Supplemental Table 1

Ordered Probit Analysis Predicting Noncompliance with the Laws of War using Cutoff Point of 6 to Judge Democracy

Variable	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Reciprocal Variables			
Victim's Level of Noncompliance	-.285, .289, n.s.	-.513, .282, .069	-.436, .349, n.s.
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.172, .051, .001	.180, .049, <.001	.237, .058, <.001
Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	1.151, .353, .001	1.411, .343, <.001	1.636, .435, <.001
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	-.232, .069, .001	-.279, .069, <.001	-.338, .085, <.001
Individual Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.169, .157, n.s.	.321, .154, .037	.167, .181, n.s.
State Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.079, .168, n.s.	.264, .164, n.s.	.122, .191, n.s.
Non-Reciprocal Variables			
Joint Ratification	-.406, .373, n.s.	-.749, .373, .045	-.673, .462, n.s.
Violator Ratified	.002, .168, n.s.	-.000, .177, n.s.	-.201, .213, n.s.
Violator Democracy	.609, .140, <.001	.668, .135, <.001	.632, .155, <.001
Violator Democracy times Joint Ratification	.032, .294, n.s.	.293, .302, n.s.	.337, .393, n.s.
Violator Democracy times Violator Ratified	-.832, .300, .006	-1.167, .308, <.001	-1.219, .397, .002
Power Ratio	.633, .235, .007	.595, .236, .012	.527, .273, .054
Power Ratio times Joint Ratification	-.668, .287, .020	-.491, .293, .093	-.388, .351, n.s.
Aerial Bombing	-.193, .194, n.s.	-.158, .198, n.s.	-.212, .230, n.s.

Armistice	-.500, .185, .007	-.439, .188, .020	-.562, .213, .008
Chemical and Biological Warfare	-1.137, .167, <.001	-1.022, .169, <.001	-1.100, .199, <.001
Treatment of Civilians	.442, .134, .001	.485, .146, .001	.361, .183, .048
Protection of Cultural Property	-.006, .185, n.s.	-.014, .207, n.s.	-.028, .322, n.s.
Conduct on the High Seas	-.342, .164, .038	-.207, .169, n.s.	-.349, .204, .088
Prisoners of War	.217, .135, n.s.	.300, .147, .041	.184, .179, n.s.
Violator Initiator	.320, .078, <.001	.369, .078, <.001	.515, .093, <.001
Violator Battle Deaths per 1000 Population	.024,.0029, <.001	.024, .0028, <.001	.026, .0035, <.001
Violator Lost	.599, .158, <.001	.519, .159, .001	.480, .192, .012
Violator Lost times Power Ratio	-.766, .273, .005	-.631, .278, .023	-.584, .336, .083
First Cutpoint (μ_1)	0.82	0.70	0.92
Second Cutpoint (μ_2)	2.46	2.17	2.37
Third Cutpoint (μ_3)	3.65	3.44	3.81
N	1066	1066	798
Log-Likelihood	-935.60	-955.28	-645.94
χ^2	701.7 w/24 d.f.	795.1 w/24 d.f.	636.9 w/24 d.f.
Significance Probability of Model	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Pseudo R^2	.273	.294	.330

Each cell gives estimated coefficient, standard error, and significance for a two-tailed test that the coefficient is different from 0 if the statistical significance exceeds the .1 level.
The omitted category for the dummy variables of the issue-areas is treatment of the wounded.

Constant is set to 0 to identify cutoff parameters.

Supplemental Table 2

Instrumental Variable Analysis Predicting Noncompliance with the Laws of War

Variable	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Instrumented Reciprocal Variable			
Victim's Level of Noncompliance	.203, .102, .046	.330, .091,<.001	.349, .106, .001
Non-Reciprocal Variables			
Joint Ratification	.106, .129, n.s.	.084, .133, n.s.	.116, .143, n.s.
Violator Ratified	.005, .093, n.s.	.022, .098, n.s.	-.084, .105, n.s.
Violator Democracy	.340, .078, <.001	.414, .077, <.001	.354, .080, <.001
Violator Democracy times Joint Ratification	-.020, .171, n.s.	.157, .175, n.s.	.140, .206, n.s.
Violator Democracy times Violator Ratified	-.412, .175, .019	-.678, .180, <.001	-.600, .210, .004
Power Ratio	.229, .144, n.s.	.278, .141, .048	.212, .148, n.s.
Power Ratio times Joint Ratification	-.388, .156, .013	-.370, .160, .021	-.285, .172, .097
Aerial Bombing	-.457, .103, <.001	-.394, .104, <.001	-.520, .122, <.001
Armistice	-.396, .112, <.001	-.305, .113, .007	-.420, .128, .001
Chemical and Biological Warfare	-.672, .114, <.001	-.570, .112, <.001	-.638, .136, <.001
Treatment of Civilians	.374, .091, <.001	.420, .103, <.001	.331, .116, .004
Protection of Cultural Property	-.002, .103, n.s.	.018, .122, n.s.	-.120, .177, n.s.
Conduct on the High Seas	-.324, .098, .001	-.185, .100, .064	-.290, .117, .013

Prisoners of War	.166, .082, .043	.231, .092, .012	.110, .101, n.s.
Violator Initiated War?	.158, .045, <.001	.196, .045, <.001	.235, .049, <.001
Violator Battle Deaths per 1000 Population	.015, .0018, <.001	.015, .0019, <.001	.014, .0022, <.001
Violator Lost	.390, .091, <.001	.338, .091, .007	.292, .100, .004
Violator Lost times Power Ratio	-.526, .156, .001	-.421, .157, <.001	-.361, .172, .036
Constant	1.340	1.049	1.135
N	1066	1066	798
F statistic	35.47 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	44.25 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	36.23 w/19, 778 d.f.s
Significance Probability of Model	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Adjusted R^2	.428	.506	.542
Sargan's statistic (distributed as χ^2 w/7 d.f.s), significance probability	3.85, n.s.	13.36, .064	10.10, n.s.

Each cell gives estimated coefficient, standard error, and significance for a two-tailed test that the coefficient is different from 0 if the statistical significance exceeds the .1 level.

Sargan's statistic tests for the validity of instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and hence valid. A significant result indicates that the instruments are invalid.

The omitted category for the dummy variables of the issue-areas is treatment of the wounded.

Supplemental Table 3

Instrumental Variable Analysis Predicting Noncompliance with the Laws of War

Variable	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Instrumented Reciprocal Variable			
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.043, .021, .039	.072, .019, <.001	.077, .023, .001
Non-Reciprocal Variables			
Joint Ratification	.110, .127, n.s.	.093, .133, n.s.	.121, .142, n.s.
Violator Ratified	-.003, .092, n.s.	.006, .098, n.s.	-.097, .104, n.s.
Violator Democracy	.328, .077, <.001	.390, .077, <.001	.328, .080, <.001
Violator Democracy times Joint Ratification	-.036, .168, n.s.	.128, .173, n.s.	.110, .203, n.s.
Violator Democracy times Violator Ratified	-.391, .172, .023	-.634, .177, <.001	-.553, .205, .007
Power Ratio	.221, .140, n.s.	.267, .139, .054	.201, .146, n.s.
Power Ratio times Joint Ratification	-.379, .154, .014	-.352, .159, .027	-.260, .171, n.s.
Aerial Bombing	-.357, .132, .007	-.230, .128, .073	-.354, .154, .021
Armistice	-.360, .119, .002	-.261, .117, .026	-.368, .135, .006
Chemical and Biological Warfare	-.605, .137, <.001	-.462, .132, <.001	-.530, .160, .001
Treatment of Civilians	.377, .089, <.001	.413, .103, <.001	.322, .116, .006
Protection of Cultural Property	.047, .104, n.s.	.088, .121, n.s.	-.036, .178, n.s.
Conduct on the High Seas	-.281, .106, .008	-.128, .103, n.s.	-.238, .123, .053

Prisoners of War	.173, .080, .031	.233, .092, .011	.115, .100, n.s.
Violator Initiated War?	.158, .044, <.001	.198, .044, <.001	.239, .049, <.001
Violator Battle Deaths per 1000 Population	.015, .0018, <.001	.015, .0020, <.001	.014, .0022, <.001
Violator Lost War?	.393, .089, <.001	.336, .091, <.001	.283, .100, .005
Violator Won times Power Ratio	-.535, .152, <.001	-.422, .156, .007	-.354, .171, .039
Constant	1.435	1.200	1.298
N	1066	1066	798
F statistic	35.74 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	44.68 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	36.72 w/19, 778 d.f.s
Significance Probability of Model	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Adjusted R^2	.442	.511	.548
Sargan's statistic (distributed as χ^2 w/5 d.f.s), significance probability	3.76, n.s.	13.06, .071	10.03, n.s.

Each cell gives estimated coefficient, standard error, and significance for a two-tailed test that the coefficient is different from 0 if the statistical significance exceeds the .1 level.

Sargan's statistic tests for the validity of instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and hence valid. A significant result indicates that the instruments are invalid.

The omitted category for the dummy variables of the issue-areas is treatment of the wounded.

Supplemental Table 4

Instrumental Variable Analysis Predicting Noncompliance with the Laws of War

Variable	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Instrumented Reciprocal Variable			
Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	.368, .176, .037	.650, .171, <.001	.655, .197, .001
Non-Reciprocal Variables			
Joint Ratification	-.673, .375, .072	-1.369, .385, <.001	-1.217, .401, .001
Violator Ratified	-.007, .095, n.s.	.026, .107, n.s.	-.146, .229, n.s.
Violator Democracy	.318, .081, <.001	.377, .085, <.001	.324, .091, <.001
Violator Democracy times Joint Ratification	-.134, .179, n.s.	-.106, .193, n.s.	-.146, .229, n.s.
Violator Democracy times Violator Ratified	-.300, .180, .095	-.441, .193, .022	-.333, .228, n.s.
Power Ratio	.128, .134, n.s.	.171, .146, n.s.	.112, .158, n.s.
Power Ratio times Joint Ratification	-.252, .170, n.s.	-.116, .187, n.s.	-.093, .201, n.s.
Aerial Bombing	-.529, .092, <.001	-.497, .104, <.001	-.647, .118, <.001
Armistice	-.390, .115, .001	-.252, .127, .046	-.429, .138, .002
Chemical and Biological Warfare	-.689, .107, <.001	-.565, .117, <.001	-.686, .134, <.001
Treatment of Civilians	.376, .092, <.001	.415, .109, <.001	.299, .131, .023
Protection of Cultural Property	-.027, .107, n.s.	-.001, .133, n.s.	-.126, .198, n.s.
Conduct on the High Seas	-.313, .102, .002	-.101, .114, n.s.	-.251, .134, .061

Prisoners of War	.186, .082, .024	.270, .097, .006	.134, .113, n.s.
Violator Initiated War?	.161, .046, <.001	.205, .049, <.001	.230, .054, <.001
Violator Battle Deaths per 1000 Population	.015, .0019, <.001	.013, .0022, <.001	.014, .0024, <.001
Violator Lost War?	.416, .091, <.001	.316, .100, .002	.302, .112, .007
Violator Lost times Power Ratio	-.551, .156, <.001	-.332, .176, .068	-.326, .194, .093
Constant	1.809	1.797	1.906
N	1066	1066	798
F statistic	33.10 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	37.49 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	28.92 w/19, 778 d.f.s
Significance Probability of Model	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Adjusted R^2	.397	.415	.424
Sargan's statistic (distributed as χ^2 w/5 d.f.s), significance probability	3.06, n.s.	7.97, n.s.	5.59, n.s.

Each cell gives estimated coefficient, standard error, and significance for a two-tailed test that the coefficient is different from 0 if the statistical significance exceeds the .1 level.

Sargan's statistic tests for the validity of instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and hence valid. A significant result indicates that the instruments are invalid.

The omitted category for the dummy variables of the issue-areas is treatment of the wounded.

Supplemental Table 5

Instrumental Variable Analysis Predicting Noncompliance with the Laws of War

Variable	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Instrumented Reciprocal Variable			
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	.074, .036, .038	.134, .036, <.001	.134, .042, .001
Non-Reciprocal Variables			
Joint Ratification	-.433, .271, n.s.	-.957, .294, .001	-.785, .296, .008
Violator Ratified	-.007, .096, n.s.	.025, .109, n.s.	-.100, .121, n.s.
Violator Democracy	.312, .082, <.001	.365, .087, <.001	.312, .094, .001
Violator Democracy times Joint Ratification	-.153, .183, n.s.	-.134, .200, n.s.	-.175, .237, n.s.
Violator Democracy times Violator Ratified	-.288, .182, n.s.	-.416, .198, .036	-.310, .234, n.s.
Power Ratio	.117, .135, n.s.	.157, .148, n.s.	.103, .162, n.s.
Power Ratio times Joint Ratification	-.248, .172, n.s.	-.110, .191, n.s.	-.080, .208, n.s.
Aerial Bombing	-.501, .096, <.001	-.448, .109, <.001	-.604, .125, <.001
Armistice	-.352, .125, .005	-.190, .137, n.s.	-.374, .150, .013
Chemical and Biological Warfare	-.631, .129, <.001	-.458, .140, .001	-.597, .157, <.001
Treatment of Civilians	.387, .090, <.001	.426, .110, <.001	.303, .134, .024
Protection of Cultural Property	.033, .107, n.s.	.086, .136, n.s.	-.064, .205, n.s.
Conduct on the High Seas	-.276, .111, .013	-.036, .124, n.s.	-.197, .146, n.s.

Prisoners of War	.196, .082, .017	.283, .099, .004	.141, .115, n.s.
Violator Initiated War?	.161, .046, <.001	.205, .050, <.001	.232, .056, <.001
Violator Battle Deaths per 1000 Population	.014, .0020, <.001	.013, .0024, <.001	.014, .0026, <.001
Violator Lost War?	.425, .092, <.001	.322, .102, .002	.301, .115, .009
Violator Lost times Power Ratio	-.574, .156, <.001	-.347, .178, .052	-.342, .198, .085
Constant	1.791	1.765	1.877
N	1066	1066	798
F statistic	32.61 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	35.90 w/19, 1046 d.f.s	27.47 w/19, 778 d.f.s
Significance Probability of Model	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Adjusted R^2	.388	.389	.394
Sargan's statistic (distributed as χ^2 w/5 d.f.s), significance probability	2.99, n.s.	7.68, n.s.	5.59, n.s.

Each cell gives estimated coefficient, standard error, and significance for a two-tailed test that the coefficient is different from 0 if the statistical significance exceeds the .1 level.

Sargan's statistic tests for the validity of instruments. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and hence valid. A significant result indicates that the instruments are invalid.

The omitted category for the dummy variables of the issue-areas is treatment of the wounded.

Supplemental Table 6

Statistical Tests of Strength of Instrumental Variables

Instrumented Reciprocal Variables	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Victim's Noncompliance	87.27	100.90	69.25
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	81.27	92.55	59.52
Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	55.90	58.46	44.87
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	50.31	51.40	37.24
Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	1.37	3.64	2.91
Victim's Noncompliance, and Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	5.02	5.45	2.87
Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	5.54	4.97	3.03
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance, and Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	4.50	4.62	2.69
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	5.48	4.21	2.79
Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	4.61	6.92	7.13

Victim's Noncompliance, Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance, and Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	1.08	2.50	2.51
Victim's Noncompliance, Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	1.13	1.90	2.33
Victim's Noncompliance, Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	3.53	4.90	2.84
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance, Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	2.92	4.20	2.64
Victim's Noncompliance, Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance, Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance, and Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	1.05	1.52	2.33

Each line reports the Craig-Donald (N-L)*mineval/L2 F-statistic for an instrumental variable analysis including the listed endogenous variables and all exogenous variables used in Table 1. The null hypotheses of this test is that the instruments are weak. Test statistics greater than 15 lead to a rejection of this null hypotheses at the .05 level with 8 instrumental variables; see Stock and Yogo (2002).

Supplemental Table 7

Ordered Probit Analysis Predicting Noncompliance with the Laws of War dropping Aerial Bombing

Variable	Cases Unweighted by Data Quality	Cases Weighted by Data Quality	Only Cases without Standardized Codings
Reciprocal Variables			
Victim's Noncompliance	-.617, .342, .071	-.993, .356, .005	-.816, .460, .076
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.252, .077, .001	.276, .079, <.001	.277, .098, .005
Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	1.516, .413, <.001	1.879, .423, <.001	1.903, .551, .001
Clarity of Victim's Violations times Joint Ratification times Victim's Noncompliance	-.297, .080, <.001	-.372, .083, <.001	-.401, .106, <.001
Individual Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.112, .207, n.s.	.337, .204, .098	.340, .242, n.s.
State Violations times Victim's Noncompliance	.011, .218, n.s.	.265, .213, n.s.	.294, .252, n.s.
Non-Reciprocal Variables			
Joint Ratification	-.819, .419, .051	-1.196, .432, .006	-1.102, .547, .044
Violator Ratified	-.025, .175, n.s.	-.040, .184, n.s.	-.216, .220, n.s.
Violator Democracy	.408, .181, .024	.450, .182, .013	.371, .216, .086
Violator Democracy times Joint Ratification	-.078, .301, n.s.	.168, .309, n.s.	.216, .412, n.s.
Violator Democracy times Violator Ratified	-.529, .325, n.s.	-.810, .336, .016	-.783, .442, .076
Power Ratio	.327, .283, n.s.	.221, .295, n.s.	-.075, .358, n.s.
Power Ratio times Joint Ratification	-.412, .330, n.s.	-.208, .345, n.s.	.175, .421, n.s.
Armistice	-.466, .186, .012	-.410, .189, .030	-.520, .215, .016

Chemical and Biological Warfare	-1.106, .169, <.001	-.959, .171, <.001	-1.024, .202, <.001
Treatment of Civilians	.459, .135, .001	.502, .147, .001	.374, .184, .042
Protection of Cultural Property	.042, .192, n.s.	.027, .213, n.s.	.011, .330, n.s.
Conduct on the High Seas	-.310, .166, .069	-.156, .170, n.s.	-.319, .206, n.s.
Prisoners of War	.230, .135, .090	.305, .148, .039	.182, .180, n.s.
Violator Initiator	.264, .086, .002	.324, .087, <.001	.497, .107, <.001
Violator Battle Deaths per 1000 Population	.025, .0032, <.001	.025, .0032, <.001	.026, .0040, <.001
Violator Lost	.745, .173, <.001	.690, .177, <.001	.670, .221, .002
Violator Lost times Power Ratio	-.976, .298, .001	-.901, .309, .004	-.799, .388, .040
First Cutpoint (μ_1)	0.40	0.20	0.44
Second Cutpoint (μ_2)	2.09	1.70	1.90
Third Cutpoint (μ_3)	3.27	2.96	3.35
N	906	885	638
Log-Likelihood	-788.30	-779.42	-498.39
χ^2	647.4 w/23 d.f.	727.5 w/23 d.f.	577.2 w/23 d.f.
Significance Probability of Model	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
Pseudo R^2	.291	.318	.367

Each cell gives estimated coefficient, standard error, and significance for a two-tailed test that the coefficient is different from 0 if the statistical significance exceeds the .1 level.

The omitted category for the dummy variables of the issue-areas is treatment of the wounded.

Constant is set to 0 to identify cutoff parameters.

Reference

Stock, James H., and Motohiro Yogo. 2002. Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. NBER Technical Working Paper No. 284. Accessed at http://www.nber.org/papers/T0284.