Methodological Appendix Accompanying NAVCO 1.2

		Page
Introduction		1
NAVCO 1.2 Variables and Descriptions		9
References		13

© Erica Chenoweth & Christopher Wiley Shay

Harvard University

Last updated November 6, 2019

Text adapted from earlier versions of the NAVCO codebook.

Introduction

The Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) 1.2 Data Set[1]

The NAVCO 1.2 data set identifies 389 maximalist resistance campaigns using violent and nonviolent methods that set on worldwide from 1945-2013. The dataset brings together numerous cases of violent and nonviolent campaigns with the objectives of expelling foreign occupations, regime change (i.e. removing dictatorships or military juntas), self-determination or separatism, and in some cases, other major types of social change (i.e. anti-apartheid campaigns). Consisting of consensus data from experts on major armed and unarmed insurrections, the dataset identifies the levels of success each campaign achieved by the end of 2014 according to each campaign's stated objective.

This is the third iteration of the NAVCO 1 datasets and represents a significant increase in the number of cases under study. Whereas NAVCO 1.0 and 1.1 identified 250 campaigns in the period 1945-2006, NAVCO 1.2 increases that number to 389 that set on from 1945-2013, largely owing to (a) the dramatic increase in the dramatic rise of maximalist nonviolent campaigns in the last fifteen years; and (b) the addition of new historical campaigns that were omitted from earlier versions of the dataset.

[1] The data set builds on the NAVCO 1.0 data set, which was released along with the article by Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* (Summer 2008), as well as the 1.1 version released in 2011 along with the book of the same title. Contact Erica Chenoweth directly for information on the changes to the data set, including added variables, added cases, and revised coding of several cases.

Defining Campaigns

A campaign is defined as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are purposive, meaning that groups and participants are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. Other scholars often use campaigns as their units of analysis, such as Robert Pape's analysis of suicide bombing campaigns (2003), Horowitz and Reiter's analysis of aerial bombing campaigns (2001), and Ackerman and Kruegler's study of strategic nonviolent conflict (1995). In such studies, campaigns usually have distinguishable beginning and end points, as well as discernable events throughout the campaign. In the case of resistance campaigns, beginning and end points are very difficult to determine, as are the events throughout the campaign. In some cases, information on such events is readily available (i.e. Northern Ireland); however, in most cases, it is not. Therefore, our selection of campaigns and their beginning and end dates are based on consensus data produced by multiple sources.

There are some difficulties with this method. First, it is difficult to gather the strength of the campaign and its activities over time (i.e. escalation or de-escalation). Second, without specific events data, it is theoretically difficult to compare all campaigns as equal when we know that some are much more disruptive than others. However, there are good reasons to analyze campaigns rather than events. First, events data are so

difficult to gather—especially nonviolent events data—that making generalizations about nonviolent conflict is virtually impossible. By analyzing campaigns rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities. Using events as the main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaigns allows us to consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.

Distinguishing Nonviolent and Violent Methods of Resistance

Some take issue with the practice of categorizing campaigns as either "violent" or "nonviolent." In many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously within the same conflict, as with armed and unarmed campaigns among different Palestinian dissidents. Alternatively, often some campaigns use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the ANC in South Africa. Characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a very complex constellation of resistance methods.

However, applying binary values to categories "violent" and "nonviolent" should not be dismissed out of hand, particularly when one can reliably observe a preponderance of resistance methods employed. Standards of inclusion in each category are as follows.

Nonviolent resistance does not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent. Sharp (1973) has identified nearly 200 nonviolent resistance tactics, such as sit-ins, protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and strikes, among many others;

scholars have recognized many more since (correspondence with Stephen Zunes, August 28, 2009). When a campaign relies primarily on nonviolent methods such as these as opposed to violent or armed tactics, the campaign can be characterized as primarily nonviolent. The nonviolent campaigns were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. The primary sources were Karatnacky and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark, and Randle (2007), and Schock (2005). Then we corroborated these data with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2007). Finally, the cases were circulated among approximately a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether their outcomes had been appropriately characterized, and whether any notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used.

Violent resistance, on the other hand, involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent. Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as primarily violent. Violent campaign data are primarily derived from the UCDP Armed Conflict Database, the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter's encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp's list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005) for information on conflicts after 2002. Our inclusion criteria require the campaigns to have maximalist objectives and at least 1,000 observed participants actively confronting the opponent during the course of the conflict.

For primarily nonviolent campaigns in which some degree of fringe violence occurred among the dissidents, we identify the presence of a violent flank.

The Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the campaign. In some cases, where campaigns entered into different phases (e.g. from nonviolent to violent or the reverse), they were split into two campaigns but share a NAVCO ID and are coded as a single campaign in the NAVCO 2.1 dataset, which allows for significant phase shifts in resistance campaigns. In the NAVCO 1.2 data, this applies specifically to the following ten campaigns:

164 – First Intifada & Palestinian Liberation

191 – Salvadoran civil conflict & FMLN

230 – Freitilin & East Timorese independence

242 – the two West Papuan independence movements

282 – Syria Uprising & Syrian Civil War

The levels of success are categorized as "Success," "Limited," or "Failure," with the purpose of describing the number of successful campaigns of each type (violent or nonviolent), to test whether the rate of success varies on the purposes of the campaigns, support from third parties, and campaign participation, among other factors. When a campaign is ongoing, the campaign observation is noted for 2014 and the case is coded as "ongoing" in the outcome variable.

Determining Participation Figures

Peak participation figures are drawn from numerous encyclopedic and internet sources, which were corroborated with news articles and/or additional sources for accuracy. The primary sources were various eyewitness news reports, Beissinger (2002), Clodfelter (2002), and Cunningham, Gledistch, and Saleyhan (2009b). We select an integer measure because we found that most observations did allow us enough sensitivity to give specific numbers. That said, some sources reported figures such as "several thousand" or "hundreds of thousands" of participants in different events. In such cases, we adapt Ronald Francisco's technique of making conservative estimates by rounding down but adding 1 when estimates are vague. Thus "several thousand" would be 2,000, and "hundreds of thousands" would be coded as 200,001. "Over a million" would be coded simply as 1,000,001 (Francisco 2004).

Underreporting Bias

Especially among the nonviolent campaigns, there is concern that the campaigns included are biased toward success, since it is the large, mature campaigns that are most commonly reported. Other would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed in their infancy (and therefore fail) will not be included in this dataset. This is a major limitation in the NAVCO dataset, and it is difficult to avoid. However, we attempt to mitigate the effects of underreporting bias in several ways.

First, we only investigate the outcomes of *major* nonviolent and violent campaigns—those that are already "mature" in terms of objectives and membership. Practically, this means that we only include nonviolent and violent campaigns where we

were certain that more than 1,000 people were actively participating in the struggle, based on various reports. For the nonviolent campaigns, we gleaned this information from the sources mentioned above. In NAVCO 1.2, we added numerous cases from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Database where it was clear that at least 1,000 people were waging armed hostilities against the opponent. Using this strict criterion and comparing major campaigns allows us to address questions of the relative effectiveness of resistance type among comparably developed mass movements.

Second, we compare nonviolent campaigns with their comparable counterparts in violent campaigns rather than to view nonviolent campaigns in isolation. We did this because there are many "non-starters" among violent campaigns as well as nonviolent ones, and the same underreporting bias exists within the study of violent insurgencies as with nonviolent insurrections.

Third, we only included cases where the objective was maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights).

Critics may still be skeptical of the case selection, especially in the case of nonviolent conflict. Most concerning is the potential omission of failed nonviolent campaigns, which may not be captured in the dataset due to extreme repression or poor news sources. To address this concern, we made certain that the dataset reflects a consensus sample, which was circulated among the world's leading authorities on nonviolent conflict to make sure we accounted for known failed campaigns. Unknown, failed, nonviolent campaigns are necessarily omitted from the dataset, just like unknown, failed, violent campaigns.

Missing Data

Some of our variables were missing for the observations of interest. This is a common problem when studying cases where conflict is occurring or has occurred, as few people in conflict-affected societies are able to accurately observe and chronicle such figures. Rather than impute these values artificially, we opted to simply accept the missing values.

NAVCO 1.2 Variables and Descriptions

The table below identifies the variables in the dataset and their descriptions.

NAVCO 1.2 Variables

Variable Name	*Source*	*Variable Description*
NAVCO ID	NAVCO 2.1	ID assigned to campaign.
CAMPAIGN	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Name of campaign.
LOCATION	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Geographic base of campaign (sovereign country).
BYEAR	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Year in which campaign begins.
EYEAR	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Year at which the campaign reaches its peak; i.e. the most members or watershed events. If data is unavailable for membership or events, this peak is considered to be the year in which the campaign ended (i.e. if the regime changed in 2002, the peak is 2002).
TARGET	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Target of the campaign.
SUCCESS	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether the campaign achieved 100% of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities. In most cases, outcome was achieved within a year of the campaign's peak. Some campaigns' goals were achieved years after the "peak" of the struggle in terms of membership, but the success was a direct result of campaign activities. When such a direct link can be demonstrated, these campaigns are coded as successful. Note

		that where information was available regarding the campaign's outcome in 2014, the most current information was used.
LIMITED	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether the campaign achieved some of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities. When a regime makes concessions to the campaign or reforms short of complete campaign success, such reforms are counted as limited success.
FAILURE	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether the campaign achieved none of its stated goals; includes campaigns that have been suppressed. Campaigns are coded as failures when they are ongoing as of the end of 2014 and are classified as "ongoing."
ONGOING	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether the campaign is ongoing and has not yet achieved its goals. Only when campaigns are ongoing and have achieved no stated objectives/outcomes by the end of 2014.
NONVIOL	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying that a campaign was primarily nonviolent during the observation.
VIOL	UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset; Gleditsch 2004; Lyall and Wilson 2009; Sepp 2005	Binary variable identifying that a campaign was primarily violent during the observation.
REGCHANGE	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying purpose of campaign as removing the incumbent national leader, excluding expulsion of foreign occupiers.
FSELFDET	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying purpose of campaign as a self-determination or independence from a foreign occupier or

		colonial power.
SECESSION	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying purpose of campaign as self-determination or territorial secession/separatism from an existing state in a territory internationally recognized as part of the target state. Sometimes these campaigns claim objectives of expelling foreign occupations. This campaign type is distinct from anti-occupation campaigns, however, because the contested territory is internationally recognized as sovereign to the target state.
OTHER	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying purpose of campaign as distinct from previous three objectives (i.e. purpose is NOT to expel a foreign occupation, change a domestic regime, or territorial separation). However, these are major campaigns with "difficult" goals, which exclude labor rights, civil rights, and other types of campaigns.
DURATION	Author's calculation	Length of campaign in days.
PARTICIPATION	Various eyewitness news reports; encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Number of participants observed actively confronting opponent at highest point (peak event). This reports the largest participation reported at a watershed event. It does not estimate the cumulative number of participants.
PERCENTAGE POPULAR PARTICIPATION	Author's calculation; Penn World Tables 6.2; World Bank Data; Popstat website	Percent of target's national population involved in peak event (participation / population)
REGVIOL	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether the regime used violence to crack down on campaign.
DEFECT	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether the target's security forces defected or engaged in noncooperation during the

		conflict. Does not include routine individual mutinies or desertions, but rather large-scale, systematic breakdowns of the execution of orders from the target regime.
VIOLENT FLANK	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Coded for nonviolent campaigns only. Binary variable identifying whether some dissidents within a nonviolent campaign have begun to use violence, even though the larger campaign remains primarily nonviolent, at any point during the course of the campaign.
VIOLSIM	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable identifying whether a different violent campaign was active simultaneous to the major campaign. Can include an independent terrorist group, violent insurrection, or other violent "spoiler" at any point during the course of the campaign.
REGAID	Various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable indicating whether target received overt military aid from another state to fight the campaign.
STATESUP	Record 2006; various encyclopedic entries; scholarly works; subject and area experts	Binary variable indicating whether campaign received overt military or economic aid from an outside another state to fight against the target.

Note: Missing variables are simply left blank in the database, except as otherwise noted.

References

Ackerman, Peter and Adrian Karatnacky, eds. 2005. *How freedom is won: from civic resistance to durable democracy*. Washington, DC: Freedom House Publishing.

Ackerman, Peter and Christopher Kruegler. 1994. *Strategic nonviolent conflict: the dynamics of people power in the twentieth century*. Westport, CT.: Praeger.

Armed Conflict Events Database. 2007. Wars of the world: national military history index. Web.

Banks, Arthur, William Overstreet, and Thomas Muller. 2004. *Political handbook of the world 2000-2002.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Beissinger, Mark. 2002. *Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet state.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Carter, April, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle. 2006. *People power and protest since 1945: a bibliography of nonviolent action*. London: Housmans.

Clodfelter, Michael. 2002. *Warfare and armed conflicts: a statistical reference to casualty and other figures, 1500-2000*. New York: McFarland and Company.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Saleyhan. 2009a. It takes two: a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (August): 570–97.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Saleyhan. 2009b. Codebook for the non-state actor data.

Fearon, James D. and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February): 75-90.

Francisco, Ronald. 2004. After the massacre: mobilization in the wake of harsh repression. *Mobilization: an International Journal* 9, no. 2 (June): 107–26.

Gleditsch, Kristian. 2004. A revised list of wars between and within independent states, 1816-2002. *International Organizations* 30, no. 3 (July): 231–62.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No other way out: states and revolutionary movement, 1945-1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Michael and Dan Reiter. 2001. When does aerial bombing work? Quantitative empirical tests, 1917-1999. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 2 (April): 147–73.

Lyall, Jason K. and Isaiah Wilson. 2009. Rage against the machines: explaining outcomes in counterinsurgency wars. *International Organizations* 63, no. 1 (Winter): 67–106.

Pape, Robert A. 1996. *Bombing to win: air power and coercion in war*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Pape, Robert A. 2003. The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August): 343–61.

Record, Jeffrey. 2006. External assistance: enabler of insurgent success. *Parameters* 36, no. 3 (Autumn): 36–49.

Schock, Kurt. 2005. *Unarmed insurrections: people power movements in nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Sepp, Kalev. 2005. Best practices in counterinsurgency. *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May/June): 8–12.

Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The politics of nonviolent action*, vol. 1-3. Boston: Porter Sargent.