# A Supporting Information

In this Supporting Information, we present tables that show the estimated coefficients on control variables that are included in the models whose results are shown in Tables 1 to 4. In the main text, we explain the theoretical rationale for including each set of controls in the estimated models. These additional model parameters address potential concerns about omitted variables that may be correlated with civilians' perceptions of armed actor abuse and territorial control, potentially biasing our results. We exclude these model estimates from our main table to avoid confusion about the variables of interest. That said, the estimated correlations between these supplemental confounding factors and willingness to collaborate are generally consistent with our theoretical rationale for inclusion (see Tables SI-1 to SI-4).

Table SI-1 corresponds to Table 1 and presents results from our baseline specifications. As expected, a respondent that thinks the government is heading the country in the wrong direction is less likely to tip on an emplaced IED (columns 3). Respondents living in areas with relatively high frequency police patrols (weekly) are more willing to tip (column 4). Willingness to tip is decreasing in village insecurity and increasing as the Taliban gains strength in the respondent's area (column 4) (holding insecurity and territorial control fixed). Table SI-2 corresponds to Table 2, accounting for economic conditions. Respondents who report that corruption affects their daily life (columns 2-4) are more likely to tip. Exposure to corruption is increasing with use of roads, which may heighten concerns about the hazards of roadside bombs. The belief that farmers cannot make a living without planting poppies (column 4) is associated with a reduced willingness to tip. There is no statistically significant estimated relationship between tipping and a family's worsening economic situation (column 3).

Table SI-3 corresponds to Table 3, accounting for pro-Taliban preferences. An individual who believes her personal situation has worsened since the overthrow of the Taliban is less

likely to tip, arguably in part because she likely has a stronger preference for the Taliban than the government relative to an individual whose situation has not worsened (columns 2 and 4). Similarly, an individual who believes a return to Taliban would be good for the country is less likely to tip relative to an individual who does not have such a preference for the Taliban (columns 3-4).

Finally, Table SI-4 corresponds to Table 4, accounting for aspects of the survey's design and enumeration. As one would expect, reporting being comfortable taking the survey is associated with higher willingness to tip (columns 2-4) (survey comprehension is positively associated with willingness to tip but is imprecisely estimated; columns 2-4). Willingness to tip is increasing in the number of people from the respondent's household present during enumeration, perhaps reflecting increasing pro-Government social desirability bias, though we cannot be sure (columns 3-4). Similarly, the later in the day the respondent is enumerated, the less willing he is to tip. It may be that comfort and familiarity with enumerators (which would increase with the amount of time enumerators are present in the village) emboldens respondents to reveal preferences that are less favorable toward the Government and more favorable toward the Taliban. Importantly, our main effects are highly consistent after taking these factors into consideration.

Table SI-1: Full Results of Table 1, baseline specifications

| | (1) Basic Model | (2) Interacted Model | (3) Interacted Model w. Political Controls | (4) Interacted Model w. Political and Security Controls (Baseline) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Govt. No Effort | -0.103*** | -0.0640*** | -0.0583*** | -0.0559*** |
| | (0.00829) | (0.0172) | (0.0171) | (0.0169) |
| Ins. No Effort | 0.115*** | 0.0623*** | 0.0619*** | 0.0644*** |
| | (0.00703) | (0.0142) | (0.0139) | (0.0137) |
| Govt. Control | | 0.0582*** | 0.0527*** | 0.0417*** |
| | | (0.0126) | (0.0125) | (0.0123) |
| Ins. Control | | 0.0685*** | 0.0672*** | 0.0612*** |
| | | (0.0114) | (0.0113) | (0.0114) |
| Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control | | -0.0291 | -0.0299 | -0.0265 |
| | | (0.0185) | (0.0185) | (0.0184) |
| Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control | | -0.0632*** | -0.0573** | -0.0531** |
| | | (0.0235) | (0.0230) | (0.0226) |
| Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control | | -0.00687 | -0.00856 | -0.0147 |
| | | (0.0162) | (0.0160) | (0.0159) |
| Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control | | 0.0690*** | 0.0656*** | 0.0594*** |
| | | (0.0136) | (0.0134) | (0.0134) |
| Govt. going Wrong Direction | | | -0.0615*** | -0.0545*** |
| | | | (0.00637) | (0.00575) |
| Police Patrol Weekly | | | | 0.0819*** |
| | | | | (0.00670) |
| Village Insecure | | | | -0.0414*** |
| | | | | (0.00842) |
| Taliban Gaining Strength | | | | 0.0153*** |
| | | | | (0.00549) |
| Summary Statistics | | | | |
| Outcome Mean | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 |
| Outcome SD | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 |
| Parameters | | | | |
| District FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Demographic Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Interacted Model | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Model Statistics | | | | |
| N | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 |
| Clusters | 377 | 377 | 377 | 377 |

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), survey wave fixed effects, and demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Govt going Wrong Direction*=1 if believes that Government is going in the wrong direction; *Police Patrols Weekly*=1 if police patrols local area at least weekly; *Village Insecure*=1 if local area security situation bad; *Taliban Gaining Strength*=1 if Taliban grown stronger in prior 6 months. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-2: Full Results of Table 2, accounting for economic conditions

| | (1) Baseline Model | (2) Baseline Model w. Corruption | (3) Baseline Model w. Family Econ. | (4) Baseline Model w. Opium Income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Govt. No Effort | -0.0559*** | -0.0554*** | -0.0554*** | -0.0505*** |
| | (0.0169) | (0.0170) | (0.0170) | (0.0167) |
| Ins. No Effort | 0.0644*** | 0.0594*** | 0.0594*** | 0.0548*** |
| | (0.0137) | (0.0137) | (0.0137) | (0.0135) |
| Govt. Control | 0.0417*** | 0.0358*** | 0.0358*** | 0.0329*** |
| | (0.0123) | (0.0122) | (0.0123) | (0.0122) |
| Ins. Control | 0.0612*** | 0.0538*** | 0.0538*** | 0.0529*** |
| | (0.0114) | (0.0113) | (0.0113) | (0.0112) |
| Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control | -0.0265 | -0.0265 | -0.0265 | -0.0285 |
| | (0.0184) | (0.0185) | (0.0185) | (0.0183) |
| Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control | -0.0531** | -0.0549** | -0.0549** | -0.0570** |
| | (0.0226) | (0.0226) | (0.0226) | (0.0224) |
| Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control | -0.0147 | -0.0120 | -0.0120 | -0.0129 |
| | (0.0159) | (0.0159) | (0.0159) | (0.0157) |
| Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control | 0.0594*** | 0.0620*** | 0.0620*** | 0.0613*** |
| | (0.0134) | (0.0135) | (0.0135) | (0.0133) |
| Govt. going Wrong Direction | -0.0545*** | -0.0544*** | -0.0542*** | -0.0508*** |
| | (0.00575) | (0.00582) | (0.00553) | (0.00536) |
| Police Patrol Weekly | 0.0819*** | 0.0805*** | 0.0805*** | 0.0784*** |
| | (0.00670) | (0.00659) | (0.00662) | (0.00664) |
| Village Insecure | -0.0414*** | -0.0427*** | -0.0425*** | -0.0406*** |
| | (0.00842) | (0.00840) | (0.00842) | (0.00836) |
| Taliban Gaining Strength | 0.0153*** | 0.0132** | 0.0133** | 0.0142*** |
| | (0.00549) | (0.00547) | (0.00536) | (0.00536) |
| Corruption Exposure | | 0.0698*** | 0.0698*** | 0.0620*** |
| | | (0.00811) | (0.00809) | (0.00781) |
| Family Econ. Worse | | | -0.00123 | 0.00163 |
| | | | (0.00661) | (0.00661) |
| Rely on Opium Income | | | | -0.0671*** |
| | | | | (0.00618) |
| Summary Statistics | | | | |
| Outcome Mean | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 |
| Outcome SD | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 |
| Parameters | | | | |
| District FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Demographic Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Interacted Model | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Model Statistics | | | | |
| N | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 |
| Clusters | 377 | 377 | 377 | 377 |

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Corruption Exposure*=1 if corruption affects daily life; *Family Econ. Worse*=1 if family's economic situation worsened in prior 12 months; *Rely on Opium Income*=1 if believes it not possible for Afghan farmers to provide for their families without growing poppies. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-3: Full Results of Table 3, accounting for pro-Taliban preferences

| | (1) Baseline Model | (2) Baseline Model w. Worse Since Taliban Overthrow | (3) Baseline Model w. Support Taliban Regime | (4) Baseline Model w. Overthrow Bad and Taliban Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Govt. No Effort | -0.0559*** | -0.0512*** | -0.0531*** | -0.0487*** |
| | (0.0169) | (0.0168) | (0.0172) | (0.0171) |
| Ins. No Effort | 0.0644*** | 0.0594*** | 0.0596*** | 0.0550*** |
| | (0.0137) | (0.0135) | (0.0137) | (0.0135) |
| Govt. Control | 0.0417*** | 0.0365*** | 0.0400*** | 0.0350*** |
| | (0.0123) | (0.0122) | (0.0122) | (0.0121) |
| Ins. Control | 0.0612*** | 0.0600*** | 0.0651*** | 0.0637*** |
| | (0.0114) | (0.0113) | (0.0114) | (0.0113) |
| Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control | -0.0265 | -0.0253 | -0.0274 | -0.0262 |
| | (0.0184) | (0.0183) | (0.0187) | (0.0185) |
| Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control | -0.0531** | -0.0504** | -0.0498** | -0.0474** |
| | (0.0226) | (0.0225) | (0.0230) | (0.0229) |
| Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control | -0.0147 | -0.0156 | -0.0192 | -0.0198 |
| | (0.0159) | (0.0159) | (0.0159) | (0.0158) |
| Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control | 0.0594*** | 0.0582*** | 0.0584*** | 0.0572*** |
| | (0.0134) | (0.0132) | (0.0134) | (0.0132) |
| Govt. going Wrong Direction | -0.0545*** | -0.0475*** | -0.0538*** | -0.0470*** |
| | (0.00575) | (0.00561) | (0.00576) | (0.00561) |
| Police Patrol Weekly | 0.0819*** | 0.0790*** | 0.0813*** | 0.0785*** |
| | (0.00670) | (0.00659) | (0.00670) | (0.00659) |
| Village Insecure | -0.0414*** | -0.0335*** | -0.0388*** | -0.0313*** |
| | (0.00842) | (0.00827) | (0.00831) | (0.00818) |
| Taliban Gaining Strength | 0.0153*** | 0.0198*** | 0.0168*** | 0.0211*** |
| | (0.00549) | (0.00547) | (0.00555) | (0.00553) |
| Worse Since Overthrow | | -0.0785*** | | -0.0766*** |
| | | (0.00677) | | (0.00670) |
| Taliban Return Good | | | -0.0546*** | -0.0513*** |
| | | | (0.0110) | (0.0110) |
| SUMMARY STATISTICS | | | | |
| Outcome Mean | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 |
| Outcome SD | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 |
| PARAMETERS | | | | |
| District FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Demographic Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Interacted Model | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| MODEL STATISTICS | | | | |
| N | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 |
| Clusters | 377 | 377 | 377 | 377 |

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Worse Since Overthrow*=1 if personal situation worse since Taliban was overthrown; *Taliban Return Good*=1 if believes Taliban return to power would be good for Afghanistan. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table SI-4: Full Results of Table 4, accounting for survey design

| | (1) Baseline Model | (2) Baseline Model w. Survey Comfort and Comprehension | (3) Baseline Model w. Number Present | (4) Baseline Model w. Survey Sequence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Govt. No Effort | -0.0559*** | -0.0555*** | -0.0545*** | -0.0542*** |
| | (0.0169) | (0.0169) | (0.0168) | (0.0168) |
| Ins. No Effort | 0.0644*** | 0.0641*** | 0.0652*** | 0.0651*** |
| | (0.0137) | (0.0137) | (0.0136) | (0.0136) |
| Govt. Control | 0.0417*** | 0.0411*** | 0.0416*** | 0.0415*** |
| | (0.0123) | (0.0123) | (0.0123) | (0.0123) |
| Ins. Control | 0.0612*** | 0.0610*** | 0.0608*** | 0.0606*** |
| | (0.0114) | (0.0114) | (0.0114) | (0.0114) |
| Govt. No Effort × Govt. Control | -0.0265 | -0.0263 | -0.0276 | -0.0279 |
| | (0.0184) | (0.0184) | (0.0183) | (0.0183) |
| Govt. No Effort × Ins. Control | -0.0531** | -0.0538** | -0.0540** | -0.0541** |
| | (0.0226) | (0.0226) | (0.0225) | (0.0224) |
| Ins. No Effort × Ins. Control | -0.0147 | -0.0146 | -0.0151 | -0.0148 |
| | (0.0159) | (0.0159) | (0.0159) | (0.0159) |
| Ins. No Effort × Govt. Control | 0.0594*** | 0.0597*** | 0.0587*** | 0.0587*** |
| | (0.0134) | (0.0134) | (0.0134) | (0.0134) |
| Govt. going Wrong Direction | -0.0545*** | -0.0544*** | -0.0542*** | -0.0540*** |
| | (0.00575) | (0.00577) | (0.00581) | (0.00580) |
| Police Patrol Weekly | 0.0819*** | 0.0817*** | 0.0819*** | 0.0817*** |
| | (0.00670) | (0.00671) | (0.00672) | (0.00670) |
| Village Insecure | -0.0414*** | -0.0409*** | -0.0405*** | -0.0406*** |
| | (0.00842) | (0.00843) | (0.00840) | (0.00840) |
| Taliban Gaining Strength | 0.0153*** | 0.0153*** | 0.0150*** | 0.0149*** |
| | (0.00549) | (0.00549) | (0.00544) | (0.00544) |
| Comfortable Survey | | 0.0223** | 0.0233** | 0.0230** |
| | | (0.0113) | (0.0114) | (0.0114) |
| Understood Survey | | 0.00111 | 0.00265 | 0.00264 |
| | | (0.0108) | (0.0108) | (0.0108) |
| Number Present | | | 0.0110*** | 0.0110*** |
| | | | (0.00221) | (0.00221) |
| Survey Seq. in Day | | | | -0.00270*** |
| | | | | (0.000557) |
| SUMMARY STATISTICS | | | | |
| Outcome Mean | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 |
| Outcome SD | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 | 0.497 |
| PARAMETERS | | | | |
| District FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Demographic Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Interacted Model | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| MODEL STATISTICS | | | | |
| N | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 | 99666 |
| Clusters | 377 | 377 | 377 | 377 |

Notes: Outcome of interest is willingness to report insurgents planting IEDs. Unit of analysis is individual survey respondent. All models include administrative district fixed effects (using ESOC boundaries), wave fixed effects, as well as demographic controls (age, education, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status). *Comfortable Survey*=1 if respondent felt comfortable with the survey; *Understood Survey*=1 if respondent understood the survey; *Number Present* is a count of individuals from respondent's household present during enumeration; *Survey Sequence in Day* is the order in the sequence of that day's enumeration (1-8). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

# B Survey Diagnostics and Primary Instruments

Figure SI-1: ANQAR diagnostics during waves conducted by firm collecting Wave 20-27 survey data (ACSOR)




(a) Refusal rate




(b) Non-contact rate




(c) Cooperation rate

Notes: data on refusal, non-contact, and overall cooperation were shared with the authors by NATO.

Table SI-5: Survey Instruments Overview

| **Variable** | **Question** | **Coding** (= 1 if) |
|---|---|---|
| Collaboration (IED tips) | If you knew that an IED had been planted, how likely would you be to report it to the local security forces? | Very likely |
| Ins. No Effort | Do you think the insurgents do enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians? | No |
| Govt. No Effort | Do you think ANDSF does enough to prevent the killing or injuring of civilians? | No |
| Ins. Control | Between the two, the Anti-Government Elements and the Government, who has more influence in your mantaqa now? | Insurgent (AGE) |
| Govt. Control | Between the two, the Anti-Government Elements and the Government, who has more influence in your mantaqa now? | Government |
| Govt. going Wrong Direction | Generally speaking, do you believe the Government of Afghanistan is going in the right direction, the wrong direction, or is in the same place, not going anywhere? | Wrong Direction |
| Police Patrols Weekly | How often do you see the Police in your mantaqa? | At least weekly |
| Village Insecure | How is the security situation in your mantaqa? Good, fair, bad? | Bad |
| Taliban Gaining Strength | Over the past 6 months, do you think that the Taliban have grown stronger, grown weaker, or remained the same? | Yes |
| Corruption Exposure | Do you believe that corruption in the Government affects your daily life? | Yes |
| Family Econ. Worse | Has your familys economic situation gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse compared to 12 months ago? | Worse |
| Rely on Opium Income | Do you think it is possible for Afghan farmers to provide for their families without growing poppies? | No |
| Worse Since Overthrow | How would you say things have changed for you since the time that the Taliban was in power? Have things gotten better, worse or remained the same? | Worse |
| Taliban Return Good | In your opinion, if the Taliban were to return to power and govern Afghanistan, would it be a good thing for the people and the country or would it be a bad thing for the people and the country? | Good |