TRANS-LOCALITY AMONG KURDS – THE CASE OF TURKEY

The article aims at presenting trans-local aspects of Kurdish society and especially trans-local ties maintained by Kurds in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul. Inspired by transnational theories in migration and diaspora studies, the author proposes a categorization of Kurdish migration waves and waves of internal migration in Turkey. Drawing on in-depth interviews conducted with Kurds in Istanbul, the paper depicts ways of maintaining ties with the country’s Kurdish regions and types of social organizing around their culture and perceived needs. The paper also offers insights into contemporary Kurdish migration in Turkey, leading to the conclusion that although trans-locality has often been forced on Kurds, the socio-political situation in 2002–2015 led to the emergence of a new, trans-local, socially active Kurdish elite in Turkey.

"Kurds have no friends but the mountains" is the popular saying among members of this ethnic group living in various regions and countries in the world. Yet dispersion, disintegration and exile have been common themes and experiences connected to Kurdish culture at least since the early twentieth century, owing to the difficult political history in the countries where the lands of Kurdistan are located (van Bruinessen 1992: 11-14). Moreover it can be interpreted that a sense of being scattered may be attributed not only to persecution but also to the cultural and linguistic and heterogeneity among Kurds (van Bruinessen 2000;Kreyenbroek 2000). It can be argued that current identification as a Kurd is even more a result of shared experience and socio-political needs among Kurds around the globe than a consequence of affinity to essentialist identity traits like language, land or biological ancestry (see : Yavuz 2001;Özcan 2006). Thus interconnectedness between various localities (both those treated as belonging to Kurds and those perceived as foreign) is a crucial contemporary characteristic of Kurdish society and culture.
This article aims to provide introductory information on trans-local and trans-national aspects of Kurdish culture and identity. It also examines trans-local practices and customs among Kurds in Turkey and especially among the Kurdish community in Istanbul. On the example of the third largest ethnic group in the Middle East, the article shows the importance and complexity of contemporary social relations, not only trans-national but also trans-local. Starting with a brief presentation of a theoretical background -the impact of transnational theory (exemplified here by works of Steven Vertovec, Thomas Faist and Nina Glick-Shiller) on migration and diaspora studies, I propose a categorization of waves of Kurdish migration since the beginning of the 20th century, based on contemporary studies on the topic. While noting the importance of the international Kurdish diaspora and the impact of trans-national and trans-local ties on Kurdish literature, the latter parts of the paper are devoted to empirical findings based on fieldwork conducted among Kurds in Istanbul, especially those who moved to the city in the 21st century under a relatively peaceful political atmosphere. In analysis of this migration wave I incorporate the concept of middling migration.
My ethnographic research is aimed at answering questions regarding Kurds who settled in Istanbul in this century: (1) What are the trans-local trajectories of their migration and homeland ties? (2) What are they ways and practices of maintaining social and cultural ties with their home-regions? (3) How are trans-local spaces socially constructed by Kurds in the city? Thus the research results depict histories and paths of trans-local migration of the respondents, their perception of home-regions and ways of identifying with and organizing around the culture and social needs of Northern Kurdistan. Such a structure of the findings follows Steven Vertovec's (1999;) observation that transnationalism (in this case translocality) manifests itself not only in interconnectedness but also in re-creation and social organizing around certain spaces perceived as crucially important, such as a homeland.
Findings presented in the latter part of the article are based on semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015 among Kurds in Turkey. The chain-referral method of sampling (also known as the snowball method) was applied. The interviews (conducted in Turkish as not every respondent was able to speak Kurdish due to longtime restrictions on the language in the country, (see also : Dzięgiel 1992: 76;Jomma 2001: 29)), were similar in reference to their goals and form to Uwe Flick's episodic interview, in which questions about specific issues related to biography are asked. Other characteristics of the episodic interview are: basing it on an interview guide, relating the issues raised to the biography and everyday life of the respondents, moving on to the core subject in the middle of the interview, referring to general topics in order to broaden the scope of conversation, and ending the interview with a request for evaluation followed by small talk (see : Flick 2002). A balanced constructivist approach developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991: 78-85, 194-204), who stressed the dialectic nature of processes of externalization, objectivation and internalization of social meanings, served as the general methodological background of the study.
Some estimates from the first decade of the 21st century imply that there are 30-38 million Kurds worldwide, and 12-20 million living in Turkey (see : Yıldız 2005: 6). Calculations of the Kurdish population in Istanbul estimate their number to be between 2 and 4 million (see : Ağırdır 2008). Judging by these estimates, one may infer that Turkish (or Northern) Kurds represent about a half of the world's Kurdish population. The empirical part of the article concentrates on Istanbul as the biggest migration center of Turkey, but also a city of tremendous qualitative significance for Kurds in the country. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the first organizations of Kurds in Turkey were created in Istanbul (Alakom 2011;Özoğlu 2004). Moreover, the ban on Kurdish cultural institutions was lifted in the early 1990s; the first such initiatives appeared in this city and only later opened branches in the southeast (Northern Kurdistan). The city also hosts the headquarters of many Kurdish journals and institutions (see : Bocheńska 2011: 168-170).

TRANS-LOCAL AND TRANS-NATIONAL DIASPORAS -THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Migration may take place between countries, but also between regions within the borders of one state. Earlier theories of internal migration (see e.g., Todaro 1969) put emphasis on economic and industrial development stimulating urbanization, while contemporary approaches indicate many similarities between international and internal migration. These perspectives indicate the popularity of constant travel in contemporary times. The phenomenon of transmigration, analyzed by such approaches, refers not only to circular migrations that cross international borders, but also to frequent traveling -or even maintaining social relations through distance -between certain locations (situated within the same country); hence, the terms "translocalˮ and "transnationalˮ are used in contemporary studies (see also : Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013). One may argue that internal migrations are the most common type of migration in the world (see: Bell et al. 2014;IOM 2016).
The transnational shift in the study of migration offered a more complex approach to problems such as the multiplicity of sending and hosting areas, or the rigidness of bureaucratic and academic definitions of migration. Thus transnational theories encouraged scholars not only to enumerate push and pull factors for migration but also take into consideration the processual and temporal character of trans-local and trans-national mobility. It can be argued that the transnational shift overcame the fixation on nation-states and the limits of analysing migration in a linear way, as classic theories and international documents often did (see : Vertovec 1999;Sirkeci 2009: 4). Steven Vertovec (2009) underlined that "transnationalismˮ has many dimensions, which have usually been undervalued by previous migration theories. Vertovec points out that transnationalism can be studied as social morphology (local and global customs), a kind of consciousness (connected to cohesion of representations of locality and identity of migrants), a form of cultural reproduction (including new spaces of such reproduction), path of flows of social and economic remittances, and places of political engagement and re-constructions of locality. While traditional migration theories distinguish between migration and return migration (see: Iglicka 2010), the transnational shift in migration studies enabled researchers to recognize continuous mobility of migrants, the fact that often whole social networks cross borders, and the internal diversity of diasporas (see : Hall 1996). Also recognized were diasporas that relate to an imagined and non-territorial homeland (Faist 2010).
The modern meaning of the concept of diaspora in social sciences is often connected with a conscious relation with a perceived homeland. In the second half of the 20th century, the concept gained currency with the rise of diaspora studies (see : Tölölyan 2012), and it became more often conceptualized in a more inclusive manner (see : Weinar 2010;Brubaker 2005). Deliberate relations with their home and engagement with their issues were usually indicated as the difference between emigration and diaspora. Gabriel Scheffer's classic definition (2003) stated that a diaspora has to have some collective identity characterizing scattered groups across different borders, which must be, to some extent, organized and maintaining physical or symbolic ties with the homeland. William Safran (1991) pointed to six distinct characteristics of diaspora: (1) dispersion from an ancestral center to a periphery or from the original homeland to other lands, (2) cultivation of a myth and collective memory about the homeland (including its geographical, historical traits, and accomplishments), (3) a sense of alienation from the host society as a result of belief in the impossibility of being fully accepted outside of one's homeland, (4) a perception of the homeland as a place of eventual return in better circumstances, and as an ideal place for living, (5) a belief in obligation to contribute to the existence of the homeland or to its restoration and to securing its wealth, (6) cultivation of a relation with the homeland and its important role in group solidarity and collective consciousness. Postulates for studying the diasporas in a broad sense, with a focus on diversity and dynamics of international social networks, were often put forward by those scholars advocating the idea of transnationalism in migration studies. This approach puts emphasis on everyday practices of migrants operating in a social environment connecting different destinations and societies (including the homeland, the host society, fellow migrants and international communities). Although processes connected with transnationalism were enabled and stimulated by modern technology and often institutional networks, scholars working within this perspective called for recognition of migrants' agency and studying transnational ties on micro-and meso-social levels (e.g., Glick Schiller et al. 1995;Guarnizo and Smith 1998). This approach also pointed to social ties of various character which are continuously maintained across borders. One of the most important observations of transnationalism is the importance of mobility instead of settlement. Contemporary migrants are relatively nonpermanent inhabitants of one place of destination, and a traditional pattern of returning to the homeland is often replaced among modern members of a diaspora with intensive mobility between the homeland and other destinations (see : Faist 2010: 12). Such an observation was also made in regard to the Kurds, and particularly those of them who live in Turkey. There are Kurdish families who instead of being seasonal migrant workers or settled migrants are in fact living and travelling between two destinations, for example having a shop in Istanbul and taking care of a flock of sheep in Turkey's southeast (Northern Kurdistan) during the summers (see : Jongerden 2007: 218-280;Gambetti and Jongerden 2015). Such a situation, however, may be a result of achieving a certain economic position or, in other cases, of constant mobility and economic necessity.
Prominent scholars studying Kurdish migrations -Bahar Başer, Ann-Catrin Emanuelsson, and Mari Toivanen (2015) -have recognized not only a growing interest in the Kurdish transnational social networks and ways enabling mobilization and cultivation of Kurdish identity transgressing borders, but they have also emphasized the importance of analyzing local conditions in which a given part of the Kurdish diaspora functions. Ipek Demir (2012Demir ( , 2015 used Avtar Brah's approach to the diaspora in the course of an analysis of influential Kurds in London. Demir also indicated the presence of the concept of space in diaspora studies as exemplified by Fiona Adamson (2002), who emphasized diasporic political spaces, and Elizabeth Mavroudi (2008), who analyzed the organization of informal political spaces of Palestinians in Athens. Brah (1996) underlined that diasporas create social spaces connected with their culture and political agenda. These spaces include diasporic discursive constructions of home, natives, migrants and borders. The borders (understood in a way which resembles boundaries in ethnic studies) can be both geographical and analytical.
Diasporic spaces are affected by intersectional locations and dislocations of a diaspora involving economic, political, cultural and psychic traits of the group and global conditions corresponding to these spheres. Brah (1996: 175-207) also emphasized that as communication and travel technologies have advanced in the late 20th century, diasporas have come to function among local and global circumstances and environments. A diaspora in such an approach is a group which creates social spaces which are connected with meanings referring to what is constructed and encountered. There is, however, a need to translate diasporic identity and meanings to the host society and often also to the society of origin and to global social networks. Demir (2015) underlined the process of translation that a diaspora must undertake to present its identity and political struggle to other groups. As observed in translation studies, this process involves selection and omission, revealing and hiding, appreciation and reconstruction. These themes are also important for studying re-creation of the spaces and culture of a homeland, a key aspect of studying transnationalism or trans-locality (Vertovec 2009).
Based on the theoretical background presented above, for the purpose of my research I treat migration in a wide sense of the concept, as proposed by transnational studies. Migration in this sense involves both stays in a new locality for more than three months and continuous mobility and circular migration among various localities. In my operational definition a diaspora can be characterized by some degree (which is often varied) of self-consciousness and shared social solidarity among trans-local migrants who maintain ties across geographical regions and create social spaces devoted to meanings and interests of the homeland. These meanings as observed by Avtar Brah and Ipek Demir have to be translated to other groups and the general public.

WAVES OF KURDISH TRANS-NATIONAL AND TRANS-LOCAL MIGRATIONS
As noted by Minoo Alinia (2004: 30), Kurdish migration in general (regardless of the original state) can be divided into two periods: before and after 1975. While the first phase was largely economic and more voluntary, the second phase was connected with armed and political struggle in all four parts of Kurdistan (see: van Bruinessen 2000). In Southern Kurdistan, The Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Iraq was officially established in 1970, but it lasted only until 1974, the year when the KDP was targeted by new military operations of Iraqi forces. This situation also led to the temporary exile of Mustafa Barzani to Iran and initiation of resettlement projects by the Iraqi state, whose purpose was to conduct the Arabization of Kurdish regions in the country (see : Dzięgiel 1992: 100-104;van Bruinessen 2000;Jomma 2001: 80-83). In the northern part, located in Turkey, after every military coup (which occurred succesively on 27th May 1960, 12 March 1971and 12 September 1980, Kurdish communities were targeted with arrests and bans. This political suppression led many activists to emigrate, especially after the 1980 coup. It can be argued that the military conflicts and deterioration of security in the 1970s in all parts of Kurdistan was the reason for the rise in Kurdish forced migration (see also : Jomma and Linka 2017: 216-218).
The expulsion of thousands of Kurdish villagers was part of a counter-insurgency war doctrine embraced by the Turkish authorities during the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. The countryside in the southeast was perceived by the military and political authorities as the hotspot of guerrilla warfare training (Jongerden 2007: 43-44).
Although the Kurds in Turkey have experienced difficult processes of displacement throughout the years of the existence of the Republic of Turkey, it would be unwise to think that involuntary migration is the only type of migration they have undergone. Substantial voluntary internal migration had taken place earlier, in the times of the Ottoman Empire. The flow to Istanbul (and other Ottoman metropoleis) of the officers that took another step in the bureaucratic hierarchy is seen by Kemal H. Karpat (2004) as a major factor in modernizing the country. His argument is that this mobility transformed existing local relations and created new elites. Internal migration flows also played a major role in the times of the Republic of Turkey, changing its population structure and making it an urbanized country circa 1985. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, when forced migration dominated in the country, there was a substantial number of voluntary migrants. To a large extent the problem of internal migration in Turkey is a Kurdish problem, as leaving the less urbanized and economically marginalized (remaining at the same time a place of military conflict especially in late 1980s and 1990s) southeast of the country (Northern Kurdistan) was one of the dominating tendencies in spatial population movements in Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand contemporary Kurdish migration in Turkey it is vital to examine the general migration flows and tendencies inside the country.
Migration waves in the Republic of Turkey can be divided into four categories. The first wave was connected to the emergence of the country and discontents of various minority groups towards centralized government (see: Kaczorowski 2015a), while the second wave was stimulated by the country's industrialization of the 1960s and 1970s. The third wave took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The fourth wave, a relatively more voluntary one (or selfinitiated -a term proposed by Duygu Örs (2019)), started after the government of Turkey suspended the policy of expulsion in the southeast at the beginning of the 21st century. Most of the respondents of the field study presented in this article were a part of this fourth wave.
To understand this fourth wave of migration it is important to mention its political context and end that led to a return to migration caused by military conflict. The first decade of the 21st century was considered by many commentators to be a time of democratization of Turkey. During those years, the situation of Kurds in Turkey changed radically owing to vast reforms undertaken by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviation AKP). After gaining power in 2002, the party announced accession to the European Union (EU) as its primary goal. An exemplification of these reforms had to do with the acceptance of six acts inspired by EU law and prepared by the AKP during its first term as a ruling party and passed by the Turkish parliament. At the same time, the criminal code was modified, and efforts were made to broaden personal freedoms (Balci 2013). These included a series of reforms called the Kurdish Opening, proclaimed by the government in 2009. The enactment of these reforms enabled broadcasts in the Kurdish language and in 2009 TRT 6, the first public TV channel in the Kurdish language, was formed. In 2012 Kurdish language classes were introduced as elective courses. In late 2012, the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the "Solution Process" (often called internationally the "Peace Process", while its original name, Çözüm süreci, literally meant "Solution Process"), which sought to end the military struggle with the outlawed PKK (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê -The Kurdistan Workers' Party) through peaceful dialogue and reforms. The following year, PKK fighters began withdrawing from Turkey and steps were taken toward reconciliation. Because of the newly open political atmosphere, Kurdish organizations and civil society have blossomed in Turkey since 2000 (Baysal and Diken 2015). A major crisis in the Solution Process occurred in 2014 when the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) attacked Kobane, a Kurdish town in the Syrian Kurdish autonomous area of Rojava ("West" in Kurdish), proclaimed in the aftermath of Arab Spring, led by a political movement with ties to PKK, the Democratic Union Party (Kurdish: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat -PYD)). Turkish authorities, although they allowed the entrance of thousands of refugees from areas under the siege of ISIS, at first were reluctant to condemn radical Islamists and publicly stated that PYD's success in self-governing in northern Syria was the greatest threat to Turkey in the region. This perception materialized during the following years in operations led by the Turkish military inside Northern Syria in 2018 (operation Olive Branch against Afrin district,) and most directly during a wide offensive against Rojava lasting from 9-17 October 2019.
In the summer of 2015 the Turkish government announced a war on terror against ISIS and the PKK, with a significant focus on arresting people associated with the Kurdish left and bombing PKK outposts not only in Turkey but also in Iraq. Resurrecting the armed conflict with the leftist Kurds also corresponded to the political strategy of gaining votes from the far right -which were necessary for AKP to return to a single-party rule. It can be noted, however, that along with this strategy, all achievements of the peace process were destroyed and an ultra-nationalistic discourse re-entered the mainstream debate (Geerdink 2015). Various publicists and political studies scholars argued that in fact the autonomous governance in Rojava and its perception as a threat to the stability of Turkey was the underlying reason behind the collapse of the Solution Process and the renewal of military conflict with Kurds in the country.
The renewal of the military conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK in 2015 and the political atmosphere in Turkey following an attempt of some groups in the Turkish army to overthrow the elected government of the AKP 2016 created a situation that caused new forced migrations and expulsion.
The new drastic operations of the Turkish army, which resulted in the destruction of whole neighborhoods of Kurdish-inhabited cities (some scholars referred to these acts as urbicidesee: Gosse 2016), already forced hundreds of Kurds to resettle. In a report published in February 2017 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the number of displaced people was estimated from 350,000 to 500,000. The number of deaths caused by the renewed conflict was estimated at 2,000 (Kaczorowski 2016;UN 2017). Therefore it can be argued that there is a need to distinguish a new fifth wave of internal migration in Turkey, which is again dominated by forced mobility, and which started around 2015. The exact consequences of these changes, however, remain to be seen.

KURDISH TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORAS AND KURDISH LITERATURE
Internal and international diasporas of Kurds have been important for the development and intensification of Kurdish nationalism at least since the late 19th century (Dzięgiel 1992: 182-185;Özoğlu 2004). One may argue that entering the political atmosphere with more freedom and meeting with Kurdish migrants from other parts of Kurdistan (including other parts of Northern Kurdistan) stimulated the creation of new initiatives and ideas in regard to Kurdish identity, culture and politics (Bocheńska 2011: 190). The first Kurdish newspapers were published in Cairo, Egypt in 1898 by Mikdat Midhat Bedirxan. The first cultural and political societies were formed in Istanbul during the same period. As mentioned above, the Latin alphabet proposed for the Kurdish language (used mainly by the Kurmanci and Zazaki dialects but proposed for all of them) was first published in Damascus. The activists living in South Caucasus, in countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Russia also exerted an influence upon the collective identity of Kurds. The most notable example from this area is the activity of Karapetê Xaço. Xaço was a person of Armenian origin who escaped genocide in 1915. By travelling through Northern Kurdistan he learned many folk songs and fairy tales of the dengbêj (Kurdish bards), and after migration to Damascus and eventually to Yerevan (in 1946) he was able to sing Kurdish tales and speak about them for years during broadcasts on public Yerevan Radio. In times of persecution of Kurdish culture by the Turkish state, these broadcasts were an important part of Kurdish cultural education and a symbol of their distinctiveness (along with smuggled cassette tapes with performances of other dengbêj and Kurdish singers) (Uzun 2004: 108-110;Bocheńska 2011: 61). South Caucasian states and regions also hosted numerous active Yezidi 1 Kurdish writers (Galip 2015: 41).
The second half of the 20th century was marked by high activity of the European Kurdish diaspora, which helped to spread self-identification as Kurdish among many local groups both within Turkey and in countries where other parts of Kurdistan are located (Khayati 2008: 79-83). The most important role in this regard was played by cultural institutions operating in Western Europe and satellite television channels broadcasting from these areas. The latter became popular especially in the 1990s. The most prominent example of such channels (in regard to Kurds in Turkey) was MED-TV broadcast from the United Kingdom starting in 1995 and later under changed names: MEDYA TV from France and Roj TV from Belgium (Romano 2006). The most influential Kurdish institutions have been operating since the 1970s in cities such as Paris, Stockholm, Berlin, Brussels and London. Similar organizations were also formed in other parts of the globe including North America and Australia. In Sweden, the policy towards minorities supported their rights to cultural self-expression by allowing funding for publications. The result of this was the blossoming of Kurdish literature in this country. The Kurdish Institute in Paris, which was formed in 1983, promoted the Kurdish language and literature by organizing seminars which were attended by representatives of Kurdish intelligentsia, as well as conferences, a library, and by assisting Kurdish students who were working on degrees at French universities (Galip 2015: 38-42). The Institute in Brussels (established in 1978) also supports Kurdish migrants, offering language courses (Dutch, French and Kurdish) for them, organizing cultural events and scientific conferences, and publishing a journal and works devoted to Kurdish culture and history (see : Jomma 2001: 120-124).
After the Second World War many Kurdish students studying at European Universities started their own organizations promoting Kurdish language and culture. The most prominent of them was formed in 1956 in Wiesbaden, West Germany and opened its branches in major academic cities across Europe. The difficult situation of the Kurdish movement in Iraq in 1975 affected the organization, leading to its division into the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE) and The Association of Kurdistan Students Abroad (AKSA). In 1987 the KSSE formed its Polish branch in Warsaw with Sidki Barwari -a student of journalism from Southern Kurdistan -as the first chair of the branch. The organization, apart from publishing information on Kurds and organizing protests and political activities spreading knowledge about the Kurds, also organized cultural events (such as Newroz celebrations) and aimed at popularization of traditional Kurdish culture through musical and dance performances, among others. Even before 1987 and the opening of the KSSE branch in Poland, in 1963 the Kurdish students in the country formed an organization associated with other Kurdish societies in Europe (Jomma 2001: 156-159;Jomma and Linka 2017: 216-220). In the 21st century some groups of Kurdish students (mainly from Turkey) organized themselves around a Facebook page in Polish and a website, Kurdystan.info. In Kraków, owing to the activity of Ziyad Raoof -a businessman and a representative of the Kurdish Regional Governmentand local scholars (among others the ethnographer Leszek Dzięgiel), the Kurdish Center for Information and Documentation was founded in 2001. The community founding the center had been associated with the Society for Polish-Kurdish friendship (established in 1992). In 2011 Kurds from Syria formed the Society of Kurds in Poland in Kalisz, aimed at integrating Kurds from various parts of Kurdistan living in the country. In November 2015, Kurds from Syria and Turkey formed the Polish-Kurdish Foundation, aiming at promoting Polish culture in Kurdistan and the Middle East as well as promoting Kurdish culture in Poland (Jomma and Linka 2017: 223-227).
Modern Kurdish literature draws inspiration from traditional Kurdish culture, although it often has been created outside of the regions of Kurdistan. Consequently writers have offered reinterpretations and universalisation of Kurdish culture and identity, often applying stylistic devices whose purpose is to place Kurdish concerns in a more universal framework. This can be exemplified by referring to Kurdistan only as a "Land of the mountainsˮ found in Uzun's works or Mehmet Dicle's creation of a fictional town (that can be even interpreted as a country) -Asûs. These literary techniques call for de-spatialization of the plots and sometimes even de-historicization of told tales (Bocheńska 2016: 7-11). Such attempts can be interpreted as a reference to the literature of the world but also as a practice described by Avtar Brah as aiming at translation of the problems of one's own for other cultures (1996). Negotiations with traditions are also featured in the novels and stories of Seyit Alp, Ruşen Arslan and Hesenê Metê. Seyit Alp referred to some topics undertaken by Ehmedê Xanî's 2 Mem and Zin and tried to update them according to the challenges posed by modern culture. He also indicated the problem of the lack of wise rulers of Kurdistan. However, he strongly opposed the traditional view of fate as driven solely by God's will, and he advocated for Kurdish agency based both on rationality and traditional Kurdish values (such as respect for the surrounding nature). The problem of the need for better self-understanding among Kurds is another of the main themes of Alp's works (see : Alp 2000;Bocheńska 2011: 292-313).
Ruşen Arslan portrayed characters focused on honest everyday work and self-development who are forced into politics only by injustices perpetrated by others (e.g., the representatives of the state). Thus, his short stories depict the duty for humble self-development but also the responsibility to react to social injustice (Arslan 2005;Bocheńska 2011: 314-326). Hesenê Metê, a leading Kurdish writer living in Sweden, has raised numerous different topics connected to the contemporary situation of Kurds in his novels and stories. Drawing from Kurdish religious and folklore traditions, Metê discusses the difficult moral issues related to human freedom and responsibility, advocating love for humans instead of for God (Bocheńska 2013). In the novel The Labirynth of Jinns he reveals the illusion of the blessing of education and rationality, showing its debris in a Kurdish village (Bocheńska 2011: 327-338), and in the short story Şepal he describes the ambiguous Kurdish-Turkish relationship (Bocheńska 2016b), presenting a portrait of a Kurdish traitor (see : Metê 2003;Bocheńska 2011: 327-338).
Similar themes are also represented by the newest generation of Kurdish writers in Turkey, like Mehmet Dicle, who was born in a village in Diyarbakır Province and migrated to Istanbul in order to study geography (Bocheńska 2016: 4-7). In "Kuça filanˮ (The street of Christians) he engages the topic of the need to shift from traditional obedience with the lack of sensitivity to the suffering of others to a deeper reflection on the surrounding order and empathy towards other creatures. The story also discusses the problem of Kurdish participation in the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and issues connected with remembering this guilt in contemporary times (see : Dicle 2010: 77-84;Bocheńska 2016: 11-15). Dicle's short stories emphasize the importance of moral awareness and sensitivity towards the suffering of those of other groups (in the Kurdish context e.g., Armenians, Turkish soldiers) (Bocheńska 2016: 15-18). Young Kurdish migrants in Istanbul often embrace these topics and literature through participation in student societies, informal discussions, meetings in Kurdish cafés, and the promotion of new releases. The availability of Kurdish literature in certain bookstores and cafés, and the fact that many Kurdish publications are published in the city, make it much easier for Kurds living in Istanbul to contribute to the literary life.

TRANS-LOCAL KURDS IN TURKEY -EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
It may be argued that one of the key characteristics of trans-locality is a different perception of spatial mobility, not necessarily connected with classic definition of migration as a permanent change of place of living. My interviews and conversations with Kurds in Istanbul led to the discovery of a peculiar understanding of key concepts -migration (göç) and homeland (memleket). Probably as a result of deep experiences endured in the family or the surrounding climate of forced migration in the 1990s, many Kurds in Turkey associate the concept of migration (göç) only with forced migration (zorunlu göç) and being a refugee (mülteci). On the other hand, Kurds who were born in Istanbul still identified with their parents' southeastern region of origin as their homeland (memleket). The definition of a migrant may also depend on the situation in which one person can feel that he or she is a voluntary migrant, while others would not consider themselves that way, noting that their stay in Istanbul may be temporary or task-oriented (they would, however, still -at the time of my research -spend most of the year living in the city). This attitude can be illustrated by a quote from a Kurdish woman from Malatya teaching English in Istanbul: I did not come to migrate [settle -KK], I came to the university (R7, aged 34, from Malatya). During a conversation, she underlined that she is not a migrant, although when reflecting on her stay in the city she admitted that she had already been living in it for ten hears.
During the interviews I asked respondents to describe the characteristics of their homeland (and other places from which they might have migrated) and everyday life in those places prior to their movement. Their understanding and evaluation of the village, city or district from which they came (memleket) was also a key point in this study. Memleket -a word of Arabic origin meaning princedom -is also used by those of the Turkish diaspora abroad to refer to their home country (Turkey). Domestically it serves more often to refer to a geographic area in Turkey a (town, a city, a village, but mainly a province) from which a given person came. Such common geographical origin is also the basis of bonds of solidarity among migrants who have organized themselves in hometown organizations throughout Turkey. Such societies offer help to fellow migrants (Hersant and Toumarkine 2005;Yücel 2005).
However, the term memleket, which is widely used in everyday life situations in Turkey, may be used not only to describe the place of one's birth but more often the homeland (place of origin) of a family. Memlekets have their symbolical aspects connected to their cultural and geographical specificity. These are represented in various forms during the day-to-day construction of space. Many young Kurds who were born in Istanbul do not perceive the city as their memleket, because their family descended from other regions. Thus, some Kurdish youth visit their homelands but have never lived there and some have even never been to their memleket (one reason for this may be the fact that some settlements were destroyed during the clashes between Turkish military forces and the PKK). Some have just followed their parents to a new place of residence, as in the case of five respondents who came to Istanbul in early childhood. A graduate student with whom I had a pilot interview during the summer of 2013 admitted that he was born in a village near Diyarbakır which was burned when he was an infant. Another respondent had moved to Istanbul with her parents and her younger sisters were born there. Memleket can be therefore associated with the area of the origin of the family which one might only know through second-hand information. One may argue that the identification with the province of one's parents is stronger if the respondent was brought up outside of Northern Kurdistan and as a result his Kurdish identity was usually based on associating himself with the ancestral region. This also coincides with the remark of Nira Yuval-Davis (2010) that efforts at maintaining belonging to certain social spheres, geographical areas and identities are stronger when this belonging is somehow threatened -in this case by the lack of stable contact with the hometown and its culture. However, it is interesting that despite the remoteness or even loss of the homeland, its name can still be preserved as an important part of self-identification in interactions with other Turkish citizens. This kind of social relations is important all over Turkey, and in fact many hometown organizations unite migrants of non-south-eastern provinces (see: Hersant and Toumarkine 2005).
Having known people in the destination of migration served not only the purpose of assistance in accustoming oneself to the new environment, but it has also had an impact on the decision to move to Istanbul. It made the city appear to those respondents as mentally closer to the hometown (or other place of residence before moving) and more attractive than other potential places. Such a factor -of social bonds connected to the destination area -has been emphasized in social sciences by theorists of chain migration (see: Douglas Massey and España 1987) and in regard to Turkish internal migration in the studies of Ayşe Gedik (1997).
Similarly to the previous wave of migration, my interviewees who represented the new wave would often migrate in a multi-step manner. Numerous respondents have mentioned that they received primary education in their village but then had to attend a boarding middleschool and later a high-school in more urbanized areas (usually the center -merkez) of the province. Their first-choice university would usually be located in Istanbul, to which they would move to study if they had earned a sufficient number of points (or grades) in graduation exams to enroll.
Eighteen out of the 52 interviewed respondents were migrating beyond their native provinces (not counting migrations from a village to a city inside the region) of Turkey before coming to Istanbul. Most of the respondents did experience some form of migration prior to moving to Istanbul (usually attending a boarding school in the center of the province) as only a minority of respondents were raised in towns or cities from which they directly migrated to Istanbul.
Most respondents would migrate successively to one place after another, although some participants did go back and forth to various cities in Turkey where part of their family resided, and where the participants attended schools and worked. Respondents who came to Istanbul with their parents migrated significantly earlier than those who came by themselves (or with their siblings and friends). The earliest migration with parents happened 25 years prior to the interview, while the shortest stay in Istanbul among this group lasted four years. The median of years spent living in Istanbul for that group was 16.5 (the average was 15 years and eight months). Among the 40 respondents who migrated to Istanbul without their parents, the median was six years (with an average of six years and a little less than four months). The respondent who lived in Istanbul the longest time (among the participants who came without parents), moved to the city 18 years ago and the one who migrated last had been living in Istanbul for ten months at the time of the interview.
In the cases of various respondents, multi-step migration and forced migration experienced in infancy (or by their parents) make it hard to clearly describe their province of origin. In the most complicated cases the respondent would identify himself or herself with their ancestral province while growing up in a different one and migrating to Istanbul from yet another province where they completed part of their education (usually high-school or some part of higher education). The most complex path of migration -among the participants -was that of a woman who finally settled in Istanbul in 2012 because she majored in art and wanted to practice her occupation. She identified herself as a Dersimli (literally a person from the Dersim region; the contemporary Turkish name -Tunceli), although she was born in Kahramanmaraş (which is often called by its original name Maraş, changed in 1973) a province neighboring Kurdish-majority regions in the southwest. She was, however, raised in Germany where her parents moved when she was a little child. Because of the problems with a permit to stay in the Schengen area, she and her parents had to move to The Netherlands, back to Germany, and then back to Turkey. In Germany they spent almost six years, and by the time she returned to Turkey she was 12 years old. At that time her parents tried to settle in Istanbul but because of hardships connected to difficult economic conditions, after a few months they moved back to Maraş. However, they had to move away, because of bad relations with surrounding people who would cause difficulties for the respondent and her family because of their Kurdish and Alevi descent. They went to the smaller Western city of Bursa. From Bursa they returned to Maraş as the participant finished secondary school. At the beginning of her high school she made a decision to come to Istanbul while her parents stayed in Maraş, but in order to study at a university she moved to Mersin. When she completed her studies in art at age 28, she finally moved to Istanbul because of the employment opportunities that the city offers in sectors connected with her major. She summarized her migrations in the following words: First, of course, we came to Maraş. We were born there -myself, my elder sister and my elder brother, we were all born there. Later we went to Germany. Later our return to Turkey happened. When we returned to Turkey, at first we stayed in Istanbul but the conditions were very difficult for my parents. Because of that we went to Maraş once again. But we could not leave there, I mean the problems with living began. I was 12 years old and because I was Kurdish and Alevi, women, men, bad people were throwing stones at me. Stones were thrown at me [...]. The reason was that I was Kurdish and Alevi. Because of that we did not stay there. We went to Bursa... We went to so many places. Eventually I made a decision and came to Istanbul (R17, aged 30, from Maraş).
It was around 2003 when she moved to Istanbul to complete the last three years of her high school education; then she studied at a university in Mersin and came back to Istanbul in 2012. However, she did not have any close relatives who would help her during the first days after migration, as her parents stayed in Maraş. Most migrations of the respondents also followed the multi-step manner, although with fewer phases, usually consisting of moving to the city of their province (in order to attend a high school or to escape from war in early childhood) and then to Istanbul. Consequently many of the respondents became trans-local migrants not by their own will, although they themselves decided to come to Istanbul as their latest migration.
Most of the respondents have never visited any other country than Turkey. The exceptions were one participant cited above who was brought up in Germany and two respondents who were abroad as recipients of the Erasmus scholarship during their studies and a worker of a telecommunications company who went on vacation to Prague, Czech Republic. The rest of the participants usually could not go beyond the borders of the country because of the complicated process of acquiring a passport and its high cost. Some respondents admitted they had relatives who went to Europe in the 1980s and the 1990s (e.g., Sweden, Germany, or France). However, they never visited them because of the cost and the problems associated with getting a Schengen visa. This tendency among respondents is in accordance with a study of the Ipsos KMG Research and Consultancy Companies published in 2015, which revealed that 94% of citizens of Turkey never go abroad on vacation and 45% never go on holiday anywhere in Turkey (HDN 2015). Many of my respondents, however, have expressed the influence of international contacts on them through the multicultural character of Istanbul and the importance of Kurdish cultural institutions operating abroad.
When respondents described their hometowns and provinces of origin, most of them emphasized their bond with them as the place of family life and of cultivation of Kurdish traditions. Villages, towns and cities in southeastern Turkey were perceived as a natural environment for maintaining Kurdish culture through collective celebrations and hospitability between neighbors, and because of the landscape, which facilitates the exercise of animal husbandry and land cultivation. Apart from this positive image of home-regions, in the context of their choice to migrate, the respondents emphasized the lack of opportunities in the southeast, both regarding economic and personal growth. The problems of the economy of traditional Kurdish regions are, according to the respondents, connected with low profitability of traditional occupations of shepherds and farmers. This situation is often understood among participants as at least partially a result of the policies and intervention of the state: 3 military operations in previous decades, a quota on cultivating certain crops, and a lack of economic programs aimed at redistribution and creating new workplaces. Such an attitude can be illustrated by a quote from the respondent who came to Istanbul to study economy: The animal husbandry is on the verge of extinction in the East. My family was cultivating tobacco ten years ago. The quota on tobacco was established. In our county (ilçe) usually every family was making a living by cultivating tobacco. However, after the quota was introduced, one third of our population had to migrate to Istanbul and to such cities as Bursa. This was due to financial opportunities. There could be at least a few factories opened where they could work, there could be other sectors that could help the migration problem. And the Kurds have attached much importance to education after that process. Currently, there are very few families where a child is not a student at a university (R14, aged 21, from Bitlis).
At the same time the respondent indicates a change in the attitude towards education among the Kurds in his province and a trait which can be assumed to be a feature of a new wave of migration -the growing share of students among internal Kurdish migrants.
Although the majority of the respondents came to Istanbul for economic and educational opportunities they did emphasize that Kurds usually migrate to western Turkish cities as a result of both economic and political problems in their regions, referring to the past and more physical insecurities prevalent at that time. From such a perspective, the respondents connected economic and political insecurities of their homelands. According to the perception of many respondents, the underdevelopment of Turkey's southeast was not only connected with a lack of investment but also with the deterioration of the natural environment and agriculture during the military operations in 1990s.
Although the quotations above depict economic difficulties affecting respondents' decisions to migrate, they did not describe their hometowns in an exclusively negative way. Moreover, they did acknowledge some improvement of the situation in their provinces (until 2015 when military operations continued) and throughout the country compared to the earlier decades. These changes to their hometowns concerned the economy, the political atmosphere and the environment for social life. One respondent from Diyarbakır who migrated to Istanbul in 2003 remarked that his city had changed since his departure and that opportunities for more social activities had appeared. Three respondents achieved higher education owing to universities functioning in the southeast. During the fieldwork I also met Kurds who were studying in their province and only visited Istanbul in order to meet with cousins and for tourism. Such a situation would be very unusual in previous decades when most of the Kurds came to Istanbul in order to survive the military conflict in their home-regions. Moreover, usually only big cities outside of Northern Kurdistan were education centers for Kurds in Turkey. This has changed, especially during the second decade of 21st century when universities like Artuklu in Mardin or Dicle in Diyarbakır flourished and become important scientific centers for the whole country.
Some participants also recognized that in many provinces with a Kurdish majority, local governments were led by the pro-Kurdish HDP party (Turkish: Halkların Demokratik Partisi -Peoples' Democratic Party) as a consequence of winning municipal elections. This was stressed by a respondent who graduated in law in Istanbul, and who earlier was studying in Izmir and was brought up in Batman: Batman has changed a lot during the last eight years, there were many new buildings. There were new settlements. When one looks at our neighboring provinces in Kurdistan -Bingöl and Bitlis -Batman is much cleaner. Especially our municipality has done a lot of things for women. We also want more freedoms for conservative people. There is, for example, Yilmaz Güney's Cinema. You can find alternative films. The ones you can find in Istanbul. We have a transport discount for students, one day when women can travel for free etc... well, as I said, it is a city which is both conservative and fighting for freedom [...] (R13, aged 27, from Batman). Participation in local government as a part of engagement and mobilization of the Kurdish leftist movement in Turkey has been analyzed by Nicole F. Watts (2010). The flourishing of non-governmental Kurdish initiatives and societies was documented by Nurcan Baysal and Şeyhmus Diken, who interviewed and analyzed more than 70 different organizations operating in Turkey's southeast for their book Civil Society in Kurdistan, published in Turkish in 2015.

TRANS-LOCAL SPACES AND PRACTICES MAINTAINED BY KURDS IN ISTANBUL
The new migrants (coming to Istanbul in the period between 2002 and 2015, the fourth wave) benefitted from a relatively more open political atmosphere in the country achieved by the initial reforms passed by the AKP-led government. They could aspire to the middle class or reach an economic position, which was very difficult, if not impossible, for forced migrants who had come to Istanbul in the previous wave because of the lack of legal recognition. Therefore the experiences of the majority of my respondents and the opportunities available for them differed significantly from those of low-skilled migrants. They, however, still had to struggle with the conditions after arrival and search for social groups who would help them on their own. It can be thus argued that they represent a part of a phenomenon analyzed in contemporary migrations studies as middling migration. This concept describes a group of migrants differing from both high-skilled migrants, who benefit more from their organizational ties, and low skilled migrants who usually migrate only because of economic needs (or other forms of insecurity). In fact the majority of my respondents, adhering to a more self-initiated wave of migration in Turkey, were middling migrants who had to rely on their own creativity, entrepreneurship and social ties when coping with their trans-local situation (Luthra and Platt 2016).
Trans-locality manifests itself not only in migration and contacts with the place of origin but also cultivation of cultural traits, re-creation of homeland spaces (including cultivating memory of them), and organization around topics important for the homeland (Vertovec 2009). In such a broad understanding, even seemingly mundane activities like drinking a special kind of tea can be trans-local practices of cultural significance.
The interior decorations of Kurdish apartments -as in the cafés -do not necessarily have scarves in Kurdish colors or portraits of Kurdish political figures on the wall; references to one's hometown are much more popular (memleket). It can be presented in the form of a photo or image of a landscape or a symbolic part of the hometown. It is very common among the migrants from provinces bordering Armenia (mainly Ağrı, Iğdır and Kars) to have images of Mount Ararat on the walls. Similar significant symbols of landscape can be found throughout Northern Kurdistan, for example the ancient Roman-built walls of Diyarbakır or images, posters, flags and decorative small carpets (Turkish: kilim) hung on the wall or kept at home or place of work can also represent a view of the central city of the province, symbols of its history or indicate the origin of the owners through direct writing of the name of the place. Such reference to the memleket is popular among non-Kurdish internal migrants in the city as well. It can be seen not only in private, homely spaces but also in spaces which are frequented on a daily basis such as shops, restaurants, diners and cafés owned by migrants.
The same function can also be played by certain objects, such as a coffee cup with decorated in the style of a certain region or a special type of sugar bowl.
The most visible Kurdish practices performed in public places such as squares or streets are connected with political activism. During leftist protests, apart from Kurdish flags, banners with slogans and flags of parties, Kurdish women perform the high-pitch ululation -zılgıtwhich is also connected to Kurdish folk dances -halay. At some of the demonstrations and especially during seated protests instruments are used as well, such as def û zirne (def is a drum instrument and zef is a wind instrument, which Kurds see as their native instruments, common among Persian cultures but also in North Africa and Central Asia). Public spaces of Istanbul are used by Kurds not only for demonstrations but also for humanitarian aid initiatives (e.g., book fairs organized to help people from Kobane and Şengal) and musical and folk-dance performances. Walking through the most popular leisure center of Istiklal Avenue one can see many street musicians singing in the Zazaki or Kurmanci dialects. Kurdish dances are another frequent activity performed in public places, including those which can be classified as everyday dwelling places in accordance with Edensor's typology. A person passing through a square on the sea coast of Kadıköy to catch the ferry departing to the European side can stumble upon groups of people dancing traditional Kurdish dances to music played through speakers powered by a car or a small radio. These people usually cannot be distingishued as mainly Kurdish as they do not wear any ethnic or political symbols; they are, however, performing one of the Kurdish folk-dances, often to music which is sung in the Kurdish language. Men, women in European clothing, and women in headscarves who pass by are invited to join the often great circles of dancers of people of different backgrounds. These Kurdish migrants transcend ethnic, gender, religious and political boundaries by creating a space of mutual performance.

EMERGENCE OF A NEW TRANS-LOCAL KURDISH ELITE IN TURKEY -CONCLUSION
Trans-locality for the majority of the Kurds in Turkey has been a necessity since the beginning of the twentieth century, either because of expulsions and resettlement policies or economic hardships. The paths of the trans-local migrations and connection, however, were more self-initiated and voluntary during the fourth wave of migration in Turkey (lasting approximately from 2002 till 2015).
Although the reasons for migration of the respondents were predominantly economic and educational, they usually moved to Istanbul in a multi-step pattern, similar to the earlier migration waves. Most of them initially moved to a city closer to their hometown or home village (e.g., the central city of their district of birth), and later to Istanbul. Some of them completed a part of their education (e.g., a B.A. degree) in other western Turkish cities such as Izmir or Ankara, and after that moved to Istanbul to continue studying or pursuing a career. While some respondents admitted that they had relatives living in Western European countries, only a small minority of the participants in my study had ever been abroad, which can be partially explained by the very high costs of passports in Turkey, and the difficulty in obtaining one. The multi-step pattern connected to educational and economic needs depicts the trans-local trajectories of Kurds who settled in Istanbul in the 21st century.
Regarding ways of maintaining trans-local cultural and social ties, respondents described various ways of participation in different cultural and political activities connected to Kurdish culture -from dancing traditional dances to hometown associations and organizing Kurdish language classes -as examples of practices engaging with issues of Northern Kurdistan and re-creating spaces of Kurdish home-regions. Many of the respondents even admitted that they deepened their knowledge about Kurdish culture and its history owing to the availability of sources and people from different parts of Kurdistan in Istanbul. The participants in my study made use of these possibilities, as the majority of them were engaged with Kurdish organizations, while some only supported them by occasionally taking part in marches and protests, some were teaching the Kurdish language or mastering it (mostly at the Kurdish Institute of Istanbul), and some were writing poems and short stories or co-establishing scientific and literary journals (like Toplum ve Kuram, founded by the graduates of various departments of social sciences or Zarema -rexne û teorî, focused on literary criticism). By these means of active participation they were co-creating public meanings and spaces connected to Kurdish culture.
While traffic, overpopulation, and high economic inequalities were quoted as the main disadvantages, Istanbul was perceived by my respondents as an attractive place to live because of its opportunities for self-development, economic prosperity and a variety of possibilities described numerous times by the interviewees with the phrase "you can find everything here." The intellectual life of the city was emphasized, especially by the culturally and politically active respondents, who, being aware of the Kurdish traditions in the city, indicated the contemporary role of the city not only in hosting migrants and refugees but also in providing an environment for the education of the new Kurdish elites. As leftist Kurds educated at Turkish universities in the 1960s and 1970s (among them the founder of PKK Abdullah Öcalan) formed Kurdish elites of 1980s and 1990s, it can be argued that new trans-local migration of Kurds in Turkey will consequently lead to new patterns of practicing Kurdish culture and politics in Turkey in the 21st century.