保健旅遊的品質與廠商決策行為分析

觀光旅遊活動是一項多元化的綜合現象，會隨著當時的社會結構、經濟環境、政治狀況和文化變遷而呈現不同的發展模式。隨著人們經濟條件和生活品質的提高，更加意識到保健養生的重要，旅遊兼醫療概念，並考量高齡人口養生、病患者無法遠行，及工作壓力症候群待治癒等需求的保健旅遊(Health Tourism)，近年間則以多元形式出現。雖然各國發展健康旅遊的策略與訴求各不相同，有些強調醫療技術與服務，有些強調身心靈。以台灣而言，在韓國文化引入台灣後，根據資料顯示台灣組團前往韓國整形美容的人數每年以20%-30%的成長速度增加。本文利用Tirole (1988)、Economides(1999)、Chan & Leland (1982)以及Cooper & Ross (1985)等人的產業模型架構，來說明保健旅遊商品的品質特色和保健旅遊業者的決策行為。本研究可以得到三點結論：第一，業者所提供的保健旅遊品質將低於社會最適的保健旅遊品質，也就是業者提供不足的保健旅遊品質水準，意味著保健旅遊市場上，賣方可能會有道德風險(Moral Hazard)的問題。第二，當具有保健知識的消費者比例增加時，保健旅遊業者提供高品質的保健旅遊時的定價下界(lower bound)將會下降。亦即，業者最適定價決策區間增大（解的數目增加），這意味著業者提供高品質的保健旅遊可能性增加。這提供政府一個政策上的建議：政府應增加或提供保健旅遊的知識管道，以降低保健旅遊業者的道德風險。此外，當具有保健知識的消費者存在保健旅遊市場時，即使保健知識的消費者比例不變，只要業者定的保健旅遊行程價格夠高，則業者價格落在最適定價區間的可能性愈大，也就是說高價格可以傳遞保健旅遊是高品質的訊號(signal)。第三，如果保健旅遊業未必是垂直整合時，也就是上游的保健業者和下游的旅遊業者垂直分工的話，由於品質提升對業者的利潤增加較小，是故業者所提供的保健旅遊產品品質較低。然而，上游的保健業者和下游的旅遊業者垂直整合的話，由於品質提升對業者的利潤增加較大，是故業者所提供的保健旅遊產品品質較高。

關鍵字

保健旅遊；決策行為；道德風險

並列摘要

Health is a permanent subject for people. As incomes and the standard of living grow up, people recognize the importance of health care more often. Tourism with health care (Health Tourism) is introduced to the market to fulfill the needs of elders who preserve health, the disabled patients who can't travel for a long distance, and the workers who need to release off pressure. Countries may adopt different strategies to promote their health tourism industry. Some focus on good technology and service, while others emphasize on care through body, mind and spirit. In this paper, we want to set up a health-tourism model to explain the motives and behaviors of consumers engaging in health tourism. Our study is based on Tirole (1988), Economides (1999), Chan and Leland (1982), and Cooper and Ross' (1985) economic theory and model to explain the quality of healthy tourism and health tourism industry policy-making behavior. We get three points to draw conclusions: First, the quality of health tourism that the firm provides is lower than the ones that in the social optimum. The firm provides unsatisfying service so that the firm may face the problem of moral hazard. Second, while the knowledge of consumers increases, the bound price of the high-quality healthy tourism will descend. Our study provides some suggestions to policy makers: The government should enhance knowledge of the health tourism operators to reduce the risk of moral hazard. In addition, while the consumers have the knowledge of health tourism, the price settled by the firm were high enough, the possibility of the price falls in the social optimum price zone. In other words, the high price can deliver the signal that the healthy tourism is high-quality. Third, if the healthy tourism industry has no vertical integration, the profits will become smaller. If the quality promotes, then the firm will provide the low-quality health tourism. On the other hand, if the health tourism industry has vertical integration, the profits will increase as the quality promotes. Then the firm will provide the high-quality health tourism service.