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Logit	OLS	OLS	Logit	Logit	Logit
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	pop>50k
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**
Population	0.077***	0.103***	0.118***	0.021**	1.749***	0.043***	0.043***	0.516***	0.412***	1.331***
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.620)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.050)	(0.077)	(0.325)
Territory	0.040*	0.032	0.007	0.009	-0.432	0.0002	-0.003	-0.340***	0.058	-0.821***
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.499)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.245)
Polities	51	51	51	51	51	3,153	3,153	7,503	7,503	2,225
Years	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	1942-2012	2000	2000	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011
Obs	250	250	252	253	200	2,642	2,641	16,872	16,362	1,859
R2	0.638	0.625	0.420	0.490	0.202	0.756	0.787	0.087	0.099	0.270

Replication of models in Table C3 with the addition of Territory (square kilometers, logged). Data drawn from states, counties, and cities in the United States. Covariates for state-level analyses: Income per capita, urbanization, Democratic vote share, College, Unemployment, Minority (%), Region (dummies). Covariates for county-level analyses: Urbanization, Minority (%), Income per capita, Democratic vote, State (dummies). Covariates for city-level analyses: Urbanization, Black (%), Asian (%), Latino (%), Income per capita, County (dummies). County analyses are cross-sectional. State and city analyses represent a short panel, with standard errors clustered at the state and city level, respectively. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

APPENDIX E: **Municipal Sovereignty**

Table E1: Municipal Sovereignty

Outcome:	Charter	Home rule (any type)	Home rule structural	Home rule functional	Home rule fiscal
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Population	0.155***	0.290***	0.195***	0.172***	0.106***
	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.034)
Polities	7,503	7,503	7,503	7,503	7,503
Years	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011	1986-2011
Obs	8,204	17,273	17,493	17,273	17,119
R2	0.072	0.138	0.135	0.098	0.118

Measures of municipal sovereignty regressed on Population (logged) and additional covariates (not shown): Urbanization, Black (%), Asian (%), Latino (%), Income per capita, and County (dummies). Logistic regression, standard errors clustered by city. *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01